From Machine Politics to the Politics of Technocracy: Charting Changes in Governance in the Mexican Municipality

Bull. Latin Am. Res., Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 341—365, 1998 ( 1998 Society for Latin American Studies. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain 0261—3050/98 $19.00#0.00

PII: S0261 - 3050(97)00072-7

From Machine Politics to the Politics of Technocracy: Charting Changes in Governance in the Mexican Municipality1 PETER M. WARD Department of Sociology and the LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA Abstract — A typology comprising technocratic rationality versus political partisanship helps to identify several local government structures found in contemporary Mexico: political machines; autonomous—indigenous; technocratic; and modernising party governments. Case study research in over a dozen municipalities for three principal parties suggest a trend towards increasing technocratic and more administratively efficient municipal government and changing patterns of partisanship. This arises from new pressures associated with electoral opening, political alternation, new government actors, growing urban development complexity, and from federal reforms offering greater local government autonomy. However, while improved administration and technocratic governance often leads to positive outcomes, they do not necessarily imply ‘good government’. ( 1998 Society for Latin American Studies. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Key words — Mexico, municipality, governance, politics, technocracy, partisanship

INTRODUCTION: ARENAS OF PARTISANSHIP The Mexican political system has undergone profound changes in recent years much of which have elicited widespread discussion and debate (Camp, 1996; Cornelius, 1996; Handelman, 1996; Rubin, 1996). One area of change that has gained less attention is in the nature of local governance, and particularly the apparent decline of partisanship (e.g. machine or patronage politics) at the municipal level. This paper examines the apparent decline and the upsurge of technocratic governments during the 1990s and focuses in particular upon a number of local government experiences that I have examined in recent research (Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1992, 1994a, 1995). Many of the cases upon which I will draw are three-year non-renewable terms of city administrations of the conservative opposition National Action Party, and to a lesser extent those of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the governing Institutionalised Revolutionary Party (PRI). Significantly, too, there is evidence that the PRI is changing its modus operandi in governance (Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1996a).2 It will be interesting to observe how the PRD responds now that it is broadening its governmental experience to include more large urban municipalities, and one of the earlier experiences (Morelia between 1991—1993) suggest that it, too, is seeking to demonstrate administrative competence and to adopt new techniques of public administration. Another significant feature of local government in Mexico is that there has been considerable alternancia back-and-forth of the parties in

342

Peter M. Ward

power, so that one can now begin to link performance to the prospects for party re-election (see endnote 2). In order to chart these shifts I have developed a typological framework which seeks to locate the nature of particular administrations. The paper contends that machine politics (and the partisan style of governance it implies) is gradually being displaced by more technocratic governance at the municipal level, and that the nature and extent of partisanship is being recast by all three political parties, albeit to different degrees. PANista cities which I have examined were often at the leading edge of this trend, and five factors contributing to this are identified: (1) increasing electoral competition and more open elections leading to the possibilities of alternancia; (2) local victories by opposition parties whose elected leaders come from different backgrounds and bring to power alternative notions of governance; (3) changes in party organisation (especially in the dominant PRI party) and the imperative that they be more responsive to the need for improved performance in local government; (4) socio-economic changes and the growing complexity of urban management and planning issues; and finally (5) policy and constitutional changes which have enhanced municipal and state autonomy and mandated greater responsibility to those levels. The argument is that while the turn away from machine politics is healthy in the short-term, the technocratic style of governance being cultivated at the municipal level, although often bringing about significant material improvements in city administration, does not, of itself, constitute good government. While there may be a convergence towards greater efficiency in the governance practices of all three major parties in Mexico, the goal of ‘good government’ remains ill defined and seemingly difficult to achieve.3 Before examining partisanship in the arena of governance in some of these cases the following section briefly considers the concept of partisanship. Partisanship cannot be understood apart from the political arenas in which it operates. Therefore, this section briefly analyses the concept in the context of three such arenas: (1) mass electoral; (2) legislative; (3) governance.4 Partisanship among the mass electorate is one of the most analysed themes in the US political science literature. The focus is on the relationship between citizens and political parties, with special attention paid to the extent to which citizens’ voting decisions are determined by allegiance to a political party (rather than by their opinion of individual candidates, the nature of the issues, etc.). In this arena, ‘the critical assumption... is that partisanship represents a positive sense of affect toward one of the parties. This affect is often learned early in life from one’s parents and theoretically grows stronger with age’ (Wattenberg, 1984: 10). In short, partisanship in this arena denotes the extent to which citizens’ allegiance toward a political party (‘party identification’) impels them to vote consistently for that party (Campbell et al., 1960). Strong partisans demonstrate firm allegiance to a party; weak partisans may lean toward a party, but remain relatively independent and base their voting decisions on a variety of factors. Until 1988 and the electoral reforms which followed between 1990 and 1996, the almost total dominance of the PRI and its ability to control the election process created a strong partisanship among the electorate albeit less shaped by affective ties to the party, and more by belief that followership would be rewarded within the spoils system. In the legislative arena, partisanship is generally gauged by the extent to which unity prevails within political parties. In countries with strong parties (e.g. the parliamentary systems of Western Europe), party cohesion is typically high, since ‘continuing in office will depend on the ability of a party to command a majority on every significant vote’

Changes in governance in Mexico

343

(Peters, 1991: 62). Therefore, discipline is strictly enforced by party leaders, resulting in high party cohesion. On the other hand, in countries with weak parties (e.g. the United States), parties do not have much control over how legislators vote. Therefore, considerations other than party (e.g. constituents’ desires and legislator re-election) will influence most legislators’ voting decisions, resulting in low party cohesion, and hence low legislative partisanship. In Mexico the no re-election clause obviates the need to cultivate one’s constituency, and traditionally the PRI was able to exercise strong party discipline through its control of the electoral process and its control over candidate selection and career development. As legislatures have become more plural, more competitive, and more meaningful in Mexico in recent years, so the extent and basis of internal party discipline is likely to become an important feature. As yet there has been virtually no research into this arena of legislative governance (Lujambio, 1995). Partisanship in the arena of governance is centred on the ends to which a party in power uses the machinery and resources of government. Governance may be considered to be highly partisan when government is used mainly or exclusively to benefit the party in power and/or that party’s supporters. Governance is minimally partisan when resource distribution is grounded in the ‘common good’; that is, when government is used not to benefit the party, but rather an entire community (or state or nation). According to one student of machine politics, the machine ‘seeks to gain office in a competitive democracy but is organised primarily around the material interests of its members’ (Guterbock, 1980: 3—4). Another scholar notes that a machine is ‘a non-ideological organisation interested less in political principle than in securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run it and work for it. It relies on what it accomplishes in a concrete way for its supporters, not on what it stands for’ (Scott, 1969: 1144). These notions of machine politics more or less approximate the traditional PRI style of governance at the national, state, and local levels. Even parties that claim to govern for the ‘common good’ will ultimately have to keep voters’ loyalty if they want to remain in power. Thus, they will try to keep their campaign promises and to satisfy the citizens who cast ballots for them. Nonetheless, there is an important qualitative difference between a party organised ‘around the material interests of its members’, and one that attempts to keep its campaign promises while governing for the good of the community. In the former, partisanship permeates all aspects of decisionmaking; in the latter, it is a (sometimes highly salient) background consideration. CHARTING THE TECHNOCRATIC TREND The purpose in the following section is fourfold: (1) to construct a typology of changing governance patterns in Mexico; (2) to consider the ideal governance types that result when two axes — technical rationality and the relationship between party leaders and government officials — are brought together; (3) to consider where a range of case studies might be located upon this typology; and (4) to assess whether there is a general trend towards more technocratic governance and a decline in partisanship in contemporary Mexican municipalities. Constructing the typology Rarely are typologies entirely satisfactory. Often they oversimplify what is a complex reality sometimes to the extent of caricature; moreover, they usually offer a snapshot, and don’t

344

Peter M. Ward

take even short-term changes into account. In this case my aim in seeking to develop a typology is to provide a heuristic that may allow the reader to envisage the different types of governance structure in Mexico, and to suggest that specific three-year administrations may be located approximately within that typology. This assumes, of course, that individual municipal administrations do not change significantly in their policy imprimatur, mode of functioning and political rationality over the three year period. Detailed research suggests that this tends to be the case unless there is a change of municipal president; once policy and governance direction are established by the incoming administration these do not change greatly, although the dynamic of activity and implementation does show a three-year dynamic.5 It is also hoped that the typology will allow the reader to conceptualise the broad directional changes in governance that appear to be taking place in contemporary Mexico. A typology of partisanship in governance can be constructed from two variables: (1) technical rationality; and (2) party—government relations. Taking ‘technical rationality’ first, this is defined as the propensity of government officials to make decisions according to technical criteria, rather than on partisan criteria. An example from city politics can help make this definition more concrete. In cities in which some residents are deprived of city services (e.g. garbage collection, water treatment, etc.) and in which resources do not permit extension of such services to all residents, government officials must decide which residents or neighbourhoods will receive services first. What should be their criteria? At one extreme, the technocrat would argue service extension should further the rational social development of the city, and that services should be extended (perhaps even first, if that is technically rational) to areas known to have voted against the party in power. At the other extreme, the official would dispense services in a highly political manner designed to punish opponents and reward supporters. Technical criteria would be absent from the decision-making process (Gilbert and Ward, 1985). Of course, real-world political decision-making is unlikely to conform fully to either of these extremes. Still, if we think of decision-making as lying on a continuum of technical rationality, it is possible to gauge the extent to which technical criteria inform governmental decisions. But what criteria should be used to determine the degree to which technical rationality does or does not dominate? Several criteria can be employed: (1) the educational and professional history of the top officials in an administration; (2) financial and fiscal management of public revenues and resources; and (3) the nature of the urban policy agenda pursued by officials. Looking at the educational and professional history of city officials is important because those who hold degrees (particularly graduate degrees) in the fields of science, engineering and business, particularly those who have worked in the private sector for a number of years, may be more likely to apply technical rationality in their decision-making than officials who lack such degrees or private sector experience. Even where the latter are highly trained technically (as they often are), their career paths are much more steeped in, and dependent upon, party political orthodoxy. An assessment of public financial management provides perspectives on issues of transparency, accountability and intergovernmental relations. Looking at urban policy agendas is important because it allows us to gauge the extent to which technical or partisan criteria actually prevail in governmental decisions about the distribution and outcomes of publicly provided services. The second principal variable is party—government relations. This, too, lies on a continuum. The issue here is the extent to which party leaders are able to influence the decisions of elected government officials who are their appointees. The assumption is that when ties between party leaders and government officials are strong and ongoing, the party is likely to

