From sustainable development to carbon control: urban transformation in Hong Kong and London

Journal of Cleaner Production 50 (2013) 56e67

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From sustainable development to carbon control: urban transformation in Hong Kong and London Paul Higgins* Department of Public and Social Administration, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 15 March 2012 Received in revised form 19 November 2012 Accepted 20 November 2012 Available online 29 November 2012

This paper explores the prevailing urban transformations of Hong Kong and London in the light of a policy shift from sustainable development preoccupation to carbon control management. The paper utilises Blühdorn’s politics of unsustainability thesis to assess the magnitude of the two cities’ urban transformations employing the theorised concepts of ‘known unsustainability,’ ‘commitment to blessed way of life,’ and ‘the discourse of opportunity’ as key analytical guides. Although it is accepted that both economies have re-orientated their prevailing urban planning trajectories in a sustainable development and, increasingly, carbon control direction the key question remains whether the proposed measures for mitigation are radical enough to avert the predicted crisis. Employing a rich empirical analysis of official documents and statistics the paper offers a broad overview which lends qualified support to the central tenets of Blühdorn’s thesis across a compelling timeframe of investigation. Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Urban transformation Sustainable development Carbon control Hong Kong London

1. Introduction This paper explores the fundamental question of why despite increased awareness and ambitions there are few powerful initiatives that decisively shift urban development in a sustainable direction (McCormick et al., 2011). Two theoretically meaningful and physically comparable case studies of Hong Kong and London are analysed to address the conundrum between what Szersyznski (2007) calls the constitutive tension between ‘ecological awareness and ecocidal behaviour’. At present, a number of explanations have been put forward to explain this puzzle ranging from deficiencies in the insatiable sensation-seeking behaviours of humans through to the critique of the all-encompassing power of institutions of consumerism which reward unsustainable competition, consumption, novelty and innovation (Jackson, 2011). The perceived transaction costs associated with addressing rising ecological scarcity are also seen to be prohibitive, compared to perpetuating the same pattern of production and environmental use (Barbier, 2011). Meanwhile, on a broader more philosophical level, Blühdorn’s (2007) ‘politics of unsustainability’ thesis adds

* Tel.: þ852 3442 9211; fax: þ852 3442 0413. E-mail address: [email protected]. 0959-6526/$ e see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.11.025

another interesting dimension to the constitutive tension proving to be one of the most influential explanations to date. First published in 2007, and subsequently updated thereafter (2009; 2011), Blühdorn’s ‘politics of unsustainability’ thesis explores the question of why despite unprecedented awareness of prevailing environmental crisis and of the urgency of radical ecological policy change ‘late-modern society is engaged much more in reproducing the principles of unsustainability than in overcoming them’ (2007: 271e272). The coincidence of an essentially uncontested consensus about the unsustainability of the status quo ante (e.g. Stern Review, 2007; IPCC, 2007) and the adamant resolve to defend and secure the structures and principles underlying this unsustainability is seen as inaugurating a new phase of eco-politics, which Blühdorn (2007, 2009) refers to as the post-ecologist politics of simulation. The politics of simulation proceeds not by some symbolic or consciously malicious deception where, for example, powerful actors (i.e. politicians and commercial groups) cynically exploit the goodwill of their recipients (citizens and consumers) by dubiously claiming ecological virtues where none exist (Szersyznski, 2007) but rather as something like a tacit strategic community between the public and its political elites. Wedded to the ‘blessed way of democratic consumer capitalism life’ the parties to this tacit alliance of unsustainability are claimed to fully accept that ecological modernisation and associated lifestyle and consumption patterns are not ‘working’ but are

P. Higgins / Journal of Cleaner Production 50 (2013) 56e67

structurally unable and politically unwilling to reflexively implement the necessary radical change (Blühdorn, 2007). Such is the claimed pervasiveness of humanity’s attraction to the fruits of democratic consumer capitalism that even where feelings of alienation persist (such as owing to the unequal distribution of unsustainability) they trigger primarily demands for tighter inclusion into the established system, but rarely for any post-capitalist alternative (Blühdorn, 2011). This observation thus contrasts with Layfield’s (2008) conviction that opposition to the expansion of capitalism represents a genuine form of environmental class struggle which contests the integration of both people and environment into capital’s social relations. An interesting dimension to Blühdorn’s (2007) politics of unsustainability thesis concerns its characterisation as a dilemma that ‘can neither be solved nor can it not be resolved’. In the first instance, criticism is levelled at the limits of what is broadly known as the ecological modernization paradigm (Hajer, 1995; Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000) which although able to provide cures for specific symptoms of unsustainability is unable to create marketable technological fixes to tackle such key environmental problems as habitat destruction, soil erosion and bio-diversity loss (Blühdorn, 2007). These criticisms are to some extent accepted by proponents of ecological modernization despite the strategy being unrivalled in certain technical fields such as green electricity, clean technologies and carbon capture (Jänicke, 2008). In the second instance, the politics of simulation demands that the political class must still be seen to be offering alternative visions, ‘that electorates are still making a choice between these visions and that political institutions are still capable of then implementing their decisions’ (Blühdorn, 2007: 266). Here, Blühdorn (2007) particularly notes how the more progressive discourse of ‘opportunity’ has gained prominence vis-à-vis the confining discourse of ‘risk’ in contemporary discussions of sustainability policy, principles and potential. Akin to Hajer’s (1995) description of ecological modernisation as a set of storylines mobilised by members of discourse coalitions to promote specific interests, the discourse of ‘opportunity’ can be similarly viewed as allowing policy-makers and business interests to content themselves with the ‘low hanging fruits’ or marketable ‘winewin solutions’ (Jänicke, 2008) to maintain economic growth. In contrast, the more grounded discourse of ‘risk’ potentially provides a better way to communicate to policy-makers the need to make critical decisions on environmental matters; which of course may be less profitable. Nonetheless, the tricky unspoken tacit performative regeneration of authentic politics that characterises the politics of unsustainability renders the task of adding empirical insight to it epistemologically difficult. To begin with, mainstream sustainability research and environmental sociology are not considered to be particularly well suited to exploring the politics of unsustainability and the specific mechanism driving it because they remain committed to trying to resolve supposedly objective environmental problems. This reflects part of the enlightenment tradition and its guiding metaphors of illumination, uncovering and exposure whereby present ecological destruction is the result of a rationality deficit: if only we had more knowledge about how nature works and if only we allowed our actions to be guided by it, then we would live in harmony with nature (Szersyznski, 2007). However, sustainable development (SD) has both normative ethical and practical dimensions. This serves to complicate the discussion about the rigour of sustainability science as normative questions cannot be answered and solved with scientific methodologies alone; they require a consensus about what is to be sustained and about how to sustain something (Baumgartner, 2011). Accordingly, the politics of unsustainability demands attention being drawn to the problem of how the prevailing system of

