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Global collapse—Fact or fiction?
Futures 40 (2008) 853–864
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Global collapse—Fact or fiction? Jorgen Randers * Norwegian School of Management BI, NO-0442 Oslo, Norway
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Available online 8 August 2008
This paper seeks to answer the following question: Is it possible that the slow societal response to the emerging climate crisis may result in ‘‘global collapse’’—that is, a situation were global society first exceeds the sustainable rate of greenhouse gas emissions, and then experiences a sudden, unwanted, and unstoppable decline in the average welfare of hundreds of millions of its citizens? Certainly, global collapse can be avoided if society decides to act in time, and even at a reasonable cost. Still, global collapse is a possibility in the 21st century, because of the numerous good reasons to postpone societal response, because of the inertia in the climate system, and because there exist self-reinforcing mechanisms that may lead to runaway temperature increase once certain thresholds are surpassed. The paper argues, finally, that climate-induced global collapse, even if it did indeed occur, would not necessarily be described by future historians as such. The collapse could well be reported as a case of bad global management. Global collapse could remain fiction, even if it proved to be fact. ß 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Overshoot and collapse—a brief history 1.1. Early discussion of the concept In 1972 there appeared a small rather technical book in the US, sporting the boring title The Limits to Growth [1]. It was authored by scientists from the management school of the prestigious American university called MIT, and it was not the type of volume you would expect to gain a wide readership. But some years later the book had been translated into more than 25 languages and published in millions of copies. It had become a bible for the emerging environmental movement, and perhaps more importantly, a main target of derision by the proponents of continued economic growth. Who dominated the scene then, as they do today. Very briefly, Limits said that physical limitations would dominate world politics in the first half of the 21st century. The book was attacked because it was perceived to call for an immediate halt in the post-war economic expansion which had already helped lift a billion people out of poverty. But stopping growth was not, in fact, the main message in The Limits to Growth. The main scientific innovation of Limits appears to have been lost on absolutely everyone—to this day. The new thought in Limits was the concept of ‘‘overshoot and collapse’’: namely the possibility that the world economy might first grow past the physical limitations of planet Earth, and subsequently experience a period of declining human welfare – lasting for decades – in spite of aggressive efforts by the world’s nations to stop the decline. Limits warned about overshoot, followed by collapse, as a potential threat in the first part of the 21st century. Overshoot and collapse would result if humanity continued to disregard planetary limitations on resource availability or global environmental constraints. * Tel.: +47 92 24 06 87; fax: +47 22 52 18 20. E-mail address: [email protected]. 0016-3287/$ – see front matter ß 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2008.07.042
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Fig. 1. Fisheries collapse—Canada (Source: [9] Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, Washington, DC, 2005).
Limits illustrated the possibility of overshoot and collapse in the form of 13 alternative global scenarios for the period up to 2100, generated by a computer simulation model of world developments. Scenarios 1 and 2 in Limits illustrated ‘‘collapse caused by expensive nonrenewable resources’’ and ‘‘collapse caused by excessive emissions of long lived pollutants’’.1 Other scenarios illustrated other types of collapse, and the final three scenarios pointed to solutions to the challenge of overshoot and collapse. The public debate that followed the publication of Limits certainly did not focus on the possibility of ‘‘overshoot and collapse’’.2 Rather it pursued the mute question of whether it is possible to have unending growth in GDP on a finite Earth. This debate has continued till today, in spite of its obvious and simple answer: Economic growth can continue forever, but only if the ecological footprint of that economic activity can be accommodated within the boundaries of the finite physical world. For growth to continue, the ecological footprint per unit of GDP must decrease so fast that the total ecological footprint remains constant (or declines). Only then can unending economic growth be environmentally sustainable.3 1.2. Overshoot and collapse—local examples Before proceeding in our discussion of overshoot and collapse, it may be useful to demonstrate the reality of the phenomenon through some examples. These are necessarily at the local level, since overshoot and collapse at the global level still lies in the future. Four examples of local overshoot and collapse, both before and after 1972, are the following: a. Over-harvesting of wood on Easter Island terminated the prosperous way of life of the Easter Islanders before the Europeans arrived in 1722 [5,7]. The Easter Islanders had nowhere to go, and the culture collapsed.4 b. Over-fishing of Canadian cod destroyed the stock and forced closure of these fisheries in early 1990s (Fig. 1) [9]. The cod has not yet returned, and the livelihood of local fishermen collapsed [10].
1
It may be simpler to access the most recent (2003) update of the original Limits study [2], or the ‘‘20-year update’’ which appeared in 1992 [3]. A rare exception is the volume [4]. More recently historian Jared Diamond popularized the concept of collapse through his treatment of societies that failed [5]. 3 For a thorough historical review of the debate following Limits, see [6]. 4 There exist competing hypotheses for the Easter Island collapse, see for example [8]. 2
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c. Over-valuation of share prices occurs sporadically, even in mature, industrial nations. Share prices are first pushed to excessive, non-sustainable levels by buoyant investors. Such a period of high share prices is necessarily followed by decline to ‘‘sustainable’’ valuations. The typical 2–4 year decline feels like (a long drawn) collapse for the players, as large fortunes continue to evaporate along with the belief that share values will ever rise again. The most recent large scale stock market collapse occurred after the year 2000 dot.com bubble, when global markets lost around one half of their value in 3 years. d. Finally, a collapse evolving as this is being written is the fall in the value of debt given to ‘‘sub-prime’’ house-owners in the US.
The collapses of the Canadian cod fisheries and the Easter Island society are examples of collapse caused by resource limitations. The two cases of collapse in the financial market are not caused by physical limitations, but are included to illustrate two points. First, both demonstrate how well-informed analysts can deny the reality of overshoot (in stock values, and in the value of the collateral) right up until the moment collapse starts. Second, both demonstrate how collapse (or at least decline) becomes unavoidable and unstoppable once valuations have overshot their sustainable level. The real problem, therefore, is the mechanisms that cause overshoot. Collapse (or at least dramatic decline) is just the unavoidable consequence – a relaxation of the tension, so to speak – once overshoot has occurred. Growing beyond the sustainable level is the root cause of the collapse problem. A state of continuing overshoot cannot be maintained—neither in Canadian fisheries nor in overexploitation of the global ecosystem. Once overshoot is a reality, sooner or later society must return to a situation that can be sustained. 1.3. Overshoot and collapse in Limits Limits discussed the same dynamics that caused the four preceding examples of overshoot and collapse—but at a global scale. The development of overshoot and collapse in two of the 13 Limits scenarios is summarized below, illustrating what overshoot and collapse looks like in the World3 computer model of global developments toward the year 2100. The World3 (system dynamics) model was built around the causal mechanisms that were assumed to drive developments over time in population, economy, resource use and environmental impact.5 Scenario 1 illustrates a ‘‘resource crisis’’ (Fig. 2).6 This is a world scenario where continued growth ultimately makes nonrenewable resources so scarce and expensive that the economy can no longer afford its former high level of functioning. The resource sector ultimately needs so much capital investment (for exploration, extraction and transport) that the other sectors of the economy starts to decline. As they fall, food and health services are reduced, causing a decline in life expectancy and rising death rates. Human welfare declines for decades. In Scenario 1, the collapse starts in the first third of the 21st century, and is over before the year 2100, but there is no renewed expansion within that time horizon. Interestingly the ecological footprint also declines after 2025, because of declining resource usage in and lower emissions from the collapsing economy. Scenario 2 in Limits describes a ‘‘pollution crisis’’ (Fig. 3).7 This is a world scenario where it is assumed that nonrenewable resources are more abundant than in Scenario 1, and that advances in resource extraction technologies are capable of postponing the onset of increasing extraction costs. As a consequence the economy can grow a bit longer (by some 20 years). But the resulting, bigger economy leads to soaring pollution levels, which depress agricultural land yields and require huge investments in agricultural production. Capital is also needed for pollution reduction technologies, and finally there is not enough investment to maintain the economy at its former high level. Mortality rates increase, as a consequence of food shortages and negative health effects from pollution. The average human welfare stagnates for a generation, before it collapses. The ecological footprint goes the same way, but only after having reached very high levels during the temporary overshoot.8 Limits goes on to describe other collapses, typically in the first half of the 21st century, resulting from various misinformed attempts to grow the global economy beyond the carrying capacity of the model world. The book then proceeds to illustrate its main message, namely that collapse can be avoided through proactive policies put in place before the advent of overshoot. The main message in 1972 was optimistic and encouraging: Sustainability can be achieved if humanity implements wise growth policy before the economy exceeds planetary limits. In other words, if one start in time. 1.4. Collapse is preceded by overshoot As mentioned, the concept of ‘‘overshoot and collapse’’ did not get much attention in the debate following the publication of Limits. The years before and after Limits were dotted with publications warning about – or some even welcoming – the end of industrial civilization. But the ensuing discussion was largely one for and against ‘‘growth’’. Limits did not manage to
5 6 7 8
See LTG30 for a complete set of references. ‘‘Scenario 1: A Reference Point’’ pp. 168–9 in LTG30. ‘‘Scenario 2: More Abundant Nonrenewable resources’’ pp. 172–3 in LTG30. Ref. [11] presents similar views.
