Giving economic accounts: Accounting as cultural practice

A c c o u n t i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d S o c i e t y , Voi. 18,No. 2/3,pP. 107-124, 1993. Printed in Great Britain

0361-3682/93 $6.00+.00 © 1993 Pergamon Press Ltd

GIVING ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS: ACCOUNTING AS C U L T U R A L P R A C T I C E *

C. EDWARD ARRINGTON

Louisiana State University and JERE R. FRANCIS

University of lowa

~stract This essay describes accounting as a practice that has no necessary relation to the institutions and practices of a professionalized t~lite known as "Accountants". We assume that the giving and receiving of economic accounts is a ubiquitous aspect of human expeflence, and we seek to explain its practice as one of donating intelligibility and understanding to what Etzioni (The Moral Dimen$io~z. Totoard a N e w Economics, Free Press, 1988) describes as the "moral dimension" of economic experience. Appropriating arguments from the moral philosopher H. Richard Niebuhr, we outline that moral dimension in a way that culminates in the act of giving economic accounts. Then, through the arguments of Paul Ricoeur, w e show h o w the hermeneutlcal horizon of the economic account can be explained as an a n a l o ~ e to the hermeneutics of speech and the hermeneutics of writing. These two opposed structures of discourse m speech and writing - - form a theoretical typology adequate to the task of expanding our sense of what accounting is and what it is not in a way that accommodates the cultural ubiquity of the economic account.

This essay begins from the assumption that giving e c o n o m i c accounts is a ubiquitous human practice; something that all of us do in diverse cultural, social, political, and e c o n o m i c settings. Accounting is not seen as necessarily limited to those practices and institutions of a professionalized ~lite known as "Accountants". As Barbara Herrnstein Smith explains, a broad sense of e c o n o m i c accounting points toward a ubiquitous aspect of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e and offers a way to assimilate the e c o n o m i c into moral discourse and debate:

Given what seems to be the inexorability of economic accounting in and throughout every aspect of human and not only human - - existence, from the base of the base to the tip of the superstructure, and given also that its operations implicate each of us in loss, cost, debt, death and other continuous or ultimate reckonings, it is understandable that the dream of an escape from e c o n o m y should be so sweet and the longing for it so pervasive and recurrent. Since it does appear to be inescapable, however, the better, that is, more effective, more profitable, alternative would seem to be not to seek to go beyond economy but to do the best w e can going through ... (Smith, 1987, p. 17))

* An earlier version of this essay was titled "Accounting and the Labor of Text Production: Some Thoughts on the Hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur". That version was presented at the conference on "Accounting and the Humanities: The Appeal of Other Voices" held at The University of Iowa, September 1989. O u r appreciation extends to participants at that conference as well as participants in accounting workshops at The University of Stirling, Macquarie University, and Louisiana State University. Special appreciation is due to our colleagues William Schweiker, David Klemm, Anthony Hopwood, and two anonymous reviewers. We would also like to thank Jay Semel, Lorna Olsen, and o u r colleagues at The Center for Advanced Study, The University of Iowa, where most of the work on this manuscript was done. i Smith's views and positions on the relation between the moral and the economic are very different from our own. The reader should not then infer that she would agree with the position taken in this essay (see Smith, 1988). 107

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Smith, and others, are interested to redeem what Etzioni ( 1 9 8 8 ) describes as "the moral dimension" of economic experience just as they are interested to redeem "the e c o n o m i c dimension" of moral experience. But she, and others, p r o c e e d in a way quite different from the more c o m m o n liberal tradition of the moraleconomic ~ a tradition which isolates this or that model of the e c o n o m i c self, and then stylizes e c o n o m i c experience as if it ought to be "correspondent with" the moral implications of the "favored" model. Smith, and her adversaries like Habermas, situate intellectual inquiry into the moral-economic aspects of experience within discourse ethics ~ a field concerned with the consequential interactions between humans engaged in speaking or writing about e c o n o m i c experience, in c o m m u n i t y with others, and with a hermeneutical eye toward interpreting, understanding, and donating meaning to lived experience. It is this dymanic, interactive, and consequential practice of discourse that forms the object domain of "economic accounting", of "the giving of economic accounts". The task of this essay is to offer one perspective on h o w accounting might be reimagined as a cultural practice of giving e c o n o m i c accounts, accounts which have economic, moral, and hermeneutical implications for those w h o give and receive them. As a caveat, ours is just one perspective, irredeemably partial and in no sense exhaustive, on b o w accounting might be construed as cultural practice (see Morgan, 1988). There are already related studies in accounting (e.g. Roberts, 1991; Arrington & Puxty, 1991), though these differ from the c o n c e r n of this essay: to describe accounting as a practical response to the tensions that surround morale c o n o m i c experience. The first section of the essay offers one way of comprehending these moral-economic tensions, and one way of understanding why discursive practices of giving accounts are necessary in the face of these tensions, by appealing to the arguments of the moral philosopher and theologian H. Richard Niebuhr.

The second section of the essay then turns to the question of h o w e c o n o m i c accounts c o m e to donate intelligibility, meaning and understanding to moral-economic experience. This second section is heavily influenced by the structural hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, particularly some of his earlier works. The essay concludes with some allusions to possibilities for further inquiry and some discussion of the limitations of the analysis.

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL RENDERING OF MORAL-ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE Perhaps the most fundamental of moral questions - - certainly an ancient question - - is the question of the self, of what it means to be both a representative of "human" being and to be a human. This a timeless question, one that has no terminus since the Socratic question m "Know thyself" m endures to death. It seems to us that any adequate response to this question must include substantial concerns with the "economic" self ~ the self w h o understands him- or herself as a being capable of constructing one's experience ("dwellings") rather than merely accepting (animal-like) the givens of one's existence. These constructions (dwellings, oikoi) are not enacted in isolation from other humans; rather, they o c c u r in community with others. To put it cryptically, Crusoe has his Friday; Friday his Crusoe. The e c o n o m i c self is thus not only a productive self but also a communal self m our e c o n o m i c choices and actions are both conditioned by and consequential for others w h o share our status as "citizens" of moral-economic communities. Thus the e c o n o m i c "serf" is not a notional self; he or she is both constituted by and constitutive o f communities of others. In Etzioni's terms, "[T]he individual and the community make each other and require each other" (1988, p. 9). In this section of the essay, though in an admittedly brief and underargued way, we explain three images of the morale c o n o m i c self: the maker, the citizen, and the answerer. These images are appropriated from H.

ACCOUNTING AS CULTURALPRACTICE Richard N i e b u h r ( 1 9 6 3 ) , and they motivate a n e e d for e c o n o m i c accounts of the moral c o m p l e x i t i e s that s u r r o u n d the e c o n o m i c aspects of the e x p e r i e n c e of serf.

The self-as-maker For Niebuhr, the m o s t obvious e l e m e n t of the e c o n o m i c s e r f - - an e l e m e n t salient in a tradition of practical moral p h i l o s o p h y that runs from Aristotle to Marx and the pragmatists B is the self-as-producer, as the "maker" of things: In the history of man's long quest after knowledge of himself as agent - - that is, as a being in charge of his conduct - - he has used fruitfully several other symbols and concepts in apprehending the form of his practical life and in givingshape to it in action. The most common symbol has been that of the maker, the fashioner. What is man like in all of his actions? The suggestion readily comes to him that he is like an artificer who constructs things according to an idea and for the sake of an end (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 48). The h u m a n p o t e n t i a l to "make" things, to c o n s t r u c t a w o r l d , raises a range of b r o a d l y moral and m o r e n a r r o w l y teleological questions, questions p e r h a p s best u n d e r s t o o d as questions about the good of p r o d u c t i v e activity. Artifacts are c o n s t r u c t e d " a c c o r d i n g to an idea and for the sake of an end". The ideational and teleological aspects of p r o d u c t i o n d i r e c t a t t e n t i o n t o w a r d the reflective and deliberative p r o c e s s e s t h r o u g h w h i c h an agent's p r o d u c t i v e imagination c o n d i t i o n s the activity of making. Such p r o c e s s e s involve imaginative speculations about, and c h o i c e s w i t h r e s p e c t to, a range of as-yet-unrealized "dwellings" that are v i e w e d as good, or at least b e t t e r than the given. This sense of the g o o d life morally c o n d i t i o n s p r o d u c t i v e activity inasmuch as artifacts ( p r o d u c t s ) are c a n d i d a t e s for questions about the g o o d that they serve, about w h a t they c o n t r i b u t e to the human pursuit of the g o o d life; or, in N i e b u h r ' s terms, questions a b o u t the "end .... for the sake of w h i c h " artifacts are p r o d u c e d . These moral d i m e n s i o n s are not s o m e t h i n g o v e r w h i c h the self is sovereign; they are not c h o i c e s that can b e referred, for example, to s o m e a u t o n o m o u s "utility" p r e f e r e n c e of the self. As Michael Walzer (1983, p. 9 7 ) notes, in every m o d e r n

