From pond to plate: Towards a twin-driven commodity chain in Bangladesh shrimp aquaculture

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Food Policy 33 (2008) 209–223 www.elsevier.com/locate/foodpol

From pond to plate: Towards a twin-driven commodity chain in Bangladesh shrimp aquaculture Md. Saidul Islam * York University, 1403-360 Assiniboine Road,Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3J 1L3 Received 10 March 2007; received in revised form 24 September 2007; accepted 11 October 2007

Abstract Globalization of the agro-food system has led developing nations to orient their production to meet global markets. Consequently, local agricultural systems are increasingly linked to global commodity networks, and generate complex intersections and sometimes tensions. Cultured shrimp in Bangladesh is such a global commodity that connects the local producers with the global consumers starting from pond to plate via a network of diverse actors in a complex manner. Field research in Bangladesh shows that shrimp aquaculture in Bangladesh is moving towards a twin-driven commodity chain in which lead firms govern supply network, while the Shrimp Seal of Quality Organization (SSOQ), a recently emerged third-party certifier, as well as other environmental NGOs define regulatory aspects of the industry. While governance in twin-driven commodity chain offers opportunities for a sustainable aquaculture, it also poses many questions which have significant policy implications for different stakeholders involved in the chain. Ó 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Twin-driven commodity chain; Certification; Shrimp aquaculture; Bangladesh

Introduction In the current global agro-food system, such as shrimp aquaculture, private food safety and quality standards, branding, contracts, certification, and agreements are axes around which food retailers are organizing competition based on quality (Busch and Bain, 2004; Hatanaka et al., 2005; Henson and Reardon, 2005). Approaches used by scholars to study this evolution of global agro-food system include French Regulation School (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 1990; Buttel, 2001), Fordist and Post-Fordist Regime (see Busch and Bain, 2004); Food Regime (McMichael, 1999, 2004) and post-Foucaultian Developmental Governmentality (e.g. Watts, 2003), as well as Environmental Governmentality (Luke, 1999; Brosius, 1999; Escober, 1995; Agrawal, 2003; Darier, 1996a, 1996b, 1999).

*

Tel.: +1 416 650 2239 (Home); +1 647 830 2239 (Cell); fax: +1 416 736 5730. E-mail address: [email protected] 0306-9192/$ - see front matter Ó 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2007.10.002

While these approaches are salient for analyzing different shifts in global capitalism, including the recent shift from public to private regulations in global agro-food system, they fail to adequately capture both the special features of these transformations across world economy, and the relationships that link these processes together. One appropriate approach to understand this evolution and transition of global agro-food system, such as shrimp in my case, is through Global Commodity Chain (GCC)1. This approach,2 popularized by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1 Within this framework, however, there is a proliferation of overlapping names and concepts, such as global value chains, value system, production networks, value networks and so forth. In the well-known framework developed by Michael Porter (1990, pp. 40–44), for instance, the ‘value system’ is a set of interlinked ‘complete’ firms that have all the business functions. For emphasis on internal governance structure of supply chain, both commodity chain and value chain are used in this paper interchangeably. 2 Authors like Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) and Dolan (2004) believe that the global commodity chain approach originated with the work of Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986) who defined it as ‘‘a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity” (p. 159).

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(1994), explores how production, distribution, and consumption of products are globally interconnected along commodity or value chains. According to them: A GCC consists of sets of inter-organizational networks clustered around one commodity of product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world-economy. These networks are situationally specific, socially constructed, and locally integrated, underscoring the social embeddedness of economic organization (1994, p. 2). As an analytical tool, commodity chain analysis is particularly useful in identifying the central role that global buyers such as NIKE, GAP, and Wal-Mart play in organizing activities within commodity chains. Gereffi (1994, 1999), for example, emphasizes the importance of what he calls ‘‘buyer-driven commodity chains,” observing that in some industries large retailers, marketers, or branded name companies play a pivotal role in establishing and ‘‘driving” geographically-dispersed production and distribution systems without necessarily owning any themselves. The UK–Africa horticulture value chain exhibits several characteristics of a ‘‘buyer-driven commodity chain” in which powerful lead firms3 (supermarkets) govern supply networks that span several African countries, defining not only what is to be produced but also how and under what conditions it is to be produced (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). These supermarkets increasingly determine the production imperatives of agro-food farms upstream in the chain and, indirectly, the employment strategies they adopt (Dolan, 2004). In sum, GCC defines product chains in terms of actors and their objectives, the structure of its markets, the strategies or instruments that actors use to influence this structure, and, finally, by the product itself, as different product chains may display different characteristics. Over the past few decades, classical export commodities (coffee, tea, sugar, tobacco, cocoa and so on) have largely been declined and displaced by what Goodman and Watts (1997, p. 10) call ‘‘high value food” that includes shrimp. Apart from dietary change, trade reform, and technical changes in the food industry (Friedland, 1994), shrimp became one of the major high-valued transnational commodities because it is promoted by the FAO and similar institutions as central to replacing the protein lost due to the exhaustion of the global fisheries (FAO et al., 2006; Roheim, 2004). As cultured shrimp requires a particular type of tropical environment, Bangladesh became an important hub for commercial shrimp production and thereby linked itself to the global commodity chain. The evolution of the ‘‘world shrimp commodity system,” the pinnacle of the Blue Revolution’s achievements, had 3 In many cases, the buyer specifies precisely how particular standards should be attained by requiring and perhaps helping to introduce particular production processes, monitoring procedures, etc. When buyer plays this role, we refer to it as the ‘‘lead firm” in the chain.

begun. It became a system defined and regulated by organizational forms (see McMichael, 2004; Public Citizen, 2005). What had previously been a simple pattern of shrimp captured in-the-wild at sea and taken to market was transformed within the space of a decade into a globalized factory farming system requiring new kinds of chain governance. The paper delineates the need for chain governance, the kind of commodity chain that Bangladesh shrimp aquaculture exhibits, and its policy implications for different stakeholders. Following this brief introduction to global commodity chain, the paper in the second section elucidates the need for, and structure of, chain governance in the global agro-food system by reviewing some relevant contemporary literature on the subject. The methods and procedures of data collection for this study have been presented in the third section. The fourth section provides an overview of shrimp aquaculture in Bangladesh including its links to global buyers and local supply chain. The fifth section reveals that shrimp aquaculture in Bangladesh is moving towards a commodity chain that goes beyond the traditional dichotomy. It is neither buyer-driven nor producerdriven, but a twin-driven commodity chain in which the wealthy buyers control supply network, while a third-party certifier (that reflects a broader shift from public to private forms governance) and some environmental groups define the regulatory aspects of production, codification, certification, and to some extent managements often working in a dynamic manner. With the emergence of a third-party certification in Bangladesh shrimp aquaculture and therefore a significant shift in chain governance, the sixth section using primary data examines the evolving implications of the new regime. The paper concludes by raising some significant questions, which also have policy implications for key stakeholders involved in the industry. Governance in global commodity chain The global commodity chain approach has become an important framework for analyzing economic development, and the evolution and complexity of global agrofood system in the context of globalization, proving fruitful for delineating the power relations or governance within chains and their prospects for broad-based growth (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). Governance can be defined as the ‘‘non-market coordination of economic activity” (Gereffi et al., 2001, p. 4), and it is the central concept in commodity chain analysis. Taking ‘‘governance” as a core in GCC analysis, writers like Humphrey and Schmitz (2001), Sturgeon (2001) further expanded Gereffi’s model. According to Humphrey and Schmitz (2001), governance in GCC refers to ‘‘the inter-firm relationships and institutional mechanisms through which non-market coordination of activities in the chain is achieved” (p. 22). The point of departure for this study in global commodity chain is the fact that some firms directly or indirectly influence the organization of global production, logistics, and marketing

