Forest governance and post-conflict peace in Liberia: Emerging contestation and opportunities for change?

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Original article

Forest governance and post-conflict peace in Liberia: Emerging contestation and opportunities for change? Michael D. Beevers* Department of Environmental Studies and International Studies, Dickinson College, P.O. Box 1773, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 17013-2896, USA

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Article history: Received 20 September 2014 Received in revised form 27 July 2015

International peacebuilders intervened in post-conflict Liberia to influence the direction of forest governance. Peacebuilders promoted reforms designed to ensure that timber revenues could no longer fuel violence and serve as a catalyst for post-conflict reconstruction. These reforms have been contentious, and have not progressed as expected. The anticipated revenue, employment and community benefits of timber extraction have not materialized, and companies that were awarded concessions have failed to honor their contractual obligations and regularly violated Liberian law. This is because the reforms prioritizing state-centric timber extraction are recreating past arrangements that fostered corruption and patronage and exploited forest communities. This paper argues that these difficulties, along with a concerted effort by international and Liberian advocacy groups to publicize the plight of communities, have led peacebuilders to rethink the privileged status of timber extraction towards a policy goal that affords communities more rights in determining how forests are managed and used. The findings suggest that ready-made solutions for the governance of natural resources can be counterproductive and make peacebuilding more challenging. The findings also suggest that despite the substantial influence of international actors involved in peacebuilding, it is possible to challenge existing narratives that allow new policy choices to emerge ã 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Available online xxx Keywords: Peacebuilding Forests Conflict Liberia Governance

1. Introduction In the 1990s, Liberia was the site of a brutal civil war that killed tens of thousands of people and disrupted the lives and livelihoods of millions more. The conflict destroyed the country’s infrastructure and led to the collapse of social, political, economic and social systems. Liberia’s GDP fell by 90% precipitating one of the most rapid economic collapses in history (IMF, 2008: p. 15). The cessation of hostilities in mid-2003 led to the installation of a transitional government and the deployment of 15,000 United Nations (UN) peacekeepers. It also sparked substantial international intervention to strengthen and solidify peace by establishing security, delivering basic services, restoring the economy and livelihoods and rebuilding governance (UNSG, 2009). The causes of the conflict have been characterized in a variety of ways. Early explanations focused on West Africa’s “barbarism” in which irrational and uncivilized warlords, motivated by ethnic hatreds committed murder for no reason (Kaplan, 1994; Richards,

1996). Other explanations suggested that tribal or religiousdifferences, changes to the international system in the 1990s or repressive and authoritarian government rule over the masses led to the Liberian state’s collapse (Reno, 1998; Ellis, 1999; Levitt, 2005). In most accounts, the conflict was linked to the extraction of natural resources. The conflict in Liberia was blamed by analysts on the exploitation of diamonds, timber and other resources that when traded on global markets provided the revenue for rebel groups and corrupt governments to buy weapons and wage war (UNSC, 2001; Global Witness, 2002). Liberia emerged as the global poster child of so called “resource conflicts”, and was the prime example of how forests were thought to fuel civil war (De Jong et al., 2007). International perceptions about what fueled the Liberian conflict shaped and influenced post-conflict peacebuilding priorities. International peacebuilders1 stressed the risk of renewed conflict stemming from the exploitation of what came to be known as “blood timber”, and intervened to reform the Liberian forest sector. The

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* Fax.: +1 17172451971. E-mail address: [email protected] (M.D. Beevers).

Autesserre (2014: p. 10) defines international peacebuilders as “foreign entities—people, countries, and organizations—whose official goal is to help build peace.”

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.07.007 2214-790X/ ã 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article in press as: M.D. Beevers, Forest governance and post-conflict peace in Liberia: Emerging contestation and opportunities for change?, Extr. Ind. Soc. (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.07.007