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Fig. 2. Resource crisis—Limits Scenario 1 (Source: [2] Limits to Growth—The 30-Year Update, 2004).
get the concepts of ‘‘overshoot’’ and ‘‘collapse’’ into the general vocabulary. Those (few) who were ‘‘against growth’’ cited its several negative side effects in the short run, not the chance that it would create overshoot.9 The implicit view held by most seems to be: 1) society would never be so stupid as to overshoot, and 2) if it did (by mistake), society would organize an orderly retreat back down into sustainable territory. There were never serious debate about the possibility that a large share of humanity might experience decades during which their quality of life would decline, either because of a continuing fall in disposable income, because of shortening life spans and increased mortality, because of outright starvation, or because of other form of deprivation. Limits warned that this could happen, and called for action to reduce the likelihood of its occurrences.10 To repeat, for collapse to occur, humanity first has to move into a state of overshoot. That is, grow into a situation where annual resource usage exceeds annual regeneration (e.g. of timber, fish, or fresh water). Or grow into a situation where pollution emission rates (e.g. of toxics, CFCs, or CO2) exceeds what the ecosystem can absorb and neutralize. If the resulting overshoot lasts long enough, the resource base will gradually become eroded and loose its productivity.
9 10
Two famous defences for more sustainable lifestyles were [12] and [13]. See [6] for more detail about the debate that followed the publication of Limits.
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Fig. 3. Pollution crisis—Limits Scenario 2 (Source: [2] Limits to Growth—The 30-Year Update, 2004).
Fish stocks will decline, as will the oceans’ ability to absorb CO2. As a consequence man will be forced to reduce his resource usage or emission rates, unless he decides to stop trying—traditionally by shifting to other resources and other pollutants. Such reduction in resource use and pollution output will normally lead to reduction in the average ‘‘human welfare’’, simply because society can no longer sustain the traditional flow of goods and services, or because its citizens are forced to live on in a depleted environment. In general terms, overshoot occurs when ‘‘the ecological footprint of humanity’’ (which equals the sum total of mankind’s resource use and pollution generation) grows beyond ‘‘the carrying capacity of the planet’’ (which equals the total capability of the globe to sustain human life). And once in overshoot, there is no way back, except ‘‘down’’—into sustainable territory. Overshoot can’t be sustained forever—just like over-fishing. The principle is illustrated in Fig. 4. Thus collapse is a sudden, unwanted, and unstoppable decline in the average welfare of a number of global citizens. It is a temporary phenomenon, something which does come to an end and (hopefully) is followed by a new period of advance in human welfare.
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Fig. 4. Overshoot and collapse—in principle.
Fig. 5. The Ecological Footprint of Humanity 1962—2003 (Source: [18] WWF Living Planet Report, 2006).
The alternative is smooth adaptation to planetary limitations, ensuring that the human footprint never exceeds the global carrying capacity. This is the recommended way according to Limits. This is sustainable development: Simple in principle, hard in practice.11 2. Overshoot and collapse at the global level 2.1. Global overshoot Overshoot has occurred at the local level, even in modern times. But what about global overshoot? Has humanity exceeded the global carrying capacity, and if so, can this be measured? Over the last decade or two, various attempts have been made to assess the sustainability of current world affairs, in general terms [14–16]. The most relevant part of this effort, for our discussion of overshoot and collapse, has tried to assess
11
For precise definitions of the terms used, see the appendices in LTG30.
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whether the current global economy exceeds the carrying capacity of planet Earth. In other words, this effort has focused on whether current rates of resource use and environmental destruction can be sustained for long periods of time. Heroic attempts have been made to quantify the answer. The leading effort, organized by Mathis Wackernagel in the Global Footprint Network [17], seeks to measure the human ecological footprint, the carrying capacity of the planet, and thereby, the degree of overshoot. The GFN publishes regular estimates of what land area would be needed to satisfy current human consumption in a sustainable manner, compared to the land area available, for example in [18]. The grim result of these efforts are summarized in Fig. 5 which shows that humanity already uses the equivalent of 25% more land than is available on planet Earth. The main reason for this overshoot is the huge forested area that humanity would have needed, if it were to absorb all the CO2 emissions from human use of fossil fuels. Using Wackernagel’s broad measure of the human ecological footprint, global overshoot already appears to be a reality. Using his metric, humanity was last sustainable in the 1980s. In this perspective, there is no way ahead except down: humanity must reduce its footprint while at the same time give room for the poor world to develop [19]. The ecological footprint effort has its weaknesses, and hopefully more complete measures of the human impact will become available over the next decade. But global overshoot can no longer be rejected as pure speculation. Using a narrower measure, namely human emissions of greenhouse gases, the conclusion can be made much stronger. It is abundantly clear that humanity is exceeding the sustainable rate of emissions of greenhouse gases—at a global level. Current emission rates (ca 40 Giga-tons of CO2-equivalents per year) are some 6 to 7 times the sustainable rate, which is estimated to be around 6 GtCO2e per year. As a consequence greenhouse gases are accumulating in the atmosphere, with global warming and climate change as unavoidable consequences [20]. If we use human greenhouse gas emissions as our indicator, global overshoot is certainly a reality. It is increasingly agreed that unless we want to experience increasingly damaging climate change, greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced dramatically over the next several decades. The current situation resembles the early stages of the pollution crisis in World3 (see Fig. 3). Hopefully humanity will manage an organized reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, ideally to sustainable levels by 2050, and thereby avoid the later stages of the developments depicted in Fig. 3. 2.2. Global collapse Even if overshoot is an emerging reality, collapse has not yet (2008) occurred at a global scale. And neither did the Limits authors expect this to happen until later in the 21st century, even if society failed to take action.12 But this gets us to the central question: Is large scale collapse a possibility in the modern world? Is global collapse fact or fiction? When trying to answer this question, it is useful to define more sharply what I will mean by global collapse. Rather arbitrarily I define a collapse as ‘‘global’’ if it affects at least 1 billion people, who lose at least 50% of something they hold dear, within a period of 20 years. The one billion people need not be located in one area: the collapse would be global, in my view, if all rich individuals in the world (say, income above 30.000 USD per person-year) agreed that their quality of life had declined by one half over several decades. Second, the decline need not be loss of income: it could be the loss of anything the citizens hold dear (like freedom, the ability to travel, or physical safety). Thirdly, the decline must be sufficiently abrupt that the population remembers how things were in the good olds days—‘‘before the collapse’’. This is my reason for choosing the 20 year time limit. As an example: if disposable income fell by 50% in 20 years, in spite of everyone working as hard as ever—people would perceive this as a calamity. Or if the life expectancy of their nation fell from, say, 80 years to 40 in the same period, in spite of maximal effort by the available health care sector. But if the population was deprived of the opportunity to drink open water in brooks and lakes over a hundred year long period, as occurred in many countries during industrialization, people would simply adjust to the new way of life. Along the same lines, if within a short generation from now OECD citizens can no longer move outside their neighbourhood without a guard, or abroad without being in a group, many would define this as a collapse in their quality of life. One recent example, namely the collapse of the former Soviet Union provides an example [21]. It can be used for calibration purposes. After the peak in 1989, the GDP per person-year in Russia fell by close to 50% before it bottomed out in 1998. The population stabilized at 148 million persons for a decade, before it began a decline. Life expectancy among men fell from 72 to 62 years. The habitual transfer payments to the states, towns and villages in the periphery of the former empire all but disappeared—people were often left to fend for themselves, based on locally available resources. For those involved, this certainly was collapse. Other analysts have used precisely that term [22], but it did affect too few people (around 300 million) to add up to global collapse in my definition of the term. Thus, global collapse is a scenario where more than a billion people lose at least one half of something they hold dear in 20 years. But such steep decline is only ‘‘collapse’’ if it occurs in spite of efforts by society to achieve the opposite. For there may come the day when global government, business and civil society – ideally in a democratic manner – agree to reduce by half the amenities of one billion people, in order to achieve some greater good for all of mankind. For instance, in the form of
12 See LTG30 pp. xvii–xviii for a retrospective study of global developments from 1972 to 2004, concluding that the world did essentially follow the ‘‘business as usual’’ scenario over this period.