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systems. Through the governance structures that such firms create, the decisions that they take have important consequences for the access of developing country farms to international markets and their range of activities (Gereffi, 1999; Kaplan and Kaplinsky, 1998). The governance structures also generate changes in local landscapes (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). The question is: why is chain governance needed? At any point in the chain, the production processes (in the widest sense, including quality, logistics, design, etc.) is defined by a set of parameters. The four key parameters, identified by Humphrey and Schmitz (2001, pp. 21–22), that define what are to be done are: (a) What is to be produced? We refer to this as a ‘‘product definition”. (b) How is it to be produced? This involves the definition of production processes, which can include elements such as the technology to be used, quality systems, labor standards and environmental standards. (c) When is it to be produced? (d) How much is to be produced? And finally, (e) What will be the price? Behind all these parameters comes the question of chain governance. Apart from all these parameters and risks, Humphrey and Schmitz (2001, pp. 20–21) further identified some factors which necessitate the need for chain governance, such as market access, acquiring production capabilities, distribution of gains, leverage points for policy initiatives, funnel for technical assistance or sale of technology, and so forth. These factors are elaborated below: Market access Developing-country producers do not automatically gain market access even when developed countries dismantle trade barriers. It is because ‘‘the chains that producers feed into are often governed by limited number of buyers” (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001, p. 20), popularly known as ‘‘oligarchic market structure”. For participating in export production for the North, producers in developing countries need access to the lead firms of these chains. These lead firms undertake what Gereffi (1999, p. 41) called ‘‘the functional integration and coordination of internationally dispersed activities”. Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) continued, ‘‘Decisions by chains’ lead firms may cause particular types of producers and traders to lose out” (p. 20). Dolan and Humphrey’s (2000, pp. 165–169) research on the UK–Africa horticulture chain, for example, suggests that small growers are marginalized. The reasons, it seems, does not lie in the efficiency advantage of the large growers but in the lead firms’ sourcing strategies, which are influenced by the expectations of consumers, NGOs and government agencies with regard to safety and environmental and labor standards. Fast track to acquisition of production capabilities As Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) explained, the producers who gain access to the chains’ lead firms normally

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find themselves on a steep learning curve. Often the lead firms are very demanding with regard to reducing cost, raising quality and increasing speed and are therefore often unpopular with the local workforce. However, the lead firms also pass on better practices and provide hands-on advice and sometimes pressure on how to improve layout and production flows and raise skills. Humphrey and Schmitz put, ‘‘It is this combination of high challenge and high support that is often found in the highly governed chains and that explains how relatively underdeveloped regions become major export producers in a short period of time” (2001, p. 20). While this upgrading effect is particularly significant for local producers new to global market (Gereffi, 1999), it can also create barriers for the acquisition of design and marketing capabilities (Schmitz and Knorringa, 2000). Distribution of gains Understanding the governance of a chain helps us to identify how gains are distributed along the chain. Kaplinsky (2000), in particular, suggests that the ability to govern often rests in intangible competences (R&D, design, branding, and marketing) which are characterized by high barriers of entry and command high returns – usually reaped by developed-country firms. In contrast, developing country farms tend to be locked into the tangible (production) activities, producing to the parameters set by the ‘‘governors”, suffering from low barriers of entry and reaping low-returns. While in need of systematic empirical verification, these government related distribution issues are critical to the debate on whether there is a spreading of the gains from globalization (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). Leverage points for policy initiatives Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) pointed out that precisely because many global value chains are not just strings of market-based relationships; they can both undermine government policy, but also offer new leverage points for government initiatives. The fact that some chains are governed by lead firms from developed countries provides leverage for influencing what happens in supplier farms in developing countries. These leverage points have been recognized by government and non-governmental agencies concerned with raising labor and environmental standards. Most policy initiatives with regard to shrimp aquaculture taken by the government of Bangladesh can therefore be linked to the nature of chain governance. Funnel for technical assistance and sale of technology Multilateral and bilateral donor agencies have for decades sought to find ways of providing effective technical assistance to developing-country producers. The lead firms of chain become the entry point for reaching out to a multitude of distant small and medium-sized suppliers. It is

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recognized, however, that some buyers may require ‘‘mentoring” in order to fulfill this funnel and transmission function (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). This gives us a significant point to verify whether the commodity chain becomes a viable route for marketing and selling high agro-food technologies produced in the Global North to the producing countries in the Global South, including Bangladesh. Risk If governance in commodity chain is about setting and/ or enforcing parameters along the chain, the question arises as to why companies would want to do this. According to Humphrey and Schmitz (2001), the main reason for specification of process parameters along the chain is ‘‘risk”. Buyers specify and enforce parameters when there are potential losses arising from failure to meet commitments, (for example, delivering the right product on time) or failure to ensure that the product conforms to the necessary standards. ‘‘These performance risks, relating to factors such as quality, response time and reliability of delivery, became more important as firms engage in nonprice competition” and ‘‘these risks may be a particular characteristic of global value chains integrating developing country producers with developed country buyers” (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001, p. 23).

