- Email: [email protected]
Generations and moral progress in culture and cultural theory
APPDEV-00776; No of Pages 3 Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology
Book review Generations and moral progress in culture and cultural theory Ruth Woods, Children's moral lives: An ethnographic and psychological approach. Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, UK, 2013, ISBN: 978-1-119-97422-2 (cloth), 250 pp., $104.95 Anyone reading Ruth Woods' Children's Moral Lives will likely be transported back in memory to their own childhood conflicts, tears, and exuberance. The book's vivaciousness proves its worth. But Richard Shweder's effusive jacket review, which compares Children's Moral Lives to Piaget's (1932/1965) The Moral Development of the Child, also invites an in-depth examination of the book's theoretical foundations. Children's Moral Lives is an ethnographic study of a multicultural primary school. Ruth Woods conducted her research as a participant observer at Woodnell Green Primary School in West London, spending hundreds of hours in classrooms and on the playground. Over time, the children came to confide in her about their relations with each other and with the school authorities. The institutional values of the school were cosmopolitan, multicultural, and progressive. School rules embodied a strong anti-aggression, anti-bullying, anti-racist stance. The research areas that collectively inform Woods' discussions include social domain theory and research by Turiel, Nucci, Smetana, Killen, Wainryb and others; cultural psychology theory and research by Shweder, Mahapatra, Miller, and Much; and social intuitionist theory by Haidt, Joseph, and others. The topics that the book covers include harm and aggression; exclusion; loyalty; racism; negotiations between student and staff about the meaning of “moral” events; and children's morality in cultural context. This choice is determined to some degree by her data; it is also non-committal, theoretically speaking. Hence, some topics are defined as moral in accord with social domain theory, including harm, exclusion, and racism. Loyalty is defined as moral by cultural psychologists and moral intuitionists (e.g., Shweder and Haidt) but not by social domain theorists. I highly value the books' observations and interpretations. However, as I will explain later in my views on the chapter on loyalty, I believe that more adequate tools for analysis could be obtained from social domain theory than from the alternatives. Aggression and the “anti-harm culture” are the primary focus of the book. Its treatment of tensions between the school's anti-aggression rules and the children's culture of play-fighting display the strengths of Woods' sensitive methodology. Many of the children at the school found joy and solidarity in roughhousing. Very often, play-fighting involved willing participants. How the children interpreted “aggressive” events depended on their robustness and on their relations with the initiator. The children negotiated with teachers to try to legitimize their play-fighting. Sometimes a sensitive child felt hurt by another child's attempts to engage them; sometimes, a child engaged in deception to try to avoid punishment. These case studies make it clear that play-fighting is more than fun. It contributes to the development of physical and psychological tolerance, subtle verbal communication, understanding of facial and body
cues, social bonding, and theory of mind. One function of play-fighting is to build the foundations for a lived morality, one of magnanimity, tolerance, generosity and courage that support moral principles in everyday interactions. Paradoxically, then, this kind of behavior could just as well be called “moral play” as “play-fighting”. It develops moral understandings by exploring invaluable distinctions between fun, tolerable roughhousing and cruel, harmful aggression. Such naturalistic observations of the microgenetics of moral development are an important contribution to the field. Another main topic of the book is loyalty in girls' friendships (Chapter 5), which was deemed problematic by teachers because they saw it as possessive and as limiting girls' freedoms. The theoretical question that reflects the teachers' intuitive evaluation is whether loyalty is indeed a moral value. Turiel (1983) defends a strict definition of morality as involving welfare/harm, justice, and rights. According to domain criteria, this particular form of loyalty is a non-universal value, applied only to an in-group, and involves personal preferences; it is therefore personal or social organizational. The social domain perspective corresponds with the views of the teachers, who apparently see a strong element of personal interest in the girls' attempts to elicit (even to coerce) “loyal” behavior from their friends. The anthropologist Shweder and the moral intuitionist Haidt count as moral all of the above, as well as respect for authority, purity, and loyalty. Woods defines morality as those values that were important to the children she studied, seemingly without considering that we all have important values that are difficult to think of as moral: personal comfort, safety, and gain; status; and inclusion. The data in the chapter on loyalty provide a picture of shifting affiliations, status-seeking, and insecurities arising when one friend was “disloyal” to another. Insistence on “shared enemies” promoted hostilities between alliances, eroding children's independence of choice. These observations of “loyalty” can only make the reader wonder how on earth it could be considered a moral phenomenon, even considering its reciprocal and affiliative elements. This type of loyalty is very different from Piaget's (1932) description of solidarity amongst the Swiss boys whom he observed, and which he held to be one of the affective foundations of moral development in children. Like loyalty, solidarity, according to Piaget, is affiliative, arising from peer interactions, not from authority. But the two are very different. The example that Piaget references is the refusal of a class of boys to single out and name one of their group as guilty of some misdemeanor, choosing instead to accept a group detention after school. Hence solidarity applies to an entire group; there is an impersonal nature to it that is an early kind of objectivity. Further comparing Piaget's solidarity to Woods' loyalty, the former tends towards equilibration and stable relationships, rather than privilege and tension. Piaget terms solidarity the ground from which autonomous justice emerges.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.appdev.2015.03.001 0193-3973/© 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.
