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Ghana and Kenya expel Communists
DEVEl@?~EnrsAND TRENDS’
Ghana and Kenya Expel Communists The Ghanaian coup of Feb. 24 brought to an abrupt halt the Peking- and Moscow-drifting activities of the Nkrumah regime, including preparations for hosting the Communist-sponsored ninth World Youth Festival in Accra (see Additional Developments, p. 24). The Ghanaian Times of March 2 reported that the “newly born” Ghana Union Congress had made a bonfire of all the Communist literature that had belonged to the old Trade Union Congress. The Sunday Times of London reported on March 6 that all East Germans in Ghana had been expelled, including 45 technicians in the trade mission, and ADN (East German News Agency) reported on March 24 that Ghana was closing its economic mission in East Berlin and East Germany its equivalent mission in Ghana. Shortly after assuming power, the National Liberation Council directly charged Peking with supplying quantities of arms to Guinea with a view to assisting the exiled Kwame Nkrumah to return to Ghana and stage a revolution, and took steps to curb Chinese Communist activities in Ghana. On March 6, the Chinese embassy in Accra handed a note of protest to the Ghanaian foreign ministry, denying the charge as “sheer fabrication and vicious slander,” and in turn countercharging the new government with taking “a series of grave steps to worsen the relations between the two countries. It has unreasonably detained and brutally beaten up Chinese experts and a staff member of the Chinese embassy; it has unilaterally torn up the agreement on economic and technical cooperation between China and Ghana and unreasonably demanded the immediate withdrawal of all the Chinese experts and a cut in the staff of the Chinese embassy [Accra Radio, March 17 reported that three Chinese diplomats had been expelled the previous day]; it has subjected to all kinds of harassment and indignities the Chinese personnel who were compelled to leave Accra. . . . The Chinese government points out in all seriousness that the Ghanaian side must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom” (Jen-min J&-pm, March 20). Speaking up for its fellow-African nation, the Kenya press described what it called the “main charge by Ghana’s new leaders against the Communists,” namely, exploitation: “ . . . under the cloak of brotherly love, they were just as eager to profit from Ghana as were any other countries. In some instances their behavior was far worse. . . . “As Ghana found to its cost, few of the projects were properly evaluated and they were usually overpriced. . . . “Payment for Communist projects was demanded in sterling and not rubles, which meant that Ghana had to sell extra goods to raise currency where she could have exported her own produce to Russia. Even when m
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Ghana did export, the Communist countries often dumped Ghanaian cocoa on Western markets, thus further depressing prices and making it even more difficult for Ghana to pay its way.” (East African Standard, Nairobi, March 18.) The Kenyan senate on March I passed an “antiChinese” motion, which characterized as “a destructive statement” the remark “excellent revolutionary situation in Africa” which Communist China’s premier, Chou En-lai, had made on Feb. 3, 1964 in Mogadishu, Somalia. On March 17 the Chinese embassy in Nairobi protested to the Kenyan government regarding the senate action, and in its March 31 issue Jen-min Jih-pao went to great lengths to explain that Premier Chou’s remark was aimed at “anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist national revolution [not-by implication-friendly, already liberated nations]. However, some people in Kenya have deliberately distorted this remark of Premier Chou En-lai’s and arbitrarily linked it up with the military coups d’ktat in some African countries. . . . “The imperialists have been the first to attack Premier Chou En-lai’s remark. . . . Now the Kenyan senate harps on the same old tune and formally passes a motion vilifying China on this score. . . . The adoption of the anti-Chinese motion by the Kenyan senate cannot but be interpreted as a grave and deliberate step to poison and sabotage the normal relations between China and Kenya. . . .” Meanwhile, the Kenyan government had ordered the immediate expulsion of two Soviet embassy officials as well as two Soviet press service correspondents and a film representative; two Czechoslovak embassy officials and a press service correspondent; and one Hungarian embassy official (Blantyre Radio, March IO; Nairobi Daily Nation, March I I ; the London Times, March I I and 17; the London DaiZy Telegraph, March 16; Budapest Radio and CTK [Czech press service], March 16). The Daily Nation explained the deportations thus: “Here is a method of spying, subversion and espionage which has now become fashionable in Africa. People from various countries come under the banner ‘journalists,’ ‘employees of news agencies’ or just ‘clerks’ in the embassies without diplomatic protection. While in Africa, these people deny any association with their own governments. Yet it is known that these newspapers and agencies are owned and run by governments. It is no secret that some of these men who pose as newspapermen are high officials in the intelligence network of their governments. . . . “Some are lmown to be traveling throughout the country, in their plausible and seemingly harmless capacities as ‘newsmelq’ ‘cameramen’ ‘news agents’ or simply as tourists. Those who were deported yesterday were not only doing these things, but actually engaging in political organization on behalf of some misguided groups in the country. What nation can tolerate this kind of practice?” (Dairy Nation, March I I .)
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May Day Slogans, 1966 The May Day and October slogans of the Soviet Union are the product of careful deliberation by the CPSU Central Committee. Because they constitute a statement, however oblique, of Party thinking, changes from one year to another indicate in which direction political and diplomatic winds are blowing from Moscow. Not unexpectedly, the peoples of the world are called upon again to stop the “military intervention of American imperialism in Vietnam [the 1965 slogan read “South Vietnam”], demand the immediate withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from South Vietnam, and [this too is new] grant the Vietnamese people the opportunity to decide their own affairs!” In 1965 the new Soviet leadership sought to gloss over the growing Sino-Soviet rift, and the Chinese People’s Republic remained in its accustomed prune position in the list of Communist nations receiving “fraternal greetings”; but the 1966 list, released by Pravda April 17, reflects the near-rupture of relations. The U.S.S.R. has withdrawn its pledge of “eternal and indestructible friendship and cooperation” from both the C.P.R. and its close ally Albania and has demoted both countries in the Communist-bloc pecking order. The C.P.R. has been consigned to fifth place, in proper Russian alphabetical order, and Albania has fallen out of alphabetical order entirely to the penultimate place among the bloc countries, followed only by Yugoslavia, which, although it receives “fraternal greetings” and is pledged “eternal and indestructible friendship,” is apparently regarded as not quite inside the Communist pale. Underscoring the importance of Premier Alexei Kosygin’s scheduled state visit to the U.A.R. in May-his first state visit outside the Communist bloc-and the objectives of the Soviet diplomatic offensive in the Middle East is the attention focused on the three major “progressive” powers of the Arab world. In addition to the U.A.R., which is accorded the prime position of friendly nations outside the Communist bloc and receives the same warm and elaborate greetings as in the past, followed by a similar slogan for de Algerian People’s Democratic Republic, Syria is for the first time accorded the importance of a separate slogan. By raising Syria to the level of the U.A.R., the Soviet leadership not only shows support for the new, leftist regime of Syrian Premier Dr. Youssef Zayyin, but serves warning on the U.A.R. that it is by no means de only Arab power deserving of major Soviet attention. This year, for the first time also, Pakistan is given separate treatment (last year it was lumped with Iran and Turkey in one slogan). This innovation is probably intended not only to commemorate Kosygin’s success at Tashkent as peacemaker between India and Pakistan (see Communist Af&zirs, IV/ I, Jan.-Feb., p. 15)) but to remind both the Communist and the “third world” nations that more is to be gained in the long run by looking to the U.S.S.R. than to China. Ghana, now in the control of an anti-Communist regime following the ouster of Kwame Nlmumah (see preceding article, p. 23), has been dropped from men-
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International Communist Front Conferences MAY
INTERNATIONAL ROUTE CONFERENCE FOR SOLIDAIUTY WITH VIETNAMESE
JUNE 13-16
COUNCIL
JUNE
7TE
MEETING
ASSEMBLY
6-16 SEPT. OCT.