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strong action among the rich to reduce their climate emissions for the benefit of all. Such a deliberate contraction should not be called global collapse. 2.3. Chicken Little? Some will argue that Chicken Little has warned fallaciously about impending doom13 so many times that the present discussion is of little interest. The difference this time around is that the world is already in overshoot. The potential for disaster is already in place. Now the question – and luckily it remains a question – is whether man will do what is necessary to ease humanity back into sustainable territory in an organized manner—without collapse. 3. Can growing greenhouse gas emissions cause global collapse? 3.1. The climate challenge Current anthropogenic emissions of climate gases are one concrete example of global overshoot. Current emissions are several times higher than the sustainable level, and increasing. Could growing emissions result in global collapse? I think yes. If humanity fails to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions dramatically over the next generation or so, this could lead to accelerating damage from climate change, and to global collapse.14 Humanity has upped the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere by some 30% from its pre-industrial level of 280 ppm of CO2, primarily through extensive burning of fossil fuels and deforestation. It is further agreed that this higher concentration has lead to higher temperatures – the global average is up from 13.7 to 14.5 8C – and that the increase will continue throughout the 21st century. Even if by a miracle, manmade emissions came to a halt tomorrow, the temperature would keep rising until 2100 and not return to pre-industrial levels until after several hundred years, because of the inertia in the global temperature system [29]. But first, it is important remember that dramatic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is possible. A number of recent studies show that deep cuts (minus 50–80% before 2050—hopefully enough to keep global warming below plus 2 8C) are feasible and not impossibly expensive.15 So the question is not whether it is possible to cut back, and avoid global collapse, but whether humanity will rise to the challenge in time. We are still (in 2008) at a stage where most nations have not yet started cutting their greenhouse gas emissions. In spite of being 10 years after the Kyoto protocol, and in spite ever louder warnings from an increasingly galvanized society of scientists in the UN’s International Panel on Climate Change [20]. IPCC foresees further temperature increases of between 1.8 and 4 8C before 2100, and twice as much at high latitudes. This may not sound much, but the world’s leading nations have agreed that temperatures must not be allowed to increase by more than 2 8C if we are to avoid dramatic negative consequences of climate change. A simple illustration: an increase of 6 8C will move the timber line and other ecosystems 1.000 m vertically up the mountainsides, lift the sea level by 1 m, and cause significant changes in the conventional patterns rainfall and wind. The summer ice of the Arctic will be long gone. Agriculture and tourism will be heavily affected, as will all coastal and low-lying activities. Even today hurricane intensities appear to have increased. So if the warming trend is allowed to continue, adaptation costs will be significant: the Stern report estimates adaptation to cost at least five times as much as mitigation.16 If humanity had begun reducing its greenhouse gas emissions one decade ago, it would have been easy to keep global warming below the 2 8C mark (i.e. stabilization below 450 ppm CO2e). This may no longer be possible [26], and if further postponement results, even the 550 ppm CO2e mark may be exceeded, leaving the world in the realm of ‘‘dangerous’’ climate change. If humanity continues to postpone action to limit its greenhouse gas emissions, the negative consequences will gather strength over the next generation. Extreme weather events (droughts, strong winds, extreme downpours) will become more commonplace. The tropics will start to dry up and the sea level will start to rise, creating environmental refugees in the process. Some ecosystems will start to degenerate, and some species will die out or try to move—like the Norwegian cod which may migrate towards the cooler waters of the Russian sector of the Barents Sea. Thus the big question is: When will humanity act? 3.2. Global decision delays Regretfully, there are a large number of good reasons why society may choose to postpone actions to reduce manmade greenhouse gas emissions.
13
A famous example was [23]. Ref. [24] includes a useful overview of the potential damage from various levels of future climate change. 15 For example [24] for the global perspective, and [25] for an English summary of The Report of the Norwegian Commission on Low Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Et klimavennlig Norge, NOU 2006:18, Government Printing Office, Oslo 2006). 16 Stern [24] estimates costs in the range of 5–20% of the world GDP after the year 2100. 14
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3.2.1. Uncertainty about climate science The public discussion about whether man does indeed have a significant impact on the climate did not end until the effort leading up to the IPCC report in 2007. But the original uncertainty is succeeded by discussions about what will in fact be the detailed effects of global warming, their strength and timing. This uncertainty can be, and is, used as an argument to postpone climate cuts until further knowledge is available. 3.2.2. The perceived high cost of action In spite of numerous studies showing the opposite, most people believe that climate action will be expensive—‘‘changing our modern life style as we know it’’. The high perceived cost makes it tempting to take the risk on non-action. 3.2.3. Long time from cost to benefit If humanity were to cut greenhouse gas emissions today, the benefit would not be perceivable until around 2040. Only from then onwards would the global temperature follow a lower path than if nothing had been done, because of the huge inertia in the climate system. In other words, the climate investments of the current generation will mainly benefit future generations. Hence they are likely to be postponed, especially since they appear boringly unprofitable when using conventional discount rates. 3.2.4. The tragedy of the climate commons Each nation feels that it won’t help much to cut their emissions, because they constitute a tiny fraction of the total. This is correct for (almost) all nations, and makes it a very difficult for someone to go first—hoping that everyone else will follow. The alternative, to pursue international agreement on common action, may prove slightly easier. But the history of the Kyoto protocol and its follow-up, shows that it takes decades to follow this route to success. 3.2.5. Initial damage strikes those who can’t afford action Observable damage, like that caused by desertification, sea level rise, and sporadic hurricanes, serves as a very real incentive for climate action. However, the first damage from climate change ironically appears to strike those that are least able to act: the small island states in the Pacific ocean, the poor millions in the Asian mega-deltas, and the nomads in the drying belts of Sub-Sahara. The winners (in the short term) are the rich nations in the temperate zone—where crops and forests will grow better in the new balmy climate. In these blessed regions politicians will find difficulties in gaining support for mitigation from voters who are far from scared by the prospects, and rather enjoy pleasant summers and lower heating bills in the winter. 3.2.6. Legitimate unwillingness among the poor to commit The climate problem was caused by the industrialized nations during their recent centuries of economic growth. Currently the GHG emissions per person in the rich world are 5–10 times that of the citizens of the developing world. It is not surprising that the developing world is delaying its cuts until the rich world a) has proven good will by reducing its emissions per person, and b) is willing to help with finance. Since many rich voters won’t commit until the poor have committed, delay results. 3.2.7. Effects on distribution—structural change, loss of jobs If one finally gets to the point of climate action, the proposed measure will normally hit one group harder than the rest, thereby generating last ditch resistance. The proposed closing of a carbon-intensive factory ignites resistance among the workers and the local community. Proposals to tax gasoline lead to touching unity among angry gas users. And so on, creating further delay. 3.2.8. The tyranny of the cost-efficient solution A more subtle obstacle is the insistence among economists to choose the cost-effective solution to climate change, i.e. the one which gives most climate gas reduction per dollar spent. Choosing the cost-effective solution is rational if funds are scarce. But it may lead to undesirable delay when the cost effective solutions can not be implemented, either because of political reasons (unwillingness to ban SUVs) or because of behavioural reasons (unwillingness among voters to wear an indoor sweater in cold nations to reduce heating needs). The search for the ideal of cost-effectiveness, further lengthen societal decision delays. In summary, there are many reasons why humanity may end up postponing effective climate action by another 20 years. Such postponement will push the ultimate concentration of CO2 well beyond the 550 ppm level and cause significant climate damage to future generations. It is not unlikely that a billion people will be impacted, since this scenario is likely to include inundation of the Asian mega-deltas and the drying out of belts north and south of the tropics—forcing large numbers of people to migrate from what they own. Global collapse is avoidable, but only if decisions are made that may prove difficult for a world divided into 180 nations with numerous pressure groups within each nation. It is no consolation that these societal decision delays were
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hypothesized and included in the Limits World3 model already 35 years ago, and is one of the causes of the pollution collapse shown in Fig. 3.17 3.3. Self-reinforcing feedback in the climate system But the central problem related to decision delays in climate policy is the fact that the climate system appears to include self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms [27]. Once triggered, these feedback loops are likely to lead to uncontrollable temperature rise, which cannot be stopped before the processes has run its course. Three examples of self-reinforcing feedback are described below. 3.3.1. Increased absorption of solar heat in an increasingly ice-free Arctic ocean As the Arctic sea ice starts to melt, the surface turns from reflective white to absorbing blue. The dark water absorbs more solar heat, which results in even warmer sea water, more melting of ice, more open ocean, and more absorption of solar heat. This process does not stop, ceteris paribus, until all sea ice is gone. The process may already have started [28]. 3.3.2. Increased emissions of methane gas from melting tundra As the northern tundra starts to melt, the frozen organic material starts releasing its content of methane gas. This results in higher greenhouse gas levels, higher temperature, more melting of the tundra, and more emission of methane. This process does not stop, ceteris paribus, until all the tundra is melted. 3.3.3. Reduced absorption of CO2 in acidic sea water As the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere increases, some of the CO2 is absorbed in the surface layers of the oceans. This increases the acidity of the sea water, which reduces its ability to absorb more CO2. Declining absorption rates leads to faster accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere, ceteris paribus. There is of course uncertainty concerning the strength of these self-reinforcing feedbacks. The strength – that is their gain and the delay involved – determines how fast the feedback mechanisms will act to increase the global temperature. And there is the possibility of balancing feedbacks, mechanisms that serve to counteract the increase in global temperature. The most obvious, fast working, mechanism that remove CO2 from the atmosphere is forest growth, which bind an increasing amount of CO2 (in stems and forest soil) if the trees are left growing. But humanity has converted much of the world’s forests into agricultural land and thereby reduced the ability of the ecosystem to remove CO2 from the atmosphere. And forests must be left uncut for long, in order to accumulate carbon at a substantial scale. Finally there is the hope, not well founded I am afraid, that the self-reinforcing mechanisms will stabilize at new equilibrium values, rather than continuing to the bitter end—where all sea ice is gone, all tundra is melted, and with no CO2 left in the ocean water. This depends on the physical characteristics of the climate system—in brief, on whether the reinforcing feedbacks have a gain larger than one. It appears that process 3 above, may reach a final equilibrium with much CO2 dissolved in the sea water, while 1 and 2 may be unstoppable when triggered. The existence of self-reinforcing mechanisms makes the climate challenge much more dangerous. For every decade society postpones action, for every ppm increase we allow in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the higher is the chance that the self-reinforcing feedbacks get triggered and takes control. It is no consolation that such selfreinforcing mechanisms were included in the Limits World3 model already 35 years ago, and is the main driver of the ‘‘pollution crisis’’ shown in Fig. 3.18 Decision delay is particularly dangerous in a system with dormant positive feedback. The combination of the two in the case of global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, regrettably leads to the conclusion that global collapse caused by growing emissions of greenhouse gases is not inconceivable. If emissions continue too long, there is no doubt that the damage resulting from higher average temperatures will negatively affect more than a billion people—in the drying tropics, in the inundating Asian mega-deltas and in low-lying islands and areas elsewhere. Whether they will lose one half of what they treasure in 20 years, is likely (if they have to migrate) but would need closer quantitative study to verify. 4. If climate-induced collapse occurred, would it be reported as such? 4.1. Root cause versus short term events My final topic will be the question of the format of the collapse—if it were to occur. First, one may prefer to use the word ‘‘decline’’ instead of collapse. The likely scenario is one where things deteriorate gradually over years, rather than through one abrupt fall. Minus 3% a year in disposable income would not feel like a crash if it only lasted for a few years. And it would not appear in statistics as a crash even if it lasted for 20 years. But if it went on for 20
17 These delays are represented many places in the World3 model: there are delays in impact, perception, decision and implementation. See LTG p. 103 and Beyond the Limits p. 238. 18 In World3 the self-reinforcing feedback is represented as follows: Higher levels of (persistent) pollution in the environment leads to lower pollution absorption rates, which in turn leads to faster accumulation of pollutants in the ecosystem. See LTG p. 103 and Beyond the Limits p. 238, and [29].
