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Good luck or good governance? The recovery of Celtic Sea herring
Marine Policy 78 (2017) 163–170
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Marine Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Good luck or good governance? The recovery of Celtic Sea herring
MARK
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Maurice Clarke , Afra Egan Marine Institute, Rinville, Oranmore, Galway H91 R673, Ireland
A R T I C L E I N F O
A BS T RAC T
Keywords: Stock recovery Herring Common Fisheries Policy Fisheries management
The herring stock in the Celtic Sea collapsed in 2004. The stock is managed under the European Union's (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), but with a large measure of local stakeholder involvement through the Pelagic Advisory Council and a local Irish stakeholder committee. An iterative process, initiated by the local committee culminated in a formal rebuilding plan, which ran until 2012, by which time, the stock had fully recovered. Subsequent analyses of stock development over this period suggest that the stock was already recovering by the time the final plan was implemented. Did the stock rebuild by good fortune or did the governance measures put in place achieve their aims? This question is answered by way of examination of stock trends over time, analyses of the main elements of the rebuilding measures, including a management strategy evaluation (MSE) along with analyses of the legal and institutional arrangements in Ireland and in the EU CFP, including the development of the Pelagic Advisory Council. Important innovations in the CFP are revealed as having been crucial for the rebuilding process.
1. Introduction
2. Materials and methods
Fish stock collapses have been a feature of recent decades. Rebuilding stocks to levels that can deliver maximum sustainable yield has become a central goal of fisheries management, including in the new EU CFP. Rebuilding plans have been implemented for fish stocks in Europe with varying degrees of success [1,2]. One of the success stories is the Celtic Sea herring. It began to decline in the late 1990s, collapsing in 2004, but recovered again by 2012. Rebuilding efforts were developed in consultation with the industry. An iterative stop-start process ensued which eventually led to a formal rebuilding plan in 2008. However, subsequent analyses of the stock show that rebuilding was already underway before that time. Would recovery have happened anyway, as it appears to have done after an earlier collapse? The first recovery took place even though quota cuts were but partially implemented, fishing mortality (F) only modestly reduced and no rebuilding measures established. This paper examines the evidence to investigate if the recovery would have happened anyway, or whether governance changes had an impact. This is done by using the latest benchmark assessment, a management strategy evaluation, a historical overview of periods of collapse and recovery and an evaluation of stakeholder engagement in the management process. The analytical methods used are outlined, and results described and discussed in sequence, with conclusions being made. Some consideration is given to the transferability of lessons for management of other European fisheries.
The latest benchmark stock assessment as conducted by ICES, [2] was used to provide estimates of key stock parameters: fishing mortality (F2–5 winter rings), recruitment and spawning stock biomass (SSB). In particular the effect of rebuilding measures on F was evaluated. This is because reviewers of rebuilding efforts have pointed out that success usually requires immediate reductions in fishing mortality. The effect of the rebuilding efforts on reducing F was evaluated. The rebuilding efforts considered were cuts in catch and the introduction of a closed area (2001–2003; 2007–2012). The number of vessels participating in the fishery was quantified. These data were obtained from the EU logbook catch declarations data held by the Irish Marine Institute. A filter of 200 t annual landings was applied to exclude vessels taking incidental by-catches of herring. In order to calculate the contribution to overall mortality from within the closure area, partial fishing mortalities were computed. Overall fishing mortality at age and year on the stock from the latest benchmark ICES assessment [2] were split according to the proportion of overall catch in numbers taken from that area. By way of comparison with the earlier collapse and recovery, mean weights at age at spawning time were extracted from the ICES assessment [2] This was to evaluate the relative contribution of individual fish to spawning stock biomass. Mean weight at age and year was divided by the corresponding numbers in the catch and regrouped to produce a time series of mean weight across all ages per
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Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Clarke).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.10.025 Received 6 September 2016; Received in revised form 12 October 2016; Accepted 12 October 2016 0308-597X/ © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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Table 1 Details of what-if scenarios tested by MSE. Start year
Recruitment regime
Initial catch
Target F
1980 2000 2000 2000 2008
Low as in 1970s Low, 1998–2004 Low, 1998–2004 Long term average Long term average
Average 1975–81 Catch in 2000 Catch in 2000 Catch in 2000 Average 2004–08
Fpa 1/3 of high SSBa Fpa Bpa Fpa None Catch fluctuation ± 10% Fpa None
a
Management trigger
Description Recruitment did not improve Recruitment did not improve No rebuilding effort Catch inertia Absence of EC rule
at this time the re-opening target SSB was proposed by ICES as one third of the highest observed SSB in the series.
given stock biomass. The second recovery could not benefit from these large fish. Rebuilding required more individual fish to be allowed to survive and therefore the second recovery required a greater input of recruits than the first. The second collapse began in 1998, with recruitment being poor since 1996. F peaked at almost 0.7 in 2000, and stock biomass slid to below the limit reference point by 2004.
year. In order to evaluate which measures, if any, effected recovery, a management strategy evaluation (MSE) was performed. This was to evaluate if recovery would have happened if: 1. Recruitment did not improve as it was observed to do. 2. Total catch remained the same rather than having been reduced. 3. The EU initiatives were not implemented.