Please cite this article as: Day, K., Generations and moral progress in culture and cultural theory, Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.appdev.2015.03.001
2
Book review
Hence grouping the two phenomena together, as suggested by cultural psychological theory, is problematic. Regardless of whether the problem is approached via children's feelings, the teachers' intuitive discomfort, or social domain analyses, it is difficult to justify loyalty as a moral value. Both its internal consequences (hurt, anxiety, and restriction of personal choice) and its external consequences (tensions, hostility, and manipulation) weigh against it. Yet all of this does not lead Woods to reconsider her classification of loyalty as a moral value or her own loyalty to the broad categorizations of cultural psychology. As already noted, I find these case studies richly informative. But I looked for a discussion of the problems of loyalty as a moral value that I did not find. Yet, social domain analyses can be very profitably applied to naturalistic events such as loyalty, analyzing them as mixed-domain events. My study of South African Zulu adolescents shows that their complex traditional values yield naturally, and profitably, to social domain analyses (Day, 2014). Naturalistic data often brings to light mixed-domain phenomena, such as the girls' loyalty at Woodwell Green, that are indeed important — because children find them so and because of their developmental outcomes, whether they are moral or not. These phenomena may be missed by theorists who arrive at a setting with a fixed agenda. Hence, formal interview and naturalistic methodologies are complementary. In places, Children's Moral Lives falls prey to certain theoretical ambiguities in attempting to coordinate with established anthropological theory. One example is the descriptions of the children's cultural origins. Woods provides a detailed account of an ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse population including immigrants and indigenous English children; Somalis and Arabs; Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians; speaking English, Farsi, Gujarati, and Hindi. Yet the conclusion of this detailed description is startling in its reductionism: “the book asks how Western children's moral experiences are influenced by the culture in which they are growing up.” Surely, neither the microsystems nor the macrosystem of these children can be fruitfully characterized as “Western”! Living in London should leave Woods in little doubt that “the West” is not what it once was. More now than ever, cultural theorists must live with the fact that most people do not live in homogeneous “Western” or “non-Western” cultures; societies' moral roots are increasingly cosmopolitan, informed by Martin Luther King, Gandhi, and reconciliation projects in Rwanda and South Africa, as well as their own local customs. The book depicts the anti-aggression movement as Western, with its origins in Norway and the United Kingdom. But the contemporary antiharm movement is surely global. It includes anti-rape demonstrations in India, anti-child abuse education in South Africa, and media concerns about the high rates of violence on Native American reservations in the U.S. and Canada. Many if not most of the political icons of non-violence – including King, Gandhi, and Mandela – enjoyed multicultural intellectual traditions. But from this book readers could easily generalize the differences between children and staff as non-Western vs. Western, or working class vs. middle-class. I would argue that these differences are best seen in terms of historical moral progress and its interactions with individual moral development. Given their multiethnic origins, would the children bring their home values to bear on moral issues at school? Woods ran eighteen tests looking for links between ethnicity, religion, and moral topics such as aggression, intention, and allocation of blame, and failed to find any significant relationships. When she speculates that children are largely occupied with constructing moral meaning from their peer relations, her findings echo those of Piaget. Yet, she does not offer any explanation for why children from such different backgrounds do not seem to express the moral orientations characteristic of their own cultures. One answer may be that children are as capable of being bicultural as bilingual; they construct codes of behavior for more than one context
