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Four barriers and a set of values that prevent violence among cannabis growers
International Journal of Drug Policy 26 (2015) 290–295
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Research paper
Four barriers and a set of values that prevent violence among cannabis growers Eirik Hammersvik ∗ Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, Post Box 1096, 0317 Oslo, Norway
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 21 February 2014 Received in revised form 13 August 2014 Accepted 21 August 2014 Keywords: Cannabis cultivation Conflict resolution Cannabis culture
a b s t r a c t Background: Cannabis markets are often described as less violent than other drug markets. Domestic cannabis cultivation markets seem to be especially non-violent. However, few studies have investigated why this might be. Methods: Two and half years of ethnographic fieldwork among indoor cannabis growers and interviews and conversations with 52 growers in Norway. Results: This study identified four barriers and a set of values that prevent violence among growers. (1) Violence attracts increased attention from police and enemies, which inhibits ‘business as usual’ and reduces profits. (2) Careful attention to profits makes growers calculate and prepare for financial losses. (3) The prospect of covering debt by producing more cannabis makes it possible to choose nonviolent sanctions. (4) Tight social ties and friendships prevent violence when conflicts erupt. However, the cannabis culture of the actors and the transactions stands out as the main reason why these four barriers are more important in cannabis markets than in other drug markets. Conclusion: This paper discusses how policymakers can benefit from the market changes that follow ‘import substitution’ to construct policies that prevent violence and facilitate peaceful drug markets and drug cultures. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction The domestic cultivation of cannabis is increasingly replacing its importation and smuggling throughout the Western world (Potter, Bouchard, & Decorte, 2011; UNODC, 2012). Norway appears to be following this trend, albeit at a slower pace than other European countries (see Hammersvik, Sandberg, & Pedersen, 2012, p. 458). The new trend of import substitution has generated new research questions, especially about how such changes affect market dynamics (see Decorte, 2010a). A crucial subject in cannabis policy has been how to prevent violence in cannabis markets. Despite the obvious importance of this topic, there are few studies of peaceful conflict resolution among cannabis growers. Nevertheless, many argue that cannabis markets seem to be less violent than other drug markets (Room, Fisher, Hall, Lenton, & Reuter, 2010, p. 61). The lack of violence in cannabis markets may be due to the drug’s soothing effect or the normalization of cannabis use in the general population (Coomber, 2006, p. 141). The normalization of cannabis
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might imply that participants in the cannabis trade are part of conventional cultures and that they espouse non-violent values. In particular, many small-scale growers may have such characteristics (Decorte, 2010a, 2010b; Potter, 2010; Hammersvik et al., 2012). The more general cultural and symbolic values in drug markets, including those related to violence, seem to be very important for the possible use of violence (Johnson, Golub, & Dulap, 2000). For example, in drug markets in ‘street cultures’, violence seems to be a symbolic resource for obtaining and maintaining ‘respect’, ‘street cred’ or ‘street capital’ (Anderson, 1999; Bourgois, 2003; Sandberg & Pedersen, 2010). Such street cultures have been described as a response to the limited opportunities marginalized men have to express their masculinity (Bourgois, 2003). Studies from Norway have shown that street culture is an important component in the upper level of the wholesale cannabis market, as well as in the open street market. In these instances, marginalized ethnic minority men with working class backgrounds play a key role (Sandberg, 2013b, p. 1144). Violence has been reported to be a typical feature of open street markets (Sandberg & Pedersen, 2011). However, the description of cannabis markets as more peaceful than other drug markets could also be a result of an “absence of reports rather than any positive information that disputes between market participants are resolved amicably and that competition
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for territory is lacking” (Room et al., 2010, p. 61). This explanation is supported by a recent study of large-scale hash operators in Denmark in which researchers found highly violent conflicts between bikers and ethnic minority gangs (Moeller & Hesse, 2013). Nevertheless, domestic cannabis growers have not been reported to be part of these conflicts. This might indicate that many growers – and especially small-scale growers – typically operate independently in networks of friends and acquaintances (see also Decorte, 2008, 2010b; Hough et al., 2003; Potter, 2010). Of course, growers may still experience frauds and business disputes. A study of largescale growers in the Netherlands found that disciplinary violence was common when unreliable and disloyal behaviour led to great losses (Spapens, 2011, p. 10). In this context, disloyal behaviour refers to acts that are interpreted as theft, fraud or informing police (snitching). Unreliability refers to breaches of business contracts, missed appointments or neglected work duties. The role of violence and threats in such situations is to discipline behaviour, deter further infractions and enforce deals and duties. Drug researchers agree that violence is one of the instruments drug dealers use to regulate business agreements. However, studies offer competing views about how much violence is used in practice (Taylor & Potter, 2013, p. 396). Over the past 15 years, a growing number of drug market researchers have claimed that violence is far less common in all Western drug markets than popular stereotypes and common beliefs imply (Jacques & Wright, 2008a, p. 222; Pearson & Hobbs, 2001, p. 41; Zimring & Hawkins, 1997, pp. 138–144). Moreover, cannabis markets are often described as the most peaceful of the drug markets. Thus, rather than seeing violence as part of a working drug market, we could see it as a result of market dysfunction and instability (Pearson & Hobbs, 2001, p. 42). The normality of peace in drug markets makes it important to investigate what prevents violence (Jacques & Wright, 2008a). In a previous study, I found that peaceful negotiations and sanctions were effective means for restoring financial losses and justice (Hammersvik, 2014). The present paper goes into greater depth regarding the economic and cultural mechanisms that prevent violence. I examine three conflicts in which disloyal or unreliable behaviour led to large financial losses without triggering violence. My aim is to determine why some growers avoid violence in conflict situations that are commonly described as triggering violence. Possible policy implications of the findings are discussed briefly at the end of the article.
Method The data for this report come from two studies of cannabis markets in Norway, namely two and a half years of ethnographic fieldwork and an interview-based study (for details see Hammersvik et al., 2012). The ‘gatekeeper’ who provided access in the fieldwork was a research participant from one of my previous projects. We first met in 2004 through a friend of a friend and we have stayed in contact. Originally, he was a large-scale cannabis importer, but he has not been involved in smuggling and distribution since the late 1990s. He has never been involved in cannabis cultivation. The research participants were recruited for the field study through snowball sampling. The convenience sample consisted of 32 growers living in the south-east of Norway and working at 23 grow sites. Four of the sites cultivated 100–350 plants and they can be categorized as large-scale grow operations (for the definition of size and information about cannabis prices, see Hammersvik et al., 2012, p. 459). Two grow sites were mid-sized (60–100 plants) and 17 were small (1–20 plants). Eleven workers operated the four large grow sites, two growers operated each of the mid-sized sites and single growers ran the small sites.
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Access and gathering of observations followed the logic of convenience. I observed what the research participants allowed me to observe. This is common in the ‘exploratory approach’ in ethnographic fieldwork with well-hidden populations (Stebbins, 2001). Some growers let me observe their grow sites only once or twice, whereas those who trusted me the most allowed me to hang around with them for months and even years. That made it possible to observe complete production and distribution cycles several times and to meet costumers, dealers and smugglers. The fieldwork also included socializing with participants at gyms, their friends’ places, in bars and cafés and at concerts. Despite the trusting relationships I developed, I was not allowed to use a tape recorder. The growers feared that the tapes could be confiscated by the police. It is not uncommon that ethnographers avoid using tape recorder (Sandberg & Copes, 2014). Hence, I wrote field notes and transcribed conversations on the same day or the day after they occurred. The interview study was an extensive investigation of cannabis users (N = 100) that was conducted by two of my colleagues in Norway from 2006 to 2010 (for details, see Sandberg & Pedersen, 2010; Sandberg, 2013a, 2013b). Participants were recruited through the researchers’ networks, students at the Universities of Oslo and Bergen, cannabis interest organizations and an Internet advertisement. The participants came from all over Norway, they were mostly ethnic Norwegians and 20 of them had cultivated cannabis. The interviews lasted from one-and-a-half to three hours. They were semi-structured and addressed the topics of drug use and dealing careers, but were quite flexible in thematic focus. After transcribing the interviews I coded them into 134 codes using the qualitative data processing program NVIVO. The most important codes and nodes for this article were “cannabis cultivation”, “drug purchase”, “sales”, “conflicts”, “other crimes” and the aggregated code “cannabis culture”, which consisted of the codes “rituals”, “symbols” and “narratives”. All participants cultivated their plants indoors, as the Norwegian climate makes outdoor cultivation very difficult. All of the growers were men between 23 and 45 years of age. Some of them were highly educated, with good jobs; others were manual workers and a few were living on social benefits. None of the participants had experienced or heard of violence among growers. However, some of them knew of violence between cannabis dealers and smugglers. The growers were mainly involved in networks that distributed cannabis, but some of them had contact with networks that distributed other types of drugs and committed diverse types of crimes. However, even these operators claimed to be more closely associated with the cannabis culture than with violent street cultures. During my two years of fieldwork, I witnessed eight serious conflicts that involved financial losses between 100,000 NOK and 1.5 million NOK (D 12,000/$16,000–D 180,000/$241,000). I observed in addition about 20 smaller conflicts. Seven of the participants in the interview study did also report on severe conflicts that did not lead to violence. My data thus include 15 serious conflicts and around 20 less serious conflicts. None of them resulted in violence. I decided to investigate how these conflicts were solved. Initially, the interviews and field notes were coded for themes pertaining to sources of conflicts, conflict development and sanctioning. Next, all statements and field notes were examined for consistency with the four identified reasons for avoiding violence that gradually emerged from the data. This approach to coding is consistent with standards of qualitative research techniques and grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). I have selected three of the eight observed conflicts to illustrate the findings. Presenting three cases in depth allows me to provide ‘thicker descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973) than would be possible when presenting multiple cases. The selection on cases was
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based on my first-hand knowledge of the conflict, the sources of the conflicts, and the financial and social costs to those involved. The three selected cases are theoretically important because disloyal and unreliable behaviours led to large financial and social costs. Such consequences are commonly thought to be among the most crucial triggers of violence between drug operators (Jacobs & Wright, 2006).
