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German catholics in the third reich: Nationalism and religion
History of European Ideas, Vol. 16, No. 1-3, pp. 83-90, 1993 Printed in Great Britain
0191--6599/93 $6.00+0.00 © 1993 Pergamon Press Ltd
GERMAN CATHOLICS IN THE THIRD REICH: NATIONALISM AND RELIGION DONALD J. DIETRICH*
In light of the seeming Collapse from 1933-1945 of the historically accepted value structure, attention has increasingly been riveted on this era and its murderous centerpiece, the Holocaust. Scholarly works 1have helped expose the reactions of clerical leaders to Nazism and their less than valorous responses, 2 although even in the midst of compromise heroic reactions were still nurtured) Publicly, however, the Church as a religious institution, guided by its hierarchy and theologians, supported German nationalism, even while critiquing the Nazi party and its nefarious Weltanschauung. As Germans, Catholics were nationalists and, since the Kulturkampf, particularly sensitive to being considered 'outsiders'? Politicised after 1871, German Catholics and their leaders matured in an antisemitic, antiliberal, authoritarian, and nationalistic sociopolitical environment. They had been rewarded for their patriotism, even though their religious affiliation was politically suspect. Hence, their learning experiences, attitudinal reinforcers, and their discriminatory abilities, finely honed in the political battles of Wilhelmine Germany, had basically placed them by 1918 in the mainstream of German historical development with their fellow citizens. They had won a hard-fought battle and then had to deal with the National Socialist party led by Hitler who hoped to redefine German society in accordance with his own historically rooted
Weltanschauung. 5 Whether Weimar Catholics identified with a democratic constitution or longed for the second Reich, they were highly charged patriots, favored at least a latent antisemitism, and did not seem to object by 1933, to an authoritarian government as long as the Church's institutional life could be safeguarded. Like so many others, Catholics were convinced that religious faith could be maintained separately from political loyalties. In fact, Hitler probably generated more intense fervor for his cause than the bishops could generate for their own anti-Nazi, pro-Germany perspective, which was too subtle and ambivalent. Given the political socialisation process after 1871 and the eventful years fraught with anxiety after 1918, not surprisingly the bulk of the Catholic laity and their clergy accepted the inevitable Hitler regime after 30 January 1933.6 In March 1933 the rapproachement, which would lead to the Concordat between the Nazis and the Church, had already become discernible. Nazi and German Catholic propaganda were successful because their key elements *Department of Theology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167, U.S.A.
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corresponded to the fundamental beliefs of their audiences. Both stressed the importance of the 'national community' and so representatives from both sides had a common basis for discussion and negotiation. The comprehension of similarities between the Nazis and the Catholic leaders is perhaps a more complex intellectual task than the understanding of their differences would be, and this may well be partially the reason why the exact roles and goals of the Concordat negotiators have been debated for years. 7 The Bishops' Fulda Conference issued its annual letter (3 June 1933). Typical of the future, it was both conciliatory and admonitory toward the government. It supported nationalism, but warned of excesses. It accepted the fact that strong authority was sometimes necessary, but cautioned against the unnecessary curtailment of human liberty. It attacked the Nazi proposed sterilisation law, similar to that earlier proposed in Prussia in 1932, and criticised racial persecution. But then it continued: 'The fact that we German bishops make the above enumerated demands does not imply that they conceal a mental reservation to the state'. 8 Once the Concordat had been approved by the Vatican and the Reich,Adolf Cardinal Bertram, Chair of the Bishops' Conference, coupled his thanks with the urgent wish that the provisions of the agreement would be carried out by Hitler in such a way that the Church could co-operate in 'the promotion of faith in God, morality and obedience to the leading authorities', which would redound with blessings for the welfare of people and fatherland. 9 A letter from Michael Cardinal Faulhaber of Munich to Hitler highlights the political attitudes of German Catholicism and reflects the episcopal ambiguity: 'What the old parliaments and parties did not accomplish in sixty years, your far-seeing statesmanship realized in six months of world-historical significance'.~° The Concordat, as it would be seen subsequently, offered a viable vehicle for protest, but not for resistance. Theological support was quickly forthcoming as well. Michael Schmaus, professor of dogmatic theology at Mtinster, reminded his readers that the German bishops would not have revoked the ban on membership in the Nazi party if they had thought that Catholic and all National Socialist ideas were necessarily in conflict. Whereas Catholic and Liberal thinking could never be reconciled, he continued, Catholicism and National Socialism could and should march hand in hand; there was a congruence of ideas. The new stress on authority in the state represented a counterpart in the natural sphere to the Church's authority in the supernatural realm. In the past Catholics had viewed the fate Of the people, anchored in blood and soil, as a manifestation of divine providence, and for that reason they would also have to share 'the just concern for maintaining the purity of the blood, the basis for the spiritual structure of the people'. H The world-renowned theologian, Karl Adam, argued that not only were National Socialism and Catholicism not in conflict with one another, but belonged together as nature and grace. Hitler was the people's chancellor. Euphorically, Adam continued: 'Now he stands before us, he whom the voices of our poets and sages have summoned, the liberator of the German genius. He had removed the blindfolds from our eyes and, through all political, economic,