3.2. Formal management and stakeholder engagement
These questions were explored with reference to both the recent stock collapse, and the earlier one in the 1970s. Management strategy evaluation followed the procedures used to evaluate the rebuilding plan [3] using a framework already developed [4,5]. The settings used in the MSE are shown in Table 1. The general approach taken was to test various historic scenarios using the most modern perception of the stock, the 2015 benchmark assessment, in an ex post analysis. Thus the target fishing mortality reference point and those for limit and target precautionary biomass are modern values [6]. Simulations of the early recovery period mimicked the management procedure of the period as closely as possible. Simulated populations were reconstructed by resampling from a pre-defined stock recruitment relationship. The stock recruitment relationship in each case was chosen to reflect average or poor conditions, depending on the scenario. Average conditions were modelled from a long term average up to the period immediately before the start point in each case.
The stock has been managed by TAC since 1974, and that was the only formal management measure in place for many years. However throughout the 1980s there was a degree of stakeholder involvement, culminating in an attempt to regulate target fishing mortality through box closures on spawning grounds [8]. This initiative led to a series of box closures that still exist. That measure is not part of this study, because it was not a rebuilding measure. The Irish industry formed a new committee in 1998, due to concerns that there was a lack of older fish in the catches, and low abundance estimates from acoustic surveys [7]. The committee worked towards its first rebuilding measures in 2001 (Table 2). Thus, the committee was ahead of ICES in formally recognising that the stock was in a poor state. An iterative process developed, within this committee, reacting to and in turn influencing developments at an EU level. Table 2 shows the scientific advice from ICES and the actions taken by the Irish stakeholder committee. There were four actions. The first was the closure of the recruit-spawner box, which varied in temporal duration in each season. The second was a procedure that vessels should “move on” to other fishing grounds if fish below a threshold minimum size were caught. The third was removal of the need to register catch each year to remain eligible for a license, the “use it or lose it clause”. Finally there was a procedure to divert part of the TAC away from spawning fish. Table 2 also shows the basis upon which the EC authorities framed the TAC for that season. These measures were prompted by, from 1999, a general scarcity of fish, pessimistic results from acoustic surveys, and from 2002, pessimistic ICES scientific advice. These measures (Table 2) were as follows:
3. Results 3.1. History of collapses and recoveries The stock collapsed on two occasions, in the 1970s and again in the early 2000s (Fig. 1). In both cases high fishing mortality and low recruitment were observed before collapse in spawning stock biomass below the limit reference point level. In each instance, the stock recovered, with strong year classes recruiting. The first collapse was probably caused by very high F on prerecruits in a nursery ground industrial fishery outside the stock management area [7]. The first recovery was not accompanied by a formal rebuilding plan, nor any rebuilding measures other than 0-TAC, which was not effective to reduce catch. Some recovery in SSB occurred before the fishery was re-opened in 1982, but good recruitment was only recorded after re-opening (the 1981 recruitment is irrelevant as it would not have been well estimated at the time). Recruitment improved and recovery benefitted from this good fortune. Fishing mortality remained very high, however, after the stock recovered. This high F was only sustained by a prolonged period of above average recruitment in the 1980s and early 1990s. The first recovery is all the more remarkable because F was so high, both during the collapse and after. A key factor in the first recovery was that the stock was composed of fish that attained a large size. Mean weights of fish at spawning time (used to calculate SSB) were on average one third higher than during the second collapse (Fig. 2). Therefore, the contribution per recruit to stock biomass was much greater in the earlier period, requiring fewer individual fish to achieve a
1. A minimum size of 23 cm TL,. increased to 25 cm TL during 2002, and moving on provision. 2. Closure of Division VIIaS, the main area where fishing took place and where aggregations were densest. 3. Diversion of quota from spawning time to feeding time to reduce numbers of fish caught per tonne. This was implemented to varying degrees in 2002, 2003 and 2004. 4. Removal of a “use it or lose it” provision for license holders from 2002 onwards. It is not clear whether item 1 it was applied, and it is not considered further. However measure 2 was largely followed, being un-officially implemented by peer-pressure within the industry. Measure 3 was implemented by the Irish authorities. Measure 4 was also implemented in official policy and did lead to a marked reduction in the number of vessels participating in the fishery (Fig. 3). The effect of this licensing 164
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Fig. 1. Stock development over time as estimated by latest ICES stock assessment in 2015. Top left, recruitment with long term (geometric) mean. Top right, estimated total catch in tonnes. Bottom left, spawning stock biomass (SSB) with latest precautionary target and limit reference points. Bottom right, fishing mortality with latest estimate of Fmsy, the fishing mortality leading to maximum sustainable yield.