Changes in governance in Mexico

345

have substantial influence within the government. Since party leaders are likely to view government as a means to benefit the party and its supporters, government decisions in the context of a strong party—government relationship are likely to reflect the partisan preferences of the party leadership. Conversely, where ties between party leaders and the government are loose, government officials are likely to be less beholden to the party, and thus have greater room to manoeuvre politically. In this situation, the path towards technocratic styles of governance that eschew partisanship opens up to government officials. It is important to recognise that these are ‘ideal-types’, and that in reality each axis or dimension is a continuum, and that only relatively few cases will be polarised at one or other end. In the municipal context, four indicators can be examined to gauge the nature of the party—government relationship and overlap: (1) agenda setting; (2) financial or other supports derived from city coffers to the party; (3) administrative appointments; and (4) campaign/city council politics. The first indicator asks who sets and shapes the government’s priorities — the party or the mayor — and considers to what end the machinery of government is employed. The second indicator regarding finance is concerned to know whether a party’s operational budget and/or personnel are padded with government funds (as was often the case with the PRI) or are used to foster a particular party-supporting constituency or group. The third indicator looks at who gets appointed to top and mid-level positions in the government, and why? Is hiring based on party loyalty and/or technical expertise? If both elements apply, which is given primary consideration? The final indicator considers who gets to select the slate (planilla) of city council hopefuls who will come into office on the coat-tails of the mayoral candidate. Do party leaders or the mayoral candidate take the lead in the selection process? Furthermore, once the mayor and her/his slate take office and form the city council (cabildo), are they party members of her/his persuasion or are they drawn from party cliques other than her/his own, as well as from the opposition parties? This will shape the extent to which the cabildo works with the mayor, and is consulted and given a voice in policy decisions. A strong party—government relationship would likely lead to highly partisan position-taking within the council, while a weaker relationship — in which a mayor is unfettered by strict party considerations — might promote an inclusionary attitude and some attempt to reach out across party lines (although this is not always the case, as will be shown below). Defining the extremes Using the elements outlined in the previous section, the typology of partisanship in governance is presented in Fig. 1. Four broad types of governance emerge when technical rationality and party—government relations are considered together as continua on two axes. Machine politics, occupying the lower-right corner is typified by a strong party— government relationship and a low degree of technical rationality. In machine politics, governmental decisions are based upon political rather than technical criteria, and there is a tight relationship between the political party or the political agenda and its representatives in the government. It is hence the most partisan form of governance. This ‘ideal type’ corresponds roughly to the machine politics that flourished in both the United States (nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) and in some respects resembles Mexico during much of the twentieth century under PRI hegemony (although here the no re-election clause means that the boss around which the machine functions cannot remain in office over a long

346

Peter M. Ward

*1a"Tijuana 1989—1992; 1b"Tijuana 1992—1995 (see Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1994) *2a"San Pedro Garza Garcı´ a 1988—1991; 2b"San Pedro Garza Garcı´ a 1991—1994 (see Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1996) *3"Monterrey 1991—1994 (see Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1996) *4a"Mexicali 1989—1992; 4b"Mexicali 1992—1995 (see Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1994) *5"Atoyac de Alvarez, 1992—1995 (see Cabrero Mendoza, 1995) *6/7"Tlalnepantla 1993—1996 (Cardeas and Santos, 1996) and Naucalpan 1993-1996 (Conde Bonfil, 1996) *8"Morelia 1991—1993 (Rodrı´ guez and Ward, case study archive) FIG 1 Typology of Changing Trends of Municipal Governance in Mexico

time, although s/he may continue to be the power behind the scenes). Individual politicians may use the city council machine to consolidate their support base by serving their own constituencies (spatial, ethnic, class) preferentially. Classic political machines are those of Mayor Richard Daley in Chicago during the 1920s and of Mayor Chagas Freitas in Rio de Janeiro during the 1970s (Diniz, 1982). It is a ‘spoils system’ in which the benefits and privileges of government belong primarily to the party-in-government and to that party’s supporters. Political patronage, which by definition eschews technical or rational decisionmaking, is used to build and maintain a smooth-running political organisation, which is in turn used to organise campaigns and to deliver the vote. Although somewhat different and less personalised, in Mexico, the ruling PRI often used this style of governance from the 1930s through the 1980s at all levels of government to maintain its grip on power in what was then seen as a nominally democratic political system (Cornelius and Craig, 1991; Cornelius, 1996).

Changes in governance in Mexico

347

¹echnocratic governance (upper-left corner) combines high technical rationality in decision-making with an extremely weak relationship between party leaders and government officials. Decisions typically are made on the basis of technical or rational criteria by government officials acting independently of party officials. Political patronage plays a negligible role in bureaucratic appointments. Policies are pursued not because they benefit the party-in-government’s supporters or boost the party’s chances of winning the next election, but rather they are pursued because they are the most cost-effective or contribute to the rational social development of the city — in short, because they somehow address the common good of the community. This is, therefore, the most non-partisan form of governance. As will be shown below, several of the PAN city administrations analysed in our studies fall close to the technocratic ‘ideal type’. However, it should be noted that while the notion of technocratic governance connotes apolitical decision-making, politics never can be removed from real-world governing. Politics is ever-present, given that public policies — no matter how strongly directed toward the common good — will always favour some individuals or groups over others. The typology adopted also produces two other forms of governance: modernising (upper-right corner) and indigenous—autonomous (the bottom-left corner). So-called ‘modernising’ governance is characterised by a strong party—government relationship combined with a high degree of technical rationality. Policy-making is informed by strong party considerations over the political philosophy adopted and its active conversion into an agenda for implementation, but the actual day-to-day decision-making is made according to technical considerations without direct and ongoing partisan intervention. This is the direction in which some of the most recently elected governments of all three parties appear to be headed (including so-called ‘New’ PRI administrations), as politicians realise the desirability of winning electoral support through more effective and less partisan administration from City Hall. In order to compete more effectively with the PAN’s cleangovernment message, the PRI is recognising the need to eschew traditional long-time local party hacks in favour of more credible and locally admired candidates from the business and civic community, even if these people have much weaker ties to the party. However, this may bring the more independent-minded PRI mayors into a struggle with local party officials who have not yet accepted the notion that government belongs to the community, rather than to the party. We see this quite clearly in Monterrey, which in 1991 elected former businessman Benjamin Reyes Clariond as mayor under the PRI banner (Clariond, 1992, 1993). Clariond’s independent and technically oriented style of governance was said to have infuriated local PRI officials, who already were upset that President Carlos Salinas de Gortari had imposed Clariond on the local party structure. By asserting his independence and undermining long-held assumptions in the party about the proper use of government resources, Clariond established himself as a moderniser — someone working within a long-established set of institutional relationships yet at the same time attempting to alter those relationships by carving out an independent place for himself (see Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1996a).6 Also, as opposition parties gain more experience, become better organised and more subject to party central office influence, then it seems likely that they, too, may be drawn away from the technocratic highground towards a ‘modernising’ party-cum-technically rational governance system. The PAN’s second trienio in Tijuana under Hector Osuna (1992—1995) showed a greater willingness to embrace some degree of party political rationality than did the first municipal president Carlos Montejo Favela who broke the