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society, p r o h i b i t i o n s are p l a c e d on p r o d u c t i o n and e x c h a n g e for teleological reasons, reasons that r e j e c t particular "artifacts" b e l i e v e d to b e i m p e d i m e n t s w i t h r e s p e c t to the pursuit of the g o o d life for a people, a polity. The p r o d u c t i v e serf is thus seen as responsible to teleological questions with r e s p e c t to the g o o d of his or h e r p r o d u c t i o n . Note that w e are not making substantive claims about w h a t is and w h a t is not g o o d to p r o d u c e ; those claims are the moral p r o v i n c e of particular selves and particular e c o n o m i c communities. But w e are making the p h i l o s o p h i c a l claim B a claim that may well be counterfactual sociologically, that all p r o d u c t i v e activity has a teleological dimension; it is always possible and usually reasonable to ask agents to give a c c o u n t s of the g o o d that their activity seeks. These accounts will inevitably r e q u i r e s o m e revelation of the i n t r o s p e c t i v e reflections and d e l i b e r a t i o n s that gave rise to particular c h o i c e s and actions on the p a r t of the agent, the maker. In claiming that e c o n o m i c c h o i c e s and actions have a teleological moral d i m e n s i o n w e c o m e to u n d e r s t a n d the difference b e t w e e n substantive claims a b o u t the g o o d of p r o d u c t i o n (claims about w h a t is g o o d ) and the claim that all p r o d u c t i o n is a c a n d i d a t e for d i s c o u r s e with r e s p e c t to the g o o d that it seeks. Indeed, the history of moral p h i l o s o p h y as well as the history of e c o n o m i c s has t w i s t e d and t u r n e d t h r o u g h a variety of ways of d e s c r i b i n g this teleological d i m e n s i o n of p r o d u c t i o n . Now, for example, many neoclassical e c o n o m i s t s c o n s t r u e the "good" of p r o d u c t i o n t h r o u g h a radically individualistic and emotivist variant of utilitarianism: humans are assumed to p r o d u c e in the name of the g o o d u n d e r s t o o d as their o w n a p p r o p r i a t i v e and private self-interests. This is a p o w e r f u l image of the good, an image that certainly explains a great deal of the reasons w h y humans p r o d u c e . But it is simply o n e image of the good, a c o n t e s t a b l e image inasmuch as it can b o t h always be referred back to the question of the good of pursuing one's o w n interests r a t h e r than s o m e o t h e r telos, and to the question of the difference b e t w e e n particular instances w h e n self-interest seems a morally justifiable

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end and when not. Niebuhr explains just how diverse moral perspectives on the teleological dimension of production have been: The men who have employed this image of man-themaker in understanding and in shaping their conduct have, of course, by no means been unanimous in their choice of the ideals to be realized nor in their estimate of the potentialities of the material that is to be given the desired or desirable form. Whether the human end is to be achieved for the sake of delight or for further use toward another end, whether it is to be designed for the delight or the use of the self, or of the immediate society or of a universal community - - these remain questions endlessly debated and endlessly submitted to individuals for personal decision. But the debates and decisions are carried on against the background of a common understanding of the nature of our personal existence. We are in all our working on selves - - our own selves or our companions - - technicians, artisans, craftsmen, artists (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 51 ).

what law rebel? By what law or system of laws shall I govern myself and others? How shall I administer the domain of which I am the ruler or in which I participate in rule?" (1963, pp. 52-53).

The self-as-citizen The productive self does not live and act in isolation. At the broadest level, the moral vocabularies and beliefs which inform the p r o d u c t i v e i m a g i n a t i o n as w e l l as t h e t a l e n t s a n d materials which inform productive activity are given over to the self by others. Niebuhr refers this communal character of the economic self t o t h e i m a g e o f " m a n - t h e - c i t i z e n " , as o n e l i v i n g u n d e r law, as o n e w h o r e c o g n i z e s h i m - o r h e r s e l f as r e s p o n s i b l e to, a c c o u n t a b l e to, t h e v a l u e s , mores, customs, expectations, and obligations t h a t f o l l o w f r o m i d e n t i t y as a c i t i z e n . T h i s metaphor of the citizen adds a deontological aspect to the moral dimension of economic experience. Niebuhr explains:

These deontologlcal questions can be reduced for purposes of this essay to the question of "To whom a m I, as a m o r a l - e c o n o m i c self, a c c o u n t a b l e ? " T h i s q u e s t i o n is n o t s t r a i g h t forward either anthropologically or existentially. V a r i o u s c o m m u n i t i e s a n d c u l t u r e s h a v e imposed a diverse range of deontological expectations and obligations upon economic agents. Further, a particular agent, especially in the contemporary world, recognizes multiple c o m m u n i t i e s t o w h i c h h e o r s h e is a c c o u n t a b l e . I n a c t i n g r e s p o n s i b l y t o w a r d o n e , h e o r s h e is likely to act irresponsibly toward others. For example, meeting the expectations of one's e m p l o y e r i n a g l o b a l l y c o m p e t i t i v e w o r l d is likely to create moral dysfunctions with respect to one's citizenship toward one's family, one's self, o r i n d e e d o n e ' s G o d . As A l a s d a i r M a c I n t y r e ( 1 9 8 4 ) n o t e s , t h e m o d e m s e l f is a " f r a g m e n t e d self", living out a variety of roles, tom between competing and incommensurable responsibilities toward the various communities to whom the self owes accountability and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as a c i t i z e n . N i e b u h r is a w a r e o f both the historical variance in notions of citizenship and the multiplicity and complexity that follow from the many ways in which o n e ' s i d e n t i t y as a c i t i z e n c o n d i t i o n s the e c o n o m i c self. H e c o l l a p s e s t h a t v a r i a n c e a n d multiplicity into three broad domains of moral comprehension:

We come to self-awareness if not to self-existence in the midst ofraores, of commandments and rules, Thou $halts and Thou shalt nots, of directions and permissions. Whether we begin with primitive man with his sense of them/c, the law of the community projected outward into the total environment, or with the modern child with father and mother images, with repressions and permissions, this life of ours, we say, must take account of morality, of the rule of mores, of the ethos, of the laws and the law, of heteronomy and autonomy, of selfdirectedness and other-directedness, of approvals and disapprovals, of social, legal, and religious sanctions. This is what our total life is like, and hence arise the questions we must answer: "To what law shall i consent, against

Again, as in the case of the maker image, those who employ the citizen symbol for the understanding and regulation of self-conduct, have various domains in view. For some the republic that is to be governed is mostly that of the multifarious self, a being which is a multiplicity seeking unity or a unity diversifying itself into many roles . . . . Or the republic in view is a human community of selves in which the manifoldness is that of many persons with many desires and subject to many regulations issuing from each other. The communal life then is considered as consenting to law and as law-giving. Or again, the community we have in mind may be universal society, and the quest may be after those laws of nature or that will of the universal God which the person is

ACCOUNTING AS CULTURALPRACTICE asked to accept not only withL¢~sent but actively~as legislating citizen in a universal domain(Niebuhr, 1963, pp. 53--54). Citizenship informs e c o n o m i c accountability in a way akin to Habermas' sense of action as something that must be justified in terms of its rightness in the face of norms, values, and expectations that make up something like the "lifeworld" of a community. But m o d e r n experience is such that there are conflicting demands of citizenship imposed upon e c o n o m i c agents - - diverse communities often have defensible deontological claims against agents. Each such c o m m u n i t y will bring its o w n unique moral horizon to bear upon the evaluation of agents and their actions: different perspectives on the good life, different expectations, different senses of what norms are binding u p o n the agent because of his or her status as a citizen of a particular community. Indeed, as w e will see, e c o n o m i c actions can be consequential for communities about w h o m the agent may be unaware, unable to recognize him- or herself as a "citizen" at all. One thinks, for example, of h o w e c o n o m i c actions in a global e c o n o m y have consequences for others far r e m o v e d from the communities within w h i c h the agent's moral identity is seemingly situated. One thinks also of h o w ecological problems emerge from e c o n o m i c activity in a way which raises questions about one's citizenship with respect to the earth or with respect to u n b o r n generations (see Stone, 1987). Two major difficulties thus confront the agent-as-citizen. First, in performing a single e c o n o m i c act, agents recognize various communities to w h o m they might be accountable as citizens. The act will be differentially responsible, and the agent differentially justified in performing the act, depending upon which c o m m u n i t y seeks an accounting for the act. second, e c o n o m i c actions can be consequential in ways which the agent did not or cannot anticipate. As Ricoeur notes, our actions escape us and have consequences which w e did not intend. These consequences may emerge for others with w h o m the agent has no conscious

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recognition of his 0 r her moral force over their lives, his or her responsibility and accountability toward them.

The self.as.answerer Through these two images (the maker and the citizen), Niebuhr paints a complex and mulEffaceted portrait of the moral dimensions of the e c o n o m i c self. He suggests an open-ended and indeterminate teleological and deontological horizon of accounting for e c o n o m i c agents and e c o n o m i c actions. Because of that complexity, he rejects the notion of criterial models of accountability, models that would identify some universal good or some universal right that could serve as a benchmark for making substantive claims about the moral integrity of e c o n o m i c agency. Having rejected criterial approaches, Niebuhr makes a twofold move. First, he suggests that discursive practices (rather than moral criteria) are the phenomenal domain in which concepts of responsibility and accountability are revealed and actualized. This makes him something of a forerunner to a quite c o m m o n c o n t e m p o r a r y field k n o w n as discourse ethics, a field which w e cannot explore in this essay (in general, see Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1990; MacIntyre, 1984; Hauerwas & MacIntyre, 1983. In accounting, see Schweiker, in press; Arrington & Puxty, 1991; Roberts, 1991). Second, he makes a pragmatic move toward cathecontic ethics, toward understanding moral questions as concerned with the "fittingness" of an agent's actions. This cathecontic approach takes account of the multiple and often conflicting choices that the agent must make with respect to the good of his or her action as well as the multiple and conflicting responsibilities that confront the agent because of his or her multiple identities as a "citizen" of diverse communities. Questions of accountability and responsibility b e c o m e questions of w h e t h e r or not m having taken account of the complex scenes in which ordinary experience transpires m agentive actions appear reasonable (for further discussion of cathecontic ethics, see Schrag, 1969, 1986). Niebuhr explains h o w a cathecontic