for most of the stock's history, apart from brief periods in the 1990s when the advised catches were very high. From 2006 onwards, the Commission issued its TAC policy proposals in advance of the Council of Ministers meeting. This narrowed the scope for setting TACs in excess of advice. The Commission proposal for this stock was for a cut in TAC of 15% [10]. These proposals were not legally binding; however, they implied that the TAC should be set as proposed, unless good evidence was available to support a different level. It can be seen from Table 2 that TACs were constantly reduced from 2006 onwards, once the Commission initiative was introduced. This initiative incentivised positive actions by the local stakeholders committee. Though F was being reduced by decreasing TACs and catches, only when it was accompanied by a full-season area closure, form 2007, did it reduce F to low levels (Fig. 6). The closure area is an important spawning [11] and nursery area [12], particularly for recruits that are 50% mature [2], and contribute to the spawning stock biomass. This reduction in F was achieved by reducing the efficiency of the fleet. Given that this was the pre-dominant spawning area in a spawningtime fishery, there were few alternatives for the fleet to target similarly dense aggregations. Also, the risk of slippage of excess catch was mitigated, because fishing these dense schools could quickly generate hauls that were too big to be landed. The effect on overall F was to reduce it markedly (Fig. 6). Fig. 7 shows the strong relationship between catch and F. As catch was reduced, there was a strong tendency for F to also reduce also. A small sentinel fishery was allowed in the area, taking no more than 8% of the Irish quota. This sentinel fishery was not a significant contributor to overall F. However in permitting a number of small vessels to take a remunerative annual catch, a positive attitude was engendered within the fishery. This counterbalanced expansionary tendencies elsewhere in the fleet. The existence of the sentinel fishery discouraged the larger segments of the fleet from seeking access, as had happened when the earlier box closure was abandoned in 2004.
Fig. 2. Weighted average mean weight at age of fish at spawning time, weighted by catch numbers across all ages. Dark shading indicates the collapse periods, starting with the first year where SSB < Blim and ending in the last year where advice for no fishing was given by ICES.
change was to reduce the participation in the fishery at a time of decreasing boat-quotas, reducing the risk of TAC overshoot (unaccounted mortality by slippage etc.) and reducing the strain on the local management structures, and on the control regime. Measures 1–3 were abandoned in 2005, due to frustration within the local committee that its efforts were not having the desired impact [7] though by then the stock had collapsed to below the limit biomass reference point. However, with hindsight, it can be seen that the closed area appears to have been having an impact by reducing F. When it was abandoned, F increased again (Fig. 4). A key institutional development took place in 2006. This was the European Commission advance TAC decision rule policy proposal. In the CFP, TAC setting is a sole competency of the Council of Fisheries Ministers [9]. Before 2006, there was a tendency for TACs for this stock to be set in excess of advised levels, (Fig. 5). Indeed this was the norm
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Table 2 History of scientific advice (left section), local rebuilding actions developed by the consultation committee, from 2000, (middle section), and the basis and outcome of TAC setting by the European Union (right section). Negotiation (within European Council) without prior TAC decision rule; CP: European Commission proposed TAC decision rule acted upon by European Council; RP: Rebuilidng Plan followed by European Council. Season
ICES scientific advice
Box closure and duration
Minimum size with moving on procedure
“Use it or lose it” licensing
% TAC diverted from spawning time
Advance EC TAC proposal
Basis of EC TAC
% TAC change
2000/2001
Maintain recent F Maintain recent F −45% in TAC. Large catch reduction −15% in TAC. −15% in TAC −49% in TAC. RP or no fishery RP or no fishery RP or no fishery RP RP or Fmsy
None
None
Yes
–
No
Negotiation
0
Part of season
23 cm
Yes
–
No
Negotiation
−5
All season Part of season
25 cm 23 cm
No No
9% 15%
No No
Negotiation Negotiation
−35 0
None None None All seasona All seasona All seasona All seasona All seasona
None None None None None None None None
No No No No No No No No
30% – – – – – – –
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Negotiation Negotiation Negotiation CP (−15%) CP (−15%) RP, CP(−25%) RP (+72%) RP (+30%)
0 0 −15 −15 −15 −25 +72 +30
2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012 a
sentinel fishery allocated 8% of Irish quota, for small boats only.
Fig. 3. No of vessels recording > 200 t of herring per year, 2000–2012.
Coupled with the reduction in licenses in the fishery, it eased the problem of allocating reducing quotas and generally reduced adversity in the industry to rebuilding initiatives. The reduced number of boats probably made enforcement of the TAC and other measures easier. The committee's rebuilding efforts intensified from 2007, as it became clear that the Commission TAC decision policy was reducing the chances of TACs being set in excess of the advice. A first rebuilding plan was drafted in 2007, and a second one in 2008 meeting the favour of the EC authorities, and being implemented from 2009. Table 3 shows the terms of the formal plan. It consisted of a Harvest Control Rule (HCR), a formalised decision rule defining the level of F to be applied in future, given the current position of SSB and F relative to their reference values. It also contained a closed area provision, a sentinel fishery and a clause defining when the plan would be considered to have been successfully completed. The draft plan was the de facto management plan from 2009, though due to institutional complexities within the EU, it never had any legal standing. The TAC setting mechanism for 2009 corresponded with the stated policy of the European Commission and was adopted by the Council. Meanwhile, the closed area provision of the plan was implemented by Irish legislation from 2009 onwards, having been established on a voluntary basis since 2007. SSB increased progressively from low to high levels during the second collapse, with several good recruitments being recorded in 2005, 2007 and 2009. The stock had achieved the defined rebuilding target by 2010.
