Forgiveness is not always divine: When expressing forgiveness makes others avoid you

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 126 (2015) 130–141

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Forgiveness is not always divine: When expressing forgiveness makes others avoid you Gabrielle S. Adams ⇑, Xi Zou, M. Ena Inesi, Madan M. Pillutla Organisational Behaviour, London Business School, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 10 July 2013 Accepted 5 October 2014 Accepted by Francesca Gino Keywords: Forgive Self-righteous Moral superiority Transgression Conflict repair

a b s t r a c t Organizational scholars have recently become interested in forgiveness as a way to resolve workplace conflicts and repair relationships. We question the assumption that forgiveness always has these relational benefits. In three studies we investigated participants’ responses to people who expressed forgiveness of them versus those who did not. We found that when the ostensible transgressor did not believe he or she had committed a wrongdoing, expressing forgiveness damaged the relationship relative to a control condition. This effect occurred when participants were made to believe that a real person had forgiven them (Studies 1 and 2) and when they imagined a co-worker had forgiven them (Study 3). Furthermore, in the absence of wrongdoing, participants’ perceptions of the forgiver as self-righteous mediated the effect of forgiveness on avoidance of forgivers (Studies 2 and 3). We discuss implications for conflict management. Ó 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Introduction Forgiveness is frequently touted as a socially desirable and even morally correct response to harming another person. This may be because it yields both intrapersonal and relational benefits. Not only does it provide physical, emotional, cognitive, and relational benefits for the forgiver (e.g. Aquino, Grover, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010; Goodstein & Aquino, 2010; Hannon, Finkel, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2012), it also serves to repair relationships damaged by conflict. After forgiveness, both transgressors and victims express a greater desire to stay in the relationship (Katz, Street, & Arias, 1997), victims are more likely to participate in favor exchanges with their transgressor (Kelln & Ellard, 1999), and inter-employee conflict in organizations is more likely to be resolved (Fehr & Gelfand, 2012). At the same time, some researchers have theorized that forgiveness can damage relationships (Exline & Baumeister, 2000; Exline, Worthington, Hill, & McCullough, 2003). Oscar Wilde’s insightful observation—‘‘Always forgive your enemies. Nothing annoys them so much’’—suggests that such expressions may not always be wellreceived by those being forgiven. For example, imagine that you stop a colleague in the hallway one day at work and state that you forgive her for taking credit for your project idea in a recent

⇑ Corresponding author at: London Business School, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom. E-mail address: [email protected] (G.S. Adams). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.10.003 0749-5978/Ó 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

meeting. Although she has a vague memory of meeting with you to discuss the project, she believes that she thought of the idea by herself. In situations such as this, what are the consequences of your expression of forgiveness for your relationship with this coworker? In the current research, we investigate responses to forgiveness from the perspective of the ostensible transgressor. Specifically, we look at the circumstances under which expressed forgiveness has negative consequences for relationships. We theorize that when an individual doubts whether they have committed a transgression, the expression of forgiveness has the potential to ‘backfire’ by making the forgiver appear morally self-righteous. Thus, instead of improving the relationship, expressing forgiveness under these circumstances may actually lead to the relationship’s deterioration.

Expressed forgiveness and relationships Forgiveness has been defined from the perspective of the forgiver as ‘‘an individual, prosocial change toward a perceived transgressor that is situated within a specific interpersonal context’’ (McCullough, Root, Tabak, & Witvliet, 2009, p. 9).1 Expressing 1 We focus on interpersonal forgiveness–forgiveness of an offender by a person who has been wronged—rather than forgiveness of or by groups (e.g. McLernon, Cairns, Hewstone, & Smith, 2004), third-party forgiveness (e.g. Green, Burnette, & Davis, 2008), or self-forgiveness (e.g. Tangney, Boone, & Dearling, 2005).

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forgiveness enables forgivers to move past a conflict toward relationship repair (for reviews, see Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000; McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2001). As a response to injustice, it can free people from the inner turmoil that comes from harboring grudges and helps them to let go of any emotional injury that they have sustained (Richards, 1988). Much research has investigated these and other ways in which victims decide to forgive and its impact on and benefits for the forgiver (e.g. Aquino & Bradfield, 2000; Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). Although researchers have examined the victim’s experience of forgiveness, few have examined how people react to its expression (see Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002, who distinguish between intrapersonal/experienced and interpersonal forgiveness). Because the victim’s internal experience of forgiveness is often opaque to the transgressor, we focus on expressed forgiveness. Interpersonal transgressions create an imbalance in resources: the victim is left with worse outcomes than the transgressor. Thus, transgressors are indebted to victims because they have caused harm or injury and thus owe them symbolic or financial compensation or restitution (Baumeister, Exline, & Sommer, 1998). Interpersonal forgiveness brings balance to the exchange by signaling that the forgiver is willing to erase the debt, thus restoring the relationship to its original equilibrium (Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004). Indeed, forgiveness expressions imply that the forgiver downplays or relinquishes claims to restitution or desires for punishment (Exline et al., 2003), thereby allowing the relationship to be repaired. One notable empirical study by Kelln and Ellard (1999) shows that forgiveness benefits relationships: participants who were led to believe they had broken a piece of laboratory equipment were more likely to comply with a researcher’s request to deliver envelopes when the researcher preemptively offered forgiveness instead of enacting retribution. The finding that forgiveness repairs interpersonal relationships following transgressions might lead to the assumption that forgiveness invariably benefits relationships, or to the conclusion that one should always forgive transgressions. Some pilot data we collected confirms this assumption: we asked 103 participants on mTurk (65 men, 36 women, 2 unreported; Mage = 31.2) how much there is a moral mandate to express forgiveness (‘‘People should express forgiveness when they believe they have been wronged’’ and ‘‘If people believe they have been wronged, the morally correct response is to express forgiveness’’) (1–7 strongly disagree/agree). We created a composite of these items, and found that 64.4% agreed (were above the midpoint of 4) that expressing forgiveness is a morally correct response to being wronged. Thus, people seem to agree that the correct response to victimization is forgiveness. However, under some circumstances, expressing forgiveness might exacerbate rather than restore the imbalance in the relationship that the transgression created. We explore how an individual’s belief about his or her own wrongdoing (or lack thereof) alters the positive effects of expressed forgiveness on relationships. We suggest that people’s reactions to being forgiven depend on whether they believe they have committed a wrongdoing, and we propose that individuals will react negatively if they doubt that they are guilty of wrongdoing. Specifically, we explore the implications of forgiveness in the absence of perceived wrongdoing for avoidance intentions and behavior. Our interest in avoidance serves as a counterpoint to research showing that forgiveness impacts desires to repair relationships after transgressions. Much of this research assumes that individuals seek to maintain relationships and that transgressions can be dealt with by seeking and receiving forgiveness or exacting revenge. For transgressors, there cannot be a desire

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to seek revenge, as there is nothing for them to avenge. Instead, they may seek to avoid the (alleged) victim or withdraw from the relationship. We study this avoidance behavior as the primary outcome of interest, and indeed, some research points to the relevance of this outcome, showing that transgressors sometimes withdraw from relationships due to self-protective motivations (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012; Schmader & Lickel, 2006). A unilateral expression of forgiveness might exacerbate such tendencies. The study of avoidance (as opposed to revenge) is a natural consequence of our central research question that makes the transgressor (rather than the victim) the focal actor.