With the proliferation of different labor and environmental standards as well as other codes of conduct – largely devised by environmental, human-rights and consumer based NGOs – most commodity chains’ product and process parameters can also be set by what Humphrey and Schmitz (2001, p. 34) call ‘‘agents external to the chains”. But how are they enforced? Humphrey and Schmitz (2001, p. 35) provide a diagram to show the tradeoffs between parameter setting and enforcement by firms within the chain as opposed to external agents: (see Fig. 1). The basic frame of governance in GCC has been used and elaborated, with substantial variance, by many agrofood scholars (for example, Freidberg, 2004; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Gibbon, 2001a, 2001b; Ponte, 2002a, 2002b; Raynolds, 1994, 2002, 2004; Talbot, 2002) suggesting that powerful buyers increasingly govern and drive production definition/specification, production processes, and enterprise participation in international supply chain. While agro-food scholars’ extension of Gereffi’s producer/buyer driven analogy to agro-food sector seems quite insightful, we can discern some critical scrutiny and challenges with what Raynolds (2004) called ‘‘a simple dichotomous characterization of producer vs. buyer driven chains” (p. 727). The nature of chain governance in agrofood system is different from that of other export-oriented manufacturing industries. Goodman and Watts (1997), for

Parameter enforcement

Lead firms

Lead firms

External agents

1.

2.

Specification of quality systems and enforcement through audit, either directly by the lead firm itself or through an agent acting directly on its instruction.

Lead firm requires suppliers to conform to a process standard or code of practice for which an independent monitoring or certification system exists.

Requirement for labor standards above the legally required minimum, verified by the lead firm or its agents.

Example would include ISO 9000, ISO 14000, SA 8000 certification, and HACCP.

Parameter setting

Voluntary implementations of fair trade code enforced by firm.

External agents

3.

4.

Farms are expected not to use suppliers that employ child labor, but this expectation is not accompanied by any system for enforcing the ban. The farms have to develop their own enforcement systems.

The EU, for example, requires that surgical instrument manufactures exporting to European market must be ISO 9000 certified. The certification is carried out by independent certification agencies.

Food sellers are legally obliged to meet hygiene standards for ready-toeat food in the EU, but the process of ensuring that these conditions are met is the responsibility of the firm in the chain. In this case, the seller is responsible for specifying mechanisms that conform that the standards can be met.

The US Department of Agriculture (DoA) requires certain regions exporting melon to the US market to have a state-administered fruit-fly monitoring and eradication programme which has to be approved by the DoA.

Fig. 1. The trade-offs between parameter setting and enforcement.

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example, showed that due to inherent characteristics and dynamics, most agro-food industries are not characterized by vertically integrated transnational production, as Gereffi (1999) found in apparel industry. In agro-food commodity chain, the nature of lead firms varies significantly (Raynolds, 2004). Among ‘‘buyer-driven” agro-food commodity chains, some are driven by large supermarket retailers, but others are dominated by processors, international traders, or global branders (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Ponte, 2002a; Gibbon, 2001a), while some are also partly influenced by environmental and labor right movements (Vandergeest, 2007). Therefore, the characterization of an agro-food system such as shrimp as simply a ‘‘buyerdriven” occludes the potential influence of other actors in the chain. Raynolds (2004) observed that agro-food commodity chains are often characterized by ‘‘important internal variations, with different types of enterprises dominating different segments or different regional strands” (p. 727). While the above diagram presented by Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) can be helpful in delineating how environmental groups and recently emerged third-party certifier have roles in defining and enforcing production and process parameters of current global agro-food system, we can argue, especially in case of shrimp, that many agents traditionally presented as ‘‘external to the chain” are no longer ‘‘external” but rather very much indispensable and intrinsic part of the commodity chain. All these critical accounts to traditional GCC analysis, agro-food chains’ dynamics and characteristics different from export-oriented manufacturing industries, and the facts that agro-food commodity areas are strongly influenced by consumer and environmental groups and deeply embedded in non-market norms such as expanding the commodity chain for socially and environmentally ‘‘friendly” food (Raynolds, 2002, 2004; Vandergeest, 2007; Busch and Bain, 2004) ardently call for a more appropriate GCC analysis for agro-food systems that identifies different sources, forms, and level of control across the commodity. I will therefore examine the complex nature of shrimp commodity chain to show how it goes beyond the Gereffi’s traditional dichotomy while paying attention to ‘‘governance”, which is the analytical core of commodity chain analysis. Methods and procedures A triangulation of methods – ethnography and qualitative interviews substantiated by secondary sources – was employed in this study. Ethnography and qualitative interviews in Bangladesh were conducted in two different phases. In the first phase (May–December 2005), ethnography and interviews were conducted in three districts of greater Khulna region: Satkhira, Bagerhat, and Khulna. These sites are selected for two main reasons: first, these are areas within the highly productive ‘‘rice bowl” region of Bangladesh currently shifting towards shrimp farming. Second, these areas contain about 80% of total shrimp

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ponds in Bangladesh (Khatun, 2004; Fleming, 2004). The sample size was nine shrimp farmers, nine villagers, six government officials, six processors, and five NGO workers, a total of 35 respondents. Snowball sampling was employed in getting access to the respondents. Three sub-districts (Upajilla) were randomly selected among areas recommended by District Fisheries Officers (DFOs) and local NGOs, namely, Satkhira Sadar in Satkhira district, Ovoinagar in Khulna district, and Mollarhat in Bagherhat district, and interviews with shrimp farmers and villagers were conducted. Six processing workers (four males and two females) were interviewed in Khulna city, where most processing factories are located. Among the six government officials interviewed, two were from the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock, two DFOs of Satkhira and Bagherhat, and two UFOs (Upajilla Fisheries Officers) of Kaliganj and Molarhat, respectively. Five NGO workers interviewed were from five NGOs, namely, Agragati Sangstha, Coastal Development Partnership, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), Grameen Bank, and Nijera Kori – all of them are among the major NGOs working in shrimp sector albeit differently. In the second phase of research (April–August 2006), a semi-structured interview with the processing workers was conducted in the greater Khulna regions. Four factories were randomly selected out of 35 factories operating in Khulna region. One person (owner/manager) from each factory management (a total of four) was interviewed with prior appointment, while four male permanent workers, five female permanent workers, and nine female casual workers were interviewed after locating them in Char and Lobon Chora villages nearby Khulna city. Apart from semi-structured interviews, a series of focus group discussions were conducted with representatives from key nodes of the shrimp commodity chain as well as with ‘‘environmentally” or ‘‘socially” conscious people living in the shrimp farming vicinity. The following table illustrates my focus group interview: (see Table 1). Though the data collected may not constitute a statistically representative sample of all shrimp producers and processors in Bangladesh, they are, however, illustrative Table 1 Focus group interview Type

Number

Place

1. 2. 3.

Fry catcher Fry traders Fry hatchery owners

12 9 7

4. 5.

Shrimp traders and middlemen Women workers in shrimp ponds

8 12

6. 7.

Upajilla fisheries officers Informed people (hotel managers, local businessmen, teachers etc.) Informed people (college professors, and human rights activists) Total

5 10

Mongla Mongla Shyam Nagar Faqirhat Shyam Nagar Faqirhat Faqirhat

8.