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social, and confessional covers, has enabled us to see and love again the one essential thing: our unity of blood, our G e r m a n self, the Homo Germanus'. 12To his credit, this article was never completed. Following the 'Night of the Long Knives' (30 June 1934), which they did not condemn, the bishops did become increasingly disenchanted with the regime. The problem until 1945 now became one of supporting traditional nationalistic values and simultaneously criticising Nazi paganism. The bishops had to remain 'good Germans' and also opponents of Nazism. 13 F r o m 1934 to 1938, each compromise merely reinforced the Church's capitulation to the regime and signaled the laity to support the Church as an institution by not mounting organised resistance. Such Catholic leaders as Karl Joseph Cardinal Schulte continued following their Ffihrer despite their increasing lack of confidence in his reliability. 'Even where we repulse inroads upon the rights of the Church, we want to respect the rights of the state in its proper jurisdiction and to see also the good and great elements in the work of the Ffihrer. TM Following the 1937 appearance of Mit Brennender Sorge the Nazis intensified their assaults on the Church by renewing and intensifying currency and morality trials. The official position of the episopacy toward the regime may be labled Eingabenpolitik, i.e. petition politics, a patriotism combined with protest approach, which describes the notes directed toward the amelioration of a dispute or the fulfillment of one of the articles of the Concordat. The approach was basically unworkable after 1936, because the official notes were only moved through bureaucratic channels slowly and obstructed or derailed along the Way. 15 During the war years, there is sufficient evidence that G e r m a n Catholics would not have received much support to resist openly their government, certainly not after June of 1941 and the 'crusade against Bolshevism' had been launched. The 1941 pastoral letter from the Bavarian bishops reflects the approach of the episcopacy during this trying period: We Germans constitute one great community of life and destiny; we Christians constitute a community of belief in Christ and the love of Christ. And if the commandment to love is always the greatest of all, this is especially true in times of danger and need .... To be united in love and in the service of the Vaterlandis our wish so that we may form one single community of sacrifice and effort for the protection of the Heimat . . . . To the free recognition of our religion guaranteed us in the Concordat belongs the freedom to remain loyal to the faith and to defend it in every situation and circumstance, to attend Mass and to receive the sacraments, to educate and instruct our children and young people in the Catholic faith as is required of parents of clergy as a matter of duty and conscience. The freer and happier men are in the fulfilling of their duty to God, the more sacred to them will be the duties to the Vaterland. 16 Unfortunately, the very protest feature of the letter actually added emphasis to the patriotic moral content; the Catholic who heard this call to duty could easily conclude that, despite the antireligious aspects and policies of the Nazi government, the official leaders of the Church continued to stand behind the national effort. Theologians as well, although less universally than their episcopal superiors,
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supported the Reich. In Theologie und Glaube (1934), Konrad Algermissen, for example, maintained that he perceived a synthesis emerging between Volkstum and Christentum. Just as the renewal of the Volk came from Christianity, so a vibrant Christianity was internally to develop within and grow from the living essence of the Volk. Part of the rebirth of the spirit had to be rooted in race and blood. Algermissen did, however, insist that Article 24 of the Nazi program was not totally valid since the Volkstum could not be the ultimate source of value, which in reality had to be God. Essentially, the Volk and Christianity belonged together as nature and supernature. 17In 1936 Emil Ritter and Kuno Brombacher issued a short work that reflected the thought patterns of those Catholics still at ease with the Nazis. They placed the blame for their contemporary problems of the Church in Germany upon Bismarck and the liberals responsible for the Kulturkampf, which resulted in the isolation of Catholics who had subsequently been forced to organise themselves socially and politically. 18 As the shaper of moral identity, the bearer of moral tradition, and the community of moral deliberation, the Church has historically tried to influence individuals. Moral identity, however, Would be difficult to create without the ethical deliberation that occurs when abstract principles are applied to concrete cases.19 Such an overt confrontation with the regime failed to materialise, leaving Catholics in a state of ambiguity due to the unclear signals sent by both the German episcopate, and, with the exception of Mit Brennender Sorge, by the Pope. In essence, Hitler himself claimed absolute moral authority. Ultimately what resulted was the process of the externalisation of conscience and obedience to authority. The way was being paved for the Holocaust as a social policy, a biological solution to the national problems, s°
II During the Weimar years, the German bishops preached against the Nazi glorification of race and blood, but generally had almost nothing specific to say about the widespread antisemitic propaganda. 21 Almost without exception, the bishops tried to protect non-Aryan Catholics, for whom the Church felt a special responsibility. In 1936, for example, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs requested statistics about the number of Jews converted to the Church in the years 1900-1935. Cardinal Bertram agreed to comply with the request. 22 But when the ministry later sought permission to consult the diocesan files on conversion and mixed marriages, the Church withheld the consent only 'on the grounds of pastoral secrecy'. Similarly in 1938, Bertram refused to open the diocesan archives to researchers working for a new state institute for the study of the Jewish question. As an institution, however, the Church extended little aid or sympathy to other than the non-Aryan Catholics throughout this period. Even during the Kristallnacht of November 1938, the bishops remained silent in the face of burning synagogues and the first roundup of the Jews.53 The deportations as well caused no adverse reactions. 24 Even the highly respected Jesuit theologian, Gustav Gundlach, could make a plea for moderate antisemitism. Writing in a reference work, Gundlach argued that a political antisemitism