without being troubled about inconsistencies. These children may be adapting by applying different values in different settings. Without knowledge of their home settings, we cannot be sure whether the children are truly “Westernized” or are adapting to multiple values via multiple “bi-cultural” moral codes. Another possibility, based on both social domain research (MilnitskySapiro, Turiel, & Nucci, 2006; Lins-Dyer & Nucci, 2007) and moral intuitionist research (Haidt, 2012), is that the Woodnell Green parents could share more sociomoral values based on socioeconomic commonalities than differences based on religion and ethnicity: for example, working class parents tend to rely more upon convention and to delay allowing autonomy to their adolescent children than do middle class parents, regardless of nationality. For me, the book reaffirms that there is not much to be gained by clinging to the Western/non-Western dichotomy. This book is a wonderful description of children making social and moral choices in a highly diverse and changeable setting that has its own unique characteristics and ought not to be reduced to a study of “Westernness,” if such a thing can be said to exist. Lastly, problems emerge from Woods' position on the directionality of moral development — that is, whether it stems from cultural values or is constructed through children's interpretations of their social experiences. While she recognizes this issue as fundamental to her work it is hard to know what her final position is. She often implies that children are passive recipients of moral values, as in cultural psychology; elsewhere, however, she applies constructivist terms such as the prioritization of values (p. 91) or the weighing of concerns (p. 108), implying that children develop via conscious choices. Woods' excellent descriptions of the schoolyard characterize “the culture of harm” as more of a process than a conflict between “child” morality and a fixed “cultural” norm. It involved subtle negotiations of individual differences, statuses, and working- and middle-class norms, along with universals such as the developmental pathway of moral play and the acceptance that “real” harm is wrong. Where she accepts classical assumptions about “culture” as a fixed, deterministic entity, she has, I think, done a disservice to her own hard work. In Chapter 7, she discusses the implications of her research for understanding physical aggression in children, suggesting that rules banning aggression could take into account the importance of aggression in working-class children's socialization as they strive to establish status relations. Her argument that the adult culture ought to accommodate children's enculturated psychological needs, going beyond the simple belief that all aggression is negative, suggests the value of a bidirectional conception of moral progress that acknowledges the ongoing contribution of both children's and adults' understandings. In this respect Woods lends support to an idea promoted in the psychological literature by Erikson (1968), which is that children's moral development helps to drive moral progress on a wider, historical plane. I think that it is impossible to engage in the cultural study of moral development without at least a peripheral exploration of the historical context. Woods pays much attention to contemporary educational views about aggression and the need for adults to intervene in children's moral education. I think that consolidating her views on directionality and historical context will make her work more powerful and more progressive. I remain in agreement with Shweder that everyone should read Children's Moral Lives; it is lively, novel, and insightful. I hope that Ruth Woods continues to use her sensitivities and good sense in her ethnographic study of moral development. However, I maintain that it is vital for any moral theorist to define morality with care and to take a position on the perennial question of whether culture is largely deterministic, or whether culture and individual development are reciprocal. I hope that Woods addresses these problems, and remain confident that she, like the children, will contribute to generational progress in her conceptions of culture and morality.
Book review
References Day, K. (2014). The right to literacy and cultural change: Zulu adolescents in postapartheid rural South Africa. Cognitive Development, 29, 81–94. Erikson, E. (1968). Identity: Youth, and crisis. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. New York: Pantheon. Lins-Dyer, M. T., & Nucci, L. (2007). The impact of social class and social cognitive domain on northeastern Brazilian mothers' and daughters' conceptions of parental control. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 31, 105–114. Milnitsky-Sapiro, C., Turiel, E., & Nucci, L. (2006). Brazilian adolescents' conceptions of autonomy and parental authority. Cognitive Development, 21, 317–331. Piaget, J. (1965). The moral judgment of the child. New York: The Free Press (Original work published 1932).
3
Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kathryn Day 2717 Derby Street #1, Berkeley, CA 94705-1338, USA E-mail address: [email protected].
