Future economy of electric power generated by nuclear and coal-fired power plants

Enrryy Vol. 6. pp. 263 215 0 Pergamon Press Lfd 1981

Printed

in Great

Britain

FUTURE ECONOMY OF ELECTRIC POWER GENERATED BY NUCLEAR AND COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS? MYNORKING 1951 Olympia Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83401, U.S.A

and CHARLES C. T. YANG Department of Material Science, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90024, U.S.A. (Received

15 March 1979)

available literature (1969-78) on estimated and predicted costs of nuclear coal-fired power plants has been examined. The complexity and difficulty of predicting nuclear power economy are discussed. Scenarios are developed for various capacity factors fixed charge rates to predict the national electric power economy generated by nuclear coal-fired power plants between 1979 and 1993.

Abstract--The

and the and and

1. INTRODUCTION

has indicated that nuclear and coal-fired energies will become the major sources for supplying electric power, because technologies for new sources of energy such as fusion or solar energy have not yet achieved a state of practical application. The coalfired power plant has the longest operating history of all forms of power energy. Factors influencing its economy are better understood than factors influencing the nuclear power economy. In this paper, we focus more on economic development of nuclear power. Due to rather short operating experience and rapid growth of nuclear technology, the operation of the nuclear power economy is not well understood. This leads to difficulty in estimating and predicting costs for nuclear power plants. An estimated cost will be defined as the cost for the year in which the literature was published and for all previous years. A predicted cost will be defined as the cost for all years after the year in which the literature was published. The estimated and actual costs are often different by a factor 01 2 or more, as reported Blake2 (Fig. 1). The estimations and predictions for the same nuclear power plant are quite different from one organization to another. For instance, the AEC estimated the cost of the nuclear power plant “Peach Bottom 2” as $525/kWe and CE (Commonwealth Edison) estimated the cost as $331/kWe. Also, the operating capacity was estimated as 1109 and 1065 MWe by AEC and CE, respectively. These differences in estimations and predictions stem from different viewpoints, criteria, and assumptions. The lack of a long term operating history of nuclear power plants makes it difficult to estimate the cost of operation and maintenance and the plant capacity factor. Rapid growth of technology leads to changes in design, manufacturing, and operation, and it also causes changes in nuclear safety regulations. This may then reflect back to bring about changes in design, even in the midst of construction, with delays in construction and increases in capital costs. Because recent escalating costs of construction materials and labor were not expected, costs predicted before 1973 are too low. Some predicted costs were not concerned with the factor of plant size, and if plant size was a factor it was not consistent. The standard plant size of 1000 MWe was not incorporated in estimations and predictions until 5 yr Rossin’

tThis research paper was a part of Mynor King’s Ph.D thesis for the Walden University 263

MYNOR KING

264

and

CHARLES C.

YANG

T.

. . 12oc

CurveI: y = - 344165.94826+ 194712.761643x-4123.7654479~‘+38.7449 Curve II: y = -2050.02+31.76x @ve Ill: y = -3926.6t 56.5x 0: below 600 MWe nuclear plant

I101 0: MC-1000

klwe

A

: above

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: no indication

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1000 MWe

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piant

nuclear

. .

plant

01 plant capacity .

0:

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predicted

n : predicted

901

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years ago

.

.

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5-10 years ago

A: predicted over 10 years ago Curve IV: Y = - 2576.447 + 40.0221239x Curve V: y = - 2470.302 +37.3163962x I: actual estimated cost of past II: linear regression of actual estimated cost III: overall predicted cost IV: predicted cost based on 75% capacity lactor V: predicted cost based on 60% capacity factor

I

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Fig. 1. Capital cost of national nuclear power plant. Source: Refs. I-30.

ago. Furthermore, there was considerable disagreement in the use of the power plant capacity factor. The escalation rate for costs of materials and labor was not consistent from one author to another even within the same year. Davis3 assumed a 643% escalation rate per year for materials, and an 8-10x escalation rate for labor from 1973 to

