- Email: [email protected]
Forest pest management sociopolitics
Fbrest Ecology and Management, 39 ( 1991 ) 2 8 9 - 2 9 7
289
Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., A m s t e r d a m
Forest pest management sociopolitics Donald L. Dahlsten and Steve H. Dreistadt Division of Biological Control University of California, Berkeley, Calffbrnia 94720, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT Dahlsten, D.L. and Dreistadt, S.H., 1991. Forest pest management sociopolitics./;'or. Ecol. Manage., 39: 289-297. Successful forest pest managers must integrate complex technical considerations with important social and political concerns. Forest managers well trained in silviculture or entomology may be prepared for the biological challenges, but they may not be prepared for the sociopolitics. Sociopolitics influences all aspects of forest pest management. Because decisions are based on incomplete information, and the outcome of projects has implications for its participants, judgements by agencies, scientists and technicians can be as biased as are those of politicians and interest groups. This paper discusses how sociopolitics influence forest pest management.
INTRODUCTION
When one of us (D.L.D.) first came to the Division of Biological Control in Berkeley in 1963, the USDA Forest Service and the California Department of Forestry sought my advice on a spray project planned for Neodiprion sawflies in northeastern California. I had just finished my Ph.D. thesis on these sawflies and I knew something about them. Asked to give my opinion I did so, presenting material from my thesis. My conclusion, that there was no evidence of the need for a sawfly spray project, was met with great anger and after the meeting I had to lunch by myself. My experience with these agencies concerning the Douglas-fir tussock moth, Orgyia pseudotsugata (McD.), in 1965, was much the same. A group from my laboratory had collected sample data indicating that a 12 000-acre 1 spray program would be sufficient, and we r e c o m m e n d e d against the planned spraying of 55 000 acres. My presentation was again met with great hostility by the agency and private industry. The larger area was sprayed, although I have since been vindicated by other Forest Service scientists who later concluded that my opinions were correct. Experiences like these, where decisions ' ~ 5000 ha.
0378-1127/91/$03.50
© 1991 - - Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
290
D.L. D A H L S T E N A N D S.H. D R E I S T A D T
were made contrary to apparent biological 'facts', led us to scrutinize the role and importance of experts in forest pest management. A C U L T U R A L PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERTS
Experts will acknowledge that their advice is often manipulated or ignored because of sociopolitical considerations. However, few experts recognize that the the advice they give may itself be biased. Expert recommendations on the research and management of forest pests are often handicapped by insufficient or contradictory data. Judgements must therefore be made, judgements often influenced by opinions and values which are subject to bias. The conflict among experts which sometimes results is, in our opinion, often due to advisors not recognizing their bias and denying the legitimacy of differing interpretations. Some seek to shroud themselves in a cloak of objectivity, when total objectivity does not exist. John Perkins ( 1982 ) provided a philosophical framework for understanding this conflict among experts. Perkins classifies experts as humanists or naturalists. Humanists believe that people have an almost limitless ability to manipulate the world to our advantage. Humanists believe in total pest management. Naturalists, according to Perkins, believe that humans are an integral component of the biosphere and that our interventions must be subtle. Unless we limit our tinkering with Mother Nature, the benefits of our actions will be outweighed by the backlash such as resistant, resurgent or secondary pests. Naturalists subscribe to an integrated or ecological approach to pest management. Conflicts arise because, even given the same data, the two groups may see the problems and potential solutions differently. Humanists seek and recomm e n d a technological or 'silver bullet' approach. Naturalists believe that the effective use of technology is more limited when all costs and benefits are considered, and that we must 'tread lightly'. We have often advised on pest management or eradication projects, and recognize that, like other experts, we may be biased. Perkins ( 1982 ) would call us naturalists. Our philosophical orientation seeks non-invasive solutions to environmental problems. This stems from our recognition of the complexity of natural systems which are typically poorly understood and sometimes easily disrupted. Our professional experience indicates that pesticides often create far more severe and wide-ranging problems than anticipated. Our passion is for the beneficial insects and birds which are sometimes devasted by the broad swath of pesticides. Finally, our first-hand experiences lead us to conclude that those agencies responsible for forest pest management often fail to scientifically evaluate the existence or extent of presumed pest problems. They are reluctant to consider information which is contrary to their precon-
FOREST PESTMANAGEMENTSOCIOPOLITICS
291
ceived plan of action. Agencies often seek advice only when it, and the individuals they consult, support their position. A S O C I O P O L I T I C A L HISTORY O F PEST C O N T R O L
Robert Metcalf (1980) has encapsulated modern pest control into three eras. The 'Era of Optimism' was from 1946 to 1962. The discovery and improved application of organochlorines led economic entomoligists to conclusions such as "The gypsy moth can be eliminated from any given area with a single application of one pound or 6ess of DDT applied per acre as an oil solution" (Popham and Hall, 1958 ). The 'Era of Doubt', from 1962 to 1976, began when Rachael Carson (1962) sounded the alarm over the side-effects of widespread pesticide applications. The 'Era of IPM', 1976-1986, was heralded by programs such as the nationwide 'Huffaker Project', which led to reduced pesticide use through increased reliance on cultural, physical and biological pest controls. Since 1986 it could be said that we are in the 'Era of Sustainability', because of the broad concern for sustaining productivity and life on the planet. These pest-control eras are largely a product of the social and political environment. The era of optimism might also be termed the era of the agency scientist or pest manager. State and federal agencies were among the biggest users and promotors of organochlorine pesticides. Unrestricted pesticide use in the U.S.A. was widely accepted by a post-World-War-II public which had great faith in the expertise and integrity of its government. McCarthyism and the Cold War tended to suppress criticism in all walks of life. For government