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approach moves beyond both teleological and deontological approaches: If we use value terms then the differences among the three approaches may be indicated by the terms the good, the right, and thefltttng; for teleology is concerned always with the highest good to which it subordinates the right; consistent deontoingy is concerned with the right, no matter what may happen to our goods; but for the ethics of responsibility the fitting action, the one that fits into a total interaction as response and as anticipation of further response, is alone conducive to the good and alone is right (1963, pp. 60---61). T h i s a c t i v i t y o f e v a l u a t i n g a c t i o n s in t e r m s o f t h e i r f i t t i n g n e s s p r o c e e d s d i s c u r s i v e l y ; t h a t is, through practices wherein agents and/or their interlocutors speak and write about economic a c t i o n s in a w a y t h a t r e v e a l s a n d e x p o s e s t h e complex moral-economic dimensionality of choices and actions. Economic choices and a c t i o n s a r e n o w s e e n as m a d e in r e s p o n s e t o choices and actions that precede the productive self, t h a t d e f i n e t h e s i t u a t e d c h a r a c t e r o f o n e ' s e x i s t e n c e . S u c h c h o i c e s a n d a c t i o n s a r e also m a d e in a n t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e c h o i c e s a n d a c t i o n s of others who will subsequently act and re-act in a w a y c o n d i t i o n e d b y t h e a g e n t ' s p r o d u c t i v e activity. T h e a g e n t ' s a c t i v i t y c o n d i t i o n s t h e available inventory of possible choices and a c t i o n s a v a i l a b l e t o o t h e r s , j u s t as t h e a c t i v i t y o f h i s t o r i c a l o t h e r s has c o n d i t i o n e d t h e a v a i l a b l e inventory of choices and actions available to the agent. In a w a y t h a t is c e n t r a l t o s u b s e q u e n t c l a i m s in this essay, this i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e , communal, and relational character of economic action leads Niebuhr to claim that now we think of all our actions as having the pattern of what we do when we answer another who addresses us. To be engaged in dialogue, to answer questions addressed to us, to defend ourselves against attacks, to reply to injunctions, to meet challenges - - this is common experience. And now we try to think of all our actions as having this character of being responses, answers, to actions upon us . . . . The pattern of thought now is interactional, however much other great images must continue to be used to describe how we perceive and conceive, form associations, and carry on txfliticai, economic, educational, religious, and other enterprises (1963, pp. 56-57). • . .

Responding to questions of accountability and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a r e n o w s e e n as h e r m e n e u t i c a l tasks t o b e p e r f o r m e d r a t h e r t h a n m e r e c h e c k i n g of the simple correspondence between actions and e x a n t e c r i t e r i a p r e s u m e d t o g o v e r n t h e agent. In Niebuhr's terms, this leads to a new (though somewhat classical) notion of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as r e s p o n s i v e n e s s . T h e p a r a d i g m o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y shifts f r o m t h e c o r r e s p o n dence between action and ex ante expectations p r e s u m e d o b l i g a t o r y , a n d t o w a r d d i s c o u r s e as a practice of revealing the reasonableness of action through the activity of giving accounts. Alasdair MacIntyre explains this hermeneutical rather than criterial paradigm of accountability, a n d h e d o e s s o in a w a y t h a t r e f e r s a c c o u n t a b i l i t y back to our original question m the question of t h e self, o f w h a t it m e a n s t o b e h u m a n : The importance of the concept of intelligibility is closely related to the fact that the most basic distinction of all embedded in our discourse and our practice ... is that between human beings and other beings. Human beings can be held to account for that of which they are the authors; other beings cannot. To identify an occurrence as an action is in the paradigmatic instances to identify it under a type of description which enables us to see that occurrence as flowing intelligibly from a human agent's intentions, motives, passions, and purposes. It is therefore to understand an action as something for which someone is accountable, about which it is always appropriate to ask the agent for an intelligible account (Maclntyre, 1984, p. 209). This section of the essay has explored moral dimensions of economic action. Because of the c o m p l e x i t y o f e c o n o m i c c h o i c e s a n d a c t i o n s in the face of multiple and conflicting claims about the good and the right, no particular teleology or deontology can be presumed universally valid as a s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t w h i c h e c o n o m i c a c t i o n a n d economic agency can be evaluated. Thus, with Niebuhr, we moved to a cathecontic posture on the moral dimensions of economic experience. T h a t p o s t u r e , in t u r n , s u g g e s t s d i s c o u r s e D t h e giving of economic accounts D as t h e medium through which claims about economic responsibility, agency, and accountability are achieved and made reasonable. The essay now turns to a more structural and

ACCOUNTING AS CULTURALPRACTICE functional concern; that is, c o n c e r n over the question Of h o w discourse works to p r o d u c e these sorts of claims. The w o r k of discourse can be modelled in terms of two very different structures of discourse, one that corresponds to discourse-as-speech, and another that corresponds to discourse-as-writing, These two structures have very different hermeneutical horizons; that is, very different possibilities for rendering the choices and actions of e c o n o m i c agents intelligible, understandable, and meaningful as moral-economic phenomena. Throughout this second section, we rely heavily upon the structural hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. However, w e appropriate his arguments in a selective way that conceals more about his broad and intriguing hermeneutical agenda than it reveals. Ricoeur's later w o r k goes well beyond the issues that w e discuss in this essay. As a caveat then, the reader should not interpret our claims and concerns as the same as Ricoeur's.

THE HERMENEUTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMIC ACCOUNT Clearly, the hermeneutical accomplishments of any discursive event - - any event w h e r e someone says ( o r writes) something about something to someone else - - will depend primarily u p o n the concrete and particular circumstances in which such a discourse unfolds. Those circumstances have to do with the time and place of the discursive event, the particular p h e n o m e n a (actions, events, etc.) to which the discourse refers, as well as the unique concerns and interests of the participants involved in the discourse (speakers or writers, listeners or readers). It is clear then that the substantive ways in which e c o n o m i c experience is rendered intelligible, meaningful, and understandable cannot be abstracted away from the performative context of actual accounting events. To paraphrase Habermas, claims about the reasonableness ( o r goodness, or rightness)

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of e c o n o m i c actions are the province of the discursive participants themselves m their lives, their concerns, their interests and desires. Nonetheless, through Ricoeur, it is possible to see h o w general structures of discursive practice condition the hermeneutical accomplishments of e c o n o m i c accounting. He describes such structures by disaggregating discourse into its various elements and by then showing h o w these elements serve quite different hermeneutical functions depending u p o n w h e t h e r discourse is structured as speech or as writing. This makes it possible to speak of the different hermeneutical horizons of speech and writing, different possibilities for interpretation, meaning, and understanding that follow from the two structures. Between the two structural poles (speech and writing) a range of hermeneutical possibilities can be seen to exist. In this section of the essay, w e describe h o w the structure of accounting discourse, understood as a m u c h broader domain than conventional notions of accounting can accommodate, conditions substantive hermeneutical and moral consequences of the discourse. In this way, w e are able to suggest a structuralhermeneutic model of accounting as a broadly cultural practice.

Language and discourse To approach accounting as a broadly conceived discursive practice, it must be freed from identification with any particular language (e.g. the double-entry calculus) since such a constraint w o u l d obviously limit the giving of accounts to only those individuals c o m p e t e n t and literate with respect to that particular language. To escape such a constraint, hermeneutical questions - - questions of meaning, interpretation, and understanding ~ must c o m e to be seen as largely independent of what language is used in the giving of e c o n o m i c accounts. By drawing a distinction between language and discourse, Ricoeur makes just this sort of independence possible. Influenced by the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, Ricoeur defines language as a "code - - or the set of codes m on the basis

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o f w h i c h a p a r t i c u l a r s p e a k e r p r o d u c e s parole as a p a r t i c u l a r message" ( 1 9 7 6 , p. 3). 2 W h i l e it is n o t o u r p u r p o s e to e x p l a i n t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of this definition fully, this definition treats language as a s y n c h r o n i c system of signs a n d rules for t h e i r r e l a t i o n to each other. All languages are, to a structuralist, c l o s e d systems o f signs, a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a language is c o m p l e t e l y e x h a u s t e d b y the r u l e s o f relations b e t w e e n signs. Put in a n oversimplified way, all languages are v i e w e d in t h e s a m e w a y that w e typically v i e w p u r e m a t h e m a t i c s ; that is, as a closed system o f signs a n d rules for t h e i r relation. T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n of this structuralist v i e w for this essay is straightforward: b e c a u s e o f its s y n c h r o n i c i t y a n d formals y s t e m i c character, language c a n n o t a c c o u n t for the m e a n i n g s that "attach" to signs t h r o u g h the use of language i n discourse. Like t h e n u m b e r s in m a t h e m a t i c s , w o r d s c o m e to b e s e e n as signs that can, theoretically, take o n an infinity of possible m e a n i n g s ; n e w m e a n i n g s c a n e m e r g e for the sign just as old m e a n i n g s c a n disappear. T h e e n t i r e h e r m e n e u t i c a l h o r i z o n of m e a n i n g a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g is g i v e n o v e r to d i s c o u r s e m to t h e p r a g m a t i c i n t e r a c t i o n of h u m a n s w h o actively p r o d u c e m e a n i n g t h r o u g h the use of language as a m e d i u m for the p r a c t i c e of discourse. R i c o e u r d e s c r i b e s how, from a structuralist view, language q u a language is n o t p r o d u c t i v e of m e a n i n g : Language no longer appears as a mediation between minds and things. It constitutes a world of its own, within which each item only refers to other items of the same system, thanks to the interplay of oppositions and differences constitutive of the system. In a word, language is no longer treated as a "form of life", as Wittgenstein would call it, but as a self.suificientsystem of inner relationships ( 1976, p. 6). He t h e n d e s c r i b e s h o w this v i e w of language frees t h e sign ( w o r d s , n u m b e r s , etc.) to take o n