348

Peter M. Ward

logjam and won the city for the PAN in 1989 (Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1994a). While the PRI is learning to play down the extent to which the party directly influences policy-making, the PAN may find it desirable to play down an overriding adherence to technocracy (see also Aziz, 1996). Autonomous governance, on the other hand, combines low technical rationality with a weak party—government linkage. This form of governance takes three forms: the local autocratic form of government associated with rural bosses often called caciques. These may be located rather closer to the ‘machine politics’ end of the spectrum since the rationale is firmly one of using public office to preferentially disburse the ‘spoils’, thereby extending one’s personal political control. Although not able to be re-elected, the cacique seeks to ensure her/his dominance through municipal presidents of her/his choosing, a practice which the PRI in the past condoned so long as political (electoral) support for its national and gubernatorial candidates was assured by these local strong men. Some caciques may also mobilise their personal fiefdoms to gain important positions in a political party, as did Gonzalo Santos and Carlos Jonguitud Barrios in San Luis Potosı´ (Pansters, 1996). It is generally recognised that while cacicazgos are less common today, they remain entrenched in many rural areas of the country. The second form of autonomous government systems exist in many indigenous populated areas where municipal president elections are grafted onto time-worn village governance practices called usos y costumbres or its recent equivalent of derecho indı& gena in Chiapas. These indigenous practices are understood and preferred by the largely Indian population, and they elect their leaders to office usually for a one-year term. Far from dying out, there is some resurgence of interest and promotion of usos y costumbres as a form of governance in the remote and more indigenous municipios of south and central Mexico (Bailo´n, 1995; Cabrero Mendoza, 1995). Sometimes the PRI and the PRD have sought to develop agreements with these autonomous municipalities, agreeing to leave their selection process intact, but urging that they come under the formal party banner. Many others are left untouched and are registered as ‘uso y costumbres’ governments. A third type of autonomous government are those not of the uso y costumbres type, but which are politically autonomous, often radical, and have no links to any political party. Examples are limited since such governments have raised the national and local PRI’s ire, and have often been highly conflictive, resulting in municipal lock-outs, often ending in police intervention and the creation of an interim shared government or concejo municipal. Another reason for their relative rarity these days is the greater possibilities for them to run under a PRD banner. Finally, there are a large number of smaller, rural and dispersed population municipalities that have a very low level of technical capacity of the administrative apparatus, and given the poverty of the municipality, are almost totally dependent upon state and federal transfers for their operating budget. They are included under the ‘Traditional PRI’ label in Fig. 1, since this has long since been the traditional area from which the PRI has drawn its electoral strength. Recent attempts at municipal strengthening seek to shift the nature of these governance structures from the lower centre of the typology, into the central and upper areas (see Fig. 1). However, in so doing, the dependency upon the party and supra-local PRI governments is weakened, and the challenge for the PRI is how to retain this traditional loyalty while giving the municipalities greater autonomy. The arrows in Fig. 1 also indicate a hypothesised trend towards a more technocratic style of governance. Movement toward the technocratic cell can occur in various ways, depending

Changes in governance in Mexico

349

on the origin of the movement. A machine style of governance, for example, can gravitate towards the technocratic governance cell, and is most clearly demonstrated (especially in northern cities) in which the PAN has won power from the PRI. PAN governing officials typically begin with weak party—government relations (given the weakness of the party structure) and quickly attempt to follow through on campaign promises of clean, effective, and transparent government. In doing so, the city is propelled from the machine politics cell directly to (or very near to) the extreme corner of the technocratic governance cell. A clear example of the PRI also adopting an almost exclusively technocratic stance is Tlalnepantla, 1994—1996 (Ca´rdenas and Santos, 1996). On the other hand, it is hypothesised that the modernising cell is more likely to become the highground goal for the ‘New’ PRI, as it accepts the principle of electoral competition and acknowledges the possibilities of alternancia, and as it seeks to offer viable and credible alternatives for local government, but in a way that combines political sensitivity with technocracy. This requires that the PRI distance itself from the old party rearguard, particular those sections tied to traditional corporatism and to a ‘spoils’ patronage politics. Occasionally, as in the case of Mayor Clariond in Monterrey where there was an important demonstration effect of the PAN in adjacent San Pedro, the PRI may also stray into the technocratic governance cell. However, as suggested above, an over-adherence to a high technocratic/low party regime may prove to be unsustainable, requiring those parties which opt for it in the first instance to retrench, and to move more towards the upper-centre and upper-right cells. In short, good administration such as that of the PRI in Tlalnepantla 1994—1996, may not prove to be good government, nor may it be enough to avoid losing power to another party.7 After the early breakthrough victories of the PAN in many cities, subsequent trienios appear also to move towards the ‘modernising-high technocratic’ cell as both the party and incumbents realise the desirability of using government to improve local party strength and organisation. Regarding the trends emanating from autonomous governance. It is hypothesised that as caciquismo continues to be eroded, so ‘machine’ politics will also decline. Where they can, the PRI or other political parties such as the PRD may seek to draw leaders elected under usos y costumbres towards their particular banner. Alternatively, they will seek to recruit leaders and to help them to move towards the middle ground of greater technical rationality, supporting efforts to develop and implement appropriate policy responses for local citizens in ways that will help the party garner continuing support at the polls. The same is true for the traditional dependent municipalities where all parties are seeking to identify local leaders with credibility who are capable of getting elected under the more transparent and fair electoral system that appears to be in place, particularly since 1997. Recent case studies in municipal governance: on the edge of a general trend? For reasons of length it is not possible to include here detailed case studies of Mexican municipal governance.8 Indeed, such detail is probably no longer necessary given the recent proliferation of published case studies about municipal government (Cabrero Mendoza, 1995, 1996; Guille´n Lo´pez, 1995, 1996a; Merino, 1994; Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1992, 1994a, 1995; Ziccardi, 1995). Rather, now that we have established a good baseline of research on municipalities (albeit heavily weighted to large cities), it seems preferable to identify common trends that may be discerned from these case studies. It is important to recognise

350

Peter M. Ward

that many of these changes described below are most often found in larger urbanised municipalities which have greater administrative capacity and opportunities for internal income revenue generation, although this is not exclusively the case. Autonomous and dependent governance systems associated with rural municipalities with dispersed populations sometimes also appear to be responding in similar directions (see Cabrero Mendoza, 1995, the case of Atoyac de Alvarez). Another important caveat is that many of these case studies are PANista cities located in the north, and in the conservative Bajı´ o region of central Mexico, as well as ‘New’-PRI municipalities in the north and in the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City. With the important exception of COCEI governments in Juchita´n, Oaxaca, there are relatively few studies for municipalities in the south of the country (Clarke, 1996; Rubin, 1994). Also, there are fewer true-PRDista city studies than for other major parties, in part because until its victories in the November 1996 elections in the metropolitan area of Mexico City and its major success in the 1997 Federal District elections, most of the party’s government experiences were in small mostly rural municipalities, and/or were cases where local leaders with little or no PRD party militancy had been ‘adopted’ and subsequently won election (as was the case in Atoyac de Alvarez). An important exception, however, was Morelia, the state capital of Michoaca´n, which was won by Ca´rdenas’ former (1988) campaign chief of staff Samuel Maldonado in 1991. Our case study research in Morelia shows attempts towards technocratic government and administrative systems on the part of Maldonado (a public administration graduate and part-time professor), but he was undermined at every turn by strong partisan responses by the state and local PRI (see also Bruhn, 1996; Maldonado, 1993). As the PRD captures more cities and does so with its own militants, I would expect the party to follow the PRI and PAN and to seek to develop governance systems that might be located in the ‘modernising’ cell of Fig. 1, combining more technocratic governance with the goal of developing the local party organisation and following. Recruitment patterns Collectively one may observe an apparent shift towards greater technocracy in the government of municipalities in Mexico. In our research into patterns of recruitment the data suggest that party affiliation or sympathy is no longer a sine qua non for appointment to public office, and that the time-worn influence of patronage of the PRI political machine to shape recruitment has waned. Today, when parties select candidates, they appear to be looking beyond their rank-and-file in favour of candidates who have local credibility and proven leadership, and who are likely to get elected in an increasingly competitive environment. Nor does the trend stop with elected positions. There is greater pluralism in party representation within government, especially among non-PRI parties which, perhaps by necessity, have had to look beyond their party ranks in order to fill the range of municipal positions. But even the PRI is becoming more open to non-party members. Jobs are no longer seen as sinecures, nor are appointments likely to be made on the basis of cronyism, nepotism kick-backs, or to partisans who are placed on the municipal payroll without fulfilling a job (aviadores). These features are in decline, with the growing expectancy that an individual should be competent and capable of doing at least a half-way reasonable job that will reflect well upon the administration. Credentials, experience, and proven administrative capacity are all increasingly favoured. Party and/or personal loyalty are less crucial than in the past. Finally, although I have not measured it systematically, there appears to be greater continuity of higher and middle-order staff in municipal government, notwithstanding the

Changes in governance in Mexico

351

continuing pressures for major turnover derived from the no re-election clause which prohibits back-to-back election of the same person to the municipal presidency. Even senior public officials may be retained from one administration to another, and this is even more likely for middle and lower ranking staff. Nevertheless Mexico remains a long way from creating the equivalent of a civil service. However, both the issues of re-election as well the creation of an administrative civil service are now being discussed, and a consensus appears to be forming over the desirability of reforms that would generate greater continuity and effectiveness within public administration. Municipal fiscal and financial management This trend towards greater pluralism and technocratic management is apparent in several key arenas of municipal public administration. In terms of fiscal and financial management there has been a dramatic improvement in the fiscal basis of many municipalities, especially those with substantial urban populations who form a stronger potential tax base for local revenue generation (Bailey, 1995; Rodrı´ guez, 1995). In all of the urban municipalities which I have analysed, the traditional dependence upon federal and state transfers (participaciones) for 70—80 per cent of the income has declined, and often the proportions of indirect to direct (ingresos propios) income sources have been inverted. Today the lion’s share of resources comes from direct income, especially from taxes and user fees which are now being collected more assiduously. This has required the overhaul and regular revision of the basis upon which these taxes and fees are levied in order to maintain their real levels, and in order to reduce subsidies in the case of user fees. In poor rural municipalities with more dispersed populations the dependency upon participaciones remains, and almost all of it goes on current expenditures of officials’ salaries. In these rural regions there is less opportunity to generate direct income for current and investment expenditures and as in the past these municipalities remain beholden to federal and state actors for capital investment and special projects. One important difference that has emerged in the past eight years is that social welfare investment programs have been more widely leveraged by municipalities, whether these were administered through PRONASOL or through Ramo XXVI appropriations.9 Moreover, the mechanisms for levering these resources favours those municipalities which demonstrate local capacity for organisation, participation, and for self-ordering their priorities. The extent to which state and federal government authorities have been able to exercise patronage appears to become less pervasive than in previous decades. This inflow of resources for local projects has often had a dramatic effect upon the level of financing received by municipalities and upon the number of development projects that have been implemented. Equally important, the resources have often contributed to a strengthening of municipal administration and government.10 One of the arenas of partisanship that looms today under New Federalism is the increasing powers of state legislatures and governors in determining the fiscal and development investment agendas of municipalities. In some states (PAN governor Vicente, Fox in Guanajuato for example), the governor and congress have set up more routinised and apparently non-partisan mechanisms for allocating funds and for prioritising municipal investment programs. In others such as PRI governor Manuel Bartlett in Puebla, funds are much more tightly and personalistically controlled, raising the opportunity for the exercise of partisanship and engendering conflict with PANista mayors, not least in the state capital itself. In other states (San Luis Potosı´ for example), any partisan intentions are largely moot, since the federal government effectively