Fig. 4. Above, mean fishing mortality, F (2−5) as estimated by ICES benchmark assessments 2015. Full closure indicated by solid black symbol, partial closure by grey symbols and no closure by open symbols. Dashed line indicates F0.1 which became the target F in the rebuilding plan. Below, total catch and catch in closed box over same period (1999–2011).
3.3. Management strategy evaluation It can be seen from Fig. 8 that in the absence of good recruitment, the precautionary target would not have been attained, and with continued risk of stock collapse. This confirms the view that improved recruitment was implicated in the recent recovery. The additional value of management action can be gauged by examining the scenarios presented in Fig. 8. If catches had not been reduced there would not have been recovery, even if recruitment was good from 2000 onwards. In the absence of the EC Commission TAC decision rule process, if
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Fig. 5. Advised and observed catch in relation to the TAC implemented. Top left, advised catch in relation to implemented TAC, top right, observed catch in relation to implemented TAC, bottom left, advised TAC in relation to implemented TAC, bottom right, TAC in relation to observed catch.
to very low rates. The earlier closure efforts were also decreasing F, before they were abandoned. The closed area was an agent for reducing F. Ironically its initial intention was, as cautioned against elsewhere [15], as an alternative to reducing catch. The sentinel fishery generated a very low F, reflecting the conclusion from a recent review [16] that sentinel fisheries are usually counterproductive unless F is trivial. Stock collapse usually results from a failure of governance and recovery plans are unlikely to work without addressing the underlying governance structure [14]. Such change did take place in this instance, contributing administrative conditions favourable for recovery. The EC Common Fisheries Policy was in gestation at the time of the first collapse, and though there were catch controls, no overarching policy existed to incentivise good practice. The second rebuilding benefitted from improved governance. In particular, the European Commission's decision rule policy, for 2007 onwards, acted as a catalyst for better governance at a national and local level within Ireland. Before 2006, there was a tradition of TACs being set in excess of advised levels, (Fig. 5). Thereafter, TACs were continually reduced by the European authorities. The new Commission TAC proposal initiative of 2006 had an important bearing on this. The existence, in Ireland, of a stakeholder consultation committee, and the culture of stakeholder engagement, existing since the 1980s, provided the environment in which rebuilding plans could be developed. The initiation of the regional Advisory Councils, whereby stakeholders concerns could be brought to bear in EU management, from 2004 onwards, provided a conduit from local management committee to the EU authorities. However, the Commission TAC decision proposal was the catalyst for more intense efforts towards rebuilding. Without the Commission initiative, the local stakeholders’ efforts may not have reached fruition. The initial local rebuilding efforts of 2001–2005 were abandoned because stakeholders felt that no matter what painful measures were taken, there was no positive effect [7]. However the closed area was indeed having an impact before it was abandoned. Another problem was that no definitive stock assessment was available to measure stock
catches continued to be set by political negotiation without an underlying decision rule for low stock size, the stock would not have recovered, and would have stabilised in a non-recovery phase with high risk of further stock collapse, even under an optimistic recruitment option. The importance of the Commission initiative is further underlined in Fig. 9. Under an optimistic recruitment regime the continuance of the old approach to setting TACs, would not have yielded recovery. Taking the evidence that the effect of the closed box was to reduce fishing mortality (Fig. 5 and 6), it can be concluded that even if recruitment was favourable, the box closure was a necessary addition. Finally, by way of comparison, the early recovery, from 1980 onwards was evaluated under a pessimistic recruitment regime. Results of this scenario in Fig. 10, show no recovery, even with catches remaining lower than they were observed to be. This shows that the first recovery was mediated by improved recruitment and that the modest changes to fisheries management in the 1980s would not have been successful if recruitment remained at 1970s levels. The weakness of the 1980s fisheries management regime can be seen from Fig. 5 that the TAC was not restrictive on outtake throughout the 1980s, nor indeed was the scientific advice implemented in TAC setting. 4. Discussion Studies of rebuilding note that ultimate success usually requires prompt reductions in fishing mortality [13–16]. Recovery in this case was ensued through a process of reductions in catch and F, through changes in governance and local industry-led initiatives. The strong relationship between the two parameters (Fig. 7) meant that reductions in catch were successful at reducing F. Catch decreased for a while under the earlier rebuilding efforts, but then increased again. Sustained reductions in catch from 2004 onwards reduced F. Though F was being reduced by decreasing catches, it was when accompanied by an area closure, form 2007, that it was brought down 167
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Table 3 Text of the rebuilding plan as agreed in 2008. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
6.