Future economy of electric power

265

1975. The uncertainties in factors such as plant size, capacity factor, escalation of costs, and inflation rate contribute to inaccurate estimations and predictions of nuclear and coal-fired power economies. The available information has been categorized by us and scenarios were developed to find the band of predicted cost limitations for electric power generated by nuclear and coal-fired energies. About 90% of the literature is concerned only with the power plant capital cost, which is the major cost of a power plant. Few authors have investigated the overall or total cost which consists of capital, operation and maintenance, and fuel costs. The correlation of the capital cost with the overall cost was obtained from the existing literature and has been used for predicting the overall costs of nuclear and coal-fired power economies. The data for costs of nuclear and coal-fired power plants predicted and estimated by vaious authors are listed in Refs. l-30. These references include view points of private institutes, governmental agencies, power plant vendors, power-plant utilities, and architectural engineering firms.

2. NUCLEAR

POWER

INDUSTRY

A brief history of the development of nuclear power will be given in order to clarify the complexity and difficulty of predicting its economy. From the information gathered by Bupp, the development of the nuclear power industry in the U.S. may be divided into four periods.4 The first period extended from the late 1950s to the early 1960s. It was the precommercial, experimental, and prototype phase. The AEC funded the construction and operating subsides for experimental reactors of various designs. The “Cooperative Power Reactor Demonstration Program” was joined by private sects and government. The first prototype commercial power reactor began to operate in December 1957 at Shippingport Pennsylvania. This period ended in the fall of 1963 when the Jersey Central Power Company announced an agreement with the General Electric Company to build a 640 MWe Boiling Water Reactor, “Oyster Greek”, at a fixed price. Through this “turnkey” contract, the plant would generate base-load power at a lower cost to the utilities than could be obtained from coal-fired or oil-fired units. The cost estimates for the early “turnkey” plants were very optimistic. The reactor manufacturers, Westinghouse and General Electric, risked substantial financial losses to secure market shares for future nuclear power generation. The second period extended from 1963 to 1966 and was called the “turnkey” period. For the sake of promoting the nuclear power industry, many manufacturers contracted with utilities under the term “turnkey”. In this program, the builder of the reactor took on all of the responsibility for designing and building the unit, including actions required to meet regulatory guidelines and testing to attain commercial status. A typical turnkey contract also provided a financial guarantee at a fixed price, which covered all construction and licensing costs excluding interest during construction. In June of 1966, General Electric announced the termination of a firm-price or “turnkey” contract in the U.S., but turnkey contracts are still available for foreign orders (e.g. in Taiwan). Westinghouse also terminated the turnkey program, although a formal announcement was not made until 1971. Turnkey contracts had led to financial disaster for the General Electric and Westinghouse companies. They lost around one billion dollars. It has been estimated that General Electric lost $608 million with seven plants and that Westinghouse lost $1079 million with six plants. These losses were reported by Montomery.5 The period 1963-66 is important for the future of nuclear power plants, regardless of the losses of these two companies. The effect of the turnkey period was to create expectations for continuing orders of nuclear power plants. Non-turnkey units were supposed to come in at costs near the turnkey prices. As it turned out, the non-turnkey units were two to three times higher than turnkey prices. Six to eight years later, manufacturers on turnkey contracts and utilities on non-turnkey contracts both suffered losses from their overly optimistic