57

democratic consumer capitalism is constructed and reconstructed to exclude the adoption of radical change. In this sense, the politics of unsustainability, though difficult to prove empirically, is considered to be accessible to investigations into the ways in which the paradoxes of the post-ecologist project are unfolding (Blühdorn, 2007). As Blühdorn (2007: 271e272) remarks: ‘There is certainly a lot of benefit in knowing that contrary to its own self-descriptions latemodern society is engaged much more in reproducing the principles of unsustainability than in overcoming them. And there is also a lot of benefit in identifying exactly how it is doing this’. Three particularly salient points emerge from the politics of unsustainability that render its empirical consideration both accessible and valid when pitched in the context of the possibility of genuine sustainable urban transformation. First, one of the distinctive features of advanced modern societies in the postecologist era is the persistent awareness of their own unsustainability against which subsequent urban transformations have been unable to produce the necessary radical change. In recent years, the condition of known sustainability has been reinforced by the broadly accepted evidence of Stern (2007) and the IPCC (2007) which provided environmental politics with an entirely new foundation by focussing the totality of eco-political efforts on a single priority: climate protection (Blühdorn, 2009). As (Blühdorn, 2009: 1) explains ‘never before had environmental policy been based on such unambiguous categorical imperatives, derived not from contested aesthetic or ethical norms, but based on the soundest and most authoritative science available’. The resulting agenda of carbon control would also seem to introduce a new set of values into state regulation that might open up possibilities for challenging mainstream modes of urban and regional development in a manner not possible under SD (While et al., 2010). Second, according to the politics of unsustainability thesis, the ensuing efforts of sustainability responses (i.e. urban transformation) are claimed to have been designed in a way that maintains ‘the blessed way of (democratic consumer) life’. That is to say despite all the expressed concern about unsustainability, and more recently the need to exert carbon control, a largely ‘business as usual’ development trajectory will be maintained. Again, this argument seems to gain support from ecological modernisers who link sustainability potential to its degree of marketization. As Jänicke (2008: 557) notes: ‘in general, an environmental problem proves politically less difficult to resolve if a marketable solution exists. In contrast, if a solution to an environmental problem requires an intervention in the established patterns of production, consumption, or transport, it is likely to meet resistance’. Third, as indicated above, the discourse of opportunity will emerge as an important selling point of sustainable urban transformation to secure specific interests. That is, amidst the various coalitions, partnerships, contractual relations, networks and other forms of governance arrangements actors’ attention will be drawn to the question of how best to grasp the wicked opportunities that arise amidst the contemporary challenges of degradation, resource depletion and adverse climate change. Since its publication in 2007 Blühdorn’s ‘politics of unsustainability’ thesis has generated a lot of interest amongst the academic community and inspired an increasing number of empirical studies devoted to exploring different elements of its key propositions (see, for example, Baker, 2007; Newig, 2007; Death, 2011; Blühdorn, 2011). Research by Newig (2007), for instance, focuses on the passing of symbolic environmental legislation in Germany which is held responsible for the absence of really effective environmental policy. Not to be understood as willfully deceiving citizens such legislation is read, instead, as reflecting a certain readiness of citizens to be deceived, so that unsustainability can continue. Likewise, Death’s (2011) study of global summits e such as the 2002

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Johannesburg Summit and the 2009 Copenhagen Convention e maintains that participants’ failure to produce new international agreements or to strengthen environmental regimes can be viewed as moments of political theatre, performative enactments of legitimacy and authority, and sites for the communication of particular examples of responsible conduct. Death (2011) maintains that environmental sustainability e like justice e must be seen to be done, and summits are one of the primary sites where this performance is played out. Teräväinen (2010), meanwhile, scrutinises the political side of technology by analysing the recent climate policy debate at the national level through the example of Finland. His research suggests that ecological modernization in Finland has neither required radical interventions to the established patterns of production and consumption nor challenged high-technology and market-led economic growth policies. Instead, it merely subordinates climate, environmental, and broader societal objectives to the techno-economic rationale, leading to a preference for short-term political choices in a situation where long-term solutions would be needed. It is, therefore, with these, and other (e.g. Baker, 2007; Blühdorn, 2011), important empirical contributions that two specific features of this current study warrant specific mention. First, the study aims to compare the democratic consumer capitalist case of London with the non-democratic consumer capitalist case of Hong Kong. This distinction allows one to begin to address the question whether the democratic consumer capitalist case of London will somehow better reflect the politics of unsustainability than its non-democratic counterpart given differences in their articulated legitimacy-governing (Landhauber and Ziegler, 2005)? The underpinning logic of this approach is that whereas democratically elected governments need to secure lasting electoral support (democratic legitimacy) for policy measures that impose major burdens on their electorates primarily for the benefit of future generations (Blühdorn, 2011), non-democratic ones can pursue more authoritarian paths (Beeson, 2010). In line with this position, the prevalence of an executive-led system in Hong Kong could have major implications for such policy areas as sustainable development (SD). Given a strong commitment to SD there is much that could be achieved in Hong Kong. Alternatively, democratic economies can be seen to provide opportunities for citizens to demand action for addressing environmental problems such as relief from pollution (Fiorino, 2011). Democracies are also likely to provide more effective governance, such as a professional civil service, stronger legal system, more accountability and less corruption (Fiorino, 2011). However, as a former British colony, these traditions have been retained in Hong Kong which is renowned for possessing a highly regarded civil service, legal system and clean government. The second important feature of this study is that it adopts a chronologically arranged investigation into how both case cities have transformed their sustainability outlooks since the concept of SD was first coined. The adoption of a longer-term assessment of the two cases’ urban transformation in the context of SD is insightful because it allows one to assess the impact of scientific evidence of the status and trends of greenhouse emissions (circa 2007e2008) on resulting public policy. However, what is important to recognise here is that, while Blühdorn’s politics of unsustainability thesis (2007, 2009 and 2011) acknowledges the impact of the Stern (2007) review and IPCC (2007) as significant sources of scientific ecological awareness e the main point of concern relates to how the state has not subsequently been able to inspire the necessary radical change. Hence, while it is possible to identify an escalation in the recognised severity of the ecological crisis the key point remains whether subsequent actions have proven to be radical enough, both in terms of objectives and practice.