officials to treat dissenters as 'un-American' was not uncommon. Rachel Carson's book opened an era of the private citizen. Individuals and communities increasingly challenged higher authorities. This public activism led to an 'Era of the Environment', as evidenced by the creation of Federal and State agencies solely devoted to environmental protection and by a sweeping series of new legislation. It would be only slightly cynical to say that the 'Era of the Attorney' soon followed. Legal experts have been increasingly called upon to mediate environmental disputes. Environmental groups in the U.S. have effectively used legislation such as the National Environmental Policy Act and National Forest Management Act to modify or halt forest pest-management programs focused on direct insect control through aerial applications of chemical pesticides. The public has become better-educated about the environment, and is increasingly sensitive to pollution, as evidenced in California by Proposition 65, which was passed by voters intent on reducing human exposure to, and water contamination by, pesticides and other hazardous chemicals. Politicians, agencies, universities, and businesses all strive to be viewed as sensitive to environmental issues. Forests are now recognized not just as
292
D.L. DAHLSTEN AND S.H. DREISTADT
providers of wood products but as important areas of recreation and wildlife habitat, and sources of clean water. GYPSY-MOTH SOCIOPOLITICS
We have been active in gypsy-moth (Lymantria dispar (L.) ) management efforts in the western U.S., where sociopolitical considerations have weighted heavily in treatment decision-making (Czerwinski and Isman, 1986). The insect itself, because of its occasional widespread abundance and temporary defoliation of trees in residential and recreational areas, is primarily a pest of the public's aesthetic sensibilities. This makes the management decisionmaking for this sociopolitical pest much more complicated than in a commercial forest situation where economic thresholds may be more easily established. Public activism is not new to the gypsy-moth scene. Forbush and Fernald ( 1896 ) reported citizen complaints and the harassment of gypsy-moth spray crews in Massachusetts 100 year ago. The Federal Government's decision not to help fund eradication efforts in the late 1800s, and State politicians' cutoff of funding once gypsy-moth populations have been suppressed to low levels, is often blamed for the failure of the initial efforts to eradicate the gypsy moth from North America (Dunlap, 1980). One of the first citizen lawsuits, against a Government pest-control project in Long Island, New York in 1957, unsuccessfully sought to prohibit aerial D D T applications against gypsy moth (Hirsh, 1984 ). However, growing public concerns over the hazards of D D T led to the eventual abandonment of its use in gypsy-moth and other projects. Management efforts in the East now focus on suppressing outbreak populations, although eradication is still being pursued in the West. One of the earliest West Coast gypsy-moth eradication projects occurred in Vancouver, Canada, in 1979. Federal and Provincial agricultural officials originally planned to treat an infestation in the Kitsilano area using aerial applications of diflubenzuron (Dimilin®). The first report of this in a daily newspaper caused a public outcry, and agricultural officials changed their plans to ground applications of carbaryl (Sevin ® ). This plan was rejected by some residents and representatives of the Greenpeace environmental group, which was founded in Vancouver. The objectors blockaded the first spray trucks and halted the project. The City Council and Greenpeace reached an agreement whereby, based on the results of a door-to-door survey, each homeowner was asked to choose between applications of carbaryl, Safer Agro-Chem's ® insecticidal soap, or no treatment. This program was implemented, and no further gypsy moths were found (Puritch and Brooks, 1981 ). In California, Oregon and Washington, gypsy-moth eradication projects have been conducted during one or more years at over 80 locations (Dreis-
FOREST PEST MANAGEMENTSOCIOPOLITICS
293
tadt and Dahlsten, 1989). Each state initially relied on the broad-spectrum insecticides carbaryl, acephate (Orthene ® ), or diflubenzuron. However, significant changes have occurred in eradication tactics, largely in response to the public's concern about pesticides, the increasingly successful litigaton by environmentalists opposed to broad-spectrum insecticides, and the development of new eradication tools. Carbaryl, the gypsy-moth insecticide preferred by most agency pest managers for two decades, is no longer used. Aerial application of Bacillus thuringiensis Berliner (B.t.) is now the most prevalent method. The search for even more environmentally safe and publicly acceptable strategies has recently led to eradication projects employing modifications of traditional sterile-insect-release technology. PACIFIC COAST STATE G Y P S Y - M O T H S O C I O P O L I T I C S
Washington's first gypsy-moth infestation in Renton was treated from the ground in 1979 with acephate. Although participation by property owners was voluntary, an extensive publicity campaign was credited with allowing treatment on 99% of the targeted 751 properties (Davidson, 1979). Infestations identified during 1982 encompassed over 1000 hectares, and appeared to require aerial application in the densely populated Seattle/Tacoma area. Staff of the Washington State and United States Departments of Agriculture recommended aerial application of carbaryl. Environmentalists with the Western Washington Toxics Coalition and Friends of the Earth, along with many local residents and a task force appointed by Seattle's Mayor Royer. favored B.t. The Washington State Legislature, which a few months earlier had passed gypsy-moth program legislation explicitly authorizing aerial insecticide applications, reversed itself by adopting a budget provision which prohibited urban aerial applications of chemical insecticides. The Washington State Department of Agriculture then decided to employ three aerial applications of B.t. Chemical insecticides have not been used in the most recent eradication projects in Washington, which have relied on B.t., mass trapping, or sterile insect releases (Dreistadt and Dahlsten, 1989 ). In Oregon, the first identified infestation was in south Salem where 26 properties were twice sprayed with acephate from the ground during the spring of 1981. Trapping that summer indicated that a more extensive infestation existed. The planned aerial applications of carbaryl "evoked the most interest of the public" that the Oregon Department of Agriculture had ever experienced in a program, and "focused on the material and methods to be used ''~. After being temporarily halted by the court because of a citizen lawsuit, two aerial applications ofcarbaryl were made on about 1600 hectares. ~L. Kunzman. Director, Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 14 April 1982.