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fighting the Jews' 'exaggerated and harmful influence' was permitted as long as it utilised morally admissable means. 25 Nazi antisemitism was implemented into planned extermination sometime during the spring of 1941 with Hitler's approval and incitement. 26By 1943, a few German bishops seemed to have understood exactly what the judgment of history would be if the Catholic Church remained silent. With a clear grasp of the historical moment, these bishops predicted that 'the world will not understand if we do not loudly raise our voices against the deprivation of the rights of innocent people'. 27 Acting for the entire episcopate, however, Bertram would not publicly accuse the Nazis of genocide. 2s Nationalism continued to characterise the frame of mind in which Bertram, in the name of all the German bishops couched his dealin.gs with the Nazi governmental and party officials. Thus, the cardinal urged them to allow church services for men who had fallen at the front and after night time bombing raids on the grounds that this would bolster resolve among all Germans to continue supporting the war effort. 29 Even after 1945, members of the hierarchy resisted punishing individual Nazis. On 31 December 1946, Archbishop Joseph Frings of Cologne criticised the allies for what he saw as attempts to hold the German people as a whole responsible for the crimes of the Nazi era. 3° That, of course, could be a reasonable position, but the Cologne prelate also was not enthusiastic about the Nuremberg Trials, only recently concluded. In fact, Frings opposed the entire concept of bringing war criminals to justice. Only God could determine guilt. Frings concluded that the Allies were following a 'pagan and naive optimism' for taking it upon themselves to make judgments on guilt or innocence. 31 The actions and words of the Catholic bishops reflect the postwar nationalism and its link to the Third Reich nationalism. Their statements supported Germans who had no wish to assume responsibility for Nazi crimes, just as they provided a 'cover' for those Catholics who had not wanted to resist the Third Reich. The Allies responded by condemning the first post-1945 Fulda letter as nationalistic. 32Unfortunately, the episcopal documents and theological tracts, attacking Nazi paganism, are abstract and do not suggest concrete courses of action. But such reflections as those on justice, the dignity of the human person, and the sanctity of the family did help preserve intact for the future some of the fundamental values historically at the base of European civilisation. The trumpets of politics and war, however, overwhelmed the subtle reflections on natural law and human dignity, offered by such scholars as Max Pribilla and Otto Schilling, and, finally, by Gundlach as well. 33
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The use of mass violence to create a society that conforms to radical ideological principles tempts all modern governments. Alerted by their experiences in the Third Reich with its exaggerated nationalistic and racist claims, churches in general should now be prepared to declare publicly their consciences against any misuse of power, no matter how seemingly trivial and insignificant such political acts may seem to be. Acceptance of authority and the
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desire to be 'true' Germans crippled Catholic resistance, at least institutionally. Unfortunately, and this German case does not prove to be the exception, the Catholic Church has historically and consistently been tempted to adapt to the world, to view its success as the imminence of God's kingdom, and to free itself from persecution. 34 During the Hitlerzeit, Catholic leaders and many in their flocks sacrificed a complete commitment to their normative value system by rigidly adhering to German nationalistic ideals as well as by invoking antisemitic terminology and stereotypes to emphasise their adherence to the German Volk. They sacrificed the meaning of their legitimate moral roots. Their response to the challenges lacked courage, but is certainly comprehensible given the unprecedented and unique experience that they were facing. Hindsight is always better than foresight. Wrestling with the questions posed in the Third Reich, German Catholics and their experiences can help us focus more precisely on such issues as those of state power, bureaucracy, human rights, and individualism versus collectivism, which have yet to be faced fully in our own civilisation, still characterised by nationalistic models of organisation. Donald J. Dietrich Boston College
NOTES 1. Theodore S. Hamerow, 'Review Essay: Guilt, Redemption, and Writing German History', American HistoricalReview 88 (1983): 53-72; Konrad Jarausch, 'Illiberalism and Beyond: German History in Search of a Paradigm' Journal of Modern History 55 (1983): 268-284: David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, Mythen deutscher Geschichtschreibung! Die geschreite buergerliche Revolution (Frankfurt, 1980). 2. Guenther Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (New York, 1964); Gordon Zahn, German Catholics and Hitler's Wars: A Study in Social Control (New York, 1969); John Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches (New York, 1968); Donald J. Dietrich, Catholic Citizens in the Third Reich: Psycho-Socia ! Principles and Moral Reasoning (New Brunswick, N.J, 1988). 3. Donald J. Dietrich, 'Catholic Resistance in the Third Reich', Holocaust and Genocide Studies 3 (1988): 171-186; see, Heinz Boberach, (ed.), Berichte der SD undder Gestapo iiber Kirchen und Kirchenvolk in Deutschland, 1934-1944 (Mainz, 1971). 4. Ronald Ross, The Beleagured Tower." The Dilemma of Political Catholicism in Wilhelmine Germany (Notre Dam, 1976);David Blackbourn, ClassReligion andLocal Politics in Wilhelmine Germany: The Centre Party in Wiirttemberg before 1914 (New Haven, 1980). 5. Douglas Hatfield, 'Kulturkampf; The Relationship of Church and State and the Failure of German Political Reform', Journal of Church andState 23 (1981): 465--484; Hans Rost, Die Paritfit und die deutschen Katholiken (Cologne, 1914); Arthur W. Staats, Social Behaviorism (Homewood, IL, 1975), pp. 45, 63. 6. Mary Alice Gallin, 'The Cardinal and the State: Faulhaber and the Third Reich' Journal of Church and State 12 (1970): 385--404; Karl Dietrich Bracher et aL, Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (Cologne, 1962), pp. 22-77; Ernst Wolfgang B6ckenf6rde 'German Catholicism in 1933' Cross Currents 11 (1961): 300.