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years, it certainly would feel like a crash. Imagine the feeling of being an investor in a stock market which continues to inch downwards for two decades! Second, the continuing gradual deterioration is likely to generate tensions—both within and among countries. If the climate changes, people will want to migrate. If water becomes scarce, have-nots will envy and pursue haves. Growing tension may break down a former cooperative spirit and institutions may falter – both within and among countries. Ultimately violence might result – both within and among nations. The period of decline may resemble the lasting conflict in the Mid East, which basically is a fight about limited land and water, but has quickly ended up as a complicated maze of stakeholders with different religious and more earthly agendas, further complicated by international resolutions which can then be broken and fuel further tension. The history of the Mid East conflict, when written, should be presented as decline induced by resource scarcity. If productive land and water were ample in the region, there would not have been the conflict. But this root cause is so deep down that it may be hidden behind the clutter of historical detail. The chance that the root cause may be forgotten, can be seen elsewhere. One might ask: Will the current civil war in Iraq ultimately be described as a consequence of scarce oil? It is true that some try to keep the record straight, and interpret the US invasion in Iraq as an element in a global struggle for ‘‘energy security’’. But the history quickly gets muddled with parallel agendas, like the fight to spread democratic ideals, or the fight among Sunnis and Shias, or between them and the independence seeking Kurds. Should the collapse of the once stable Iraq society be called a resource collapse? Or to the contrary, should the success of Putin’s premiership in Russia be credited to its lucky coincidence with a period of high export prices for oil and gas? My point is simple. Even if a Global Collapse takes place, its format will unavoidably be a long drawn period of messy social strife, involving many players with many agendas. For those who experience the period on the ground, it may well be impossible to maintain an overall picture of what is going on. For them, the main task will be the ordinary human occupation of making the best of the day. It could be hoped that historians, when gathering all facts in the peaceful aftermath of the Collapse, would identify, agree and highlight the root cause. But it may also be that even in retrospect, the period will not be described as an era of environmental collapse, but as a dark, less civilized period. 4.2. Histories of the 21st century So, if climate-induced global collapse were to occur in the 21st century, would it be described in the history books of the year 2100 as such? Would it be described as ‘‘the century of climate-induced global collapse’’? I think not. In most conceivable scenarios, the root cause will quickly be translated into some more conventional hardship, like a global epidemic, world war, widespread hunger, or economic depression. These will be written up in the history books, not the story of collapse induced by growing emissions of greenhouse gases. Thus the history books of the year 2100 may end up containing one of these stories. 4.2.1. Epidemics General warming led to the move northwards of tropical disease, which created impressive epidemics (‘‘pandemics’’) in the dense mega-cities in the subtropical and temperate parts of the world. Hundreds of million people were killed. The 21st century was the century of repeated global epidemics. 4.2.2. World war The drying up of the rivers in China, caused by the melting of the glaciers in the Himalayas, made it tempting for the Chinese to obtain fresh irrigation water from the relatively uninhabitated Russian Far East. Russia did not agree, and the US helped Russia throw out Chinese occupiers—in exchange for priority access to Russian gas. The 21st century was the century of the new East–West axis: the fight of USA and Russia against the rest. 4.2.3. Widespread hunger The excess agricultural capacity of EU, US and Australia was reduced by increasing temperatures and drought. Ever more land was used to produce biofuels for the rich world. At the same time China became a net buyer of food in the international markets, because of its rapidly increasing living standards, and the drying of Chinese rivers. Food aid ceased and food price rose. The result was widespread hunger in the poor regions of the world. The 21st century was the century of the greatest famine ever. 4.2.4. Depression Global warming led to significant shift in the economic structure and trading pattern of the world. Energy and carbonintensive industries were moved from countries with Kyoto obligations to other parts of the world. Tropical countries with ability to grow sugar cane took over employment from the oil exporting countries. On top of this China and India became the new industrial factories and back-offices of the world. It was all grossly mishandled and led to major unemployment in the developed world. The central banks proved unable to forestall a serious depression, because they were so busy funding and controlling a rapidly evolving carbon trading system. The 21st century was the century of the greatest depression ever. In conclusion, growing emissions of climate gases may well cause significant problems for humanity in the 21st century – even global collapse – without this ever becoming visible in the history books of the year 2100. The root cause in all the
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stories above, namely climate change, may escape the headlines. Instead media may rather focus on proximate issues like flooding, migration, starvation, local conflict, unemployment and failure of government. The Cassandras who warned about future collapse, may not be able to prove they were right, even after it happened. 5. Conclusion The phenomenon of overshoot and collapse – and the possibility of global collapse – is still relevant and worthy of study. Global collapse triggered by ever growing emissions of greenhouse gases is still conceivable in the first half of the 21st century, because of the unfortunate combination of global decision delays and self-reinforcing feedback in the climate system. Interestingly it may prove difficult to verify that global collapse did take place—even if it did, and even after the fact. Global collapse – defined as a situation where more than one billion people lose one half of what they hold dear in less than 20 years – may well be hidden from the headlines and the history books. The 21st century is more likely to be described as a period of intense local strife, institutional breakdown, regionalization and general malaise. The root cause – humanity overstepping an environmental limit – may well be lost in the clutter of historical detail. Global Collapse could remain fiction, even if it proved to be fact. References [1] D.H. Meadows, D.L. Meadows, J. Randers, W.W. Behrens, The Limits to Growth, Universe Books, New York, 1972 (referred to as ‘‘Limits’’). [2] D.H. Meadows, J. Randers, D.L. Meadows, Limits to Growth—The 30 Year Update, Chelsea Green Publishing Company, Vermont, 2004(referred to as ‘‘LTG30’’). [3] D.H. Meadows, D.L. Meadows, J. Randers, Beyond the Limits, Chelsea Green Publishing Company, Post Mills, Vermont, 1992 (referred to as ‘‘Beyond the Limits’’). [4] W.R. Catton, Overshoot, University of Illinois Press, 1982 (ISBN 0-252-009826). [5] J. Diamond, Collapse, Viking, New York, 2005. [6] U. Bardi, Cassandra’s Curse. Revisiting the ‘‘Limits to Growth’’, ugo.bardi@unifi.it, 2006. [7] J. Sterman, Business Dynamics—Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World, Mc-Graw-Hill, Boston, 2000, p. 126. [8] C. Pointing, A Green History of the World: the Environment and Collapse of Great Civilizations, Penguin, 1993. [9] Ecosystems and Human Well-Being. Synthesis, Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, Washington DC, 2005; Global Database on Marine Fisheries and Ecosystems, www.seaaroundus.org. [10] M. Kurlansky, Cod, Vintage, London, 1999. [11] J. Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Society, Cambridge University Press, 1990. [12] E. Goldsmith, Blueprint for survival, The Ecologist 2 (1 (January)) (1972). [13] E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, 1973 (available as Small Is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered: 25 Years Later, Hartley & Marks Publishers, 1973 ISBN 0-88179-169-5). [14] Sustainable Development. Critical Issues, OECD, Paris, 2001. [15] The sustainability strategy for Norway (St.meld 1 2003-04, Nasjonalbudsjettet 2004. Kapittel 6: Nasjonal handlingsplan for bærekraftig utvikling, Government Printing Office, Oslo, 2003). [16] Sustainability indicators for Norway (NOU 2005:5 Enkle signaler i en kompleks verden, Government Printing Office, Oslo, 2005). [17] www.footprintnetwork.org. [18] WWF Living Planet Report 2006, WWF International, Gland, 2006. [19] J. Kitzes, et al., Shrink and share: humanity’s present and future ecological footprint, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 363 (1491) (2008). [20] Summary for decision makers, Working Group 1, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fourth Assessment Report, 2007. [21] L. Grigoriev, Institute for Energy and Finance, Private Communication, Moscow, 2006. [22] B.J. Smith, The Collapse of the Soviet Union, Lucent Books, 1994. [23] R. Batra, The Great Depression of 1990, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1985. [24] N. Stern et al., The Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change, London, 2006, www.sternreview.org.uk. [25] J. Randers, K. Alfsen, How can Norway become a climate-friendly society? World Econ. 8 (1 (January–March)) (2007). [26] D. Zhenghelis, Member of the Stern Review, Private Communication, London, 2006. [27] Avoiding dangerous climate change, Met Office Symposium, Exeter, UK 2005. www.stabilisation2005.com. [28] Arctic Sea Ice Extent May Have Fallen By 50 Percent Since 1950s, Science Daily, 2 October 2007, www.sciencedaily.com. [29] J. Randers, The emergence of Limits to Growth Scenario 2—The pollution Crisis, International System Dynamics Conference, Boston, 2007, www.system dynamics.org.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Futures journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/futures
Global collapse—Fact or fiction? Jorgen Randers * Norwegian School of Management BI, NO-0442 Oslo, Norway
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Available online 8 August 2008
This paper seeks to answer the following question: Is it possible that the slow societal response to the emerging climate crisis may result in ‘‘global collapse’’—that is, a situation were global society first exceeds the sustainable rate of greenhouse gas emissions, and then experiences a sudden, unwanted, and unstoppable decline in the average welfare of hundreds of millions of its citizens? Certainly, global collapse can be avoided if society decides to act in time, and even at a reasonable cost. Still, global collapse is a possibility in the 21st century, because of the numerous good reasons to postpone societal response, because of the inertia in the climate system, and because there exist self-reinforcing mechanisms that may lead to runaway temperature increase once certain thresholds are surpassed. The paper argues, finally, that climate-induced global collapse, even if it did indeed occur, would not necessarily be described by future historians as such. The collapse could well be reported as a case of bad global management. Global collapse could remain fiction, even if it proved to be fact. ß 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Overshoot and collapse—a brief history 1.1. Early discussion of the concept In 1972 there appeared a small rather technical book in the US, sporting the boring title The Limits to Growth [1]. It was authored by scientists from the management school of the prestigious American university called MIT, and it was not the type of volume you would expect to gain a wide readership. But some years later the book had been translated into more than 25 languages and published in millions of copies. It had become a bible for the emerging environmental movement, and perhaps more importantly, a main target of derision by the proponents of continued economic growth. Who dominated the scene then, as they do today. Very briefly, Limits said that physical limitations would dominate world politics in the first half of the 21st century. The book was attacked because it was perceived to call for an immediate halt in the post-war economic expansion which had already helped lift a billion people out of poverty. But stopping growth was not, in fact, the main message in The Limits to Growth. The main scientific innovation of Limits appears to have been lost on absolutely everyone—to this day. The new thought in Limits was the concept of ‘‘overshoot and collapse’’: namely the possibility that the world economy might first grow past the physical limitations of planet Earth, and subsequently experience a period of declining human welfare – lasting for decades – in spite of aggressive efforts by the world’s nations to stop the decline. Limits warned about overshoot, followed by collapse, as a potential threat in the first part of the 21st century. Overshoot and collapse would result if humanity continued to disregard planetary limitations on resource availability or global environmental constraints. * Tel.: +47 92 24 06 87; fax: +47 22 52 18 20. E-mail address: [email protected]. 0016-3287/$ – see front matter ß 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2008.07.042
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Fig. 1. Fisheries collapse—Canada (Source: [9] Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, Washington, DC, 2005).