8 71

Shyam Nagar

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of the types of the production and marketing that takes place in the lower end of shrimp commodity chain in Bangladesh. In addition to the above, I had informal and occasional meetings with other government officials, NGO workers, national intellectuals, other resource persons with similar interests, the Shrimp Seal of Quality Organisation (SSOQ), the Bangladesh Shrimp Farmers Association (BSFA), the Bangladesh Shrimp and Fish Foundation (BSFF), and the Bangladesh Frozen Food Exporters Association (BFFEA). In both phases, semi-structured interviews were conducted in conversational mode. This allowed for rapport and trust to develop between the interviewer and respondents, as well as maneuverability in exploring emergent themes. Moreover, respondents in the obtained sample have been identified as ‘‘key” individuals to interview. The respondents therefore speak with relative authority on the subject matter. In addition to primary data, collected through key informants and focus group interviews and ethnography (my direct observation in the field), I also rely on secondary sources for data verification. Where possible, I attempted to triangulate to verify my findings by comparing data and information from different sources. Overview of shrimp aquaculture in Bangladesh Background Bangladesh is one of the major shrimp-producing countries of the world. It enjoys an advantageous natural setting for shrimp culture. The low-lying area of Sundarban, home to the world’s largest mangrove forest, is an important hub for shrimp fry. The beginning of the present shrimp culture dates back to the late sixties when a number of fish-freezing plants were set up in Chittagong and Khulna. Shrimp cultivation and export in Bangladesh have undergone rapid expansion over the last two decades. Since the 1980s there has been a dramatic increase in shrimp farming, especially in the coastal areas where this has been termed as the ‘‘blue revolution” (Deb, 1998). Between 1980 and 1995, the area under shrimp cultivation increased from 20 000 ha to 140 000 ha (Metcalfe, 2003, p. 433). The Department of Fisheries estimates that there are approximately 203 071 ha of coastal shrimp farms producing an average of 75 167 metric tons of shrimp annually and an average of 370 kg/ha/year (Gammage et al., 2006, p. 1). During the mid-seventies, production and export of shrimp witnessed an exponential growth, owing to a combination of several factors, such as increased demand from abroad and a large supply of low-wage local labors. Demand for shrimp products stemmed from Europe, the United States, Japan and the Middle East; while the European Union continues to be the largest importer of Bangladeshi shrimp (Pokrant and Reeves, 2003; Khatun, 2004; Gammage et al., 2006). Shrimp, being the second largest industry in Bangladesh next to garments, brings a foreign exchange of about US$360 million annually, which

accounts for 4.9% of exports in 2004 (Gammage et al., 2006, p. 1). Besides earning foreign exchange, the sector also employs significant numbers of rural workers. USAID Bangladesh (2006, p. 9) estimates that as many as 1.2 million people are directly involved in shrimp production in Bangladesh with an additional 4.8 million household members supported by the industry. Approximately 35 000 metric tonnes of shrimp are exported to the world annually (Ito, 2004, p. 1002). Experts estimate that the volume can be raised up to 300 000 tonnes through, among others, proper utilization of shrimp fry. The country’s shrimp sector has set an ambitious target to raise export earnings by 2008 to about US$1.7 billion, (i.e. five times up from the present annual exports) (NewAge, April 3, 2004) (see Table 2). Local supply chain Shrimp production in Bangladesh involves a complex system of supply chain where at least three major groups – shrimp farmers, local depots owners, and processing factories – are in action with middlemen’s presence in every stage. The process actually starts from the sea in which fry collectors, many of them are women, collect fry and sell them to local middlemen before they reach actual shrimp farmers. Department of Fisheries (2005) estimates that there are about half million fry collectors in the coastal zones of Bangladesh (Gammage et al., 2006). Most small and some medium scale farmers face financial crisis and cannot buy shrimp larvae with their own Table 2 Export of Bangladeshi shrimp (Percentage) Country

Percentage of earning in terms of value

USA Japan EU Countries Belgium UK Netherlands Germany Denmark France Norway Switzerland Italy South East Asia Thailand Singapore Malaysia Taiwan Hong Kong Australia Middle East Saudi Arabia UAE Other countries including India Total

34.78 11.26

Subtotals 34.78 11.26 48.74

16.22 11.26 8.59 6.86 2.07 1.15 0.92 0.76 0.91 2.21 0.12 0.29 0.08 0.05 1.67 0.03 0.03 0.02 2.93 100

0.03 0.05

2.93 100

Source: Bangladesh Export Promotion Bureau, 2004.

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money. Therefore, they borrow money from a group of people who actually work as middlemen and are collectors of shrimp. The faria [intermediary who buys and sells products] and aratdar [commission agent or intermediary who buys and sells products] play a pivotal role in injecting credit into the chain and exerting control over sale prices and margins. My ethnography along with USAID Bangladesh (2006) confirms that shrimp faria offers conditional loans or ‘‘dadon” to the farmers and buy shrimp from them at a price that the faria determines. This price-fixing is ensured through the conditions imposed through the loan. The shrimp faria tries to pay the shrimp farmer as little as

Stock Exchange

Private Capital

215

possible for the shrimp in order to maximize the profits the faria earn when selling to the aratdar. Moreover, shrimp farias and aratdars use relatively fewer grades than those prevailing in the export market – a tactic that tends to depress prices in the exchange. There are also other groups of people who provide loans (dadon) with high interest. They are locally known as ‘‘Dadondar” (loan-provider) and ‘‘Mahajon” (the great people), a reified semantic cover that occludes exploitation. The middlemen transport shrimp usually in a van from the farmlands to the urban depots, which are mostly situated near processing factories. During the field visit, it

Nationalized banks

Private Capital

Processing and Export Companies Privatized bank

Commission or Purchasing agents

Other fish traders

Private Capital

Dadon Credit

Local Depot Owners (Depot Maliks)

Private Capital Money Lenders

Dadon credit NGOs Dadon Credit

Village Traders (Farias)

Lessors

Deferred rent

Household resources

Shrimp Farmers

Local branches of national

banks Grameen Bank

Dadon credit Farmers’ cooperative funds

Suppliers: fry traders, feed stockists etc.

Labor

Private capital

Credit line Supply line Fig. 2. Local supply chain.

