Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy

Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2017) 1e12

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Communist and Post-Communist Studies journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud

Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy Stephen K. Wegren a, *, Alexander Nikulin b, Irina Trotsuk c, Svetlana Golovina d a

Department of Political Science, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX, United States Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russian Federation People's Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russian Federation d Kurgan State Agricultural Academy, Kurgan, Russian Federation b c

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Available online xxx

This article analyzes gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy. Continuation of unequal gendered roles in Russia's rural informal economy suggests that tradition and custom remain strong. Gender differentials in time spent tending the household garden remain significant, as is the distribution of household tasks into gendered roles in ways that effect professional advancement for women. Land ownership is the domain of men, and women are not owners in Russia's new economy. Moreover, men earn more from entrepreneurial activity, a function of how male and female services are valued and priced in society. Responsibility that is shared includes the marketing of household food. The conclusion is that institutional change is less impactful on gender inequality than persistence of culture and tradition. © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California.

Keywords: Informal economy Gender equality Rural Russia Gendered roles Household gardens

1. Introduction Tremendous institutional change has occurred in Russian society, including the countryside, since 1992.1 The core elements that defined Soviet agriculture are not paramount todaydobligatory plans and production quotas, regulated food and labour markets, the presence of stateeowned large farms, state controlled income levels, and strict regulation of entrepreneurial activity. Institutional reform facilitated income differentiation and stratification at the farm, household, and individual level. Property rights now include private ownership. Marketing options have expanded and large farms must be commercially successful in order to survive. Thus, in the rural formal economy there is significant institutional impact on economic behaviour, although not necessarily in the area related to gender equality. The demise of the Soviet Union and resulting institutional change brought a collapse of the command economy. Regulated prices, planned output, guaranteed employment, and relative social egalitarianism have disappeared. Economic security in old age was decimated, as insecurity became the new normal. In rural society, economic insecurity engendered survival strategies and coping mechanisms at the farm, household, and individual level (Kalugina, 2002; Miller, 2002; Visser, 2003). Economic decline led not only to survival strategies but also created incentives to engage in small-scale entrepreneurship. Household income became less dependent on farm wages and transfer payments, and began to draw a larger percentage from the informal economy (Maslova et al., 2007, pp. 85e6).

* Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (S.K. Wegren). 1 According to Douglass North, institutions consist of informal constraints, formal rules, and the enforcement of both. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007 0967-067X/© 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California.

Please cite this article in press as: Wegren, S.K., et al., Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy, Communist and PostCommunist Studies (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007

2

S.K. Wegren et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2017) 1e12

The collapse of communism not only created new economic opportunities but also raised questions about the role of women in the new Russia. Some authors argued that women were ‘losers’ during the 1990s. Many social protections that benefited women during the Soviet period eroded as social policies went unfunded or under funded; women bore the brunt of unemployment; women's wages diverged from men's and the income gap grew larger; women had a higher incidence of poverty; sexual harassment became more prevalent; overt discrimination was common; and upward mobility for women remained difficult (Bridger, 1996; Bridger et al., 1996; Ashwin, 2000, 2006; Saarinen et al., 2013). Women experienced deteriorating medical care, and were negatively impacted by chronic wage arrears, which made caring for the family all the more difficult. Women also endured increasingly strained relations within the household as men struggled to cope with diminished economic status and falling standards of living for their families, for which they felt responsible. Many men consumed alcohol excessively and the incidence of domestic violence increased significantly (Kay, 2006). Similarly, rural women did not fare well during the 1990s. Rural unemployment for women, for example, was disproportionately highdan estimated 60 to 70 per cent of all rural unemployment even though women constituted just over one-half of the rural population (Mikhailov, 1996, p. 64). Just as shock therapy created survival strategies and coping mechanisms in the economy at large, so too in the rural economy. The question is whether survival strategies created change in gendered roles. A significant aspect of adaptation to market reform was a turn to the informal economy, first as a means for survival and later to generate income. For this reason, gendered roles in Russia's rural informal sector are examined. The article addresses three main questions. (1) What are the characteristics of contemporary gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy? (2) Is there evidence of discernible change from the past in gendered roles and inequality in the rural informal economy, in other words, how significant is institutional impact? (3) To what extent do contemporary economic roles reflect traditional values about the division of labour in Russia's rural informal economy? To answer those questions, evidence is drawn from published statistical data from the Russian government, from various household surveys that span 1995e2013, and from selected focus group interviews.2 The household surveys come from distinct regions at different times and therefore provide useful snapshots at separate points in time. The focus group interviews are from Kurgan oblast in 2013. The methodology for the surveys and interviews is explained in the Appendix at the end of the article. 2. Theory The Western literature on contemporary rural Russia falls into two groupings. The first group examines the informal rural sector and analyzes household production from Russia's subsidiary agricultural plots, or household gardens (lichnoe podsobnoe khoziaistvo)dbut gendered roles in the informal economy are not investigated (Kitching, 1998; O'Brien et al., 2000; Pallot and Nefedova, 2003, 2007; Wegren, 2005; Ioffe et al., 2006; O'Brien and Patsiorkovsky, 2006; Visser, 2008). A second group analyzes the formal economy by focusing on large farming enterprises and private farms, but again gender is not considered (Spoor, 2003; Lerman, 2008; Visser, 2008). An altogether separate group of studies is sensitive to gender but is not germane to rural Russia, although these studies do discuss both formal and informal sectors in the non-agricultural economy (Bridger et al., 1996; Sperling, 1999; Kay, 2000; Ashwin, 2006, 2006; Saarinen et al., 2013). The present analysis situates Russia's rural informal economy at the intersection of two distinct theoretical literatures. The first theoretical literature is New Institutionalism, which argues that institutions are central in shaping and affecting behaviour. Because the transition from communism was unprecedented, New Institutionalism seemed especially relevant for understanding the attempt to incentivize behaviours supporting capitalism (Furubotn and Richter, 1991; Brinton and Nee, 1998). At the forefront of New Institutionalism is Douglass North, who argues that, ‘institutions are the framework within which human interaction takes place. They are perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive team sport …. they consist of formal written rules as well as typically unwritten codes of conduct’ (North, 1990, pp. 3e4). Institutional change was significant in the rural formal economy, where farm status, operation, and external economic relations converted to capitalist principles. Reforming the formal economy was an immense task, requiring that economic actors change their economic psychology, their analytical prism for decision-making, their cost-benefit estimations, and their actual economic behaviour. The rural formal and rural informal economies exist side by side. Institutional change in the informal economy was less dramatic, but there was some behavioural impact as explained below. The second theoretical literature concerns the relationship between economic growth and value change. Inglehart and Norris (2003) find a gradual trend toward greater gender equality in nations that are secular and have post-modern, that is, non-traditional cultural values. As to the import of economic growth, which modernization theory asserts will change cultural values, Inglehart and Baker argue that, ‘economic development tends to transform a given society in predictable directions, but the process and path are not inevitable. Many factors are involved, so any prediction must be contingent on the historical and cultural context of the society in question’ (Inglehart and Baker, 2001, p. 21, emphasis added). In a subsequent book, Inglehart and Welzel confirmed the persistence of a society's historical-cultural heritage even when per capita GDP and structure of the labour force are controlled. They conclude that, ‘Despite widespread talk of the globalization of culture, the nation remains a key unit of shared experience, with its educational and cultural institutions shaping the values of almost everyone in that society’ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, p. 69). With regard to gender equality, in a different book Inglehart and

2

A subset of women is selected from the original 25 for this article. The participants are referred to as ‘worker 1e4’ or ‘expert 1e11’.