an infinity o f p o s s i b l e m e a n i n g s d e p e n d i n g u p o n h o w signs are d e p l o y e d in discourse. He refers this f r e e d o m to w h a t h e calls the polysemic c h a r a c t e r o f t h e sign; and, b y polysemy, h e m e a n s the ability of the sign to c o m e to m e a n m o r e t h a n o n e thing. H e e x p l a i n s as well h o w p o l y s e m y is n o t o n l y a desirable h e r m e n e u t i c a l feature o f t h e sign ( i n a s m u c h as it makes the d o m a i n o f m e a n i n g e x p a n d in a w a y that a c c o m m o d a t e s t h e diverse n e e d s for m e a n i n g that a c c r u e to e x p e r i e n c e ) b u t also h o w p o l y s e m y is n e c e s s a r y as a n e c o n o m i c p r i n c i p l e : That polysemy is not a pathological phenomenon but a healthy feature of our language is shown by the failure of the opposite hypothesis. A languagewithout polysemy would violate the principle of economy, for it would extend its vocabulary infinitely. Furthermore, it would violate the rule of communication, because it would multiply its designations as often as, in principle, the diversity of human experience and the plurality of subjects of experience demanded. We need a lexical system that is economical, flexible, and sensitive to context, in order to express the spectrum of human experience (Ricoeur, 1977, p. 115). T w o p o i n t s follow from this s t r u c t u r a l v i e w of language that are r e l e v a n t to o u r a r g u m e n t . First, a s t r u c t u r a l i s t v i e w o f language gives h e r m e n e u t i c a l q u e s t i o n s e n t i r e l y o v e r to d i s c o u r s e s i n c e language c o m e s to b e s e e n as in a n d o f itself i n d e p e n d e n t of q u e s t i o n s of meaning, interpretation, and understanding. T h e r e is, in short, n o n e c e s s a r y c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n "signs" a n d " m e a n i n g s " m i s t a k e n l y p r e s u m e d to "attach" to them. In this way, m e a n i n g is p r o d u c e d a n d r e - p r o d u c e d pragmatically a n d c o n t i n g e n t l y ; it passes e n t i r e l y o v e r to d i s c u r s i v e practices, Second, b e c a u s e m e a n i n g is p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h p r a g m a t i c interactions; and, b e c a u s e s u c h i n t e r a c t i o n s are always s i t u a t e d w i t h i n t h e c o n c r e t e moral, political, a n d social c o n t e x t s of t h e i r o w n e n a c t m e n t , h e r m e n e u t i c s c o m e s to b e s e e n as a moral, political, a n d social p h e n o m e n o n . T h e

2 Structural linguistics (or structuralism) has been an important intellectual influence over numerous disciplines - - the anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss (1966), the economics of Luis Althusser (1971, 1979); the semiology of Roland Barthes ( 1967), the psychoanalytic theories ofJacques Lacan(1977). It is also a significantinfluence over the deconstructive programme of Jacques Derrida ( !975, 1978, 1981 ). For a lucid introduction to structuralism, see Johnathan Culler (1982).

ACCOUNTING AS CULTURALPRACTICE m e a n i n g of e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t s b e c o m e s , for example, inextricably b o u f t d ~ u p with the h e r m e n e u t i c a l n e e d s of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n v o l v e d in giving a n d r e c e i v i n g s u c h a c c o u n t s .

Hermeneutics a n d the event character o f discourse Having shifted the linguistic analysis of h e r m e n e u t i c s to d i s c o u r s e a n d away from language, R i c o u e r t h e n seeks to e x p l a i n h e r m e n e u t i c a l p r o c e s s e s t h r o u g h a t t e n t i o n to the e l e m e n t s that make u p a d i s c u r s i v e event. T h e first is w h a t h e calls t h e " e v e n t " c h a r a c t e r of discourse, the historical s i t u a t i o n of a d i s c u r s i v e e v e n t in space a n d time. Put simply, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , m e a n i n g s , a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g s that a d i s c o u r s e yields c o m e to b e s e e n as i n f l u e n c e d b y the t i m e a n d place of the e n a c t m e n t o f the d i s c o u r s e as an event. T h e h e r m e n e u t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the e v e n t c h a r a c t e r of d i s c o u r s e c a n b e s e e n as b o u n d e d b y t w o p o l e s m t h e e v e n t c h a r a c t e r of s p e e c h a n d t h e e v e n t c h a r a c t e r of writing. T h e m o s t o b v i o u s d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the t w o ( s p e e c h a n d w r i t i n g ) has to d o w i t h the t r a n s i t o r y or fleeting c h a r a c t e r of speech; it is a d i s c o u r s e that has an identifiable b e g i n n i n g a n d an identifiable end, a finite, historical h o r i z o n l i m i t e d b y the physical ability o f p a r t i c i p a n t s to sustain it. Writing, o n t h e o t h e r hand, is t h e o r e t i c a l l y limitless in time. W r i t i n g thus makes d i s c o u r s e repetitious m a brand n e w discursive event takes p l a c e e v e r y t i m e the w r i t t e n text is read. T h u s w r i t i n g e x t e n d s t h e t e m p o r a l r e a c h of the t e x t across the s p e c t r u m of history, to r e a d e r s in d i s t a n t w o r l d s at d i s t a n t times. I n an a n a l o g o u s way, the h e r m e n e u t i c s of e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t i n g can b e u n d e r s t o o d as v a r y i n g d e p e n d i n g u p o n t h e historical r e a c h of t h e a c c o u n t . Often, e c o n o m i c e v e n t s are a c c o u n t e d for as t r a n s i t o r y events, r e l e v a n t p e r h a p s for t h e p r e s e n t m o m e n t b u t n o t for others. A g o o d e x a m p l e w o u l d b e the "family" c o n v e r s a t i o n over, say, the " m o n t h l y " b u d g e t , a conversation focused upon contemporary e c o n o m i c activities, activities w h i c h lose t h e i r hermeneutical relevance once the next m o n t h ( t h e n e x t p a y c h e c k ) i n t e r v e n e s . At t h e o t h e r

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extreme - - the hermeneutics of discourse m o d e l l e d as w r i t i n g - - o n e c a n i m a g i n e h o w a text o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e c o n s u m p t i o n p a t t e r n s o f c o n t e m p o r a r y W e s t e r n families makes t h e meaning of the same e c o n o m i c concept (family c o n s u m p t i o n ) e x p a n d its h e r m e n e u t i c a l h o r i z o n to e n c o m p a s s the e x p e r i e n c e s of d i s t a n t o t h e r s (e.g. the T h i r d W o r l d o r u n b o r n g e n e r a t i o n s ) . T h e different a c c o u n t s , o n e a n a l o g o u s to t h e m o d e l o f s p e e c h a n d t h e o t h e r to t h e m o d e l of writing, o c c u p y different historical situations. As t h e s e historical situat i o n s differ, so d o e s t h e m e a n i n g ( t h e h e r m e n e u t i c a l h o r i z o n ) o f the d i s c o u r s e event. It is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e that t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r a d i s c o u r s e is, materially, s p o k e n o r w r i t t e n is less i m p o r t a n t t h a n the h e r m e n e u t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g d i s c o u r s e as s o m e t h i n g that f u n c t i o n s like s p e e c h o r like writing. For e x a m p l e , s o m e w r i t i n g (e.g. an office m e m o ) has the h e r m e n e u t i c a l c h a r a c t e r of s p e e c h - - m e a n i n g is r e l e v a n t for the m o m e n t b u t n o t b e y o n d t h e m o m e n t . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t , for Ricoeur, is to r e c o g n i z e t h e r a n g e of ways in w h i c h m e a n i n g , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a n d understanding can emerge through discursive events. T h e h e r m e n e u t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the m o d e l o f w r i t i n g go far b e y o n d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f repeating speech, m a t e r i a l l y fixing speech, t h r o u g h writing:

When we consider the range of social and political changes which can be related to the inventionof writing, we may surmise that writing is much more than mere material fixation.We need only remind ourselves of some of these tremendous achievements. To the possibility of transferring orders over long distances without serious distortions may be connected the birth of political rule exercised by a distant state . . . . To the fixation of rules for reckoning may be referred the birth of market relationships, therefore the birth of economics. To the constitution of archives, history. To the fixation of law as the standard of decisions, independent from the opinion of the concrete judge, the birth of justice and juridical codes, etc. Such an immense range of effects suggests that human discourse is not merely preserved from destruction by being fixed in writing, but that it is deeply affected in its communicative function (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 28).