294
D.L. DAHLSTEN AND S.H. DREISTADT
In 1984, the Ninth Circuit District Court of Appeals ruled that the programmatic environmental impact statement of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Oregon's environmental assessment were inadequate, and that chemical insecticides could not be used. Since then, B.t. has been the only material used for gypsy-moth eradication in Oregon, where about 200 000 ha have been sprayed (Dreistadt and Dahlsten, 1989). In California's first identified infestation, in San Jose in 1977, diflubenzuron was applied twice from the air to an area with 10 000 residences. Carbaryl was applied twice from the ground to about 20% of this are in 1977 and 1978 (Dreistadt and Dahlsten, 1989). In 1981, an extensive gypsy-moth infestation was identified in Santa Barbara. An environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by the Santa Barbara County Department of Agriculture, and the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA), indicated that aerial carbaryl applications were the only available effective strategy. This EIR was the target of separate lawsuits by the City of Santa Barbara and by an environmental coalition including the Scenic Shoreline Preservation Committee and Citizens for a Better Environment. A comprise project was agreed upon, which consisted of three ground applications of carbaryl at three sites, six aerial applications of B.t. to approximately 3800 ha, and mass trapping on 2000 ha, with more than 12 000 pheromone-baited traps. Opposition to subsequent gypsy-moth eradication projects in California included formal requests from local government for B.t. application instead of carbaryl in cities including Oakland, Berkeley, Palo Alto and Santa Cruz, and a 1983 lawsuit by Citizens for a Better Environment (Dreistadt, 1983 ). In 1985, Santa Cruz County and Felton residents obtained an injunction halting the CDFA's planned carbaryl applications there. As a result, six weekly aerial applications of B.t. over an area of 1000 ha, and six weekly ground treatments with B.t. on one property, were employed. CDFA's next gypsy-moth eradication program (in the Los Angeles are in 1987 ) for the first time included no plans for carbaryl. Two ground applications of diflubenzuron were combined with four aerial applications of B. t. Much of the public controversy over gypsy-moth eradication has focused on the use of broad-spectrum insecticides. Little attention has been given to the appropriateness of the policy of eradicating low-level infestations in the West rather than suppressing established populations as they reach defoliating levels. Sociopolitical concerns have weighed heavily in favor of eradication. For example, the USDA has told Washington agricultural officials that "the only federal money available is in eradication of non-infested states; if 'suppression' is decided upon, the federal government will not be [financially ] involved ''t. ~E.H. Davidson, Washington State Dept. of Agriculture: Quoted in Gypsy Moth Steering Committee minutes, 31 January 1983.
FOREST PEST MANAGEMENTSOCIOPOLITICS
29 5
First on the list of arguments in favor of eradication which Oregon and Washington have distributed is not the direct or biological effects of this pest. The first concern identified is that they "can expect high risk quarantines" (Anonymous, 1983 ). A "general infestation of large areas of the state would lead to restrictive quarantines [Anonymous, 1982-1987; their emphasis ] on Oregon-produced plant materials". (Oregon nursery sales combined with Christmas-tree sales are valued now at more than $215 million dollars annually. ) Such quarantines are often more politically than biologically motivated. For example, prior to the undertaking of large-scale eradication efforts in Oregon, California imposed a gypsy-moth quarantine that included processed lumber products exported to California, Oregon's largest market. As the likelihood of gypsy moth spreading via processed lumber is remote, it was apparent, from various newspaper reports 1, that the restrictive California quarantines were designed to prod Oregon to vigorously pursue eradication. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Citizens and environmental groups have increasing access to technical resources and will skeptically evaluate agency plans. If the agencies have failed to critically examine the problem and management alternatives, or if broadspectrum pesticides are recommended, these plans are likely to be challenged in political, legislative, judicial, academic a n d / o r media arenas. Often, there is no serious consideration of management options other than direct control with pesticides. There are tacit assumptions that chemical controls always work, and that more-selective alternatives are ineffective. Agencies and their experts must recognize that their advice may be subject to bias, must be more considerate of the risks borne and perceived by non-project proponents, and make greater efforts to investigate and employ alternative strategies. Public opinion and environmental groups are also subject to bias, but may have brought about important, scientifically indicated policy changes when those changes were not forthcoming from within management agencies; their views deserve a more open reception than they often receive from those agencies. Our gypsy-moth experience in the West is that everything 'works', including strategies that the agencies and their advisors repeatedly said would be ineffective. A lack of research contributes to ill-conceived programs. More funds must be devoted to developing proper sampling techniques and employing these in The Associated Press, 1984. California eyes Lane quarantine over moths. The Statesman J. Salem 8 Sept.; Anonymous, 1984. Moth measures imperative. The Statesman J. Salem. 11 Sep.: The Associated Press, 1984. California may ease its ban. The Statesman J. Salem, 19 Sep.