The aim of this study is not designed, then, to compare the sustainability outcomes of London and Hong Kong (for example, which one is performing more highly on the air pollution index) but rather to provide a descriptive analytical comparison of their varied politics of simulation processing. Although Hong Kong and London are both global command centres for international finance their different structures and styles of governance generate diverse types of policy response, which in part depend on the specificities of the local, political, geographical and economic historical realities. For instance, whereas the politics of Hong Kong is dominated by a powerful administrative structure that has remained in place since its days as a British colony London is governed by an elected mayor whose responsibilities include elements of urban planning and economic development (Raco and Street, 2011). Both economies have experienced a process of de-industrialisation and in the midst of multi-dimensional global uncertainty e finance, climate change, ageing populations e quality-of-life factors have moved up the policy agenda (Raco and Street, 2011). The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next part, a brief but informative overview of the two case study contexts is provided drawing particular attention to the location, context and governance of SD in London and Hong Kong. Against this backdrop the paper utilises a rich array of policy documents and official statistics to interrogate practical realities of the three emergent tenets of Blühdorn’s ‘politics of unsustainability’ thesis e ‘known unsustainability,’ ‘commitment to blessed way of life,’ and ‘the discourse of opportunity’. This is conducted on a crosscomparison thematic basis to facilitate the richness of the discussion and the degree of convergence/divergence between distinct contexts. In the final, concluding, part the key themes of this paper’s conceptual and analytical analysis are revisited. 2. Two case contexts China’s most affluent city, Hong Kong, is located on the southwest coast of China, on the eastern side of the Pearl River estuary adjoining Guangdong Province (see Fig. 1). A former colony of Britain reunited with its Motherland in 1997 the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is a local government of the People’s Republic of China ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. Constitutionally framed by the Basic Law under the remit ‘one country, two systems’, Hong Kong has an established executive-led system which has managed to maintain publiceprivate sector cooperation, respect for the rule of law, independent courts and a rich and autonomous civil society, including freedom of speech and press (Burns, 2004). Under the Basic Law, Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy in domestic policy except in defence and foreign affairs. Hong Kong exercises executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication and its capitalist system within China is protected until 2047 (Roberts and Hills, 2002). Situated in the south east of England London (see Fig. 2) is a capital city, the largest metropolitan area in the United Kingdom and one of the largest urban zones in the European Union. Similar in terms of physical and population size to Hong Kong (see Table 1) Greater London covers an area of 1572 square kilometres within which a population of 7.56 million resides. This amounts to a population density of 4807 inhabitants per square kilometre. The respective figures for Hong Kong are 1104 square kilometres and 7.07 million residents. However, since approximately 75% of Hong Kong’s land comprises no-built-up areas the urban area of Hong Kong has the highest population and employment density in the world. Measured at block level, some areas may have population densities of more than 400,000 people per square kilometre (Burdett et al., 2011).

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Fig. 1. The geographical location of the Hong Kong study area. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hong_Kong_Location.svg, a map showing Hong Kong’s location in Asia on China’s south coast (accessed February 16th 2012).

The compact form of both cities, therefore, allows specific efficiencies of urban transport and domestic energy use that single them out from comparable units of analysis (i.e. Hong Kong has one of the lowest rates of private car use in the developed world and London’s per capita carbon footprint is 17% lower than its country

Table 1 Key social, economic and environmental data for London and Hong Kong. London Social Population (million) Area km2 Population density (people per km2) Central area density (people per km2) Life expectancy (years) Economic GDP per capita (US$) Gini-coefficient Ratio of top 10%:lowest 10% income Unemployment Minimum wage (per hour) Environmental Annual CO2 emissions (kg per capita) Annual waste production (kg per capita) Annual electricity use (kWh per capita) Car ownership per 1000 Ecological footprint (ha/person)

Fig. 2. The geographical location of the London study area. Source: http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/File:London_(European_Parliament_constituency).svg (accessed February 16th 2012).

Hong Kong

7.56 (2009)a 1572 (2009)a 4807 (2009)a

7.07 (2011)b 1104 (2008)c 6540 (2011)b

8326 (2011)d

22,193 (2011)d

79.2 (2004)d

82.5 (2010)d

60,831 (2007)d 53 (2007)d 13.8 (UK, 2011)e

45,090 (2010)d 32 (2005)d 17.8 (2011)e

10% (2012)f £6.08 (21 years over)h

3.4% (2011)g HK$28 wUS$3.60i

5800 (2006)j

6000 (2008)k

459 (2006)d

434 (2009)d

4539 (2000)d

5768 (2005)d

345 (2008)d 4.54 (2006)l

59 (2003)d 4.0 (2010)m

Notes: All documents accessed February 2012. Dates in parenthesis represent data year. a The Government Office for London and the London Research Centre, Focus on London 2009 http://www.london.gov.uk/. b HK the facts (2012) http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/ population.pdf. c http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2008/Table03.pdf. d Burdett et al., 2011 Cities Health and Well-Being. e Human Development Report 2009, UNDP. f http://lseo.org.uk/data/london-data. g http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong_kong_statistics/statistics_by_subject/index. jsp?subjectID¼2&charsetID¼1&displayMode¼T. h http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Employment/Employees/ TheNationalMinimumWage/DG_10027201. i http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201011/10/P201011100222.htm. j http://legacy.london.gov.uk/gla/publications/environment/soereport/fullreport.pdf. k http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/climate_change/files/HKGHG_Sectors_ 201009.pdf. l http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/research/library/publications/115654. aspx. m http://assets.wwfhk.panda.org/downloads/hong_kong_ecological_footprint_ report_2010.pdf.

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average, largely due to the efficient public transport system and lower use of private vehicles in the capital). However, as per other ‘global cities’, both Hong Kong and London display distinctive patterns of social and spatial inequalities that are reflected in the varied quality of life of their citizens. Some of the social, economic and environmental figures presented in Table 1 thus mask underlying spatial and demographic inequalities of condition (Higgins and Campanera, 2012). Whereas London can be likened to a kind of ‘City State’ within the national economy (Ertürk et al., 2011), Hong Kong is a ‘City State’ (Special Administrative Region) nestling beside an economic powerhouse (Ghai, 2000). London’s current shift towards national prominence has its roots in the economic and political changes of the 1980s when deindustrialisation undermined non-metropolitan elites while the deregulation of finance allowed the growth of London as an international financial centre (Raco and Street, 2011). The Greater London Authority (GLA) was established in 2000 and covers the 32 London boroughs and the Corporation of London (see Fig. 3). The respective district level authorities for Hong Kong are presented in Fig. 4. In London, the GLA is made up of a directly elected Mayor (the Executive) and a separately elected Assembly (to scrutinise the Mayor). The GLA is designed to provide citywide, strategic government for London with overall powers of transport, policing, economic development, fire and emergency planning. Both cities have produced a Spatial Development Strategy setting out and reviewing an integrated social, economic and