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fundamental objectives of international intervention were to improve governance so that timber could no long fuel violence and, paradoxically, help ensure that in the future timber extraction served as a catalyst for post-conflict reconstruction. The UN placed sanctions on Liberian timber exports, and international actors pushed for a review of all resource concessions and enhanced state authority over forest resources. The same international actors endorsed and promoted new laws, policies and practices, which were passed by the government of Liberia, intended to improve revenue transparency and government accountability, and provide for public participation in resource-related decisions. These reforms sought to ensure that commercial timber extraction, conservation initiatives and community–forestry activities were balanced in order to optimize the economic, social and environmental benefits of Liberia’s forests, which were at once important to national development goals, globally significant for conservation and vital for the livelihoods of a majority of the population. It turned out that international actors prioritized restarting large-scale timber extraction for export markets. Between 2008 and 2009 substantial efforts were made to grant concessions to foreign-backed timber companies to provide the government and communities with revenue, contribute to poverty alleviation and development objectives and create jobs. Nearly a decade later, however, these reforms are contentious, and have not progressed as expected. The promised revenue, employment and community benefits of timber extraction have not materialized, and companies that were awarded concessions have failed to honor their contractual obligations and have regularly violated Liberian law. This is largely because the reforms prioritizing state-centric timber extraction recreate past arrangements that fostered corruption and patronage and exploited forest communities. I argue that these problems, along with a concerted effort by international and Liberian advocacy groups to publicize the plight of communities, have led international peacebuilders to rethink the preferential treatment of state-led timber extraction towards a policy goal that affords communities more rights in determining how forests are managed and used. The findings suggest that ready-made solutions for the governance of natural resources in the aftermath of conflict can be counterproductive and lead to blind spots that make peacebuilding not only more challenging, but potentially destabilizing. The findings also suggest that despite the substantial influence of international actors, it is possible for existing narratives to be challenged and new policy choices to emerge. While international peacebuilders are not the only figures responsible for the forest reforms, they had unprecedented influence in Liberian affairs in the aftermath of the conflict. The argument is developed first by analyzing the literature linking natural resources, conflict and peace. It subsequently focuses on international intervention to reform Liberia’s forest sector and documents increasing contestation over those reforms. The paper then explains the roots of the contestation and how this contestation is opening up opportunities that challenge existing narratives about the links between natural resources and peace that genuinely lead to policy change. It concludes by exploring the larger implications for post-conflict peacebuilding and natural resource governance. The paper draws on participant observations and 85 interviews with government officials, members of international organizations, and Liberian advocacy groups involved in forestry reforms and communities affected by potential timber extraction between 2008 and 2011. The analysis also benefited from email communications with stakeholders and publicly available reports as well as meeting notes, policy documents and memos not in the public domain. For reasons of confidentiality, I do not quote interviewees by name and list only their status/position and interview year.

2. Natural resources, conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding Over the last two decades, international peacebuilders have devoted significant attention and resources to post-conflict natural resource governance reform (Lujala and Rustad, 2012). One reason is that natural resources have been linked to “dozens of armed conflicts, millions of deaths, and the collapse of peace processes” (Lujala and Rustad, 2012: p. 6). Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) found that between 1970 and 2008, 29–56% of all civil conflicts involved natural resources. There is considerable debate about the precise links between natural resources and armed conflict, but three explanations are commonly cited (Le Billon, 2001). First, the capture of resource-rich territory and the associated resource revenues can be an opportunity and motivation for rebellion, and once a conflict begins, extraction can be a means of bankrolling belligerents and prolonging war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Ross, 2004). Second, grievances related to resource extraction can provoke armed conflict. Government policies that limit or undermine land ownership (e.g., privatization, conservation areas, development projects), promote the enclosure or appropriation of land and resources that limits access and use, or perpetuate degradation and population displacement linked to environmental changes and frustration over unfulfilled economic benefits from resources, can all can produce violence (Peluso and Watts, 2001; Le Billon, 2012). Third, resource dependent countries tend to be more conflict prone (Collier, 2007). Evidence suggests, for example, that resource-rich countries are more corrupt and less accountable, more economically feeble and impoverished, and more authoritarian; the outcome of which is “a downward spiral that may . . . lead to civil war” (Ross, 2004: p. 26). Natural resources also appear to be important for sustaining peace (Lujala et al., 2012; UNEP, 2009). In situations when natural resources played a role in an armed conflict, post-conflict peace was about 40% shorter than when they did not (Rustad and Binningsbø, 2012). The reasons for this are complex, but analysts suggest that resource revenue falling into the hands of rebel groups and corrupt government officials is a main reason for conflict relapse (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Le Billon, 2003). As a result, UN sanctions have been imposed to regulate resource extraction and many post-conflict governments were encouraged by international actors to review resource contracts to ensure their legality. International peacebuilders also initiated commodity-tracking schemes to curtail illegal resource exploitation and bring more revenue into official government coffers. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, for instance, is a tracking system created to prevent rebel groups from profiting from diamond mining and trading. The Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade initiative encourages timber-producing countries to adopt a system for tracking timber and limiting the proceeds from logging available to armed groups. While sanctions and commoditytracking schemes offer promise, evidence suggests that sanctions can impair local livelihoods in some cases (Cooper, 2008). Likewise, there remain questions about the ability of commodity schemes to end or prevent conflict or whether post-conflict governments have the capacity or will to track resource exports (Le Billon and Nicholls, 2007). Beyond these security imperatives, peacebuilding operations have focused on exploiting natural resources (Lujala and Rustad, 2012; World Bank, 2004). In many post-conflict countries, revenues from resources were an integral, if not dominant, part of the pre-war national economy and state budget. Moreover, armed conflict severely upends economies, intensifies poverty and destroys infrastructure. The view among many international peacebuilders is that natural resources can foster economic revival, create employment, address poverty and provide a source of public revenue (Collier and Hoeffler, 2012; UNEP, 2009).