gTH WORLD YOUTH FFSTNAL 6TH CONGRES
Additional
WFDY Wwmng, & IUS North Korea (World Federation of Democratic Youth & International Union of Students) WPC Helsinki, (World Finland Peace Council) WFDY Sofia, Bulgaria WFDY 85 IUS IOJ (International Organization of Journalists)
Fast
Berlin, East Germany
Developments
On March 17 the presidium of the World Peace Council convened in Budapest to discuss organizational problems and current international issues. Recommendations regarding the future structure of the Council were submitted on March 18, at a parallel Budapest meeting of representatives of national peace committees from some 80 countries. It was decided that the World Peace congresses will no longer be held at regular intervals; they will be organized on specific topics, in conjunction with outside bodies, to “demonstrate the unity and cooperation of the various peace movements.” Plans were announced for a conference to further the denuclearization of the Mediterranean, to be held “soon” in Barcelona, Spain or Nicosia, Cyprus; an international rally in Geneva on July 20, the lath anniversary of the signing of the 1954 General Agreement on Vietnam; an investigation of the legality of flights by atomic-armed aircraft of one country in the air space of another; and a campaign to emphasize the dangers of atomic extermination. (TASS, March 17; Zagreb Radio, March 17; Polskie Radio, March 17.) Preparations for the 9th World Youth Festival have once again been upset by a coup rf’e’la~ The original plan to hold the Festival in Algiers last July had to be scrapped because of the overthrow of the pro-Communist Ben Bella regime. In January the International Preparatory Committee met again and after much argument announced that the Festival would be held in Accra, Ghana in September. However, the newly formed National Liberation Council, which seized power on Feb. 24, overthrowing the pro-Communist regime of Kwame Nkrumah, has dissolved the Ghana Young Pieneers, who were to act as hosts to the Festival, and has announced that it will not receive the Festival’s participants. (MTI [official Hungarian news agency], March 26.) The national preparatory committees, as well as national and international organizations engaged in the preparations, have been requested to submit suggestions to the International Preparatory Committee on where and when to hold the Festival. Although the Committee had committed itself to hold it in Africa, it seems unlikely that it will schedule it there a third time (Neue Z&&r Zeifung, Feb. 28); the likely choice will be Havana or Sofia, both cities having vied for the honor when Accra was selected. The 2nd “Berlin Conference of Catholic Christians (see Communist Affairs, IV/i, Jan.-Feb., p. 19) was held March 22-24 in East Berlin. It was attended by about 200 “Catholics” from 18 European countries, including Hans Seigewas ser, East German state secretary for church affairs, and Werner Rumpel, general secretary of the East German Peace Council.
COMMUNIST
AFFAIIU
tion in the slogans. Indonesia, which had the largest and strongest Communist organization outside the Communist bloc countries until the abortive coup of Sept. 30, 1965 and the consequent bloodletting, is still accorded separate treatment, but the word “great” is no longer used to describe the people of Indonesia. Perhaps the most significant departures, indicating changing Soviet attitudes, are to be found in the slogans addressed to the West. Instead of a joint slogan for the Soviet Union’s three wartime allies in the fight against Nazi Germany, this year France, Great Britain and the United States are separately greeted, in that order: “ . . . May the traditional friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and France develop and grow stronger in the interests of universal peace and European security.” (Read containment of West Germany for “European security.“) “ . . . May the cooperation between the peoples of Great Britain and the Soviet Union develop and grow stronger in the struggle against the threat of war, in the interests of the peaceful development of Europe and to secure peace throughout the world.” “. . . May the cooperation between the peoples of the United States of America and the Soviet Union broaden in the interests of preventing world war, in the name of preserving peace.” (Re changing U.S.-Soviet relations, see “The Communist World in Flux,” pp. 3-10.) General de Gaulle’s scheduled June visit to Moscow, coupled with the general’s withdrawal of France from the NATO structure and his concerted efforts in the direction of a European security system saris the United States, accounts largely for the distinctions made in addressing each of the three Western powers. That the Soviet Union, whose own Warsaw Pact is suffering NATO-like centrifugal pulls, is entertaining new hopes for the break-up of the Atlantic alliance and for a Western Europe in which the United States plays a diminishing part is reflected in yet another new slogan: “May friendship and cooperation of the peoples of European countries in the interests of strengthening peace and security in Europe develop and grow stronger!” Anticipating the possibility that the NATO powers may try to shift their seat of activity from France to Spain and Portugal, special slogans are addressed to the peoples of Spain and Portugal which decry the “fascist dictatorships” under which they live-an indication that a new propaganda campaign may be planned whose aim will be to damage NATO’s reputation as an alliance of democratic nations.
Anti-Communists Consolidate Control in Indonesia By the end of April, both the organization and the influence of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) had been largely destroyed by the violent Moslem and army reaction that followed the left-wing Sept. 30 coup attempt (see Communist Aflairs, 11115, Sept.-Oct. 1965, PP. g-11, and III/G, Nov.-Dec. 1965, pp. 13-14). In the process, President Sukamo’s power has been almost as decisively broken. With the new civilian-military leadership attempting to cope with the harsh realities facing the bankrupt nation, the long domination of Inlv
a Mmcxwb~,
1966
$onesian state policy by fantasy, sloganeering and braggadocio appears to have ended. A bloodbath of unprecedented proportions was directed against the PK.I and its mass organizations following the attempt of the leftist forces to decapitate the Indonesian army by the torture-murder of six of its top generals. Only recently, as Western observers have again been able to travel and obtain information within the country, has the full scope of the destruction of Communist elements been revealed. Sukarno announced with great regret several months ago that 87,000 Communists and sympathizers had been killed, but reports now indicate the number may be nearer 300,000. There is reason to believe that not more than one member of the PKI Politburo survives (abroad), and that only three or four of the so-man Central Committee are still alive. It can be assumed that similar destruction of the policy-making and administrative organs of the Party and its related functional mass organizations has taken place on the provincial, district and even village level. Although some armed bands capable of guerrilla-type action probably remain, and while General Nasution has warned of the remnants of the “PKI spirit in Indonesia,” organized communism in the archipelago in effect no longer exists. In February President Sukarno made an abortive attempt to reassert his authority and salvage a cabinet of leftists, crypto-Communists and personal cronies. He dismissed General Nasution from all his posts and reorganized the cabinet, but the move backfired badly and within a few weeks the pressure of huge Moslem and student street demonstrations in the major urban centers forced a retreat. A new triumvirate now wields power in Indonesia: General Suharto to handle defense and security matters, Adam Malik in charge of political and foreign affairs, and the popular Sultan of Jogjakarta to cope with economic and social problems. General Nasution holds a relatively nominal position in the government, but his influence behind the scenes may be crucial. Sukarno has been retained as titular President, and he continues to speak with a certain bravado, but both his charisma and his powers of political manipulation have declined well beyond what most observers had expected. The new government has publicly made a rather frank and realistic assessment of the bankrupt state of Indonesia’s domestic economy and of her political and fiscal credit abroad. The specific economic measures taken thus far have been stopgap in nature, but this is understandable in the light of the appalling nature of the long-range problems produced by an empty treasury, wild inflation, and almost total breakdown of transportation, coupled with a very low level of supply and production in many sectors. Since the ouster and arrest of Foreign Minister Subandrio in mid-March, mending of relations with the non-Communist world has proceeded, while ties with Peking have rapidly eroded. Despite continued antiMalaysia pledges made “for the record,” Indonesian leaders appear to be moving toward some kind of rational settlement of the “confrontation,” beginning with re-establishment of relations with Singapore. Events are moving toward a re-entry into the United Nations, 25
and official attitudes toward the United States and Britain continue to improve. Relations with Japan, which were always quite cordial, will probably become even closer as the Asian industrial giant becomes Indonesia’s key link to the outside world and the desperately needed economic aid which only the non-Communist developed nations can provide. The Sino-Indonesian “axis” has completely collapsed, and a rupture of all relations between Djakarta and Peking may be near. Mobs of student demonstrators have again attacked the Chinese embassy in Djakarta and the consulate in Surabaya, leading to strong warnings from Peking that relations are at the “breaking point.” China has terminated its economic aid to Indonesia and has withdrawn its technicians. Indonesian authorities are taking no steps to arrest the trend. They have either promoted or acquiesced in numerous popular demonstrations demanding severance of relations with Peking, the largest of these taking place, ironically, in connection with May Day festivities. In the present mood of the country, the attempts of the new leadership to bring Indonesia out of chaos and to revive a more rational spirit of nationalism will probably have considerable initial popular support. However, two particularly serious hazards threaten future progress. The population may expect the regime to do too much too soon in reviving the economy and improving the standard of living. Furthermore, the passions and bitterness which arose on all sides during the anti-PKI program and the desire for revenge which will undoubtedly flow from the wholesale slaughter accompanying the purges may create a climate of frustration and instability damaging to long-range prospects for Indonesian recovery.