7.
For 2009, the TAC shall be reduced by 25% relative to the current year (2008). In 2010 and subsequent years, the TAC shall be set equal to a fishing mortality of F0.1. If, in the opinion of ICES and STECF, the catch should be reduced to the lowest possible level, the TAC for the following year will be reduced by 25%. Division VIIaS will be closed to herring fishing for 2009, 2010 and 2011. A small-scale sentinel fishery will be permitted in the closed area, Division VIIaS. This fishery shall be confined to vessels, of no more than 65 feet in length. A maximum catch limitation of 8% of the Irish quota shall be exclusively allocated to this sentinel fishery. Every three years from the date of entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall request ICES and STECF to evaluate the progress of this rebuilding plan. When the SSB is deemed to have recovered to a size equal to or greater than Bpa in three consecutive years, the rebuilding plan will be superseded by a long-term management plan.
Fig. 6. Top, overall mean fishing mortality (F) for 2–5 winter ring fish, middle partial mean F from closure area, with dark line indicating that the closure was implemented and the pale line that it was not. F0.1 indicated by hatched line in each case. Below, total catch (pale) and catch taken from the closed area (dark) over same period (1999–2011). Fig. 8. Various what-if scenario testing drivers for the second recovery. Upper panel (SSB over time from 2000, with limit reference point, solid line and precautionary target, hatched line), lower panel, risk of SSB < Blim during same period.
development. Most importantly, however, there was no overarching policy framework in Europe to incentivise continuing with these measures. The Commission TAC-decision rule initiative, from 2006, incentivised positive actions by the local stakeholders committee and the Pelagic AC, copper-fastening the rebuilding efforts thenceforth. Between the initial steps in 2001 and the final plan, in 2008, a process developed which in itself contributed to rebuilding. The process finally led stakeholders and managers to agree a plan with a single course of action. This reduced the institutional/political likelihood of TACs being set too high. This process, culminating in the final plan, was successful in reducing fishing mortality to lowest levels in the time series, and was accompanied by increases in the stock to well above the precautionary levels. The differences between the two stock recovery periods highlight important aspects of the second recovery. Fishing mortality remained
Fig. 7. Relationship between recorded catch and fishing mortality (F2-5 winter ring) during 1999–2009, r2=0.94.
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very high after the stock recovered the first time. High F was only sustained by a prolonged period of above average recruitment in the 1980s and early 1990s. In contrast F was already decreasing during the second collapse, concomitant with decreased TACs and catches, better enforcement [7], and especially from 2007, the closure area. Some of the lessons learned here can be transferred to other recovery situations. However, this stock has minimal interaction with other stocks of herring and is caught in a single species fishery. Therefore its rebuilding may not apply directly to fisheries for mixed stocks, for higher trophic level species and or where other multi-species interactions need to be considered. Nevertheless, the procedural lessons are clear. In particular, local stakeholder engagement was central to rebuilding efforts. The changes in governance and consultation at an EC level provided a more productive environment for local initiatives to come to fruition. This overarching governance superstructure was a key to success. Local stakeholder rebuilding efforts are likely to struggle in the absence of overarching governance structures. Another lesson is in managing the expectations of the local stakeholders. This proved difficult and initiatives were abandoned, some of which could have led to earlier success. The more proactive role of the European Commission, in proposing TACs before the negotiation process began, brought renewed vigour to stakeholder initiatives, leading to an agreed management approach, which has been adhered to by all parties since. In this case a single stakeholder committee in one EU member state represented almost the entire catching sector. Where several local stakeholder groups exist in one or several countries, having differing views on how to proceed, the chance of success is diminished. However the structures exist through the Regional Advisory Councils [9] and these should be tested fully in other situations.
Fig. 9. Test scenario for absence of EC TAC decision rule from 2008. Upper panel (SSB over time from 2008, with limit reference point, solid line and precautionary target, hatched line), lower panel, risk of SSB < Blim during same period.
5. Conclusions The rebuilding was not simply good fortune, neither was it due entirely to the rebuilding plan. Rather, it resulted from a prolonged period of administrative and institutional change, culminating in the rebuilding plan. This process brought fishing mortality under control and created an environment where the natural ability of the stock to rebound was harnessed. If there was good fortune in improved recruitments, then better governance increased their chances of survival. The presence of a rebuilding plan, which has since been replaced by a long term management plan, should provide a framework to mitigate risk of collapse in future. If so, then proactive harvesting will take the place of reactive measures to restore a depleted resource. This success of the overall process agrees with the observation [13,17] that conversion of advice into policy through a transparent, participatory process is central to achieving fisheries sustainability.