Limits illustrated the possibility of overshoot and collapse in the form of 13 alternative global scenarios for the period up to 2100, generated by a computer simulation model of world developments. Scenarios 1 and 2 in Limits illustrated ‘‘collapse caused by expensive nonrenewable resources’’ and ‘‘collapse caused by excessive emissions of long lived pollutants’’.1 Other scenarios illustrated other types of collapse, and the final three scenarios pointed to solutions to the challenge of overshoot and collapse. The public debate that followed the publication of Limits certainly did not focus on the possibility of ‘‘overshoot and collapse’’.2 Rather it pursued the mute question of whether it is possible to have unending growth in GDP on a finite Earth. This debate has continued till today, in spite of its obvious and simple answer: Economic growth can continue forever, but only if the ecological footprint of that economic activity can be accommodated within the boundaries of the finite physical world. For growth to continue, the ecological footprint per unit of GDP must decrease so fast that the total ecological footprint remains constant (or declines). Only then can unending economic growth be environmentally sustainable.3 1.2. Overshoot and collapse—local examples Before proceeding in our discussion of overshoot and collapse, it may be useful to demonstrate the reality of the phenomenon through some examples. These are necessarily at the local level, since overshoot and collapse at the global level still lies in the future. Four examples of local overshoot and collapse, both before and after 1972, are the following: a. Over-harvesting of wood on Easter Island terminated the prosperous way of life of the Easter Islanders before the Europeans arrived in 1722 [5,7]. The Easter Islanders had nowhere to go, and the culture collapsed.4 b. Over-fishing of Canadian cod destroyed the stock and forced closure of these fisheries in early 1990s (Fig. 1) [9]. The cod has not yet returned, and the livelihood of local fishermen collapsed [10].
1
It may be simpler to access the most recent (2003) update of the original Limits study [2], or the ‘‘20-year update’’ which appeared in 1992 [3]. A rare exception is the volume [4]. More recently historian Jared Diamond popularized the concept of collapse through his treatment of societies that failed [5]. 3 For a thorough historical review of the debate following Limits, see [6]. 4 There exist competing hypotheses for the Easter Island collapse, see for example [8]. 2
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c. Over-valuation of share prices occurs sporadically, even in mature, industrial nations. Share prices are first pushed to excessive, non-sustainable levels by buoyant investors. Such a period of high share prices is necessarily followed by decline to ‘‘sustainable’’ valuations. The typical 2–4 year decline feels like (a long drawn) collapse for the players, as large fortunes continue to evaporate along with the belief that share values will ever rise again. The most recent large scale stock market collapse occurred after the year 2000 dot.com bubble, when global markets lost around one half of their value in 3 years. d. Finally, a collapse evolving as this is being written is the fall in the value of debt given to ‘‘sub-prime’’ house-owners in the US.
The collapses of the Canadian cod fisheries and the Easter Island society are examples of collapse caused by resource limitations. The two cases of collapse in the financial market are not caused by physical limitations, but are included to illustrate two points. First, both demonstrate how well-informed analysts can deny the reality of overshoot (in stock values, and in the value of the collateral) right up until the moment collapse starts. Second, both demonstrate how collapse (or at least decline) becomes unavoidable and unstoppable once valuations have overshot their sustainable level. The real problem, therefore, is the mechanisms that cause overshoot. Collapse (or at least dramatic decline) is just the unavoidable consequence – a relaxation of the tension, so to speak – once overshoot has occurred. Growing beyond the sustainable level is the root cause of the collapse problem. A state of continuing overshoot cannot be maintained—neither in Canadian fisheries nor in overexploitation of the global ecosystem. Once overshoot is a reality, sooner or later society must return to a situation that can be sustained. 1.3. Overshoot and collapse in Limits Limits discussed the same dynamics that caused the four preceding examples of overshoot and collapse—but at a global scale. The development of overshoot and collapse in two of the 13 Limits scenarios is summarized below, illustrating what overshoot and collapse looks like in the World3 computer model of global developments toward the year 2100. The World3 (system dynamics) model was built around the causal mechanisms that were assumed to drive developments over time in population, economy, resource use and environmental impact.5 Scenario 1 illustrates a ‘‘resource crisis’’ (Fig. 2).6 This is a world scenario where continued growth ultimately makes nonrenewable resources so scarce and expensive that the economy can no longer afford its former high level of functioning. The resource sector ultimately needs so much capital investment (for exploration, extraction and transport) that the other sectors of the economy starts to decline. As they fall, food and health services are reduced, causing a decline in life expectancy and rising death rates. Human welfare declines for decades. In Scenario 1, the collapse starts in the first third of the 21st century, and is over before the year 2100, but there is no renewed expansion within that time horizon. Interestingly the ecological footprint also declines after 2025, because of declining resource usage in and lower emissions from the collapsing economy. Scenario 2 in Limits describes a ‘‘pollution crisis’’ (Fig. 3).7 This is a world scenario where it is assumed that nonrenewable resources are more abundant than in Scenario 1, and that advances in resource extraction technologies are capable of postponing the onset of increasing extraction costs. As a consequence the economy can grow a bit longer (by some 20 years). But the resulting, bigger economy leads to soaring pollution levels, which depress agricultural land yields and require huge investments in agricultural production. Capital is also needed for pollution reduction technologies, and finally there is not enough investment to maintain the economy at its former high level. Mortality rates increase, as a consequence of food shortages and negative health effects from pollution. The average human welfare stagnates for a generation, before it collapses. The ecological footprint goes the same way, but only after having reached very high levels during the temporary overshoot.8 Limits goes on to describe other collapses, typically in the first half of the 21st century, resulting from various misinformed attempts to grow the global economy beyond the carrying capacity of the model world. The book then proceeds to illustrate its main message, namely that collapse can be avoided through proactive policies put in place before the advent of overshoot. The main message in 1972 was optimistic and encouraging: Sustainability can be achieved if humanity implements wise growth policy before the economy exceeds planetary limits. In other words, if one start in time. 1.4. Collapse is preceded by overshoot As mentioned, the concept of ‘‘overshoot and collapse’’ did not get much attention in the debate following the publication of Limits. The years before and after Limits were dotted with publications warning about – or some even welcoming – the end of industrial civilization. But the ensuing discussion was largely one for and against ‘‘growth’’. Limits did not manage to
5 6 7 8
See LTG30 for a complete set of references. ‘‘Scenario 1: A Reference Point’’ pp. 168–9 in LTG30. ‘‘Scenario 2: More Abundant Nonrenewable resources’’ pp. 172–3 in LTG30. Ref. [11] presents similar views.