rying and annoying people.” But the Party disclaimed responsibility for the “arrogance, nepotism, and disregard for the voice and criticism of the masses” which had caused offense. It blamed people who, although linked politically with the Party, still retained their “bourgeois mentality.” A reference to their hastiness in adopting “foreign experience” without regard to Albania’s own conditions, raised more questions than it answered, but may have been aimed at the influence of “revisionist” economic ideas now prevalent in Eastern Europe. The letter admitted that some state organs (as opposed to Party organs) were also to blame for underestimating the “dangerous illness” of bureaucracy. Even Communists had been infected by the “whitecollar disease” which caused people to glorify administrative work and despise production.
Albania Tries to Avert Politico-Economic Crises
Albania has relied heavily on Chinese assistance to compensate her for cancellation of all Soviet aid, which left the country on the verge of economic ruin in 1961. But reports that Peking has disappointed Albanian hopes of increased Chinese financial commitments for the 1966-70 period could explain the regime’s renewed insistence on self-reliance, its attempts to keep up morale by sending office workers into industry and agriculture, and to raise efficiency and reduce expenditure by administrative reorganization and cuts in the defense budget. In addition, recent increases of trade with some Western countries (France and Great Britain), the resumption of commercial relations with Greece (a preliminary barter agreement was announced in Athens on March 24) and the raising of diplomatic representation in Austria to embassy level have been signs of Albania’s desire to break out of her dangerous isolation. Meanwhile, the Albanians have reaffirmed their gratitude to the Chinese for their “precious, fraternal aid” and in their foreign policy, as well as in their internal measures, they have confirmed their unswerving loyalty to Peking’s ideological line. On March 22 Albania refused “with contempt” an invitation to attend the Soviet Party’s 23rd Congress, stating that she could not have relations of any kind with “traitors of communism and renegades of Marxism-Leninism.”
The Albanian government reshuffle, announced by Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu on March 17, aimed at drastically reducing a top-heavy bureaucracy, is the latest of a series of moves since January to deal with what has seemed to be an acute political and economic crisis. The launching in mid-January of a Peking-style campaign to transfer white-collar workers and intellectuals to “voluntary” work on farms and in factories was followed by the Politburo’s announcement on Feb. g that it had decided to send 12 prominent Party officials, including 4 Politburo members, to supervise production work in provincial centers. The background to these measures was filled in by a surprisingly frank article in the Party daily Zeri i Popullit of Feb. 20. The veteran Communist writer Petro Mark0 reported that during his tour of the country at the Party’s request, he had found that cadres were unpopular and out of touch with the masses. Party members were regarded as smug, lazy and infected by the bourgeois way of living. The Central Committee’s “open letter to Communists, workers and the Army” on March 4, though couched in Stalinist jargon, highlighted the Party’s concern over its unpopularity. It was admitted that bureaucracy flourishing throughout Albania had caused serious damage-bureaucratic “distortions” were “wor-
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The letter affirmed that measures had already been taken to rectify these shortcomings and errors, but did not say what these measures were. A decree, published on March 7, abolished army ranks as from May 1 and reintroduced political commissars (they had been withdrawn from the army in 1955)) effective immediately. These moves, clearly of Chinese inspiration, showed the Party anxious to reassert its control over the army at a time of popular unrest and mounting economic difficulties. Hopes of economic reform, raised by an article in Zeri i Popullit on Jan. to, in which the economist Fejzo Bino attacked outdated forms of planning and suggested decentralization as an escape route from the “quagmire of bureaucracy,” did not materialize. The Party newspaper’s attack on March 13 on Yugoslavia’s economic policy and the reforms pursued by “Khrushchevite revisionists” confirmed Albania’s refusal to follow the example set by the rest of Eastern Europe.