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7. Howard J. Ehrlich, The Social Psychology of Prejudice: A Systematic Theoretical Review and Propositional Inventory of the American Social Psychological Study of Prejudice (New York, 1973), p. 149. 8. Osservatore Romano (21 June 1933). 9. John Jay Hughs, 'The Pope's "Pact with Hitler": Betrayal or Self-Defense', Journal of Church and State 17 (1975): 76; Alfons Kupper, Staatliche Akten fiber die Reichskonkordatsverhandlungen, 1933 (Mainz, 1969), pp. 290ff.; Bernard Stasiewski, Akten deutscher Bisch6fe fiber die Lage der Kirche 1933-1945 1, 1933-1934 (Mainz, 1968), pp. 30ff., 239-248. 10. Ludwig Volk, Der Bayerische Episkopat und der Nationalsozialismus 1930-1934 (Mainz, 1965), pp. 2-6; A, Kupper, 'Zur Geschichte des Reichskondordats', Stimmen der Zeit 163 (1958-59): 367; Kupper, p. 236. 11. Michael Schmaus, Begegnungen zwischen katholischem Christentum und nationalsozialistischer Weltanschauung, 2nd ed. (Miinster, 1934), pp. 7, 23, 29, 42. 12. Karl Adam, 'Deutsches Volkstum und katholisches Christentum', Theologische Quartalschrift 114 (1933): 42, 59. 13. Bracher, Machtergreifung, pp. 897ff.; Conway, p. 94; Lewy, p. 171; Stasiewski, Akten, pp. 704-705. 14. Wilhelm Corsten (ed.), K6lner Aktenstficke. Zur Lage der katholischen Kirche in Deutschland, 1933-1945 (Cologne, 1949), pp. 156-161. 15. Zahn, German Catholics, p. 62; E. Jackson Baur, 'Opinion Changes in a Public Controversy'. Public Opinion Quarterly 26 (1962): 226; David Reide, 'The Official Attitude of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy in Germany toward National Socialism, 1933-1945', Ph.D. dissertation (State University of Iowa, 1957). 16. Amtsblatt ffir die Erzdi6zese Mfinchen und Freising (25 February 1941), pp. 29-30. 17. Konrad Algermissen, 'Christentum und Germanentum', Theologie und Glaube 26 (1934): 302-303,312, 319, 321-322, 328. 18. Emil Ritter and Kuno Brombacher, Sendschreiben Katholischen Deutschen, 2nd ed. (MUnster, 1936). 19. Jeremy Miller, 'Ethics within an Ecclesial Context', Angelicum 57 (1980): 32-44; Ludwig Volk, Akten Deutscher Bisch6fe fiber die Lage der Kirche, 1936-1939 (Mainz, 1981). 20. John M. Steiner, 'The SS Yesterday and Today: A Sociopsychological View' in Joel E. Dimsdale, ed. Survivors, Victims and Perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust (Washington, DC, 1980), p. 423. 21. Faulhaber, pp. 13, 19; Mfinchener KatholischeKirchenzeitung, No. 31 (31 July 1932), p. 332; Der Rfitlischwur 114, No. 1 (1924): 4. 22. Bertram's letter to the German bishops (14 October 1936) in Lewy, p. 282. 23. Vicar General Buchweiser to Kerrl (18 November 1937) in Lewy, p. 63; Leon Poliakov, Harvest of Hate. The Nazi Program for the Destruction of the Jews of Europe (New York, 1974), p. 17; Bertram to Thierack (11 November 1942) in Lewy, pp. 288-289. 24. Lewy, p. 295. 25. Gustav Gundlach, S.J., 'Antisemitismus', Lexikonffir Theologie undKirche, 2nd rev. ed. (Freiburg, 1930), 1: 504. After the downfall of Nazism, the new edition of this work has replaced Gundlach's piece with an article that condemns Nazism. 26. Christopher Browning, Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution (New York, 1985). 27. Frank Buscher and Michael Phayer, 'German Catholic Bishops and the Holocaust, 1940-1952' German Studies Review 11 (1988): 467. 28. VKZ Reihe A, Ver6ffentlichen der Kommission ffir Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 38 (Bonn), p. 350, footnote 2; Bertram to Prange, the Vicar General of the Berlin Diocese
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(17 April 1944). 29. VKZ Reihe A Vol. 38, 255-256; Bertram to Muhs, Breslau (15 October 1943). 30. Frederic Spotts, The Churches and Politics in Germany (Middletown, Conn., 1973), pp. 89-116. 31. Friedrich Rothenpieler, Der Gedanke einer Kollektivschuld in juristischer Sicht (Berlin, 1982), pp. 208-209. 32. Verena Rotzenhart-Vieha, 'The German Reaction to the American Occupation, 1944-1947', (Diss., University of California-Santa Barbara, 1980), pp. 155-156. 33. See, for example, Max Pribilla, 'Christliche Haltung', Stimmen der Zeit 135 (1939): 169-179; Otto Schilling, 'Das Prinzip der Moral', Theologische Quartalschrift (1938): 419-426; Dietrich, 'Catholic Citizens', pp. 171-186. 34. Hans K/ing, The Council." Reform and Reunion, trans. Cecily Hastings (New York, 1961), pp. 21-22.