Moneylenders, salaried workers

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was found that many shrimp collectors/middlemen also take loan from the depot owners to give loan to the farmers or to buy shrimp from the farmers and thus is bound to sell shrimp to a particular depot owner. At the depots, some pre-processing activities such as washing, beheading, icing and packaging are done before it goes to the factories for final processing. When the depot receives shrimp from different collectors, they immediately supply those either directly to the processing factories or deliver it to the moneylenders who take the responsibility to supply shrimp to the factories. Whichever way it is, the depot owners are not paid by the factories but by the moneylenders. There are also a number of other players in the supply chain whose livelihoods depend on the sector as they are indirectly involved in the chain. They are ice sellers, ice factory owners, plastic box and sheet manufacturer, van operators, van owners, truck drivers and truck owners. Thus a simple route from the hatchery to the factories takes a complicated and lengthy form of chain where the interest of a number of people is served. In the process it is probably the farmers who lose out most while the middlemen, even not being involved in the mainstream, receive a dividend higher than the farmers. The following supply chain adopted from Rutherford (1994, p. 21), Ito (2004, p. 1008) as well as my observation in the field, shows a complex web of supply chain, together with financial flows (see Fig. 2). My study found that though shrimp farming is a profitable industry; however, it does not reward everyone involved in it. Stakeholders like fry collectors, hatchery workers, depot workers, ice van operators, processing workers etc. are still in poverty and their incomes are not sufficient for their families though compared to their previous state in paddy regime, they are much better off. On the other hand, hatchery owners, large-scale farms owners, middlemen/traders, depot owners, processing plant owners, ice factory owners, exporters etc. are among the biggest beneficiaries. Towards a twin-driven commodity chain Shrimp is one of the major high-valued transnational commodity that can generate enormous revenues. In value terms, the production from shrimp farming is worth more than US$ 10 billion per year (Roheim, 2004, p. 227) which represents more than one-sixth of all aquacultural trade (Bene, 2005, p. 585). As such, shrimp aquaculture is considered a great development opportunity in large number of developing countries in tropical areas including Bangladesh, where it is promoted by what ‘‘Public Citizen” (April 2005, p. 2) calls ‘‘the development trilogy” (international development banks, bilateral aid agencies, and multilateral development assistance agencies) as well as national governments as a basis for rural development and generation for foreign exchange. However, it is also highly contested industry, targeted by environmental groups who claim that shrimp has environmental and social impacts that far out-

weigh their benefits to local communities and ocean ecologies (Vandergeest et al., 1999). Shrimp farming therefore has been the subject of heated debate and scrutiny. One of the reasons why this particular type of farming has come under close scrutiny on a global scale is that while open (capture) fisheries are generally deemed to be self-producing and self-sustaining, closed (culture) fisheries need direct use of inputs and human care, involves property rights and, while being renewable, generates a wide range of externalities4 that makes sustainable development a critically important issue (Battacharya et al., 1999). It is estimated that more than 60% of the Asia’s mangroves including Sundarban, the biggest mangrove forest of the world, have already been converted to commercial fisheries, mostly shrimp aquaculture, degrading habitats and land (Roheim, 2004). Because shrimp is such an important export earner for its producers and has such a marked negative impacts on their environments, different environmental and human rights NGOs are actively involved in this industry both contesting and promoting this sector. Since the early 1990s, numerous researchers and local and international NGOs voiced serious concerns regarding negative environmental and social disruptions caused by shrimp aquaculture in the local level. However, despite major efforts to resolve these concerns, the debate about the sustainability of the shrimp culture is still largely unsettled (see Bene, 2005; Vandergeest, 2007; Gammage et al., 2006; USAID, 2006; Roheim, 2004). This situation has led environmental and social justice NGOs remain actively involved in this sector.5 A consortium including the World Bank, the Network of Aquaculture Centers in Asia Pacific (NACA), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) concluded in 2002 that ‘‘there are many positive developments with regard to the social impact of shrimp farming aquaculture throughout the world . . . [and] several examples of efforts being made to develop solutions that are economically remunerative, environmentally sound and socially benefi4

An externality describes a situation where the benefits or costs of an economic activity affect a third party. Pollution is clearly a negative externality. 5 For example, in May 1995, Greenpeace and 24 other NGOs, some representing people living in the communities that were directly feeling the impacts of the shrimp farming boom, submitted an unprecedented ‘‘NGO Statement on Unsustainable Aquaculture” to the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) meeting in New York at the United Nations. The group urged their governments to move quickly to ensure the development of aquaculture that would be compatible with the social, cultural and economic interests of coastal communities, and ensure that in future such developments be sustainable, socially equitable and ecologically sound. The NGO statement to the United Nations was followed up by an NGO Forum on Shrimp Aquaculture held in Choluteca, Honduras (Oct. 13–16, 1996), organized by Greenpeace together with CODDEFFAGOLF, a Honduran grassroots group. Twenty-one NGOs from Latin America, India, the US and Sweden concluded the meeting with the adoption of the Choluteca Declaration. The Choluteca Declaration reaffirms the demands contained in the NGO Statement on Unsustainable Aquaculture submitted to the United Nations earlier in the year (see Hagler 1997).

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cial” (World Bank et al., 2002, p. 47). Conversely, at the same time the UK based Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), in partnership with US WildAid, published a report highlighting that shrimp farming has been systematically accompanied by intimidation, aggression and threats against those who attempted to oppose its expansion (EJF, 2003). While there are both supporters and opposition to shrimp industry, one thing is very clear: environmental groups have a great role in defining ‘‘sustainability” of this industry. Following Gereffi (1994, 1999), Gammage et al. (2006) argue that shrimp aquaculture in Bangladesh exhibits a buyer-driven commodity chain. However, with active involvement of different environmental groups and recently the emergence of a third party certifier, I think, the chain exhibits more than simply a ‘‘buyer-driven” power structure. The shrimp seal of quality organization (SSOQ) is currently working in Bangladesh as a third party certifier. Though it started certifying Bangladeshi shrimp on a limited scale in February 2005 (The Independent, February 18, 2005), with the patronage of USAID it has managed to form a strong alliance with both local and global environmental agencies, such as Aquacultural Certification Council (ACC), Global Aquaculture Alliance (GAA) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) (Khan, 2005; Gillard and Quader, 2004; Qudir and Kabir, 2005). Though all these agencies may not situate themselves directly in marketing or supply segment of the commodity chain, they nevertheless have a monopoly over defining quality, sustainability of production, and managing environment, and therefore reflect a broader shift towards what Gereffi et al. (2001, p. 65) call ‘‘a private layer of governance that moves beyond state borders to shape global supply chain”. As major buyers of commercial shrimp such as Wal-Mart (2005, 2006), Darden, and Lyons recently committed to buy only ACC-certified seafood, including farmed shrimp, it potentially gives the SSOQ a lot more clout in Bangladesh. The shrimp commodity chain linking Bangladesh to Japan, European Union, and United States may partly demonstrate several characteristics of a ‘‘buyer-driven commodity chain”. Contrary to what Gereffi (1994, 1999) states with regard to the sole governing role of the powerful lead firms (supermarkets), I argue that a network of diverse international environmental groups such as the Aquacultural Certification Council (ACC), the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), the Global Aquaculture Alliance (GAA) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) as well as local environmental and labour rights NGOs such as the Nijera Kori (NK), the Coastal Development Partnership (CDP), the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), the Bangladesh Shrimp and Fish Foundation (BSFF), the Bangladesh Shrimp Farmers Association (BSFA) etc. along with the Department of Fisheries (DOF) largely defines not only what kind of shrimp is to be produced but also how and under what conditions it is to be produced. While these environmental and labour rights groups represent diverse