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Hermeneutics and subjectivity: the speaker and the writer Whereas language lacks a subject m in the sense that the question "Who is speaking?" does not apply at this level m discourse refers back to its speaker by means of a complex set of indicators such as the personal pronouns. We shall say that the "instance of discourse" is self-referential (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 198). Perhaps the m o s t o b v i o u s c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e m e a n i n g of d i s c o u r s e is the force of speakers a n d w r i t e r s as agents of the p r o d u c t i o n of discourse. T h e p r o d u c t i o n of d i s c o u r s e is a m o r a l - e c o n o m i c activity, i n f u s e d w i t h p u r p o s e and hermeneutical intention, replete with possibilities for c h o i c e s a n d a c t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t to w h a t gets said ( w r i t t e n ) . D i s c o u r s e thus c o m e s to b e a r w h a t Calvin Schrag ( 1 9 8 6 ) t e r m s the "self-implicature" o f its p r o d u c e r s , or w h a t R i c o e u r t e r m s style, "the p r o m o t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r .standpoint" ( 1981, p. 137). R i c o e u r d r a w s u p o n the m e t a p h o r of w o r k to explain: The key is in the categories of production and labour; in this respect, the model of the artisan is particularly instructive (the stamp on furniture in the eighteenthcentury, the signature of the mist, etc. ). For the concept of author.., appears as the correlate of the individuality of the work. The most striking proof is provided by the example which is least literary, namely the style of the construction of the mathematical object. . . . Even the construction of an abstract model of phenomena, insofar as it is a practical activity immanent in a process of structuration, bears a proper name. A given mode of structuration necessarily appears to be chosen instead of some other mode . . . . Man individuates himself in producing individual works. The signature is the mark of that relation ( 1981, pp. 137-138). W h i l e all discursive e v e n t s b e a r the "signature", the "self-implicature" o f t h e i r p r o d u c e r s , for Ricoeur, the h e r m e n e u t i c a l force of this self-implicature" differs dramatically as o n e m o v e s from t h e m o d e l of writing. That force is s t r o n g e s t in s p e e c h w h e r e the m e a n i n g of w h a t is said is often i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e q u e s t i o n of w h a t / (as a s p e a k e r ) m e a n . T h e h e r m e n e u t i c a l force of speakers is e x e r c i s e d t h r o u g h a variety of physical a n d r h e t o r i c a l m e c h a n i s m s u n a v a i l a b l e in writing. A s p e a k e r

c a n use his o r h e r b o d y to produce gestures, i n t o n a t i o n s , inflections, p o i n t i n g , etc., all o f w h i c h c o n t r i b u t e to t h e h e r m e n e u t i c a l cons e q u e n c e s o f t h e discourse. Speech c a n m o v e t h r o u g h a dialectic o f q u e s t i o n s a n d answer, of i n t e r r u p t i o n , of appeals for clarification. Alternatively, w r i t i n g places t h e a u t h o r at a d i s t a n c e from the reader. T h e speaking s u b j e c t disappears, r e p l a c e d b y material marks ( 1 9 7 6 , p. 26). T h e d i s c u r s i v e t r a n s a c t i o n b e c o m e s o n e b e t w e e n the t e x t a n d t h e reader, n o t t h e a u t h o r a n d the reader. I n t h e c o n t e x t of giving e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t s , w h a t are t h e h e r m e n e u t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f this difference b e t w e e n t h e m o d e l o f s p e e c h a n d the m o d e l o f w r i t i n g , this different force o f the s p e a k e r a n d t h e author? T h e m o s t o b v i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n has to d o w i t h q u e s t i o n s o f e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t a b i l i t y a n d e c o n o m i c agency. T o recall N i e b u h r , w e have s e e n h o w e c o n o m i c c h o i c e s a n d a c t i o n s c o n f r o n t a self c a u g h t u p in a w e b of complex and often i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e c h o i c e s a n d available a c t i o n s that have teleological a n d d e n t o l o g i c a l i m p o r t for b o t h the self as w e l l as for others. Such c o m p l e x i t y a n d i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y led N i e b u h r to suggest the image o f t h e " a n s w e r e r " as the a p p r o p r i a t e image for q u e s t i o n s of a g e n c y a n d a c c o u n t ability. I n a similar way, M a c l n t y r e suggested that a c c o u n t a b i l i t y q u e s t i o n s entail d i s c o u r s e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d revealing s u b j e c t i v e i n t e n tions. In his terms, q u e s t i o n s of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y are q u e s t i o n s o f the e x t e n t to w h i c h w e c a n "see [an] o c c u r r e n c e as flowing intelligibly from a h u m a n a g e n t ' s i n t e n t i o n s , motives, passions, and purposes". The question of accountability thus d e m a n d s access to the s u b j e c t i v i t y o f e c o n o m i c actors; and, t h r o u g h Ricoeur, w e are able to see h o w d i s c o u r s e m o d e l l e d as s p e e c h facilitates s u c h access. Yet s o m e t i m e s e c o n o m i c e v e n t s are of h e r m e n e u t i c a l i n t e r e s t in ways less b o u n d to s u b j e c t i v e i n t e n t i o n s . I n this sense, e c o n o m i c e v e n t s take o n o b j e c t i v e status. H u m a n s have t h e n e e d to k n o w w h a t is g o i n g o n in the e c o n o m i c world independently of concerns w i t h w h o is a c c o u n t a b l e o r r e s p o n s i b l e for s u c h events. Likewise, agents n e e d t o k n o w t h e state

ACCOUNTING AS CULTURALPRACTICE o f e c o n o m i c e x p e r i e n c e a s ~ i t is p r i o r t o reflections upon what kind of w o r l d they seek t o p r o d u c e . T h e y n e e d t o k n o w t h e materials, r e s o u r c e s , an d c o n s t r a i n t s at hand; w h a t is p o s s i b l e and w h a t is not. T h e y n e e d t o k n o w t h e kind o f e c o n o m i c w o r l d that o t h e r p e o p l e at o t h e r p l a c e s a n d t i m e s h a v e o c c u p i e d ; t h e y n e e d in s h o r t an " a r c h i v e " that m a k e s e c o n o m i c i n f o r m a t i o n available i r r e s p e c t i v e o f h e r m e n e u t i c a l c o n c e r n s w i t h w h o is r e s p o n sible o r a c c o u n t a b l e for t h e e v e n t s r e c o r d e d in s u c h archives. E c o n o m i c a c t i o n s o f t e n h a v e unintended consequences; they can impact the m o r a l q u a l i t y o f e c o n o m i c e x p e r i e n c e in w a y s that a g e n t s d o n o t and o f t e n c o u l d n o t anticipate. In this sense, e c o n o m i c a c t i o n c a n b e c o m e m o r a l l y an d h e r m e n e u t i c a l l y r e l e v a n t t o distant c o m m u n i t i e s w i t h n o p r e d i c t a b l e i n t e r e s t at all in h o l d i n g an a g e n t a c c o u n t a b l e o r r e s p o n s i b l e . R i c o e u r refers this s o r t o f d i s s e m i n a t o r y h e r m e n e u t i c a l f u n c t i o n to t h e s o c i a l d i m e n s i o n o f e c o n o m i c e x p e r i e n c e , a d i m e n s i o n that is analogically r e l a t e d to d i s c o u r s e m o d e l l e d as w r i t i n g , as a t ex t : In the same way that a text is detached from its author, an action is detached from its agent and develops consequences of its own. This autonomisation of human action constitutes the social dimension of action. An action is a social phenomenon ... because our deeds escape us and have effects which we did not intend ... An action leaves a "trace", it makes its "mark" when it contributes to the emergence of such patterns which become the documents of human action ( 1981, p. 206). Thus w e have seen h o w subjectivity can be differentially f o r c e f u l in p r o d u c i n g th e m e a n i n g of e c o n o m i c events, and w e have seen h o w the m o d e l o f t h e s p e a k e r as o p p o s e d to t h e m o d e l o f t h e w r i t e r is th e paradigmatic instance o f this differential force. This has significant implications for u n d e r s t a n d i n g t w o v e r y different h e r m e n e u t i cal functions o f the e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t n r e n d e r i n g e c o n o m i c actions intelligible as something for w h i c h e c o n o m i c actors are ( o r are n o t ) a c c o u n t a b l e o r responsible; and, disseminating e c o n o m i c information for reasons that have little o r n o t h i n g to d o w i t h q u e s ti o n s o f accountability an d responsibility.

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H e r m e n e u t i c s a n d r e f e r e n t i a l i t y : t h e "'world" of discourse Whereas the signs in language only refer to other signs within the same system, and whereas language therefore lacks a world just at it lacks temporality and subjectivity, discourse is always about something. It refers to a world which it claims to describe, to express, or to represerit. It is in discourse that the symbolic function of language is actualised (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 198). E c o n o m i c a c t i o n s ar e a c t i o n s u p o n a w o r l d that is s o m e h o w t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h t h e e c o n o m i c act, a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o b v i o u s in t h e classical s e n s e o f O i k u m e n e as r e f e r r i n g t o t h e c o n s t r u c t e d c o n d i t i o n s o f h u m a n d w el l i n g . O n e o f t h e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t is to m a k e r e f e r e n c e to this c o n s t r u c t e d w o r l d in a w a y that d o n a t e s m e a n i n g , intelligibility an d u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o its e x i s t e n c e . T h u s R i c o e u r can sp eak o f t h e r e f e r e n t i a l i t y o f d i s c o u r s e in a w a y that d r a w s u p o n F r e g e ' s ( 1 9 7 0 ) c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n m e a n i n g as s e n s e ( " w h a t is m e a n t " ) and r e f e r e n c e ( t h e o b j e c t d o m a i n , t h e w o r l d , t h e " a b o u t w h a t " t h e s e n s e is m e a n t ) . T h e h e r m e n e u t i c s o f s e n s e an d r e f e r e n c e h a v e m o r a l i m p l i c a t i o n s i n a s m u c h as " . . . b e c a u s e w e ar e in t h e w o r l d , w e ar e a f f e c t e d by situations, an d because we orient ourselves comprehensively in t h o s e situations, w e h a v e s o m e t h i n g t o say, w e h a v e e x p e r i e n c e t o b r i n g to l a n g u a g e " ( R i c o e u r , 1976, pp. 2 0 - 2 1 ). Ricoeur then turns to h o w the hermeneutics o f s e n s e and r e f e r e n c e f u n c t i o n d i f f er en t l y as o n e m o v e s f r o m t h e m o d e l o f s p e e c h to t h e m o d e l o f writing. In s p e e c h , s e n s e an d r e f e r e n c e f u n c t i o n o s t e n s i v e l y ; that is, in a w a y that i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e s c o n c e p t s and m e a n i n g s to t h e local an d p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s that d e s c r i b e t h e o b j e c t i v e s i t u a t i o n o f t h e participants: In spoken discourse ... what the dialogue ultimately refers to is the situation common to the interlocutors. This situation in a way surrounds the dialogue, and its landmarks can all be shown by a gesture, or by pointing a finger, or designated in an ostensive manner by the discourse itself through the oblique reference of those other indicators which are the demonstratives, the adverbs of time and place, and the tense of the verb (1981, p. 201.).