Please cite this article in press as: Wegren, S.K., et al., Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy, Communist and PostCommunist Studies (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007

S.K. Wegren et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2017) 1e12

3

Norris were even more direct when they argued, ‘culture matters, and indeed it matters a lot’ to values about gender equality, and that ‘cultural traditions are remarkably enduring in shaping men's and women's worldviews; nevertheless, glacial shifts are taking place that move systematically away from traditional values and toward more egalitarian sex roles' (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, pp. 8e9). This article serves as a case study to test alternative hypotheses from these two literatures. (1) Culture and tradition continue to shape attitudes toward gender equality and gendered economic roles in the informal economy. (2) Institutions, in Russia's case, Western neoliberal institutions, shape attitudes toward gender equality and gendered economic roles in the informal economy. If the first hypothesis is true we expect to see basic continuities in historical gendered roles in the informal economy and persistence in gender inequality. If the second hypothesis is true, we expect to see movement toward the Western modelda post-modern set of cultural values from which gender equality is increasing. The analysis of gendered roles in Russia's rural informal economy fills a significant void in the literature. An overview of Russia's informal economy is presented below, followed by an examination of the empirical evidence and the light it sheds on these two hypotheses. 3. Methodology The article employs data from several rounds of household surveys. The first data set comes from panel surveys of three Russian villages in 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2003, funded by the Russian Academy of Sciences, the National Science Foundation, the Moscow Public Science Fund, the Ford Foundation, and the University of Missouri. A panel survey interviews the same households (or individuals) at different points in time, thereby making longitudinal analysis possible. The 1995 and 1997 data are publicly available from the ICPSR at the University of Michigan and were accessed through that source. The 1999 and 2003 data were made available by Professor David O'Brien, University of Missouri, USA. The 1995e2003 surveys collected data from three villages in Belgorod oblast, Rostov oblast, and Tver’ oblast. Belgorod and Rostov oblasts are located in the south, where land and climate are favourable for agriculture. The third oblast, Tver, is located in the north, in the so-called non-black earth zone of Russia that generally is not conducive to plant growing. One village was sampled in each oblast, and the same villages were surveyed in alternating waves. The original number of respondents in the first wave was 508, but due to deaths and out-migration the size of the sample decreased over time. As a result, in 2003 n ¼ 382, thereby reflecting the number of respondents who participated in each round of the surveys. In the 2003 round of the survey, 132 respondents were sampled in Rostov oblast, 131 in Belgorod oblast, and 119 in Tver’ oblast. The second survey is from 800 households in five regions of Russia in 2001, funded by National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER). The five regions include Belgorod oblast, Volgograd oblast, Krasnodar krai, Novgorod oblast, and the Republic of Chuvashia. Within each region, four villages were selected, and within each village, 40 households were surveyed, for a total sample of five raions, 20 villages, and 800 households (160 households in each region). Person-toperson interviews were conducted by a research institute in Moscow. The refusal rate was less than 4 per cent. Each interview lasted about one hour. The person who answered the door was interviewed, although information was collected for up to five adults in the household and up to three children. In all, data were collected for 1858 adults. The questionnaire was comprised of more than 100 questions on various economic, political, social, and demographic aspects. The third survey is from 900 households in nine regions in 2006, funded by NCEEER. Regions were chosen in each of the seven federal okrugs of Russiadin the north, south, east, and west of Russia, encompassing more than 10 per cent of the regions of the Russian Federation. The nine regions include Altai krai, Amur oblast, Krasnodar krai, Voronezh oblast, Moscow oblast, Leningrad oblast, Kurgan oblast, Krasnoyarsk krai, and the Republic of Tatarstan. The pretest was conducted in Kaluga oblast. A total of 10 raions and 34 villages were surveyed, with 100 households sampled in each region. Person-to-person interviews were conducted by a research institute in Moscow. The refusal rate was less than 4 per cent. Each interview lasted about one hour. The person who answered the door was interviewed, although information was collected for up to five adults in the household and up to three children. In all, data were collected for 2235 adults. The questionnaire was comprised of more than 100 questions on various economic, political, social, and demographic aspects. For each of the surveys (1995e2003, 2001, and 2006), person-to-person interviews were conducted by a research institute in Moscow. The refusal rate was less than 4 per cent. Each interview lasted about one hour. The person who answered the door was interviewed, although information was collected about other members of the household as well. The fourth survey comes from two southern regions of Russia in early 2013 (89 respondents from Rostov oblast and 80 respondents from Krasnodar krai). This survey was funded by OXFAM. Both regions are favourable to agriculture. The selection method was non-random after consultation with local officials. Person-to-person interviews were conducted by an academy of higher education located in Moscow. The response rate was greater than 97 per cent. Each interview last approximately one hour. The survey consisted of 51 questions on economic, social, and demographic aspects. In addition to quantitative data from households, the article employs selective qualitative information from two focus groups conducted in Kurgan oblast in May 2013. Kurgan oblast is located about 1500 miles east-southeast from the city of Moscow, in a region referred to as ‘beyond the Urals’ due to its location on the east side of the Urals mountains. It is a major grain-growing region, and approximately 40 per cent of the population is classified as rural. Interviews were held 20e60 kilometers from the city of Kurgan (population about 320,000 in 2010), in other words, in non-urban areas, which means that participants reflect rural, not urban, opinions. The two focus groups include women non-agricultural workers who live in Kurgan oblast. The women were randomly selected from different professions by a researcher from the Kurgan State Agricultural Academy. The common denominator Please cite this article in press as: Wegren, S.K., et al., Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy, Communist and PostCommunist Studies (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007