0191--6599/93 $6.00+0.00 © 1993 Pergamon Press Ltd
GERMAN CATHOLICS IN THE THIRD REICH: NATIONALISM AND RELIGION DONALD J. DIETRICH*
In light of the seeming Collapse from 1933-1945 of the historically accepted value structure, attention has increasingly been riveted on this era and its murderous centerpiece, the Holocaust. Scholarly works 1have helped expose the reactions of clerical leaders to Nazism and their less than valorous responses, 2 although even in the midst of compromise heroic reactions were still nurtured) Publicly, however, the Church as a religious institution, guided by its hierarchy and theologians, supported German nationalism, even while critiquing the Nazi party and its nefarious Weltanschauung. As Germans, Catholics were nationalists and, since the Kulturkampf, particularly sensitive to being considered 'outsiders'? Politicised after 1871, German Catholics and their leaders matured in an antisemitic, antiliberal, authoritarian, and nationalistic sociopolitical environment. They had been rewarded for their patriotism, even though their religious affiliation was politically suspect. Hence, their learning experiences, attitudinal reinforcers, and their discriminatory abilities, finely honed in the political battles of Wilhelmine Germany, had basically placed them by 1918 in the mainstream of German historical development with their fellow citizens. They had won a hard-fought battle and then had to deal with the National Socialist party led by Hitler who hoped to redefine German society in accordance with his own historically rooted
Weltanschauung. 5 Whether Weimar Catholics identified with a democratic constitution or longed for the second Reich, they were highly charged patriots, favored at least a latent antisemitism, and did not seem to object by 1933, to an authoritarian government as long as the Church's institutional life could be safeguarded. Like so many others, Catholics were convinced that religious faith could be maintained separately from political loyalties. In fact, Hitler probably generated more intense fervor for his cause than the bishops could generate for their own anti-Nazi, pro-Germany perspective, which was too subtle and ambivalent. Given the political socialisation process after 1871 and the eventful years fraught with anxiety after 1918, not surprisingly the bulk of the Catholic laity and their clergy accepted the inevitable Hitler regime after 30 January 1933.6 In March 1933 the rapproachement, which would lead to the Concordat between the Nazis and the Church, had already become discernible. Nazi and German Catholic propaganda were successful because their key elements *Department of Theology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167, U.S.A.
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corresponded to the fundamental beliefs of their audiences. Both stressed the importance of the 'national community' and so representatives from both sides had a common basis for discussion and negotiation. The comprehension of similarities between the Nazis and the Catholic leaders is perhaps a more complex intellectual task than the understanding of their differences would be, and this may well be partially the reason why the exact roles and goals of the Concordat negotiators have been debated for years. 7 The Bishops' Fulda Conference issued its annual letter (3 June 1933). Typical of the future, it was both conciliatory and admonitory toward the government. It supported nationalism, but warned of excesses. It accepted the fact that strong authority was sometimes necessary, but cautioned against the unnecessary curtailment of human liberty. It attacked the Nazi proposed sterilisation law, similar to that earlier proposed in Prussia in 1932, and criticised racial persecution. But then it continued: 'The fact that we German bishops make the above enumerated demands does not imply that they conceal a mental reservation to the state'. 8 Once the Concordat had been approved by the Vatican and the Reich,Adolf Cardinal Bertram, Chair of the Bishops' Conference, coupled his thanks with the urgent wish that the provisions of the agreement would be carried out by Hitler in such a way that the Church could co-operate in 'the promotion of faith in God, morality and obedience to the leading authorities', which would redound with blessings for the welfare of people and fatherland. 9 A letter from Michael Cardinal Faulhaber of Munich to Hitler highlights the political attitudes of German Catholicism and reflects the episcopal ambiguity: 'What the old parliaments and parties did not accomplish in sixty years, your far-seeing statesmanship realized in six months of world-historical significance'.~° The Concordat, as it would be seen subsequently, offered a viable vehicle for protest, but not for resistance. Theological support was quickly forthcoming as well. Michael Schmaus, professor of dogmatic theology at Mtinster, reminded his readers that the German bishops would not have revoked the ban on membership in the Nazi party if they had thought that Catholic and all National Socialist ideas were necessarily in conflict. Whereas Catholic and Liberal thinking could never be reconciled, he continued, Catholicism and National Socialism could and should march hand in hand; there was a congruence of ideas. The new stress on authority in the state represented a counterpart in the natural sphere to the Church's authority in the supernatural realm. In the past Catholics had viewed the fate Of the people, anchored in blood and soil, as a manifestation of divine providence, and for that reason they would also have to share 'the just concern for maintaining the purity of the blood, the basis for the spiritual structure of the people'. H The world-renowned theologian, Karl Adam, argued that not only were National Socialism and Catholicism not in conflict with one another, but belonged together as nature and grace. Hitler was the people's chancellor. Euphorically, Adam continued: 'Now he stands before us, he whom the voices of our poets and sages have summoned, the liberator of the German genius. He had removed the blindfolds from our eyes and, through all political, economic,