Four barriers that prevent violence The cost of violence: violence attracts attention and interferes with business At one of the large grow sites (200–250 plants cultivated in soil), the conflict started with unreliable behaviour, but it evolved to include disloyalty and large financial losses. The grow operation consisted of two gardeners, Calvin (35) and David (35), and two investors, Eric (36) and Bob (42). Eric and Bob had been growing and dealing cannabis for 10 and eight years, respectively, whereas Calvin and David were inexperienced at running large illegal operations. David’s poor understanding of the importance of complying with agreements first led to unreliable behaviour and later to acts of disloyalty. The growers’ patience with David ended after he forgot to change the charcoal filter, which let odours leak into the neighbourhood that were strong enough to attract attention from outsiders. Because Calvin was afraid that someone would find the grow site, he decided to close it down the same day the odours escaped. This decision cost the growers 1.2 million NOK (D 144,000/$193,000) in future income. I was there when Eric and Calvin discussed how they should sanction David without risking further losses. Eric: I say we throw him out [of the operation and the house]. Calvin: Yeah, that would be the fair thing to do, but he has nowhere to go and no money to rent a new place. I think he will get pissed off and then he will for sure get talkative when he gets drunk with his friends. The best thing would be to give him the 10,000 [of the money he had lent], and tell him that he has to pay his share of the rent from now on. I don’t think he can afford living here, but I don’t want to force him. . . [. . .] Eric: I bet they [his friends] already know. Calvin: Maybe some of them, but I don’t want the guys around Albert to know about it. Those guys are fucked up, and I bet they will tip someone off [weed robbers]. . . maybe they will follow us to the next location. It’s better to get rid of him in a safe way, and then put up a new grow site. In this discussion, Calvin feared that if they pressured David he would become too talkative. That could lead to unwanted attention from other criminals or the police. However, Calvin’s plan to demand high house rent to get rid of David and the risk he posed failed in every possible way: David managed to pay the rent for the next six months and when they moved out of the grow house he took 150,000 NOK (D 18,000/$24,000) from Calvin’s cash reserve. Theft is a crucial trigger for serious violence (including murder), even among cannabis growers (Spapens, 2011, p. 10). However, Calvin and Eric did not see violence as a way to get the 150,000 NOK back. An important reason for not using violence was that David did not have money or anything valuable that they could take. To force David to make money by taking on ‘missions’ for smugglers and wholesale distributors was considered too risky since David lacked experience with such activities. After all, Calvin and Eric would have to vouch for him and could thus end up being held responsible if David failed. A more profitable solution would be to start a new
grow site, and attempt to talk David into repaying some of the money. They succeeded. David agreed to a down payment plan and Calvin started a new grow site. The argument that violence is ‘bad for business’ is prominent in the literature on drug dealers and illegal operators (Adler, 1993, p. 102; Pearson & Hobbs, 2001, p. 42; Reuter, 1983, p. 151; Venkatesh, 2008, pp. 95–98). In peaceful societies, violence will draw attention from the community, the police and competitors. Unwanted attention forces distributors to operate more carefully and thus less profitably than usual. Thus, large-scale drug operators are often concerned with finding ways to avoid violence and its costs (Zaitch, 2005, p. 213). Recognition of the dilemmas posed by violence has been used to argue that peaceful and non-violent resolutions can be more economically rational than violent sanctions (Friman, 2009, p. 286; Jacques, 2009). The attitude towards profit: prepared for financial losses Eric was among the most experienced large-scale growers in the sample. One afternoon while we were at one of his grow sites, I asked him if he was surprised that they had to close the grow site and thereby lose 1.2 million NOK (D 144,000/$193,000) in future income due to David’s unreliable behaviour. No, I would have been more surprised if we had managed to run it [the grow op] so smoothly that we had gotten that kind of money (laughs). I knew David was a newbie, and I suspected that he would fuck up, but Calvin wanted to try him out. So no, I am not surprised. You see, there is no guarantee of making money when you are doing this, right. You try your best, but there are so many things that can go wrong that you calculate losses. The most important thing is to avoid debt and rather hope that things will go better the next time round. The last comments here are consistent with the core attitude towards profits that many cannabis growers and sellers share with other drug distributors and other high-risk businesspersons – profit is not guaranteed, just possible. The main goal is to cover debts, avoid losses and make money over the long run. Knowledge of the many risks of drug dealing leads large operators to prepare for losses and therefore they often calculate wastage (Venkatesh, 2008). A similar attitude towards profit is described in studies of large- and small-scale dealers in different types of drug markets (Adler, 1993; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2000; Venkatesh, 2008). This rationale is similar to one found among legitimate professionals, such as stock-brokers and commission sellers (Gambetta, 2009; Pearson & Hobbs, 2004). What we might understand as a cautious optimism about profit, or a realistic attitude towards profit-making, might be stronger among cannabis growers than among other drug distributors. This cautious optimism about profit is reinforced by the fact that growers know their crops can fail. Cannabis plants are an uncertain form of capital. They can die, get sick, and when dried, they can become mouldy. As with other types of drugs, cannabis can also be stolen or seized by the police. All of the large growers in the sample had experienced failed crops due to technical problems and insects. Thus, making a lot of money growing cannabis was usually something that growers hoped for in the long run. They knew that to make a lot of money they had to run the grow operation flawlessly, and that this was a considerable challenge (Hammersvik et al., 2012). Absence of debt: enough time to find peaceful solutions At one of the large grow sites (250–300 plants cultivated in a hydroponic system) I observed a conflict that escalated because of unreliable money management and unfair
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sanctioning. The growers, Mike (39) and Bill (41), had known each other for more than 20 years and had worked together on several large drug projects that ranged from the import and cultivation of cannabis to the large wholesale of hash. On a few occasions, they had also run mid-sized amphetamine and cocaine operations. The source of the conflict was Mike’s unreliable money management. Mike agreed to watch over Bill’s money while Bill was abroad for a year setting up a large drug operation. After Bill had been gone for a while, Mike borrowed 350,000 NOK (D 42,400/$56,000) of Bill’s money without his permission to buy a large batch of hash. The deal went wrong and Mike was caught by the police and sentenced to prison. As soon as Mike was released from prison, Bill demanded his money back. Over the next three or four years, Mike did ‘favours’ for Bill without payment. His errands yielded far more than the 350,000 NOK he owed Bill, so Mike was surprised when one day Bill gave him two months to repay the money. I met Mike at his regular pub a few days after Bill had demanded his money back.
is still expensive and hard work, but as long as the grow site is running, growers can produce more. This gives them a unique way to control and avoid risky loans, and by avoiding short-term debts they have more time to resolve conflicts and restore financial losses without having to risk the costs of using violence.