4

S.K. Wegren et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2017) 1e12

for each woman was that she owned and operated a garden plot, lichnoe podsobnoe khoziaistvo. The second set of interviews is from experts at the Kurgan State Agricultural Academy. A subset of 15 women is selected from the original 25 for this article, based upon relevance to the article. Focus group interviews ran about an hour. No names were collected and participants remained anonymous. The sessions were digitally recorded and then transcribed into Russian. The statements appearing in the article are translations by the lead author from the transcription. 4. Russia's informal economy In the post-Soviet period, the size and importance of the informal economy has grown. To be sure, the magnitude varies depending on the definition used for the informal economy (Lehmann and Zaiceva, 2013, pp. 7e8). Official statistics from the Russian government estimate that the percentage of GDP produced in the informal economy increased from 13 per cent in 1993 to 23 per cent in 1996, and then to about 25 per cent in the 2000s (Timofeyev, 2013, p. 858). Others argue that the magnitude is much higher, reaching over 40 per cent of GDP as early as 1995 and remaining above that level through 2006 (Timofeyev, 2013, p. 859). Today, Russia's informal economy is estimated to range from 40 per cent of economic turnover to as much as 50e65 per cent of Russia's national output (War on Cash and Informal Economy, 2013; Morris and Polese, 2014, p. 2). Just as the size of the informal economy has grown, participation in the legal informal economy has steadily increased since 2000 according to data from the Russian government. In 2001, there were an estimated 9.1 million persons working in the informal sector in Russia, equal to 14 per cent of the employed population in the nation (Goskomstat, 2002, p. 81). By 2012, that number grew to 13.6 million, equal to 19 per cent of the total employed population (Rosstat, 2013, pp. 113, 115). But what is Russia's informal economy? There is a good deal of conceptual fuzziness about the informal sector in Russia and other post-communist states. The informal economy often refers to reimbursed favors, unpaid labour, or paid household labour (Morris and Polese, 2014, p. 5). In other cases it is used to describe the underground economy, or the shadow economy (tenevaia ekonomika). In the legal informal sector, the self-employed should register but choose not to do so. The legal informal sector includes a variety of economic activitiesdagricultural production and fishing, small-scale manufacturing, construction and repair, trade, hotels and restaurants, transportation, educational services, health care services, and the renting of dwellings (Ustinova, 2009). In still other cases the informal sector refers to illegal labour in the so-called shadow economy, even though that labour may occur in the formal economy. The illegal informal economy is distinct in that work in the illegal sector cannot be registered (Kim, 2002, p. 692). For example, illegal migrants or undocumented workers may be engaged in trade, construction, or as hired agricultural workers, but are not formally registered as employees. Thus, whether legal or illegal, the informal sector lies outside state regulation, monitoring, or control (Morris and Polese, 2014, p. 3). Finally, because the informal economy often depends on informal economic relationsdreciprocity, kinship, social networks of supportdit is characterized as pre-modern, or even anti-modern by preventing capital formation. Others disagree with this position and argue that informality is ‘tied closely to emerging forms of marketized relations’ (Morris and Polese, 2014, p. 8). In any event, the informal economy stands in contrast to the formal economy with its impersonal transactions, exchanges, and interactions. Suffice it here to indicate core characteristics that separate the informal from the formal economy. First, income in the informal economy is not taxed and lies outside of social security contributions. Second, the informal workplace is small, having five or fewer workers. Third, employees in the informal economy are not registered for their employment, they are not on a work roster, and do not have a contract that specifies rules, responsibilities and obligations (Lehmann and Zaiceva, 2013, p. 9). Fourth, the informal economy acts as a safety net. Timofeyev argues that even though employment in the informal sector is less secure and may have worse working conditions, informal activities ‘provide individuals with employment that enables them to fulfill their needs and improve their well-being’ (Timofeyev, 2013, p. 860). Because many people who work in the informal sector may have lost their job in the formal sectordinvoluntary informal employeesdthe informal sector puts people back to work, and therefore the informal sector has an ameliorating effect on unemployment and poverty. 5. The soviet rural informal economy In the Soviet era, the informal economy was referred to as the black market, parallel economy, or underground economy, and consisted of a mix of legal, semi-legal, and illegal activity (Smith, 1976, pp. 106e34; Simis, 1982, pp. 144e79; Willis, 1985, pp. 205e18). Although the Soviet regime opposed the informal private sector, it was ‘forced to make concessions to the requirements of reality …. the Soviet state has acknowledged the impracticality of forbidding certain types of private economic activity, particularly in the sphere of food production and consumer services’ (Feldbrugge, 1984, p. 529). Although it was extremely difficult to reach reliable estimates about the size of the Soviet black market, a ‘robust’ underground economy for consumer products, including cars, petrol, foodstuffs, fishing and hunting, and alcohol existed (O'Hearn, 1980). Moreover, the informal economy often operates on the principle of Russian blat, a term used to define the ‘use of personal networks for obtaining goods and services in short supply and for circumventing formal procedures’ during the Soviet period and thereafter (Ledeneva, 2009, p. 257). Blat served as an alternative currencydan informal exchange of favorsdand for that reason it was often considered a form of corruption, although Ledeneva argues that it was not (Ledeneva, 2009, pp. 258e61). In as much as blat represented the ‘know-how’ of the Soviet system, in the post-Soviet the term is much less prevalent Please cite this article in press as: Wegren, S.K., et al., Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy, Communist and PostCommunist Studies (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007

S.K. Wegren et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2017) 1e12

5

although it continues to exist and describes the exchange of favors (Ledeneva, 2009, p. 262). Blat remains inherent to understanding Russia's informal economy. The rural informal economy was characterized first and foremost by household subsidiary agriculturedhousehold gardens or lichnoe podsobnoe khoziaistvodand for this reason such land plots are the focus throughout the rest of this paper. Household garden plots were operated in spare time or in retirement, and produced mainly non-monetary income (food) that was consumed by the household; the product mix was completely unregulated by the state. Nearly all rural households operated household gardens, with the highest participation rates among collective farm families. State farm workers also were entitled to operate a garden, although their rate of participation was somewhat lower. In addition, persons and families not engaged in agricultural production but who lived in rural areas, and families in urban areas, also operated household gardens (Wadekin, 1973, pp. 106e26). The maximum size of a household garden was limited by law, although the actual amount of allocated land depended upon profession (Wadekin, 1973, pp. 20e42; Goskomstat, 1989b, pp. 16e8). The size of the land plot was also inversely related to the population in a villagedthe larger population, the smaller the garden plot owing to increased demand for land. Another factor that affected the size of a garden plot was the level of development of a state or collective farm. The higher the level of development, the better workers were paid and the need for a large garden plot diminished (Kalugina, 1991, p. 113). Although subsidiary agriculture used only about 3 per cent of total agricultural land, it produced an estimated 30 per cent of output; in particular, it produced a large percentage of the nation's milk, meat, potatoes, and vegetables, but labour productivity was low (Medvedev, 1987, pp. 364e5). Output varied by republic, profession, and size of family (Goskomstat, 1988, 1989b, p. 474, p. 68). An estimated 80 per cent of household output was consumed by the family, although the actual level of sales varied by commodity (Bridger, 1987, p. 106). The most common commodities for sale from household gardens were wool, vegetables, and meat; commodities most consumed by families were milk, eggs, and potatoes. Households used three main channels for food sales: a state or collective farm, a consumer cooperative, or an urban farm market. The most advantageous of the three was the urban market where prices were on average twice as high as in state retail food stores (Ostrovskii, 1988, p. 80). Soviet leaders did not like the fact that household gardens lie outside the planned economy and resented these vestiges of capitalism. Efforts were made to curtail ‘private agriculture’ during the late 1950s under Khrushchev (Wadekin, 1973, pp. 274e315). After 1964, however, the Soviet leadership eased restrictions on household gardens because of the food they produced was needed to feed the urban population. During the late 1970s and early 1980s when the socialized sector experienced poor agricultural production, the government adopted additional incentives to increase household production (Medvedev, 1987, pp. 374e7). When store shelves went empty in the winter of 1990e1991, household production played a vital role in supplying the urban population with meat, vegetables, and fruits. Despite their economic importance, the operation of household gardens depended upon assistance, legal and illegal, from state and collective farms, a practice that remains true today. During the Soviet era, informal transactions occurred between farm manager and farm employees, which was another dimension of managerial leverage over farm employees. Various forms of assistance were provided, including fodder, young animals, organic fertilizer, and access to pasture land. Farm employees were sometimes paid in kind for their labour with inputs that they could use to operate their plot, for example, hay that could be used to feed animals. Farm employees stole many inputs from large farms, including feed, fertilizer, seed, and tools, that were used to operate the garden. Large farms also were vital for providing services such as plowing, veterinary care, and as a market for food sales. In terms of gendered roles in the informal economy, primary responsibility for tending the household plot fell on women. Humphrey observed that, ‘The availability of labour depends above all on the women in the family, since it is they who do most of the onerous tasks on a year-round basis’ (Humphrey, 2001, p. 294). There were regional variations, of course, but generally speaking women spent considerably more time tending the plot and had many more responsibilities. To illustrate, Bridger noted that in the mid-1960s rural men in the Russian Republic spent about 9 per cent of their total work time tending the family plot, while rural women spent about 35 per cent of their total work time (Bridger, 1987, p. 110). Data from 1965 clarify the enormous differentiation in amount of time spent tending the household garden. In 1965, women spent 589 h of time in the garden and taking care of household animals, whereas men spent only 112 h (Denisova, 2010, p. 146). Women's burden was measured not merely by the number of hours they spent tending the garden, but also by the degree to which the labour was physically taxing. Women had primary responsibility for feeding, milking, cleaning, and medical care of household animals. This work was manualdthe cows were milked by hand, animal manure had to be shoveled by hand, and water for the animals often had to be carried from a well that may or may not be nearby. Likewise, labour invested in the household garden productiondwhether it be tilling, planting, weeding, watering, harvestingdwas done manually, and usually by women (Vinogradov and Pleysier, 2007). Bridger observes that, ‘the majority of the work involved in producing more than a quarter of Soviet agricultural output is done by hand, by women, as an extension of their domestic labour’ (Bridger, 1987, p. 108). The garden plot was not, of course, women's only duty. Women had primary responsibility for maintaining the household, cooking, cleaning, childcare, and shopping. Denisova refers to the combination of employment, household chores, and garden responsibilities as women's ‘triple burden’ (Denisova, 2010, pp. 143e50).