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social, and confessional covers, has enabled us to see and love again the one essential thing: our unity of blood, our G e r m a n self, the Homo Germanus'. 12To his credit, this article was never completed. Following the 'Night of the Long Knives' (30 June 1934), which they did not condemn, the bishops did become increasingly disenchanted with the regime. The problem until 1945 now became one of supporting traditional nationalistic values and simultaneously criticising Nazi paganism. The bishops had to remain 'good Germans' and also opponents of Nazism. 13 F r o m 1934 to 1938, each compromise merely reinforced the Church's capitulation to the regime and signaled the laity to support the Church as an institution by not mounting organised resistance. Such Catholic leaders as Karl Joseph Cardinal Schulte continued following their Ffihrer despite their increasing lack of confidence in his reliability. 'Even where we repulse inroads upon the rights of the Church, we want to respect the rights of the state in its proper jurisdiction and to see also the good and great elements in the work of the Ffihrer. TM Following the 1937 appearance of Mit Brennender Sorge the Nazis intensified their assaults on the Church by renewing and intensifying currency and morality trials. The official position of the episopacy toward the regime may be labled Eingabenpolitik, i.e. petition politics, a patriotism combined with protest approach, which describes the notes directed toward the amelioration of a dispute or the fulfillment of one of the articles of the Concordat. The approach was basically unworkable after 1936, because the official notes were only moved through bureaucratic channels slowly and obstructed or derailed along the Way. 15 During the war years, there is sufficient evidence that G e r m a n Catholics would not have received much support to resist openly their government, certainly not after June of 1941 and the 'crusade against Bolshevism' had been launched. The 1941 pastoral letter from the Bavarian bishops reflects the approach of the episcopacy during this trying period: We Germans constitute one great community of life and destiny; we Christians constitute a community of belief in Christ and the love of Christ. And if the commandment to love is always the greatest of all, this is especially true in times of danger and need .... To be united in love and in the service of the Vaterlandis our wish so that we may form one single community of sacrifice and effort for the protection of the Heimat . . . . To the free recognition of our religion guaranteed us in the Concordat belongs the freedom to remain loyal to the faith and to defend it in every situation and circumstance, to attend Mass and to receive the sacraments, to educate and instruct our children and young people in the Catholic faith as is required of parents of clergy as a matter of duty and conscience. The freer and happier men are in the fulfilling of their duty to God, the more sacred to them will be the duties to the Vaterland. 16 Unfortunately, the very protest feature of the letter actually added emphasis to the patriotic moral content; the Catholic who heard this call to duty could easily conclude that, despite the antireligious aspects and policies of the Nazi government, the official leaders of the Church continued to stand behind the national effort. Theologians as well, although less universally than their episcopal superiors,
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supported the Reich. In Theologie und Glaube (1934), Konrad Algermissen, for example, maintained that he perceived a synthesis emerging between Volkstum and Christentum. Just as the renewal of the Volk came from Christianity, so a vibrant Christianity was internally to develop within and grow from the living essence of the Volk. Part of the rebirth of the spirit had to be rooted in race and blood. Algermissen did, however, insist that Article 24 of the Nazi program was not totally valid since the Volkstum could not be the ultimate source of value, which in reality had to be God. Essentially, the Volk and Christianity belonged together as nature and supernature. 17In 1936 Emil Ritter and Kuno Brombacher issued a short work that reflected the thought patterns of those Catholics still at ease with the Nazis. They placed the blame for their contemporary problems of the Church in Germany upon Bismarck and the liberals responsible for the Kulturkampf, which resulted in the isolation of Catholics who had subsequently been forced to organise themselves socially and politically. 18 As the shaper of moral identity, the bearer of moral tradition, and the community of moral deliberation, the Church has historically tried to influence individuals. Moral identity, however, Would be difficult to create without the ethical deliberation that occurs when abstract principles are applied to concrete cases.19 Such an overt confrontation with the regime failed to materialise, leaving Catholics in a state of ambiguity due to the unclear signals sent by both the German episcopate, and, with the exception of Mit Brennender Sorge, by the Pope. In essence, Hitler himself claimed absolute moral authority. Ultimately what resulted was the process of the externalisation of conscience and obedience to authority. The way was being paved for the Holocaust as a social policy, a biological solution to the national problems, s°
II During the Weimar years, the German bishops preached against the Nazi glorification of race and blood, but generally had almost nothing specific to say about the widespread antisemitic propaganda. 21 Almost without exception, the bishops tried to protect non-Aryan Catholics, for whom the Church felt a special responsibility. In 1936, for example, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs requested statistics about the number of Jews converted to the Church in the years 1900-1935. Cardinal Bertram agreed to comply with the request. 22 But when the ministry later sought permission to consult the diocesan files on conversion and mixed marriages, the Church withheld the consent only 'on the grounds of pastoral secrecy'. Similarly in 1938, Bertram refused to open the diocesan archives to researchers working for a new state institute for the study of the Jewish question. As an institution, however, the Church extended little aid or sympathy to other than the non-Aryan Catholics throughout this period. Even during the Kristallnacht of November 1938, the bishops remained silent in the face of burning synagogues and the first roundup of the Jews.53 The deportations as well caused no adverse reactions. 24 Even the highly respected Jesuit theologian, Gustav Gundlach, could make a plea for moderate antisemitism. Writing in a reference work, Gundlach argued that a political antisemitism