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opinions on environmental and labour rights questions and there are both consensus and disagreement within these organizations, they seem to have common goals for improved sustainability of commercial shrimp. Therefore, shrimp commodity chain, with its unique characters different from other agro-food industries6, exhibits not just a uniliner ‘‘buyer-driven commodity chain” in which lead firms govern supply network and define everything; but it is moving towards a ‘‘Twin-Driven Commodity Chain” in which lead firms govern the supply network, while environmental groups and recently emerged third-party certifiers lay out and govern the regulatory aspects of the aquaculture, sometimes both working in an overlapping manner. The following figure is an example of a twin-driven commodity chain: (see Fig. 3). The twin-driven commodity chain will provide an important framework to analyse and understand the key players from ponds to plates and their roles in the chain. It will also help us understand the role of certification agency in the chain and its broader impact on the aquaculture; the nature and dynamics of gender and employment relations, as well environmental and agrarian changes in Bangladesh. Certification regime and its policy implication Emergence of a third-party certifier is currently a salient feature in Bangladesh shrimp aquaculture. Busch and Bain (2004) argue that standards such as certification are not ‘‘merely objective technical or economic devices”; rather they ‘‘play a fundamental role in reconfiguring social relations”. The struggle to meet these demands is ‘‘producing both winners and losers, as actors who are unable to meet the new and more rigorous retail standards are excluded from the market” (p. 341). In other words, certification often has the effect of marginalizing those producers who cannot afford to participate, or do not have the cultural, social, and technical knowledge, and therefore subsequently leads to industry consolidation by eliminating small players (Hatanaka et al., 2005; Busch and Bain, 2004; Tanaka and Busch, 2003; Deaton, 2004; Mutersbaugh, 2002; Tanner, 2000). Is certification leading to industry consolidation in Bangladesh shrimp aquaculture, and if so, at whose expense? Certification institutions often mandate local consultation, but seldom provide a substantial role for local ‘‘communities” and workers in certification 6

Export oriented industries like apparel, or even other agro-food industries, such as coffee (Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005; Raynolds, 2002), beans and vegetables (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000) may exhibit several characteristics of ‘‘buyer-driven commodity chain”; however, shrimp is unique in the sense that unlike other agro-food systems, shrimp needs a particular environmental and biological setting for production, some unique sets of codes of conducts and requirements to ensure freshness and ‘‘quality”, and finally has given rise to a huge environmental movements locally and globally because of its negative environmental and social legacies. All these make shrimp aquaculture different from most other global agro-food system.

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M.S. Islam / Food Policy 33 (2008) 209–223 1. Buyer side: Supply network

2. Regulation side: Regulatory network

Consumers: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

The United States European Union Japan Other Southeast Asian countries Middle east Canada Other countries

Transnational NGOs/ Movements, such as: 1.

2.

3.

NGO Statement on Sustainable Aquaculture: 1995 (led by Greenpeace) Choluteca Declaration: 1996 (led by Greenpeace and Coddeffagolf) Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF)

Consortium Program: WB,

Retailers/ Supermarkets

EurepGap

FAO, NACA, and WWF GAA/ ACC

Secondary Markets MSC

Restaurants/ Hotels

Development Trilogy: (a) International Development Banks (WB, IMF, ADB), (b) Bilateral Aid Agencies (USAID, CIDA, JICA, CEC, EIB, NORAD etc.), (c) Multilateral Development Assistance Agencies (UNDP, UNFAO etc.)

Importing Companies, such as: Cargill Inc., Wal-Mart, Charoen Pokphand Group, Darden Restaurants, Inc., Land O’Lakes, SGS (Société Générale de Surveillance), Switzerland and Lloyds, UK etc.

Shrimp Seal of Quality Organization

Other Local NGOs: BSFA, NK, GB, CPD, CDP, CARE, BRAC, UBING, Caritas etc. Bangladesh Fish and Shrimp Foundation Bangladesh Shrimp Development Association

Local Exporting Companies, such as: Bangladesh Seafood Exporters Association, Agricultural Marketing Company, Squire Consumers Private Ltd. etc.

Department of Fisheries

Fig. 3. Twin-driven commodity chain.

(Certifying the Uncertifiable, 2003; Vandergeest, 2007). In other word, certification tends to marginalize communities which it claims to protect. Certification can be understood as a new regulatory regime (Mutersbaugh, 2002), and a way of imposing new labor demands on local producers and producer institutions; it often also transform local politics (Beulens et al., 2005; Boselie et al., 2003; Henson and Loader, 2001). What kind of transformation of local politics and agrarian change, if any, is generated by the emergence of certification in Bangladesh shrimp aquaculture remains a crucial question for future research.

The emergence of a third-party certification regime for Bangladesh would appear quite positive in creating awareness of the environmental regulation, food-safety issues, potential high productivity, and proper and timely response to international market demands. However, it also raises some fundamental questions with regard to the role of the government, participation of the communities where shrimp farms are located – around which some environmental NGOs have campaigned, and the fate of the small farmers who cannot afford to participate in this highly technical regime. The study discerns two conspicu-

M.S. Islam / Food Policy 33 (2008) 209–223

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Table 3 Local stakeholders’ reaction to the SSOQ Statements

Key stakeholders

#

Agree %

Disagree %

Ambivalent %

No idea %

Small producers are likely to lose out as buyers opt for linkages to fewer, larger suppliers to ensure traceability

Govt. officers Farmers Traders and processors NGO workers

11 15 11 11 48

81.82 53.33 45.45 63.64 60.42

9.09 6.67 27.27 18.18 14.58

9.09 26.67 18.18 9.09 16.67

0 13.33 9.09 9.09 8.33

Govt. officers Farmers Traders and processors NGO workers

11 15 11 11 48

0 13.33 27.27 54.55 22.92

81.82 6.67 54.55 18.18 37.50

18.18 26.67 9.09 18.18 18.75

0 53.33 9.09 9.09 20.83

Govt. officers Farmers Traders and processors NGO workers

11 15 11 11 48

72.73 53.33 54.55 18.18 50.00

9.09 13.33 27.27 45.45 22.92

9.09 20.00 9.09 27.27 16.67

9.09 13.33 9.09 9.09 10.42

Govt. officers Farmers Traders and processors NGO workers

11 15 11 11 48

81.82 46.67 54.55 27.27 52.08

13.33 27.27 45.45 22.92

9.09 13.33 9.09 9.09 10.42

0 26.67 9.09 18.18 14.58

Govt. officers Farmers Traders and processors NGO workers

11 15 11 11 48

90.91 46.67 27.27 18.18 45.83

0 40.00 27.27 63.64 33.33

9.09 6.67 36.36 9.09 14.58

0 6.67 9.09 9.09 6.25

Totala The SSOQ is the only alternative in the face of buyers’ demands with regard to environmental sustainability, traceability, quality, and socially responsible shrimp culture Total The SSOQ undermines local communities’ capacity/knowledge to manage environment