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Fig. 2. Resource crisis—Limits Scenario 1 (Source: [2] Limits to Growth—The 30-Year Update, 2004).
get the concepts of ‘‘overshoot’’ and ‘‘collapse’’ into the general vocabulary. Those (few) who were ‘‘against growth’’ cited its several negative side effects in the short run, not the chance that it would create overshoot.9 The implicit view held by most seems to be: 1) society would never be so stupid as to overshoot, and 2) if it did (by mistake), society would organize an orderly retreat back down into sustainable territory. There were never serious debate about the possibility that a large share of humanity might experience decades during which their quality of life would decline, either because of a continuing fall in disposable income, because of shortening life spans and increased mortality, because of outright starvation, or because of other form of deprivation. Limits warned that this could happen, and called for action to reduce the likelihood of its occurrences.10 To repeat, for collapse to occur, humanity first has to move into a state of overshoot. That is, grow into a situation where annual resource usage exceeds annual regeneration (e.g. of timber, fish, or fresh water). Or grow into a situation where pollution emission rates (e.g. of toxics, CFCs, or CO2) exceeds what the ecosystem can absorb and neutralize. If the resulting overshoot lasts long enough, the resource base will gradually become eroded and loose its productivity.
9 10
Two famous defences for more sustainable lifestyles were [12] and [13]. See [6] for more detail about the debate that followed the publication of Limits.
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Fig. 3. Pollution crisis—Limits Scenario 2 (Source: [2] Limits to Growth—The 30-Year Update, 2004).
Fish stocks will decline, as will the oceans’ ability to absorb CO2. As a consequence man will be forced to reduce his resource usage or emission rates, unless he decides to stop trying—traditionally by shifting to other resources and other pollutants. Such reduction in resource use and pollution output will normally lead to reduction in the average ‘‘human welfare’’, simply because society can no longer sustain the traditional flow of goods and services, or because its citizens are forced to live on in a depleted environment. In general terms, overshoot occurs when ‘‘the ecological footprint of humanity’’ (which equals the sum total of mankind’s resource use and pollution generation) grows beyond ‘‘the carrying capacity of the planet’’ (which equals the total capability of the globe to sustain human life). And once in overshoot, there is no way back, except ‘‘down’’—into sustainable territory. Overshoot can’t be sustained forever—just like over-fishing. The principle is illustrated in Fig. 4. Thus collapse is a sudden, unwanted, and unstoppable decline in the average welfare of a number of global citizens. It is a temporary phenomenon, something which does come to an end and (hopefully) is followed by a new period of advance in human welfare.
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Fig. 4. Overshoot and collapse—in principle.
Fig. 5. The Ecological Footprint of Humanity 1962—2003 (Source: [18] WWF Living Planet Report, 2006).
The alternative is smooth adaptation to planetary limitations, ensuring that the human footprint never exceeds the global carrying capacity. This is the recommended way according to Limits. This is sustainable development: Simple in principle, hard in practice.11 2. Overshoot and collapse at the global level 2.1. Global overshoot Overshoot has occurred at the local level, even in modern times. But what about global overshoot? Has humanity exceeded the global carrying capacity, and if so, can this be measured? Over the last decade or two, various attempts have been made to assess the sustainability of current world affairs, in general terms [14–16]. The most relevant part of this effort, for our discussion of overshoot and collapse, has tried to assess
11
For precise definitions of the terms used, see the appendices in LTG30.
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whether the current global economy exceeds the carrying capacity of planet Earth. In other words, this effort has focused on whether current rates of resource use and environmental destruction can be sustained for long periods of time. Heroic attempts have been made to quantify the answer. The leading effort, organized by Mathis Wackernagel in the Global Footprint Network [17], seeks to measure the human ecological footprint, the carrying capacity of the planet, and thereby, the degree of overshoot. The GFN publishes regular estimates of what land area would be needed to satisfy current human consumption in a sustainable manner, compared to the land area available, for example in [18]. The grim result of these efforts are summarized in Fig. 5 which shows that humanity already uses the equivalent of 25% more land than is available on planet Earth. The main reason for this overshoot is the huge forested area that humanity would have needed, if it were to absorb all the CO2 emissions from human use of fossil fuels. Using Wackernagel’s broad measure of the human ecological footprint, global overshoot already appears to be a reality. Using his metric, humanity was last sustainable in the 1980s. In this perspective, there is no way ahead except down: humanity must reduce its footprint while at the same time give room for the poor world to develop [19]. The ecological footprint effort has its weaknesses, and hopefully more complete measures of the human impact will become available over the next decade. But global overshoot can no longer be rejected as pure speculation. Using a narrower measure, namely human emissions of greenhouse gases, the conclusion can be made much stronger. It is abundantly clear that humanity is exceeding the sustainable rate of emissions of greenhouse gases—at a global level. Current emission rates (ca 40 Giga-tons of CO2-equivalents per year) are some 6 to 7 times the sustainable rate, which is estimated to be around 6 GtCO2e per year. As a consequence greenhouse gases are accumulating in the atmosphere, with global warming and climate change as unavoidable consequences [20]. If we use human greenhouse gas emissions as our indicator, global overshoot is certainly a reality. It is increasingly agreed that unless we want to experience increasingly damaging climate change, greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced dramatically over the next several decades. The current situation resembles the early stages of the pollution crisis in World3 (see Fig. 3). Hopefully humanity will manage an organized reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, ideally to sustainable levels by 2050, and thereby avoid the later stages of the developments depicted in Fig. 3. 2.2. Global collapse Even if overshoot is an emerging reality, collapse has not yet (2008) occurred at a global scale. And neither did the Limits authors expect this to happen until later in the 21st century, even if society failed to take action.12 But this gets us to the central question: Is large scale collapse a possibility in the modern world? Is global collapse fact or fiction? When trying to answer this question, it is useful to define more sharply what I will mean by global collapse. Rather arbitrarily I define a collapse as ‘‘global’’ if it affects at least 1 billion people, who lose at least 50% of something they hold dear, within a period of 20 years. The one billion people need not be located in one area: the collapse would be global, in my view, if all rich individuals in the world (say, income above 30.000 USD per person-year) agreed that their quality of life had declined by one half over several decades. Second, the decline need not be loss of income: it could be the loss of anything the citizens hold dear (like freedom, the ability to travel, or physical safety). Thirdly, the decline must be sufficiently abrupt that the population remembers how things were in the good olds days—‘‘before the collapse’’. This is my reason for choosing the 20 year time limit. As an example: if disposable income fell by 50% in 20 years, in spite of everyone working as hard as ever—people would perceive this as a calamity. Or if the life expectancy of their nation fell from, say, 80 years to 40 in the same period, in spite of maximal effort by the available health care sector. But if the population was deprived of the opportunity to drink open water in brooks and lakes over a hundred year long period, as occurred in many countries during industrialization, people would simply adjust to the new way of life. Along the same lines, if within a short generation from now OECD citizens can no longer move outside their neighbourhood without a guard, or abroad without being in a group, many would define this as a collapse in their quality of life. One recent example, namely the collapse of the former Soviet Union provides an example [21]. It can be used for calibration purposes. After the peak in 1989, the GDP per person-year in Russia fell by close to 50% before it bottomed out in 1998. The population stabilized at 148 million persons for a decade, before it began a decline. Life expectancy among men fell from 72 to 62 years. The habitual transfer payments to the states, towns and villages in the periphery of the former empire all but disappeared—people were often left to fend for themselves, based on locally available resources. For those involved, this certainly was collapse. Other analysts have used precisely that term [22], but it did affect too few people (around 300 million) to add up to global collapse in my definition of the term. Thus, global collapse is a scenario where more than a billion people lose at least one half of something they hold dear in 20 years. But such steep decline is only ‘‘collapse’’ if it occurs in spite of efforts by society to achieve the opposite. For there may come the day when global government, business and civil society – ideally in a democratic manner – agree to reduce by half the amenities of one billion people, in order to achieve some greater good for all of mankind. For instance, in the form of
12 See LTG30 pp. xvii–xviii for a retrospective study of global developments from 1972 to 2004, concluding that the world did essentially follow the ‘‘business as usual’’ scenario over this period.