COMMUNIST
AFFAIRS
India
Forced to Release Jailed
Communists
The Indian government yielded to the pressure tactics adopted by the Indian Communists and by April 30 had released a majority of the jailed Indian Communists. E. M. S. Namboodiripad, former chief minister of Kerala and a leader of the pro-Peking Communist Party of India (CPI), A. K. Gopalan and others previously had been released. (Overseas edition, Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, April 30.) ..I> The Indian government’s decision to review the continuance of the D.I.R. (Defense of India Rule promulgated under the emergency provisions of the Indian Constitution following the Communist Chinese attack on Indian borders in October 1962) and to release most of the political prisoners came partially as a result of the agitation carried out by the Indian Communists in cooperation with all other leftist parties, especially in Kerala and West Bengal. Taking advantage of India’s deteriorating food situation, in early February the Communists launched a campaign of violence in the formerly Communist-ruled state of Kerala which ultimately forced the Indian government to increase the food ration there. In West Bengal the Communists’ campaign to gain political power and prestige by means of civil disturbances started on the opening day of the budget session, Feb. 16, when Communists and other leftist opposition members of the state legislature interrupted the inaugural speech of the governor by staging a walkout in protest against “the Government’s complete failure to check the rising prices of food and other daily necessities and its refusal to release political prisoners arrested under the D.I.R.” (Statesman, Calcutta, Feb. 17.) On Feb. 21, the state legislature “had to be adjourned amidst boisterous scenes within four minutes of its meeting for the presentation of the Budget” when an opposition member snatched a copy of the budget speech from the hands of the West Bengal finance minister. The violent scenes inside the state legislature were matched by mob violence outside. On Feb. 16, the police opened fire in Basirhat, a Communist stronghold 47 miles from Calcutta, to control “a violent crowd” which ransacked several government offices (Statesman, Feb. 17). The pro-Moscow CPI, in its editorial in the Party organ New Age (Feb. 27) commenting on the opposition’s strategy, said: ‘L. . . the people have no other alternative but to stand up and fight for their own sake and for the sake of the nation. . . . If Kerala could teach the highhanded rulers a lesson, West Bengal too can.” The reference to Kerala indicated Communist determination to adopt the same tactics used in Kerala in February to gain political support by exploiting the food situation. Following the Feb. 16 incident in Basirhat, a statewide condition of uncertainty coupled with acts of violence continued for six days. On Feb. 22, Calcutta students observed Martyrs’ Day in memory of those killed by police fire. On March 4, demonstrators set ablaze state-run buses in several places. On March 5 and 6, 22 government offices were set afire and the demonstrators burned the Krishnanagar railway station, banks and many private homes. Iv
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On March IO, the Communists and other leftist parties organized a general strike in West Bengal which resulted in large-scale destruction of public properties, the loss of 3g lives as the result of police gunfire and the arrest of over 5,500 persons, and brought the civil administration to virtual collapse. Reported the Statesman, March 28, “Within two hours in the morning, from g:30 to I 1:3o-the coincidence is marked-there were dozens of cases of wanton destruction of railway and Government property and mob-police clashes, furious crowds striking hard at any effort to maintain normal civic activities.” Referring to the cases of arson, the Statesman (March 31) reported that those responsible were remarkable for “their deliberateness, deftness, determination in purpose and above all the neat organization with which they practiced incendiarism. Unless a special quality of fuel was used, the 18 coaches of the Barauni Express could not have been consumed so quickly by fire, with flames rising up to 20 feet. It was obvious that a premeditated plan worked, an organized small group was in operation and the group had men who had the necessary training. . . .” Throughout the state, the army had to be called to assist the civil administration. P. C. Sen, chief minister of West Bengal, told the West Bengal Congress Parliamentary Party that “recent violence and destruction in West Bengal fitted in well with international Communist methods.” (Statesman, March 29.) The pro-Moscow CPI organ New Age (March 27)) reporting on the situation in West Bengal, claimed that “unprecedented mass upsurge in the state has raised the problems of food, daily necessities and democratic rights in West Bengal to the national level.” As a result of this agitation, the food situation in West Bengal continued to deteriorate; and the Indian government decided to review the cases of the imprisoned Commtmists. The majority of them now have been released to ease the political tension.
Burma
Insurgents
Focus on Youth
The Revolutionary Government of Burma has recently revealed the methods which are being used by Communist and other underground groups to recruit young students for insurgent activities. According to a government statement broadcast by Rangoon Radio on March 31 and carried by the Rangoon daily Gwdian of April I, a number of students have been taken into the jungle by “leftist and rightist insurgents and saboteurs.” Forty-three are known to have been abducted between December 1965 and March 1966. Of these, 2g were found by the army, who returned them to their parents, 4 surrendered after realizing the falsity of the rebels’ promises and IO were killed in clashes between the army and Communist insurgents. The victims were high school and even primary school students and included girls of I 5 and I 6. Although this was the first time that the full story was made known, it had been hinted at by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, General Ne Win, during a speech at the Peasants’ Seminar held in March in Rangoon, when he disclosed that there were anti-
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government elements in Burma actively engaged in trying to lure young people with promises of “good pay and a lot of fun.” The Rangoon Working People’s Daily of April I suggested that the reason insurgents were concentrating on the young was that they were failing to gain any significant support against the government from the working people. Though this is the first indication for some time of Communist attempts to exploit students and young children in Burma, it is by no means a new development. Before General Ne Win came to power, Communists had successfully infiltrated the student unions in Burma and used them as fronts which would give public support for their policies. After the coup of March 1962, the Revolutionary Council took steps to control activities, and Communist influence in the universities was reduced by the arrest of Communist leaders. Activists remained relatively quiet until November 1963, when the government attempted to hold peace talks with the Communist insurgents. At a large mass rally on Nov. IO, sponsored by leftist organizations “to bring pressure upon the Revolutionary Government,” agitators made speeches against the “suppression” of students. Following the collapse of the peace talks, student agitation and subversion were renewed, and riots and demonstrations led to the temporary closure of the liberal arts faculties of Rangoon and Mandalay universities.
‘Mao Tse-tung . . . Mao Tse-tung . . . Mao Tse-tung’ The months March and April witnessed intensified glorification of Mao Tse-tung’s thought in the ideological field throughout Communist China. As it is the Chinese Communist way to use campaigns and drives to achieve their immediate political or economic objectives, the present campaign may well be an indication that the oligarchy in Peking is determined to ensure the ideological commitment of Party members when the founder, thinker, mentor and consolidator of the regime is gone. From March 2 to 8, the Peking Jen-min Jib-pao (People’s Daily) devoted its most prominent space to printing either the slogans-“Using the Writing of Chairman Mao as the Supreme Directive for All Our Work,” “ Mao Tse-tung’s Thought in Command”--or direct quotations from Mao’s writings. From March g to 26, with the exception of March II and March 24 when the journal had to give its most prominent space to publishing Peking’s “strongest protest to the Indonesian government” and the Chinese CP Central Committee’s reply declining the invitation to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, the daily for 16 days carried a front-page banner reminding the people that “Mao Tse-ttmg’s Thought Controls Everything.” To demonstrate how the studying of the writings of Mao Tse-tung could be creatively applied, Hsinhw (New China News Agency) in one of its special articles pointed out: “A ng-year-old woman in northwest China, badly burned in a mine explosion, has built a new life in her determined fight back, inspired by the works of Mao Tse-ttmg.” (Hsinhua, March 3.)