352

Peter M. Ward

sidelines the state government by earmarking funds to specific municipalities (see also endnote 10). While the level of revenue sharing through participaciones has not increased significantly as many municipal officials would like (from the current 20 percent to 30 or 35 percent of the total sum transferred to the states), the criteria relating to their distribution by states are becoming more transparent and better understood. Also, by 1996 almost one-half of the states in Mexico had created a state-wide ¸ey de Coordinacio& n Fiscal to determine the distribution. Municipal officials have a better idea of what determines their allocated transfers and what they might do to maximise the amount due to them (by being more aggressive in tax collection, for example). But they are also expected to report accurately and frequently upon incomes and expenditures, and many municipalities have taken measures to open up the ‘black-box’ of financial management, making regular announcements about the budget in the press, on public bulletin boards, and through the cabildo. In order to ensure greater accountability, and in some cases to improve collection of direct income, municipalities have upgraded their human and physical resources in the financial management sector: by hiring more staff, by computerisation and training, and sometimes by even adopting new accounting methods such as zero-based budgeting. Policy agenda-setting The determination of policy agendas also shows less discretionality from the local executive, both in terms of prioritising activities, as well as in the manner of implementation. There is more an attempt to foster public consultation and participation in the ranking of priorities. The criteria for deciding which communities will benefit from public works is less likely to be determined by partisan influences and more by technical criteria of need, costs, period in the ‘queue’, etc. (with some notable exceptions, of course). Several key areas have become the focus for improved service provision. Policing and security services have often been modernised, especially by PANista city administrations, for whom this has been a high priority (Ward, 1995) . Similarly, regulating street vending and reforming the operation of the rastro, have often been PANista priorities.11 Street lighting is another public service that many municipalities have improved. In each of these cases, responsibility lies firmly with the municipality. Other public services, such as water and drainage, while also a municipal responsibility, require state and federal intervention because of their ‘lumpy’ nature and high capital costs (Bennett, 1995). PRONASOL funds for domestic water provision and other relatively high cost projects did have the effect of strengthening the autonomy of municipalities to extend their activities in these arenas without being overly dependent upon good relations with the state government. In some notable cases, too, municipalities have sought to privatise public services such as water (Aguascalientes), refuse (garbage) collection and certain policing functions (see Conde Bonfil, 1996 and Dı´ az Flores and Garcı´ a del Castillo, 1996, respectively). Concepts such as ‘total quality’ are also being applied to public sector municipal and state management systems (Ca´rdenas and Santos, 1996). Party—government relations and overlaps The separation between a political party and government has also become an important issue in Mexico’s democratic transition (Centeno and Maxwell, 1992; Centeno, 1994;

Changes in governance in Mexico

353

Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1994b).12 Thus we have begun to observe important changes in the nature of party—government relations. Not only have patterns of recruitment become more plural and less party influenced, but the traditional conformity with party orthodoxy which placed municipal presidents subservient to the strict hierarchy of state and federal executives above them has diminished, especially with the presence of different political parties in power at state and municipal levels, as well as in some local legislatures. Now those in government have greater autonomy and look less to the party for their future career development. There have also been major changes in state—citizen relations, with opposition parties breaking the mould of PRI corporatist organisations being treated preferentially by local government officials. Non-partisan or less partisan municipal presidents have begun to reach out to citizens, creating new and usually direct linkages with city hall. These links have been cemented by improved bureaucratic procedures to make administration easier and less time consuming (the ventanilla unica scheme for example). Officials are also expected to make themselves more readily available to respond to citizen demands—as in the case of the weekly servicing ‘tianguis’ in the courtyard of the City Hall of Leo´n, Guanajuato. Perhaps in part because of the municipal strengthening role of PRONASOL and the creation of Solidarity Committees, many municipal governments have sought to develop new opportunities for citizen participation organisation in local government. This has taken the form of the creation of citizen committees, community organisations, comisarı& as, and so on. Usually such committees are apolitical and have no formal links to political parties. Thus, there has been an important opening in the civic culture of government, displacing the partisan political culture that dominated formerly. In many municipalities the role of the cabildo is becoming more significant. Its form of integration remains an anomaly since alderman (regidores and sı& ndicos) are ‘elected’ on the coat-tails of the municipal president, and depending upon the state municipal code which determines how city councils are integrated, the level of multi-party representation varies. Nevertheless, cabildos are more likely than ever before to meet in open sessions and play the role of public ‘watchdog’ with oversight of programs and budget. Rarely are they the prime organ for policy-making and prioritisation however, so much so that in the case of Atoyac de Alvarez even though the cabildo was open to broader citizen participation, the mayor felt that this was insufficient, and she created an additional (higher) tier to provide for public participation and debate (see Cabrero Mendoza, 1995). Cabildos can be the locus of partisanship and inter-party strife, however. An unwary municipal president might find that his or her planilla is stacked by the party’s municipal committee with people whose loyalty and policy inclinations lean more heavily towards the party apparatchiks than to the incoming municipal president. Some candidates, when canvassed by party officials about whether they would be willing to run, made control over selection of their planilla a precondition. Others who did not, often found themselves beleaguered in the cabildo by aldermen of their own party, and not just by opposition members. Work in the cabildos of three municipalities in Baja California suggested that party politics and partisanship were alive and well at least within that sphere of local government (Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1994a; see also Guille´n Lo´pez, 1995, 1996a). Perhaps this is one area where, thus far at least, we have seen less innovation in municipal governance in Mexico, although this, too, may prove to be a false assertion once research begins to analyse cabildos more systematically.

354

Peter M. Ward

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE TREND TOWARDS TECHNOCRACY The shift towards more technocratic governance and the changing nature of partisanship identified in this paper are, I believe, indicative of a broader trend driven by several factors which are briefly identified below. A primary reason is the increasing competitiveness of the elections. Until 1988 few people in Mexico had much confidence that voting for any party other than the PRI would be translated into opposition government victories. Whatever the reasons for the greater willingness of the PRI and federal government to recognise opposition victories after 1989, the ‘prize’ of opposition government began to be conceded thereafter. However, between 1989—1994 winning power remained subject to negotiation, and to vote overturns. The series of COFIPE reforms from 1990 through 1994 were crucial determinants of this new-found electoral environment in which, by and large, the vote has come to be respected even if the process itself remained unfair and stacked heavily in favour of the PRI. Later COFIPE reforms in 1996 paved the way for further improvements which led to a more level playing field and relatively clean elections in 1997. Other difficulties remain, particularly with the state electoral organs which generally have not advanced so far in their capacity to mount elections. Especially important in this process has been the so-called citizenisation of electoral processes removing the federal government representation, and reducing the (formerly) dominant role of the political parties, and to replace it with non-party citizen counsellors who now have paramountcy in electoral commissions. This has contributed to a dramatic decline in the endemic ‘cultura de sospecha’ that Mexicans previously had towards elections, and it is also indicative of the increased expectancies that exist today among Mexicans for greater civic involvement in government. The NGO called ‘Civic Alliance’ achieved a high degree of civic monitoring of the 1994 federal elections. A much larger number of election precincts today will have representatives of the major political parties present and involved in the count. In short, notwithstanding flawed elections in Yucata´n and Tabasco in 1995, there is greater confidence that election results will be respected—as appears to have been the case in July 1997. However, this new-found respect for elections did not mean that they were necessarily fair, nor that electoral malfeasance will not occur. Nor did it obviate the occasional recourse to post-electoral conflict, especially where the PRI was determined to have won by a narrow margin.13 The cases of Monterrey in 1994 and Hueyotzingo in 1996 both bore witness to the PAN’s ability to negotiate a post-election deal that would award them the benefit of the doubt and the municipal government. But generally speaking, there is greater respect for elections, and as a result, there is greater interest and incentive to participate in them. Moreover, the 1997 mid-term election results suggest that parties agree to respect the vote even when they lose by a relatively small (three or four per cent) margin. Even in Campeche where the PRD candidate claimed widespread fraud in the state election, while she threatened to mobilise on the streets she received only half-hearted support from the PRD leadership. The second major reason for the observed technocratic shift in governance stems directly from the first. ‘Opposition’ parties have won power at the state and municipal levels, and in so doing have broken the mould of government practices. Although there are differences between the PAN and the PRD, by drawing new sectors of the population into government (the private sector and business groups for example in the case of the PAN), so they have also furnished public administration with new techniques and new ways of doing things