Me: [. . .] something must have gone wrong? Mike: I don’t know, but he is desperate for money. The last time something like this happened [to his friend] was because he had borrowed money from his work and he failed to repay. He got noticed, and his family did not take it very nicely. Me: What will happen if you cannot get the money in time? Mike: He says he will sell the debt to the bikers and that he has already talked with Knut [one of the criminal bikers]. I don’t understand what the fuck is going on. Like, why is he coming after me?
Mike: Well, he was sorry for being a dick, so I guess I have. . . [laughs]. He says that he will forget the last 60,000 [D 7,400/$10,000 –] when the first batch is done. Like, he will put it down as operating expenses. Me: (. . .) don’t you think it would be better for you to quit growing (. . .)? Mike: Yeah [laughs], but you know, I want my weed, and like, we have been doing this kind of shit since we were kids. I know he needs me. He doesn’t trust anyone else. Me: And still he wanted to sell your debt? Mike: Yeah, but I don’t know if he would actually have done it. Like, he did it when Jerry and those guys owed us money, but they weren’t like real friends, just business partners. He said a week ago—we had, like, taken a lot [cocaine, marijuana and whisky]—that he would not have sold the debt. He just needed me to help him out; but he admitted that it was a bad way of doing it.
As the dead-line got closer, the pressure from Bill increased and so did Mike’s worries. Mike knew that Bill had previously sold debts to bikers and that many years earlier he had used a gun to collect money after an amphetamine deal went wrong. Three weeks before the dead-line, Mike had still not gathered enough money, so he called Bill for a meeting at his apartment. I happened to be there when Bill arrived. After a loud argument and a lot of gesticulating, they calmed downed and started to talk about the situation. Bill explained why he had been so desperate for money. As Mike suspected, Bill had borrowed money from his legitimate work and had problems repaying it. The plan was to use the money to invest in a large hash deal and use the profit to cover the expenses of a new large grows operation. However, two days before the meeting (recounted above) Bill received a large order for hash. The money from the deal enabled him to repay the money he had borrowed from work and get the money they needed for a new grow operation. The threat of violence disappeared as soon as Bill’s stressful economic situation was resolved. The absence of debt was also an important reason why Eric and Calvin in the previous case had time enough to offer David a three-year repayment plan. Economic desperation is a common explanation for violence in general (Howe & Crilly, 2001), and this is also true of the violence that occurs in drug economies (Anderson, 1999; Bourgois, 2003; Goldstein, 1985; Jacques & Wright, 2008a). Severe violence among dealers is often related to economic desperation because of defaults on loans (Jacobs & Wright, 2006). Thus, large-scale operators usually want to reduce the risks associated with short-term debt. This involves being careful about whom they borrow money or drugs from, and they use different strategies to guarantee their loans. In addition, cannabis growers who operate independently (without investors) can manage or settle debts by producing more cannabis. If a dealer loses his drugs, he will usually have to cover their value in money. Thus, whereas dealers exchange money for drugs, growers get paid for the work involved in producing cannabis. Cannabis cultivation
Friendship and tight social bonds: ensuring trust and skilful workers Over the next months, Mike remained angry and disappointed with how Bill treated him as a partner and friend. By doubling Mike’s debt, Mike felt that Bill had violated both black market norms and common norms of friendship. Mike mostly seemed to be disappointed by the way Bill had overlooked their friendship. Nevertheless, after a few months—after Bill had found a new location for the next grow site—they were friends again. I asked him if he had forgiven Bill for threatening him.
According to Mike, Bill probably would not have resorted to violence because of their long-lasting relationship and because of how difficult it is to find skilled and trustworthy workers. These two elements often go hand in hand. It is difficult to find trusted and loyal colleagues in illegal markets. Thus, it is common for operators to work with trusted friends and family members (Zaitch, 2005). Losing loyal and reliable partners or workers means that the operator must go through the risky process of assessing new prospects (Adler, 1993, pp. 67, 73, 113). In general, both legal and illegal economic transactions depend on trust (Gambetta, 1990). Limited access to formal justice systems in illegal markets makes it necessary for illegal operators to use other means to ensure trustworthy transactions. Working with friends and family is reported to be the dominant strategy for ensuring trustworthy relationships and transactions. However, and as we have seen, friendship does not necessarily prevent disloyal and unreliable behaviour. Nevertheless, tight social bonds are generally believed to prevent violence when conflicts arise (Black, 1998, pp. 77–79), and they are a key condition for the effectiveness of peaceful conflict resolution strategies (Hammersvik, 2014). For drug operators, generosity and friendship are important investments for building a good reputation and thus for reducing the risk of conflicts (Adler, 1993, p. 102). One way of being generous is to expunge debt (Zaitch, 2005, p. 206). In sum, friendships and close social relationships are believed to prevent violence when severe conflicts erupt between drug distributors (Jacobs & Wright, 2006, p. 67; Reuter, 2009, p. 277; Zaitch, 2005, p. 221).
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The symbolic value of violence in the cannabis culture The four barriers that prevented violence among the growers in this study were partly linked to financial incentives and thus to the general economic rationale for violence in illegal markets. However, violence is not only an economic tool for ensuring larger market shares, trustworthy relationships and transactions. Violence is also a powerful language of masculinity, honour and respect, reputation and status, and identity and group solidarity (Anderson, 1999; Bourgois, 2003; Sandberg & Pedersen, 2011). Violence has different meanings and values in different drug cultures and markets (Coomber, 2006; Goode, 1970; Johnson et al., 2000; Langer, 1977; Sandberg, 2013b). In drug cultures that value the symbols of violence, a reputation for violence can help one accumulate criminal capital and thus business opportunities and profit (Bourgois, 2003). The opposite is true for drug cultures that do not value violence. The growers in this study were not embedded in drug cultures that valued violence as a symbol of honour and respect. Therefore, they interpreted the sources of conflict and conflict resolution differently than those who follow ‘street codes’. Frank (35), a former owner of a 250-plant grow operation, suggested that the peaceful drug culture milieu he was in was an important reason why he did not resort to violence when his former partner told the police (snitched) about the grow operation. I made it clear at once that I was not a violent man; it was more like fuck him. The revenge will be that he will have to live with the harm he’s done; that’s enough for me. I will do just fine, like I will survive, but I hope he continues to have a bad conscience. That was my standpoint. But, obviously, there were some who flared up and who were like, “we should have broken his kneecaps”. But I know those guys would not have been capable of doing it [laughs]. But in a different milieu, if you snitch on a guy who gets three years [in prison], then. . . I don’t know, maybe it would have been a sufficient reason for murder. Frank rejected the street codes by clearly stating that he was not the type of law-breaker who uses or values violence. The rejection of street codes was the most common feature in all the growers’ accounts of why and how they operated. For example, Calvin and Eric told us that violence did not build a good reputation in their network. Rather, it would deter friends, customers and partners. As with the other growers in the sample, they also spoke disrespectfully about people who followed street codes, often referring to them as ‘criminals’ and ‘losers’ (see also Hammersvik et al., 2012). Negative attitudes towards violence have been reported in many other studies of cannabis distributors. Researchers on cannabis distribution in Western societies over the past 40 years have used different terms and concepts to categorize distributors as either cannabis ideologists or commercialists (Goode, 1970, pp. 254–355; Langer, 1977; Potter, 2010; Weisheit, 1991; Young, 1971, pp. 124–162). Cannabis ideologists are usually described as peaceful dealers, whereas commercial dealers are willing to commit violence if it makes financial sense (Dorn, Murji, & South, 1992). Sandberg and Pedersen (2010; see also Sandberg, 2013b) have conceptualized what others have termed cannabis ideology as ‘cannabis culture’, which they define as a collection of rituals, narratives and symbols. The approach implies that users, growers and dealers of different scales do not need to embrace the whole cannabis culture; instead, they can utilize the culture’s repertoire of symbolic resources to account for their own and others’ actions (Sandberg, 2013a, 2013b). However, the conflicting values between the cannabis and street cultures may create boundaries and limits to how operators who work in both worlds can utilize the symbolic resources from the conflicting cultures. This is especially true of
how business disputes are resolved, because conflicts are an important proving ground for character and cultural capability (Jacobs, 2000, p. 130). Operators who violate the cultural codes for how to interpret and resolve conflicts are at risk of being excluded from business opportunities and the social network. Exclusion has serious economic, personal and social consequences for large-scale drug distributors (Adler, 1993, pp. 93–101; Venkatesh, 2008). Thus, cannabis growers who distribute to users and distributors who identify with the cannabis culture do not have much to gain by using violence or by adhering to aggressive street codes. They have too much to lose.