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strong action among the rich to reduce their climate emissions for the benefit of all. Such a deliberate contraction should not be called global collapse. 2.3. Chicken Little? Some will argue that Chicken Little has warned fallaciously about impending doom13 so many times that the present discussion is of little interest. The difference this time around is that the world is already in overshoot. The potential for disaster is already in place. Now the question – and luckily it remains a question – is whether man will do what is necessary to ease humanity back into sustainable territory in an organized manner—without collapse. 3. Can growing greenhouse gas emissions cause global collapse? 3.1. The climate challenge Current anthropogenic emissions of climate gases are one concrete example of global overshoot. Current emissions are several times higher than the sustainable level, and increasing. Could growing emissions result in global collapse? I think yes. If humanity fails to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions dramatically over the next generation or so, this could lead to accelerating damage from climate change, and to global collapse.14 Humanity has upped the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere by some 30% from its pre-industrial level of 280 ppm of CO2, primarily through extensive burning of fossil fuels and deforestation. It is further agreed that this higher concentration has lead to higher temperatures – the global average is up from 13.7 to 14.5 8C – and that the increase will continue throughout the 21st century. Even if by a miracle, manmade emissions came to a halt tomorrow, the temperature would keep rising until 2100 and not return to pre-industrial levels until after several hundred years, because of the inertia in the global temperature system [29]. But first, it is important remember that dramatic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is possible. A number of recent studies show that deep cuts (minus 50–80% before 2050—hopefully enough to keep global warming below plus 2 8C) are feasible and not impossibly expensive.15 So the question is not whether it is possible to cut back, and avoid global collapse, but whether humanity will rise to the challenge in time. We are still (in 2008) at a stage where most nations have not yet started cutting their greenhouse gas emissions. In spite of being 10 years after the Kyoto protocol, and in spite ever louder warnings from an increasingly galvanized society of scientists in the UN’s International Panel on Climate Change [20]. IPCC foresees further temperature increases of between 1.8 and 4 8C before 2100, and twice as much at high latitudes. This may not sound much, but the world’s leading nations have agreed that temperatures must not be allowed to increase by more than 2 8C if we are to avoid dramatic negative consequences of climate change. A simple illustration: an increase of 6 8C will move the timber line and other ecosystems 1.000 m vertically up the mountainsides, lift the sea level by 1 m, and cause significant changes in the conventional patterns rainfall and wind. The summer ice of the Arctic will be long gone. Agriculture and tourism will be heavily affected, as will all coastal and low-lying activities. Even today hurricane intensities appear to have increased. So if the warming trend is allowed to continue, adaptation costs will be significant: the Stern report estimates adaptation to cost at least five times as much as mitigation.16 If humanity had begun reducing its greenhouse gas emissions one decade ago, it would have been easy to keep global warming below the 2 8C mark (i.e. stabilization below 450 ppm CO2e). This may no longer be possible [26], and if further postponement results, even the 550 ppm CO2e mark may be exceeded, leaving the world in the realm of ‘‘dangerous’’ climate change. If humanity continues to postpone action to limit its greenhouse gas emissions, the negative consequences will gather strength over the next generation. Extreme weather events (droughts, strong winds, extreme downpours) will become more commonplace. The tropics will start to dry up and the sea level will start to rise, creating environmental refugees in the process. Some ecosystems will start to degenerate, and some species will die out or try to move—like the Norwegian cod which may migrate towards the cooler waters of the Russian sector of the Barents Sea. Thus the big question is: When will humanity act? 3.2. Global decision delays Regretfully, there are a large number of good reasons why society may choose to postpone actions to reduce manmade greenhouse gas emissions.
13
A famous example was [23]. Ref. [24] includes a useful overview of the potential damage from various levels of future climate change. 15 For example [24] for the global perspective, and [25] for an English summary of The Report of the Norwegian Commission on Low Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Et klimavennlig Norge, NOU 2006:18, Government Printing Office, Oslo 2006). 16 Stern [24] estimates costs in the range of 5–20% of the world GDP after the year 2100. 14
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3.2.1. Uncertainty about climate science The public discussion about whether man does indeed have a significant impact on the climate did not end until the effort leading up to the IPCC report in 2007. But the original uncertainty is succeeded by discussions about what will in fact be the detailed effects of global warming, their strength and timing. This uncertainty can be, and is, used as an argument to postpone climate cuts until further knowledge is available. 3.2.2. The perceived high cost of action In spite of numerous studies showing the opposite, most people believe that climate action will be expensive—‘‘changing our modern life style as we know it’’. The high perceived cost makes it tempting to take the risk on non-action. 3.2.3. Long time from cost to benefit If humanity were to cut greenhouse gas emissions today, the benefit would not be perceivable until around 2040. Only from then onwards would the global temperature follow a lower path than if nothing had been done, because of the huge inertia in the climate system. In other words, the climate investments of the current generation will mainly benefit future generations. Hence they are likely to be postponed, especially since they appear boringly unprofitable when using conventional discount rates. 3.2.4. The tragedy of the climate commons Each nation feels that it won’t help much to cut their emissions, because they constitute a tiny fraction of the total. This is correct for (almost) all nations, and makes it a very difficult for someone to go first—hoping that everyone else will follow. The alternative, to pursue international agreement on common action, may prove slightly easier. But the history of the Kyoto protocol and its follow-up, shows that it takes decades to follow this route to success. 3.2.5. Initial damage strikes those who can’t afford action Observable damage, like that caused by desertification, sea level rise, and sporadic hurricanes, serves as a very real incentive for climate action. However, the first damage from climate change ironically appears to strike those that are least able to act: the small island states in the Pacific ocean, the poor millions in the Asian mega-deltas, and the nomads in the drying belts of Sub-Sahara. The winners (in the short term) are the rich nations in the temperate zone—where crops and forests will grow better in the new balmy climate. In these blessed regions politicians will find difficulties in gaining support for mitigation from voters who are far from scared by the prospects, and rather enjoy pleasant summers and lower heating bills in the winter. 3.2.6. Legitimate unwillingness among the poor to commit The climate problem was caused by the industrialized nations during their recent centuries of economic growth. Currently the GHG emissions per person in the rich world are 5–10 times that of the citizens of the developing world. It is not surprising that the developing world is delaying its cuts until the rich world a) has proven good will by reducing its emissions per person, and b) is willing to help with finance. Since many rich voters won’t commit until the poor have committed, delay results. 3.2.7. Effects on distribution—structural change, loss of jobs If one finally gets to the point of climate action, the proposed measure will normally hit one group harder than the rest, thereby generating last ditch resistance. The proposed closing of a carbon-intensive factory ignites resistance among the workers and the local community. Proposals to tax gasoline lead to touching unity among angry gas users. And so on, creating further delay. 3.2.8. The tyranny of the cost-efficient solution A more subtle obstacle is the insistence among economists to choose the cost-effective solution to climate change, i.e. the one which gives most climate gas reduction per dollar spent. Choosing the cost-effective solution is rational if funds are scarce. But it may lead to undesirable delay when the cost effective solutions can not be implemented, either because of political reasons (unwillingness to ban SUVs) or because of behavioural reasons (unwillingness among voters to wear an indoor sweater in cold nations to reduce heating needs). The search for the ideal of cost-effectiveness, further lengthen societal decision delays. In summary, there are many reasons why humanity may end up postponing effective climate action by another 20 years. Such postponement will push the ultimate concentration of CO2 well beyond the 550 ppm level and cause significant climate damage to future generations. It is not unlikely that a billion people will be impacted, since this scenario is likely to include inundation of the Asian mega-deltas and the drying out of belts north and south of the tropics—forcing large numbers of people to migrate from what they own. Global collapse is avoidable, but only if decisions are made that may prove difficult for a world divided into 180 nations with numerous pressure groups within each nation. It is no consolation that these societal decision delays were
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hypothesized and included in the Limits World3 model already 35 years ago, and is one of the causes of the pollution collapse shown in Fig. 3.17 3.3. Self-reinforcing feedback in the climate system But the central problem related to decision delays in climate policy is the fact that the climate system appears to include self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms [27]. Once triggered, these feedback loops are likely to lead to uncontrollable temperature rise, which cannot be stopped before the processes has run its course. Three examples of self-reinforcing feedback are described below. 3.3.1. Increased absorption of solar heat in an increasingly ice-free Arctic ocean As the Arctic sea ice starts to melt, the surface turns from reflective white to absorbing blue. The dark water absorbs more solar heat, which results in even warmer sea water, more melting of ice, more open ocean, and more absorption of solar heat. This process does not stop, ceteris paribus, until all sea ice is gone. The process may already have started [28]. 3.3.2. Increased emissions of methane gas from melting tundra As the northern tundra starts to melt, the frozen organic material starts releasing its content of methane gas. This results in higher greenhouse gas levels, higher temperature, more melting of the tundra, and more emission of methane. This process does not stop, ceteris paribus, until all the tundra is melted. 3.3.3. Reduced absorption of CO2 in acidic sea water As the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere increases, some of the CO2 is absorbed in the surface layers of the oceans. This increases the acidity of the sea water, which reduces its ability to absorb more CO2. Declining absorption rates leads to faster accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere, ceteris paribus. There is of course uncertainty concerning the strength of these self-reinforcing feedbacks. The strength – that is their gain and the delay involved – determines how fast the feedback mechanisms will act to increase the global temperature. And there is the possibility of balancing feedbacks, mechanisms that serve to counteract the increase in global temperature. The most obvious, fast working, mechanism that remove CO2 from the atmosphere is forest growth, which bind an increasing amount of CO2 (in stems and forest soil) if the trees are left growing. But humanity has converted much of the world’s forests into agricultural land and thereby reduced the ability of the ecosystem to remove CO2 from the atmosphere. And forests must be left uncut for long, in order to accumulate carbon at a substantial scale. Finally there is the hope, not well founded I am afraid, that the self-reinforcing mechanisms will stabilize at new equilibrium values, rather than continuing to the bitter end—where all sea ice is gone, all tundra is melted, and with no CO2 left in the ocean water. This depends on the physical characteristics of the climate system—in brief, on whether the reinforcing feedbacks have a gain larger than one. It appears that process 3 above, may reach a final equilibrium with much CO2 dissolved in the sea water, while 1 and 2 may be unstoppable when triggered. The existence of self-reinforcing mechanisms makes the climate challenge much more dangerous. For every decade society postpones action, for every ppm increase we allow in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the higher is the chance that the self-reinforcing feedbacks get triggered and takes control. It is no consolation that such selfreinforcing mechanisms were included in the Limits World3 model already 35 years ago, and is the main driver of the ‘‘pollution crisis’’ shown in Fig. 3.18 Decision delay is particularly dangerous in a system with dormant positive feedback. The combination of the two in the case of global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, regrettably leads to the conclusion that global collapse caused by growing emissions of greenhouse gases is not inconceivable. If emissions continue too long, there is no doubt that the damage resulting from higher average temperatures will negatively affect more than a billion people—in the drying tropics, in the inundating Asian mega-deltas and in low-lying islands and areas elsewhere. Whether they will lose one half of what they treasure in 20 years, is likely (if they have to migrate) but would need closer quantitative study to verify. 4. If climate-induced collapse occurred, would it be reported as such? 4.1. Root cause versus short term events My final topic will be the question of the format of the collapse—if it were to occur. First, one may prefer to use the word ‘‘decline’’ instead of collapse. The likely scenario is one where things deteriorate gradually over years, rather than through one abrupt fall. Minus 3% a year in disposable income would not feel like a crash if it only lasted for a few years. And it would not appear in statistics as a crash even if it lasted for 20 years. But if it went on for 20
17 These delays are represented many places in the World3 model: there are delays in impact, perception, decision and implementation. See LTG p. 103 and Beyond the Limits p. 238. 18 In World3 the self-reinforcing feedback is represented as follows: Higher levels of (persistent) pollution in the environment leads to lower pollution absorption rates, which in turn leads to faster accumulation of pollutants in the ecosystem. See LTG p. 103 and Beyond the Limits p. 238, and [29].