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Many e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t s are s i t u a t e d in this c o n t e x t o f o s t e n s i v e r e f e r e n c e . Most o b v i o u s l y , q u e s t i o n s o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y and a g e n c y r e q u i r e a g r e a t deal o f a t t e n t i o n to t h e p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s o f t h e local c o n d i t i o n s that s u r r o u n d an a g e n t and his o r h e r c h o i c e s and actions. W h a t e m p i r i c a l and e x i s t e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s d i d an e c o n o m i c a c t o r c o n f r o n t ? W h a t are t h e l o c a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s that h a v e c o n s t i t u t e d t h e e c o n o m i c a c t o r as a subject, as a p a r t i c u l a r h u m a n b e i n g w i t h p a r t i c u l a r talents, f r e e d o m s , constraints, etc.? W h a t p r o d u c t s , o b j e c t s , " w o r l d s " d i d h e o r sh e creat e? W h a t w e r e th e e n v i r o n m e n t a l conditions m the organizational conditions, the m a r k e t c o n d i t i o n s , o r t h e c u r r e n t social-political c o n d i t i o n s m that i n f l u e n c e d e c o n o m i c outc o m e s and t h e c h o i c e s and a c t i o n s o f e c o n o m i c actors? Apart f r o m q u e s t i o n s o f a g e n c y a nd a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , o s t e n s i v e r e f e r e n c e f u n c t i o n s to p r o v i d e local i n f o r m a t i o n in e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t s i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e e c o n o m i c status o f this family, o r this firm, o r this individual, o r this locality all b e i n g e x a m p l e s . In all o f t h e s e i n s t an ces o f t h e e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t , t h e discourse makes reference to a particular world a n d is g e n e r a l l y in d i f f e r e n t t o o t h e r , spatially a n d t e m p o r a l l y distant, w o r l d s . T h e s e n s e o f the discourse ~ the hermeneutical implications of the discourse ~ is i n f l u e n c e d by s u c h particularities of reference. The model of writing opens the hermeneutics o f s e n s e and r e f e r e n c e b e y o n d t h e b o u n d s o f t h e ostensive. T h e w r i t t e n t e x t will b e r e a d in different o s t e n s i v e " w o r l d s " a n d r e a d in a w a y that m u s t necessarily, b u t p e r h a p s o b l i q u e l y , traverse the distance b e t w e e n the ostensive w o r l d o f t h e a u t h o r and t h e o s t e n s i v e w o r l d o f t h e reader. As an aside, it s e e m s t o us that o n e o f t h e marks o f g r e a t t e x t s is p r e c i s e l y this c a p a c i t y to span o s t e n s i v e w o r l d s ; S h a k e s p e a r e ' s t e x t s say s o m e t h i n g a b o u t g e n e r a l i z e d w o r l d s , a n d w e d o n o t usually r e a d S h a k e s p e a r e to appropriate some ostensive understanding of Elizabethan England. Rather, w e seek to interp r e t an d u n d e r s t a n d h o w " o u r " w o r l d a n d " h i s " w o r l d share s o m e t h i n g in c o m m o n w i t h all o t h e r wo rl d s . R i c o e u r d e s c r i b e s t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e o s t e n s i v e w o r l d o f s p e e c h and t h e

n o n - o s t e n s i v e w o r l d o f w r i t i n g in t e r m s o f a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o n c e p t o f U m w e l t and the c o n c e p t of Welt: For us, the world is the ensemble of references opened up by the texts. Thus we speak about the '~,orld" of Greece, not to designate any more what were the situations for those who lived them, but to designate the non-situational references which outlive the effacement of the first and which henceforth are offered as possible modes of being, as symbolic dimensions of our beingin-the-world. For me, this is the referent of all literature; no longer the Umwelt of the nstensive references of dialogue, but the Welt projected by the non-ostensive references of every text that we have read, understood, and loved. To understand a text is at the same time to light up our own situation, or, if you will, to interpolate among the predicates of our situation all the significations which make a Welt of our Umwelt. It is this enlarging of the Umweit into the Welt which permits us to speak of the references opened up by the text - - it would be better to say that the references open up the world. Here again ... writing ... frees us from the visibility and limitation of situations by opening up a world for us, that is, new dimensions of our being-in. the-world (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 202). A n al o g i es b e t w e e n g r eat l i t e r a t u r e and e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t s m a y s e e m far-fetched b u t ar e n e i t h e r e n t i r e l y u n w o r t h y n o r w i t h o u t p r e c e d e n t ( s e e March, 1987). I n d e e d , o n e n e e d only observe h o w m u c h of the content of such l i t e r a t u r e is d e v o t e d to e c o n o m i c e x p e r i e n c e to m a k e g o o d o n s u c h analogies, p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e b r o a d an d c u l t u r a l s e n s e o f t h e e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t that w e p u r s u e h er e. In r e a d i n g a Dickens, o r a Defoe, o r a Flaubert, o r G e o r g e B e r n a r d Shaw, for e x a m p l e , o n e can s e e h o w t h e n o n - o s t e n s i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e sensereference c o n n e c t i o n enlightens our understanding of our o w n e c o n o m i c experience, our o w n o s t e n s i v e situation. M o r e m u n d a n e l y , e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t s are o f t en w i d e l y p u b l i s h e d , describing the e c o n o m i c e x p e r i e n c e s of people at distant t i m e s and p l a c e s in ways d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t to o u r o w n e x p e r i e n c e s . J o u r n a l i s m in a global e c o n o m y is a g o o d e x a m p l e ; so is t h e e c o n o m i c a l l y f o c u s e d m u s i c and p o e t r y that reveals h o w our o w n Western e c o n o m i c actions are i n t e r c o n n e c t e d w i t h an d c o n s t i t u t i v e o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e s o f t h e p o o r , o f t h e T h i r d World,

ACCOUNTING AS CULTURALPRACTICE and o f u n b o r n g e n e r a t i o n s w h o face t h e m i s e r a b l e p r o s p e c t o f an e c 0 h 0 m i c a l l y r a v a g e d e c o - s y s t e m . In t h e s e a n d o t h e r ways, t h e "sense" of the objective conditions of e c o n o m i c e x p e r i e n c e surpasses t h e c o n s t r a i n t s o f local, ostensive reference - - "our" w o r l d and "their" w o r l d are s e e n t o s h a r e s o m e t h i n g in c o m m o n .

Hermeneutics a n d intersubjectivity: the audience o f discourse In a c o m p l e x w o r l d , e c o n o m i c e v e n ts, c o n s i d e r e d b o t h in i s o l a t io n a n d in r e l a t i o n to o t h e r ev en t s , c a n i n f l u e n c e t h e q u a l it y o f li v ed e x p e r i e n c e for a large n u m b e r o f p e o p l e . A g e n t s o f e c o n o m i c e v e n t s c a n n o t always ( o r e v e n usually) anticipate what these influences will be n o r can t h e y identify in any t o t a l i z i n g w a y w h o t h e i n d i v i d u al s affected b y t h e i r a c t i o n s are. This u n c e r t a i n t y suggests that e c o n o m i c c h o i c e s a n d a c t i o n s are m o r a l l y a m b i g u o u s o b j e c t s o f r e f l e c t i o n an d d e l i b e r a t i o n for e c o n o m i c agents confronted with the question "What ought I to do?" Granting the open-ended and morally a m b i g u o u s c h a r a c t e r o f this a g e n t i v e q u e s t i o n , it is n o n e t h e l e s s r e a s o n a b l e to a s s u m e that s o m e c h o i c e s an d a c t i o n s are less m o r a l l y e x t e n s i v e than o t h e r s . S o m e a c t i o n s are u n d e r s t o o d as less e n d u r i n g an d m o r e lo c a l than o t h e r s ; that is, t h e i r i n f l u e n c e o v e r e x p e r i e n c e is b o t h t r a n s i t o r y an d r e l e v a n t t o an identifiable c o m m u n i t y an d u n l i k e l y t o e x t e n d t o o t h e r s o u t s i d e o f this c o m m u n i t y . O n e thinks for e x a m p l e o f s h o r t - t e r m c h o i c e s a n d a c t i o n s that i n f l u e n c e l a b o r an d p r o d u c t i o n in small c o m m u n i t i e s o r d i s t r i b u t i v e c h o i c e s a n d a c t i o n s (e.g. b u d g e t i n g ) that h a v e significant f o r c e o n l y f o r t h e n e x t day, or week, or month. Alternatively, some choices a n d a c t i o n s e n d u r e f o r t h e l o n g - t e r m a nd e x t e n d t h e i r i n f l u e n c e and r e l e v a n c e to m a n y individuals. This differential m o r a l extensiveness of economic e v e n t s has its h e r m e n e u t i c a l c o r r e l a t e , for R i c o e u r , in t he difference b e t w e e n the audience of s p e e c h and t h e a u d i e n c e o f writing. In s p e e c h , t h e r e is an identifiable an d p r e s e n t a u d i e n c e to w h o m t h e d i s c o u r s e is a d d r e s s e d . This a u d i e n c e p l a c e s t h e s p e a k e r w i t h i n a singular d i s c o u r s e c o m m u n i t y