Discussion I have identified four barriers that prevented cannabis growers from using violence in conflicts that are commonly thought to trigger violence: the cost of violence, close relationships to partners, a realistic attitude about profit and the absence of economic hardship. All four barriers have previously been described in the literature on conflict resolutions in illegal drug markets (Jacques & Wright, 2008a, 2008b; Jacques, 2009; Pearson & Hobbs, 2001; Taylor, 2007). The “costs of violence” (Reuter, 1983, p. 150) within the framework of economic desperation have long been acknowledged. Black market operators’ attitudes towards profit have been an important analytical factor in the economic theories, as has the concept of “criminal entrepreneurs” (Dorn et al., 1992; Gambetta, 2009; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2000; Pearson & Hobbs, 2004; Weisheit, 1991). Co-operating with friends and family is reported to be a widespread strategy for reducing the risk of violence (see also Adler, 1993, p. 101; Goode, 1970, pp. 251–257; Jacobs & Wright, 2006, p. 64; Zaitch, 2005, p. 221). In a previous publication based on the data from this study, I found that friendships and close social relationships are crucial conditions that facilitate effective and peaceful conflict resolution (Hammersvik, 2014). The four barriers are intertwined with the economic rationale that applies generally to drug markets, and even to other illegal markets in general. However, if the assumption that cannabis markets are more peaceful than other markets is valid, the power of the four barriers to prevent violence seems to be stronger in cannabis markets than in other illegal markets. The reason may be that they are enforced by the peaceful cannabis culture with which many of the operators in the cannabis trade identify. Economic rationales and principles do not unfold in a vacuum; rather, they are interpreted and preformed within existing cultures (Sandberg, 2013b). Multiple studies have reported that the symbolic meanings of violence in drug cultures have great significance for how operators view and use violence (Anderson, 1999; Bourgois, 2003; Johnson et al., 2000; Langer, 1977; Sandberg, 2013b). In drug cultures in which the use of violence is not a symbolic resource, operators do not use conflicts as a stage for their violent skills. That makes violence a poor instrument for building a good reputation. Drug operators who do not value the symbolic aspects of violence can still use violence as an economic tool, such as for enforcing business agreements. However, the four barriers discussed above show that the potential costs of violence are many, which implies that violence is a difficult instrument to handle. The ability of these four barriers to prevent violence, and the way that the cannabis culture enforces them, may be relevant to policymakers who want to reduce the potential for violence in cannabis markets. Serious violence in drug markets is often explained by drug cultures, the type of participants involved (ideologist or commercialists), market structures, the length of supply chains and the size of the transactions. If these explanations are valid, it is reasonable to suggest that policymakers should try to reduce the long supply chain of criminal networks and organizations that are
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involved in hash and cannabis smuggling. Compared with smuggling, domestic cannabis involves a shorter supply chain, fewer operators who value violence and fewer large-scale transactions. One strategy for reducing the size of the supply chain, and thus the size and number of transactions, could be a softer approach towards local cannabis production than is used for smuggling. This is not yet the practice in Norway. Cannabis cultivation is treated the same as smuggling and has a maximum penalty of 21 years. This ignores the fact that even large-scale cultivation implies a shortening of the supply chain. An important goal of allowing cultivation for personal use is to reduce the demand for cannabis and thus to make cannabis sales less lucrative for criminal networks that are involved in other types of crimes (Lenton, 2011). This is acknowledged in several countries with a more liberal approach to cannabis control than in Norway. However, a softer approach to domestic production than to smuggling could present some problems (see Hough et al., 2003; Room et al., 2010). It might lead more people to participate in domestic cannabis production, including both people who otherwise would not develop a criminal career, and criminal entrepreneurs who identity with the street culture (Decorte, 2008; Hough et al., 2003; Lenton, 2011). However, if the intention is to decrease the risk of violence in the cannabis trade, a potential path could be to find ways that encourage small-scale ideological growers at the expense of large-scale criminal entrepreneurs. Conflict of interest No interest of conflicts. References Adler, P. A. (1993). Wheeling and dealing: An ethnography of an upper-level drug dealing and smuggling community. New York: Columbia Press. Anderson, E. (1999). Code of the street: Decency, violence, and the moral life of the inner city. New York: W.W. Norton. Black, D. (1998). The social structure of right and wrong (rev. utg.). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Bourgois, P. (2003). In search of respect: Selling crack in El Barrio. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coomber, R. (2006). Pusher myths: Re-situating the drug dealer. London: Association Books. Corbin, M. J., & Strauss, L. A. (2008). Developing grounded theory: The second generation (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Decorte, T. (2008). Domestic marihuana cultivation in Belgium: On (un)intended effects of drug policy on the cannabis market. In J. Fountain, & D. J. Korf (Eds.), Cannabis in Europe: Dynamics in perception, policy and markets (pp. 69–86). Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers. Decorte, T. (2010a). The case for small-scale domestic cannabis cultivation. International Journal of Drug Policy, 21(4), 271–275. Decorte, T. (2010b). Small-scale web survey of 687 small-scale growers in Belgium. Contemporary Drug Problems, 37(2), 341–370. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1992). Traffickers: Drug markets and law enforcement. London: Routledge. Friman, H. R. (2009). Drug markets and the selective use of violence. Crime, Law and Social Change, 52(1), 285–295. Gambetta, D. (1990). Trust. Making and breaking cooperative relations. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. Gambetta, D. (2009). Codes of the underworld. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays. New York: Basic Books. Goode, E. (1970). The marijuana smokers. New York: Basic Books. Goldstein, P. J. (1985). The drugs/violence nexus: A tripartite conceptual framework. Journal of Drug Issues, 15(4), 493–506. Hammersvik, E., Sandberg, S., & Pedersen, W. (2012). Why small-scale cannabis growers stay small: Five mechanisms that prevent small-scale growers from going large scale. International Journal of Drug Policy, 2(6), 458–464.
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Hammersvik, E. (2014). Fredelig konflikthåndtering blant store cannabisdyrkere [Peaceful conflict resolution among large-scale cannabis growers]. Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, 55(3), 291–319. Hough, M., Warburton, H., Few, B., May, T., Man, L., & Witton, J. (2003). A growing market: The domestic cultivation of cannabis. London: Joseph Rowntree Foundation & National Addiction Centre. Howe, A., & Crilly, M. (2001). Deprivation and violence in the community: A perspective from a UK Accident and Emergency Department. Injury, 32(5), 349–351. Jacobs, B. A. (2000). Robbing drug dealers. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Jacobs, B. A., & Wright, R. (2006). Street justice: Retaliation in the criminal underworld. New York: Cambridge University Press. Jacques, S. (2009). The necessary conditions for retaliation: Toward a theory of nonviolent and violent forms in drug markets. Justice Quarterly, 27(2), 186–205. Jacques, S., & Wright, R. (2008a). The relevance of peace to studies of drug market violence. Criminology, 46(1), 221–254. Jacques, S., & Wright, R. (2008b). The victimization–termination link. Criminology, 46(4), 1009–1038. Johnson, B., Golub, A., & Dulap, E. (2000). The rise and decline of hard drugs, drug markets, and violence in inner-city New York. In A. Blumstein, & J. Wallman (Eds.), The crime drop in America (pp. 164–206). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Langer, J. (1977). Drug entrepreneurs and dealing culture. Social Problems, 24(3), 377–386. Lenton, L. (2011). Reforming laws applying to domestic cannabis production as a harm reduction strategy—A case study. In T. Decorte, G. R. Potter, & M. Bouchard (Eds.), World wide weed: Global trends in cannabis cultivation and its control (pp. 197–213). London: Ashgate. Levitt, S., & Venkatesh, S. (2000). An economic analysis of a drug-selling gang’s finances. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), 755–789. Moeller, K., & Hesse, M. (2013). Drug market disruption and systemic violence: Cannabis markets in Copenhagen. European Journal of Criminology, 10, 206–221 (Published online 21 January 2013). Pearson, G., & Hobbs, D. (2001). Middle market drug distribution. London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate. Pearson, G., & Hobbs, D. (2004). “E” is for enterprise: Middle level drug markets in ecstasy and stimulants. Addiction Research and Theory, 12(6), 565–576. Potter, G. R. (2010). Weed, need and greed: A study of domestic cannabis cultivation. London: Free Association Books. Potter, G. R., Bouchard, M., & Decorte, T. (2011). The globalization of cannabis cultivation. In T. Decorte, G. R. Potter, & M. Bouchard (Eds.), World wide weed: Global trends in cannabis cultivation and its control (pp. 1–20). London: Ashgate. Reuter, P. (1983). Disorganized crime: The economics of the visible hand. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Reuter, P. (2009). Systematic violence in drug markets. Crime, Law and Social Change, 52(1), 275–284. Room, R., Fisher, B., Hall, W., Lenton, S., & Reuter, P. (2010). Cannabis policy: Moving beyond stalemate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sandberg, S., & Pedersen, W. (2010). Cannabiskultur. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Sandberg, S., & Pedersen, W. (2011). Street capital. Black cannabis dealers in a white welfare state. Bristol: The Policy Press. Sandberg, S., & Copes, H. (2014). Speaking with ethnographers: The challenges of researching drug dealers and offenders. Journal of Drug Issues, 43, 176–197. Sandberg, S. (2013a). Cannabis culture: A stable subculture in a changing world. Criminology and Criminal Justice, 13(1), 63–79. Sandberg, S. (2013b). The importance of culture for cannabis markets. Towards an economic sociology of illegal drug markets. British Journal of Criminology, 52(6), 1133–1151. Spapens, T. (2011). The cannabis market in the Netherlands. Tilburg University: Police Academy of the Netherlands. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1856467 Stebbins, R. A. (2001). Exploratory research in the social sciences. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Taylor, A. P. (2007). How drug dealers settle disputes: Violent and nonviolent outcomes. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. Taylor, M., & Potter, R. P. (2013). From “social supply” to “real dealing”: Drift, friendship, and trust in drug dealing careers. Journal of Drug Issues, 43(4), 392–406. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2012). World drug report. New York: United Nations. Venkatesh, S. (2008). Gang leader for a day: A rogue sociologist takes to the streets. New York: Penguin. Weisheit, R. A. (1991). The intangible rewards from crime: The case of domestic marijuana cultivation. Crime and Delinquency, 37(4), 506–527. Young, J. (1971). The drugtakers. London: Paladin. Zaitch, D. (2005). The ambiguity of violence, secrecy, and trust among Colombian drug entrepreneurs. Journal of Drug Issues, 35(1), 201–227. Zimring, F. E., & Hawkins, G. (1997). Crime is not the problem: Lethal violence in America. New York: Oxford University Press.