Perceived wrongdoing moderates the relational benefits of expressed forgiveness When transgressions occur, the involved parties may have different interpretations of the event (e.g. Zechmeister & Romero, 2002), thus leading to disagreement about whether the transgressor has committed a wrongdoing. For example, they may disagree about whether the event constitutes a wrongdoing: one party may blame the other while the accused party denies responsibility. Even if people agree that a wrongdoing has occurred, they may differ in how serious they think it is; offenders may perceive their transgressions to be less serious than victims do (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). They may also disagree about the mitigating factors that could put the transgression in perspective—for example, a colleague may have missed an important deadline that inconvenienced others because he was tending to a sick child. Thus, there is high potential for disagreement about the transgressor’s ostensible blameworthiness for wrongdoing. This suggests that forgiveness may sometimes be offered to individuals who perceive themselves to have done wrong as well as to those who do not. Forgiveness conveys very different messages when transgressors perceive themselves to have committed a wrongdoing compared to when they do not. When transgressors perceive themselves to be responsible for wrongdoing, forgiveness does not convey any additional information beyond what they previously knew. However, if forgiveness is expressed when people believe they have not done anything wrong, as is sometimes the case (Exline et al., 2003), it may communicate that the forgiver thinks the recipient has committed a transgression. Thus, such messages inform the person being forgiven about the forgiver’s perception of them. Instead of leading to relationship repair, it may lead the recipient of forgiveness to avoid the forgiver. Why? We argue that under such circumstances, those who are forgiven may attribute the offer of forgiveness to be due to a flaw in the forgivers’ character—in this case, selfrighteousness.

Self-righteousness We define perceived self-righteousness as the perceiver’s belief that the forgiver erroneously views him or herself as morally superior to them. This is a definition that is close to Falbo and Belk’s (1985) measure of self-righteousness as the ‘‘conviction that one’s behaviors or beliefs are correct’’ and similar to the dictionary definition: ‘‘having or characterized by a certainty, especially an unfounded one, that one is totally correct or morally superior’’ (oxforddictionaries.com). Perceived self-righteousness, as we have conceptualized it, is an inference about what the target believes about his/her morality relative to the perceiver.

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Typically, the expression of forgiveness is linked to the perception that the forgiver is a moral person. Philosophical and theological work has emphasized the moral value of forgiveness (see Exline et al., 2003 for a review). By forgoing a debt, forgivers are seen as morally virtuous (Adams, 1991; North, 1987), and expressing forgiveness enables the forgiver to adopt the moral high ground. As Heider (1958) noted, ‘‘Forgiveness can ... devaluate the attacker, and affirm the power and status of the forgiver’’ (p. 269). Researchers have found that people felt morally superior when they persisted on a tedious task but later found out that someone else had quit (Jordan & Monin, 2008), although less work has examined attributions of self-righteousness to others (perceived self-righteousness). However, in the absence of agreement that a transgression has occurred, the offer of forgiveness communicates that instead of being of truly morally superior character, the forgiver is undeservedly self-righteous. Thus, in the present research, we highlight an important characteristic of perceived self-righteousness: that their assumed moral position is incorrect or erroneous. In other words, those who are forgiven in the absence of perceived wrongdoing perceive the forgiver to have incorrectly adopted a morally superior position. By morally elevating themselves in this manner, self-righteous people claim a status that the supposed perpetrator does not believe they should hold. People are therefore unlikely to want to continue a relationship with such individuals. Although little research has been conducted on perceptions of others as self-righteous, some has focused on social comparisons in the moral domain (Monin, 2007). Moreover, the literature on arrogant employees—a similar judgment—suggests that these people are often disliked and avoided in workplace contexts (e.g. Judge, LePine, & Rich, 2006, but see Brunell et al., 2008). Other literature has found that the belief that an outgroup is morally superior to one’s own group is threatening, and leads people to refuse offers of help from those outgroup members (Täuber & van Zomeren, 2012). In sum, even though people may hold the best and most virtuous of intentions in expressing forgiveness (i.e. relationship restoration), their actions may lead to the opposite effect. We hypothesized that an ostensible transgressor’s perceived wrongdoing would moderate the effect of forgiveness on relationship outcomes—in particular, the ostensible transgressor’s desire to interact with the forgiver in the future. In Study 1 we created an experimental paradigm in which laboratory participants who perceived themselves to be innocent of wrongdoing could sit farther from a confederate who expressed forgiveness. In Study 2, we additionally investigated the effects of forgiveness after perceived wrongdoing, and tested self-righteousness as the mechanism by which people want to avoid forgivers (more than non-forgivers) in the absence of perceived wrongdoing. Finally, in Study 3, we tested two alternative mechanisms beyond perceived self-righteousness: perceived accusation and moral self-concept threat. Above and beyond the effects of perceived accusation and moral self-concept threat, self-righteousness explained the effect of forgiveness on avoidance behavior. In the studies below, we report all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures.

Study 1: Forgiveness and avoidance The goal of Study 1 was to test our hypothesis about the effects of forgiveness in the absence of perceived wrongdoing under the controlled conditions of a laboratory study. We manipulated whether or not a confederate forgave innocent participants for a wrongdoing. To test the behavioral consequences of our hypothesis, we examined whether participants would engage in actual avoidance behavior. Drawing on social distance measures, we used an subtle but meaningful measure of avoidance: how far