Please cite this article in press as: M.D. Beevers, Forest governance and post-conflict peace in Liberia: Emerging contestation and opportunities for change?, Extr. Ind. Soc. (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.07.007

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Compared to other economic sectors, resource extraction is often viewed as having relatively quick revenue-generating potential in post-conflict countries (World Bank, 2004). Furthermore, it has been suggested by some that poverty, measured by per capita income, is a significant determiner of civil war and conflict relapse (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Such analysis suggests that poverty and weak economic growth can create a “conflict trap” that makes renewed conflict more likely (Collier et al., 2003). The idea here is not only that “development brings peace”, but that with employment and rising incomes, people will be less inclined to take up arms or rebel against the government. As Bannon and Collier (2003: p. 8) have argued “economic growth is the best protector against civil war.” Paris (2004), however, suggests that rapid economic reforms are disruptive for post-conflict reconstruction since such policies intensify social and political conflict. Similarly, resource extraction, and the direct role of state policies, have resulted in increased poverty, a lack of community benefits and considerable social and environmental costs that not only foster conflict but can increase the propensity for violence (Bebbington, 2012). In other words, economic development, and its corresponding “extractivism”, can create unequal patterns of human development, and yield instability and conflict. Regardless, a business-friendly environment that attracts extractive industries is considered by many international peacebuilders as critical for peace and development (World Bank, 2004). This is a reflection of the neoliberal economic processes that associate development goals and funding infrastructure projects with resource extraction in the Global South. To ensure that revenues from natural resources do not jeopardize peace, international peacebuilders often support policies to enhance revenue transparency, government accountability and codes of conduct for extractive industries. This is because, in the eyes of peacebuilders, the main problem with natural resource extraction is that revenue falls into the hands of rebel groups or is siphoned off by corrupt government officials if poorly governed (Lujala and Rustad, 2012). Putting the spotlight on revenue is intended to increase trust in the government and the extractive industries, and ensure that revenues fund development priorities. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), for example, is an international initiative that requires companies to publish what they pay to governments and governments to publish what they receive from companies. However, one fundamental problem with the initiative is that government officials and companies alike often have an incentive to conceal resource revenues, given the substantial rents involved, suggesting that revenue transparency is at times not credible. In addition, transparency can be a smokescreen that does little to alter existing social relations that thrive on corruption and patronage, or alter the economic system that perpetuates poverty and injustice. Finally, among international peacebuilders, there is frequently an assumption that state institutions must be reconstructed in order for democracy, justice, economic recovery and security to be successful (Fukuyama, 2004). This idea carries over to natural resource governance because governments and their agencies are perceived by international actors as the best institution for managing resources and governing extraction. The problem is that predatory state authorities often use their positions of power to channel resource revenues into personal bank accounts or to maintain political alliances that undermine the provision of basic services and result in “shadow states” (Reno, 1998). Numerous studies also underscore how state control over land and resources can result in violence and human rights abuses (Peluso and Watts, 2001). In short, there is general agreement among international peacebuilders that, while posing substantial challenges, natural resources are also vital for peacebuilding. More to the point, if properly governed by state authorities and carefully extracted by

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private companies, natural resources are seen as having the potential to jump-start economies, raise living standards and provide a source of revenue that can be indispensable for peace and development (Lujala and Rustad, 2012). In the next two sections, I analyze post-conflict Liberia where international peacebuilders intervened to reform the country’s forest sector. 3. International intervention to reform post-conflict Liberia’s forest sector International actors were largely unaware of Liberia’s history of social conflict around natural resources until worldwide attention began to focus on “conflict resources” in the late 1990s. Academic studies underscored the ways natural resources financed war and rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Media accounts and reports by international advocacy organizations argued that natural resources and armed conflict were linked (Global Witness, 1998, 2001, 2002; Smillie et al., 2000; New York Times, 1999; Rupert, 1999). This was compounded by evidence that Sierra Leonean diamonds were being smuggled through Liberia with the involvement of Liberian officials and the revenues were fueling violence (UN Panel of Experts, 2000: p. 12). The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1343 mandating that “all states prevent the direct or indirect import of rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not the diamonds originated in Liberia” (UNSC, 2001). Sierra Leone’s so-called “blood diamonds” remained a foremost concern of international actors at the turn of the millennium. Soon, however, Liberia’s forests also gained notoriety. The UN found that Liberia’s timber industry was funding illicit activities with the revenues going to buy weapons and arming Sierra Leone’s rebels (UN Panel of Experts, 2000). It also surfaced that communities were being subjected to harassment, violence and impoverishment as timber companies left behind “nothing but sickness, hunger, poverty and poor welfare” (SAMFU, 2002). In May 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1478 banning the import of all round logs and timber products originating in Liberia (UNSC, 2003a). A UN panel recommended that sanctions remain in place until “peace and stability are restored and good governance is established” (UN Panel of Experts, 2003: pp. 31–34). A subsequent UN resolution, required the government to establish “full authority and control of timber producing areas” and take “all necessary steps to ensure that government revenues . . . are not used to fuel conflict” (UNSC, 2003b). The resolution mandated the establishment of transparency and accountability mechanisms to ensure that timber revenues “benefit the Liberian people, including development” (UNSC, 2003b). When hostilities came to an end in August 2003 Liberia faced substantial challenges, but the problem of “conflict forests” was a focal point. International peacebuilders were concerned that unfettered timber extraction could lead to renewed conflict, but also understood that timber was important for post-conflict reconstruction. A “road map” was produced emphasizing transparent and accountable governance for managing, maintaining, and disbursing timber revenues (NTGL, 2003).2 To support the reforms, the US government formed the Liberia Forest Initiative, to reduce the threat of forest conflict, rebuild a sustainable timber sector and assist the Liberian government in establishing control over forest areas by rebuilding the capacity of the Forest Development Authority (FDA) (Altman et al., 2012).3 Concerned about corruption in the timber