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In another special article Hsinhua praised “the production brigade in Nanliu, one of the poorest villages in Shansi province, [where] little rain fell for 137 days, from summer to autumn; but Nanliu reaped 3.2 tons per hectare of grain, 19 per cent over the peak year of 1964; increased total cotton output by 13.3 per cent; the number of pigs and draught animals by 20 per cent; and income from side occupations by 40 per cent. This was the result not only of hard work, but also long debates and lively discussions in the course of which the people of Nanliu liberated their minds and grasped Mao Tse-tung’s thinking and applied it to their day-today problems.” (Hsinhua, March I 0.) “The members of the People’s communes are working wonders with their own resources,” according to Hsinhua on March 29. “The study of Mao Tse-tung’s writings is equipping them with confidence in their ability to solve problems and with a deeper MarxistLeninist outlook.” Under the caption “The Theory of Mao Tse-tung Can Be Accurately Applied Within the Four Seas,” the Jenmin Jih-pao of April 6 quoted the opinion expressed in an article published by the Australian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) that Chairman Mao “has created a veritable treasure house of material on the Party and has made a unique contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory.” Three days later, the journal further quoted a statement made by the Argentine CP organ Vanguardia Communista that “Mao Tse-tung’s thinking guides the revolutionary transformation of China. . . .” In an editorial “In Putting Politics First, One Must Constantly Put Mao Tse-tung’s Thinking in Command,” the Jen-min Jih-pao on April 22 stated in part: “Mao Tse-tung’s thinking, having passed the test of practice in the Chinese and world revolutionary struggles, in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, and in the struggle against Khrushchev’s revisionism, has already become the powerful ideological weapon of the Chinese people as well as the extremely valuable common treasure of the world’s revolutionary people. Mao Tse-tung’s thinking is exerting an increasingly great and profound influence in the world . . . . “Mao Tse-tung’s thinking is the scientific summation of the Party’s line, principles, policies and experience in struggle. Our Party’s line, principles and policies are all drawn up under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung’s we must put Mao Tse-tung’s thinking. Therefore, thinking in command in carrying out the Party’s line, principles and policies . . . . ”
COMMUNIST
AmAIns
Ghana and Kenya Expel Communists The Ghanaian coup of Feb. 24 brought to an abrupt halt the Peking- and Moscow-drifting activities of the Nkrumah regime, including preparations for hosting the Communist-sponsored ninth World Youth Festival in Accra (see Additional Developments, p. 24). The Ghanaian Times of March 2 reported that the “newly born” Ghana Union Congress had made a bonfire of all the Communist literature that had belonged to the old Trade Union Congress. The Sunday Times of London reported on March 6 that all East Germans in Ghana had been expelled, including 45 technicians in the trade mission, and ADN (East German News Agency) reported on March 24 that Ghana was closing its economic mission in East Berlin and East Germany its equivalent mission in Ghana. Shortly after assuming power, the National Liberation Council directly charged Peking with supplying quantities of arms to Guinea with a view to assisting the exiled Kwame Nkrumah to return to Ghana and stage a revolution, and took steps to curb Chinese Communist activities in Ghana. On March 6, the Chinese embassy in Accra handed a note of protest to the Ghanaian foreign ministry, denying the charge as “sheer fabrication and vicious slander,” and in turn countercharging the new government with taking “a series of grave steps to worsen the relations between the two countries. It has unreasonably detained and brutally beaten up Chinese experts and a staff member of the Chinese embassy; it has unilaterally torn up the agreement on economic and technical cooperation between China and Ghana and unreasonably demanded the immediate withdrawal of all the Chinese experts and a cut in the staff of the Chinese embassy [Accra Radio, March 17 reported that three Chinese diplomats had been expelled the previous day]; it has subjected to all kinds of harassment and indignities the Chinese personnel who were compelled to leave Accra. . . . The Chinese government points out in all seriousness that the Ghanaian side must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom” (Jen-min J&-pm, March 20). Speaking up for its fellow-African nation, the Kenya press described what it called the “main charge by Ghana’s new leaders against the Communists,” namely, exploitation: “ . . . under the cloak of brotherly love, they were just as eager to profit from Ghana as were any other countries. In some instances their behavior was far worse. . . . “As Ghana found to its cost, few of the projects were properly evaluated and they were usually overpriced. . . . “Payment for Communist projects was demanded in sterling and not rubles, which meant that Ghana had to sell extra goods to raise currency where she could have exported her own produce to Russia. Even when m
2
hlARCH-hKL,
1966
Ghana did export, the Communist countries often dumped Ghanaian cocoa on Western markets, thus further depressing prices and making it even more difficult for Ghana to pay its way.” (East African Standard, Nairobi, March 18.) The Kenyan senate on March I passed an “antiChinese” motion, which characterized as “a destructive statement” the remark “excellent revolutionary situation in Africa” which Communist China’s premier, Chou En-lai, had made on Feb. 3, 1964 in Mogadishu, Somalia. On March 17 the Chinese embassy in Nairobi protested to the Kenyan government regarding the senate action, and in its March 31 issue Jen-min Jih-pao went to great lengths to explain that Premier Chou’s remark was aimed at “anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist national revolution [not-by implication-friendly, already liberated nations]. However, some people in Kenya have deliberately distorted this remark of Premier Chou En-lai’s and arbitrarily linked it up with the military coups d’ktat in some African countries. . . . “The imperialists have been the first to attack Premier Chou En-lai’s remark. . . . Now the Kenyan senate harps on the same old tune and formally passes a motion vilifying China on this score. . . . The adoption of the anti-Chinese motion by the Kenyan senate cannot but be interpreted as a grave and deliberate step to poison and sabotage the normal relations between China and Kenya. . . .” Meanwhile, the Kenyan government had ordered the immediate expulsion of two Soviet embassy officials as well as two Soviet press service correspondents and a film representative; two Czechoslovak embassy officials and a press service correspondent; and one Hungarian embassy official (Blantyre Radio, March IO; Nairobi Daily Nation, March I I ; the London Times, March I I and 17; the London DaiZy Telegraph, March 16; Budapest Radio and CTK [Czech press service], March 16). The Daily Nation explained the deportations thus: “Here is a method of spying, subversion and espionage which has now become fashionable in Africa. People from various countries come under the banner ‘journalists,’ ‘employees of news agencies’ or just ‘clerks’ in the embassies without diplomatic protection. While in Africa, these people deny any association with their own governments. Yet it is known that these newspapers and agencies are owned and run by governments. It is no secret that some of these men who pose as newspapermen are high officials in the intelligence network of their governments. . . . “Some are lmown to be traveling throughout the country, in their plausible and seemingly harmless capacities as ‘newsmelq’ ‘cameramen’ ‘news agents’ or simply as tourists. Those who were deported yesterday were not only doing these things, but actually engaging in political organization on behalf of some misguided groups in the country. What nation can tolerate this kind of practice?” (Dairy Nation, March I I .)
23
May Day Slogans, 1966 The May Day and October slogans of the Soviet Union are the product of careful deliberation by the CPSU Central Committee. Because they constitute a statement, however oblique, of Party thinking, changes from one year to another indicate in which direction political and diplomatic winds are blowing from Moscow. Not unexpectedly, the peoples of the world are called upon again to stop the “military intervention of American imperialism in Vietnam [the 1965 slogan read “South Vietnam”], demand the immediate withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from South Vietnam, and [this too is new] grant the Vietnamese people the opportunity to decide their own affairs!” In 1965 the new Soviet leadership sought to gloss over the growing Sino-Soviet rift, and the Chinese People’s Republic remained in its accustomed prune position in the list of Communist nations receiving “fraternal greetings”; but the 1966 list, released by Pravda April 17, reflects the near-rupture of relations. The U.S.S.R. has withdrawn its pledge of “eternal and indestructible friendship and cooperation” from both the C.P.R. and its close ally Albania and has demoted both countries in the Communist-bloc pecking order. The C.P.R. has been consigned to fifth place, in proper Russian alphabetical order, and Albania has fallen out of alphabetical order entirely to the penultimate place among the bloc countries, followed only by Yugoslavia, which, although it receives “fraternal greetings” and is pledged “eternal and indestructible friendship,” is apparently regarded as not quite inside the Communist pale. Underscoring the importance of Premier Alexei Kosygin’s scheduled state visit to the U.A.R. in May-his first state visit outside the Communist bloc-and the objectives of the Soviet diplomatic offensive in the Middle East is the attention focused on the three major “progressive” powers of the Arab world. In addition to the U.A.R., which is accorded the prime position of friendly nations outside the Communist bloc and receives the same warm and elaborate greetings as in the past, followed by a similar slogan for de Algerian People’s Democratic Republic, Syria is for the first time accorded the importance of a separate slogan. By raising Syria to the level of the U.A.R., the Soviet leadership not only shows support for the new, leftist regime of Syrian Premier Dr. Youssef Zayyin, but serves warning on the U.A.R. that it is by no means de only Arab power deserving of major Soviet attention. This year, for the first time also, Pakistan is given separate treatment (last year it was lumped with Iran and Turkey in one slogan). This innovation is probably intended not only to commemorate Kosygin’s success at Tashkent as peacemaker between India and Pakistan (see Communist Af&zirs, IV/ I, Jan.-Feb., p. 15)) but to remind both the Communist and the “third world” nations that more is to be gained in the long run by looking to the U.S.S.R. than to China. Ghana, now in the control of an anti-Communist regime following the ouster of Kwame Nlmumah (see preceding article, p. 23), has been dropped from men-
24
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International Communist Front Conferences MAY
INTERNATIONAL ROUTE CONFERENCE FOR SOLIDAIUTY WITH VIETNAMESE
JUNE 13-16
COUNCIL
JUNE
7TE
MEETING
ASSEMBLY
6-16 SEPT. OCT.