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years, it certainly would feel like a crash. Imagine the feeling of being an investor in a stock market which continues to inch downwards for two decades! Second, the continuing gradual deterioration is likely to generate tensions—both within and among countries. If the climate changes, people will want to migrate. If water becomes scarce, have-nots will envy and pursue haves. Growing tension may break down a former cooperative spirit and institutions may falter – both within and among countries. Ultimately violence might result – both within and among nations. The period of decline may resemble the lasting conflict in the Mid East, which basically is a fight about limited land and water, but has quickly ended up as a complicated maze of stakeholders with different religious and more earthly agendas, further complicated by international resolutions which can then be broken and fuel further tension. The history of the Mid East conflict, when written, should be presented as decline induced by resource scarcity. If productive land and water were ample in the region, there would not have been the conflict. But this root cause is so deep down that it may be hidden behind the clutter of historical detail. The chance that the root cause may be forgotten, can be seen elsewhere. One might ask: Will the current civil war in Iraq ultimately be described as a consequence of scarce oil? It is true that some try to keep the record straight, and interpret the US invasion in Iraq as an element in a global struggle for ‘‘energy security’’. But the history quickly gets muddled with parallel agendas, like the fight to spread democratic ideals, or the fight among Sunnis and Shias, or between them and the independence seeking Kurds. Should the collapse of the once stable Iraq society be called a resource collapse? Or to the contrary, should the success of Putin’s premiership in Russia be credited to its lucky coincidence with a period of high export prices for oil and gas? My point is simple. Even if a Global Collapse takes place, its format will unavoidably be a long drawn period of messy social strife, involving many players with many agendas. For those who experience the period on the ground, it may well be impossible to maintain an overall picture of what is going on. For them, the main task will be the ordinary human occupation of making the best of the day. It could be hoped that historians, when gathering all facts in the peaceful aftermath of the Collapse, would identify, agree and highlight the root cause. But it may also be that even in retrospect, the period will not be described as an era of environmental collapse, but as a dark, less civilized period. 4.2. Histories of the 21st century So, if climate-induced global collapse were to occur in the 21st century, would it be described in the history books of the year 2100 as such? Would it be described as ‘‘the century of climate-induced global collapse’’? I think not. In most conceivable scenarios, the root cause will quickly be translated into some more conventional hardship, like a global epidemic, world war, widespread hunger, or economic depression. These will be written up in the history books, not the story of collapse induced by growing emissions of greenhouse gases. Thus the history books of the year 2100 may end up containing one of these stories. 4.2.1. Epidemics General warming led to the move northwards of tropical disease, which created impressive epidemics (‘‘pandemics’’) in the dense mega-cities in the subtropical and temperate parts of the world. Hundreds of million people were killed. The 21st century was the century of repeated global epidemics. 4.2.2. World war The drying up of the rivers in China, caused by the melting of the glaciers in the Himalayas, made it tempting for the Chinese to obtain fresh irrigation water from the relatively uninhabitated Russian Far East. Russia did not agree, and the US helped Russia throw out Chinese occupiers—in exchange for priority access to Russian gas. The 21st century was the century of the new East–West axis: the fight of USA and Russia against the rest. 4.2.3. Widespread hunger The excess agricultural capacity of EU, US and Australia was reduced by increasing temperatures and drought. Ever more land was used to produce biofuels for the rich world. At the same time China became a net buyer of food in the international markets, because of its rapidly increasing living standards, and the drying of Chinese rivers. Food aid ceased and food price rose. The result was widespread hunger in the poor regions of the world. The 21st century was the century of the greatest famine ever. 4.2.4. Depression Global warming led to significant shift in the economic structure and trading pattern of the world. Energy and carbonintensive industries were moved from countries with Kyoto obligations to other parts of the world. Tropical countries with ability to grow sugar cane took over employment from the oil exporting countries. On top of this China and India became the new industrial factories and back-offices of the world. It was all grossly mishandled and led to major unemployment in the developed world. The central banks proved unable to forestall a serious depression, because they were so busy funding and controlling a rapidly evolving carbon trading system. The 21st century was the century of the greatest depression ever. In conclusion, growing emissions of climate gases may well cause significant problems for humanity in the 21st century – even global collapse – without this ever becoming visible in the history books of the year 2100. The root cause in all the
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stories above, namely climate change, may escape the headlines. Instead media may rather focus on proximate issues like flooding, migration, starvation, local conflict, unemployment and failure of government. The Cassandras who warned about future collapse, may not be able to prove they were right, even after it happened. 5. Conclusion The phenomenon of overshoot and collapse – and the possibility of global collapse – is still relevant and worthy of study. Global collapse triggered by ever growing emissions of greenhouse gases is still conceivable in the first half of the 21st century, because of the unfortunate combination of global decision delays and self-reinforcing feedback in the climate system. Interestingly it may prove difficult to verify that global collapse did take place—even if it did, and even after the fact. Global collapse – defined as a situation where more than one billion people lose one half of what they hold dear in less than 20 years – may well be hidden from the headlines and the history books. The 21st century is more likely to be described as a period of intense local strife, institutional breakdown, regionalization and general malaise. The root cause – humanity overstepping an environmental limit – may well be lost in the clutter of historical detail. Global Collapse could remain fiction, even if it proved to be fact. References [1] D.H. Meadows, D.L. Meadows, J. Randers, W.W. Behrens, The Limits to Growth, Universe Books, New York, 1972 (referred to as ‘‘Limits’’). [2] D.H. Meadows, J. Randers, D.L. Meadows, Limits to Growth—The 30 Year Update, Chelsea Green Publishing Company, Vermont, 2004(referred to as ‘‘LTG30’’). [3] D.H. Meadows, D.L. Meadows, J. Randers, Beyond the Limits, Chelsea Green Publishing Company, Post Mills, Vermont, 1992 (referred to as ‘‘Beyond the Limits’’). [4] W.R. Catton, Overshoot, University of Illinois Press, 1982 (ISBN 0-252-009826). [5] J. Diamond, Collapse, Viking, New York, 2005. [6] U. Bardi, Cassandra’s Curse. Revisiting the ‘‘Limits to Growth’’, ugo.bardi@unifi.it, 2006. [7] J. Sterman, Business Dynamics—Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World, Mc-Graw-Hill, Boston, 2000, p. 126. [8] C. Pointing, A Green History of the World: the Environment and Collapse of Great Civilizations, Penguin, 1993. [9] Ecosystems and Human Well-Being. Synthesis, Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, Washington DC, 2005; Global Database on Marine Fisheries and Ecosystems, www.seaaroundus.org. [10] M. Kurlansky, Cod, Vintage, London, 1999. [11] J. Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Society, Cambridge University Press, 1990. [12] E. Goldsmith, Blueprint for survival, The Ecologist 2 (1 (January)) (1972). [13] E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, 1973 (available as Small Is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered: 25 Years Later, Hartley & Marks Publishers, 1973 ISBN 0-88179-169-5). [14] Sustainable Development. Critical Issues, OECD, Paris, 2001. [15] The sustainability strategy for Norway (St.meld 1 2003-04, Nasjonalbudsjettet 2004. Kapittel 6: Nasjonal handlingsplan for bærekraftig utvikling, Government Printing Office, Oslo, 2003). [16] Sustainability indicators for Norway (NOU 2005:5 Enkle signaler i en kompleks verden, Government Printing Office, Oslo, 2005). [17] www.footprintnetwork.org. [18] WWF Living Planet Report 2006, WWF International, Gland, 2006. [19] J. Kitzes, et al., Shrink and share: humanity’s present and future ecological footprint, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 363 (1491) (2008). [20] Summary for decision makers, Working Group 1, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fourth Assessment Report, 2007. [21] L. Grigoriev, Institute for Energy and Finance, Private Communication, Moscow, 2006. [22] B.J. Smith, The Collapse of the Soviet Union, Lucent Books, 1994. [23] R. Batra, The Great Depression of 1990, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1985. [24] N. Stern et al., The Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change, London, 2006, www.sternreview.org.uk. [25] J. Randers, K. Alfsen, How can Norway become a climate-friendly society? World Econ. 8 (1 (January–March)) (2007). [26] D. Zhenghelis, Member of the Stern Review, Private Communication, London, 2006. [27] Avoiding dangerous climate change, Met Office Symposium, Exeter, UK 2005. www.stabilisation2005.com. [28] Arctic Sea Ice Extent May Have Fallen By 50 Percent Since 1950s, Science Daily, 2 October 2007, www.sciencedaily.com. [29] J. Randers, The emergence of Limits to Growth Scenario 2—The pollution Crisis, International System Dynamics Conference, Boston, 2007, www.system dynamics.org.