participants chose to sit from the confederate (e.g. Houston & Bull, 1994; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). Method Participants Thirty-nine people were recruited from a list of participants maintained by the behavioral research lab at a business school in the United Kingdom. One participant was excluded because she had heard about the method and purpose of the study from a previous participant. Thus, 38 participants (16 men; 22 women; Mage = 27 years) were included in the analysis. They were paid £10 ($17.00) for their participation. Procedure We employed a 2-cell design (forgiveness versus no forgiveness) to study the effects of forgiveness when participants did not perceive themselves to have committed any wrongdoing. Participants entered the lab where a confederate (posing as a participant) had already taken a seat in the waiting room. Together, they were escorted to a room where the experimenter told them that they would be given 10 minutes to write an essay about the environment (the essay prompt was adapted from a sample GRE exam). They were told that they could discuss the topic but had to write their essays separately. Based on their performance on the essay (graded by the experimenter), the two of them would split 5 entries into a lottery for £50.00 ($83.00). At this point, the experimenter left the room and asked them to bring her the essays when they were done. As they began to write their essays, the confederate rubbed her finger on the desk and said, ‘‘These rooms are so disgusting—why doesn’t she ever clean the desk? Ugh.’’ After they had completed the writing task, the participant, who was always seated closest to the door, delivered both their essays to the experimenter (if the participant did not offer to take the confederate’s essay, the confederate asked him/her). After the participant returned, the experimenter brought 5 lottery tickets to the room and allocated 4 to the participant and only 1 to the confederate, and started to leave the room to retrieve other study materials (the demographics sheet). At this point, the confederate stopped the experimenter and said, ‘‘Did something happen when he/she brought you the essays?’’ The experimenter always said, ‘‘No, nothing happened’’ as she continued to walk away. We included this interaction so that all participants would know the confederate felt a wrongdoing had occurred. Once the experimenter had departed, the confederate either said nothing (control condition) or offered forgiveness: ‘‘Well, she must have given me fewer tickets because I said the room was dirty. It’s OK, I forgive you for telling her I said that.’’ The experimenter returned with the demographics sheet, waited for the participant and confederate to fill it out, and then led them to a room with 15 computers arranged in 5 rows of 3 cubicles. The confederate always finished her demographics sheet quickly so that she could leave the room first and sit in the middle of the first row. Our primary dependent measure was how close the participant sat to the confederate (seating distance value: min = 1, max = 9; see Fig. 1 for illustration and coding scheme).2 At the end of the study, participants were debriefed and received payment. 2 In the computer room (and after the primary behavioral measure of avoidance, i.e. seating distance), all participants filled out other measures including the TRIM and items pertaining to self-righteousness on the computer (see Study 2). These effects were not significant, nor did the self-reported avoidance measures correlate with seating distance, r(38) = .042, p = .802. We believe that these measures did not show a difference between conditions because the act of choosing a seat may have alleviated their desire to avoid the confederate and the tendency to view her as self-righteous.

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forgiveness in the absence of perceived wrongdoing increases perceptions of the forgiver as self-righteous.

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Participants All participants (n = 167; 100 men, 60 women, 7 unreported; Mage = 31.99 years) were recruited from mTurk. One week after the study, a lottery was held in which one participant was selected to receive a $50.00 bonus.

Fig. 1. Coding scheme for Study 1. Each box represents a seat within the computer room. Values within boxes represent coding values.

Results Consistent with our hypothesis, there was a significant difference between the control and forgiveness conditions in terms of how close participants sat to the confederate, t(36) = 2.59, p = .014, d = .84. Participants who perceived themselves to be innocent and forgiven sat farther away (M = 4.42, SD = 1.75) than participants who perceived themselves to be innocent but were not forgiven (M = 3.05, SD = 1.50). Discussion In Study 1, participants sat farther away from a confederate when she forgave them than when she did not offer forgiveness. In this study, participants in both conditions were innocent but knew the confederate believed a wrongdoing had occurred; the only difference was in whether they were forgiven. One potential confound is that those participants in the forgiveness condition heard the confederate twice raise the issue of lab dirtiness (as opposed to only once in the control condition), and thus may have perceived her to have complained more in this condition, which would have increased avoidance. Moreover, although Study 1 employs a behavioral measure of avoidance, one concern is that participants may have perceived such a strong message of forgiveness to constitute an accusation. To compensate for these shortcomings as well as the limitations of a small sample size, we conducted a second study in which we tested the effects of forgiveness (versus none) using a more implicit message of forgiveness in an effort to demonstrate that the effects of forgiveness on avoidance hold even when messages of forgiveness are subtler. Study 2: Dictator game allocations We conducted a second study in which we manipulated perceived wrongdoing and forgiveness in the context of a dictator game. In this game, the allocator has control over a pool of resources and can choose to share part of it with a recipient; most allocators offer less than fifty percent of the resources to recipients (Bolton, Katok, & Zwick, 1998). However, anything less than a 50– 50 split constitutes a violation of equal distribution norms and is perceived to be unfair (indeed, roughly two-thirds of third-party observers will pay to punish those who make uneven allocations, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). We thus manipulated the extent to which participants transgressed by keeping more resources for themselves, and then assigned them to be forgiven or not by the recipient. In this study, the recipient was thought to be a real person. We measured avoidance by asking about both avoidance intentions and desires to play with their assigned partner in a second round of the game. We also tested our proposed mechanism: that

Procedure We conducted an experiment in which we manipulated perceived wrongdoing (ticket allocation) and forgiveness (none; expressed forgiveness). Participants were told that they would be playing a game with another participant who had logged on to the study at the same time as them (but this person’s identity was not revealed to them). In reality, they played the game against the computer. To increase the believability that they were playing against a real participant, time delays were inserted while participants ‘waited’ to be matched with their counterpart (e.g. ‘‘Please wait until the system matches you with another participant.’’). Next, participants were told that in addition to their study payment, a lottery would be held after the study for a prize of $50 and that each pair of participants would receive 5 ticket entries into the lottery for this prize. They were told that one member of their pair would be assigned to the allocator role and would split them between him/herself and his/her partner. Participants were also told that after the allocation had taken place, the recipient would be allowed to send a message to the allocator. In reality, all participants were assigned to the allocator role. Because allocators in these types of games typically keep most resources for themselves (Bolton et al., 1998), to manipulate wrongdoing, we randomly assigned participants to allocate either 1 ticket (‘‘perceived wrongdoing condition’’) or 4 tickets (‘‘no perceived wrongdoing condition’’) to the recipient.3 Next, we manipulated the message participants received from their ostensible counterpart. Participants in the forgiveness condition received a message from their counterpart that said: ‘‘It’s OK, I’m not mad about the number of tickets you gave me. I’m willing to excuse your allocation’’ while those in the control condition read, ‘‘I received your allocation.’’ Following this procedure, participants responded to dependent measures and provided demographic information. Measures We measured self-righteousness, avoidance intentions, and desires for a new partner. Self-righteousness. We employed three items to measure participants’ perceptions of the target as self-righteous: ‘‘To what extent does your counterpart think s/he is morally superior to you?’’ ‘‘To what extent does your counterpart think s/he is more virtuous than you are?’’ and ‘‘To what extent does your counterpart have an inflated sense of moral self-worth?’’ on a scale ranging from 1

3 We conducted a separate pretest with 61 participants (41 men, 20 women, Mage = 30.97 years) to test the allocation of 1 versus 4 tickets as a valid manipulation of perceived wrongdoing. We measured how much participants perceived they had engaged in wrongdoing (‘‘I feel guilty that the tickets were allocated this way’’) as well as how selfish they perceived the allocation to be (‘‘This is a selfish allocation’’) on scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Participants who kept 4 tickets felt more guilty (M = 3.81, SD = 2.09) and thought the allocation was more selfish (M = 4.90, SD = 1.60) than participants who kept only 1 ticket (M = 2.10, SD = 1.69 and M = 3.23, SD = 2.30), both ts < .3.28, ps < .002 (the Levene’s test for unequal variances was significant so t-tests were conducted without assuming equal variances).