gTH WORLD YOUTH FFSTNAL 6TH CONGRES
Additional
WFDY Wwmng, & IUS North Korea (World Federation of Democratic Youth & International Union of Students) WPC Helsinki, (World Finland Peace Council) WFDY Sofia, Bulgaria WFDY 85 IUS IOJ (International Organization of Journalists)
Fast
Berlin, East Germany
Developments
On March 17 the presidium of the World Peace Council convened in Budapest to discuss organizational problems and current international issues. Recommendations regarding the future structure of the Council were submitted on March 18, at a parallel Budapest meeting of representatives of national peace committees from some 80 countries. It was decided that the World Peace congresses will no longer be held at regular intervals; they will be organized on specific topics, in conjunction with outside bodies, to “demonstrate the unity and cooperation of the various peace movements.” Plans were announced for a conference to further the denuclearization of the Mediterranean, to be held “soon” in Barcelona, Spain or Nicosia, Cyprus; an international rally in Geneva on July 20, the lath anniversary of the signing of the 1954 General Agreement on Vietnam; an investigation of the legality of flights by atomic-armed aircraft of one country in the air space of another; and a campaign to emphasize the dangers of atomic extermination. (TASS, March 17; Zagreb Radio, March 17; Polskie Radio, March 17.) Preparations for the 9th World Youth Festival have once again been upset by a coup rf’e’la~ The original plan to hold the Festival in Algiers last July had to be scrapped because of the overthrow of the pro-Communist Ben Bella regime. In January the International Preparatory Committee met again and after much argument announced that the Festival would be held in Accra, Ghana in September. However, the newly formed National Liberation Council, which seized power on Feb. 24, overthrowing the pro-Communist regime of Kwame Nkrumah, has dissolved the Ghana Young Pieneers, who were to act as hosts to the Festival, and has announced that it will not receive the Festival’s participants. (MTI [official Hungarian news agency], March 26.) The national preparatory committees, as well as national and international organizations engaged in the preparations, have been requested to submit suggestions to the International Preparatory Committee on where and when to hold the Festival. Although the Committee had committed itself to hold it in Africa, it seems unlikely that it will schedule it there a third time (Neue Z&&r Zeifung, Feb. 28); the likely choice will be Havana or Sofia, both cities having vied for the honor when Accra was selected. The 2nd “Berlin Conference of Catholic Christians (see Communist Affairs, IV/i, Jan.-Feb., p. 19) was held March 22-24 in East Berlin. It was attended by about 200 “Catholics” from 18 European countries, including Hans Seigewas ser, East German state secretary for church affairs, and Werner Rumpel, general secretary of the East German Peace Council.
COMMUNIST
AFFAIIU
tion in the slogans. Indonesia, which had the largest and strongest Communist organization outside the Communist bloc countries until the abortive coup of Sept. 30, 1965 and the consequent bloodletting, is still accorded separate treatment, but the word “great” is no longer used to describe the people of Indonesia. Perhaps the most significant departures, indicating changing Soviet attitudes, are to be found in the slogans addressed to the West. Instead of a joint slogan for the Soviet Union’s three wartime allies in the fight against Nazi Germany, this year France, Great Britain and the United States are separately greeted, in that order: “ . . . May the traditional friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and France develop and grow stronger in the interests of universal peace and European security.” (Read containment of West Germany for “European security.“) “ . . . May the cooperation between the peoples of Great Britain and the Soviet Union develop and grow stronger in the struggle against the threat of war, in the interests of the peaceful development of Europe and to secure peace throughout the world.” “. . . May the cooperation between the peoples of the United States of America and the Soviet Union broaden in the interests of preventing world war, in the name of preserving peace.” (Re changing U.S.-Soviet relations, see “The Communist World in Flux,” pp. 3-10.) General de Gaulle’s scheduled June visit to Moscow, coupled with the general’s withdrawal of France from the NATO structure and his concerted efforts in the direction of a European security system saris the United States, accounts largely for the distinctions made in addressing each of the three Western powers. That the Soviet Union, whose own Warsaw Pact is suffering NATO-like centrifugal pulls, is entertaining new hopes for the break-up of the Atlantic alliance and for a Western Europe in which the United States plays a diminishing part is reflected in yet another new slogan: “May friendship and cooperation of the peoples of European countries in the interests of strengthening peace and security in Europe develop and grow stronger!” Anticipating the possibility that the NATO powers may try to shift their seat of activity from France to Spain and Portugal, special slogans are addressed to the peoples of Spain and Portugal which decry the “fascist dictatorships” under which they live-an indication that a new propaganda campaign may be planned whose aim will be to damage NATO’s reputation as an alliance of democratic nations.
Anti-Communists Consolidate Control in Indonesia By the end of April, both the organization and the influence of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) had been largely destroyed by the violent Moslem and army reaction that followed the left-wing Sept. 30 coup attempt (see Communist Aflairs, 11115, Sept.-Oct. 1965, PP. g-11, and III/G, Nov.-Dec. 1965, pp. 13-14). In the process, President Sukamo’s power has been almost as decisively broken. With the new civilian-military leadership attempting to cope with the harsh realities facing the bankrupt nation, the long domination of Inlv
a Mmcxwb~,
1966
$onesian state policy by fantasy, sloganeering and braggadocio appears to have ended. A bloodbath of unprecedented proportions was directed against the PK.I and its mass organizations following the attempt of the leftist forces to decapitate the Indonesian army by the torture-murder of six of its top generals. Only recently, as Western observers have again been able to travel and obtain information within the country, has the full scope of the destruction of Communist elements been revealed. Sukarno announced with great regret several months ago that 87,000 Communists and sympathizers had been killed, but reports now indicate the number may be nearer 300,000. There is reason to believe that not more than one member of the PKI Politburo survives (abroad), and that only three or four of the so-man Central Committee are still alive. It can be assumed that similar destruction of the policy-making and administrative organs of the Party and its related functional mass organizations has taken place on the provincial, district and even village level. Although some armed bands capable of guerrilla-type action probably remain, and while General Nasution has warned of the remnants of the “PKI spirit in Indonesia,” organized communism in the archipelago in effect no longer exists. In February President Sukarno made an abortive attempt to reassert his authority and salvage a cabinet of leftists, crypto-Communists and personal cronies. He dismissed General Nasution from all his posts and reorganized the cabinet, but the move backfired badly and within a few weeks the pressure of huge Moslem and student street demonstrations in the major urban centers forced a retreat. A new triumvirate now wields power in Indonesia: General Suharto to handle defense and security matters, Adam Malik in charge of political and foreign affairs, and the popular Sultan of Jogjakarta to cope with economic and social problems. General Nasution holds a relatively nominal position in the government, but his influence behind the scenes may be crucial. Sukarno has been retained as titular President, and he continues to speak with a certain bravado, but both his charisma and his powers of political manipulation have declined well beyond what most observers had expected. The new government has publicly made a rather frank and realistic assessment of the bankrupt state of Indonesia’s domestic economy and of her political and fiscal credit abroad. The specific economic measures taken thus far have been stopgap in nature, but this is understandable in the light of the appalling nature of the long-range problems produced by an empty treasury, wild inflation, and almost total breakdown of transportation, coupled with a very low level of supply and production in many sectors. Since the ouster and arrest of Foreign Minister Subandrio in mid-March, mending of relations with the non-Communist world has proceeded, while ties with Peking have rapidly eroded. Despite continued antiMalaysia pledges made “for the record,” Indonesian leaders appear to be moving toward some kind of rational settlement of the “confrontation,” beginning with re-establishment of relations with Singapore. Events are moving toward a re-entry into the United Nations, 25
and official attitudes toward the United States and Britain continue to improve. Relations with Japan, which were always quite cordial, will probably become even closer as the Asian industrial giant becomes Indonesia’s key link to the outside world and the desperately needed economic aid which only the non-Communist developed nations can provide. The Sino-Indonesian “axis” has completely collapsed, and a rupture of all relations between Djakarta and Peking may be near. Mobs of student demonstrators have again attacked the Chinese embassy in Djakarta and the consulate in Surabaya, leading to strong warnings from Peking that relations are at the “breaking point.” China has terminated its economic aid to Indonesia and has withdrawn its technicians. Indonesian authorities are taking no steps to arrest the trend. They have either promoted or acquiesced in numerous popular demonstrations demanding severance of relations with Peking, the largest of these taking place, ironically, in connection with May Day festivities. In the present mood of the country, the attempts of the new leadership to bring Indonesia out of chaos and to revive a more rational spirit of nationalism will probably have considerable initial popular support. However, two particularly serious hazards threaten future progress. The population may expect the regime to do too much too soon in reviving the economy and improving the standard of living. Furthermore, the passions and bitterness which arose on all sides during the anti-PKI program and the desire for revenge which will undoubtedly flow from the wholesale slaughter accompanying the purges may create a climate of frustration and instability damaging to long-range prospects for Indonesian recovery.