296
D.L. DAHLSTEN AND S.H. DREISTADT
decision-making. Prior to any treatments, sample data must be related to actual damage to the multiple uses for which our forests must be managed. Projects often become paramilitary operations which are an end unto themselves. They are driven by the hiring of personnel, obtaining of permits, procurement of equipment, and the extent of the area covered (Lorraine, 1984). Program decisions are much less sensitive to the density of insects, weather, or forest stand conditions. Scientific advice must be more frequently sought. We need to support longterm research conducted not just when an insect is a pest but when it is at endemic levels. We must orient our efforts toward long-term management goals. The crisis intervention, or fire-fighting, approach which dominates our forest pest management results in little new information gathered or knowledge gained from each project. Even for those 'big bug' project pests which have been the focus of substantial research, much of the available knowledge is not being applied. The non-target and possible human health effects of management projects should be monitored. The cost of these potential side-effects must be considered in careful economic analysis prior to any actual management projects. Biological monitoring of a project can provide much information of value in future decision-making. For example, because of great public concern, the 1980-82 medfly eradication project in the south San Francisco Bay Area was one of the few large-scale programs where non-target effects were widely studied. The supposedly selective malathion-bait sprays had significant adverse effects on domestic honeybees and important natural enemies. Medfly spraying led to secondary pest outbreaks in gardens, landscape, native vegetation, and orchards (Dreistadt and Dahlsten, 1986 ). These non-target impact studies became very useful in later project decision-making. A proposal to eradicate several well-established fruit flies in Hawaii through repeated widespread malathion-bait sprays is being modified, because it is now recognized that the sprays would have serious adverse ecological effects. Agency decision-makers must be open-minded and balanced. Presenting a single and extreme viewpoint to the public in order to justify projects tends to provoke an equally extreme opposing response from some citizen groups. The resulting polarization of views greatly increases the conflict. Concerned individuals must be informed and involved in the decision-making process from the start. There must be more effort to educate rather than propagandize the public. Pest control is a biological and ecological endeavor. However, the questions are not just scientific and technical, but involve issues of public policy. Social and political pressures will increasingly bear on forest pest management. Responding to these sociopolitical concerns is as important to successful forest pest management as is dealing with the pests.
FOREST PEST MANAGEMENT SOCIOPOLITICS
297
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The University of California's Institute of Governmental Studies has supported us through the Joseph P. and Polly Harris Trust Program. We thank Susan N. Tait for editorial assistance.
REFERENCES Anonymous, 1982-1987. The gypsy-moth in Oregon. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture. Anonymous, 1983. Staff Summary Report, the Gypsy Moth. Washington State Dept. of Agriculture, Olympia, 3 pp. Carson, R., 1962. Silent Spring. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 368 pp. Czerwinski, C. and Isman, M.B., 1986. Urban pest management and social conflict in the control of gypsy moth in west coast cities, Bull. Entomol. Soc. Am., 32: 36-41. Davidson, E.H., 1979. An urban gypsy moth eradication program in 1979. Paper presented at the Entomological Society of America Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, 25-29 November (unpublished). Dreistadt, S.H., 1983. Gypsy moth in California: Is carbaryl the answer? CBE Environ. Rev., May/June; 3-7. Dreistadt, S.H. and Dahlsten, D.L., 1986. Medfly eradication in California: Lessons from the field. Environment 28(6): 18-20, 40-44. Dreistadt, S.H. and Dahlsten, D.L., 1989. Gypsy moth eradication in Pacific Coast states: History and evaluation. Bull. Entomol. Soc. Am., 35:13-19. Dunlap, T., 1980. The gypsy moth: a study in science and public policy. J. For. Hist., 24:116126. Forbush, E.H. and Fernald, C.H., 1896. The Gypsy Moth. Wright and Potter, Boston, 495 pp. Hirsh, R., 1984. The case against carbaryl. CBE Environ. Rev., Aug/Sept. 3-5. Lorraine, H., 1984. The 1980 medfly crisis: An analysis of uncertainty management under conditions of non-routine problem solving. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 407 pp. Metcalf, R.L., 1980. Changing role of insecticides in crop protection. Annu. Rev. Entomol., 22: 219-256. Perkins, J.H., 1982. Insects, Experts, and the Insecticide Crisis. Plenum Press, New York, 304 Pp. Popham, W.L. and Hall, D.G., 1958. Insect eradication programs. Annu. Rev. Entomol., 3: 335-334. Puritch, G.S. and Brooks, B.C., 1981. Effects of insecticidal soap in the gypsy moth program in Kitsilano on insects and vegetation. Canadian Forestry Service, Pacific Forest Research Centre, Victoria, B.C., 23 pp.