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(not at all) to 7 (to a great extent), a = .96. We developed these items to specify a comparative relationship between the counterpart and the participant of a special, undeserved, and erroneous conviction of moral correctness. Avoidance intentions. We prompted participants: ‘‘Imagine that you know your counterpart outside of this study—that is, you might interact with him/her because you live nearby one another.’’ Then, participants responded to the avoidance subscale of the transgression-related interpersonal motives scale developed by McCullough et al. (1998). This subscale measures participants’ motivations to avoid perpetrators of interpersonal transgressions. Items include ‘‘I’ll avoid him/her’’ and ‘‘I’ll withdraw from him/ her’’ (a = .95, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Partner preferences. To further measure avoidance, we told participants, ‘‘You will now play this game again. You have an equal chance of being assigned to the role of allocator or recipient. However, you can decide whether you would like to play with the same counterpart or whether you would like to be assigned a different counterpart for this next round. Please indicate how much you would prefer to play with the same or a different counterpart below.’’ Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly prefer the same counterpart) to 6 (strongly prefer a different counterpart). Attention and manipulation checks. Finally, we tested participants’ attention by asking them how many tickets they had allocated to the recipient. We also conducted a manipulation check of forgiveness: ‘‘My counterpart forgave me for allocating the tickets the way I did’’ (1–7 strongly disagree/agree). Results

F(1, 138) = 3.77, p = .054, g2 = .03. When participants kept 1 ticket (lower perceptions of wrongdoing), participants thought the recipient was more self-righteous when the recipient forgave them (M = 5.78, SD = 1.39) than when the recipient said nothing about forgiveness (M = 2.45, SD = 1.57), F(1, 138) = 83.94, p < .001, d = 2.23. When participants kept 4 tickets (greater perceived wrongdoing), they also perceived the recipient to be more selfrighteous when they were forgiven (M = 4.18, SD = 1.78) than when the recipient said nothing about forgiveness (M = 1.86, SD = 1.10), F(1, 138) = 41.76, p < .001, d = 1.56, although this effect was weaker (see Fig. 2, Panel A). Avoidance intentions Similarly, the main effects of ticket allocation and forgiveness on avoidance intentions were also significant, F(1, 138) = 23.85, p < .001, g2 = .15, and F(1, 138) = 34.09, p < .001, g2 = .20 respectively. There was a marginally significant interaction between the allocation amount and forgiveness, F(1, 138) = 3.18, p = .077, g2 = .02. When participants kept 1 ticket, they were more likely to want to avoid the recipient when they were forgiven (M = 3.66, SD = .85) than when they were not (M = 2.47, SD = 1.01), F(1, 138) = 28.86, p < .001, d = 1.27. When participants kept 4 tickets, they were also more likely to avoid the recipient when they were forgiven (M = 2.62, SD = .85) than when they were not (M = 1.99, SD = .99), F(1, 138) = 8.27, p = .005, d = .69, weaker. Partner preferences Finally, we tested our prediction on desires for a new counterpart in another round of the game. This measure correlated with participants’ self-reported avoidance intentions, r(142) = .536,

Panel A: Self-Righteousness

Fourteen participants raised suspicions at the end of the study (in an open-ended box in response to the prompt: ‘‘Did you notice anything unusual about this study?’’) that the other participant was not real (e.g. ‘‘I don’t think there was actually another person.’’). These participants were not included in the analysis because we could not be assured that their perceptions and avoidance intentions were genuine.4 Seven additional participants were not able to accurately recall how many tickets they had allocated. Finally, 4 people started but did not complete the dependent measures. Only participants who completed all dependent measures and accurately responded to the attention check were included in the analysis (n = 142). Manipulation check There was a main effect of forgiveness condition on whether participants felt they had been forgiven, F(1, 138) = 125.16, p < .001, g2 = .48. Participants in the implicit forgiveness condition (M = 6.39, SD = .98) felt they had been forgiven more than participants in the control condition (M = 4.03, SD = 1.42). No other effects were significant. Self-righteousness We conducted a 2  2 univariate ANOVA and found main effects of the ticket allocation, F(1, 138) = 18.16, p < .001, g2 = .12 and forgiveness conditions, F(1, 138) = 122.18, p < .001, g2 = .47. The interaction between forgiveness and the number of tickets allocated (perceived wrongdoing) was marginally significant, 4 When retaining these 14 participants, the p-values for the interaction between wrongdoing and forgiveness for self-righteousness and desires for a new partner were p = .041 and p = .013 respectively. The p-value for the avoidance subscale of the TRIM was p = .129.

Panel B: Desires for a New Partner

*p < .05

Fig. 2. Forgiveness when the participant perceives themselves to have transgressed or not affects beliefs that the target is self-righteous (Panel A) and desires for a new partner rather than the same one (Panel B), Study 2. Panel A: Self-Righteousness. Panel B: Desires for a New Partner, ⁄p < .05.