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International Journal of Drug Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/drugpo
Research paper
Four barriers and a set of values that prevent violence among cannabis growers Eirik Hammersvik ∗ Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, Post Box 1096, 0317 Oslo, Norway
a r t i c l e
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Article history: Received 21 February 2014 Received in revised form 13 August 2014 Accepted 21 August 2014 Keywords: Cannabis cultivation Conflict resolution Cannabis culture
a b s t r a c t Background: Cannabis markets are often described as less violent than other drug markets. Domestic cannabis cultivation markets seem to be especially non-violent. However, few studies have investigated why this might be. Methods: Two and half years of ethnographic fieldwork among indoor cannabis growers and interviews and conversations with 52 growers in Norway. Results: This study identified four barriers and a set of values that prevent violence among growers. (1) Violence attracts increased attention from police and enemies, which inhibits ‘business as usual’ and reduces profits. (2) Careful attention to profits makes growers calculate and prepare for financial losses. (3) The prospect of covering debt by producing more cannabis makes it possible to choose nonviolent sanctions. (4) Tight social ties and friendships prevent violence when conflicts erupt. However, the cannabis culture of the actors and the transactions stands out as the main reason why these four barriers are more important in cannabis markets than in other drug markets. Conclusion: This paper discusses how policymakers can benefit from the market changes that follow ‘import substitution’ to construct policies that prevent violence and facilitate peaceful drug markets and drug cultures. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction The domestic cultivation of cannabis is increasingly replacing its importation and smuggling throughout the Western world (Potter, Bouchard, & Decorte, 2011; UNODC, 2012). Norway appears to be following this trend, albeit at a slower pace than other European countries (see Hammersvik, Sandberg, & Pedersen, 2012, p. 458). The new trend of import substitution has generated new research questions, especially about how such changes affect market dynamics (see Decorte, 2010a). A crucial subject in cannabis policy has been how to prevent violence in cannabis markets. Despite the obvious importance of this topic, there are few studies of peaceful conflict resolution among cannabis growers. Nevertheless, many argue that cannabis markets seem to be less violent than other drug markets (Room, Fisher, Hall, Lenton, & Reuter, 2010, p. 61). The lack of violence in cannabis markets may be due to the drug’s soothing effect or the normalization of cannabis use in the general population (Coomber, 2006, p. 141). The normalization of cannabis
∗ Tel.: +47 22844386. E-mail address: [email protected] http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2014.08.011 0955-3959/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
might imply that participants in the cannabis trade are part of conventional cultures and that they espouse non-violent values. In particular, many small-scale growers may have such characteristics (Decorte, 2010a, 2010b; Potter, 2010; Hammersvik et al., 2012). The more general cultural and symbolic values in drug markets, including those related to violence, seem to be very important for the possible use of violence (Johnson, Golub, & Dulap, 2000). For example, in drug markets in ‘street cultures’, violence seems to be a symbolic resource for obtaining and maintaining ‘respect’, ‘street cred’ or ‘street capital’ (Anderson, 1999; Bourgois, 2003; Sandberg & Pedersen, 2010). Such street cultures have been described as a response to the limited opportunities marginalized men have to express their masculinity (Bourgois, 2003). Studies from Norway have shown that street culture is an important component in the upper level of the wholesale cannabis market, as well as in the open street market. In these instances, marginalized ethnic minority men with working class backgrounds play a key role (Sandberg, 2013b, p. 1144). Violence has been reported to be a typical feature of open street markets (Sandberg & Pedersen, 2011). However, the description of cannabis markets as more peaceful than other drug markets could also be a result of an “absence of reports rather than any positive information that disputes between market participants are resolved amicably and that competition
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for territory is lacking” (Room et al., 2010, p. 61). This explanation is supported by a recent study of large-scale hash operators in Denmark in which researchers found highly violent conflicts between bikers and ethnic minority gangs (Moeller & Hesse, 2013). Nevertheless, domestic cannabis growers have not been reported to be part of these conflicts. This might indicate that many growers – and especially small-scale growers – typically operate independently in networks of friends and acquaintances (see also Decorte, 2008, 2010b; Hough et al., 2003; Potter, 2010). Of course, growers may still experience frauds and business disputes. A study of largescale growers in the Netherlands found that disciplinary violence was common when unreliable and disloyal behaviour led to great losses (Spapens, 2011, p. 10). In this context, disloyal behaviour refers to acts that are interpreted as theft, fraud or informing police (snitching). Unreliability refers to breaches of business contracts, missed appointments or neglected work duties. The role of violence and threats in such situations is to discipline behaviour, deter further infractions and enforce deals and duties. Drug researchers agree that violence is one of the instruments drug dealers use to regulate business agreements. However, studies offer competing views about how much violence is used in practice (Taylor & Potter, 2013, p. 396). Over the past 15 years, a growing number of drug market researchers have claimed that violence is far less common in all Western drug markets than popular stereotypes and common beliefs imply (Jacques & Wright, 2008a, p. 222; Pearson & Hobbs, 2001, p. 41; Zimring & Hawkins, 1997, pp. 138–144). Moreover, cannabis markets are often described as the most peaceful of the drug markets. Thus, rather than seeing violence as part of a working drug market, we could see it as a result of market dysfunction and instability (Pearson & Hobbs, 2001, p. 42). The normality of peace in drug markets makes it important to investigate what prevents violence (Jacques & Wright, 2008a). In a previous study, I found that peaceful negotiations and sanctions were effective means for restoring financial losses and justice (Hammersvik, 2014). The present paper goes into greater depth regarding the economic and cultural mechanisms that prevent violence. I examine three conflicts in which disloyal or unreliable behaviour led to large financial losses without triggering violence. My aim is to determine why some growers avoid violence in conflict situations that are commonly described as triggering violence. Possible policy implications of the findings are discussed briefly at the end of the article.