environmental framework for future development. In London this is known as the London plan (GLA, 2004, 2009, 2011) and in Hong Kong it is known as the 2030 strategy (Development Bureau and Planning Department, 2007). The two spatial development plans are committed to sustainable urban transformation and exalt a strong governance outlook. For instance, the London Sustainable Development Commission (LSDC) is appointed by the Mayor and scrutinises and formally publishes reports on various London strategies. The LSDC is composed of individual experts from the economic, social, environmental and London governance sectors. Commissioners give their time voluntarily, promoting SD, embedding sustainability into London-wide strategies, and helping make sustainability a meaningful and understandable concept for all Londoners. Since 2002 London has also developed the London Climate Change Partnership comprising over 30 organisations networking with over 200 others across the city to prepare London in the face of the impacts of climate change (http://www. londonsdc.org/lsdc/). The steering group for this body comprises representatives from the government, climate science, developers, finance, health, environment and communication sectors. One of the fundamental difficulties with Hong Kong’s government structure is that responsibilities for environmental questions are scattered around different government departments, and efforts to coordinate the different arms of government are problematic. Although the Environment Bureau is an executive agency of the government of Hong Kong responsible for developing

Fig. 3. London districts. Source: Author.

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Fig. 4. Hong Kong districts. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Hong_Kong_18Districts_EN.svg (accessed February 16th 2012).

policies in environmental protection, nature conservation; enforcing environmental legislation and sustainable development it struggles to deal with environmental issues in an integrated manner, especially in rethinking the ways urban development take place and urban forms are shaped. To further complicate matters, the environmental agenda in Hong Kong has undergone a transformation with attention switching from purely local problems to far more complex, cross-jurisdictional, regional issues (Hills and Welford, 2002; Welford et al., 2006). As a non-Annex I Party under the Kyoto Protocol, China (including Hong Kong) is not required to meet any mandatory greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions limits or reduction targets. Hong Kong is only required to formulate, implement, publish, and regularly update national or regional programmes to mitigate climate change (The Kyoto Protocol, art. 10). Nonetheless, climate change mitigation and carbon control has become part and parcel of the quest for sustainable development in both case economies and, to a large extent, has been ‘mainstreamed’ into various policy areas. Emerging state strategies of carbon control should, in theory, represent a harder edge to state environmental regulation via non-negotiable target setting in contrast with the fairly weak implementation of sustainability principles by western governments to date (While et al., 2010). In addition, carbon control is much more demanding than other environmental problems to deal with because it is much more connected to SD as opposed to just the environment; it relates strongly to a variety of production, consumption, quality of life and outsourced environmental issues, amongst others. Having outlined some background details of the location, context and governance of SD in London and Hong Kong attention can now be turned to the consideration of the conceptually-derived themes of ‘known unsustainability,’ ‘commitment to blessed way of life,’ and ‘the discourse of opportunity’. 3. Known unsustainability A key tenet of Blühdorn’s politics of unsustainability thesis (2007, 2009 and 2011) is that it proceeds in the context of society’s persistent awareness of unsustainability; a condition recently reinforced by the

widely-accepted evidence of Stern (2007) and the IPCC (2007) concerning anthropogenic climate change. An analysis of the longer-term SD documentation in Hong Kong and London lends support to the phenomenon of ‘known unsustainability’ with far greater prominence being given to climate governance from about 2008 onwards, in both cases. Until this point the relevant SD documentation only went as far to assuming that, to put it rather bluntly, ‘something’ had to be done about ‘something’. For instance, London’s ‘Making your plans sustainable’ handbook produced in 2004 (LSDC, 2004: 8) loosely remarked that: ‘Global warming is a present reality. Too much carbon dioxide has been emitted into the atmosphere. Sea levels are also rising gradually causing increased risk of flooding. Global warming requires serious changes in our behaviour, to slow down the warming effect and eventually stop it, but it also now requires us to adapt our plans to take into account the changing climate in London.’ The words ‘too much’ in the above statement did not really give the impression of the type of authoritative insight that was later able to be communicated following Stern (2007) and IPCC (2007) but merely that something was not right with the status quo ante. Hong Kong was even more reticent in this regard, with its 2005 SD strategy acknowledging that ‘We are only just beginning to consider how best to balance continued economic development with care for our natural surroundings and to understand how both these considerations affect the quality of life in our city. The debate on Hong Kong’s sustainable development has started. However, globally, overreliance on burning such fuels to produce electricity is widely believed to be a factor in climate change’ (Sustainable Development Unit, 2005). Accordingly, at this fairly early stage of climate change mitigation, Hong Kong appeared to be merely going through the motions of producing an SD strategy, demonstrating a complicit, if not committed, stance to the cause. Having used guidance available from the United Nations documents and from publications on best practice, Hong Kong’s version of SD, operationally at least, ticked all the right boxes e setting out an overall Strategic Vision, Strategic objectives, Targets and Action plans e but substantively it came short. Post-IPCC (2007), however, and a far more serious tone began to dictate the discourse of both case economies; and in line with international conventions data began to be produced to identify the extent of the problem in emissions terms (see Tables 2 and 3).

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Table 2 Greenhouse gas emissions in Hong Kong by sector.

Table 4 UK Climate Projections for London under a medium emissions scenario to 2050.

Year

Energy including Waste Industrial electricity (67%), processes transport (18%) and product and other end fuel use

Agriculture, Totala forestry and other land use

Per capita (t)

2005 2006 2007b 2008b

38,800 38,710 39,700 38,200 (92%)

73 74 52 29 (0%)

6.2 6.2 6.3 6.0

2220 2140 2180 2160 (5%)

867 1380 1350 1590 (4%)

42,000 42,300 43,300 42,000

Rising temperatures

More seasonal rainfall

a

Figures rounded. b provisional figures. Source: Synthesised from Annexes 3 and 4 of Environment Bureau (2010).