289
Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., A m s t e r d a m
Forest pest management sociopolitics Donald L. Dahlsten and Steve H. Dreistadt Division of Biological Control University of California, Berkeley, Calffbrnia 94720, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT Dahlsten, D.L. and Dreistadt, S.H., 1991. Forest pest management sociopolitics./;'or. Ecol. Manage., 39: 289-297. Successful forest pest managers must integrate complex technical considerations with important social and political concerns. Forest managers well trained in silviculture or entomology may be prepared for the biological challenges, but they may not be prepared for the sociopolitics. Sociopolitics influences all aspects of forest pest management. Because decisions are based on incomplete information, and the outcome of projects has implications for its participants, judgements by agencies, scientists and technicians can be as biased as are those of politicians and interest groups. This paper discusses how sociopolitics influence forest pest management.
INTRODUCTION
When one of us (D.L.D.) first came to the Division of Biological Control in Berkeley in 1963, the USDA Forest Service and the California Department of Forestry sought my advice on a spray project planned for Neodiprion sawflies in northeastern California. I had just finished my Ph.D. thesis on these sawflies and I knew something about them. Asked to give my opinion I did so, presenting material from my thesis. My conclusion, that there was no evidence of the need for a sawfly spray project, was met with great anger and after the meeting I had to lunch by myself. My experience with these agencies concerning the Douglas-fir tussock moth, Orgyia pseudotsugata (McD.), in 1965, was much the same. A group from my laboratory had collected sample data indicating that a 12 000-acre 1 spray program would be sufficient, and we r e c o m m e n d e d against the planned spraying of 55 000 acres. My presentation was again met with great hostility by the agency and private industry. The larger area was sprayed, although I have since been vindicated by other Forest Service scientists who later concluded that my opinions were correct. Experiences like these, where decisions ' ~ 5000 ha.
0378-1127/91/$03.50
© 1991 - - Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
290
D.L. D A H L S T E N A N D S.H. D R E I S T A D T
were made contrary to apparent biological 'facts', led us to scrutinize the role and importance of experts in forest pest management. A C U L T U R A L PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERTS
Experts will acknowledge that their advice is often manipulated or ignored because of sociopolitical considerations. However, few experts recognize that the the advice they give may itself be biased. Expert recommendations on the research and management of forest pests are often handicapped by insufficient or contradictory data. Judgements must therefore be made, judgements often influenced by opinions and values which are subject to bias. The conflict among experts which sometimes results is, in our opinion, often due to advisors not recognizing their bias and denying the legitimacy of differing interpretations. Some seek to shroud themselves in a cloak of objectivity, when total objectivity does not exist. John Perkins ( 1982 ) provided a philosophical framework for understanding this conflict among experts. Perkins classifies experts as humanists or naturalists. Humanists believe that people have an almost limitless ability to manipulate the world to our advantage. Humanists believe in total pest management. Naturalists, according to Perkins, believe that humans are an integral component of the biosphere and that our interventions must be subtle. Unless we limit our tinkering with Mother Nature, the benefits of our actions will be outweighed by the backlash such as resistant, resurgent or secondary pests. Naturalists subscribe to an integrated or ecological approach to pest management. Conflicts arise because, even given the same data, the two groups may see the problems and potential solutions differently. Humanists seek and recomm e n d a technological or 'silver bullet' approach. Naturalists believe that the effective use of technology is more limited when all costs and benefits are considered, and that we must 'tread lightly'. We have often advised on pest management or eradication projects, and recognize that, like other experts, we may be biased. Perkins ( 1982 ) would call us naturalists. Our philosophical orientation seeks non-invasive solutions to environmental problems. This stems from our recognition of the complexity of natural systems which are typically poorly understood and sometimes easily disrupted. Our professional experience indicates that pesticides often create far more severe and wide-ranging problems than anticipated. Our passion is for the beneficial insects and birds which are sometimes devasted by the broad swath of pesticides. Finally, our first-hand experiences lead us to conclude that those agencies responsible for forest pest management often fail to scientifically evaluate the existence or extent of presumed pest problems. They are reluctant to consider information which is contrary to their precon-
FOREST PESTMANAGEMENTSOCIOPOLITICS
291
ceived plan of action. Agencies often seek advice only when it, and the individuals they consult, support their position. A S O C I O P O L I T I C A L HISTORY O F PEST C O N T R O L
Robert Metcalf (1980) has encapsulated modern pest control into three eras. The 'Era of Optimism' was from 1946 to 1962. The discovery and improved application of organochlorines led economic entomoligists to conclusions such as "The gypsy moth can be eliminated from any given area with a single application of one pound or 6ess of DDT applied per acre as an oil solution" (Popham and Hall, 1958 ). The 'Era of Doubt', from 1962 to 1976, began when Rachael Carson (1962) sounded the alarm over the side-effects of widespread pesticide applications. The 'Era of IPM', 1976-1986, was heralded by programs such as the nationwide 'Huffaker Project', which led to reduced pesticide use through increased reliance on cultural, physical and biological pest controls. Since 1986 it could be said that we are in the 'Era of Sustainability', because of the broad concern for sustaining productivity and life on the planet. These pest-control eras are largely a product of the social and political environment. The era of optimism might also be termed the era of the agency scientist or pest manager. State and federal agencies were among the biggest users and promotors of organochlorine pesticides. Unrestricted pesticide use in the U.S.A. was widely accepted by a post-World-War-II public which had great faith in the expertise and integrity of its government. McCarthyism and the Cold War tended to suppress criticism in all walks of life. For government officials to treat dissenters as 'un-American' was not