MYNOR KING and CHARLES C. T. YANG

266

cost expectations. The losses of General Electric and Westinghouse during the turnkey period were caused by the following factors: (I) There was a dramatic change in labor costs. Labor costs increased 5% annually prior to 1966 and 30% thereafter. (2) The birth of the environmental movement led to greatly increased environmental control cost (3) There was an increase in licensing costs. (4) There was a decrease in labor productivity and an increase in the number of unskilled workers involved because of competition for skilled workers. The third period extended from 1967 through the peak order year of 1973. The first period demonstrated to the utilities the technological feasibility for building larger capacity power reactors. The second period showed manufacturers that turnkey contracts could not be continued. This third period was a period of non-turnkey contracts. During 1966, 20 plants were ordered and only 6 were on turnkey contracts. Reactors ordered after 1966 were built by utilities under normal financial arrangements involving contracts with architectual engineers. During 1967, 30 reactors were ordered and only one was on a turnkey basis. In the early 1970s the nuclear industry began to die due to an increase in nuclear safety regulations, higher costs and interest rates, and antinuclear activity. The fourth period began in 1974. This period in which the nuclear power industry fell

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.

.

:

.

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.

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plant. Source:Refs.

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Future economy of electric power

267

drastically. New and some old orders were cancelled. Nine orders were cancelled between 1975 and 1976 and 8 orders were cancelled in 1977. The development of the breeder reactor was cancelled by President Carter and clipped the basis on which the long term development of the nuclear power economy depends.

3. NATIONAL

NUCLEAR AND COAL-FIRED POWER ECONOMIES

The available literature concerned with the economy of nuclear and coal-fired power covers the IO-yr period, 1969-78. The subject is separated into cost estimations and predictions, Figures 1 and 2 show capital costs for nuclear and coal-fired power plants across the nation. The figures present estimated and predicted costs which are indicated by hollow and solid data, respectively. Curve I is a fit with nonlinear regression of estimated costs. Curves II and III are linear regressions of estimated and predicted costs, respectively. The dotted portion of Curve II was extrapolated from the data of estimated costs, and the solid portion of Curve II was calculated from these data. The data in Fig. 1 and 2 scatter and deviate with increase of the years for both estimation and prediction. The accuracy is lost when predictions are for more than 15 yr. In Fig. 1, the costs are too low for nuclear power plants for the years 1990-2000. When predictions were made before the 1973-74 energy crisis, costs were far under Curve III. The predicted costs for more than 15 yr did not contribute to the regression analysis but are listed for reference. The predicted costs for nuclear power for 1985 were between $675 and $1275/kWe, and the predicted costs for coal-fired power were between $275 and $925/kWE. The ratios of the highest to the lowest predicted costs were 1.9 for nuclear and 3.4 for coal-fired units. Figure 3 is based on Blake’s report and shows the accuracy of the predictions. The

0 0 0

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5

6

Time interval of Dlont

7

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9

9

year

of prediction

IO

II

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Fig. 3. Deviation of predictions for the nuclear power economy.

MYNORKING and CHARLESC. T. YANG

268

Table 1. Comparison of prediction and combination models. P = prediction model, C = combina .tion model; -: P is lower than C; + : P is higher than C. Year cf Plant Operation

Nuclear Poker Cost P Model C Model

Coal-Fired Power Cost P Model C Model (P-C) (X)