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in t h e s a m e w a y that s o m e e c o n o m i c acts are r e l e v a n t t o a c o m m u r i i t y b u t n o t to others. T h u s Merleau-Ponty can describe the hermeneutics o f s p e e c h in t e r m s o f t h e " c o m m o n w o r l d " s h a r e d b y s p e a k e r s an d t h e i r i n t e r l o c u t o r s : In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground: my thought and his are interwoven in a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other ks for me no longer a mere bit of behaviour in my transcendental field nor I in his: we are collaborators with each other in a consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we coexist through a common world (1962, p. 354; cited in Roberts, 1991, p. 362). O n t h e o t h e r hand, t h e m o d e l o f w r i t i n g e s c a p e s t h e limits o f an identifiable a u d i e n c e i n a s m u c h as t h e w r i t t e n t e x t b e c o m e s available t o a n y o n e w h o can read. In R i c o e u r ' s terms: The narrowness of the diaiogical relation explodes. Instead of being addressed just to you, the second person, what is written is addressed to an audience that it creates itself.... The co-presence of subjects in dialogue ceases to be the model for every 'Mnderstanding". The relation writing--reading ceases to be a particular case of the relation speaking--hearing.... In escaping the momentary character of the event, the bounds lived by the author, and the narrowness of ostensive reference, discourse escapes the limits of being face to face. it no longer has a visible auditor. An unknown, invisible reader has become the unprivileged addressee of the discourse (1981, pp. 202-203). W h e n o n e considers the different relations b e t w e e n speakers/hearers and authors/readers, s o m e i n t e r e s t i n g issues w i t h r e s p e c t to e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t a b i l i t y surface. It s e e m s , to us, that t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n g i v i n g e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t s an d e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t a b i l i t y has for the most part been considered from a moral p e r s p e c t i v e akin t o t h e m o d e l o f s p e e c h . In fact, R o b e r t s ( 1 9 9 1 ) has t r e a t e d s p e e c h as t h e p a r a d i g m a t i c m o d e l for w h a t h e calls "socializing" m o d e s of accountability, modes that differ f r o m w h a t h e calls " h i e r a r c h i c a l " m o d e s like t h o s e c o n v e n t i o n a l l y u n d e r s t o o d as

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the practices o f a c c o u n t a n t s . D e s c r i b i n g socializing a c c o u n t a b i l i t y in t e r m s of relative a b s e n c e of a s y m m e t r i e s of p o w e r , face-to-face i n t e r a c t i o n , a n d an a c k n o w l e d g e d i n t e r d e p e n d e n c y b e t w e e n self a n d other, h e e x p l a i n s the dialogical character, the h e r m e n e u t i c a l force, a n d the m o r a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f giving "socializing" a c c o u n t s as follows: • .. the process is a social one. Those who one happens to work with or alongside, become those with whom one shares and builds a common interpretation of one's world of work. Journeys to and from work, lunches and after work drinks, toilets, corridors, all the unsurveilled "back regions" of organizational life serve as locations for such sense-making talk. Through such talk not only is the officialversion of organizational reality penetrated and reinterpreted, but also it is the basis for a diffuse set of loyalties and ties, of enmity as well as friendship, that humanize and socialize the experience of work (1991, p. 362). In situating a dialogical m o d e l o f a c c o u n t i n g in the c o n t e x t o f work, R o b e r t s is l i m i t i n g the e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t in t w o ways. First, the e x p e r i e n c e o f w o r k is just o n e a m o n g m a n y identifiable sociological categories of e c o n o m i c citizenship, all of w h i c h c a n b e s e e n as b o t h sites w h e r e e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t s are g i v e n a n d sites w h e r e the m o d e l of s p e e c h is h e r m e n e u t i c a l l y a n d m o r a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e for t h e o r i e s o f a c c o u n t ing. O n e thinks, for e x a m p l e , of families, local c o m m u n i t i e s , c h u r c h e s , clubs, schools, etc., as s u c h sites. A t t e n d i n g to the r e l e v a n c e of e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t s to these sites is an i m p o r t a n t part of m o v i n g t o w a r d m o r e g e n e r a l t h e o r i e s a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t i n g as c u l t u r a l practice. W h a t these sites have in c o m m o n is a p a r t i c u l a r h e r m e n e u t i c a l a n d m o r a l h o r i z o n for w h i c h the m o d e l of s p e e c h is the p a r a d i g m a t i c i n s t a n c e of a c c o u n t giving. Citizens o f these identifiable c o m m u n i t i e s share in a sense of social solidarity - - n o t q u i t e a c o n s e n s u s w i t h r e s p e c t to e x p e r i e n c e s , values, beliefs, a n d desires b u t at least a c o m m o n e c o n o m i c , moral, political, a n d social identity; a c o m m o n "citizenship". T h e y r e c o g n i z e t h e m selves as m e m b e r s of an identifiable c o m m u n i t y ; and, w i t h that, they a c c e p t p a r t i c u l a r s u b s t a n t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d o b l i g a t i o n s that follow from

t h e i r citizenship. T h e y u n d e r s t a n d that in describing and debating e c o n o m i c questions, h e r m e n e u t i c a l a n d m o r a l c o n c e r n s are l i m i t e d to a n d identified w i t h p a r t i c u l a r s u b s t a n t i v e claims that define w h a t it m e a n s to b e a c i t i z e n of this p a r t i c u l a r c o m m u n i t y . T o b e a c i t i z e n is to k n o w that the w a y in w h i c h t h e teleological a n d d e o n t o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f a c t i o n will b e i n t e r p r e t e d is,for this c o m m u n i t y , p r e d i c t a b l e , describable, a n d p r e s u m e d s o m e w h a t b i n d i n g o n agents. A t t e n t i o n to the h e r m e n e u t i c a l a n d m o r a l h o r i z o n o f d i s c o u r s e as w r i t i n g reveals a s e c o n d l i m i t a t i o n o f Roberts' a t t e m p t to v i e w dialogue as t h e p a r a d i g m for d i s c u s s i o n o f a c c o u n t i n g a n d a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . As w e have argued, e c o n o m i c choices, events, a n d a c t i o n s have i n f l u e n c e s b e y o n d t h e confines o f a local c o m m u n i t y ; and, further, q u e s t i o n s of the a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of agents c a n b e raised b y t h e s e " o t h e r " c o m m u n i t i e s w h i c h a n a g e n t m a y n o t have e v e n a n t i c i p a t e d in t h e c o u r s e o f reflecting u p o n his or h e r o w n actions. In R i c o e u r ' s terms, the m o d e l o f w r i t i n g r e c o g n i z e s that t h e m e a n i n g of e c o n o m i c e v e n t s is n o t e x h a u s t e d b y t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n an a g e n t a n d a "local" c o m m u n i t y just as it r e c o g n i z e s that the local c o m m u n i t y has n o n e c e s s a r y privilege in "judging" agents a n d t h e i r actions: the meaning of human action is... addressed to an indefinite range of possible "readers". The judges are not the contemporaries, but, as Hegel said, history itself.... That means that, like a text, human action is an open work, the meaningof which is "in suspense". It is because it "opens up" new references and receives flesh relevance from them, that human deeds are also waiting for flesh interpretations which decide their meaning. MI significant events and deeds are, in this way, opened to this kind of practical interpretation through present /wax/.*. Human action, too, is opened to anybody who can read. in the same way that the meaning of an event is the sense of its forthcoming interpretations, the interpretation by the contemporaries has no particular privilege in this process (Ricoeur, 1981, pp. 208-209). • . .

T h e a b s e n c e o f such "privilege" p r e c l u d e s t r e a t i n g t h e m o d e l o f s p e e c h as the universal p a r a d i g m o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y discourse.

ACCOUNTING AS CULTURALPRACTICE

The h e r m e n e u t i c s o f distanciation A discursive practice like giving e c o n o m i c accounts is, for purposes of this essay, a practical response to "a general need for making our own what is foreign to us" (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 43). Therein resides the hermeneutical problem, a problem of making "one's own" what was "alien" through deploying language to donate meaning, intelligibility, and understanding to lived experience which is, q u a experience and sans discourse, meaningless and unintelligible. The notion of giving e c o n o m i c accounts performs this sort of hermeneutical function for those aspects of experience that w e understand as the economic, aspects that always and already are situated in the context of moral experience (recall Niebuhr). Ricoeur has given us one way to structure this hermeneutical problem; specifically, he shows h o w the model of speech and the model of writing form very different horizons for the hermeneutics of human action. These different horizons are revealed by working through the hermeneutical implications that follow from attention to the event character of discourse, to the differential force of speakers and writers over the production of meaning, to the different "worlds" to w h i c h speech and writing refer, and to the different concepts of audience that inform the model of speech and the model of writing. These structural properties of discourse have their hermeneutical correlates in two principles that Ricoeur evokes n appropriation and distanciation. Appropriation is the telos, the end that discourse seeks - - it is the "making one's own" what was "alien" through the struggle and the practice of producing meaning, intelligibility, and understanding. Thus it is a hermeneutical c o n c e p t central to any model of discovery or learning, of understanding, indeed of growth or what Ricoeur terms "the extension of selfu n d e r s t a n d i n g " ( 1 9 7 6 , p. 43). H o w are w e to understand the accomplishment of appropriation? For Ricoeur, at least for that aspect of his w o r k addressed in this essay,