Available online xxxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology
Book review Generations and moral progress in culture and cultural theory Ruth Woods, Children's moral lives: An ethnographic and psychological approach. Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, UK, 2013, ISBN: 978-1-119-97422-2 (cloth), 250 pp., $104.95 Anyone reading Ruth Woods' Children's Moral Lives will likely be transported back in memory to their own childhood conflicts, tears, and exuberance. The book's vivaciousness proves its worth. But Richard Shweder's effusive jacket review, which compares Children's Moral Lives to Piaget's (1932/1965) The Moral Development of the Child, also invites an in-depth examination of the book's theoretical foundations. Children's Moral Lives is an ethnographic study of a multicultural primary school. Ruth Woods conducted her research as a participant observer at Woodnell Green Primary School in West London, spending hundreds of hours in classrooms and on the playground. Over time, the children came to confide in her about their relations with each other and with the school authorities. The institutional values of the school were cosmopolitan, multicultural, and progressive. School rules embodied a strong anti-aggression, anti-bullying, anti-racist stance. The research areas that collectively inform Woods' discussions include social domain theory and research by Turiel, Nucci, Smetana, Killen, Wainryb and others; cultural psychology theory and research by Shweder, Mahapatra, Miller, and Much; and social intuitionist theory by Haidt, Joseph, and others. The topics that the book covers include harm and aggression; exclusion; loyalty; racism; negotiations between student and staff about the meaning of “moral” events; and children's morality in cultural context. This choice is determined to some degree by her data; it is also non-committal, theoretically speaking. Hence, some topics are defined as moral in accord with social domain theory, including harm, exclusion, and racism. Loyalty is defined as moral by cultural psychologists and moral intuitionists (e.g., Shweder and Haidt) but not by social domain theorists. I highly value the books' observations and interpretations. However, as I will explain later in my views on the chapter on loyalty, I believe that more adequate tools for analysis could be obtained from social domain theory than from the alternatives. Aggression and the “anti-harm culture” are the primary focus of the book. Its treatment of tensions between the school's anti-aggression rules and the children's culture of play-fighting display the strengths of Woods' sensitive methodology. Many of the children at the school found joy and solidarity in roughhousing. Very often, play-fighting involved willing participants. How the children interpreted “aggressive” events depended on their robustness and on their relations with the initiator. The children negotiated with teachers to try to legitimize their play-fighting. Sometimes a sensitive child felt hurt by another child's attempts to engage them; sometimes, a child engaged in deception to try to avoid punishment. These case studies make it clear that play-fighting is more than fun. It contributes to the development of physical and psychological tolerance, subtle verbal communication, understanding of facial and body
cues, social bonding, and theory of mind. One function of play-fighting is to build the foundations for a lived morality, one of magnanimity, tolerance, generosity and courage that support moral principles in everyday interactions. Paradoxically, then, this kind of behavior could just as well be called “moral play” as “play-fighting”. It develops moral understandings by exploring invaluable distinctions between fun, tolerable roughhousing and cruel, harmful aggression. Such naturalistic observations of the microgenetics of moral development are an important contribution to the field. Another main topic of the book is loyalty in girls' friendships (Chapter 5), which was deemed problematic by teachers because they saw it as possessive and as limiting girls' freedoms. The theoretical question that reflects the teachers' intuitive evaluation is whether loyalty is indeed a moral value. Turiel (1983) defends a strict definition of morality as involving welfare/harm, justice, and rights. According to domain criteria, this particular form of loyalty is a non-universal value, applied only to an in-group, and involves personal preferences; it is therefore personal or social organizational. The social domain perspective corresponds with the views of the teachers, who apparently see a strong element of personal interest in the girls' attempts to elicit (even to coerce) “loyal” behavior from their friends. The anthropologist Shweder and the moral intuitionist Haidt count as moral all of the above, as well as respect for authority, purity, and loyalty. Woods defines morality as those values that were important to the children she studied, seemingly without considering that we all have important values that are difficult to think of as moral: personal comfort, safety, and gain; status; and inclusion. The data in the chapter on loyalty provide a picture of shifting affiliations, status-seeking, and insecurities arising when one friend was “disloyal” to another. Insistence on “shared enemies” promoted hostilities between alliances, eroding children's independence of choice. These observations of “loyalty” can only make the reader wonder how on earth it could be considered a moral phenomenon, even considering its reciprocal and affiliative elements. This type of loyalty is very different from Piaget's (1932) description of solidarity amongst the Swiss boys whom he observed, and which he held to be one of the affective foundations of moral development in children. Like loyalty, solidarity, according to Piaget, is affiliative, arising from peer interactions, not from authority. But the two are very different. The example that Piaget references is the refusal of a class of boys to single out and name one of their group as guilty of some misdemeanor, choosing instead to accept a group detention after school. Hence solidarity applies to an entire group; there is an impersonal nature to it that is an early kind of objectivity. Further comparing Piaget's solidarity to Woods' loyalty, the former tends towards equilibration and stable relationships, rather than privilege and tension. Piaget terms solidarity the ground from which autonomous justice emerges.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.appdev.2015.03.001 0193-3973/© 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.