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p < .001. The main effects of the ticket allocation, F(1, 138) = 42.74, p < .001, g2 = .24, and forgiveness, F(1, 138) = 13.71, p < .001, g2 = .09 on partner preferences were qualified by an interaction, F(1, 138) = 6.86, p = .010, g2 = .05. When participants kept 1 ticket, they wanted a new partner more when they were forgiven (M = 5.18, SD = 1.26) than when they were not forgiven (M = 3.68, SD = 1.49), F(1, 138) = 19.86, p < .001, d = 1.09. When participants kept 4 tickets, there was no difference in participants’ desires for a new partner when they were forgiven (M = 3.00, SD = 1.47) versus the control condition (M = 2.74, SD = 1.39), F(1, 138) = .59, p = .444, d = .18, see Fig. 2, Panel B. Mediation analyses We tested whether perceptions of the target as self-righteous would mediate the effect of the ticket allocation and forgiveness first on avoidance intentions and then on partner preferences (see Fig. 3). Avoidance intentions. We coded forgiveness as 0 = no forgiveness, 1 = implicit forgiveness. Perceived wrongdoing was coded as 0 = 1 ticket kept (lower perceived wrongdoing); 1 = 4 tickets kept (higher perceived wrongdoing). When controlling for self-righteousness, the interaction between the number of tickets kept and forgiveness on avoidance intentions was no longer significant, B = .41, SE(B) = .31, t(137) = 1.32, p = .188. We conducted bootstrapped moderated mediation analyses using the statistical software of Hayes (2013) (model 8) to test for a conditional indirect effect (with 1,000 resamples). The bootstrap coefficient for this overall model was .15 (SE = .10), and the 95% confidence interval (95% CI) ranged from .40 to .0004, indicating a significant effect. We broke down this moderated mediation pattern by the number of tickets kept: when participants kept 1 ticket, the coefficient for the indirect effect was .50, 95% CI .17–.93. Thus, in the absence of perceived wrongdoing, participants who were forgiven perceived the target to be more self-righteous than the non-forgiving target, which in turn made them want to avoid the forgiving target more than the non-forgiving target. When participants kept 4 tickets (greater perceived wrongdoing), the indirect effect was also significant, bootstrap coefficient .35, 95% CI .14–.64, but the effect size was much smaller.

Perception of Target as Self-Righteous .26***

-.99* Avoidance Intentions

Perceived Wrongdoing X Forgiveness

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Partner preferences. We also tested whether self-righteousness would mediate the interaction between the ticket allocation and forgiveness for desires for a new partner. Controlling for self-righteousness, the interaction between forgiveness and perceived wrongdoing was still significant, B = 1.00, SE(B) = .47, t(137) = 2.15, p = .034. The bootstrap coefficient for the overall model was .24 (SE = .15), and the 95% confidence interval ranged from .61 to .02. Breaking this down, when participants kept 1 ticket, the bootstrap coefficient was .82, 95% CI .31–1.39. Consistent with our other measure of avoidance, when participants kept 4 tickets, the bootstrap coefficient was .57, and the 95% CI also excluded zero (.22–.95). Discussion In the context of a resource allocation game, we found that in the absence of perceived wrongdoing, participants wanted to avoid their counterparts more (and were more likely to choose a new counterpart for another game) when their counterpart subtly offered forgiveness than when he or she was silent. This increase in avoidance was due to participants’ perceptions of the counterpart as self-righteous. Interestingly, we observed a similar (although less pronounced) pattern of forgiveness when participants kept 4 tickets (and thus presumably perceived themselves to have committed greater wrong) for the avoidance intentions scale (but not for desires for a new partner). One possible explanation for this effect is that participants did not believe keeping 4 out of 5 tickets in a resource allocation game constituted a wrongdoing because doing so was within the rules of the game. Indeed, the means for perceived wrongdoing from the pretest were below the midpoint of the scale, indicating that this may have been a case of perceiving greater versus slightly less wrongdoing, rather than wrongdoing versus no wrongdoing. Thus, the finding that forgiveness leads to more ascriptions of self-righteousness and avoidance when participants kept 4 tickets is not inconsistent with our theory. This also suggests that for forgiveness to benefit relationships, the perception that one has committed a clear and unambiguous wrongdoing is critical. In sum, Study 2 provides evidence that when participants do not perceive themselves to have engaged in wrongdoing, they want to avoid individuals who forgive them more than those who do not because they perceive these people to be self-righteous. However, one limitation of this study is its somewhat contrived nature; asking participants to allocate a specific number of tickets may have decreased how much they perceived they had engaged in wrongdoing. We conducted a third study to more cleanly manipulate perceived wrongdoing, and to test alternative mechanisms that could explain the detrimental effects of forgiveness for relationships.

-.41 (.55+)

Study 3: Plagiarism Perception of Target as Self-Righteous .35***

-.99 Perceived Wrongdoing X Forgiveness

Desire for New Partner -1.00* (-1.25**)

Fig. 3. Perceptions of the target as self-righteous mediate the relationship between perceived wrongdoing and forgiveness and intentions to avoid future interactions with the forgiver (Study 2). Note: Unstandardized coefficients are reported (the coefficient in parentheses indicates the direct effect of forgiveness on avoidance prior to controlling for self-righteousness). ⁄⁄⁄ p 6 .001, ⁄⁄ p 6 .01, ⁄ p 6 .05, + p 6 .077.

In Study 3 we tested two alternative mechanisms that could account for the negative impact of forgiveness in the absence of perceived wrongdoing. First, in this context, transgressors may interpret forgiveness to be an undeserved accusation, which in turn feels unjust, frustrating, and disloyal (Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer, 1990) because the accused perpetrator owes no debt to the alleged victim. In such situations, expressing forgiveness entails pointing the finger of blame at the perceived wrongdoer while simultaneously claiming to forego any remaining ill will. The person being forgiven may come to resent the forgiver, resulting in an increased desire to avoid further contact with him or her. Thus, in this study we manipulated verbal accusation and forgiveness relative to a control condition, and we measured the extent to

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which participants felt accused of wrongdoing. We hypothesized that a) the accusation manipulation would not affect self-righteousness but only felt accusation and b) self-righteousness would continue to mediate the effect of forgiveness on avoidance even after controlling for felt accusation. Second, forgiveness may pose a threat to the alleged wrongdoer’s moral self-concept. Individuals are motivated to see themselves as morally good (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Bryan, Adams, & Monin, 2013; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008), but forgiveness may make the recipient consider whether they have done something wrong, causing him/her to reflect upon him/herself as immoral. Thus, actions on the part of the victim threaten this moral sense of self, thus endangering the conflict repair process. Facing unfair accusation and the sting of moral self-concept threat, intentions to avoid the forgiver might well be justifiable. Thus, in Study 3, we measured moral self-concept threat as another potential mediator in addition to self-righteousness and felt accusation. In sum, to test whether self-righteousness would continue to mediate in the face of these alternative explanations, we included an accusation condition and explored perceived accusation, moral self-concept threat, and self-righteousness as mediators. We conducted these tests to compare them against participants’ interpretations of the forgiver as self-righteous in the context of taking credit for someone else’s work. Finally, in light of the findings from Study 2, we presented a clearer case of perceived wrongdoing by telling participants that they had either plagiarized someone else’s work or were innocent of plagiarism. Method Participants Participants were 374 people (214 men; 155 women; 5 unreported, Mage = 34.01) who were recruited through mTurk and paid $0.50. Four people failed to complete all of the dependent measures; consistent with Study 2, we excluded their data from our analyses but their inclusion did not change the results. Procedure We employed a 2 (participants’ perceived wrongdoing versus none)  3 (target response: silent, forgive, accuse) between-participants design. Participants read a scenario in which they imagined that they were coworkers with Linda at an advertising company, and that they were competing to lead a project for a client. They were told that they and Linda were supposed to come up with separate project proposals, and that the two of them could discuss their proposals together but ultimately were going to present them separately. The participant was told that his/her proposal had won, but that Linda suspected some aspects of her plan were included in the winning proposal. Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of two perceived wrongdoing conditions, and one of three forgiveness conditions. In the perceived wrongdoing condition, participants read: ‘‘After the meeting, you both check your records and realize that Linda’s original plan did, in fact, inspire your idea. You believe you did steal her idea,’’ or, in the no perceived wrongdoing condition, ‘‘After the meeting, you both check your records and realize that Linda’s original plan did not inspire your idea. You believe you did not steal her idea.’’ In the silent condition, participants read, ‘‘You run into Linda the next day in the hall. The incident doesn’t come up.’’ In the forgiveness condition, we told participants, ‘‘The incident comes up in your conversation with her. Linda says that she forgives you for what you did.’’ In the accusation condition, we told participants, ‘‘Something Linda says makes you believe she thinks you did something wrong.’’ Finally, participants responded to dependent measures and provided demographic information.