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fighting the Jews' 'exaggerated and harmful influence' was permitted as long as it utilised morally admissable means. 25 Nazi antisemitism was implemented into planned extermination sometime during the spring of 1941 with Hitler's approval and incitement. 26By 1943, a few German bishops seemed to have understood exactly what the judgment of history would be if the Catholic Church remained silent. With a clear grasp of the historical moment, these bishops predicted that 'the world will not understand if we do not loudly raise our voices against the deprivation of the rights of innocent people'. 27 Acting for the entire episcopate, however, Bertram would not publicly accuse the Nazis of genocide. 2s Nationalism continued to characterise the frame of mind in which Bertram, in the name of all the German bishops couched his dealin.gs with the Nazi governmental and party officials. Thus, the cardinal urged them to allow church services for men who had fallen at the front and after night time bombing raids on the grounds that this would bolster resolve among all Germans to continue supporting the war effort. 29 Even after 1945, members of the hierarchy resisted punishing individual Nazis. On 31 December 1946, Archbishop Joseph Frings of Cologne criticised the allies for what he saw as attempts to hold the German people as a whole responsible for the crimes of the Nazi era. 3° That, of course, could be a reasonable position, but the Cologne prelate also was not enthusiastic about the Nuremberg Trials, only recently concluded. In fact, Frings opposed the entire concept of bringing war criminals to justice. Only God could determine guilt. Frings concluded that the Allies were following a 'pagan and naive optimism' for taking it upon themselves to make judgments on guilt or innocence. 31 The actions and words of the Catholic bishops reflect the postwar nationalism and its link to the Third Reich nationalism. Their statements supported Germans who had no wish to assume responsibility for Nazi crimes, just as they provided a 'cover' for those Catholics who had not wanted to resist the Third Reich. The Allies responded by condemning the first post-1945 Fulda letter as nationalistic. 32Unfortunately, the episcopal documents and theological tracts, attacking Nazi paganism, are abstract and do not suggest concrete courses of action. But such reflections as those on justice, the dignity of the human person, and the sanctity of the family did help preserve intact for the future some of the fundamental values historically at the base of European civilisation. The trumpets of politics and war, however, overwhelmed the subtle reflections on natural law and human dignity, offered by such scholars as Max Pribilla and Otto Schilling, and, finally, by Gundlach as well. 33
llI
The use of mass violence to create a society that conforms to radical ideological principles tempts all modern governments. Alerted by their experiences in the Third Reich with its exaggerated nationalistic and racist claims, churches in general should now be prepared to declare publicly their consciences against any misuse of power, no matter how seemingly trivial and insignificant such political acts may seem to be. Acceptance of authority and the
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desire to be 'true' Germans crippled Catholic resistance, at least institutionally. Unfortunately, and this German case does not prove to be the exception, the Catholic Church has historically and consistently been tempted to adapt to the world, to view its success as the imminence of God's kingdom, and to free itself from persecution. 34 During the Hitlerzeit, Catholic leaders and many in their flocks sacrificed a complete commitment to their normative value system by rigidly adhering to German nationalistic ideals as well as by invoking antisemitic terminology and stereotypes to emphasise their adherence to the German Volk. They sacrificed the meaning of their legitimate moral roots. Their response to the challenges lacked courage, but is certainly comprehensible given the unprecedented and unique experience that they were facing. Hindsight is always better than foresight. Wrestling with the questions posed in the Third Reich, German Catholics and their experiences can help us focus more precisely on such issues as those of state power, bureaucracy, human rights, and individualism versus collectivism, which have yet to be faced fully in our own civilisation, still characterised by nationalistic models of organisation. Donald J. Dietrich Boston College
NOTES 1. Theodore S. Hamerow, 'Review Essay: Guilt, Redemption, and Writing German History', American HistoricalReview 88 (1983): 53-72; Konrad Jarausch, 'Illiberalism and Beyond: German History in Search of a Paradigm' Journal of Modern History 55 (1983): 268-284: David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, Mythen deutscher Geschichtschreibung! Die geschreite buergerliche Revolution (Frankfurt, 1980). 2. Guenther Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (New York, 1964); Gordon Zahn, German Catholics and Hitler's Wars: A Study in Social Control (New York, 1969); John Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches (New York, 1968); Donald J. Dietrich, Catholic Citizens in the Third Reich: Psycho-Socia ! Principles and Moral Reasoning (New Brunswick, N.J, 1988). 3. Donald J. Dietrich, 'Catholic Resistance in the Third Reich', Holocaust and Genocide Studies 3 (1988): 171-186; see, Heinz Boberach, (ed.), Berichte der SD undder Gestapo iiber Kirchen und Kirchenvolk in Deutschland, 1934-1944 (Mainz, 1971). 4. Ronald Ross, The Beleagured Tower." The Dilemma of Political Catholicism in Wilhelmine Germany (Notre Dam, 1976);David Blackbourn, ClassReligion andLocal Politics in Wilhelmine Germany: The Centre Party in Wiirttemberg before 1914 (New Haven, 1980). 5. Douglas Hatfield, 'Kulturkampf; The Relationship of Church and State and the Failure of German Political Reform', Journal of Church andState 23 (1981): 465--484; Hans Rost, Die Paritfit und die deutschen Katholiken (Cologne, 1914); Arthur W. Staats, Social Behaviorism (Homewood, IL, 1975), pp. 45, 63. 6. Mary Alice Gallin, 'The Cardinal and the State: Faulhaber and the Third Reich' Journal of Church and State 12 (1970): 385--404; Karl Dietrich Bracher et aL, Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (Cologne, 1962), pp. 22-77; Ernst Wolfgang B6ckenf6rde 'German Catholicism in 1933' Cross Currents 11 (1961): 300.