Please cite this article as: Day, K., Generations and moral progress in culture and cultural theory, Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.appdev.2015.03.001
2
Book review
Hence grouping the two phenomena together, as suggested by cultural psychological theory, is problematic. Regardless of whether the problem is approached via children's feelings, the teachers' intuitive discomfort, or social domain analyses, it is difficult to justify loyalty as a moral value. Both its internal consequences (hurt, anxiety, and restriction of personal choice) and its external consequences (tensions, hostility, and manipulation) weigh against it. Yet all of this does not lead Woods to reconsider her classification of loyalty as a moral value or her own loyalty to the broad categorizations of cultural psychology. As already noted, I find these case studies richly informative. But I looked for a discussion of the problems of loyalty as a moral value that I did not find. Yet, social domain analyses can be very profitably applied to naturalistic events such as loyalty, analyzing them as mixed-domain events. My study of South African Zulu adolescents shows that their complex traditional values yield naturally, and profitably, to social domain analyses (Day, 2014). Naturalistic data often brings to light mixed-domain phenomena, such as the girls' loyalty at Woodwell Green, that are indeed important — because children find them so and because of their developmental outcomes, whether they are moral or not. These phenomena may be missed by theorists who arrive at a setting with a fixed agenda. Hence, formal interview and naturalistic methodologies are complementary. In places, Children's Moral Lives falls prey to certain theoretical ambiguities in attempting to coordinate with established anthropological theory. One example is the descriptions of the children's cultural origins. Woods provides a detailed account of an ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse population including immigrants and indigenous English children; Somalis and Arabs; Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians; speaking English, Farsi, Gujarati, and Hindi. Yet the conclusion of this detailed description is startling in its reductionism: “the book asks how Western children's moral experiences are influenced by the culture in which they are growing up.” Surely, neither the microsystems nor the macrosystem of these children can be fruitfully characterized as “Western”! Living in London should leave Woods in little doubt that “the West” is not what it once was. More now than ever, cultural theorists must live with the fact that most people do not live in homogeneous “Western” or “non-Western” cultures; societies' moral roots are increasingly cosmopolitan, informed by Martin Luther King, Gandhi, and reconciliation projects in Rwanda and South Africa, as well as their own local customs. The book depicts the anti-aggression movement as Western, with its origins in Norway and the United Kingdom. But the contemporary antiharm movement is surely global. It includes anti-rape demonstrations in India, anti-child abuse education in South Africa, and media concerns about the high rates of violence on Native American reservations in the U.S. and Canada. Many if not most of the political icons of non-violence – including King, Gandhi, and Mandela – enjoyed multicultural intellectual traditions. But from this book readers could easily generalize the differences between children and staff as non-Western vs. Western, or working class vs. middle-class. I would argue that these differences are best seen in terms of historical moral progress and its interactions with individual moral development. Given their multiethnic origins, would the children bring their home values to bear on moral issues at school? Woods ran eighteen tests looking for links between ethnicity, religion, and moral topics such as aggression, intention, and allocation of blame, and failed to find any significant relationships. When she speculates that children are largely occupied with constructing moral meaning from their peer relations, her findings echo those of Piaget. Yet, she does not offer any explanation for why children from such different backgrounds do not seem to express the moral orientations characteristic of their own cultures. One answer may be that children are as capable of being bicultural as bilingual; they construct codes of behavior for more than one context