Total The SSOQ, being an agent of the buyers, will potentially exclude small-scale, but privilege large-scale, farmers/producers

Total Department of Fisheries is capable of full certification, as required by buyers

Total a

Percentage may not total to 100 because of rounding.

ous shifts or trends in the wake of a third-party certification in Bangladesh shrimp aquaculture: the shift of the government’s role from regulator to regulated, and industry consolidation that causes isolation of communities. Government: from regulator to regulated The Bangladesh government is still in a great quandary whether to participate in the SSOQ regime, as at the time of writing, the Department of Fisheries and a number of exporters still rejected the idea of a third-party certifier, while the SSOQ has through its campaign created a considerable amount of public support from different stakeholders. During my fieldwork in 2006, the majority of the stakeholders were still skeptical of the role and operation of the SSOQ. This is reflected in the answers of the selected stakeholders (respondents in qualitative interviews and focus group discussions7 to the following key closed-ended questions: (see Table 3). The study found that farmers are not so familiar with what happens after their shrimp is harvested from their ponds, including the process of certification, demands of the international market, and the idea of a third-party certifier sidelining the state. Therefore, their responses to the questions with regard to the SSOQ are mostly ‘‘no idea” 7

Combining both qualitative interviews and focus group discussions, there were 11 government officers in the Department of Fisheries, 15 shrimp farmers, 11 shrimp traders and processors, and 11 NGO workers.

or ‘‘ambivalent”. It raises a further question whether the SSOQ’s campaign is primarily confined to the powerful stakeholders – such as global environmental actors, NGOs and processors – and not the farmers considering them as easy to manage and therefore less important in the commodity chain. The chart shows that government officials are strongly opposed to the idea of a third-party certifier that might lead to a ‘‘clear power compromise,” ‘‘undermining of state’s capability,” ‘‘increasing external control and pressure of our internal affairs,” or ‘‘further subordination of our sovereignty” as some government officers expressed their views. Though the expressions of the government officers seem different, they carry a common meaning that they are ‘‘increasingly vulnerable” and ‘‘fed-up” in the face of buyers’ shifting demands and the emergence of a thirdparty certifier, which not only takes the key role in certification from the government agencies but also intends to certify government agencies involved in shrimp aquaculture. Most stakeholders think that the emergence of the SSOQ will lead to a significant change in the role of the government. Before the HACCP regime, the government was the sole agency to make environmental and social regulations and implement them using its own capacity. The HACCP made a dramatic shift in the role of the government, a shift in which the buyers and the governments in consuming countries especially the United States along

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M.S. Islam / Food Policy 33 (2008) 209–223

with different environmental and human rights groups prescribed environmental and social regulations that the government needed to implement in order to export its shrimp. Therefore, the role of the government moved from ‘‘regulations maker” to merely ‘‘regulations implementer” that involved restructuring of its institutions as well as paying costs to implement private regulations. The SSOQ will potentially make another major shift in the role of the government, as this third-party-certifier will take the lead in implementing and managing regulations. More importantly, the new regime will regulate the government too, thus reflecting a further shift from regulation implementer to regulated. What the new role of the government will be is still an empirical question and will not be known until the SSOQ is in full operation. However, according to my respondents, the government will not be totally diminished or entirety displaced from its role but remains crucial as the implementer of regulations. Consolidation to isolation The recent development also creates a concern among many industry participants that it might lead to an ‘‘industry consolidation”. As the buyers are trying to tighten their power and control over the industry by opting for linkages to fewer and larger suppliers to ensure traceability, small producers are likely to lose out. The chart shows that the majority of government officers, farmers, and NGO workers as well as processors and traders think that small players in the chain will increasingly be isolated, as they will not be able cope with shifting demands of the buyers as well as environmental groups. There is already ghere agun (a fire in the shrimp-pond), a rural metaphor in Bangladesh used by some small-scale farmers that elucidates the increasing higher cost of shrimp cultivation. Though the SSOQ argues that it will form a ‘‘small-holders groups” with a help of community-based NGOs to ensure ‘‘group certification” (see Williams, 2003), the industry participants’ concern over industry consolidation and its likely effect on small producers still remains. It is not clear whether this approach will actually work. My respondents, though some of them are not sure about the role of the SSOQ, also think that the SSOQ has no clearcut strategies to involve local communities. A respondent opined that it was a long-time campaign of the NGOs to involve communities in the development projects, but the SSOQ has no invited spaces for the communities to participate. The SSOQ is moving towards a solution that is technical rather than social, and based more on imposition of codes than on participation, according to another respondent, who added that it would potentially ‘‘disenfranchise and isolate the rural communities more than ever.” Though the SSOQ developed various codes to ensure ‘‘better management practices” in different stages of shrimp aquaculture, the orientation remains technical in nature. With the exception of NGO workers, most stakeholders think that the SSOQ disregards the rural community’s capacity and knowledge to manage the environment. There is no clear