Such evidence acknowledged both the extent of the climate change problem and the likely impact that it would have on subsequent governance trajectories (see Table 4). In London, for example, it was projected that:

Tidal surges

Sea level rise

Climate change will mean that south-east England will experience progressively warmer wetter winters, and hotter, drier summers. On top of these changes to our average climate will be an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, such as heat waves, tidal surges, storms and heavy rainfall. By the latter part of this century, an extreme weather event of a magnitude that might happen once every 100 years today, may occur every three or four years, and a new intensity will define the once in a 100 years event. Sea levels will continue to rise for centuries (GLA, 2010: 15). In Hong Kong, meanwhile, similar projections (see Table 5) were seen to form part of an established trend: The rising trend in temperature in Hong Kong is likely to continue in the future. The number of very hot days is projected to increase for the rest of the 21st century, and conversely the number of cold days is going to fall dramatically. In addition, there is likely to be greater variability in rainfall patterns with a higher frequency of extreme conditions, i.e., extremely wet years and extremely dry years are expected to become more frequent for the rest of the 21st century. The number of heavy rain days is likely to increase. It is expected that the mean sea level rise in the South China Sea, including Hong Kong waters, would increase to tally with the global average in the late 21st century (Environment Bureau, 2010: 11e12). Although London reports that average summer temperatures in London have warmed by more than 2  C over the period 1977e 2006 and that in England and Wales there were 2139 excess deaths during the August 2003 heat-wave (in some respects the accumulated impact of climate change) it, nonetheless, remained upbeat that carbon dioxide emissions have fallen by 11% since 2000 despite a rising population (GLA, 2010). This implied that although unsustainability was still being contributed to it was occurring at a slower pace. However, compared to 1990, London’s current emissions levels (circa 2010) seem less impressive only managing Table 3 Carbon dioxide emissions by sector in London. Year

Industry and commercial

Domestic

Road transport

Total

Population (000’s, mid-year)

Per capita (t)

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

20,389 21,738 20,977 21,157 18,752

17,291 17,193 16,807 16,865 15,232

9286 9158 9092 8704 8457

46,966 48,089 46,876 46,726 42,441

7485 7547 7602 7668 7753

6.3 6.4 6.2 6.1 5.5

Source: Compiled from Department of Energy and Climate Change http://www. decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/climate_stats/data/data.aspx.

Summers will be warmer, with the average summer day 12 being 2.7  C warmer and very hot days 6.5  C warmer than the baseline average. By the end of the century the hottest day of the year could be 10  C hotter than the hottest day today. Winters will be warmer, with the average winter day being 2.2  C warmer and a very warm winter day 3.5  C above the baseline. Summers will be drier, with the average summer 19% drier and the driest summer 39% drier than the baseline average. Winters will be wetter, with the average winter 14% wetter and the wettest winter 33% wetter than the baseline average. Tidal surges are not projected to increase in frequency, though the height of a one-in-fifty-year tidal surge is projected to increase by up to 70 cm by the end of the century. Sea levels are projected to rise by up to 90 cm by the end of the century. An extreme projection of a 2-metre increase has been generated using the latest ice-sheet modelling.

Source: Adapted from the draft climate change adaptation strategy for London (GLA, 2010: 25)

a reduction of 1%, due to rising emissions between 1990 and 2000 (GLA et al., 2011). Across the same period of time Hong Kong’s emissions performance is even less impressive than London’s with 2010 levels roughly the same as 1990 (6.2 per capita). Despite this rather disappointing outcome the relevant Hong Kong authorities have, like those in London, proceeded to produce fairly ambitious targets (Environment Bureau, 2010: 44) which do not corroborate with recent trends. In particular, Hong Kong proposes to produce an absolute reduction in its total GHG emissions from 42 million tonnes in 2005 to 28e34 million tonnes in 2020 (equivalent to a 19e33% reduction) (Environment Bureau, 2010). Per capita emission is also expected to reduce from 6.2 tonnes to 3.6e 4.5 tonnes (27e42%) and to reduce carbon intensity (kg CO2-e/HK dollar) by 50e60% below the 2005 level by 2020 (Environment Bureau, 2010). Table 5 Observed climate changes in Hong Kong from the last century to 2009. Climatic variables

Observed change per decade

Annual mean temperature

Increasing by 0.12  C (1885e2009) Decreasing by 0.24  C (1947e2009) Increasing by 3.5 nights (1947e2009) Decreasing by 2.3 days (1948e2009) 23.1  C

Mean diurnal range Hot nights (minimum temperature 28  C) in JuneAug Cold days (minimum temperature 12  C) in DeceFeb Decadal mean annual temperature ( C) from 1971 to 2000 Very hot days (i.e. 33  C or above) in JuneAug Cold days (i.e. 12  C or below) in DeceFeb Annual rainfall Thunderstorm days Heavy rain days (hourly rainfall > 30 mm) Mean sea level (Victoria Harbour)

8.2 16.3 Increasing by 51 mm (1947e2009) Increasing by 1.8 days (1947e2009) Increasing by 0.4 days (1947e2009) Rising by 26 mm (1954e 2009)

Source: Adapted from the Environment Bureau of HK (2010: 11).

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London’s targets are even more ambitious. For instance, the London Climate Change Action Plan set a target of a 60% cut by 2025 vis-à-vis the UK Climate Change Act 2008 target to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions by 80% below 1990 levels (about 77% below 2005 levels) by 2050. The sternness of the London figures derive from the deployment of a ‘contraction and convergence’ model in which by 2050 everyone in the world would be entitled to an equal share of emissions with the aim of atmospheric CO2 concentrations not exceeding 450 ppm (LSDC, 2009). This entitlement is roughly equivalent to 2 tonnes of CO2 per person each year. Meanwhile, a study commissioned by the LSDC (2009) entitled ‘Capital Consumption’ is founded upon an even more radical approach setting out the evidence base for ways in which London could achieve a 90% reduction in carbon emissions, using the more challenging, and higher, consumption based emissions figure as a baseline. The underlying rationale for this approach was expressed along more holistic grounds: London’s citizens are responsible for 90 Mt CO2 per year e twice the 44 Mt CO2 that can be attributed to London under a production approach. A consumption-based approach is important if we are going to tackle climate change in an honest manner. It means we don’t shift responsibility for reducing the carbon emissions of the goods we buy often from poorer countries, entirely on to them to solve or perhaps ignore. In London we consume three times our fair share of the earth’s resources (LSDC, 2009: 5).

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Table 6 The new vocabulary of sustainable urban transformation. Concept

Definition

Resilience

The ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while retaining the same basic structure and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organisation, and the capacity to adapt to stress and change. The degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity. The ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences. Action taken to reduce the impact of human activity on the climate system, primarily through reducing net greenhouse gas emissions, for example carbon dioxide. A combination of the probability of an event and its consequences, with several ways of combining these two factors being possible. There may be more than one event, consequences can range from positive to negative, and risk can be measured qualitatively or quantitatively.

Vulnerability

Adaptive capacity

Mitigation

Risk

Source: Adapted from IPCC (2007) and DEFRA (2009).