Changes in governance in Mexico

355

(Mizrahi, 1994a, b). Whether the ‘business enterprise’ model is an appropriate one for local government will be discussed further below, but the PAN in particular has demonstrated the desirability and benefits that may be derived from more transparent financial management and by greater efficiency. More importantly, by not being subject to the political orthodoxy which governed relations with federal and state overlords, they were able to break the mould of traditional political relations, both with governors and with PRI corporatist organisations. The ability to exercise a new-found autonomy was a breath of fresh air in opening-up City Hall to the possibility of innovation. Our research in Chihuahua and elsewhere suggests that these innovations were often emulated by the PRI where it won back the government in a subsequent election. Once the orthodoxy of control was broken, there appears to have been little attempt to restore it — and certainly not in its entirety. By 1996 approximately one third of the population was governed by parties other than the PRI, and this rose to over one half-of the nation after the July 1997 elections. This includes PAN control of all of the major metropolitan areas other then Mexico City (Guadalajara, Monterrey, Puebla), as well as many state capitals such as Oaxaca, Tuxtla Gutie´rrez, Aguascalientes, Hermosillo, Morelia, Me´rida, Mexicali, Saltillo, San Luis Potosı´ , and an overall total of 248 municipalities (as well as six of the 31 states). The PRD, too, governs in over 294 of the nation’s municipalities, most of them rural and town districts rather than large urban areas — with the significant exceptions, of the Federal District ‘governorship’ several municipalities in the Mexico City metropolitan area, and the state capitals of Colima and Jalapa. Some 405 municipalities mostly in the southern state of Oaxaca are governed outside the formal party system through the traditional usos y costumbres structure (CESEM 1998). This has generated a rich diversity of municipal governance experiences and, above all, the rising expectancy that parties respond more positively and more equitably to citizen demands. This leads me to a third reason for wider technocratic governance: ¹he need for parties to exercise effective government in order to remain in power. Governor Ruffo won power in the state of Baja California on a ‘sweep the rascals out of office’ platform after a series of ineffective and corrupt PRI governors had plundered the state and totally eroded any credibility and support that the PRI had ever enjoyed.14 Recognising the possibilities of another alternancia six years later that would bring the PRI back into office, Ruffo insisted when I interviewed him in 1993, that the PAN’s best chances in 1995 would be on its record of good government. The point here is that parties have had to be responsive to the expectancy of improved and responsible government. Hence the need to select candidates with local credibility; the need to develop coherent agendas; the need to govern efficientl y and to maximise program implementation, all of which will reflect well on the party and get their candidates re-elected.15 This has required that parties rethink and regroup. For the PRI it has been a tough learning curve, as six decades of patronage and control over political careers has had to be totally revamped to the new realities (Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1996a). No longer can the PRI depend upon its corporatist organisations to guarantee the vote, nor can it rely upon fraud if all else fails. Also it cannot maintain party installations and activists on the public purse. Nevertheless the PRI has one major advantage over the other parties at the local level, and that is the existing level of base-level organisation that it enjoys throughout the country. Although a considerable number of those base-level cells have collapsed since 1995, the current challenge for the PRI is to recast itself so that it may sustain its density of local organisational activity and maintain the loyalty of its partisans.

356

Peter M. Ward

Tying the party’s electoral manifesto to issues of good governance, choosing credible candidates, and then keeping their electoral promises will be a crucial element in determining whether the PRI is successful in rising to that challenge. In the interim, of course, the failure to improve the economic well-being for the majority of the population, combined with corruption scandals, led to major reversals in 1997 including the loss of overall majority control of Congress, although the PRI remains the dominant party by a considerable margin. Traditionally opposition parties have been characterised by weak links between party and electorate. Their unstable relationship with the electorate contrasts sharply with that of the PRI, which since the 1930s has cultivated corporate relationships with peasants, workers, and the middle classes. These institutionalised relationships guaranteed the PRI a stable base of support, which it used to crush electorally weakly organised opposition parties. But as these relationships began to unravel in the 1980s, and as the political space was deliberately opened for the opposition, so despite their weak organisational capacities and tenuous links to the electorate they were able to capitalise on the electorate’s widespread discontent with the PRI and with the federal government. Even if opposition parties wished to engage in machine politics, their weak organisational base makes this impossible. Simply put, they lack the stable links to the electorate that make machine politics possible. Therefore the path toward technocratic governance has remained wide open. For the PAN and the PRD, therefore, the electoral challenge is somewhat different. Neither begins to approach the organisational density of the PRI, and can less easily be masters of their fate. Thus far the PRD has acted in a largely ad hoc fashion, adopting local candidates who may have little ideological or party affinity. For them the challenge will be to develop a more replicable party agenda that they can press upon candidates who stand under the party banner. Only in so doing will they have anything consistent to offer local populations rather than the serendipity of a local leader who is neither PRI nor PAN. The PRD’s success in 1997, particularly in Mexico City’s Federal District where Ca´rdenas won a landslide victory, offers the party leadership the opportunity to begin to overcome its rather motley camp-follower image, to forge a more consistent local government platform, and to do so on the centre-stage. Although the PAN appears to go from strength to strength adding two more governorships in 1997 (including the all-important northern state of Nuevo Leo´n) it, too, is now having to address problems associated with the exercise of government rather than sniping from the sidelines as opposition. Part of the PAN’s difficulty lies in the ideological divisions within the party, particularly those that exist between its party ideologues and activists on the one hand, and its local governing practitioners on the other (Camp, 1995). The former tend to occupy positions in party headquarters and in Congress. Those who have entered municipal and state government for the PAN thus far, have invariably done so on an improved government agenda, rather than on an ideological one. Nor has the PAN sought to develop the party bases by exercising partisanship towards its militants and its supporters when in power. Almost as if to underscore the difference of its new modus operandi compared with that of the PRI, first trienio PANista administrations in particular have often alienated local party supporters and militants. In the earlier victories, the lack of experienced party workers has forced the party to turn to the business and professional sectors for its senior officials and local candidates, which in turn has reinforced the tendency of PAN mayors to govern technocratically. Guille´n Lo´pez (1996b) terms this ‘permeability’, by which he means the ease of civic representatives to move into positions of authority

Changes in governance in Mexico

357

without being, necessarily, long-term party members or adherents. This permeability declines in second and third trienios, as party rule and control increases. Second and third trienios appear to act somewhat more adeptly and politically, perhaps because it is increasingly difficult to demonstrate and eulogise a fresh approach after three or six years in office. Whatever the reason, they tend to show a tendency to move across into the ‘modernising’ box of Fig. 1. The PAN has also begun to be more selective of candidates from among the party faithful. It appears that after the initial breakthrough the hand of the local party apparatus has been strengthened, and it can now begin to select candidates from a larger pool and more of its own choosing. Nevertheless, the PAN just like the other parties, must increasingly identify itself with a municipal policy agenda that is both ideologically consistent, and at the same time different to that of its principal protagonists. Another problem increasingly faced by the PAN is that not all of its governance experiences have been positive: the PAN, too, has begun to experience criticism for some elected officials who through incompetence, ill-judgement, or corruption, have severely embarrassed the party’s image. The municipal president of Zapopan (part of the metropolitan area of Guadalajara) was obliged to resign over financial mismanagement; and overzealous municipal presidents’ crusades against mini-skirts and what they consider to be inappropriate dress of employees has generated some public ridicule. Nor did former party president Castillo Peraza’s 1997 election campaign in the Federal District reflect particularly well on the party, choosing as he did to deliberately confront hostile audiences and to engage in a mud-slinging campaign against Ca´rdenas. In the event both tactics backfired badly, and only the party faithful stayed with him—around 17 per cent of the vote (Ward, 1997). A fourth set of factors that appears to have shaped the trend towards more technocratic management is the level of economic development. In the more economically developed areas of Mexico the issues dominating city policy agendas have begun to shift from an overarching concern to provide basic services, to more mixed agenda which includes management concerns related to planning, zoning and setback ordinances, conservation, contamination and quality of life issues (such as the environment), and options for rationally preparing for population growth while ensuring enough jobs for future city residents. As yet the parties appear not to have thought through their respective positions upon many of these issues. In the past this was unnecessary since the issues relating to basic services were so obvious and politically undeniable that they were uniformly embraced (within the constraints that investment resources allowed). In a new classic article, Scott (1969) contends that poverty plays a crucial role in the development of machine politics. The poor, whom he describes as the ‘mass clientele’ of machines, are highly receptive to ‘material inducements’ in the form of favours, jobs, money, or — in the case of Mexican cities — basic services (p. 1150). Traditionally the PRI used service provision and land regularisation as the cannon fodder for mobilising its political machine (Cornelius, 1975; Gilbert and Ward, 1985; Ward, 1981). While servicing issues remain important, cities generally have much higher servicing levels than most of their non-urban municipal counterparts, and since 1970 there has been a significant increase in the extension of public services to poor areas, such that by the 1990s it had become a less all-encompassing issue for city governments, many of which by now were PANista. Where basic services remained a political issue they were increasingly attended to under the PRONASOL program. As a result, the agenda of urban programs has become much more diversified, focusing upon licensing, sanitary code enforcement, street traders, markets and slaughterhouses, public parks and gardens, transport and