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Disagreement existed among international actors as to whether the goal of the road map should be the lifting of UN sanctions and moving forward as quickly as possible with timber exports, or being more deliberate in terms of passing comprehensive legal and regulatory reforms. 3 The FDA is the government agency responsible for managing Liberia’s forests.

Please cite this article in press as: M.D. Beevers, Forest governance and post-conflict peace in Liberia: Emerging contestation and opportunities for change?, Extr. Ind. Soc. (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.07.007

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industry that could derail Liberia’s peace, international peacebuilders demanded a review of all timber concessions. The review found that between 1985 and 2004, 26 million acres of timber concessions had been awarded, which is more than double the acreage available for timber extraction (FCRC, 2005). More than US $64 million was still owed to the government from concession holders (FCRC, 2005). The review uncovered evidence of abuse by timber companies including, “damage to crops, militia threats and unpaid salaries”; all of which severely impaired the livelihoods of local communities (FCRC, 2005). Of the 72 concessions reviewed, no company could demonstrate that it had acquired contracts legally. The committee encouraged the transitional government to cancel all existing forest concessions and suspend future concessions until reforms were in place (FCRC, 2005). The transitional government failed to implement the committee’s recommendation and evidence of corruption and illegal timber extraction increased (McGovern, 2008). The result was the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) that placed foreign experts in charge of all Liberia’s revenues, expenditures and concessions. While the transitional government, and other African leaders, objected to GEMAP on the grounds that it undermined Liberia’s sovereignty, peacebuilders were unwilling to continue to support the government without confirmation that corruption was on the decline and public funds were being managed transparently (McGovern, 2008: p. 342). The swearing in of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as president in January 2006 sped up efforts to get sanctions lifted and pass forest reforms. Sirleaf issued an executive order in February 2006 cancelling all existing concessions and putting a moratorium on future timber concessions. President Sirleaf also argued that sanctions should be lifted because “if there is no conflict and we now have peace and we have a new government that is doing the right things, then we want to see a change” (Sirleaf, 2006). And, in fact, by 2006, international actors framed Liberia’s forests less in the context of a “conflict resources”, and more in terms of development, economic revival and poverty alleviation, and as a revenue stream for the government. Poverty and slow economic growth were perceived as the biggest threat to renewed conflict (IMF, 2008). By contrast, international and Liberian advocacy groups viewed the push to lift UN sanctions with suspicion. The Sustainable Development Institute, for instance, argued that increasing extraction did not guarantee peace or development given that timber did little to historically benefit local populations that were ultimately subjected to human rights abuses (SDI, 2006: p. 7). Regardless, the UN Security Council agreed to end the sanctions on the condition that forest governance reform was in passed in 90 days. In September 2006, the National Forestry Reform Law (NFRL) was enacted. The NFRL called for a balance between the “three C’s” – commercial, community and conservation – and improved fiscal management and transparency (Republic of Liberia, 2006a). The law included the basic qualifications for timber companies and rules for the issuance of timber contracts, and sought to create a system to track timber from extraction to export, and publish the revenue payments of timber companies. The reforms established land rental fees to help local community development and established mechanisms for public participation. The reforms required passage of a “community rights law” to determine the rights and responsibilities of communities (Republic of Liberia, 2006a). Given the global importance of biodiversity, the law provided for the creation of a protected areas network. The balance between commercial, community and conservation values of forests notwithstanding, the NFRL, and corresponding National Forestry Policy (2006), were “timber centric”. International actors and the Liberian government alike pointed out that timber exports contributed significantly to Liberia’s pre-war economy and would be vital during the post-conflict period (Republic of Liberia, 2006b:

p. 3; IMF, 2008: p. 63). Estimates concluded that timber exports could provide Liberia with over US$50 million in revenue by 2010 and provide thousands of jobs (IMF, 2008: p. 64). Underemphasized was the fact that nearly three-quarters of the population earned a living directly from forests and these forests provided people with energy, shelter, agricultural land and sacred sites. Regardless, the perception was that since timber was relatively accessible, concessions could be tenured to companies quickly. To summarize, international peacebuilders intervened directly in post-conflict Liberia to shape and influence the direction of forest governance. Peacebuilders endorsed and promoted specific reforms (e.g., laws, policies and practices) designed to improve forest governance so that timber would no longer fuel violence and to help ensure that timber extraction could serve as a catalyst for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. In other words, the main objective of international actors was to transform so-called “conflict forests” into “peace forests” by, among other things, improving revenue transparency and government accountability, and providing for public participation in resource-related decisions. 4. Emerging contestation over Liberia’s forest reforms Efforts to restart timber extraction intensified between 2007 and 2008. During this time, the FDA conducted forest inventories, delineated the lands designated for extraction and opened up bids for large-scale timber concessions. However, the government was unable to issue timber contracts to reputable companies and violations of the forest laws were commonplace. Numerous companies, despite having letters of “non-involvement” were implicated in past illegal operations upon further investigation (UN Panel of Experts, 2008). A majority of companies initially labeled “qualified” for timber contracts by the FDA had no experience in the timber industry and were found to have no access to funds or credit; raising questions as to whether the companies, at best, would be able to log sustainably, or at worst, were fronts for nefarious illegal operations (SDI, 2010).4 In 2008, forest management contracts totaling nearly 600,000 acres were mysteriously altered to allow for a one-time payment, instead of annual payments, that would have amounted a $50 million loss of revenue for the government over a 25-year period and deprived local communities of land rental fees (UN Panel of Experts, 2008: p. 23). It was also disclosed that bidders on forest contracts routinely failed to disclose their true ownership and timber concessions open for bidding were not advertised as required by the law (UN Panel of Experts, 2008). In one instance, the highest bidder, and one that was considered “unqualified”, mysteriously received a large timber concession (Global Witness 2009; UN Panel of Experts, 2009).5 Timber contracts were frequently signed without due diligence. Three bidding companies were found to have colluded. The same companies owed the government over $3 million even before timber operations began, suggesting a lack of financial resources. In another controversy, three companies bidding on vast contracts were linked to a Malaysian timber company accused of unsustainably harvesting timber and abusing communities around the world (Global Witness, 2009; UN Panel of Experts, 2009). Nearly one million hectares of forest were allocated to companies between 2008 and 2009, but difficulties virtually halted all timber extraction on “public lands” (Siakor, 2011). This

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Interview with member of international organization involved in forest reform oversight, Monrovia, 2009. 5 The concession was eventually cancelled.

Please cite this article in press as: M.D. Beevers, Forest governance and post-conflict peace in Liberia: Emerging contestation and opportunities for change?, Extr. Ind. Soc. (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.07.007

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led to an explosion of private use permits (PUPs) to allow contracts between private land owners and companies if approved by the FDA. PUPs require companies to provide a “business plan”, conduct assessments (social and environmental) and sign social agreements with affected communities.6 However, there are no fees paid to the government or local communities, there is no competitive bidding process and no restrictions on contract size or duration. Between 2010 and 2012, at least 66 PUPs were issued on forest lands covering nearly 25% of the country with 70% of all timber exports coming from PUPs (Global Witness, 2012; SIIB, 2012). Nevertheless, most PUPs were forged and illegal, leading the UN Panel of Experts (2012: p. 33) to call PUPs an “unregulated route to substantial concession holdings” that threatened to destroy Liberia’s forests with no compensation. PUPs were issued without genuine community involvement on land that was not private, but collectively owned.7 To make matters worse, the permits were enabled by malfeasance on the part of the FDA.8 In response, President Sirleaf issued Executive Order #44 putting a moratorium on all PUPs because they posed a threat to the country’s natural heritage (Republic of Liberia, 2013). The inability of the government to issue timber concessions and evidence that timber companies violated forest laws led to accusations that the timber sector was reverting to the “old ways of doing business”, and putting communities at risk.9 As concessions were being awarded in 2008–2009, it became clear that land ownership and tenure would be a contentious issue. Liberia’s constitution declared that all land, except when defined as communal or private and deeded, was to be held in trust by the Republic, and this was underscored by the 2006 forest reforms. In Liberia, like many other locations in the Global South, local communities have historically been excluded from decisions about how land is used, despite the perception that it is owned collectively by the people (Wily, 2007; De Wit, 2014). As noted by a Liberian NGO in 2009, “communities have no right to say no” under the new forest reforms.10 Regardless, decisions about what land would be set aside for extraction were determined without consultation with communities or data about land ownership. In 2007–2008, for example, three quarters of all forest areas were selected for timber extraction; only one percent was allocated for community forestry (Lomax, 2008: p. 19). The issuance of PUPs has only aggravated the situation. It has been estimated that today over half of Liberia’s total land area has already been awarded for commercial purposes to foreign-backed companies, and this could rise to 75% in the next few years (De Wit, 2014: p. 4). Most, if not all of this land has overlapping and contested tenure and ownership rights, which sets up a situation where disputes over land can snowball—particularly given that most concessions are issued for renewable terms of 25 years or more (De Wit, 2014: p. 4). The Liberian Governance Commission argued that complex and contentious land ownership would be made worse by the rapid privatization of forests (Sawyer, 2009). All this sets up social conflict even before timber harvesting begins. In cases where timber companies had received concessions, PUPs or otherwise, disagreements with communities were

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Social agreements are arrangements between timber companies and affected communities that are to be negotiated before extraction commences. The agreements are supposed to detail the rights and responsibilities of communities and timber companies and detail the benefits communities will receive in exchange for timber. 7 Liberian law does not clearly define “private land”, which enabled timber companies to negotiate with people that claimed ownership (with fraudulent documents) of land and/or dubiously claimed to speak for local communities. 8 In 2014, eight former government officials were indicted for issuing PUPs. 9 Interview with Liberian NGO, 2008. 10 Interview with member of a Liberian NGO, 2009.