uncommon. Rachel Carson's book opened an era of the private citizen. Individuals and communities increasingly challenged higher authorities. This public activism led to an 'Era of the Environment', as evidenced by the creation of Federal and State agencies solely devoted to environmental protection and by a sweeping series of new legislation. It would be only slightly cynical to say that the 'Era of the Attorney' soon followed. Legal experts have been increasingly called upon to mediate environmental disputes. Environmental groups in the U.S. have effectively used legislation such as the National Environmental Policy Act and National Forest Management Act to modify or halt forest pest-management programs focused on direct insect control through aerial applications of chemical pesticides. The public has become better-educated about the environment, and is increasingly sensitive to pollution, as evidenced in California by Proposition 65, which was passed by voters intent on reducing human exposure to, and water contamination by, pesticides and other hazardous chemicals. Politicians, agencies, universities, and businesses all strive to be viewed as sensitive to environmental issues. Forests are now recognized not just as
292
D.L. DAHLSTEN AND S.H. DREISTADT
providers of wood products but as important areas of recreation and wildlife habitat, and sources of clean water. GYPSY-MOTH SOCIOPOLITICS
We have been active in gypsy-moth (Lymantria dispar (L.) ) management efforts in the western U.S., where sociopolitical considerations have weighted heavily in treatment decision-making (Czerwinski and Isman, 1986). The insect itself, because of its occasional widespread abundance and temporary defoliation of trees in residential and recreational areas, is primarily a pest of the public's aesthetic sensibilities. This makes the management decisionmaking for this sociopolitical pest much more complicated than in a commercial forest situation where economic thresholds may be more easily established. Public activism is not new to the gypsy-moth scene. Forbush and Fernald ( 1896 ) reported citizen complaints and the harassment of gypsy-moth spray crews in Massachusetts 100 year ago. The Federal Government's decision not to help fund eradication efforts in the late 1800s, and State politicians' cutoff of funding once gypsy-moth populations have been suppressed to low levels, is often blamed for the failure of the initial efforts to eradicate the gypsy moth from North America (Dunlap, 1980). One of the first citizen lawsuits, against a Government pest-control project in Long Island, New York in 1957, unsuccessfully sought to prohibit aerial D D T applications against gypsy moth (Hirsh, 1984 ). However, growing public concerns over the hazards of D D T led to the eventual abandonment of its use in gypsy-moth and other projects. Management efforts in the East now focus on suppressing outbreak populations, although eradication is still being pursued in the West. One of the earliest West Coast gypsy-moth eradication projects occurred in Vancouver, Canada, in 1979. Federal and Provincial agricultural officials originally planned to treat an infestation in the Kitsilano area using aerial applications of diflubenzuron (Dimilin®). The first report of this in a daily newspaper caused a public outcry, and agricultural officials changed their plans to ground applications of carbaryl (Sevin ® ). This plan was rejected by some residents and representatives of the Greenpeace environmental group, which was founded in Vancouver. The objectors blockaded the first spray trucks and halted the project. The City Council and Greenpeace reached an agreement whereby, based on the results of a door-to-door survey, each homeowner was asked to choose between applications of carbaryl, Safer Agro-Chem's ® insecticidal soap, or no treatment. This program was implemented, and no further gypsy moths were found (Puritch and Brooks, 1981 ). In California, Oregon and Washington, gypsy-moth eradication projects have been conducted during one or more years at over 80 locations (Dreis-
FOREST PEST MANAGEMENTSOCIOPOLITICS
293
tadt and Dahlsten, 1989). Each state initially relied on the broad-spectrum insecticides carbaryl, acephate (Orthene ® ), or diflubenzuron. However, significant changes have occurred in eradication tactics, largely in response to the public's concern about pesticides, the increasingly successful litigaton by environmentalists opposed to broad-spectrum insecticides, and the development of new eradication tools. Carbaryl, the gypsy-moth insecticide preferred by most agency pest managers for two decades, is no longer used. Aerial application of Bacillus thuringiensis Berliner (B.t.) is now the most prevalent method. The search for even more environmentally safe and publicly acceptable strategies has recently led to eradication projects employing modifications of traditional sterile-insect-release technology. PACIFIC COAST STATE G Y P S Y - M O T H S O C I O P O L I T I C S
Washington's first gypsy-moth infestation in Renton was treated from the ground in 1979 with acephate. Although participation by property owners was voluntary, an extensive publicity campaign was credited with allowing treatment on 99% of the targeted 751 properties (Davidson, 1979). Infestations identified during 1982 encompassed over 1000 hectares, and appeared to require aerial application in the densely populated Seattle/Tacoma area. Staff of the Washington State and United States Departments of Agriculture recommended aerial application of carbaryl. Environmentalists with the Western Washington Toxics Coalition and Friends of the Earth, along with many local residents and a task force appointed by Seattle's Mayor Royer. favored B.t. The Washington State Legislature, which a few months earlier had passed gypsy-moth program legislation explicitly authorizing aerial insecticide applications, reversed itself by adopting a budget provision which prohibited urban aerial applications of chemical insecticides. The Washington State Department of Agriculture then decided to employ three aerial applications of B.t. Chemical insecticides have not been used in the most recent eradication projects in Washington, which have relied on B.t., mass trapping, or sterile insect releases (Dreistadt and Dahlsten, 1989 ). In Oregon, the first identified infestation was in south Salem where 26 properties were twice sprayed with acephate from the ground during the spring of 1981. Trapping that summer indicated that a more extensive infestation existed. The planned aerial applications of carbaryl "evoked the most interest of the public" that the Oregon Department of Agriculture had ever experienced in a program, and "focused on the material and methods to be used ''~. After being temporarily halted by the court because of a citizen lawsuit, two aerial applications ofcarbaryl were made on about 1600 hectares. ~L. Kunzman. Director, Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 14 April 1982.