Measures Participants responded to measures of self-righteousness, moral self-concept threat, perceived moral accusation, and avoidance intentions. Self-righteousness. To measure self-righteousness, we asked the same measures used in Study 2, a = .88. Moral self-concept threat. We included a measure of moral selfconcept threat to test whether participants actually felt more immoral based on the target’s forgiveness response. We followed Cornelissen, Bashshur, Rode, and Le Menestrel (2013) who used a scale developed by Jordan, Gino, Tenbrunsel, and Leliveld (2014); they assess moral self-concept threat by measuring the discrepancy between the perceived and ideal self by adapting Aquino and Reed’s (2002) scale of 9 traits that are characteristic of moral people. We asked, ‘‘Compared to the [honest] person I would like to be, right now I feel. . .’’ and asked them to respond on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (much less [honest] than the person I want to be) to 9 (much more [honest] than the person I want to be), a = .92. Perceived accusation. We measured the extent to which participants felt they had been accused of being immoral. We developed 9 items to be the opposite of Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral traits: dishonest, uncaring, cruel, unfair, unfriendly, selfish, lazy, unhelpful, and mean. We also added a tenth item to this scale— immoral—to increase its face validity, and asked participants about the extent to which Linda thought they were [dishonest] on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a great extent), a = 95. Avoidance. We again employed the 7-item avoidance subscale of the TRIM, a = 93. Results Self-righteousness We performed a 2  3 univariate ANOVA with self-righteousness as the dependent variable. There was a significant main effect of perceived wrongdoing, F(1, 368) = 14.41, p < .001, g2 = .04, as well as a significant main effect of target response, F(2, 367) = 2.97, p = .053, g2 = .02 . The interaction was also significant, F(2, 364) = 8.44, p < .001, g2 = .04. Analyses of simple effects revealed that when participants did not perceive they had plagiarized, they perceived Linda as more self-righteous when she forgave them (M = 5.18, SD = 1.34) or accused them (M = 5.37, SD = 1.13) than when she said nothing (M = 4.39, SD = 1.77), both ps 6 .003, ds P .51. The difference between the forgiveness and accusation conditions was not significant, p = .438, d = .16. When participants believed they had plargiarized, being forgiven (M = 3.90, SD = 1.70) reduced perceptions of Linda as selfrighteous compared to when Linda said nothing (M = 4.63, SD = 1.40) or accused them (M = 4.60, SD = 1.43), both ps 6 .012, ds P .48. The difference between the silent and accusation conditions was not significant, p = .906, d = .02. Moral self-concept threat There was a main effect of perceived wrongdoing, F(1, 368) = 20.79, p < .001, g2 = .05, but the interaction with target response was not significant, F(2, 364) = .60, p = .550, g2 = .003. When participants believed they were innocent of wrongdoing, being forgiven (M = 5.02, SD = 1.03) or accused (M = 5.16, SD = 1.24) did not threaten participants’ moral self-concepts any more than when Linda said nothing to them (M = 5.08, SD = 1.22), all ps P .530, ds 6 .12. They only felt more morally threatened when they perceived they had engaged in wrongdoing, regardless of whether Linda accused them (M = 4.43, SD = 1.25), forgave them

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(M = 4.63, SD = 1.25), or was silent (M = 4.53, SD = 1.20), all ps P .367, ds 6 .16. Perceived accusation There was a main effect of target response, F(2, 367) = 11.21, p < .001, g2 = .06, which was qualified by an interaction with perceived wrongdoing, F(2, 364) = 7.84, p < .001, g2 = .04. Analyses of simple effects showed that when participants were innocent, they felt more accused when Linda accused them (M = 4.61, SD = 1.37) than when Linda forgave them (M = 4.10, SD = 1.45) or said nothing (M = 3.78, SD = 1.64), both ps 6 .037, ds P .36. The difference between the forgiveness and silent conditions was not significant, p = .219. When participants perceived they had committed plagiarism, they felt less accused when Linda forgave them (M = 3.31, SD = 1.43) than when she said nothing (M = 4.44, SD = 1.23) or accused them (M = 4.68, SD = 1.36), both ps < .001, ds P .86. The difference between the silent and accusation conditions was not significant, p = .330, d = .20. Avoidance Participants wanted to avoid Linda more when they perceived they had engaged in wrongdoing than when they perceived themselves to be innocent, F(1, 368) = 18.97, p < .001, g2 = .05. The main effect of Linda’s response to them (F(2, 367) = 11.43, p < .001, g2 = .06) was qualified by an interaction with perceived wrongdoing, F(2, 364) = 3.68, p = .026, g2 = .03, see Fig. 4. When they believed they had not plagiarized, participants wanted to avoid Linda more when she forgave them (M = 2.89, SD = .88) than when she was silent (M = 2.54, SD = .88), p = .033, d = .40, and more when she accused them (M = 3.22, SD = .96), than when she forgave them, p = .032, d = .36. When they believed they had plagiarized, participants wanted to avoid Linda more when she accused them (M = 2.79, SD = .97) than when she said nothing (M = 2.42, SD = .80) or forgave them (M = 2.13, SD = .90), both ps 6 .016, ds P .42. The difference between the latter two conditions was trending but not significant, p = .090, d = .35. Mediation analyses Because there was no effect of target response on moral selfconcept threat in the absence of perceived wrongdoing, we only tested the mediating roles of perceived accusation and self-righteousness in driving the relationship between Linda’s response and participants’ desire to avoid her. We did this using the multiple mediator model suggested by Preacher and Hayes (2008). To simplify the model, we tested mediation first when participants

*p < .05 Fig. 4. Forgiveness when the participant perceives they have transgressed or not affects intentions to avoid the target in the future (scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) (Study 3). ⁄ p < .05.