Method The data for this report come from two studies of cannabis markets in Norway, namely two and a half years of ethnographic fieldwork and an interview-based study (for details see Hammersvik et al., 2012). The ‘gatekeeper’ who provided access in the fieldwork was a research participant from one of my previous projects. We first met in 2004 through a friend of a friend and we have stayed in contact. Originally, he was a large-scale cannabis importer, but he has not been involved in smuggling and distribution since the late 1990s. He has never been involved in cannabis cultivation. The research participants were recruited for the field study through snowball sampling. The convenience sample consisted of 32 growers living in the south-east of Norway and working at 23 grow sites. Four of the sites cultivated 100–350 plants and they can be categorized as large-scale grow operations (for the definition of size and information about cannabis prices, see Hammersvik et al., 2012, p. 459). Two grow sites were mid-sized (60–100 plants) and 17 were small (1–20 plants). Eleven workers operated the four large grow sites, two growers operated each of the mid-sized sites and single growers ran the small sites.
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Access and gathering of observations followed the logic of convenience. I observed what the research participants allowed me to observe. This is common in the ‘exploratory approach’ in ethnographic fieldwork with well-hidden populations (Stebbins, 2001). Some growers let me observe their grow sites only once or twice, whereas those who trusted me the most allowed me to hang around with them for months and even years. That made it possible to observe complete production and distribution cycles several times and to meet costumers, dealers and smugglers. The fieldwork also included socializing with participants at gyms, their friends’ places, in bars and cafés and at concerts. Despite the trusting relationships I developed, I was not allowed to use a tape recorder. The growers feared that the tapes could be confiscated by the police. It is not uncommon that ethnographers avoid using tape recorder (Sandberg & Copes, 2014). Hence, I wrote field notes and transcribed conversations on the same day or the day after they occurred. The interview study was an extensive investigation of cannabis users (N = 100) that was conducted by two of my colleagues in Norway from 2006 to 2010 (for details, see Sandberg & Pedersen, 2010; Sandberg, 2013a, 2013b). Participants were recruited through the researchers’ networks, students at the Universities of Oslo and Bergen, cannabis interest organizations and an Internet advertisement. The participants came from all over Norway, they were mostly ethnic Norwegians and 20 of them had cultivated cannabis. The interviews lasted from one-and-a-half to three hours. They were semi-structured and addressed the topics of drug use and dealing careers, but were quite flexible in thematic focus. After transcribing the interviews I coded them into 134 codes using the qualitative data processing program NVIVO. The most important codes and nodes for this article were “cannabis cultivation”, “drug purchase”, “sales”, “conflicts”, “other crimes” and the aggregated code “cannabis culture”, which consisted of the codes “rituals”, “symbols” and “narratives”. All participants cultivated their plants indoors, as the Norwegian climate makes outdoor cultivation very difficult. All of the growers were men between 23 and 45 years of age. Some of them were highly educated, with good jobs; others were manual workers and a few were living on social benefits. None of the participants had experienced or heard of violence among growers. However, some of them knew of violence between cannabis dealers and smugglers. The growers were mainly involved in networks that distributed cannabis, but some of them had contact with networks that distributed other types of drugs and committed diverse types of crimes. However, even these operators claimed to be more closely associated with the cannabis culture than with violent street cultures. During my two years of fieldwork, I witnessed eight serious conflicts that involved financial losses between 100,000 NOK and 1.5 million NOK (D 12,000/$16,000–D 180,000/$241,000). I observed in addition about 20 smaller conflicts. Seven of the participants in the interview study did also report on severe conflicts that did not lead to violence. My data thus include 15 serious conflicts and around 20 less serious conflicts. None of them resulted in violence. I decided to investigate how these conflicts were solved. Initially, the interviews and field notes were coded for themes pertaining to sources of conflicts, conflict development and sanctioning. Next, all statements and field notes were examined for consistency with the four identified reasons for avoiding violence that gradually emerged from the data. This approach to coding is consistent with standards of qualitative research techniques and grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). I have selected three of the eight observed conflicts to illustrate the findings. Presenting three cases in depth allows me to provide ‘thicker descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973) than would be possible when presenting multiple cases. The selection on cases was
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based on my first-hand knowledge of the conflict, the sources of the conflicts, and the financial and social costs to those involved. The three selected cases are theoretically important because disloyal and unreliable behaviours led to large financial and social costs. Such consequences are commonly thought to be among the most crucial triggers of violence between drug operators (Jacobs & Wright, 2006).
Four barriers that prevent violence The cost of violence: violence attracts attention and interferes with business At one of the large grow sites (200–250 plants cultivated in soil), the conflict started with unreliable behaviour, but it evolved to include disloyalty and large financial losses. The grow operation consisted of two gardeners, Calvin (35) and David (35), and two investors, Eric (36) and Bob (42). Eric and Bob had been growing and dealing cannabis for 10 and eight years, respectively, whereas Calvin and David were inexperienced at running large illegal operations. David’s poor understanding of the importance of complying with agreements first led to unreliable behaviour and later to acts of disloyalty. The growers’ patience with David ended after he forgot to change the charcoal filter, which let odours leak into the neighbourhood that were strong enough to attract attention from outsiders. Because Calvin was afraid that someone would find the grow site, he decided to close it down the same day the odours escaped. This decision cost the growers 1.2 million NOK (D 144,000/$193,000) in future income. I was there when Eric and Calvin discussed how they should sanction David without risking further losses. Eric: I say we throw him out [of the operation and the house]. Calvin: Yeah, that would be the fair thing to do, but he has nowhere to go and no money to rent a new place. I think he will get pissed off and then he will for sure get talkative when he gets drunk with his friends. The best thing would be to give him the 10,000 [of the money he had lent], and tell him that he has to pay his share of the rent from now on. I don’t think he can afford living here, but I don’t want to force him. . . [. . .] Eric: I bet they [his friends] already know. Calvin: Maybe some of them, but I don’t want the guys around Albert to know about it. Those guys are fucked up, and I bet they will tip someone off [weed robbers]. . . maybe they will follow us to the next location. It’s better to get rid of him in a safe way, and then put up a new grow site. In this discussion, Calvin feared that if they pressured David he would become too talkative. That could lead to unwanted attention from other criminals or the police. However, Calvin’s plan to demand high house rent to get rid of David and the risk he posed failed in every possible way: David managed to pay the rent for the next six months and when they moved out of the grow house he took 150,000 NOK (D 18,000/$24,000) from Calvin’s cash reserve. Theft is a crucial trigger for serious violence (including murder), even among cannabis growers (Spapens, 2011, p. 10). However, Calvin and Eric did not see violence as a way to get the 150,000 NOK back. An important reason for not using violence was that David did not have money or anything valuable that they could take. To force David to make money by taking on ‘missions’ for smugglers and wholesale distributors was considered too risky since David lacked experience with such activities. After all, Calvin and Eric would have to vouch for him and could thus end up being held responsible if David failed. A more profitable solution would be to start a new
grow site, and attempt to talk David into repaying some of the money. They succeeded. David agreed to a down payment plan and Calvin started a new grow site. The argument that violence is ‘bad for business’ is prominent in the literature on drug dealers and illegal operators (Adler, 1993, p. 102; Pearson & Hobbs, 2001, p. 42; Reuter, 1983, p. 151; Venkatesh, 2008, pp. 95–98). In peaceful societies, violence will draw attention from the community, the police and competitors. Unwanted attention forces distributors to operate more carefully and thus less profitably than usual. Thus, large-scale drug operators are often concerned with finding ways to avoid violence and its costs (Zaitch, 2005, p. 213). Recognition of the dilemmas posed by violence has been used to argue that peaceful and non-violent resolutions can be more economically rational than violent sanctions (Friman, 2009, p. 286; Jacques, 2009). The attitude towards profit: prepared for financial losses Eric was among the most experienced large-scale growers in the sample. One afternoon while we were at one of his grow sites, I asked him if he was surprised that they had to close the grow site and thereby lose 1.2 million NOK (D 144,000/$193,000) in future income due to David’s unreliable behaviour. No, I would have been more surprised if we had managed to run it [the grow op] so smoothly that we had gotten that kind of money (laughs). I knew David was a newbie, and I suspected that he would fuck up, but Calvin wanted to try him out. So no, I am not surprised. You see, there is no guarantee of making money when you are doing this, right. You try your best, but there are so many things that can go wrong that you calculate losses. The most important thing is to avoid debt and rather hope that things will go better the next time round. The last comments here are consistent with the core attitude towards profits that many cannabis growers and sellers share with other drug distributors and other high-risk businesspersons – profit is not guaranteed, just possible. The main goal is to cover debts, avoid losses and make money over the long run. Knowledge of the many risks of drug dealing leads large operators to prepare for losses and therefore they often calculate wastage (Venkatesh, 2008). A similar attitude towards profit is described in studies of large- and small-scale dealers in different types of drug markets (Adler, 1993; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2000; Venkatesh, 2008). This rationale is similar to one found among legitimate professionals, such as stock-brokers and commission sellers (Gambetta, 2009; Pearson & Hobbs, 2004). What we might understand as a cautious optimism about profit, or a realistic attitude towards profit-making, might be stronger among cannabis growers than among other drug distributors. This cautious optimism about profit is reinforced by the fact that growers know their crops can fail. Cannabis plants are an uncertain form of capital. They can die, get sick, and when dried, they can become mouldy. As with other types of drugs, cannabis can also be stolen or seized by the police. All of the large growers in the sample had experienced failed crops due to technical problems and insects. Thus, making a lot of money growing cannabis was usually something that growers hoped for in the long run. They knew that to make a lot of money they had to run the grow operation flawlessly, and that this was a considerable challenge (Hammersvik et al., 2012). Absence of debt: enough time to find peaceful solutions At one of the large grow sites (250–300 plants cultivated in a hydroponic system) I observed a conflict that escalated because of unreliable money management and unfair
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sanctioning. The growers, Mike (39) and Bill (41), had known each other for more than 20 years and had worked together on several large drug projects that ranged from the import and cultivation of cannabis to the large wholesale of hash. On a few occasions, they had also run mid-sized amphetamine and cocaine operations. The source of the conflict was Mike’s unreliable money management. Mike agreed to watch over Bill’s money while Bill was abroad for a year setting up a large drug operation. After Bill had been gone for a while, Mike borrowed 350,000 NOK (D 42,400/$56,000) of Bill’s money without his permission to buy a large batch of hash. The deal went wrong and Mike was caught by the police and sentenced to prison. As soon as Mike was released from prison, Bill demanded his money back. Over the next three or four years, Mike did ‘favours’ for Bill without payment. His errands yielded far more than the 350,000 NOK he owed Bill, so Mike was surprised when one day Bill gave him two months to repay the money. I met Mike at his regular pub a few days after Bill had demanded his money back.