rying and annoying people.” But the Party disclaimed responsibility for the “arrogance, nepotism, and disregard for the voice and criticism of the masses” which had caused offense. It blamed people who, although linked politically with the Party, still retained their “bourgeois mentality.” A reference to their hastiness in adopting “foreign experience” without regard to Albania’s own conditions, raised more questions than it answered, but may have been aimed at the influence of “revisionist” economic ideas now prevalent in Eastern Europe. The letter admitted that some state organs (as opposed to Party organs) were also to blame for underestimating the “dangerous illness” of bureaucracy. Even Communists had been infected by the “whitecollar disease” which caused people to glorify administrative work and despise production.
Albania Tries to Avert Politico-Economic Crises
Albania has relied heavily on Chinese assistance to compensate her for cancellation of all Soviet aid, which left the country on the verge of economic ruin in 1961. But reports that Peking has disappointed Albanian hopes of increased Chinese financial commitments for the 1966-70 period could explain the regime’s renewed insistence on self-reliance, its attempts to keep up morale by sending office workers into industry and agriculture, and to raise efficiency and reduce expenditure by administrative reorganization and cuts in the defense budget. In addition, recent increases of trade with some Western countries (France and Great Britain), the resumption of commercial relations with Greece (a preliminary barter agreement was announced in Athens on March 24) and the raising of diplomatic representation in Austria to embassy level have been signs of Albania’s desire to break out of her dangerous isolation. Meanwhile, the Albanians have reaffirmed their gratitude to the Chinese for their “precious, fraternal aid” and in their foreign policy, as well as in their internal measures, they have confirmed their unswerving loyalty to Peking’s ideological line. On March 22 Albania refused “with contempt” an invitation to attend the Soviet Party’s 23rd Congress, stating that she could not have relations of any kind with “traitors of communism and renegades of Marxism-Leninism.”
The Albanian government reshuffle, announced by Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu on March 17, aimed at drastically reducing a top-heavy bureaucracy, is the latest of a series of moves since January to deal with what has seemed to be an acute political and economic crisis. The launching in mid-January of a Peking-style campaign to transfer white-collar workers and intellectuals to “voluntary” work on farms and in factories was followed by the Politburo’s announcement on Feb. g that it had decided to send 12 prominent Party officials, including 4 Politburo members, to supervise production work in provincial centers. The background to these measures was filled in by a surprisingly frank article in the Party daily Zeri i Popullit of Feb. 20. The veteran Communist writer Petro Mark0 reported that during his tour of the country at the Party’s request, he had found that cadres were unpopular and out of touch with the masses. Party members were regarded as smug, lazy and infected by the bourgeois way of living. The Central Committee’s “open letter to Communists, workers and the Army” on March 4, though couched in Stalinist jargon, highlighted the Party’s concern over its unpopularity. It was admitted that bureaucracy flourishing throughout Albania had caused serious damage-bureaucratic “distortions” were “wor-
26
The letter affirmed that measures had already been taken to rectify these shortcomings and errors, but did not say what these measures were. A decree, published on March 7, abolished army ranks as from May 1 and reintroduced political commissars (they had been withdrawn from the army in 1955)) effective immediately. These moves, clearly of Chinese inspiration, showed the Party anxious to reassert its control over the army at a time of popular unrest and mounting economic difficulties. Hopes of economic reform, raised by an article in Zeri i Popullit on Jan. to, in which the economist Fejzo Bino attacked outdated forms of planning and suggested decentralization as an escape route from the “quagmire of bureaucracy,” did not materialize. The Party newspaper’s attack on March 13 on Yugoslavia’s economic policy and the reforms pursued by “Khrushchevite revisionists” confirmed Albania’s refusal to follow the example set by the rest of Eastern Europe.
COMMUNIST
AFFAIRS
India
Forced to Release Jailed
Communists
The Indian government yielded to the pressure tactics adopted by the Indian Communists and by April 30 had released a majority of the jailed Indian Communists. E. M. S. Namboodiripad, former chief minister of Kerala and a leader of the pro-Peking Communist Party of India (CPI), A. K. Gopalan and others previously had been released. (Overseas edition, Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, April 30.) ..I> The Indian government’s decision to review the continuance of the D.I.R. (Defense of India Rule promulgated under the emergency provisions of the Indian Constitution following the Communist Chinese attack on Indian borders in October 1962) and to release most of the political prisoners came partially as a result of the agitation carried out by the Indian Communists in cooperation with all other leftist parties, especially in Kerala and West Bengal. Taking advantage of India’s deteriorating food situation, in early February the Communists launched a campaign of violence in the formerly Communist-ruled state of Kerala which ultimately forced the Indian government to increase the food ration there. In West Bengal the Communists’ campaign to gain political power and prestige by means of civil disturbances started on the opening day of the budget session, Feb. 16, when Communists and other leftist opposition members of the state legislature interrupted the inaugural speech of the governor by staging a walkout in protest against “the Government’s complete failure to check the rising prices of food and other daily necessities and its refusal to release political prisoners arrested under the D.I.R.” (Statesman, Calcutta, Feb. 17.) On Feb. 21, the state legislature “had to be adjourned amidst boisterous scenes within four minutes of its meeting for the presentation of the Budget” when an opposition member snatched a copy of the budget speech from the hands of the West Bengal finance minister. The violent scenes inside the state legislature were matched by mob violence outside. On Feb. 16, the police opened fire in Basirhat, a Communist stronghold 47 miles from Calcutta, to control “a violent crowd” which ransacked several government offices (Statesman, Feb. 17). The pro-Moscow CPI, in its editorial in the Party organ New Age (Feb. 27) commenting on the opposition’s strategy, said: ‘L. . . the people have no other alternative but to stand up and fight for their own sake and for the sake of the nation. . . . If Kerala could teach the highhanded rulers a lesson, West Bengal too can.” The reference to Kerala indicated Communist determination to adopt the same tactics used in Kerala in February to gain political support by exploiting the food situation. Following the Feb. 16 incident in Basirhat, a statewide condition of uncertainty coupled with acts of violence continued for six days. On Feb. 22, Calcutta students observed Martyrs’ Day in memory of those killed by police fire. On March 4, demonstrators set ablaze state-run buses in several places. On March 5 and 6, 22 government offices were set afire and the demonstrators burned the Krishnanagar railway station, banks and many private homes. Iv
2
hfARCH-hUL,
1966
)
On March IO, the Communists and other leftist parties organized a general strike in West Bengal which resulted in large-scale destruction of public properties, the loss of 3g lives as the result of police gunfire and the arrest of over 5,500 persons, and brought the civil administration to virtual collapse. Reported the Statesman, March 28, “Within two hours in the morning, from g:30 to I 1:3o-the coincidence is marked-there were dozens of cases of wanton destruction of railway and Government property and mob-police clashes, furious crowds striking hard at any effort to maintain normal civic activities.” Referring to the cases of arson, the Statesman (March 31) reported that those responsible were remarkable for “their deliberateness, deftness, determination in purpose and above all the neat organization with which they practiced incendiarism. Unless a special quality of fuel was used, the 18 coaches of the Barauni Express could not have been consumed so quickly by fire, with flames rising up to 20 feet. It was obvious that a premeditated plan worked, an organized small group was in operation and the group had men who had the necessary training. . . .” Throughout the state, the army had to be called to assist the civil administration. P. C. Sen, chief minister of West Bengal, told the West Bengal Congress Parliamentary Party that “recent violence and destruction in West Bengal fitted in well with international Communist methods.” (Statesman, March 29.) The pro-Moscow CPI organ New Age (March 27)) reporting on the situation in West Bengal, claimed that “unprecedented mass upsurge in the state has raised the problems of food, daily necessities and democratic rights in West Bengal to the national level.” As a result of this agitation, the food situation in West Bengal continued to deteriorate; and the Indian government decided to review the cases of the imprisoned Commtmists. The majority of them now have been released to ease the political tension.