A similar, but less extensive, distributive logic is apparent in the Hong Kong documentation: Hong Kong’s economic development is at a more mature state compared with other places in China, and we possess relatively more potential to further reduce our emissions. We believe that Hong Kong could adopt a strategy that seeks to maximise our scope for GHG reduction. Due to the different stages of development, and taken into account our stage of economic development, Hong Kong has the capacity to adopt a more aggressive carbon intensity reduction target and contribute to the nation’s efforts in tackling climate change. Indeed, as the national financial and services centre, to embrace a more progressive reduction target in our overall emission reduction strategy will help demonstrate the nation’s determination in promoting work in this area (Environment Bureau, 2010: 22). By 2008, then, it becomes very apparent from the two cases that carbon control had began to characterise the documented landscape of sustainable urban transformation connecting environmental challenges to far broader concerns with production, consumption and quality of life. Whether the subsequent actions proposed and, more importantly, taken are sufficient to avert the predicted crises remains to be seen the key point from this section is that both economies acknowledge that there is a serious and largely deteriorating problem. This view thus lends support to the first tenet of Blühdorn’s politics of unsustainability considered here.

3.1. Blessed way of life As carbon control has reshaped the remit and urgency of SD, a new vocabulary of environmental protection has materialised comprising such concepts as resilience, vulnerability, adaptive capacity, mitigation and risk (see Table 6 for a brief summary of these concepts). Consistent with scientific insights on climate change, post-2008, the new environmental protection terms have been deployed in both case contexts with a national government document in the United Kingdom entitled ‘Measuring Adaptation

to Climate Change’ document (DEFRA, 2010: 3) providing one of the starkest warnings yet of the deleterious impact of environmental change on present lifestyles. The document duly ushers the need for greater resilience (especially flood management and defence provisions) and adaptation, along with recognition and consideration of the impact of renewed material scarcity (especially in terms of securing energy and food supplies) and emergencies: Climate change mitigation efforts, like cutting our greenhouse gas emissions, are crucial to avoid extreme dangerous climate change in the latter half of this century. But we are already locked into climate change over the next forty years e that is why, alongside our mitigation efforts, we need to take action to adapt to the impacts of climate change . Because the impacts of climate change will have an effect on the most crucial areas of our society e public health, energy supply, water supply, transport etc. e we need to be sure that the action we are taking to prepare is having the desired effect. These various warnings seem to suggest that the ‘blessed way of democratic consumer capitalism life’ (Blühdorn, 2007) might be reaching a plateau in England. Likewise, at metropolitan level (GLA, 2011: 26) it is explained that ‘London has to be ready to deal with a warmer climate and one likely to be significantly wetter in the winter and drier during the summer. There will also be an increased probability of flooding and a need to cope with the greater consequences when it does happen’. Turning to Hong Kong, the major vulnerable areas that have been identified with climate change include biodiversity and nature conservation, built environment and infrastructure, business and industry, energy supply, financial services, food resources, human health and water resources (Environment Bureau, 2010). However, it remains uncertain whether the proposed measures (see Tables 7 and 8 in Section 3.2) are sufficiently radical given the prevailing supremacy of the consumerist market economy values in relation to ecologically sound development. For instance, the 2004 London Plan (GLA, 2004: 109e110) maintains that ‘A sustainable and inclusive strategy offers the widest access to shopping and leisure

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Table 7 Proposed measures to achieve a 90% reduction in consumption emissions in London by 2050. Sector

Proposed measures Current emissions (mt CO2) and (%) contribution

Projected emissions in 2050 (mt CO2)

Food

9.05 10%

0.90

Consumer goods

10.61 12%

Private services

9.53 11%

Built 8.22 infrastructure 9%

Housing 4.57 infrastructure 5%

Public sector

9.78 11%

Household energy

19.76 22%

Personal transport

17.99 20%

Renewable electricity, low meat & dairy, farm emissions improvements, post farm gate efficiencies, reduced food waste 50% renewable electricity, freight efficiencies, electronics consumption reduced, ambitious waste strategy, waste target in strategy, local paper recycling loops, longer lasting clothes, durable floor coverings, household goods recycling, jewellery consumption reduced, reduction in smoking, overall industry efficiencies Renewable electricity, reduced consumption of water, zero carbon heating in buildings, reuse of furniture and equipment, reduction in consumption of paper, business travel efficiencies, resource efficiencies, procurement policies & alternative fuels Renewable electricity, low impact materials, increase in reclamation, increased recycled content, manufacturing efficiencies, durable materials, local sourcing, reduce over-ordering and reuse over-ordered materials, strategic planning to reduce need for new infrastructure, freight improvements, alternatives to diesel Renewable electricity, reduce need to build, reclaimed materials increased, recycled content increased, manufacturing efficiencies, freight efficiencies, low impact materials, durable materials, local sourcing, reduce over-ordering and reuse over-orders, on-site alternatives to diesel Renewable electricity, zero carbon heating in buildings, move to low paper use, reuse of furniture and equipment, business transport reduced, purchasing policies Energy supply, thermal efficiency, behavioural change, domestic new build, additional CCAP measures, 100% renewable electricity, increased microgeneration Renewable electricity, 50% renewable electricity, CCAP London based actions, CCAP national and EU actions, domestic flights, aviation efficiencies, less flying overall, car clubs, increase in home working, public transport, car efficiencies

2.20

0.50

2.18

0.25

0.77

5.00

4.22

Source: Adapted from Capital Consumption, LDSC (2009).

activities for the greatest number of people, including those currently least able to enjoy them. The Mayor supports the government’s policy of promoting consumer activity in town centres. Leisure uses contribute to London’s evening economy and ensure that town centres remain lively beyond shopping hours’ (GLA, 2004: 131e132). Similarly, post-Stern (2007) and IPCC (2007) the 2011 London Plan (GLA, 2011: 193) continues to herald London’s competitiveness in one of the most environmentally-damaging industries, air travel: ‘adequate airport capacity serving a wide range of destinations is