Please cite this article in press as: Wegren, S.K., et al., Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy, Communist and PostCommunist Studies (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007

6

S.K. Wegren et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2017) 1e12 Table 1 Division of time spent tending household garden, 1975e2008. Time spent operating household garden Men-1975 (in percent of work time) Women-1975 (in percent of work time) Men-1980 (in percent of work time) Women-1980 (in percent of work time) Men-1985 (in percent of work time) Women-1985 (in percent of work time) Men-1988 (in percent of work time) Women-1988 (in percent of work time) Men-2008 (in hours and minutes per week) Women-2008 (in hours and minutes per week)

11.7 30.5 15.3 30.9 18.0 29.3 18.9 28.7 15.56 29.0

Sources: Goskomstat, 1989a, p. 212; Rosstat, 2010, pp. 26e7; and authors' calculations.

6. The post-soviet rural informal economy Contemporary household gardens meet the criteria for the informal economy that were enumerated above: income is not taxed, the ‘workplace’ consists of fewer than five workers, employment is not registered, and gardens provide an economic safety net.3 Today, there are nearly 16 million households that have a registered garden (over 50 million people, not all of whom are rural dwellers). These people use more than 7.4 million hectares of agricultural land. Household gardens are small, with 82 per cent less than one-quarter of a hectare (Zhukov, 2013, p. 51). Output mix differs from private family farms, and total production from the agricultural informal sector continues to be significant, accounting for 41 per cent of the ruble value of total output in 2013. Subsidiary agriculture is primarily used for household consumption, although some households are commercially oriented (Pallot and Nefedova, 2007, pp. 195e6, 202). The basic characteristics of lichnoe podsobnoe khoziaistvo remain, that is, unregulated household food production that can be consumed or sold. Institutional change includes the right to privatize the household garden land, that is, convert it from use rights to ownership. Income restrictions have been removed, as were any remaining federal limits on household animals (some regional governments impose limits to prevent household gardens being used as private farms in disguise.) The options for marketing household produce have expanded. The main limitation is on the maximum size of a household garden, which is regulated by regional land law, and although there is variation, in most cases it cannot exceed three hectares. Most household gardens are considerably smaller than the maximum size, as indicated above. Furthermore, there is continuity in attitudes about household gardens on the part of the population. These vestiges of capitalism and private economic activity were popular in the Soviet era and remain so in the post-Soviet period. Institutional impact is seen by a high rate of privatization of household gardens. In 2011, more than 72 per cent of land used in household gardens was owned as private property (Federal Service, 2011, p. 81). In addition, household gardens remain the predominant producer in the post-Soviet rural informal economy. In the post-Soviet period, the economic crisis of the 1990s meant that household gardens became a principal stratagem for household survival, and during the first half of the decade the number of families engaged in subsidiary agriculture increased (mostly urban households), the amount of land used in subsidiary agriculture almost doubled, and household output spiked upward (Goskomstat, 1999, pp. 16e9). In 1992, for example, food output from households accounted for less than one-third of the total ruble value of food production, but increased to almost one-half by 1995 (Goskomstat, 1998, p. 213). Moreover, institutional impact is seen by an increase in nonagricultural household enterprise, small business, and income generating activities related to land (O'Brien et al., 2000; O'Brien et al., 2004; O'Brien and Patsiorkovsky, 2006; O'Brien et al., 2007). Four measures of the agricultural informal economy are used to investigate gender inequality in Russia's contemporary rural informal economy. These measures include responsibility for the operation of the garden and time spent tending it, gender differentials in responsibility for marketing food, gendered ownership of property, and gendered differences in income from entrepreneurial activity. 6.1. Operation of the garden and time spent tending it Historically defined gender roles reflect a division of labour whereby primary responsibility for tending the garden falls on women. For example, in 1973e1974, women spent more than 2.5 times as much time tending the household garden as men (Denisova, 2010, p. 155). In 1975, collective farm women spent more than 30 per cent of their time working in the household garden, whereas men spent less than 12 per cent of theirs (Goskomstat, 1989a, p. 212). In 1989, collective farm male workers spent 19 per cent of their time working in the household garden, compared to 29 per cent for women (Goskomstat, 1989a, p. 212). A comparison of the amount of time men and women spent tending the household garden is illustrated in Table 1.

3 Although employment status is not registered, the land plot's type of usage has to be registered in order to distinguish taxable economic activity from non-taxable activity. Russia uses the terms ‘juridical persons’ for businesses engaged in taxable activity, applied to companies, corporate farms and enterprises; the term ‘physical persons’ applies to household garden operators whose income is not taxable.

Please cite this article in press as: Wegren, S.K., et al., Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy, Communist and PostCommunist Studies (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007

S.K. Wegren et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2017) 1e12

7

Table 2 Distribution of labour in operating household gardens, 2013.