is still expensive and hard work, but as long as the grow site is running, growers can produce more. This gives them a unique way to control and avoid risky loans, and by avoiding short-term debts they have more time to resolve conflicts and restore financial losses without having to risk the costs of using violence.
Me: [. . .] something must have gone wrong? Mike: I don’t know, but he is desperate for money. The last time something like this happened [to his friend] was because he had borrowed money from his work and he failed to repay. He got noticed, and his family did not take it very nicely. Me: What will happen if you cannot get the money in time? Mike: He says he will sell the debt to the bikers and that he has already talked with Knut [one of the criminal bikers]. I don’t understand what the fuck is going on. Like, why is he coming after me?
Mike: Well, he was sorry for being a dick, so I guess I have. . . [laughs]. He says that he will forget the last 60,000 [D 7,400/$10,000 –] when the first batch is done. Like, he will put it down as operating expenses. Me: (. . .) don’t you think it would be better for you to quit growing (. . .)? Mike: Yeah [laughs], but you know, I want my weed, and like, we have been doing this kind of shit since we were kids. I know he needs me. He doesn’t trust anyone else. Me: And still he wanted to sell your debt? Mike: Yeah, but I don’t know if he would actually have done it. Like, he did it when Jerry and those guys owed us money, but they weren’t like real friends, just business partners. He said a week ago—we had, like, taken a lot [cocaine, marijuana and whisky]—that he would not have sold the debt. He just needed me to help him out; but he admitted that it was a bad way of doing it.
As the dead-line got closer, the pressure from Bill increased and so did Mike’s worries. Mike knew that Bill had previously sold debts to bikers and that many years earlier he had used a gun to collect money after an amphetamine deal went wrong. Three weeks before the dead-line, Mike had still not gathered enough money, so he called Bill for a meeting at his apartment. I happened to be there when Bill arrived. After a loud argument and a lot of gesticulating, they calmed downed and started to talk about the situation. Bill explained why he had been so desperate for money. As Mike suspected, Bill had borrowed money from his legitimate work and had problems repaying it. The plan was to use the money to invest in a large hash deal and use the profit to cover the expenses of a new large grows operation. However, two days before the meeting (recounted above) Bill received a large order for hash. The money from the deal enabled him to repay the money he had borrowed from work and get the money they needed for a new grow operation. The threat of violence disappeared as soon as Bill’s stressful economic situation was resolved. The absence of debt was also an important reason why Eric and Calvin in the previous case had time enough to offer David a three-year repayment plan. Economic desperation is a common explanation for violence in general (Howe & Crilly, 2001), and this is also true of the violence that occurs in drug economies (Anderson, 1999; Bourgois, 2003; Goldstein, 1985; Jacques & Wright, 2008a). Severe violence among dealers is often related to economic desperation because of defaults on loans (Jacobs & Wright, 2006). Thus, large-scale operators usually want to reduce the risks associated with short-term debt. This involves being careful about whom they borrow money or drugs from, and they use different strategies to guarantee their loans. In addition, cannabis growers who operate independently (without investors) can manage or settle debts by producing more cannabis. If a dealer loses his drugs, he will usually have to cover their value in money. Thus, whereas dealers exchange money for drugs, growers get paid for the work involved in producing cannabis. Cannabis cultivation
Friendship and tight social bonds: ensuring trust and skilful workers Over the next months, Mike remained angry and disappointed with how Bill treated him as a partner and friend. By doubling Mike’s debt, Mike felt that Bill had violated both black market norms and common norms of friendship. Mike mostly seemed to be disappointed by the way Bill had overlooked their friendship. Nevertheless, after a few months—after Bill had found a new location for the next grow site—they were friends again. I asked him if he had forgiven Bill for threatening him.
According to Mike, Bill probably would not have resorted to violence because of their long-lasting relationship and because of how difficult it is to find skilled and trustworthy workers. These two elements often go hand in hand. It is difficult to find trusted and loyal colleagues in illegal markets. Thus, it is common for operators to work with trusted friends and family members (Zaitch, 2005). Losing loyal and reliable partners or workers means that the operator must go through the risky process of assessing new prospects (Adler, 1993, pp. 67, 73, 113). In general, both legal and illegal economic transactions depend on trust (Gambetta, 1990). Limited access to formal justice systems in illegal markets makes it necessary for illegal operators to use other means to ensure trustworthy transactions. Working with friends and family is reported to be the dominant strategy for ensuring trustworthy relationships and transactions. However, and as we have seen, friendship does not necessarily prevent disloyal and unreliable behaviour. Nevertheless, tight social bonds are generally believed to prevent violence when conflicts arise (Black, 1998, pp. 77–79), and they are a key condition for the effectiveness of peaceful conflict resolution strategies (Hammersvik, 2014). For drug operators, generosity and friendship are important investments for building a good reputation and thus for reducing the risk of conflicts (Adler, 1993, p. 102). One way of being generous is to expunge debt (Zaitch, 2005, p. 206). In sum, friendships and close social relationships are believed to prevent violence when severe conflicts erupt between drug distributors (Jacobs & Wright, 2006, p. 67; Reuter, 2009, p. 277; Zaitch, 2005, p. 221).