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pervasive. One community presented the FDA with a deed to land that had already been awarded to a timber company, only to be told that it could not cancel the contract (NGO Coalition of Liberia, 2008). The promise of lucrative fees and payments have not been forthcoming and prospects for new health clinics, roads and schools have failed to appear. A recent social audit documenting community benefit sharing found that in a large majority of cases, timber companies still owed substantial sums to the government and communities, even though extraction continued (Harris et al., 2013). The report goes on to document, a “mismatch between what communities are expecting in terms of community development, and what is actually provided” (Harris et al., 2013: p. 11). Social agreements negotiated between communities and timber companies have been written without full community involvement and in virtually all the cases documented communities were dissatisfied with the social agreement (UN Panel of Experts, 2008; Harris et al., 2013). Numerous communities accused timber companies of breaching social agreements even before harvesting started and about half of all timber contacts approved by the government have been obstructed by community opposition.11 Finally, communities protest because they have not been consulted about company and government negotiations and do not have the information needed to make decisions (Harris et al., 2013). Communities routinely have insufficient access to contracts and planning documents, and requests for copies from the FDA or companies go unnoticed.12 This highlights the perpetually poor bargaining position of local communities that are “manipulated by powerful elites.”13 As one member of an affected community noted, “whatever happens . . . we will lose.”14 Despite, or because of, these problems several developments have surfaced to get reforms back on track. In 2009, Liberia signed the EITI, which required timber companies to publish payments to the government and the government to disclose payments received. Liberia also signed a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the European Union to address illegal logging, improve transparency and public participation and enhance community rights; ostensibly by requiring all timber exported to the EU to be compliant with Liberian law (EU/FLEGT, 2014). And more recently, Liberia and Norway have entered into a $150 million partnership to “improve forest governance, strengthen law enforcement and support reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and degradation” (Government of Norway, 2014). These initiatives are promising, but to date, forest sector reform is contentious and has not progressed as expected. In the section below, I explain the roots of this contestation, and discuss whether or not it has opened up opportunities for change vis-à-vis how forests in Liberia are governed. 5. The roots of contestation and opportunities for change in Liberia’s forest reforms What explains the fact that, despite substantial international intervention and an investment of tens of millions of dollars, Liberia’s forest reforms remain mired in contention and controversy? Some analysts insist that the difficulties are the result of limited state capacity, a lack of information or coordination and expectation of problems among diverse international, national and local stakeholders (Altman et al., 2012). Others suggest that it is a matter of enforcing existing reforms and properly implementing new initiatives like the EITI, the Voluntary Partnership Agreement

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Interview with Liberian forestry official, 2010. Email communication with Liberian journalist, 2013. Interview with representative of Liberian NGO, 2009. Interview with community representative, 2008.

Please cite this article in press as: M.D. Beevers, Forest governance and post-conflict peace in Liberia: Emerging contestation and opportunities for change?, Extr. Ind. Soc. (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.07.007

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with the European Union, plans for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) or the Liberia–Norway Partnership (Siakor, 2011). I argue, however, that current reforms are unlikely to be successful because they mirror past arrangements that enabled patronage and corruption and aggravated tensions between timber companies, local communities and the government (Beevers, 2015). International peacebuilders framed the Liberian conflict as a place where the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources by rebel groups fueled conflict. This understanding led to a particular set of reforms that emphasized the consolidation of state control over forest resources and timber extraction by foreignbacked companies, albeit with improved revenue transparency, accountability and public participation provisions. The idea was that if governed effectively, timber could be turned from a “conflict resource” into a resource that catalyzes long-term peace and development. The problem is that these reforms reconstruct past arrangements that have long destabilized the country. Specifically, the reforms continue to mirror the state-led timber extraction model that fostered corruption and patronage and ultimately led to the exploitation of local communities. Liberia has a long history of exploitation when it comes to land and natural resources. Contrary to international narratives, violence over access to natural resources is not new to the Liberian people, and did not start in the 1990s (Sawyer, 1992; Levitt, 2005). Social conflict over land and resources can be traced to the country’s very founding, when rules governing the distribution and ownership of land, the character of interactions with indigenous peoples, and the extent of political rights were drawn up, and a “paternalistic and authoritarian political order” was created (Levitt, 2005: p. 39; Sawyer, 1992; Wily, 2007; TRC, 2009). These dynamics persisted well into the 20th century. The Firestone Rubber and Tire Company was granted a 99-year lease on four percent of the country’s land in 1926, and by the 1950s, Liberia’s “Open Door Policy” had opened up the country’s natural resources (i.e., agricultural products, timber, gold and iron ore) to foreign domination (Sawyer, 1992: p. 244). Timber extraction became a vital part of Liberia’s economy in the 1970s when most of the land area was in the hand of concessionaires (Reno, 1998: p. 83). Between 1976 and 1980, respectively, the value of Liberia’s timber rose from $32 million to $72 million (FAO, 1984: pp. 3-6). Resource extraction was arranged without transparency and the benefits accrued to a small group of landowners, foreign investors and political elites, and left most of the country underdeveloped with local communities exploited (Clower et al., 1966). The longterm consequence has been resistance to export-oriented concessions and opposition to the idea that the Liberia state, as opposed to local communities, was the “master of the land” (Sawyer, 1992: p. 242). As Levitt (2005: p. 86) notes, every conflict in Liberia has deep roots in competition over land and resources and much of the social conflict is due to state control over natural resources, which for most of Liberia’s history has been predatory and exploitative. Early efforts to contest the dominance of timber extraction in post-conflict forest reforms were largely rebuffed. Virtually from the beginning, international and Liberian advocacy groups questioned whether the country was ready for timber extraction. A coalition of a dozen groups criticized the reforms for failing to address long-standing disputes related to land ownership, access, user rights and meaningful public participation (NGO Open Letter, 2006). The coalition argued that concessions required no legal obligation to address communal tenure before timber harvesting could begin, and that social agreements would do little to protect communities from unwanted encroachment. The coalition recommended that the forest reforms focus on the rights of communities that had been exploited for generations; rather than