Acknowledgements This work was funded by the Irish Marine Institute. The manuscript was improved by inputs from the review and editorial process, which are gratefully acknowledged. The findings and conclusions in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Marine Institute. Articles published stand on their own scientific merit, and will be considered along with other work in the Marine Institute's advisory and policy-making processes. Neither the Marine Institute nor the authors accept any responsibility whatsoever for loss or damage occasioned, or claimed to have been occasioned, in part or in full as a consequence of any person acting or refraining from acting, as a result of a matter contained in this publication. All or part of this publication may be reproduced without further permission, provided the source is acknowledged.
Fig. 10. What-if scenario testing if recruitment remained depressed as during 1970 s. Upper panel (SSB over time from 1980, with limit reference point, solid line and precautionary target, hatched line), lower panel, risk of SSB < Blim during same period.
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[9] R. Churchill, D. Owen, The EC Common Fisheries Policy, Oxford Univeristy Press, 2010. [10] European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the Council on Fishing Opportunities for 2007. Com 2006 (499). European Commission; 2006. [11] D. O’Sullivan, E. O’Keefe, A. Berry, O.Tully, M. Clarke, An Inventory of Irish Herring Spawning Grounds. Irish Fisheries Bulletin No. 42; 2013. [12] M. Clarke A. Egan J.P. Molloy, A Survey of nursery grounds for Celtic Sea and VIIj herring. Irish Fisheries Investigations No. 22; 2010. [13] J. Brodziak, S.X. Cadrin, C.M. Legault, S.A. Murawski, Goals and strategies for rebuilding New England groundfish stocks, Fish. Res. 94 (2008) 355–366. [14] C. Hammer, O.S. Kjesbu, G.H. Kruse, P. Shelton, Rebuilding depleted fish stocks: biology, ecology, social science and management strategies, ICES J. Mar. Sci. 67 (2010) 1825–1829. [15] J.W. Horwood, J.H. Nichols, S. Milligan, Evaluation of closed areas for fish stock conservation, J. Appl. Ecol. 35 (6) (1998) 893–903. [16] S.A. Murawski, Rebuilding depleted fish stocks: the good, the bad, and, mostly, the ugly, ICES J. Mar. Sci. 67 (2010) 1830–1840. [17] C. Mora, R.A. Myers, M. Coll, S. Libralato, T.J. Pitcher, R.U. Sumalia, D. Zeller, R. Wtason, K.J. Gatson, B. Worm, Management effectiveness of the worlds marine fisheries, PLoS Biol. (2009) 7e1000131.
References [1] M. Cardinale, H. Dörner, A. Abella, J.L. Andersen, J. Casey, R. Döring, E. Kirkegaard, A. Motova, J. Anderson, E.J. Simmonds, C. Stransky, Rebuilding EU fish stocks and fisheries, a process under way?, Mar. Policy 39 (2013) 43–52. [2] ICES. Report of benchmark workshop on herring stocks west of Scotland, ICES CM ACOM: 34; 2015. [3] A. Egan, A. Campbell, M. Clarke, Rebuiling of the Celtic Sea Herring, Mar. Resour. Ser. No. 24 (2012). [4] D. Skagen, HCS Celtic User Manual Downloaded from 〈www.dwsk.net〉 on the 1st May, 2009. [5] D. Skagen, HCS 10-3 Celtic User Manual. Downloaded from 〈www.dwsk.net〉 on the 30thJune, 2010. [6] ICES. Advice for herring (Clupea harengus) in divisions 7.a south of 52°30’ north, 7.g–h, and 7.j–k (Irish Sea, Celtic Sea, and southwest of Ireland). in: ICES. Report of the ICES Advisory Committee, Book 5. ICES; 2016. [7] J. Molloy, The Herring Fisheries of Ireland (1900–2005) Biology, Research, Development and Assessment. Marine Institute, 2006. [8] J. Molloy, The closure of herring spawning grounds in the Celtic Sea and Division VIIj. Department of the Marine Fisheries Leaflet No. 145; 1989.
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Marine Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Good luck or good governance? The recovery of Celtic Sea herring
MARK
⁎
Maurice Clarke , Afra Egan Marine Institute, Rinville, Oranmore, Galway H91 R673, Ireland
A R T I C L E I N F O
A BS T RAC T
Keywords: Stock recovery Herring Common Fisheries Policy Fisheries management
The herring stock in the Celtic Sea collapsed in 2004. The stock is managed under the European Union's (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), but with a large measure of local stakeholder involvement through the Pelagic Advisory Council and a local Irish stakeholder committee. An iterative process, initiated by the local committee culminated in a formal rebuilding plan, which ran until 2012, by which time, the stock had fully recovered. Subsequent analyses of stock development over this period suggest that the stock was already recovering by the time the final plan was implemented. Did the stock rebuild by good fortune or did the governance measures put in place achieve their aims? This question is answered by way of examination of stock trends over time, analyses of the main elements of the rebuilding measures, including a management strategy evaluation (MSE) along with analyses of the legal and institutional arrangements in Ireland and in the EU CFP, including the development of the Pelagic Advisory Council. Important innovations in the CFP are revealed as having been crucial for the rebuilding process.