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The symbolic value of violence in the cannabis culture The four barriers that prevented violence among the growers in this study were partly linked to financial incentives and thus to the general economic rationale for violence in illegal markets. However, violence is not only an economic tool for ensuring larger market shares, trustworthy relationships and transactions. Violence is also a powerful language of masculinity, honour and respect, reputation and status, and identity and group solidarity (Anderson, 1999; Bourgois, 2003; Sandberg & Pedersen, 2011). Violence has different meanings and values in different drug cultures and markets (Coomber, 2006; Goode, 1970; Johnson et al., 2000; Langer, 1977; Sandberg, 2013b). In drug cultures that value the symbols of violence, a reputation for violence can help one accumulate criminal capital and thus business opportunities and profit (Bourgois, 2003). The opposite is true for drug cultures that do not value violence. The growers in this study were not embedded in drug cultures that valued violence as a symbol of honour and respect. Therefore, they interpreted the sources of conflict and conflict resolution differently than those who follow ‘street codes’. Frank (35), a former owner of a 250-plant grow operation, suggested that the peaceful drug culture milieu he was in was an important reason why he did not resort to violence when his former partner told the police (snitched) about the grow operation. I made it clear at once that I was not a violent man; it was more like fuck him. The revenge will be that he will have to live with the harm he’s done; that’s enough for me. I will do just fine, like I will survive, but I hope he continues to have a bad conscience. That was my standpoint. But, obviously, there were some who flared up and who were like, “we should have broken his kneecaps”. But I know those guys would not have been capable of doing it [laughs]. But in a different milieu, if you snitch on a guy who gets three years [in prison], then. . . I don’t know, maybe it would have been a sufficient reason for murder. Frank rejected the street codes by clearly stating that he was not the type of law-breaker who uses or values violence. The rejection of street codes was the most common feature in all the growers’ accounts of why and how they operated. For example, Calvin and Eric told us that violence did not build a good reputation in their network. Rather, it would deter friends, customers and partners. As with the other growers in the sample, they also spoke disrespectfully about people who followed street codes, often referring to them as ‘criminals’ and ‘losers’ (see also Hammersvik et al., 2012). Negative attitudes towards violence have been reported in many other studies of cannabis distributors. Researchers on cannabis distribution in Western societies over the past 40 years have used different terms and concepts to categorize distributors as either cannabis ideologists or commercialists (Goode, 1970, pp. 254–355; Langer, 1977; Potter, 2010; Weisheit, 1991; Young, 1971, pp. 124–162). Cannabis ideologists are usually described as peaceful dealers, whereas commercial dealers are willing to commit violence if it makes financial sense (Dorn, Murji, & South, 1992). Sandberg and Pedersen (2010; see also Sandberg, 2013b) have conceptualized what others have termed cannabis ideology as ‘cannabis culture’, which they define as a collection of rituals, narratives and symbols. The approach implies that users, growers and dealers of different scales do not need to embrace the whole cannabis culture; instead, they can utilize the culture’s repertoire of symbolic resources to account for their own and others’ actions (Sandberg, 2013a, 2013b). However, the conflicting values between the cannabis and street cultures may create boundaries and limits to how operators who work in both worlds can utilize the symbolic resources from the conflicting cultures. This is especially true of
how business disputes are resolved, because conflicts are an important proving ground for character and cultural capability (Jacobs, 2000, p. 130). Operators who violate the cultural codes for how to interpret and resolve conflicts are at risk of being excluded from business opportunities and the social network. Exclusion has serious economic, personal and social consequences for large-scale drug distributors (Adler, 1993, pp. 93–101; Venkatesh, 2008). Thus, cannabis growers who distribute to users and distributors who identify with the cannabis culture do not have much to gain by using violence or by adhering to aggressive street codes. They have too much to lose.
Discussion I have identified four barriers that prevented cannabis growers from using violence in conflicts that are commonly thought to trigger violence: the cost of violence, close relationships to partners, a realistic attitude about profit and the absence of economic hardship. All four barriers have previously been described in the literature on conflict resolutions in illegal drug markets (Jacques & Wright, 2008a, 2008b; Jacques, 2009; Pearson & Hobbs, 2001; Taylor, 2007). The “costs of violence” (Reuter, 1983, p. 150) within the framework of economic desperation have long been acknowledged. Black market operators’ attitudes towards profit have been an important analytical factor in the economic theories, as has the concept of “criminal entrepreneurs” (Dorn et al., 1992; Gambetta, 2009; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2000; Pearson & Hobbs, 2004; Weisheit, 1991). Co-operating with friends and family is reported to be a widespread strategy for reducing the risk of violence (see also Adler, 1993, p. 101; Goode, 1970, pp. 251–257; Jacobs & Wright, 2006, p. 64; Zaitch, 2005, p. 221). In a previous publication based on the data from this study, I found that friendships and close social relationships are crucial conditions that facilitate effective and peaceful conflict resolution (Hammersvik, 2014). The four barriers are intertwined with the economic rationale that applies generally to drug markets, and even to other illegal markets in general. However, if the assumption that cannabis markets are more peaceful than other markets is valid, the power of the four barriers to prevent violence seems to be stronger in cannabis markets than in other illegal markets. The reason may be that they are enforced by the peaceful cannabis culture with which many of the operators in the cannabis trade identify. Economic rationales and principles do not unfold in a vacuum; rather, they are interpreted and preformed within existing cultures (Sandberg, 2013b). Multiple studies have reported that the symbolic meanings of violence in drug cultures have great significance for how operators view and use violence (Anderson, 1999; Bourgois, 2003; Johnson et al., 2000; Langer, 1977; Sandberg, 2013b). In drug cultures in which the use of violence is not a symbolic resource, operators do not use conflicts as a stage for their violent skills. That makes violence a poor instrument for building a good reputation. Drug operators who do not value the symbolic aspects of violence can still use violence as an economic tool, such as for enforcing business agreements. However, the four barriers discussed above show that the potential costs of violence are many, which implies that violence is a difficult instrument to handle. The ability of these four barriers to prevent violence, and the way that the cannabis culture enforces them, may be relevant to policymakers who want to reduce the potential for violence in cannabis markets. Serious violence in drug markets is often explained by drug cultures, the type of participants involved (ideologist or commercialists), market structures, the length of supply chains and the size of the transactions. If these explanations are valid, it is reasonable to suggest that policymakers should try to reduce the long supply chain of criminal networks and organizations that are
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involved in hash and cannabis smuggling. Compared with smuggling, domestic cannabis involves a shorter supply chain, fewer operators who value violence and fewer large-scale transactions. One strategy for reducing the size of the supply chain, and thus the size and number of transactions, could be a softer approach towards local cannabis production than is used for smuggling. This is not yet the practice in Norway. Cannabis cultivation is treated the same as smuggling and has a maximum penalty of 21 years. This ignores the fact that even large-scale cultivation implies a shortening of the supply chain. An important goal of allowing cultivation for personal use is to reduce the demand for cannabis and thus to make cannabis sales less lucrative for criminal networks that are involved in other types of crimes (Lenton, 2011). This is acknowledged in several countries with a more liberal approach to cannabis control than in Norway. However, a softer approach to domestic production than to smuggling could present some problems (see Hough et al., 2003; Room et al., 2010). It might lead more people to participate in domestic cannabis production, including both people who otherwise would not develop a criminal career, and criminal entrepreneurs who identity with the street culture (Decorte, 2008; Hough et al., 2003; Lenton, 2011). However, if the intention is to decrease the risk of violence in the cannabis trade, a potential path could be to find ways that encourage small-scale ideological growers at the expense of large-scale criminal entrepreneurs. Conflict of interest No interest of conflicts. References Adler, P. A. (1993). Wheeling and dealing: An ethnography of an upper-level drug dealing and smuggling community. New York: Columbia Press. Anderson, E. (1999). Code of the street: Decency, violence, and the moral life of the inner city. New York: W.W. Norton. Black, D. (1998). The social structure of right and wrong (rev. utg.). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Bourgois, P. (2003). In search of respect: Selling crack in El Barrio. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coomber, R. (2006). Pusher myths: Re-situating the drug dealer. London: Association Books. Corbin, M. J., & Strauss, L. A. (2008). Developing grounded theory: The second generation (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Decorte, T. (2008). Domestic marihuana cultivation in Belgium: On (un)intended effects of drug policy on the cannabis market. In J. Fountain, & D. J. Korf (Eds.), Cannabis in Europe: Dynamics in perception, policy and markets (pp. 69–86). Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers. Decorte, T. (2010a). The case for small-scale domestic cannabis cultivation. International Journal of Drug Policy, 21(4), 271–275. Decorte, T. (2010b). Small-scale web survey of 687 small-scale growers in Belgium. Contemporary Drug Problems, 37(2), 341–370. Dorn, N., Murji, K., & South, N. (1992). Traffickers: Drug markets and law enforcement. London: Routledge. Friman, H. R. (2009). Drug markets and the selective use of violence. Crime, Law and Social Change, 52(1), 285–295. Gambetta, D. (1990). Trust. Making and breaking cooperative relations. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. Gambetta, D. (2009). Codes of the underworld. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays. New York: Basic Books. Goode, E. (1970). The marijuana smokers. New York: Basic Books. Goldstein, P. J. (1985). The drugs/violence nexus: A tripartite conceptual framework. Journal of Drug Issues, 15(4), 493–506. Hammersvik, E., Sandberg, S., & Pedersen, W. (2012). Why small-scale cannabis growers stay small: Five mechanisms that prevent small-scale growers from going large scale. International Journal of Drug Policy, 2(6), 458–464.
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