Animal care Time spent in garden Selling produce Buying seed/ fertilizer Paperwork Food processing

Percentage of men who do little to Percentage of women who do little to Percentage of men who do none of this chore none of this chore all of this chore

Percentage of women who do all of this chore

5 18

14 6

10 5

18 18

36

24

27

52

24

10

31

70

27 31

10 6

39 5

65 43

Notes: a. Not all responses are indicated and thus totals do not add to 100. b. ‘little to none’ defined as 0e19% of that chore as indicated by respondents. c. ‘all’ defined as 100% of that chore as indicated by respondents. Source: Authors' survey data, 2013, n ¼ 169.

There are broad continuities over time. In 1975, women spent almost three times as much time tending the garden as did men. In 1980, the ratio was about twice as much. In 1985 and 1988, men were spending about two-thirds as much time as women in the garden. Thus, women had primary responsibility to the end of the Soviet period, although the ratios did change a bit over time.4 In the mid-1990s, women continued to be responsible for the majority of labour in household gardens, in addition to their other responsibilities inside and outside the home (Mikhailov, 1996, p. 67). By 2008, rural women's loss of economic security and higher unemployment meant that they continued to devote considerable time in the garden. According to survey data from the Russian government, in 2008 men (aged 18 or over) spent just under 16 h per week, whereas women spent almost twice as much time, 29 h per week. An optimist would argue that significant change has occurreddfrom three times as much time spent by women in the 1970s to only twice as much 40 years later. A pessimist would note that twice as much is still twice as much, and women's triple burden has not disappeared. An increase in the importance of the informal economy means that the burden on women has increased. Expert 1 from Kurgan State Agricultural Academy notes that previously women's primary responsibility was animal husbandry, but now women have expanded responsibility because they grow a variety of products such as tomatoes, cucumbers, and flowers that are sold. Worker 3 said that labour is no easier than during the Soviet period because machinery for household gardens is not commonly used because it is too expensive. Expert 1 counters that there is a lot of equipment available for use in household gardens, including imported equipment, but rural incomes are low and ‘men give little money for acquiring this equipment,’ and therefore women's labour remains principally manual. Worker 3 further observed that credit is expensive (interest rates are high) which often precludes obtaining a loan.5 The take away, therefore, is that in the post-Soviet era women continue to have primary responsibility for work in the household garden. Household survey data from 2013 facilitate further insight. The distribution of labour for various garden-related chores is illustrated in Table 2. Reality is somewhat more nuanced than presented heredfor instance, other adults (in-laws, neighbours) or children may help with the workload. Time spent operating the garden is shared between men and women. That said, the preponderance of responsibility clearly falls on women. Specifically, there are three broad patterns: (1) men are more likely to do little to none of garden-related chores with the exception of animal care; (2) women are less likely to do little to none of garden-related chores; and (3) women are more likely to have full responsibility for selling produce, buying seed and fertilizer, and paperwork. In addition, women have more responsibility for food processing, which is an extension of food preparation and cooking, both of which are ‘female’ responsibilities. These responses reflect a continuation of gendered roles, thereby suggesting broad continuity in stereotypes that have not changed much even after the introduction of market reform. In as much as the operation of a household garden has traditionally depended upon assistance from a nearby large farm, the final question in this section is whether there are gendered differences in the amount of assistance received. It might be hypothesized that men may have better working relationships with a farm manager, who most likely was also a man, and therefore men gardeners may receive more assistance. Household survey data from 2001 to 2006 allow investigation. In 2001, 85 per cent of women respondents and 81 per cent of men respondents indicated that they received ‘very little’ or ‘no support’ from a large farm (N ¼ 665). In 2006, 78 per cent of men and women indicated that they received ‘very little’ or ‘no support’ from a large farm (N ¼ 703). In both years, less than 1 per cent of men and women said they received ‘very much’ assistance.

4 The slight reduction for women was due to three main factors. First, household animal husbandry became less popular, for which women had primary responsibility. Second, rising agricultural income from farm employment made income from the household garden less important. Third, as women's education levels rose, they moved into non-production and specialist roles that paid better and that reduced the time they had to work in the garden. 5 In spring 2014 the Russian government introduced subsidized credit to households for the purchase of equipment, animals, and other inputs.

Please cite this article in press as: Wegren, S.K., et al., Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy, Communist and PostCommunist Studies (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007

8

S.K. Wegren et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2017) 1e12 Table 3 Mean Monthly Income from Food Sales by Gender, 1995e2006, in rubles.

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2006

Husbands

Wives

Husbands as % of wives

583 194 368 580 918 1925

678 151 479 451 864 1663

86% 128% 77% 122% 106% 116%

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Sources: Authors' survey data, 1995e2006.

Assistance from a large farm does not appear to vary by gender, and the absences of significant assistance, at least in the surveys cited, means that the work burden remains heavy on women.

6.2. Responsibility for food sales It is difficult to get a full picture of the division of labour for household food sales and evidence that does exist yields mixed results. Rural women are important economic actors who contribute directly and indirectly to food marketing through their myriad roles in the household that frees men for other productive activities. That said, food sales by ‘physical persons’ are not considered taxable income according to the 2002 law on subsidiary agriculture, so the Russian government has little direct financial stake in knowing how much is sold. The consequence is that official data are lacking on the question of who has primary responsibility for household food sales. The government estimates how many households engage in food sales but it is believed that these figures are probably understated (Pallot and Nefedova, 2007, p. 195). For example, for 2001, official statistics estimated that about 8 per cent of households sold at least some of their food, a number that rose to 21 per cent in 2007 before declining to 18 per cent in 2012 (Goskomstat, 2002, p. 84; Rosstat, 2008, 2012, p. 88, p. 109). Beyond those data, Russian scholars have attempted to calculate household commercialization, confirming that only a small percentage of households produce mainly for commercial reasons (Petrikov, 2007; Uzun and Saraikin, 2012). Owing to the absence of official data on gendered roles in food sales, available evidence about the division of labour for household food sales is mainly suggestive. Anecdotal evidence suggests that women are commonly observed at urban markets as the sellers of household produce. Household data indicate that responsibility for food sales is shared (see Table 2), but the question as to whom has primary responsibility remains. The 2006 household survey asked ‘who is the main person responsible for agricultural food sales?’ Among male respondents, 84 per cent said that husbands have primary responsibility, and only 11 per cent said wives. Female respondents were more divided, but 45 per cent said that wives are mainly responsible. In other words, there are fundamentally different gendered perceptions as to who has how much responsibility for food sales.6 Income data from surveys of rural households are interesting but ultimately inconclusive. In Table 3, income from food sales over six time points are presented for husbands and wives. Income data for 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2003 are panel data and directly comparable; 2001 and 2006 data come from larger cross-sectional surveys of other regions and include a different mix of households than in the panel surveys. In two of the six time points wives reported higher income from food sales than husbands.7 In the 1997 survey, household agricultural production actually increased over 1995, but sales were lower (O'Brien et al., 2000, p. 133). The reason is that household plot production comprised a core component of household survival and thus lower sales reflects higher household consumption. Ultimately, these data suggest that men shared a significant portion of responsibility for food sales. But any conclusions are attenuated because sales data obscure many variablesdvillage location and its suitability for agriculture, the economic and financial condition of the households, the demographic structure of the household, and the regional (and village) economic environment at that particular time. Further, the data reflect the value of production sold, not time spent selling food, and if wives are selling potatoes, for instance, and men are selling meat, then women would need to allocate many more hours to reach a comparable income level with men. Thus, it is difficult to generalize from the available evidence, and the actual division of responsibility is likely to depend on the families involved and the specific characteristics of the household.