358

Peter M. Ward

policing, street cleansing and lighting, and most recently of all, the enforcement of urban planning codes. This agenda is intrinsically less amenable to party machine control. It is also inherently more technocratic and middle-class based. In predominantly rural municipalities, with higher levels of poverty and basic needs still unsatisfied, the potential for partisanship in decision making and service disbursement remains. However, the traditional constraint was always a lack of resources. Scarcity, therefore, heightened the stakes and the opportunities for clientelism, which the PRI exploited to good effect. Nevertheless, although some of the opportunities for systemic partisanship may have been reduced, major federal government programs and lines remain an important basis of PRI support. An excellent example is Chalco on the eastern outskirts of Mexico City. In the November 1996 elections in the State of Mexico, while other major mixed-income peripheral municipalities went to the PAN, and the PRD triumphed in working class Netzahuaco´yotl, Valle de Chalco/Solidaridad (as it is called) remained loyal to the PRI — not surprising given the privileged attention it received under both Salinas and Zedillo (Hiernaux, 1995). Last, but not least, it is important to recognise, and to give credit for, the impact that public policy and constitutional reform have had in leading the changes. Beyond the electoral arena already discussed, there has been a noticeable shift towards greater efficiency and effectiveness in public policy implementation since the late 1970s. This may be documented in a variety of arenas — housing, land regularisation, health care, public servicing, and so on (Ward, 1986, 1995). Part of the reason for the more effective use of resources and the improved policy content appears to have been the diminishing (political) returns of clientelism, and the need to ensure that social control be maintained, particularly during a period of ongoing austerity (1982—1989). Whatever the underlying rationale, the margins for political error due to ineffectual local government narrowed, and the PRI found itself losing a number of local elections culminating in the loss of Baja California in 1989. But in addition to this move towards more effective social policy at the federal level, reforms began to give greater responsibility and autonomy to municipal government, most notably President de la Madrid’s reform of Art. 115 in 1983. Subsequently, Ramo XXVI funds were increasingly targeted towards municipalities albeit through the states. As we have seen, PRONASOL and explicit programs for municipal strengthening have all emerged from an increasing federal commitment to reduce poverty and to improve living conditions in poor areas, but in ways that tend not to overtly involve partisanship, at least not at the municipal level. Most recently, New Federalism and the Poverty Combat Campaign which replaces PRONASOL with Ramo XXVI funding directly to the municipalities, also promises to strengthen non-partisan municipal governance (Rodrı´ guez, 1997). Similarly, the growing decentralisation of education and health care, along with the expectancy that states and larger urban municipalities manage more effectively their finance offices, urban development and public works programs, have all raised the stakes for technically competent government (Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1996b). These are often complex management issues, and the risks of leaving them in the hands of partisan or corrupt officials diminishes as an option. In short, effective intergovernmental relations between the federal, state, and municipal levels demands more modern governance systems and practices. The recently-published Urban Development Program 1995—2000 (SEDESOL, 1995) is a good example of the increasing reliance that is being placed upon improving the capacity of municipal administration to intervene efficiently in planning, urban development and land-use arenas, predicated upon more technocratic practices.

Changes in governance in Mexico

359

WELL RUN, BADLY GOVERNED? Most analysts view the turn away from machine politics that has accompanied Mexico’s slow transition to a more democratic government and politics as a healthy development. Transcending the blatantly partisan and patronage politics cultivated by the PRI over half a century is at least a necessary first step toward a more open and participatory system of governance at the municipal level. However, people may be less convinced that institutionalisation of highly technocratic style of governance is an optimum substitute. One possible unintended consequence of the drift towards a lower level of partisanship in Mexican municipalities may be the increasing inability of mayors to govern, even as they preside over highly efficient administrations and hence well-run cities. Whether this seeming paradox occurs will depend to a large extent upon the extent to which administrators and bureaucrats overwhelmingly dominate City Hall, and how far political parties and civil society are encouraged and able to participate in local government. My proposition here is a simple one: that there is an important difference between running a city and governing it. Lowi (1969: chap. 7) points to the breakdown of order in US cities in the 1960s, and suggests that a well-run city is not necessarily a well-governed city. Lowi attempts to refute the commonly accepted myth that ‘reform of large city governments toward technologically meaningful, efficiently bureaucratised political power is an appropriate form of governmental structure for all the problems the cities ever will face, and that any departures could only result in less efficiency, and, therefore, a reduction of the public interest’ (pp. 193—194). In fact, he contends that new bureaucratic machines have displaced the old-style political machines that governed most large US cities during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These new machines frustrate politicians’ efforts to govern by insulating bureaucrats and decentralising city government toward its career bureaucracies. They operate on the assumption that if bureaucrats ‘know their own specialities well enough, they are capable of reasoning out solutions dispassionately to problems they share with men of equal but different technical competencies’ (p. 201). The problem with this argument, Lowi notes, is that it ignores the limits of technical solutions to political problems. Lowi quotes Frankel (1964: 487) to make the point: ‘[D]ifferent [technical] elites disagree with each other; the questions with which specialists deal spill over into areas where they are not specialists, and they must either hazard amateur opinions or ignore such larger issues 2’ (pp. 201—202). The role of politicians is to transcend the neutral specialists and provide concrete political solutions to intractable community problems (see also Centeno, 1994). It is this art of governing that can be undermined if the drift toward technocracy goes too far. Significantly, after the major political reversals in Chihuahua’s 1995 mid-term elections PAN governor Francisco Barrio underscored the need to be less wedded to administrative reform and efficiency, and to give greater priority to politics per se (Aziz, 1996: 53). It may be that the trend towards technocratic management which we observe in Mexico is an overreaction to the partisanship and machine politics that went before, and that some redressing of the imbalance is required. This might feature attempts to foster ‘modernising governments’ in the top right of the typology (Fig. 1). In order to complement the more sound administrative practices, the aim should be to provide greater opportunities for political solutions and debate to enter the governance structure. There are several ways in which this might be achieved. First, through the creation of new instances of public participation in government. As the political culture opens in Mexico, so local governance

360

Peter M. Ward

will need to embrace the newly emerging civic culture, and not depend upon authoritarian, patriarchal or matriarchal leaders to provide. Thus new forms of leadership are required, particularly ones which will privilege collective responsibility and involvement. Interestingly, some of the major innovations in this direction came from the ‘traditional governance’ case of Atoyac de Alvarez, in which strong leadership forged new instances and opportunities for co-government. However, the recent law to deny independent party candidates the opportunity to run for elected office runs counter to this trend and appears deliberately to reduce the permeability of civic leaders moving into public office. Mexico requires that all individuals running for office must do so through a registered party, and party registration is determined by the appropriate electoral authorities at the state and national levels. This means that the importance of party organisations (particularly the smaller ones which may have no local relevance) is artificially inflated, and takes precedence over other (often civic) organisations which may have great local relevance, credibility and following. This tends to reduce the possibilities either for independents or for local organisations to enter government, unless they run under a political party ‘flag’ of convenience, and it marginalises, rather than encourages, popular participation. The proliferation of the practice of adoption of ‘flags’ or party franchises by individuals or groups in this way, while pragmatic, is considered by some analysts to run counter to greater representational and participatory democracy that is widely advocated (Guille´n Lo´pez, 1996b). If debate and accountability cannot be constructed through new or independent political organisations, then the alternative of opening-up government to party politics may not be so bad. This is not to advocate a return to partisanship or to machine politics, but rather to expect political parties to think through and explain how their particular ideology and strategy would impact upon local governance. Nuanced to particular conditions, parties might expect to have a greater say over the positions that their elected mayors adopt, even though their influence over the implementation by municipal officers should be minimal. Once elected, officials need to be made accountable to the citizens rather than to party apparatchiks. If the public isn’t convinced, then they will have the opportunity to register their displeasure at the subsequent elections, and elect an alternative party. Thirdly, and independent of whether parties do or do not become more involved in determining municipal governance, changing the law to allow for the possibility of reelection of municipal presidents (perhaps with term limits), would at a stroke lead to greater retention of administrative experience rather than the wholesale change every three years. More importantly in my view, it would provide greater incentive for individuals to do a good job in order to get themselves re-elected. Currently, the incentives are extremely limited.16 A fourth mechanism of improving local governance opportunities in Mexico would be to empower the cabildo. Although an overstatement of its actual functions, the cabildo plays a role of quasi-municipal legislature monitoring executive programs and approving expenditure, yet neither aldermen (regidores) nor trustees (sı& ndicos) are elected in their own right, either directly for municipal districts, or ‘at large’ throughout the municipality (or a mixture — sı& ndicos at large, and regidores on a district basis). There are major problems with the way in which composition of the cabildo is derived: it being drawn from a series of nominees who are ‘elected’ en bloc as part of the municipal president’s ticket. Moreover there is variation and ambiguity between states about the methods and proportions whereby ‘opposition’ members are included into the ayuntamiento (Guille´n Lo´pez, 1995, 1996a).

Changes in governance in Mexico

361

These anomalies and idiosyncrasies of composition make for a lack of political or civic authority of cabildo members, as well as for potential cronyism towards the municipal president or to the local party bosses. Regardless of whether elections were to be party or non-party driven, were they directly elected, then regidores would have greater personal authority to participate in municipal government, as well as a greater expectancy to act on behalf of his or her constituents.17 In conclusion, this paper has described important changes in the way in which municipalities are being governed, particularly the shift away from overt partisanship towards more technocratic modes of government. I have also analysed the principal driving forces behind these changes. Some of these causes are also effects: while the electoral and civil society opening appear to have led to changes in the ways in which municipalities are being governed, it has also created a new raft of population expectancies eager to become more active in day-to-day government. So far, though, it is rare to find examples of new forms of government that successfully and imaginatively embrace civil society into that process of co-governance.