294
D.L. DAHLSTEN AND S.H. DREISTADT
In 1984, the Ninth Circuit District Court of Appeals ruled that the programmatic environmental impact statement of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Oregon's environmental assessment were inadequate, and that chemical insecticides could not be used. Since then, B.t. has been the only material used for gypsy-moth eradication in Oregon, where about 200 000 ha have been sprayed (Dreistadt and Dahlsten, 1989). In California's first identified infestation, in San Jose in 1977, diflubenzuron was applied twice from the air to an area with 10 000 residences. Carbaryl was applied twice from the ground to about 20% of this are in 1977 and 1978 (Dreistadt and Dahlsten, 1989). In 1981, an extensive gypsy-moth infestation was identified in Santa Barbara. An environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by the Santa Barbara County Department of Agriculture, and the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA), indicated that aerial carbaryl applications were the only available effective strategy. This EIR was the target of separate lawsuits by the City of Santa Barbara and by an environmental coalition including the Scenic Shoreline Preservation Committee and Citizens for a Better Environment. A comprise project was agreed upon, which consisted of three ground applications of carbaryl at three sites, six aerial applications of B.t. to approximately 3800 ha, and mass trapping on 2000 ha, with more than 12 000 pheromone-baited traps. Opposition to subsequent gypsy-moth eradication projects in California included formal requests from local government for B.t. application instead of carbaryl in cities including Oakland, Berkeley, Palo Alto and Santa Cruz, and a 1983 lawsuit by Citizens for a Better Environment (Dreistadt, 1983 ). In 1985, Santa Cruz County and Felton residents obtained an injunction halting the CDFA's planned carbaryl applications there. As a result, six weekly aerial applications of B.t. over an area of 1000 ha, and six weekly ground treatments with B.t. on one property, were employed. CDFA's next gypsy-moth eradication program (in the Los Angeles are in 1987 ) for the first time included no plans for carbaryl. Two ground applications of diflubenzuron were combined with four aerial applications of B. t. Much of the public controversy over gypsy-moth eradication has focused on the use of broad-spectrum insecticides. Little attention has been given to the appropriateness of the policy of eradicating low-level infestations in the West rather than suppressing established populations as they reach defoliating levels. Sociopolitical concerns have weighed heavily in favor of eradication. For example, the USDA has told Washington agricultural officials that "the only federal money available is in eradication of non-infested states; if 'suppression' is decided upon, the federal government will not be [financially ] involved ''t. ~E.H. Davidson, Washington State Dept. of Agriculture: Quoted in Gypsy Moth Steering Committee minutes, 31 January 1983.
FOREST PEST MANAGEMENTSOCIOPOLITICS
29 5
First on the list of arguments in favor of eradication which Oregon and Washington have distributed is not the direct or biological effects of this pest. The first concern identified is that they "can expect high risk quarantines" (Anonymous, 1983 ). A "general infestation of large areas of the state would lead to restrictive quarantines [Anonymous, 1982-1987; their emphasis ] on Oregon-produced plant materials". (Oregon nursery sales combined with Christmas-tree sales are valued now at more than $215 million dollars annually. ) Such quarantines are often more politically than biologically motivated. For example, prior to the undertaking of large-scale eradication efforts in Oregon, California imposed a gypsy-moth quarantine that included processed lumber products exported to California, Oregon's largest market. As the likelihood of gypsy moth spreading via processed lumber is remote, it was apparent, from various newspaper reports 1, that the restrictive California quarantines were designed to prod Oregon to vigorously pursue eradication. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Citizens and environmental groups have increasing access to technical resources and will skeptically evaluate agency plans. If the agencies have failed to critically examine the problem and management alternatives, or if broadspectrum pesticides are recommended, these plans are likely to be challenged in political, legislative, judicial, academic a n d / o r media arenas. Often, there is no serious consideration of management options other than direct control with pesticides. There are tacit assumptions that chemical controls always work, and that more-selective alternatives are ineffective. Agencies and their experts must recognize that their advice may be subject to bias, must be more considerate of the risks borne and perceived by non-project proponents, and make greater efforts to investigate and employ alternative strategies. Public opinion and environmental groups are also subject to bias, but may have brought about important, scientifically indicated policy changes when those changes were not forthcoming from within management agencies; their views deserve a more open reception than they often receive from those agencies. Our gypsy-moth experience in the West is that everything 'works', including strategies that the agencies and their advisors repeatedly said would be ineffective. A lack of research contributes to ill-conceived programs. More funds must be devoted to developing proper sampling techniques and employing these in The Associated Press, 1984. California eyes Lane quarantine over moths. The Statesman J. Salem 8 Sept.; Anonymous, 1984. Moth measures imperative. The Statesman J. Salem. 11 Sep.: The Associated Press, 1984. California may ease its ban. The Statesman J. Salem, 19 Sep.