6 Looking back retrospectively, it is very possible that the discrepancy in responses is due to the wording of the question or the interpretation of the question by respondents. The ‘main responsibility’ could be interpreted broadly or narrowly. For example, a narrow interpretation would be about who actually conducts the transaction and collects payment. A broad interpretation would be about who is responsible for picking/gathering/harvesting the produce, who transports the produce to market, who sets up for sale, who arranges for and pays the rental fee, who conducts the transactions, and who collects payment. 7 1995, N ¼ 288 husbands and 372 wives; 1997, N ¼ 282 husbands and 369 wives; 1999, N ¼ 276 husbands and 368 wives; 2001, N ¼ 612 husbands and 769 wives; 2003, N ¼ 252 husbands and 360 wives; 2006, N ¼ 730 husbands and 853 wives.

Please cite this article in press as: Wegren, S.K., et al., Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy, Communist and PostCommunist Studies (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007

S.K. Wegren et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2017) 1e12

9

Interviews from focus groups also yield a mixed picture and women participants disagree among themselves. One opinion reflects a sentiment that household food sales were easier in Soviet times. Worker 3 argues that in the past a large farm was a natural market for buying young animals and selling fooddit was ‘convenient and good, no problems.’ Today, in her opinion, market access for individuals is much more complicated. Expert 3 from Kurgan State Agricultural Academy states that access to market today requires overcoming so many obstacles that many people raise a limited number of livestock only for their consumption, and this pertains to both men and women. This feeling is supported by the view of Expert 1 who argues that distance to market is often a problemdagricultural enterprises, raion centers, or oblast centers are often located far away. Although more women drive today than in the past, Expert 2 observes that getting the product to market is difficult, especially if meat is being sold. Public transportation is not a convenient method to transport food to market. Expert 7 notes that women have an inherent physical disadvantage when it comes to food sales because they are not as physically strong. In disagreement is Expert 8, who argued that women are better sellers when she said, ‘it seems to me that if a woman is selling, it is easier to approach her to buy something than a man’. A second line of argumentation is that food sales were difficult in Soviet times and the situation has not improved, merely the types of problems have changed. Expert 10 states that if before there were few cars and few women drove, then today there is more competition at food markets and corruption. Expert 2 points out that today a food sellerdboth men and womendrequire certifications, licenses, and other documentation that confirm the sanitary standards of the food, and these documents may entail bribes to obtain. Along the same lines, Expert 3 argues that men and women face the same obstacles in food sales and access to market, and therefore the main problems are not due to gender differences but to other factors. For instance, she notes that in Soviet times it was easier to raise livestock because a person could obtain hay, grain, or feed from farm workers who were paid in kind by the farm. Combine and tractor drivers would sell their excess that household gardeners could buy for a good price. Today, ‘surplus’ hay and feed as income in kind is much less available from farm workers, and to buy it at retail prices is very expensive. Thus, both men and women face this limitation and find it too expensive to maintain animals, particularly if the household is located close to a city. For these households it is easier to buy meat than raise their own.

6.3. Gendered property ownership Although there are were and are different types of land usage, our focus is on the household garden plot used for subsidiary food production, or lichnoe podsobnoe khoziaistvo. In the Soviet period, permission to operate a household garden was given to a family. In essence, the plot and animals were ‘owned’ collectively, although in the case of land there was no real ownership. If the land plot had a domik (small shed) situated on it for tools, seed, plants, and others, it too was considered part of the joint property. The garden operation had a representative who acted as the head of operations, and who acted in the names of the other members (owners) in dealings with the outside world. There was no requirement that the representative be a man or the oldest among the owners, but that was commonly the case. In the post-Soviet period, institutional change brought the possibility to own land individually. The conversion of jointly owned property to individual property is enormously complicated and space limitations preclude a detailed discussion. Suffice it to say that rural women tend not to be registered owners of household gardens, which reflects the patriarchal nature of many households. Almost one-half of women in the 2013 sample indicate that the household garden is registered in the husband's name, whereas only 15 per cent of men say that the plot is registered in the wife's name. Moreover, only 26 per cent of women say that the plot is registered in their name, whereas 53 per cent of men say the plot is in their name.8 This finding suggests that the historical tradition of property (house, garden plot) passing through male lines in the family has remained intact even after market reform liberalized laws regarding ownership (Farnsworth, 1992, pp. 95e7). Registration of land ownership not only reflects power relationships within the household, it also has broader economic ramifications. For rural women, income potential in the informal economy is limited by gendered land ownership. Household garden plots, as privately owned land, may be used to generate additional income or increase production capacity. For example, the registered owner may use the plot as collateral to obtain credit that in turn can be reinvested to purchase mechanized equipment or livestock. Further, registered landowners can mortgage their plot to obtain financing, which in turn can be used to obtain rental land for raising livestock or pasture, depending on the locale. Thus, registered landowners have advantages and ways of raising capital that non-owners do not. Moreover, among land plots already held in ownership, men possess larger land holdings. Although the number of respondents is relatively small, in the 2013 survey men reported larger household gardens than women (10 times larger on average), and men had more rental land. Owners and households with larger rental plots tend to have more livestock, because rental land is used to raise livestock or feed for livestock. More livestock are statistically correlated with higher agricultural production and household income (O'Brien et al., 2000, p. 141; O'Brien et al., 2007, pp. 37e46). Men are also more likely to increase land holdings. In a 2001 household survey, for example, men reported a mean increase in land holdings of 2.2 hectares since 1991, whereas women reported an increase of only 0.82 hectares (most land increases entailed rental). In a 2006 household survey, men reported a mean increase of 1.2 hectares since 1991 and women only 0.23 hectares. Thus, land

8

The remainder is accounted for by land plots registered as joint (indivisible) property.

Please cite this article in press as: Wegren, S.K., et al., Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy, Communist and PostCommunist Studies (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007

10

S.K. Wegren et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2017) 1e12 Table 4 Mean Monthly Income from Entrepreneurship by Gender, 1995e2006, in rubles.