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perceived that they had not plagiarized, and next when participants perceived they had plagiarized, see Fig. 5. We created two dummy-coded vectors for the forgiveness and accusation conditions, using the control condition as the referent group (Hayes & Preacher, 2011), and we bootstrapped all multiple mediation models with 1000 samples. No perceived wrongdoing condition. We first tested whether selfrighteousness and perceived accusation (entered simultaneously) mediated the effect of forgiveness (versus silence) on avoidance. To test the effect of forgiveness versus the control condition, we conducted this analysis by controlling for the accusation condition dummy (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In the absence of perceived wrongdoing, self-righteousness significantly mediated the effect of being forgiven (versus silent) on avoidance (bootstrap coefficient .08; 95% CI from .004 to .24) but perceived accusation did not (bootstrap coefficient .06, 95% CI from .04 to .21). In other words, in the absence of perceived wrongdoing, when participants were forgiven, they were more likely to avoid the target because they perceived her to be self-righteous, not because they felt accused. We next tested whether self-righteousness and perceived accusation mediated the effect of accusation (versus silence) on avoidance when controlling for the forgiveness condition dummy. When innocent of wrongdoing, perceived accusation mediated the effect of being accused (versus silence) on avoidance (bootstrap coefficient .17, 95% CI .05–.36), but self-righteousness did not (bootstrap coefficient .10, 95% CI .006 to .25). Thus, when participants perceived they had not plagiarized, they avoided the accusing

Panel A: No Wrongdoing

Panel B: Wrongdoing

Fig. 5. Self-righteousness and perceived accusation of immorality mediate the effect of target response (forgiveness or accusation versus silence) on avoidance (Study 3). Panel A: No Wrongdoing. Panel B: Wrongdoing. Note: Unstandardized coefficients are reported (the coefficient in parentheses indicates the direct effect of forgiveness or accusation on avoidance prior to controlling for the mediating variables). ⁄⁄⁄ p 6 .001, ⁄⁄ p 6 .01, ⁄ p 6 .05.

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target because they felt accused, not because they perceived her to be self-righteous. Perceived wrongdoing condition. We conducted the same analyses as described above for the perceived wrongdoing condition. Both self-righteousness and perceived accusation mediated the relationship between forgiveness (versus silence) and avoidance intentions, when controlling for the accusation condition. The bootstrap coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) were .07 ( .21 to .006) and .19 ( .35 to .07) respectively. Neither self-righteousness nor perceived accusation mediated the effect of accusation (versus silence) on avoidance intentions, controlling for the forgiveness condition; the bootstrap coefficients (and 95% confidence intervals) were .003 ( .06 to .05) and .04 ( .02 to .15) respectively. Discussion In Study 3, for participants who did not believe they had plagiarized their co-worker’s presentation, both forgiveness and perceived accusation increased avoidance intentions relative to the control condition, but through distinct paths: forgiveness predicted avoidance intentions through perceived self-righteousness, but not through perceived accusation and accusation predicted avoidance intentions through perceived accusation. In contrast, participants who had plagiarized (i.e. perceived themselves to have committed a wrongdoing) thought the coworker was less self-righteous and felt less accused when they were forgiven than when the co-worker had said nothing. In other words, forgiveness improved participants’ perceptions of the target and marginally decreased their willingness to avoid her. In sum, we found that the effects of expressed forgiveness on avoidance were qualified by perceived wrongdoing and mediated by selfrighteousness—and not by perceptions that they had been accused of being immoral, nor by moral self-concept threat. General discussion In this paper, we point out an irony of forgiveness: whereas forgiveness is often expressed in order to increase closeness and repair relationships, it also yields behavioral consequences that may be the opposite of the forgiver’s intended effect: avoidance of the forgiver. Across three studies, participants wanted to avoid a forgiving target more than a silent one in the absence of their perceived wrongdoing. This effect occurred when participants had committed real (Studies 1 and 2) and imagined (Study 3) transgressions, and when participants (believed that they) were actually being forgiven by a real person (Studies 1 and 2) and imagined co-workers forgiving them (Study 3). Moreover, the effect of forgiveness on avoidance was mediated by perceptions of the target as self-righteous. Our studies suggest that mutual agreement about whether someone has committed a transgression is a necessary precondition for forgiveness to facilitate conflict repair. Adopting the perspective of the person being forgiven has allowed us to examine the negative interpersonal consequences of expressing forgiveness. Prior research highlights many positive interpersonal consequences of forgiveness such as relationship repair and the deterrence of future offenses (Wallace, Exline, & Baumeister, 2008, but see McNulty, 2011). Forgiveness also has positive intrapersonal consequences for the forgiver such as increased well-being (Cox, Bennett, Tripp, & Aquino, 2012), less cognitive rumination (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2007), and lower levels of stress (Tartaro, Luecken, & Gunn, 2005). Yet along with others (Luchies, Finkel, Kumashiro, & McNulty,

2010), we suggest that people should not be too quick to express forgiveness. Our findings are consistent with those of Monin, Sawyer, and Marquez (2008) who suggest that people resent those who behave morally when they have not done so—however, we investigate whether people perceive others to be self-righteous not because they themselves have not offered forgiveness, but because they think this response is inappropriate given their perceived lack of wrongdoing. One implication of the present research is that even people with the best intentions (to express forgiveness with an eye toward conflict repair) may be perceived as self-righteous. Thus, inferences about a forgiving target’s intentions may be malicious—‘‘This person is using forgiveness strategically to show that she is better than me’’—or slightly more benign—‘‘Even though this person forgives me, I haven’t done anything to deserve forgiveness.’’ Our research indicates that even when people have good intentions, their offerings can backfire. Such reactions to forgiveness lead us to question the mandate that people should be quick to ‘‘forgive and forget’’— because expressions of forgiveness can have negative consequences for relationships (see also Luchies & Finkel, 2011). Theoretical contributions These studies have the potential to contribute to existing theories on forgiveness in organizations in multiple ways. First, we question an implicit assumption that forgiveness is always beneficial and will repair relationships. Indeed, we claim the opposite— that expressing forgiveness could damage relationships under some circumstances. By highlighting the negative impact of expressing forgiveness in some situations, we join the debate on the unquestioning acceptance of forgiveness as a panacea in all situations. For example, some have suggested that forgiveness undermines victims’ dignity and exacerbates further conflict (Murphy, 2005). As noted earlier, others have shown that forgiveness that is not accompanied by transgressor remorse damages forgivers’ self-respect (Luchies et al., 2010). However, one ethnographic study has shown that some organizations institutionalize ‘‘forgiveness’’ as a normative response to conflict (e.g. Cameron, 2005). Our evidence highlights the importance of acknowledging the debate on mandates to forgive in the organizational behavior literature. The implications of forgiveness are not as straightforward as many have assumed. Before cultivating a forgiving cultural climate, it is important to arrive at a mutual understanding of the events surrounding the wrongdoing. Second, we adopt the novel and unique perspective of the person being forgiven—a perspective that is rarely studied yet has important implications for conflict repair in organizations. In research on the consequences of forgiveness, much work has focused on the effects of forgiveness for the forgiver: how forgivers feel, think, and behave toward the offender (e.g. Karremans, Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Kluwer, 2003; McCullough et al., 1998). From the perspective of the person being forgiven, forgiveness can signal that the forgiver possesses negative traits such as self-righteousness. These asymmetric responses to forgiveness between forgivers and assumed offenders pave the way for a new theoretical perspective to study the wider implications of forgiveness for conflict. Third, we draw attention to the contribution of this research to the literature on victimization. Past research has shown that people compete to claim victim status (Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012) in order to reap the benefits associated with this role. Indeed, one possible way to claim victimhood is to strategically express forgiveness to a perceived transgressor in order to establish one’s victim status, elicit sympathy, and reap some of the rewards of victimhood. These studies highlight why it is important not to claim victimhood when the person being forgiven believes such statements are unwarranted or undeserved.