1980 lS84 1988 1992 1996

599.4 825.8 1,052.Z 1,278.6 1,505.o

617.7 808.1 998.5 1.188.8 1,379.z

-3.1 +2.1 +5.1 +7 +8.4

z511.4 712.4 913.4 1,114.4 1,315.4

598.2 762.2 926.2 1,090.l 15254.1

-17 - 7 - 1.4 + 2.1 + 4.6

ratio between the actual cost and the predicted cost for nuclear power plants is proportional to the time interval between the year in which the prediction is made and the year of completion of the power plant. A similar conclusion may also be expected for coalfired power plants. Figure 3 shows that the predictions of capital costs for nuclear power plants are far below actual costs. The actual cost becomes about three times greater than the predicted cost for the 7th year interval. This fact shows that variables used to predict the power economy are very uncertain and are not well understood. Unexpected events take place, such as the occurrence of the energy crisis and cancellation of the breeder reactor. These events were triggered by political factors and resulted in higher costs of building materials and nuclear fuel. When predictions are made for more than 15 yr, the inaccuracies are so great that the estimates represent only intelligent guesses. Two models were proposed to predict the nationwide electric economy generated by nuclear and coal-fired power plants. One is based solely on predicted costs (P) and the other is based on the combined data of estimations and predictions (C) from Figs. 1 and 2. Linear regression was used to obtain predictions for the nationwide power economy. The energy crisis caused a sharp increase in the cost of building materials and labor. Therefore, there is a gap in capital costs before and after the energy crisis. A plant completed before the crisis will cost much less than one built after the crisis. Since almost all estimations were done before the energy crisis and predictions were done after it, these two costs will be quite different. If the Combination model is used for the predictions, the costs will be lower. Table 1 shows that the lower predicted costs in later years of the combination model are due to lower estimated costs in this model. The slope of linear regression for the combination model is decreased by the influence of lower estimated data prior to the energy crisis. Thus, predictions from the combination model will be much lower than from the prediction model. For this readon, the combination model will not be used as a basis to develop scenarios to predict the electric power economy generated by nuclear and coal-fired power plants. The comparison of the two models is shown below. Prediction Model y, = -3928.6

+ 56.5x

yc = -3508.49 Combination Model y, = -3189.72

y, = -2681.16

+ 50.24875x + 47.5935x

+ 40.9924x

with gn = 165.05, with 0, = 154.39;

(1) (2)

with on = 132.58, with ue = 161.55

(3) (4)

Here, y, = future predicted cost of nuclear power, y, = future predicted cost of coal-fired power, g’n= deviation of predicted nuclear power cost, crc = deviation of predicted coalfired power cost, x = year of power-plant operation defined by the last two digits.

4. SENSITIVITY STUDY OF THE POWER ECONOMY

NUCLEAR

Figure 4 shows the relation of nuclear power plant capacity to its capital cost, The

Future economy of electric power

.

269

MYNOR KING and CHARLES

270

Symbol capacity 0 0

0

, ‘79

‘81

T. YANG

factor (%I

I

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C.

‘83 Year of nSear

. po%

,

.

. ‘93

‘95

ptaZperatiogni

Fig. 5. Sensitivity study on nuclear power-plant

capacity factors.

data are categorized by the year of operation and linear regression is applied to each group of data. Regardless of the year of plant operation, all curves indicate that the capital cost decreases as the capital capacity increases. The data indicate that in 1970 plant sizes were small, but the capacity gradually increased in 1973 and 1974. Thus, the size of nuclear power plants increased gradually as the result of demands by utilities. The data on capital cost in Fig. 4 scatter more in later years. The deviation (a) of the linear regression is proportional to the increase of the years. In 1974, the deviation equals 108.37 as compared to 12.65 in the year 1970. The scatter of capital-cost data is due to complex financial factors applying to each plant and the length of the construction period. Some plants were finished within the planning period, but most were not and this increased capital costs. Figures 5 and 6 show the influence of the power plant capacity factor on power cost @/kWe-hr). The data are from Scott’s report.‘j The linear regressions show that the higher the capacity factor the lower the cost. A 20% difference in the nuclear plant capacity factor may vary the cost from 0.75 +?/kWe-hr in 1977 to 0.9 $/kW-hr in 1993, and a 5% difference in the coal-fired plant capacity factor may change the cost from 0.5 e/kW-hr in 1977 to 1.2$/kW-hr in 1993. In general, nuclear power plants have a lower capacity factor than coal-fired power plants. This result follows because the shutdown period of nuclear power plants is longer and more frequent bacause of refueling and the complex design of the entire operating system, which also results in fequent breakdowns of components. Predictions of the power cost will be drived from the capital cost with several assumed capacity factors and fixed charges. A fixed charge includes the escalation of the costs of

271

Future economy of electric power u Low High

)

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I 1977

‘79

coal coal

with with

‘81 Year

bar under the data bar on to(, of the &Ha

‘83 ‘85 of cool-fired

plont

‘87 ‘89 operotion

‘91

‘93

Fig. 6. Sensitivity study on coal-fired power-plant capacity factors.

materials and labor, general inflation, interest rate, taxes and insurance cost. Utilities pay the fixed amount per year for a given number of years to pay off the loan. The fixed charge rates of 10, 15, and 17% have been assumed by workers at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Bechtel Power Corporation3 and Ebasco Services Incorporated,’ respectively. The 18% fixed charge is used in the scenario as a maximum limit. Capacity factors are discussed in the next section.