296
D.L. DAHLSTEN AND S.H. DREISTADT
decision-making. Prior to any treatments, sample data must be related to actual damage to the multiple uses for which our forests must be managed. Projects often become paramilitary operations which are an end unto themselves. They are driven by the hiring of personnel, obtaining of permits, procurement of equipment, and the extent of the area covered (Lorraine, 1984). Program decisions are much less sensitive to the density of insects, weather, or forest stand conditions. Scientific advice must be more frequently sought. We need to support longterm research conducted not just when an insect is a pest but when it is at endemic levels. We must orient our efforts toward long-term management goals. The crisis intervention, or fire-fighting, approach which dominates our forest pest management results in little new information gathered or knowledge gained from each project. Even for those 'big bug' project pests which have been the focus of substantial research, much of the available knowledge is not being applied. The non-target and possible human health effects of management projects should be monitored. The cost of these potential side-effects must be considered in careful economic analysis prior to any actual management projects. Biological monitoring of a project can provide much information of value in future decision-making. For example, because of great public concern, the 1980-82 medfly eradication project in the south San Francisco Bay Area was one of the few large-scale programs where non-target effects were widely studied. The supposedly selective malathion-bait sprays had significant adverse effects on domestic honeybees and important natural enemies. Medfly spraying led to secondary pest outbreaks in gardens, landscape, native vegetation, and orchards (Dreistadt and Dahlsten, 1986 ). These non-target impact studies became very useful in later project decision-making. A proposal to eradicate several well-established fruit flies in Hawaii through repeated widespread malathion-bait sprays is being modified, because it is now recognized that the sprays would have serious adverse ecological effects. Agency decision-makers must be open-minded and balanced. Presenting a single and extreme viewpoint to the public in order to justify projects tends to provoke an equally extreme opposing response from some citizen groups. The resulting polarization of views greatly increases the conflict. Concerned individuals must be informed and involved in the decision-making process from the start. There must be more effort to educate rather than propagandize the public. Pest control is a biological and ecological endeavor. However, the questions are not just scientific and technical, but involve issues of public policy. Social and political pressures will increasingly bear on forest pest management. Responding to these sociopolitical concerns is as important to successful forest pest management as is dealing with the pests.
FOREST PEST MANAGEMENT SOCIOPOLITICS
297
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The University of California's Institute of Governmental Studies has supported us through the Joseph P. and Polly Harris Trust Program. We thank Susan N. Tait for editorial assistance.
REFERENCES Anonymous, 1982-1987. The gypsy-moth in Oregon. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture. Anonymous, 1983. Staff Summary Report, the Gypsy Moth. Washington State Dept. of Agriculture, Olympia, 3 pp. Carson, R., 1962. Silent Spring. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 368 pp. Czerwinski, C. and Isman, M.B., 1986. Urban pest management and social conflict in the control of gypsy moth in west coast cities, Bull. Entomol. Soc. Am., 32: 36-41. Davidson, E.H., 1979. An urban gypsy moth eradication program in 1979. Paper presented at the Entomological Society of America Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, 25-29 November (unpublished). Dreistadt, S.H., 1983. Gypsy moth in California: Is carbaryl the answer? CBE Environ. Rev., May/June; 3-7. Dreistadt, S.H. and Dahlsten, D.L., 1986. Medfly eradication in California: Lessons from the field. Environment 28(6): 18-20, 40-44. Dreistadt, S.H. and Dahlsten, D.L., 1989. Gypsy moth eradication in Pacific Coast states: History and evaluation. Bull. Entomol. Soc. Am., 35:13-19. Dunlap, T., 1980. The gypsy moth: a study in science and public policy. J. For. Hist., 24:116126. Forbush, E.H. and Fernald, C.H., 1896. The Gypsy Moth. Wright and Potter, Boston, 495 pp. Hirsh, R., 1984. The case against carbaryl. CBE Environ. Rev., Aug/Sept. 3-5. Lorraine, H., 1984. The 1980 medfly crisis: An analysis of uncertainty management under conditions of non-routine problem solving. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 407 pp. Metcalf, R.L., 1980. Changing role of insecticides in crop protection. Annu. Rev. Entomol., 22: 219-256. Perkins, J.H., 1982. Insects, Experts, and the Insecticide Crisis. Plenum Press, New York, 304 Pp. Popham, W.L. and Hall, D.G., 1958. Insect eradication programs. Annu. Rev. Entomol., 3: 335-334. Puritch, G.S. and Brooks, B.C., 1981. Effects of insecticidal soap in the gypsy moth program in Kitsilano on insects and vegetation. Canadian Forestry Service, Pacific Forest Research Centre, Victoria, B.C., 23 pp.