without being troubled about inconsistencies. These children may be adapting by applying different values in different settings. Without knowledge of their home settings, we cannot be sure whether the children are truly “Westernized” or are adapting to multiple values via multiple “bi-cultural” moral codes. Another possibility, based on both social domain research (MilnitskySapiro, Turiel, & Nucci, 2006; Lins-Dyer & Nucci, 2007) and moral intuitionist research (Haidt, 2012), is that the Woodnell Green parents could share more sociomoral values based on socioeconomic commonalities than differences based on religion and ethnicity: for example, working class parents tend to rely more upon convention and to delay allowing autonomy to their adolescent children than do middle class parents, regardless of nationality. For me, the book reaffirms that there is not much to be gained by clinging to the Western/non-Western dichotomy. This book is a wonderful description of children making social and moral choices in a highly diverse and changeable setting that has its own unique characteristics and ought not to be reduced to a study of “Westernness,” if such a thing can be said to exist. Lastly, problems emerge from Woods' position on the directionality of moral development — that is, whether it stems from cultural values or is constructed through children's interpretations of their social experiences. While she recognizes this issue as fundamental to her work it is hard to know what her final position is. She often implies that children are passive recipients of moral values, as in cultural psychology; elsewhere, however, she applies constructivist terms such as the prioritization of values (p. 91) or the weighing of concerns (p. 108), implying that children develop via conscious choices. Woods' excellent descriptions of the schoolyard characterize “the culture of harm” as more of a process than a conflict between “child” morality and a fixed “cultural” norm. It involved subtle negotiations of individual differences, statuses, and working- and middle-class norms, along with universals such as the developmental pathway of moral play and the acceptance that “real” harm is wrong. Where she accepts classical assumptions about “culture” as a fixed, deterministic entity, she has, I think, done a disservice to her own hard work. In Chapter 7, she discusses the implications of her research for understanding physical aggression in children, suggesting that rules banning aggression could take into account the importance of aggression in working-class children's socialization as they strive to establish status relations. Her argument that the adult culture ought to accommodate children's enculturated psychological needs, going beyond the simple belief that all aggression is negative, suggests the value of a bidirectional conception of moral progress that acknowledges the ongoing contribution of both children's and adults' understandings. In this respect Woods lends support to an idea promoted in the psychological literature by Erikson (1968), which is that children's moral development helps to drive moral progress on a wider, historical plane. I think that it is impossible to engage in the cultural study of moral development without at least a peripheral exploration of the historical context. Woods pays much attention to contemporary educational views about aggression and the need for adults to intervene in children's moral education. I think that consolidating her views on directionality and historical context will make her work more powerful and more progressive. I remain in agreement with Shweder that everyone should read Children's Moral Lives; it is lively, novel, and insightful. I hope that Ruth Woods continues to use her sensitivities and good sense in her ethnographic study of moral development. However, I maintain that it is vital for any moral theorist to define morality with care and to take a position on the perennial question of whether culture is largely deterministic, or whether culture and individual development are reciprocal. I hope that Woods addresses these problems, and remain confident that she, like the children, will contribute to generational progress in her conceptions of culture and morality.
Book review
References Day, K. (2014). The right to literacy and cultural change: Zulu adolescents in postapartheid rural South Africa. Cognitive Development, 29, 81–94. Erikson, E. (1968). Identity: Youth, and crisis. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. New York: Pantheon. Lins-Dyer, M. T., & Nucci, L. (2007). The impact of social class and social cognitive domain on northeastern Brazilian mothers' and daughters' conceptions of parental control. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 31, 105–114. Milnitsky-Sapiro, C., Turiel, E., & Nucci, L. (2006). Brazilian adolescents' conceptions of autonomy and parental authority. Cognitive Development, 21, 317–331. Piaget, J. (1965). The moral judgment of the child. New York: The Free Press (Original work published 1932).
3
Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kathryn Day 2717 Derby Street #1, Berkeley, CA 94705-1338, USA E-mail address: [email protected].
Available online xxxx