5. CONVERSION

OF CAPITAL COST POWER COST

TO TOTAL

The total power cost is the sum of the capital, operation and maintenance, and fuel costs. Correlations have been calculated from data in the references; the nuclear data come from Refs. 25-26 and the coal-fired data from Refs. 2&22, 25. Correlations of average sub-costs for nuclear and coal-fired power plants are calculated and presented in Table 2. Table 2 shows that the capital cost for a nuclear power plant is much higher than for a coal-fired power plant. To convert the capital cost into total cost, the capital costs (Curve III in Figs. 1 and 2) are divided by 0.6642 for nuclear and 0.4868 for coal-fired units, respectively. The total cost is reconverted from $/kWe capital cost to e/kWe-hr with the assumed capacity factors and fixed charges. The capacity factor will be somewhat different for nuclear and

MYNORKINGand CHARLES C. T. YANG

272

Table 2. Correclation of power-plant sub-costs. Total (%)

Power source I

Nuclear power

I

100

I Coal-fired power

L

Capital (%)

100

I

I

1

66.42

I

Fuel (%)

Operation and maintenance (%) 26.68

48.68

I

6.9

I

I 44.7

6.62

I

coal-fired power plants. Past experience shows that coal-fired plants have higher capacity factors than nuclear power plants. Nuclear capacities of 57, 65, and 75% were assumed. Fifty-seven percent was the average capacity factor from past operating experience of existing nuclear power plants. 9 Sixty-five per cent was the average load for 1977.” The capacity factor is expected to increase to 75%. Thus, 57, 65, and 75% were the nuclear capacity factors chosen for the development of scenarios. Coal-fired capacity factors of 70,75, and 80% were chosen. The fixed charge rate was discussed in the previous section. Equations of conversion are written as follows: y is the total cost @/kW-hr) and x is the year for power-plant operation using the last two digits of the year. By varying the capacity factor and fixed charge rate, nine scenarios were developed to predict nationwide nuclear and coal-fired economies. The total nuclear cost ($/kW-hr) including capital, operation and maintenance, and fuel costs may be calculated from the following equation : y = - 3928.6 + 56.5 x

FC x lOO($//$) 8760 (hr/yr) x CF x 0.4868

1’

(5)

The total coal-fired cost (@kWh), including capital, operation and maintenance, and fuel costs may be calculated from the following equation: y = -3508.49

+ 50.24 x

FC x 100($//a) 8760(hr/yr) x CF x 0.6642

1’

(6)

where FC = fixed charge rate and CF = capacity factor. Scenarios with different capacity factors and fixed charge rates are presented in Figs. 7 and 8. These figures show the nuclear and coal-fired power economies, respectively. It was stated earlier that the deviations in Curve III of Figs. 1 and 2 were great because of scattering of data. It is expected that equal deviations or uncertainties apply to the nine scenarios of Fig. 7 and 8. The deviation in electric power is 165.05 for nuclear generation and 154.37 for coal-fired generation. The majority of the predicted costs did not start until 1978 for nuclear power (Fig. 1) and 1980 for coal-fired power (Fig. 2). Therefore, the uncertainty or deviation in the predictions of electric power cost from the nine scenarios of Figs. 7 and 8 will be greater before 1978 for nuclear power generation and before 1980 for coal-fired power generation.