1. Introduction
2. Materials and methods
Fish stock collapses have been a feature of recent decades. Rebuilding stocks to levels that can deliver maximum sustainable yield has become a central goal of fisheries management, including in the new EU CFP. Rebuilding plans have been implemented for fish stocks in Europe with varying degrees of success [1,2]. One of the success stories is the Celtic Sea herring. It began to decline in the late 1990s, collapsing in 2004, but recovered again by 2012. Rebuilding efforts were developed in consultation with the industry. An iterative stop-start process ensued which eventually led to a formal rebuilding plan in 2008. However, subsequent analyses of the stock show that rebuilding was already underway before that time. Would recovery have happened anyway, as it appears to have done after an earlier collapse? The first recovery took place even though quota cuts were but partially implemented, fishing mortality (F) only modestly reduced and no rebuilding measures established. This paper examines the evidence to investigate if the recovery would have happened anyway, or whether governance changes had an impact. This is done by using the latest benchmark assessment, a management strategy evaluation, a historical overview of periods of collapse and recovery and an evaluation of stakeholder engagement in the management process. The analytical methods used are outlined, and results described and discussed in sequence, with conclusions being made. Some consideration is given to the transferability of lessons for management of other European fisheries.
The latest benchmark stock assessment as conducted by ICES, [2] was used to provide estimates of key stock parameters: fishing mortality (F2–5 winter rings), recruitment and spawning stock biomass (SSB). In particular the effect of rebuilding measures on F was evaluated. This is because reviewers of rebuilding efforts have pointed out that success usually requires immediate reductions in fishing mortality. The effect of the rebuilding efforts on reducing F was evaluated. The rebuilding efforts considered were cuts in catch and the introduction of a closed area (2001–2003; 2007–2012). The number of vessels participating in the fishery was quantified. These data were obtained from the EU logbook catch declarations data held by the Irish Marine Institute. A filter of 200 t annual landings was applied to exclude vessels taking incidental by-catches of herring. In order to calculate the contribution to overall mortality from within the closure area, partial fishing mortalities were computed. Overall fishing mortality at age and year on the stock from the latest benchmark ICES assessment [2] were split according to the proportion of overall catch in numbers taken from that area. By way of comparison with the earlier collapse and recovery, mean weights at age at spawning time were extracted from the ICES assessment [2] This was to evaluate the relative contribution of individual fish to spawning stock biomass. Mean weight at age and year was divided by the corresponding numbers in the catch and regrouped to produce a time series of mean weight across all ages per
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Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Clarke).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.10.025 Received 6 September 2016; Received in revised form 12 October 2016; Accepted 12 October 2016 0308-597X/ © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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Table 1 Details of what-if scenarios tested by MSE. Start year
Recruitment regime
Initial catch
Target F
1980 2000 2000 2000 2008
Low as in 1970s Low, 1998–2004 Low, 1998–2004 Long term average Long term average
Average 1975–81 Catch in 2000 Catch in 2000 Catch in 2000 Average 2004–08
Fpa 1/3 of high SSBa Fpa Bpa Fpa None Catch fluctuation ± 10% Fpa None
a
Management trigger
Description Recruitment did not improve Recruitment did not improve No rebuilding effort Catch inertia Absence of EC rule
at this time the re-opening target SSB was proposed by ICES as one third of the highest observed SSB in the series.
given stock biomass. The second recovery could not benefit from these large fish. Rebuilding required more individual fish to be allowed to survive and therefore the second recovery required a greater input of recruits than the first. The second collapse began in 1998, with recruitment being poor since 1996. F peaked at almost 0.7 in 2000, and stock biomass slid to below the limit reference point by 2004.
year. In order to evaluate which measures, if any, effected recovery, a management strategy evaluation (MSE) was performed. This was to evaluate if recovery would have happened if: 1. Recruitment did not improve as it was observed to do. 2. Total catch remained the same rather than having been reduced. 3. The EU initiatives were not implemented.
3.2. Formal management and stakeholder engagement
These questions were explored with reference to both the recent stock collapse, and the earlier one in the 1970s. Management strategy evaluation followed the procedures used to evaluate the rebuilding plan [3] using a framework already developed [4,5]. The settings used in the MSE are shown in Table 1. The general approach taken was to test various historic scenarios using the most modern perception of the stock, the 2015 benchmark assessment, in an ex post analysis. Thus the target fishing mortality reference point and those for limit and target precautionary biomass are modern values [6]. Simulations of the early recovery period mimicked the management procedure of the period as closely as possible. Simulated populations were reconstructed by resampling from a pre-defined stock recruitment relationship. The stock recruitment relationship in each case was chosen to reflect average or poor conditions, depending on the scenario. Average conditions were modelled from a long term average up to the period immediately before the start point in each case.