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2006

Husbands

Wives

Husbands as % of wives

32,291 62,979 165 638 704 770

538 8049 9 60 232 170

6002% 782% 1833% 1063% 303% 453%

Notes: a. Numbers have been rounded. b. 1995 and 1997 are in pre-denominated rubles. Denomination occurred in 1998. Sources: Authors' survey data, 1995e2006.

ownership appears to be a male domain, and to the extent that acquiring agricultural land paves the way to higher income and better standard of living, men are significantly advantaged. 6.4. Income relationships and entrepreneurial income Entrepreneurial activity is defined as an economic pursuit that generates income outside the primary place of employment (not including the household garden). For most individuals entrepreneurial income is supplementary to their primary employment; a small minority earns a significant amount of additional monthly income that facilitates income differentiation. Entrepreneurial activities include both agricultural and non-agricultural services. For men, entrepreneurial income may come from providing agricultural or non-agricultural servicesdrepair, construction, delivery, mechanized labour, or manual labour. Women may earn entrepreneurial income from gendered roles such as sewing, haircutting, food processing, handicrafts, or babysitting. Gender differentials in income from entrepreneurial activity reflect how male and female services are valued and priced in society. Mean monthly income from entrepreneurial activity during 1995e2006 is shown in Table 4. The table clearly demonstrates that men (husbands) earn significantly more in entrepreneurship than women, no doubt a consequence of women's triple burden and the valuation of services that women provide. At every data point, wives have minuscule earnings from entrepreneurship compared to the husband in the household.9 The 2013 data allow us to probe a bit deeper into the question of participation versus valuation of services. The distribution of entrepreneurial income from the 2013 survey is shown in Table 5. The table indicates that the number of participants is similar for men and women in entrepreneurial activity, 28 men and 27 women, although as a percentage of the sample women have lower rates of participation because their number in the sample is greater. Entrepreneurial earnings are low, however. Among respondents who have entrepreneurial income, 44 percent earn less than R500 a month, equal to about $15 at 2013 exchange rates. Women account for 14 of the 24 respondents with entrepreneurial income less than R500 a month. Conversely, 25 respondents have entrepreneurial income greater than R4,000 a month (15 men and 10 women); and within that cohort, 19 respondents have entrepreneurial income higher than R5,000 a month ($166). Among the 19 highest earners, 12 are men (63 percent) and 7 are women (37 percent), reflecting once again realities of time and opportunity. Thus, women are active participants in entrepreneurial activity, but gendered roles and the economic value attached to those roles result in lower earnings. That said, there are ‘green shoots’ of change in the informal economy. One example of change emerges from fieldwork and lies outside the data. In Rostov and Krasnodar regions, rural women have begun to participate more actively in network trading business using the internet. Other women offer services as accountants and book keepers. These roles pale against the litany of gendered roles that define the informal economy, but they are a start. 7. Conclusion This article demonstrates the continuation of gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy. Two alternative hypotheses about institutional impact and persistence of culture and tradition were tested. The first hypothesis is borne out in macro-economic behaviour. Institutional impact is seen by the significant increase in participation in subsidiary agriculture during the first half of the 1990s, an expansion in land used for household gardening, and an increase in food production from household gardens. Neoliberal reforms also codified land ownership, and almost three-quarters of households hold their land in private ownership. The second hypothesis is borne out with regard to gender inequality. Writing about the economy in general, Sarah Ashwin argued that, ‘it seems that Soviet norms are being reproduced in post-Soviet Russia …. The position of men and women in employment relative to each other has not changed a great deal since the collapse of communism, despite the enormous upheavals of the period. The gender division of labour in which “women do everything and men do the rest” persists, with women continuing to play the leading role in the household’ (Ashwin, 2006, p. 50).

9 1995, N ¼ 288 husbands and 372 wives; 1997, N ¼ 282 husbands and 369 wives; 1999, N ¼ 276 husbands and 368 wives; 2001, N ¼ 612 husbands and 769 wives; 2003, N ¼ 252 husbands and 360 wives; 2006, N ¼ 730 husbands and 853 wives.

Please cite this article in press as: Wegren, S.K., et al., Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy, Communist and PostCommunist Studies (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007

S.K. Wegren et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2017) 1e12

11

Table 5 Distribution of entrepreneurial income by gender, 2013. Entrepreneurial earnings per month in rubles

# of men with entrepreneurial income

# of women with entrepreneurial income

<250 251-500 501-1000 1001e2000 2001e3000 4001e5000 >5001 Total number of persons with income from entrepreneurship

9 1 1 0 2 3 12 28

13 1 1 1 1 3 7 27

Source: Authors' survey data, 2013, n ¼ 169.

In the rural informal economy, persistence in unequal gendered roles in the operation of household gardens suggests that tradition and custom remain strong. Gender differentials in time spent tending the household garden are significant, as is the distribution of household tasks into gendered roles in ways that effect professional advancement for women. Further, the evidence is suggestive that land ownership is the domain of men, and women are not owners in Russia's new economy, a legacy that may be traced back to the earliest days of market reform. Moreover, men earn more from entrepreneurial activity, a function of how male and female services are valued and priced in society. The one area where responsibility is shared is the marketing of household food, and the evidence on this question was mixed. Thus, institutional impact is highly variegated and the analysis suggests that institutional change may lead to substantial change in economic behaviour as predicted by New Institutionalists. At the same time, this article sensitizes us to the reality that institutional change faces considerable obstacles when confronting tradition and customs in issues relating to gender equality. Owing to the strength and persistence of culture and tradition, gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy is likely to endure.

References Ashwin, S. (Ed.), 2000. Gender, State and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia. Routledge Publishers, London and New York. Ashwin, S. (Ed.), 2006. Adapting to Russia's New Labour Market: Gender and Employment Behaviour. Routledge Publishers, London and New York. Bridger, S., 1987. Women in the Soviet Countryside: Women's Roles in Rural Development in the Soviet Union. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Bridger, S., 1996. The return of the family farm: a future for women? In: Marsh, R. (Ed.), Women in Russia and Ukraine. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 141e154. Bridger, S., Kay, R., Pinnick, K., 1996. No More Heroines? Russia, Women, and the Market. Routledge Publishers, London and New York. Brinton, M.C., Nee, V., 1998. The New Institutionalism in Sociology. Russell Sage, New York. Denisova, L., 2010. In: Mukhina, I. (Ed.), Rural Women in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia. Routledge Publishers, London and New York. Farnsworth, B., 1992. The litigious daughter-in-law: family relations in rural Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century. In: Farnsworth, B., Viola, L. (Eds.), Russian Peasant Women. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, pp. 89e106. Federal Service of State Registration, Cadastre, and Cartography, 2011. godu. Gosudarstvennyi (Natsional’nyi) Doklad O Sostoianii I Ispol’zovanii Zemel’ V Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vol. 2010. Rosreestr, Moscow. Feldbrugge, F.J.M., 1984. Government and shadow economy in the Soviet union. Sov. Stud. 36 (4), 528e543. Furubotn, G., Richter, R., 1991. The New Institutional Economics. Texas A&M Press, College Station. Goskomstat, 1988. Sel’skoe Khoziaistvo SSSR. Finansy i statistika, Moscow. Goskomstat, 1989a. gg. Biudzhet Rabochikh, Sluzhashchikh I Kolkhoznikov, vol. vols. 1975-1988. Goskomstat, Moscow. Goskomstat, 1989b. godu. Lichnoe Podsobnoe Khoziaistvo Naseleniia, vol. 1988. Goskomstat, Moscow. Goskomstat, 1998. Rossiia V Tsifrakh. Goskomstat, Moscow. Goskomstat, 1999. Sel’skokhoziaistvennaia Deiatel’nost’ Khoziaistv Naseleniia V Rossii. Goskomstat, Moscow. Goskomstat, 2002. Ekonomicheskaia Aktivnost’ Naseleniia Rossii. Goskomstat, Moscow. Humphrey, C., 2001. In: Marx Went Away: but Karl Stayed behind, Rev. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. Inglehart, R., Baker, W.E., 2001. Modernization's challenge to traditional values: who's afraid of ronald McDonald? Futurist 35 (2), 16e21. Inglehart, R., Norris, P., 2003. Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Inglehart, R., Welzel, C., 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Ioffe, G., Nefedova, T., Zaslavsky, I., 2006. The End of Peasantry? the Disintegration of Rural Russia. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. Kalugina, Z., 1991. Lichnoe Podsobnoe Khoziaistvo V SSSR. Nauka, Novosibirsk. Kalugina, Z., 2002. Adaptation strategies of agricultural enterprises during transformation. In: O'Brien, D.J., Wegren, S.K. (Eds.), Rural Reform in Post-Soviet Russia. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, pp. 267e284. Kay, R., 2000. Russian Women and Their Organizations: Gender, Discrimination and Grassroots Women's Organizations, 1991-96. Routledge Publishers, London and New York. Kay, R., 2006. Men in Contemporary Russia: the Fallen Heroes of Post-Soviet Change? Ashgate Publishers, Aldershot, UK. Kim, B.Y., 2002. The participation of Russian households in the informal economy. Econ. Transition 10 (3), 689e717. Kitching, G., 1998. The revenge of the Peasant? The collapse of large-scale Russian agriculture and the role of the peasant ‘private plot’ in that collapse, 199197. J. Peasant Stud. 26 (1), 43e81. Ledeneva, A., 2009. From Russia with blat: can informal networks help modernize Russia? Soc. Res. 76 (1), 257e288. Lehmann, H., Zaiceva, A., 2013. Informal Employment in Russia: Definitions, Incidence, Determinants and Labour Market Segregation. OECD Economics Department Working Paper no. 1098. OECD, Paris. Lerman, Z. (Ed.), 2008. Russia's Agriculture in Transition. Lexington Books, Lanham. Maslova, I.S., Baranenkova, T.A., Kubishin, E.S., 2007. Neformal’naia Zaniatost’ V Rossii. Nauka, Moscow. Medvedev, Z.A., 1987. Soviet Agriculture. W. W. Norton & Co, New York. Mikhailov, O., 1996. Zhenskii trud i zaniatost’ na sele. APK Ekon. Upr. 5, 63e68.