on the rights of timber companies (NGO Open Letter, 2006). Debates over the Community Rights Law (CRL) in 2008–2009, in which international peacebuilders provided substantial assistance, also revolved around whether communal forests would be the central organizing principle and whether communities would be in direct control of forests. International peacebuilders and the Liberian government scoffed at the idea of “community forest management” in 2008, arguing that putting communities with little capacity and know-how in charge of forest policy would ultimately lead to deforestation and deprive the country of a valuable economic resource.15 At issue today, and what I suggest form the roots of the ongoing contestation, is whether forest governance will remain “statecentered” with the privileged status on timber extraction, or whether it will be increasingly “community-centered” with more focus on livelihoods and rights. In other words, international and Liberian advocacy groups, along with affected communities, are contesting the legitimacy and authority of state institutions as the rightful manager of the forests out of concern that it will restore historical land ownership arrangements that produced resistance and violence in the past. Timber concessions have been approved by the government in spite of the fact that almost all have overlapping land claims. There is little faith that a system built on large-scale concessions, and “patron-client” relations, can truly benefit local communities given that timber companies have failed to provide promised benefits, reneged on social agreements and failed to pay fees and payments owed to the government and local communities. As the proliferation of PUPs illustrate, communities are still being exploited and excluded; and the government is largely perceived as being corrupt and colluding with timber companies. All this has raised questions as to whether the forest reforms have done anything meaningful to restructure the underlying arrangements to Liberia’s forest sector. The difficulties with the current forest reforms, coupled with vocal concerns from international and Liberian advocacy groups that communities continue to be “little more than a discussion point”, have changed the terms of the debate and offer genuine opportunities for change (LRCFP, 2011). Due to the significant challenges associated with Liberia’s forest reforms, international peacebuilders are rethinking the privileged status of timber extraction to post-conflict reconstruction, and are realizing the benefits of community management of resources for post-conflict peacebuilding. There is an emergent narrative suggesting that amplifying community voices and endowing communities with the authority to make decisions is the best way to ensure peace, foster development and protect environmental benefits as well. According to one international consultant, communities “have always protected Liberia’s forests; it was the introduction of the industrial model that put new pressures on land, forests and people—[and] manufactured new threats.”16 Such narratives are emerging in current policies aimed at strengthening Liberian forest reform. The US Agency for International Development funded pilot projects to demonstrate the potential challenges and opportunities of community forestry (LRCFP, 2011). The CRL, which eventually passed in 2009, did not fundamentally change the underlying governing arrangements, but brought community rights to the forefront. The CRL provided a mechanism by which communities could assert the right of ownership to traditional land, clarified the FDA’s role as a “regulatory authority” (not “land owner”), and provided communities with more decision making authority (Republic of Liberia, 2009). In May 2013, the Land Rights Policy passed by the Liberian

15 16

Interview with Liberian and international forestry officials, 2008. Interview with international consultant involved in forest reforms, 2008.