6. CONCLUSIONS

For the purpose of verifying the accuracy of predictions, some available data of estimated and actual costs are plotted in Figs. 7 and 8. The estimated costs are within the extension of the nine scenarios and are represented by hollow circles. Actual electric utility rates from profit and nonprofit utility companies are plotted, respectively, as triangles and solid circles. The nonprofit electric utility rate of the Idaho Falls Electric Utility, which is owned by the city, is used for comparison with the scenarios. The same rate extends from 1974 to 1979, and it will increase by the end of 1979. The Idaho Falls electric utility rate is so low because the city purchases its electric power from the Federal Bonneville Power Administration, where the power-plant capital costs is subsidized by the U.S. Government, Therefore, the cost of electric power pays only operation

Future economy of electric power

I: y = - 11.75 + 0.16633% II: y = - 17.63 +025250x III: y=-21.~6+0.30300X

273

(r = 154.39

Iv: y= -10.97+0.15711x V: y = - 16.45 +0.23567x VI: y = - 19.75 + 0.26260~ “,I: y = - 10.26+ 0.14729X V,,,: y = - 15.43 +0.22094x IX: y = - 16.51 +0.26510x

! -v 0 t

1

3-

0

.f

2: l : Actual cost for resident at Idaho Falls. Idaho. Estimated cost from actual plant cost (Ref. A24 and 25). n: Actual cost for resident at Bonneville County, Idaho. CF: Capacity factor. FC: Annual fixed charge rate. 0:

[

OL-

1960

‘64

‘68

‘72

,

’

‘76

‘80

, ‘84

/

I

,

‘88

‘92

‘96

Year of coal fired power plant operation

Fig. 7. The national electric power economy generated by nuclear power plants.

EGY Vol. 6, No. 3-F

MYNOR KING

214

7r

I: y = -11.85+0.17036x. II: y = - 17.77 +0.25554x Ill: y = - 21.32 + 0.30665~ IV: y = -10.39to.14939x V: y= - 15.56+0.22409x VI: y = - 16.69+0.2SS91x VII: y = - 9.00 +0.12347x y=-13.50+0.19421x IX: y = - 16.21+0.23305x

and

CHARLFS C.

T.

YANG

r = 165.05

VIII:

6

0: 0:

1960

‘64

‘66

‘72

‘76

Year of nuclear

‘60 power

Actual

cost for resident

Estimated

‘94

‘9a

at Idaho

cost from actual

‘92

plant

‘96

plant operation

Fig. 8. The national electric power economy generated by coal-fired power plants.

Future economy of electric power

275

and maintenance by users. The private electric utility rate in Bonneville County, just outside the city limit, is relatively high, about two and one-half times higher than in the city of Idaho Falls. Purchases of electric power are made from the Utah Power Authority which is a private utility company. The difference between subsidized and private power is obvious. The private electric utility rate is at the upper limit of the scenarios and are costs for generating electric energy from nuclear and coal-fired power plants without adding any profits by the utility companies. This verification shows that the scenarios will predict the electric power costs through their extension, and it is expected that the cost of electric power generated by nuclear and coal-fired plants will be within the scenario limits.