critical to the competitive position of London in a global economy. Airport capacity serving the capital and wider south east of England must be sufficient to sustain London’s competitive position’. Meanwhile, having already witnessed the opening of Heathrow airport’s Terminal 5 in 2008 the 2011 London Plan confidently proclaims that ‘The Mayor: strongly opposes any further expansion at Heathrow involving an increase in the number of aircraft movements there, due to the adverse noise and air quality impacts already being experienced by residents and others in the vicinity of Heathrow and its environs’ (GLA, 2011). The fact that this quote already acknowledges the adverse impacts that the airport is causing to residents represents a microcosm of ‘known unsustainability’ in terms of knowledge-action completeness. Hong Kong produces a similarly schizophrenic outlook. That is, although climate adaptation, mitigation, risk, resilience and vulnerability have entered the lexicon of the Hong Kong sustainability discourse its climate change strategy and action agenda does not offer any serious counter measures to avert the crisis merely suggesting avoidance of ‘food wastage,’ the practice of ‘recycling’, ‘supporting greening’ and ‘conserving water and energy’ as the type of ‘small steps that, taken together, will bring significant changes’ (Environment Bureau, 2010: 25). Consistent with the maintenance of the blessed way of capitalist consumer life, these recommended measures hardly amount to some major radical ecologist alternative. On the contrary, the authors seem keen to reassure their much valued business constituency that a ‘Low carbon way of living is not about forgoing economic growth. Instead it opens up a new window of green business opportunities. Green technologies and products such as renewable energy, electric vehicles (EVs) as well as energy efficient and green consumer products have emerged in large numbers in the market in recent years’ (Environment Bureau, 2010: 4). At best the formal documentation maintains that Hong Kong’s future spatial development pattern should adopt the planning concept of prudent use of land resources by preparing for more development around mass transit railway stations to facilitate fast and mass movement of people in an environmentally-friendly mode of transport. This would help to reduce reliance on the use of private cars and curb carbon emissions, thus contributing to our efforts in the fight against global warming. More often than not, however, it is the ‘business as usual logic’ that pervades the strategy as the following quote from the overarching 2030 strategy (Development Bureau and Planning Department, 2007: 8) lays testimony: This intensification process is reflected in the annual statistics for cross-boundary movements e person-trips rose from about 75 million in 1997 to about 160 million in 2006, while vehicle-trips (mostly by goods vehicles) grew from some 10 million to 15 million over the same period. Growth in both cross-boundary person and vehicle-trips is expected to continue at high speed. The commissioning of the Hong Kong-Shenzhen Western Corridor (SWC) and the Lok Ma Chau Spur Line in mid 2007 could help ease off part of the load, but new infrastructure for the medium to long term will be needed. As such, we are, in collaboration with relevant Mainland authorities, working on some important projects, such as the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge (HZMB), the GuangzhouShenzhen- Hong Kong Express Rail Link (ERL) and the Liantang/ Heung Yuen Wai Control Point with a view to accelerating their implementation. 3.2. The discourse of opportunity This, then, leads us onto the third proposition; Blühdorn’s notion that amidst the networking activities of various governance actors positive attention will be drawn to the question of how best

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Table 8 Proposed measures to reduce to reduce carbon intensity in Hong Kong by 50e60 % by 2020 compared with 2005. Theme

Present contribution to greenhouse gas emission

Proposed measures and expected gain by 2020 from 2005

Maximising energy efficiency

60%

Greening road transport

18%

Promoting use of clean fuels for motor vehicles

16%

Expanding the scope and tightening the requirements of the building energy. Codes, such that all new commercial buildings will be up to 50% more energy efficient. Expanding the use of district cooling or water-cooled air conditioning, such that up to 20% of all commercial buildings will be up to 50% better in refrigeration performance compared with buildings using regular air conditioners. Tightening the overall thermal transfer value (OTTV) standards and promoting wider adoption of green roofing to reduce their energy demand by up to 50%. Improving energy efficiency in commercial buildings through good housekeeping, information technology products and intelligent building environmental management system, such that 25% of existing commercial buildings can be 15% more energy efficient. Expanding the scope and tightening the energy efficient electrical appliance standards for domestic use, such that all appliances sold in the market will be 25% more energy efficient. Invest in the mass transportation systems and improve public transport to maintain a low carbon contribution from this sector. Wider use of motor vehicles running on alternative fuel such that 30% of private cars, 15% of buses and goods vehicles are hybrid. Implementation of importers’ average fleet efficiency standards such that new vehicles will be 20% more energy efficient. Reliance on fossil fuels for motor vehicle use may be further reduced by requiring petrol and diesel to be blended with 10% of ethanol and biodiesel respectively. Look into the possibility of better utilising waste cooking oils in producing biodiesel locally. This will boost the global production of biofuels and enable Hong Kong to have access to adequate supply. Development and full operation of one integrated waste management facility (IWMF), two organic waste treatment facilities (OWTFs), and one sludge treatment facility; and full utilisation of the recovered landfill gas and gas generated from wastewater treatment. To develop IWMF in phases by adopting advanced incineration with energy recovery as the core waste treatment technology. The first phase will have a daily treatment capacity of 3000 tonnes of waste and can supply about 480 million kilowatt-hours (kWh) of surplus electricity to the power grid per year, which is sufficient for use by over 100,000 households. This is equivalent to 440,000 tonnes less GHG emissions. To develop OWTFs in two phases by 2020. On completion, the facilities will have a total daily treatment capacity of 400e500 tonnes of organic waste. The biogas generated in the treatment process can also be used for power generation. It is estimated that for the two phases of OWTF, about 28 million kWh of surplus electricity can be supplied to the power grid per year, which is adequate for use by 6000 households and expected to reduce GHG emissions by about 50,000 tonnes per year. In view of the highly-polluting and high-carbon nature of coal, to suppress the percentage of coal-fired power in our fuel mix and keep coal-fired power plants at a very low utilisation rate or as reserve, such that coal would account for no more than 10% of the fuel mix; taking into account the supply of natural gas secured under the Memorandum of Understanding between Hong Kong and the Mainland, to maximise the use of natural gas and increase its share in the fuel mix to around 40%. To substantially increase the share of non-fossil low carbon fuels, such that renewable energy would make up about 3e4% of the fuel mix, and the balance of about 50% would be met by imported nuclear power.

Turning waste to energy

5%

Revamping fuel mix for electricity generation

1%

to grasp the (wicked) opportunities that arise in contemporary discourses of degradation, resource depletion and adverse climate change. The contention that part of the policy discourse of ensuring sustainable urban transformation involves identifying ‘opportunities’ for future development is firmly supported in both sets of documentation. One of the most striking manifestations of this is found in chapter seven of the LSDC-sponsored (2009: 34) document entitled ‘Capital Consumption’ which leads with the following quote, laying opportunity and risk side-by-side: ‘This section considers both the opportunities for positive economic, social and health outcomes from the measures outlined above and the possible risks’. In fact, documents from both case economies are laced with depictions of un-problematic ‘winewin’ scenarios between environment and economy. Again, the LSDC-sponsored (2009) document ‘Capital Consumption’ provides a good example of this. Despite setting out its most demanding climate reduction targets to date it (LSDC, 2009: 43) also maintains that: ‘London stands to benefit from many opportunities for innovative business models around resource efficiency and sustainable production, which could form a core element of London’s economic recovery.’ Likewise, the