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7. Howard J. Ehrlich, The Social Psychology of Prejudice: A Systematic Theoretical Review and Propositional Inventory of the American Social Psychological Study of Prejudice (New York, 1973), p. 149. 8. Osservatore Romano (21 June 1933). 9. John Jay Hughs, 'The Pope's "Pact with Hitler": Betrayal or Self-Defense', Journal of Church and State 17 (1975): 76; Alfons Kupper, Staatliche Akten fiber die Reichskonkordatsverhandlungen, 1933 (Mainz, 1969), pp. 290ff.; Bernard Stasiewski, Akten deutscher Bisch6fe fiber die Lage der Kirche 1933-1945 1, 1933-1934 (Mainz, 1968), pp. 30ff., 239-248. 10. Ludwig Volk, Der Bayerische Episkopat und der Nationalsozialismus 1930-1934 (Mainz, 1965), pp. 2-6; A, Kupper, 'Zur Geschichte des Reichskondordats', Stimmen der Zeit 163 (1958-59): 367; Kupper, p. 236. 11. Michael Schmaus, Begegnungen zwischen katholischem Christentum und nationalsozialistischer Weltanschauung, 2nd ed. (Miinster, 1934), pp. 7, 23, 29, 42. 12. Karl Adam, 'Deutsches Volkstum und katholisches Christentum', Theologische Quartalschrift 114 (1933): 42, 59. 13. Bracher, Machtergreifung, pp. 897ff.; Conway, p. 94; Lewy, p. 171; Stasiewski, Akten, pp. 704-705. 14. Wilhelm Corsten (ed.), K6lner Aktenstficke. Zur Lage der katholischen Kirche in Deutschland, 1933-1945 (Cologne, 1949), pp. 156-161. 15. Zahn, German Catholics, p. 62; E. Jackson Baur, 'Opinion Changes in a Public Controversy'. Public Opinion Quarterly 26 (1962): 226; David Reide, 'The Official Attitude of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy in Germany toward National Socialism, 1933-1945', Ph.D. dissertation (State University of Iowa, 1957). 16. Amtsblatt ffir die Erzdi6zese Mfinchen und Freising (25 February 1941), pp. 29-30. 17. Konrad Algermissen, 'Christentum und Germanentum', Theologie und Glaube 26 (1934): 302-303,312, 319, 321-322, 328. 18. Emil Ritter and Kuno Brombacher, Sendschreiben Katholischen Deutschen, 2nd ed. (MUnster, 1936). 19. Jeremy Miller, 'Ethics within an Ecclesial Context', Angelicum 57 (1980): 32-44; Ludwig Volk, Akten Deutscher Bisch6fe fiber die Lage der Kirche, 1936-1939 (Mainz, 1981). 20. John M. Steiner, 'The SS Yesterday and Today: A Sociopsychological View' in Joel E. Dimsdale, ed. Survivors, Victims and Perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust (Washington, DC, 1980), p. 423. 21. Faulhaber, pp. 13, 19; Mfinchener KatholischeKirchenzeitung, No. 31 (31 July 1932), p. 332; Der Rfitlischwur 114, No. 1 (1924): 4. 22. Bertram's letter to the German bishops (14 October 1936) in Lewy, p. 282. 23. Vicar General Buchweiser to Kerrl (18 November 1937) in Lewy, p. 63; Leon Poliakov, Harvest of Hate. The Nazi Program for the Destruction of the Jews of Europe (New York, 1974), p. 17; Bertram to Thierack (11 November 1942) in Lewy, pp. 288-289. 24. Lewy, p. 295. 25. Gustav Gundlach, S.J., 'Antisemitismus', Lexikonffir Theologie undKirche, 2nd rev. ed. (Freiburg, 1930), 1: 504. After the downfall of Nazism, the new edition of this work has replaced Gundlach's piece with an article that condemns Nazism. 26. Christopher Browning, Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution (New York, 1985). 27. Frank Buscher and Michael Phayer, 'German Catholic Bishops and the Holocaust, 1940-1952' German Studies Review 11 (1988): 467. 28. VKZ Reihe A, Ver6ffentlichen der Kommission ffir Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 38 (Bonn), p. 350, footnote 2; Bertram to Prange, the Vicar General of the Berlin Diocese
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(17 April 1944). 29. VKZ Reihe A Vol. 38, 255-256; Bertram to Muhs, Breslau (15 October 1943). 30. Frederic Spotts, The Churches and Politics in Germany (Middletown, Conn., 1973), pp. 89-116. 31. Friedrich Rothenpieler, Der Gedanke einer Kollektivschuld in juristischer Sicht (Berlin, 1982), pp. 208-209. 32. Verena Rotzenhart-Vieha, 'The German Reaction to the American Occupation, 1944-1947', (Diss., University of California-Santa Barbara, 1980), pp. 155-156. 33. See, for example, Max Pribilla, 'Christliche Haltung', Stimmen der Zeit 135 (1939): 169-179; Otto Schilling, 'Das Prinzip der Moral', Theologische Quartalschrift (1938): 419-426; Dietrich, 'Catholic Citizens', pp. 171-186. 34. Hans K/ing, The Council." Reform and Reunion, trans. Cecily Hastings (New York, 1961), pp. 21-22.