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Land Commission went further. The policy, among other things, recognized customary land ownership and land rights on an equal footing with private land; allowed communities to document their communal lands; permitted management of customary lands and resources to be decided by community members and declared that the resources on communal land (forests, water, carbon) should be owned by the community (Republic of Liberia, 2014). The EU VPA also has the potential to promote forest governance that puts communities at the center; although its main objective of the agreement is to ensure the export of legal timber (Global Witness, 2013). The VPA reiterates that Liberian communities have the right to free, prior and informed consent, the right to identify forest rights and uses (including sacred sites and traditional uses) and the right to benefit sharing (EU/FLEGT, 2014). Likewise, the Liberia– Norway Partnership is committed to respecting community rights, and “holds promise . . . for forest communities that have been marginalized for generations” (Siakor quoted in Government of Norway, 2014). It is an open question as to whether or not Liberia will continue to emphasize community livelihoods and rights in the reforms, or whether forest governance will truly be transformed. There are significant challenges associated with community-based resource governance including elite capture made possible by dubious local structures and traditional authorities, and whether advocacy organizations or stakeholder committees truly speak for local communities. But despite these challenges, there has been a trend toward decentralizing land management structures and securing tenure rights globally (Larson and Soto, 2008). Community management of forests and other resources can provide higher livelihood and conservation benefits than more centralized approaches (Persha et al., 2011). However, state-centric approaches to natural resource management remain deeply entrenched, particularly in the Global South (Peluso, 1992; Ojha, 2008). In addition, economic processes of “extractivism” are perceived as critical to development goals—even if community opposition and social conflict frequently accompany these activities. This link is especially strong in post-conflict countries where restarting extractive industries is perceived as critical for peace, development and reconstruction. Finally, it is uncertain whether initiatives like REDD and commitments to “zero” deforestation, which attempt to preserve forest cover and enhance carbon stocks, will engage and safeguard communities. At the moment, however, contention stemming from the forest reform process in Liberia appears to be opening up an opportunity that could challenge existing narratives about the links between natural resources, conflict and peace, and genuinely lead to policy change.

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obligations and have violated Liberian law. The expected revenue, employment and community benefits of timber extraction have also not materialized. These difficulties, along with a concerted effort by international and Liberian advocacy groups to publicize the plight of communities, have led international peacebuilders to rethink the preferential treatment of state-led timber extraction towards a policy goal that affords communities more rights in determining how forests are managed and used. The findings suggest that despite the substantial influence of international actors involved in peacebuilding, it is possible for existing narratives to be challenged and new policy choices to emerge (Autesserre, 2010). From this perspective, governance is a product of contestation; they are not merely “reforms” that are authoritatively designed and adopted. Stakeholders view forests in profoundly different ways, making forest governance a deeply contentious process not just in post-conflict countries, but in all countries. Forests are multi-functional landscapes that can serve as sources of livelihoods that have cultural significance, can provide components of critical ecosystems important for the planet, or can be a resource to be extracted and consumed (Conca, 2006). In Liberia, there is the perception that how forests are governed, by whom and for what purposes are still very much in flux. As such, international, national and local actors are trying to shape the agenda and impose their interests, in ways that influence the longterm trajectory of forest governance. International peacebuilders must acknowledge that contention is a normal part of governance, especially when it comes to natural resources. Finally, the findings also suggest that ready-made solutions for the governance of natural resources in the aftermath of conflict can be counterproductive and make peacebuilding not only more challenging, but potentially destabilizing. While more transparency and accountability are worthy goals, the emphasis on timber extraction and state control of resources has created contention that if not sufficiently channeled could reignite historic tensions. All this suggests that the role of international peacebuilders is not to impose a particular vision of the future but to use its legitimacy and authority to encourage open debate among diverse perspectives and help to productively and peacefully channel contestation. While peace in Liberia will not disintegrate due to a failure of forest reform alone, peace and development are more likely when policies build trust and seek consensus. International peacebuilders also need to ask what kind of governing arrangements they seek to cultivate. In the words of Lipschutz and Mayer (1996: p. 248), is it one in which “capital seems to be in charge” or one that “privileges local choice” while still taking into account “global complexities and connections?” Only time will tell.

6. Conclusion Acknowledgements This paper has argued that when international peacebuilders intervened directly in post-conflict Liberia, it had a significant impact on shaping and influencing the direction of forest governance. Specifically, peacebuilders endorsed and promoted reforms (e.g., laws, policies and practices) designed to ensure that timber revenues could no long fuel violence, but could also serve as a catalyst for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. The objective was to transform “conflict forests” into “peace forests” through improved revenue transparency, better accountability, and enhanced public participation. While international peacebuilders were not the only actors responsible for the forest reforms, they had unprecedented influence in Liberian affairs in the aftermath of the conflict. These reforms have been contentious, and have not progressed as expected. This is largely because in many respects, the reforms prioritizing state-centric timber extraction are recreating past arrangements that fostered corruption and patronage and exploited forest communities. Companies awarded concessions have not honored their contractual

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Michael D. Beevers received his Ph.D. in International Relations and Environmental and Natural Resource Politics from the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. Mr. Beevers was a Harrison Fellow at the University of Maryland, and Peace Scholar at the US Institute of Peace in Washington DC. He served as a research associate at Princeton University and as a consultant for the United Nations Environment Programme and World Resources Institute.

Please cite this article in press as: M.D. Beevers, Forest governance and post-conflict peace in Liberia: Emerging contestation and opportunities for change?, Extr. Ind. Soc. (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.07.007