indication that communities will have a role or place in the new certification regime. It shows a trend as also argued by Vandergeest (2007) that if a commodity is produced for the wealthier buyers, regardless of who produce it and who are affected by it, there is a less room for the local community’s involvement but increasing and more direct control by the buyers in the commodity chain. Conclusion Analysis in this paper shows that Bangladesh shrimp aquaculture is now on the brink of what Busch and Bain (2004, p. 337) term ‘‘private regulation of the public” (PRP). The SSOQ, a private third-party certifier, could gradually take over the key certification and managerial roles of the government. Though there persist on the one hand, tension between the parties, and on the other, reluctance and skepticism from the government and some traders/exporters, experiences elsewhere show that the government will eventually have no option but to cooperate with the emerging regime, as Vandergeest (2007, p. 1163) argues that ‘‘producers who are able to obtain certification by the most important schemes secure privileged market access.” Then, what are the broader implications emerging in this study for global agro-food system? The dilemma is that the certification regime has emerged with a promise to protect communities affected by environmental externalities and to ensure human rights and community participation, but as its technical measures move towards industry consolidation, in practice it leaves almost no space for community participation. It further isolates the community, but has to work with local civil administration and NGOs to achieve its goals and objectives. A model for involving community, known as ‘‘community-based natural resource management” (CBNRM), which is supposed to enhance the role of communities in development projects or environmental regulations, but it, as Vandergeest (2007) found, tends to emerge where resources are less valuable and are not used for producing commodities for wealthier buyers, and therefore certification regimes cannot uphold this model, as certification regimes tend to emerge around highly contested products, such as shrimp, that have significant value. Though domination by the government agencies in managing environment and natural resources has gradually been displaced by private regulations, the government is also left with some responsibilities that entail a paradox of power: that is, in the new regime consolidation of the government’s power is tied to a continuous consolidation of its cooperation with, and subordination to, the market demands orchestrated by what Gereffi et al. (2001) call the ‘‘NGO-industrial complex”. In other words, the more a government works with the market, the more it will gain power. The paradox is that once a country produces a global commodity for wealthy buyers, the government has to surrender to powerful market players its key roles in managing the environment and monitoring food safety

M.S. Islam / Food Policy 33 (2008) 209–223

standards and food quality attributes, but again the same government’s power emanates from its continuous and shifting collaborations with market demands. While the rise of private regulation offers ‘‘opportunities to create alternative practices that are more socially and environmentally sustainable” (Hatanaka et al., 2005, p. 354), it poses many crucial questions that have profound implications for development and further research. What will be the role of the government agencies in the wake of a TPC regime? Evidence elsewhere (see Greene and Kremen, 2003; Martinez and Ban˜ados, 2004) shows that government agencies have moved to cooperate with the TPCs, as it ‘‘appeals to technoscientific values such as independence, objectivity, and transparency in an attempt to increase trust and legitimacy among their customers and to limit liability” (Hatanaka et al., 2005, p. 355). Then, how can the SSOQ and the government agencies of Bangladesh move from tension to collaboration? As skepticism and concern spread among NGOs and scholars that certification will potentially marginalize the small players as the buyers opt for linkages to fewer and larger suppliers to ensure traceability, how can this emerging regulatory regime protect the small players and transmit gains to all social strata in Bangladesh? Does the regime move from a civic democracy to a consumer democracy in which the key players in the chain are accountable only to the wealthy consumers and not to the poor rural producers and their communities affected by environmental externalities? How can the communities in shrimp farming areas participate meaningfully in the new regime? What new spaces for meaningful participation can the regime offer to rural communities as well as to marginalized participants including women? How can producers and particularly small-scale farmers be positioned at the center of development of codes of conduct and certification? What is the role of farmer associations or small-scale farmer groups in supporting participation of small-scale farmers or vulnerable groups? Can implementation of codes of conduct and certification boost rural development in areas where shrimp are grown and processed? How? To what extent do existing codes include social principles, and how are they operated? What are the core social principles that should be included? How should they be developed and implemented? As Thompson and Cowan (2000) pointed out, most literature on commodity chains in the global agro-food system are dominated by a discussion of the process of local or regional integration into the global economy rather than an examination of the reorganization and reconstitution of local and regional production/consumption relations and concomitant changes such as in gender and labor patterns and in environmental and agrarian landscapes. Twin-driven commodity chain analysis, introduced in this paper, will potentially provide a powerful tool and framework to analyse and understand the key players and their roles in the chain: who sets parameters? why? from what point of view and to what effect? who is privileged and who is marginalized?

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Acknowledgements Research on which this paper is based was carried out by the support of a grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada. For useful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper, the author thanks Professor Peter Vandergeest, Professor Stuart Schoenfeld, Professor Hira Singh, and two other anonymous reviewers. References Aglietta, M., 1979. A Theory of Capitalist Regulations. New Left Books, London. Agrawal, A., 2003. Environmentality: technologies of government and the making of subjects. Asian Environments Series lectures, York Centre for Asian Research, Toronto, September 29. Bangladesh Export Promotion Bureau, 2004. Available from http:// www.epb.gov.bd/index.html (Accessed: December 12, 2005). Battacharya, D., Rahman, M., Khatun, F.A., 1999. Environmental impacts of trade liberalization and policies for the sustainable management of natural resources: A case study on Bangladesh’s shrimp farming industry. Center for Policy Dialogue, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Bene, C., 2005. The good, the bad and the ugly, discourse, policy controversies and the role of science in the politics of shrimp farming development. Development and Policy Review 23 (5), 585–614. Beulens, A. J.M., Broens, D.F., Folstar, P., Hofstede, G., 2005. Food safety and transparency in food chains and networks relationships and challenge. Food Control 16 (6), 481–486. Boselie, D., Henson, S., Weatherspoon, D., 2003. Supermarket procurement practices in developing countries, the role of the public and private sectors. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85 (5), 1155–1161. Boyer, R., 1990. The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction. Columbia University Press, New York. Brosius, P.J., 1999. Green dots, pink hearts: displacing politics from the Malaysian rain forest. American Anthropologist 101 (1), 36–57. Busch, L., Bain, C., 2004. New! Improved? The transformation of the global agrifood system. Rural Sociology 69 (3), 321–346. Buttel, F.H., 2001. Some reflections on late twentieth century agrarian political economy. Sociologia Ruralis 41 (2), 165–181. Certifying the Uncertifiable, 2003. FSC Certification of tree plantations in Thailand and Brazil. August, World Rainforest Movement. ´ ., 1996b. Environmental governmentality, the case of Canada’s Darier, E green plan. Environmental Politics 5 (4), 585–606. ´ ., 1996a. The politics and power effects of garbage recycling in Darier, E Halifax, Canada. Local Environment 1 (1), 63–86. ´ ric, 1999. Foucault and the environment: An introduction. In: Darier, E ´ . (Ed.), Discourses of the Environment. Blackwell, Oxford, Darier, E pp. 1–34. Deaton, B.J., 2004. A theoretical framework for examining the role of third-party certifiers. Food Control 15 (8), 615–619. Deb, A.K., 1998. Fake blue revolution, environmental and socioeconomic impacts of shrimp culture in the coastal areas of Bangladesh. Ocean and Coastal Management 4 (1998), 63–88. Dolan, C.S., 2004. On farm and packhouse: Employment at the bottom of a global value chain. Rural Sociology 69 (1), 99–126. Dolan, C.S., Humphrey, J., 2000. Governance and trade in fresh vegetables, the impact of Uk supermarkets on the African horticulture industry. Journal of Development Studies 37 (2), 147–176. EJF, 2003. Smash and grab. Environmental Justice Foundation in Partnership with WildAid, London. Escober, A., 1995. Encountering Development, the Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

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