GLA (2011: 32) views the role of London as ‘a world leader in improving the environment locally and globally, taking the lead in tackling climate change, reducing pollution, developing a low carbon economy and consuming fewer resources and using them more effectively’. Equally, despite acknowledging the ‘need for a fundamental re-thinking of the way in which the economy of London will have to work in order to meet the major challenges of the next two decades’, the LSDC (2009: 5) feels that ‘this presents London with a unique range of opportunities, with a chance to invest in development of a new form of economy better geared to supporting a better quality of life for all Londoners’. Meanwhile, in Hong Kong the third stage of the public consultation of the 2030 strategy suggests that SD (Environment Bureau, 2003: 2) provides it with the opportunity to provide ‘a quality living environment through better urban design, better protection of our natural and cultural heritage and the provision of facilities to enrich our cultural life and enhance our opportunities for recreation, using our land resources in a more sustainable manner’. An exploration of how the two economies actually propose to grasp these opportunities and achieve the necessary carbon reduction targets (see Tables 7 and 8) suggests, however, that their approaches are largely

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framed with the continuance of almost unlimited economic growth and marginal changes to the blessed way of life. Even the more radically concerned ‘Capital Consumption’ document, whose initiatives are listed in Table 7, explains that (LSDC, 2009: 5 and 9) ‘the measures shown would create many new businesses and satisfying jobs in London . Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP) can be described most simply as “achieving more with less.”’ As can be seen from both tables the proposed measures are rather ambiguous and do not envisage a radically distinct break from the existing way of life. In Hong Kong approximately half of the anticipated time to make the transition has passed but prevailing greenhouse gas emissions have hardly shifted (see Table 2). Similarly in London, one has not noted a significant increase in vegetarianism during the launch of the 2009 report and many of the measures involve refining existing lifestyles with renewable energy, waste management and waste reduction and re-use strategies. Both sets of documents have far less to say about habitat destruction, soil erosion and bio-diversity whose ecological modernization limits escape the direct vision of adverse climate change avoidance probably because they are non-marketable problems and also because they represent the deleterious impacts of some of the most entrenched ways of consumer capitalist life. 4. Conclusion This paper has explored the prevailing urban transformations of Hong Kong and London employing the theorised concepts of ‘known unsustainability,’ ‘commitment to blessed way of life,’ and ‘the discourse of opportunity’ (Blühdorn, 2007, 2009, 2011). Although it remains difficult to prove Blühdorn’s thesis in terms of underlying motivations, manifest attention has been placed on three central tenets of its premise; all of which are largely supported by the findings presented here. First, in terms of the issue of ‘known unsustainability’ the respective authorities in both case economies undoubtedly acknowledge the prevailing unsustainablity of current development producing their own evidence of both the extent and likely future impacts of the problem. Moreover, the presence of established scientific evidence on climate change was found to have led to heightened documented urgency on carbon control, post-2007, the content of which could not merely be classified as symbolic, since SD as an overarching organising principle, would probably have been sufficient for this purpose. Instead, the speed with which carbon control has become central to SD is also testimony to the strength of this conviction that unsustainability is increasingly known. However, although both case studies paint reasonably good stories with respect to proposed targets and, lesser so, with respect to proposed actions the overall situation can at best be described as largely stagnant within an overall deteriorating situation for the world as a whole (Global Carbon Project and International Energy Agency). None of the proposed actions from Hong Kong and London amount to a radical ecologist change but merely a shift towards refining existing lifestyles with renewable energy, waste management and waste reduction and re-use strategies. Such continuance in the blessed way of consumer capitalist societies thus provides plenty of business ‘opportunities’ without properly grappling with the mounting risks. Arguably, this approach is a perfectly valid one if, as society’s commitment to consumer capitalism suggests, the relevant actors need to be externally motivated to make the necessary change, which leaves one to consider whether the two factors (environmental good and extrinsic motivation) can somehow be reconciled. In many respects the most fundamental question is whether what is being proposed and enacted by the Hong Kong and London

authorities is enough to avert the predicted crisis and the dates by which their proposed GHG emissions targets should be met are nearly upon us. A key date in Hong Kong’s proposal is 2020 when an absolute reduction of 19e33% in its total GHG emissions are promised and in London interim targets are pending for 2015 where the target is to achieve a 22% reduction on carbon dioxide emissions on 1990 levels. However, as two largely serviceorientated economies the key question, global-holistically, is consumption and, on this basis, the London documentation acknowledges that the city needs to perform at heightened intensity while Hong Kong has yet properly made better appreciation of adopting this position, probably because consumption is so crucial to its economic structure. At the same time, while overall unsustainability might be reduced in London as consumption and greenhouse gas emissions decline in the post-credit crunch fuelled era, the key political sustainability challenge that currently exposes itself must be how to achieve the necessary consumption downgrading in a more socially equitable way. Only (co-ordinated) government, and in some respects authoritarian policy, can hope to do this. Paraphrasing Wilkinson and Robinson (2010) societies somehow need to be able to respond to climate change whilst making qualitative improvements in the social functioning of society. This relates not only to how humans interact with one another but also to their consumption and lifestyle patterns. The unavailability of marketable technological solutions for relevant environmental problems like habitat destruction, soil erosion and bio-diversity loss lays testimony to the limits of consumer capitalism and the need for society to devise new incentives and disciplines. The more society fails to achieve targeted GHG emissions reduction the more likely it will be that future efforts to mitigate the impact of, or respond to, environmental change will have to involve a decrease in individual liberty as governments seek to transform environmentally destructive behaviour (Beeson, 2010). One of the most successful institutional efforts of London in this regard has been the congestion charge which has reduced traffic flow, idling engines and roadside pollution in core areas of the city, speeding up public-bus travel and commute times in the process. Akin to Levett’s (1998: 300e301) notions of ‘cross-chains’ and the ‘reconciliation of contrasting positions’, such as between individual motorists and pedestrians, some important policy implications can be drawn here. For example, some types of sustainabilitytransformations may involve looking beyond existing technological advances within path dependencies in favour of re-invention. As Levett (1998: 300e301) maintains in the case of car manufacturing technology: ‘improving the fuel consumption of car engines would be good for reducing global warming but would do nothing for any of the other ‘cross-chains’ of car use, about congestion, danger, unliveable streets, inequity, social exclusion, community severance, reduction in healthy exercise, town centre erosion and so on . By contrast an action nearer to the social end of the chain, reducing the need to travel by car, would improve all of these’. It is possible, then, a combination of carefully crafted curtailments to the blessed way of (democratic) consumer capitalist life, along with continued ecologist modernist breakthroughs on the technical front and the dedicated nurturing of the natural environment through reconciliation of divergent interests needs to be dramatically up-scaled, combined and practiced if the pending sustainability crises forecast by science still have a chance of being avoided. The more likely event, however, is that the pyrrhic victory of the blessed way of consumer capitalism life will have to live alongside increasingly visible manifestations of mounting risk and vulnerability as resilience, adaptive capacity and mitigation factors struggle to sustain themselves.

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