REFERENCES 1. A. D. Rossin and T. A. Rieck, Science Ml, 582 (1978). 2. C. Blake, D. Cox, and W. Fraize. “Analysis of Projected vs. Actual Costs for Nuclear and Coal-Fired Power”, Rep. of MITRE Corporation, E (49-18 -2433 (Sept. 1976). 3. W. Kenneth Davis, “Economics of Nuclear Power,” International Symposium on Nuclear Power Technology and Economics”, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China (13 Jan. 1975). 4. 1. C. Bupp and J. C. Devian, “The Economics of Nuclear Power”, Tech. Rev. pp. 1525 (Feb. 1975). 5. W. D. Montomery and James P. Quirk, “Cost Escalation in Nuclear Power”, Rep. Environmental Quality Laboratory, EY-76-G-03-1305 (Jan. 1978). 6. Robert E. Scott, “Projections of the Cost of Generating Electricity in Nuclear and Coal-Fired Power Plants”, Rep. Centerfor the Biology of Natural System, Washington University, Saint Louis, Missouri (Dec. 1975). 7. I. Spiewak and 0. H. Klepper, Nucl. Tech. 38, 288 1978). 8. Leonard F. C. Reichle, “The Economics of Nuclear Power”, Public Utilities Fortnight/y (3 Feb. 1977). 9. K. W. Boer, “Sharing the Sun Solar Technology in the Seventies”, Joint Conf: Inr. Solar Energy Society and Solar Energy Sot. of Canada, Inc., 5 (15-20 Aug. 1976). 10. Rurik Krymm, James A. Lane, and Ivan S. Zheludev, IAEA Bull. 19, 47 (1977). 11. J. H. Wright, “Cost Experience and Trends in the Cost of Pressurized Water Reactors”, Proc. Symp. Istanbul (IAEA-SM-126/14), 20, 51 (Oct. 1969). 12. H. I. Bovers and N. L. Myers, “Estimated Capital Costs of Nuclear and Fossile Power Plants”, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Report, ORNL-TM-3243 (March 1971). 13. P. L. Hotman, “U.S. Civilian Nuclear Power Cost-Benefit Analysis”, Hanford Engineering Development, Laboratory Rep. Conf. -710901-14 (Sept. 1971). 14. Vance L. Sailor, “Costs and Benefits of Nuclear Power”, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Rep. BNL-17266 (Oct. 1972). 15. “Coal-Fired Fossil Plant, lOOO-MWE Central Station Power Plants Investment Cost Study”, Rep. United Engineers and Constructors, Inc., WASH-1230, III (June 1972). 16. “Boiling Water Reactor Plant, IOOO-MWE Central Station Power Plants Investment Cost Study”, Rep. United Engineers and Constructors, Inc., WASH-134 II (June 1972). 17. “Pressurized Water Reactor Plant, 1000-MWE Central Station Power Plants Investment Cost Study”, Rep. United Engineers and Constructors, Inc., WASH-1230, I (June 1972). 18. M. Salim Akhtar, J. Instit. NUG 15(S), 144 (1973). 19. M. Ray Thomasson, “Energy Supply and Demand Challenges and Some Possible Solutions”, AAAS Energy Symp. AAS74-001,25 Feb. 1974. 20. Shelby T. Brewer, “Qualification and Comptiiison of External Costs of Nuclear and Fossil Electrical Power Systems”, Energy and the Environment: Cost-Benefit Analysis: Proc. Atlanta, Georgia. (23-27 June 1975). 21. Merrill J. Whitman, “An Analysis of Current Trends in Nuclear and Fossil Power Generation Costs”, Energy and the Enoironment: Cost-Benejit Analysis: Proc. Atlanta, Georgia (23-27 June 1975). 22. Doan L. Phung, “Cost Comparison Between Base-Load, Coal-Fired and Nuclear Plants”, Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Rep. E-(40-l)-GEN-33 (1975). 23. Julian McCaull, Enuironmenr 18, 10, 11 (1976). 24. P. L. Auer, A. S. Manne, and 0. S. Yu, Energy 1, 301 (1976). 25. Permanent Kumar, “Economic Considerations in Selecting a Nuclear Versus Coal-Fired Plant”, Greater Los Angeles Area Energy Symp., Los Angeles Council of Engineers and Scientists, 2 (1976). 26. Harvey F. Bush, “1977 Update, Power Plant Economics”, Testimony Given Before the Connecticut Power Utilities Control Authority by Bethel Power Corporation (1977). 27. R. W. Hardie and J. H. Chamberline, Nucl. Tech. 33, 212 (1977). 28. Chanes L. Radasill, EPRI J. pp. 14-17 of October issue (1977). 29. John H. Crowley, Nucl. Eng. Int. 39, (July 1978). 30. George Woite, IAEA Bull, 20, 1, 11 (1978).