NOTES 1. An earlier and extended version of this paper was presented at the Colegio Mexiquense, Simposio Internacional Sobre Desarrollo Municipal: Retos y Posibilidades, 5—6 September 1996. I should like to acknowledge the participation of graduate students Scott Graves (Government at UT-Austin) and Nicolas Pineda Pablos (Colegio de Sonora and the Institute of Latin American Studies at UT-Austin) in a preliminary (1994) version of this paper. Indeed, the San Pedro Garza Garcı´ a and Monterrey case studies form part of a larger Policy Research Project conducted at the LBJ School of Public Affairs in 1993—1994, directed by Victoria Rodrı´ guez and Peter Ward. See also the outline of the original research program in the Bulletin of ¸atin American Research (Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1991). My thanks, also, to co-director of the research Victoria Rodrı´ guez, and to two anonymous referees for their constructive comments regarding revision. The usual disclaimers apply. 2. The cities researched include: Chihuahua & Cd. Jua´rez (PAN, 1983—1986); Ensenada (PAN, 1986—1989; 1989—1992; 1992—1995), Tijuana (PAN, 1989—1992, 1992—1995), Mexicali (PRI, 1989—1992; 1992—1995) in Baja California; Zamora (PAN, 1983—1996, 1986—1989, 1989—1991) and Morelia (PRD, 1991—1993) in Michoaca´n; Leo´n (PAN, 1988—1991, 1992—1995), Guanajuato (PDM, 1983—1986), Celaya (PAN, 1992—1995), Salamanca (PAN, 1992—1995) in Guanajuato; San Pedro Garza Garcı´ a (1989—1991, 1991—1994) and Monterrey (PRI 1991—1994) in Nuevo Leo´n. Significantly, with the exceptions of Leo´n, San Pedro and Tijuana, there has been a subsequent ‘alternancia’ of the party in office — either the PRI or the PAN winning back the city. Since 1991, Morelia has gone PRD—PRI—PAN in three trienios. 3. I return to the notion of ‘good government’ later at the conclusion to the paper. Suffice to mention at the outset that a key component is institutional provision and governance practices which embrace citizen involvement in government. Interestingly, elsewhere in the context of Workers’ Party (PT) experiences in power in Sa8 o Paulo and a number of other cities and alcaldias, the challenge of embracing citizen participation while central to PT platform, proved to be very difficult to realise. Where they failed (such as in Sa8 o Paulo), they invariably lost the subsequent election (Jacobi, 1995). 4. The reason for selecting the decline of partisanship in governance (as opposed to the other arenas of partisanship — mass electoral and legislative) is that this was the principal focus of the research agenda (Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1991). To date there is relatively little research on the nature and rationality of party behaviour in the legislative arena, be this in the national and state legislatures, or in the cabildo. 5. This comprises nine to twelve months setting up shop; the next year to fifteen months of implementation, and the last nine months in wrapping up affairs. Depending upon candidate selection this last period may be associated with more overt partisanship in decision making, but it occurs during the ‘lame duck’ period rather than the administrative mainstream phase. 6. Early in 1996 when PRI Governor Socrates Rizzo resigned, Clariond became the interim governor to see out the remaining 18 months of Rizzo’s term.

362

Peter M. Ward

7. Indeed, in the November 1996 elections Tlalnepantla was won by the PAN, as was Naucalpan which had also demonstrated strong ‘technocratic’ policies and style of governance (see Conde in Cabrero Mendoza, 1996). 8. An earlier version of this paper containing the full case studies is forthcoming in Garrocho and Sobrino. That paper describes in detail the highly technocratic administrations observed under the PAN in San Pedro (NL) and the PRI in Monterrey; the modernising governance of the ‘New’ PRI in Mexicali; and that of a more autonomous governance system in Atoyac de Alvarez, Guerrero. 9. Ramo XXVI has traditionally been the federal line of funding for regional development. From 1989 onwards it was converted into the anti-poverty program call the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL) which became a flagship social welfare program during the Salinas administration. Under President Zedillo this has reverted to Romo XXVI. 10. The actual proportion of total fiscal resources that the federation returns to the states and to municipalities continues to be debated. Notwithstanding the Fiscal Co-ordination Law (LCF) which requires that 20 per cent be redistributed to the states of which at least one-fifth must be passed down to the municipalities, federal government officials insist that this has increased to 24 per cent due to the new tax collection opportunities that states now have. Moreover, they argue that the total redistributed is 50 per cent taking account of the federal funding in education, infrastructure, anti-poverty supports (Ramo XXVI), etc. From this perspective, therefore, the debate is both about the amount that any one state receives, and the criteria used to distribute that which falls outside of the LCF. At a recent conference (Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1996b) several participants identified the continuing predominance of federal government in determining local expenditures through projects which came down the pipe already etiquetado (‘labelled’). 11. This has often led to local conflict since both activities have traditionally been dominated by PRI corporatist organisations. Although not partisan in application between areas of a city, it is possible to view this prioritisation of security matters as being partisan on the part of the PAN, given that these are major concerns especially for the middle classes from which the PAN often gets much of its support; and given that the rastro and streetsellers organisations are ‘strongholds’ of PRI corporatist organisations. However, these are not exclusively PAN agendas; PRIı´ sta administrations have also engaged in such policies—see for example Benjamin Clariond in Monterrey (Rodrı´ guez and Ward, 1996a). 12. Both President Zedillo and former PRI party president Marı´ a de los Angeles Moreno sought to claim the moral high ground for creating a ‘sana distancia’ between the PRI and the federal government. Since December 1996, however, President Zedillo appears to have recognised the need to be more active and promotional on behalf of his party, and not to stand aloof during election campaigns. 13. In San Luis Potosı´ local electoral law requires a runoff election in municipalities in which one party does not receive 51 per cent of the vote, or if less, does not have a full ten per cent margin of victory over the second party’s candidate. This is designed to offset post-electoral conflict in cases where a narrow victory might bring it within the margins of electoral ‘noise’ and malpractice. 14. So desperate was the electorate to indicate its displeasure and elect another party to office that in the 1988 presidential election Ca´rdenas took the state. A year later the PAN’s candidate (Ruffo) won a clear victory over the PRI. 15. The need for local candidates to be adopted by a party was reasserted by the cross-party electoral law of 1996. Prior to this law it had appeared that Mexico was tending towards a position that would allow independent candidates to run for office. This would be particularly attractive at the municipal level where a candidate or group with a strong local following might have sought election. However, this possibility was negated under the new legislation. It appears that none of the parties wished to see independents or extra-party groups vying for office. In terms of municipal representative democracy this reduces the possibilities of pluralism, while strengthening the party’s hand in influencing that policy agenda. 16. The same argument might be made for state and federal deputies, but probably not for president, senators and governors all of whom serve for six year terms. Significantly, until the early 1930s deputies could be re-elected for successive terms in Mexico (a fact that is widely forgotten). However, given that the PRI has traditionally tightly controlled candidate selection, maximum turnover acted to increase dependence upon the party for career advancement and to minimise the cultivation of an independent constituency power-base. Under authoritarian rule and/or ‘fixed’ elections, constituency politics may be undesirable since it can enhance local caciquismo. However, under situations of pluralism and free elections, constituency politics may enhance governance. 17. It is not widely recognised in Mexico that in the US (with one or two notable exceptions), city councillors are elected on the basis of their personal attributes and record, rather than on the basis of party affiliation and representation (see Ward, 1996).