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the answer resides in attention to the structural properties through which the dynamic interactions that we call discourse transpire. These structural properties find their paradigmatic instances (and extremes ) in the model of speech and the model o f writing, and they find their hermeneutical equivalent in what Ricoeur terms the c o n c e p t of distanciation w the dynamic effort to situate the struggle to appropriate within particular spatial and temporal horizons that b e c o m e productive of certain kinds of meaning but not of others. In this section of the essay, in an admittedly brief and underargued way, w e have suggested that accounting theorists may look toward the structure of discourse as a way to begin to reconceptualize accounting as a m u c h broader human practice than conventional notions of accounting can accommodate. We have suggested that the hermeneutics of the e c o n o m i c account can be understood in terms of the different distantiative possibilities of speech at one extreme and of writing at the other. We have seen h o w hermeneutical consequences of e c o n o m i c accounts depend upon various configurations of ( 1 ) the event character of e c o n o m i c experience, ( 2 ) the subjectivity of e c o n o m i c actors and e c o n o m i c agents, ( 3 ) the objective conditions (the w o r l d ) of e c o n o m i c experience, and ( 4 ) the audience to w h o m an e c o n o m i c account is addressed. In this way, w e were able both to keep the full .range of possibilities for substantive claims and conclusions available to those w h o participate in giving and receiving particular e c o n o m i c accounts, as well as to make particular arguments about h o w these various accounts will function hermeneutically. By attending to the hermeneutical implications of the structure of discourse, w e were able to think with but beyond Niebuhr; that is w e w e r e able to accept his view of the cathecontic and discursive character of concerns with responsibility and accountability but then move to s h o w h o w the understandings that follow from these concerns are conditioned by the structure of discursive events.

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LIMITATIONS, SPECULATIONS, AND A RETURN TO THE BEGINNING There are at least two major limitations of this essay. The first is the absence of any sustained attempt to engage with concrete acts of economic accounting as currently understood. Refusing such an engagement follows from our desire to keep the available empirical domain of the economic account maximally open; that is, a concern to avoid any substantive claims that might limit the economic account to this or that class of speakers (writers), this or that economy, this or that culture, this or that audience. But, that desire for maximal openness with respect to the question of what accounting is and what it is not leaves us unable to inquire critically into concrete acts of e c o n o m i c accounting as we settle instead for broadly theoretical and philosophical claims about h o w understanding emerges from quite abstract and stylized regimes of possible accounts. A second limitation follows from the partiality and limited character of this essay as a study in hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is of course concerned with h o w understanding emerges through discursive practices. The relation between human understanding and discourse is the concern of this essay. But the question of how the structure of discourse conditions understanding is just a preliminary step in a broader hermeneutical agenda, an agenda ultimately focused upon h o w individuals understand their lives, their "selves". It is in this sense that Hans-Georg Gadamer can speak of hermeneutics as the heir apparent to practical philosophy, and we have done little in this essay in the way of inquit 3' into the way in which economic accounts mediate individual understandings of real individual lives. Along with Alasdair MacIntyre and Ricoeur, we would suggest that moving beyond the structural claims advanced in this essay can benefit from attention to the n a r r a t i v e character of discursive events. Indeed, Ricoeur's later work turns to the paradigm of narrative ( 1984, 1985, 1988. See also the collection of essays in Kemp & Rasmussen, 1989). A narrative

approach to e c o n o m i c accounts would view such accounts as stories within which individuals are major characters in their own accounts, minor characters in the accounts of others. These narratives have temporal horizons; they have beginnings, middles, and ends. They have social horizons; they have e c o n o m i c horizons; institutions influence them. They have temporal dimensions, as e c o n o m i c events are described and explained in terms of both proximal and distal events that surround them. The temporality of narrative suggests that the concrete practice of giving e c o n o m i c accounts does not follow the stylized distantiative character of speech or of writing but instead tacks between the two as distal events are used to situate proximal actions historically and speculatively. The present and the proximal are understood as influenced by and situated within the actual events of the past and the anticipated events of the future. Put in moral terms, understanding the agency of contemporary actors demands understanding of the historical situation that makes current action possible as well as the teleological and future horizon that donates moral purpose to agents and their actions. It is at the linguistic level of narrative that the complex interactions between actors, other humans, social institutions, and the temporal dimensions of experience can be revealed discursively and c o m e to surpass the static conceptualizations of speech and writing. To conclude, w e will return to the question that motivated this essay m the question of the human, of the self. With Schweiker (1993), w e would view the e c o n o m i c account as a discursive medium through which humans c o m e to understand the moral-economic dimensions of their lives and thus c o m e to understand something about the meaning of their lives, their "selves". These accounts take many forms depending upon w h o the participants in e c o n o m i c accounting are, what language they speak, ~¢hat values, beliefs, and desires guide their thoughts and actions, and the particular histories, economies, and societies that constitute them as humans, as selves with particular identities.

ACCOUNTING AS CULTURAL PRACTICE But though economic accounts take on d i v e r s e f o r m s , t w o g e n e r a l ~|~ms s e e m a p p r o p r i a t e t o c o n c l u d e t h i s essay. All o f us g i v e a n d r e c e i v e e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t s , a n d all o f us d e p e n d upon such accounts to donate intelligibility, meaning, and understanding to the morale c o n o m i c d i m e n s i o n s o f b o t h o u r s e l v e s as w e l l as o t h e r s . T h i s e s s a y has m a d e an initial f o r a y into one aspect of such account giving -- the relation between the structure of economic

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accounts and the hermeneutical possibilities that follow from that structure. Thus the essay j o i n s R o b e r t s ( 1 9 9 1 ) in p u r s u i n g a b r o a d e r sense of the "possibilities" of accountability. Those possibilities are exciting and important. Actualizing them depends upon whether or not a c a d e m i c s i n t e r e s t e d in t h e e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t c a n e s c a p e t h e i m a g e o f " a c c o u n t i n g " as m a d e in t h e i m a g e o f t h e " A c c o u n t a n t " .

BIBLIOGRAPHY Althusser, L., Lenin and Philosophy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971 ). Althusser, L., For Marx, Brewster, B. (transl.) (London: Verso, 1979). Arrington, C. E. & Puxty, A., Accounting, Interests, and Rationality: a Communicative Relation, Critical Perspectives on Accounting ( 1991 ) pp. 31-58. Barthes, R., Elements ofSemiologv, Lavers, A. & Smith, C. (transls) (London: Johnathan Cape, 1967). Culler, J., On Deconstruction (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982). " Derrida, J., Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory o f Signs, Allison, D. (transl.) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973). Derrida, J., The Retrait of Metaphor, Gardner, F., Iginla, B., Madden, R. & West, W. (transls) Enclitic (1978) pp. 5-33. Derrida, J., Positions, Bass, A. (transl.) (London: Athione Press, 1981 ). Etzioni, A., The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics (New York: Free Press, 1988). Frege, G., On Sense and Reference, Black, M. (transl.), in Geach, P. & Black, M. (eds), Translations from the Philosophical Writings o f Gottlob Frege, pp. 56-78 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970 ). Habermas, J., The Theory o f Communicative Action: Vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization o f Society, McCarthy, T. (transl.) (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984). Habermas, J., The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, Lawrence, F. (transl.) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). Habermas, J., Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Lenhardt, C. & Nicholson, S. W. (transis) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990). Hauerwas, S. & Maclntyre, A. (eds), Revisions.. Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). Kemp, T. P. & Rasmussen. D. (eds), The Narrative Path: the Later Works o f Paul Ricoeur (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). Lacan, J.. Ecrits: a Selection (Ixmdon: Tavistock, 1977). Levi-Strauss, C., The Savage Mind (London: Weidenfeld & Nicoison, 1966). Maclnt3"re, A..After Virtue. a Study in Moral Theory ( Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984 ). March, J. G., Ambiguit), and Accounting: the Elusive Link Between Information and Decision Making, Accounting Organizations and Socie O, (1987) pp. 153-168. Merleau-Ponty, M., The Phenomenolog], o f Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962). Morgan, G., Accounting as ReMit), Construction: Towards a New Epistemology for Accounting Practice, Accounting Organizations and Socie O, ( ! 988 ) pp. 477-486. Niebuhr, H. R., The Responsible Self: an Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy ( San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1963). Ricoeur, P., Interpretation Theo~,: Discourse and the Surplus o f Meaning (Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976). Ricoeur, P., The Rule o f Metaphor'. Multidisciplinary Studies o f the Creation o f Meaning in Language, Czerny, R. (transl.) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977). Ricoeur, P., Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation, Thompson, J. B. (ed. & transl.) (Cambridge University Press, 1981 ).

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C.E. ARRINGTON and J. R. FRANCIS Ricoeur, P., Time a n d Narrative, Vol. 1, McLaughlin, K. & Pellauer, D. (transls) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). Ricoeur, P., Time and Narrative, Vol. 2, McLaughlin, FL & Pellauer, D. (transls) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). Ricoeur, P., Time a n d Narrative, Vol. 3, Blarney, IC & Pellauer, D. (transls)( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). Roberts, J., The Possibilities of Accountability, Accounting Organizations a n d Society ( 1991 ) pp. 355-368. Schra~, C., Experience a n d Being (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969). Schrag, C., Communicative Praxis and the Space o f Subjectivity (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986). Schweiker, W., Accounting for Ourselves: Accounting Practice and the Discourse of Ethics, Accounting Organizations and Society (1993) pp. 231-252. Smith, B. H., Value Without Truth Value, in Fekete, J. (ed.), Life After Postmodernism: Essays on Value and Culture (New York: St Martin's Press, 1987). Smith, B. H., Contingencies o f Value: Alternative Perspectives f o r Critical Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988). Stone, C. D., Earth and Other Ethics: the Case f o r Moral Pluralism (New York: Harper & Row, 1987). Walzer, M., Spheres o f Jastice (New York: Basic Books, 1983).