Burma
Insurgents
Focus on Youth
The Revolutionary Government of Burma has recently revealed the methods which are being used by Communist and other underground groups to recruit young students for insurgent activities. According to a government statement broadcast by Rangoon Radio on March 31 and carried by the Rangoon daily Gwdian of April I, a number of students have been taken into the jungle by “leftist and rightist insurgents and saboteurs.” Forty-three are known to have been abducted between December 1965 and March 1966. Of these, 2g were found by the army, who returned them to their parents, 4 surrendered after realizing the falsity of the rebels’ promises and IO were killed in clashes between the army and Communist insurgents. The victims were high school and even primary school students and included girls of I 5 and I 6. Although this was the first time that the full story was made known, it had been hinted at by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, General Ne Win, during a speech at the Peasants’ Seminar held in March in Rangoon, when he disclosed that there were anti-
27
government elements in Burma actively engaged in trying to lure young people with promises of “good pay and a lot of fun.” The Rangoon Working People’s Daily of April I suggested that the reason insurgents were concentrating on the young was that they were failing to gain any significant support against the government from the working people. Though this is the first indication for some time of Communist attempts to exploit students and young children in Burma, it is by no means a new development. Before General Ne Win came to power, Communists had successfully infiltrated the student unions in Burma and used them as fronts which would give public support for their policies. After the coup of March 1962, the Revolutionary Council took steps to control activities, and Communist influence in the universities was reduced by the arrest of Communist leaders. Activists remained relatively quiet until November 1963, when the government attempted to hold peace talks with the Communist insurgents. At a large mass rally on Nov. IO, sponsored by leftist organizations “to bring pressure upon the Revolutionary Government,” agitators made speeches against the “suppression” of students. Following the collapse of the peace talks, student agitation and subversion were renewed, and riots and demonstrations led to the temporary closure of the liberal arts faculties of Rangoon and Mandalay universities.
‘Mao Tse-tung . . . Mao Tse-tung . . . Mao Tse-tung’ The months March and April witnessed intensified glorification of Mao Tse-tung’s thought in the ideological field throughout Communist China. As it is the Chinese Communist way to use campaigns and drives to achieve their immediate political or economic objectives, the present campaign may well be an indication that the oligarchy in Peking is determined to ensure the ideological commitment of Party members when the founder, thinker, mentor and consolidator of the regime is gone. From March 2 to 8, the Peking Jen-min Jib-pao (People’s Daily) devoted its most prominent space to printing either the slogans-“Using the Writing of Chairman Mao as the Supreme Directive for All Our Work,” “ Mao Tse-tung’s Thought in Command”--or direct quotations from Mao’s writings. From March g to 26, with the exception of March II and March 24 when the journal had to give its most prominent space to publishing Peking’s “strongest protest to the Indonesian government” and the Chinese CP Central Committee’s reply declining the invitation to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, the daily for 16 days carried a front-page banner reminding the people that “Mao Tse-ttmg’s Thought Controls Everything.” To demonstrate how the studying of the writings of Mao Tse-tung could be creatively applied, Hsinhw (New China News Agency) in one of its special articles pointed out: “A ng-year-old woman in northwest China, badly burned in a mine explosion, has built a new life in her determined fight back, inspired by the works of Mao Tse-ttmg.” (Hsinhua, March 3.)
28
In another special article Hsinhua praised “the production brigade in Nanliu, one of the poorest villages in Shansi province, [where] little rain fell for 137 days, from summer to autumn; but Nanliu reaped 3.2 tons per hectare of grain, 19 per cent over the peak year of 1964; increased total cotton output by 13.3 per cent; the number of pigs and draught animals by 20 per cent; and income from side occupations by 40 per cent. This was the result not only of hard work, but also long debates and lively discussions in the course of which the people of Nanliu liberated their minds and grasped Mao Tse-tung’s thinking and applied it to their day-today problems.” (Hsinhua, March I 0.) “The members of the People’s communes are working wonders with their own resources,” according to Hsinhua on March 29. “The study of Mao Tse-tung’s writings is equipping them with confidence in their ability to solve problems and with a deeper MarxistLeninist outlook.” Under the caption “The Theory of Mao Tse-tung Can Be Accurately Applied Within the Four Seas,” the Jenmin Jih-pao of April 6 quoted the opinion expressed in an article published by the Australian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) that Chairman Mao “has created a veritable treasure house of material on the Party and has made a unique contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory.” Three days later, the journal further quoted a statement made by the Argentine CP organ Vanguardia Communista that “Mao Tse-tung’s thinking guides the revolutionary transformation of China. . . .” In an editorial “In Putting Politics First, One Must Constantly Put Mao Tse-tung’s Thinking in Command,” the Jen-min Jih-pao on April 22 stated in part: “Mao Tse-tung’s thinking, having passed the test of practice in the Chinese and world revolutionary struggles, in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, and in the struggle against Khrushchev’s revisionism, has already become the powerful ideological weapon of the Chinese people as well as the extremely valuable common treasure of the world’s revolutionary people. Mao Tse-tung’s thinking is exerting an increasingly great and profound influence in the world . . . . “Mao Tse-tung’s thinking is the scientific summation of the Party’s line, principles, policies and experience in struggle. Our Party’s line, principles and policies are all drawn up under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung’s we must put Mao Tse-tung’s thinking. Therefore, thinking in command in carrying out the Party’s line, principles and policies . . . . ”
COMMUNIST
AmAIns