Changes in governance in Mexico

363

REFERENCES Aziz, A. (1996) ¹erritorios de Alternancia: el primer gobierno de oposicio& n en Chihuahua. Triana Editores, Mexico. Bailey, J. (1995) Fiscal centralism and pragmatic accommodation in Nuevo Leon. In Opposition Government in Mexico, eds V. Rodrı´ guez and P. Ward, pp. 173—188. University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque. Bailo´n, M. J. (1995) Opposition mayorships, and public expenditure in Oaxaca. In Opposition Government in Mexico, eds V. Rodrı´ guez and P. Ward, pp. 205—222. University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque. Bennett, V. (1995) ¹he Politics of ¼ater: ºrban Protest, Gender, and Power in Monterrey, Mexico. University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg. Bruhn, K. (1996) ¹aking on Goliath: ¹he Emergence of a New ¸eft Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico. Penn State Press, Pennsylvania. Cabrero Mendoza, E. (ed.) (1995) ¸a nueva gestio& n municipal en Me& xico. Analı´ sis de experiencias innovadoras en gobiernos locales. CIDE/Miguel Angel Porru´a, Mexico D.F. Cabrero Mendoza, E. (ed.) (1996) ¸os dilemas de la modernizacio& n municipal: estudios sobre la hacendaria en municipios urbanos de Me& xico. CIDE/Miguel Angel Porru´a, Mexico D.F Camp, R. A. (1995) The PAN’s social bases: implications for leadership. In Opposition Government in Mexico, eds V. Rodrı´ guez and P. Ward. pp. 65—80. University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque. Camp, R. A. (1996) Politics in Mexico, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Campbell, A. et al. (1960) ¹he American »oter. John Wiley & Sons, New York. Ca´rdenas Zepeda, A. and Santos Za´vala, J. (1996) El caso de Tlalnepantla, Estado de Me´xico. In ¸os dilemas de la modernizacio& n municipal: estudios sobre la hacendaria en municipios urbanos de Me& xico, ed. E. Cabrero Mendoza, pp. 527—590. CIDE/Miguel Angel Porru´a, Mexico D.F. Centro de Servicios y Estudios Municipales (CESEM) (1998) Personal communication with the author 29C1C1998. Data also published in Reforma, 17C11C1997. Centeno, M. A. (1994) Democracy within Reason: ¹echnocratic Revolution in Mexico. State University Press, Pennsylvania. Centeno, M. & Maxwell, S. (1992) The marriage of finance and order: changes in the Mexican political elite. Journal of ¸atin American Studies 24(1), 57—85. Clariond Reyes-Retana, B. (1992) Primer Informe de Gobierno. Monterrey, Nuevo Leo´n. Clariond Reyes-Retana, B. (1993) Segundo Informe de Gobierno. Monterrey, Nuevo Leo´n. Clarke, C. G. (1996) Opposition to PRI ‘hegemony’ in Oaxaca. In Dismantling the Mexican State?, eds R. Aitkin, N. Craske, G. Jones and D. Stansfield, pp. 267—290. Macmillan, London. Conde Bonfil, C. (1996) El caso de Naucalpan de Jua´rez. In ¸os dilemas de la modernizacio& n municipal: estudios sobre la hacendaria en municipios urbanos de Me& xico, ed. E. Cabrero Mendoza, pp. 329—433. CIDE/Miguel Angel Porru´a , Mexico D.F Cornelius, W. (1975) Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City. Stanford University Press, Stanford. Cornelius, W. (1996) Mexican Politics in ¹ransition: ¹he Breakdown of a One-Party-Dominant Regime. Monograph Series No. 41, Center for US—Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego. Cornelius, W. and Craig, A. (1991) ¹he Mexican Political System in ¹ransition. Monograph Series No. 35, Center for US—Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego. Cornelius, W., Craig, A. and Fox, J. (eds) (1994) ¹ransforming State—Society Relations in Mexico: ¹he National Solidarity Strategy. Center for US—Mexican Studies, The University of California, San Diego. Dı´ az Flores, M. and Garcı´ a del Castillo, R. (1996) El caso del municipio de Aguascalientes, Ags. In ¸os dilemas de la modernizacio& n municipal: estudios sobre la hacendaria en municipios urbanos de Me& xico, ed. E. Cabrero Mendoza, pp. 103—190. CIDE/Miguel Angel Porru´a, Mexico D.F. Diniz, E. (1982) »oto e ma& quina polı& tica. Paz e Terra, Sa8 o Paulo. Frankel, C. (1964) Bureaucracy and democracy in the new Europe. Daedalus, winter. Garrocho, C. and Sobrino, J. (eds) (in press) Desarrollo municipal: retos y posibilidades. El Colegio Mexiquense, Toluca. Gilbert, A. and Ward, P. (1985) Housing the State and the Poor: Policy and Practice in ¸atin American Cities. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Guille´n Lo´pez, T. (1995) Municipios en transcio& n: actores sociales y nuevas polı& ticas de gobierno. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation/Ford Foundation joint publication, Mexico D.F. Guille´n Lo´pez, T. (1996a) Gobiernos municipales en Me& xico: entre la modernizacio& n y la tradicio& n polı& tica. El Colegio de la Frontera Norte/Miguel Angel Porru´a, Mexico D.F. Guille´n Lo´pez, T. (1996b) Modernizacı´ on de la polı´ tica municipal en Me´xico. Paper presented at the International Symposium Desarrollo Municipal 5—6 September, Colegio Mexiquense, Toluca.

364

Peter M. Ward

Guterbock, T. M. (1980) Machine Politics in ¹ransition: Party and Community in Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Handelman, H. (1996) Mexican Politics: ¹he Dynamics of Change. St. Martin’s Press, New York. Hiernaux, D. (1995) Nueva perife& ria, vieja metro& poli: el valle de Chalco, Ciudad de Me& xico. Universidad Auto´noma Metropolitana-Xochimilco, Mexico D.F. Jacobi, P. (1995) Alcances y lı´ mites de los gobiernos locales progresistas en Brasil. Las alcaldı´ as petistas. Revista Mexicana de Sociologı´ a 2(95), 143—162. Lombardi, M. and Vega, D. (eds) (1989) ¸as ciudades en conflicto: una perspectiva latinoamericana. Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo. Lowi, T. J. (1969) ¹he End of ¸iberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority. W. W. Norton & Co., New York. Lujambio, A. (1995) Federalismo y congreso en el cambio polı& tico de Me& xico. Instituto de Investigacio´n Jurı´ dicas, UNAM, Mexico D.F. Maldonado, S. (1993) Cronica de una experiencia. Author’s edition, Morelia. Merino, M. (ed.) (1994) En busca de la democracia municipal. ¸a participacio& n ciudadana en el gobierno local mexicana . El Colegio de Me´xico, Mexico D.F. Mizrahi, Y. (1994a) Entreprenuers in the opposition: modes of political participation in Chihuahua. In Opposition Government in Mexico, eds V. Rodrı´ guez and P. Ward, pp. 81—96. The University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque. Mizrahi, Y. (1994b) Rebels without a cause? The politics of entrepreneurs in Chihuahua. Journal of ¸atin American Studies 26(1), 137—158 Pansters, W. G. (1996) Citizens with dignity: opposition and government in San Luis Potosı´ , 1938—1993. In Dismantling the Mexican State?, eds R. Aitkin, N. Craske, G. Jones and D. Stansfield, pp. 244—266. Macmillan, London. Peters, B. G. (1991) European Politics Reconsidered. Holmes & Meier, New York. Rodrı´ guez, V. (1995) Municipal autonomy and the politics of intergovernmental finance: Is it different for the opposition? In Opposition Government in Mexico, eds V. Rodrı´ guez and P. Ward, pp. 153—172. University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque. Rodrı´ guez, V. (1997) Decentralization in Mexico: From Reforma Municipal to Solidaridad to Nuevo Federalismo. Westview Press, Boulder. Rodrı´ guez, V. and Ward, P. (1991) Opposition politics, power, and public administration in urban Mexico. Bulletin of ¸atin America Research 10(1), 23—36. Rodrı´ guez, V. and Ward, P. (1992) Policymaking, Politics, and ºrban Governance in Chihuahua: the Experience of Recent PANista Governments. LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin. Rodrı´ guez, V. and Ward, P. ( 1994a) Political Change in Baja California: Democracy in the Making?. Monograph Series No. 40, Center for US—Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego. Rodrı´ guez, V. and Ward, P. (1994b) Disentangling the PRI from the government in Mexico. Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 10(1), 163—186. Translated and reproduced in Este Paı´ s, July 1995. Rodrı´ guez, V. and Ward, P. (eds) (1995) Opposition Government in Mexico. University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque. Rodrı´ guez, V. and Ward, P. (1996a) The new PRI: recasting its identity. In Dismantling the Mexican State?, eds R. Aitkin, N. Craske, G. Jones and D. Stansfield, pp. 92—115. Macmillan, London. Rodrı´ guez, V. and Ward, P. (eds) (1996b) New Federalism, State and ¸ocal Government in Mexico. Memoria/ Synthesis of the Conference Held at the University of Texas at Austin, 25—26 October, ILAS—Mexican Center. Rubin, J. (1994) COCEI in Juchita´n: grassroots radicalism and regional history. Journal of ¸atin American Studies 26(1), 109—136. Rubin, J. (1996) Decentering the regime: culture and regional politics in Mexico. ¸atin American Research Review 31(3), 85—126. Saragoza, A. (1988). ¹he Monterrey Elite & the Mexican State, 1880—1940. University of Texas Press, Texas. Scott, J. C. (1969) Corruption, machine politics, and political change. American Political Science Review 63, 1142—1158. SEDESOL (1995) Programa Nacional de Desarrollo ºrbano, 1995—2000. Sedesol, Mexico D.F. Ward, P. M. (1981) Political pressure for urban services: the response of two Mexico City administrations. Development and Change 12, 379—407. Ward, P. M. (1986) ¼elfare Politics in Mexico: Papering Over the Cracks? Allen and Unwin, London. Published in 1989: Polı& ticas be bienestar social en Me& xico, 1970—89. Nueva Imagen/Patria, Mexico D.F.

Changes in governance in Mexico

365

Ward, P. M. (1993) Social policy and political opening in Mexico. Journal of ¸atin American Research 25, 613—628. Ward, P. M. (1995) Policy making and policy implementation among non-PRI governments: The PAN in Cd. Jua´rez and in Chihuhuahua. In Opposition Government in Mexico, eds V. Rodrı´ guez and P. Ward, pp. 135—151. University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque. Ward, P. M. (1996) Problemas actuales en el gobierno y la administracio´n de las megaciudades latinoamericanas. Gestio´ n y Polı´ tica Pu´ blica 5(1), 127—149. Ward, P. M. (1998) Mexico City. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester. Wattenberg, M. P. (1984) ¹he Decline of American Political Parties, 1952—1980. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Ziccardi, A. (ed.) (1995) ¸a tarea de gobernar: gobiernos locales y participacio& n ciudadana. Miguel Anguel Porru´a and the UNAM, Mexico D.F.