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Finally, we draw attention to self-righteousness—a perception that is relatively understudied within the organizational literature yet has important implications for conflict management. The present research suggests that perceptions of self-righteousness, sententiousness, or moral superiority are barriers to relationship repair. Future research could investigate how attributions of self-righteousness function in the workplace to exacerbate inter-employee conflict. It is important to understand when selfrighteousness inhibits relationship repair and when, conversely, people believe such sanctimony is warranted or even the hallmark of a moral leader (e.g. an accurate reflection of a moral rank). Organizational prescriptions Some prescriptions can be drawn from this research for employees and managers in organizations. From the perspective of the forgiver, it may not always be wise to express forgiveness. It is important for the forgiver to establish that the person they are forgiving also perceives that he/she has done something wrong, i.e. has done something that warrants forgiveness. Otherwise, forgivers with the best of intentions may experience some undue and unexpected consequences. Indeed, our research suggests that the person being forgiven seems to experience forgiveness as an insult. From the perspective of the person being forgiven, it is important to understand that statements of forgiveness include an accusation of wrongdoing. Thus, an individual should pause to reflect upon whether he/she has done anything for which he/she should be forgiven. The best solution may be for the forgiver and the person being forgiven to try to mutually understand why there is disagreement about wrongdoing, so that the conflict does not escalate (as could be the case if the person being forgiven were to simply avoid the forgiver). Limitations and future directions The negative relational consequences of forgiveness we have noted may be exacerbated in organizational contexts in which employee interdependence is high and cooperation and collaboration are emphasized. The use of laboratory methods gave us the control required to test our theory but compromised our ability to study relationships in their natural context. Our focus on avoidance was motivated out of the desire to understand not when forgiveness strengthens relationships, but rather when it destroys them. Thus, we chose to focus on the opposite of relationship repair: avoidance, i.e. the desire to forego a relationship with the target. However, we recognize that in addition to avoidance behaviors, other negative outcomes, such as revenge or desires for third-party punishment, could follow from receiving forgiveness under these circumstances. Future research could also investigate people’s desires to be forgiven as a function of how relationally close they are to the forgiver: transgressors may not care about being forgiven if they are close with that person and simply want to move past the disagreement, but closeness may also exacerbate the likelihood that forgiveness will yield conflict if there is disagreement about wrongdoing. Other research could set forth boundary conditions for the effect that we have proposed, such as those we have outlined below. Experienced versus expressed forgiveness One important boundary condition of the present research is the expression versus the experience of forgiveness, and the extent to which it is offered strategically. Such expressions or statements can imply that the target sincerely forgives someone for his or her wrongdoing, but it could also be the case that forgiveness, despite

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being expressed, is not actually experienced or felt by the forgiver (so-called ‘hollow’ forgiveness: Baumeister et al., 1998). People may also infer that those who strategically express forgiveness without feeling it (‘pseudoforgiveness’) (Enright, Freedman, & Rique, 1998) may be using forgiveness as a ploy to demonstrate moral superiority or to gain or maintain power over others. The former, sincere intention behind hollow forgiveness involves no conscious ill will; the strategic intention behind pseudoforgiveness supposes a conscious attempt by the forgiver to achieve a higher rank in the moral hierarchy relative to the perpetrator. We recommend that future research should compare the consequences of sincere, hollow, and strategic statements of forgiveness. We believe that the effects of forgiveness in the absence of wrongdoing on avoidance would be even stronger in the case of pseudoforgiveness. Refusing forgiveness When an accused perpetrator has not committed a wrongdoing, is it worse to express forgiveness or to explicitly refuse forgiveness? Similar to forgiveness, refusals to forgive also convey that the expresser believes a wrongdoing has been committed and that the person being refused forgiveness is responsible. In short, the person who refuses to forgive simultaneously blames the perpetrator and attempts to occupy a moral high ground. We thus expect that when people have not transgressed, a target’s refusal to forgive them will also increase their inferences that the target is self-righteous and desires to avoid him/her in the future. Whether refusals to forgive exacerbate perceptions of self-righteousness and avoidance relative to expressed forgiveness (when the accused perpetrator does not perceive him/herself to have transgressed) is a question is worthy of further empirical study. Other responses to conflict When people do not perceive themselves to have engaged in wrongdoing, do other responses to conflict also increase people’s avoidance intentions in the same way that forgiveness does? There are myriad responses that victims can have to transgressions, including retaliation, revenge, desires for third party punishment, or demands for compensation or restitution (Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008; Darley & Pittman, 2003; McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak, 2013). It would be worth exploring whether responding to perceived wrongdoing by demanding an apology or asking a perpetrator to repent and make amends may impact relationships and hinder conflict repair. These responses might not evoke the sense that the person is self-righteous, and ironically, might be less damaging to relationships. Other moderators Although the focus of our studies was on reactions to being forgiven when people perceive themselves to be innocent of wrongdoing, there remains the possibility that purported victims and transgressors might disagree not over whether a wrongdoing has occurred, but whether a wrongdoing is actually immoral. In other words, victims and transgressors may disagree about the correctness of an action, whether it is justifiable, and whether others would act as they have. Future research could go beyond these and other victim and perpetrator disagreements to test other circumstances that give rise to the detrimental effects of forgiveness on relationships. Conclusion Our research corroborates Oscar Wilde’s observation that forgiveness can be annoying: when accused perpetrators do not

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