Please cite this article in press as: Wegren, S.K., et al., Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy, Communist and PostCommunist Studies (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007

12

S.K. Wegren et al. / Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2017) 1e12

Miller, L.G., 2002. Communal coherence and barriers to reform. In: O'Brien, D.J., Wegren, S.K. (Eds.), Rural Reform in Post-Soviet Russia. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, pp. 221e242. Morris, J., Polese, A.P., 2014. The Informal Post-Socialist Economy: Embedded Practices and Livelihoods. Routledge Publishers, London and New York. North, D.C., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, New York. Ostrovskii, V.B. (Ed.), 1988. Lichnoe Podsobnoe Khoziaistvo. Nauka, Moscow. O'Brien, D.J., Patsiorkovski, V.V., Dershem, L.D., 2000. Household Capital and the Agrarian Problem in Russia. Ashgate Publishers, Aldershot. O'Brien, D.J., Patsiorkovsky, V.V., 2006. Measuring Social and Economic Change in Rural Russia: Surveys from 1991 to 2003. Lexington Books, Lanham. O'Brien, D.J., Wegren, S.K., Patsiorkovsky, V.V., 2004. Contemporary rural responses to reform from above. Russ. Rev. 63 (2), 256e276. O'Brien, D.J., Wegren, S.K., Patsiorkovsky, V.V., 2007. Stratification in Russian villages. Problems Post-Communism 54 (1), 37e46. O'Hearn, D., 1980. The consumer second economy: size and effects. Sov. Stud. 32 (2), 218e234. Pallot, J., Nefedova, T., 2003. ‘Geographical differentiation in household plot production in rural Russia. Eurasian Geogr. Econ. 44 (1), 14e38. Pallot, J., Nefedova, T., 2007. Russia's Unknown Agriculture: Household Production in Post-Socialist Rural Russia. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Petrikov, A.V., 2007. Lichnye podsobnye khoziaistva Rossii: problemy i perspektivy razvitiia. Ekon. sel’skokhoziaistvennykh i Pererabat. predpriiatii 5, 6e9. Rosstat, 2008. Ekonomicheskaia Aktivnost’ Naseleniia Rossii. Rosstat, Moscow. Rosstat, 2010. Itogi Pilotnogo Vyborochnogo Obsledovaniia Ispol’zovaniia (Biudzheta) Vremeni Naseleniem. Rosstat, Moscow. Rosstat, 2012. Ekonomicheskaia Aktivnost’ Naseleniia Rossii. Rosstat, Moscow. Rosstat, 2013. Ekonomicheskaia Aktivnost’ Naseleniia Rossii. Rosstat, Moscow. Saarinen, A., Ekonen, K., Uspenskaia, V., 2013. Women and Transformation in Russia. Routledge Publishers, London and New York. Simis, K., 1982. USSR: the Corrupt Society: the Secret World of Soviet Capitalism. Simon and Schuster, New York. Smith, H., 1976. The Russians. Ballantine Books, New York. Sperling, V., 1999. Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia: Engendering Transition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Spoor, M. (Ed.), 2003. Transition, Institutions, and the Rural Sector. Lexington Books, Lanham. Timofeyev, Y., 2013. The effects of the informal sector on income of the poor in Russia. Soc. Indic. Res. 111, 855e866. Ustinova, N., 2009. Informal economy in national accounts of Russia. In: Paper Prepared for Conference on Measuring the Informal Economy in Developing Countries, Kathmandu, Nepal, 23e26 September 2009. Available at: www.iariw.org (Accessed 10 February 2014). Uzun, V., Saraikin, V., 2012. Ekonomicheskaia klassifikatsiia lichnykh podsobnykh khoziaistv. APK Ekon. Upr. 1, 41e48. Vinogradov, A., Pleysier, A., 2007. The Women of Izmaelovka: a Soviet Union Collective Farm in Siberia. University Press of America, Lanham. Visser, O., 2003. Farm restructuring, property rights, and household strategies in rural Russia. In: Spoor, M. (Ed.), Transition, Institutions, and the Rural Sector. Lexington Books, Lanham, pp. 83e102. Visser, O., 2008. Crucial Connections: the Persistence of Large Farms Enterprises in Russia. Radboud University, Nijmegen. Wadekin, E., 1973. In: Bush, Keith (Ed.), The Private Sector in Soviet Agriculture, second ed. University of California Press, Berkeley. War on Cash and Informal Economy, 2013. Russia to Ban Transactions over $10,000. http://prudentinvestornewsletters.blogspot.com/2013/03/war-on-cashand-informal-economy-russia.html (Accessed 15 February 2014). Wegren, S.K., 2005. The Moral Economy Reconsidered: Russia's Search for Agrarian Capitalism. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. Willis, D.K., 1985. Klass: How Russians Really Live. St. Martin’s Press, New York. Zhukov, A., 2013. Kooperatsiia lichnykh podsobnykh khoziaistv neobkhodima. APK Ekon. Upr. 3, 51e57.

Please cite this article in press as: Wegren, S.K., et al., Gender inequality in Russia's rural informal economy, Communist and PostCommunist Studies (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.007