The stock has been managed by TAC since 1974, and that was the only formal management measure in place for many years. However throughout the 1980s there was a degree of stakeholder involvement, culminating in an attempt to regulate target fishing mortality through box closures on spawning grounds [8]. This initiative led to a series of box closures that still exist. That measure is not part of this study, because it was not a rebuilding measure. The Irish industry formed a new committee in 1998, due to concerns that there was a lack of older fish in the catches, and low abundance estimates from acoustic surveys [7]. The committee worked towards its first rebuilding measures in 2001 (Table 2). Thus, the committee was ahead of ICES in formally recognising that the stock was in a poor state. An iterative process developed, within this committee, reacting to and in turn influencing developments at an EU level. Table 2 shows the scientific advice from ICES and the actions taken by the Irish stakeholder committee. There were four actions. The first was the closure of the recruit-spawner box, which varied in temporal duration in each season. The second was a procedure that vessels should “move on” to other fishing grounds if fish below a threshold minimum size were caught. The third was removal of the need to register catch each year to remain eligible for a license, the “use it or lose it clause”. Finally there was a procedure to divert part of the TAC away from spawning fish. Table 2 also shows the basis upon which the EC authorities framed the TAC for that season. These measures were prompted by, from 1999, a general scarcity of fish, pessimistic results from acoustic surveys, and from 2002, pessimistic ICES scientific advice. These measures (Table 2) were as follows:
3. Results 3.1. History of collapses and recoveries The stock collapsed on two occasions, in the 1970s and again in the early 2000s (Fig. 1). In both cases high fishing mortality and low recruitment were observed before collapse in spawning stock biomass below the limit reference point level. In each instance, the stock recovered, with strong year classes recruiting. The first collapse was probably caused by very high F on prerecruits in a nursery ground industrial fishery outside the stock management area [7]. The first recovery was not accompanied by a formal rebuilding plan, nor any rebuilding measures other than 0-TAC, which was not effective to reduce catch. Some recovery in SSB occurred before the fishery was re-opened in 1982, but good recruitment was only recorded after re-opening (the 1981 recruitment is irrelevant as it would not have been well estimated at the time). Recruitment improved and recovery benefitted from this good fortune. Fishing mortality remained very high, however, after the stock recovered. This high F was only sustained by a prolonged period of above average recruitment in the 1980s and early 1990s. The first recovery is all the more remarkable because F was so high, both during the collapse and after. A key factor in the first recovery was that the stock was composed of fish that attained a large size. Mean weights of fish at spawning time (used to calculate SSB) were on average one third higher than during the second collapse (Fig. 2). Therefore, the contribution per recruit to stock biomass was much greater in the earlier period, requiring fewer individual fish to achieve a
1. A minimum size of 23 cm TL,. increased to 25 cm TL during 2002, and moving on provision. 2. Closure of Division VIIaS, the main area where fishing took place and where aggregations were densest. 3. Diversion of quota from spawning time to feeding time to reduce numbers of fish caught per tonne. This was implemented to varying degrees in 2002, 2003 and 2004. 4. Removal of a “use it or lose it” provision for license holders from 2002 onwards. It is not clear whether item 1 it was applied, and it is not considered further. However measure 2 was largely followed, being un-officially implemented by peer-pressure within the industry. Measure 3 was implemented by the Irish authorities. Measure 4 was also implemented in official policy and did lead to a marked reduction in the number of vessels participating in the fishery (Fig. 3). The effect of this licensing 164
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Fig. 1. Stock development over time as estimated by latest ICES stock assessment in 2015. Top left, recruitment with long term (geometric) mean. Top right, estimated total catch in tonnes. Bottom left, spawning stock biomass (SSB) with latest precautionary target and limit reference points. Bottom right, fishing mortality with latest estimate of Fmsy, the fishing mortality leading to maximum sustainable yield.
for most of the stock's history, apart from brief periods in the 1990s when the advised catches were very high. From 2006 onwards, the Commission issued its TAC policy proposals in advance of the Council of Ministers meeting. This narrowed the scope for setting TACs in excess of advice. The Commission proposal for this stock was for a cut in TAC of 15% [10]. These proposals were not legally binding; however, they implied that the TAC should be set as proposed, unless good evidence was available to support a different level. It can be seen from Table 2 that TACs were constantly reduced from 2006 onwards, once the Commission initiative was introduced. This initiative incentivised positive actions by the local stakeholders committee. Though F was being reduced by decreasing TACs and catches, only when it was accompanied by a full-season area closure, form 2007, did it reduce F to low levels (Fig. 6). The closure area is an important spawning [11] and nursery area [12], particularly for recruits that are 50% mature [2], and contribute to the spawning stock biomass. This reduction in F was achieved by reducing the efficiency of the fleet. Given that this was the pre-dominant spawning area in a spawningtime fishery, there were few alternatives for the fleet to target similarly dense aggregations. Also, the risk of slippage of excess catch was mitigated, because fishing these dense schools could quickly generate hauls that were too big to be landed. The effect on overall F was to reduce it markedly (Fig. 6). Fig. 7 shows the strong relationship between catch and F. As catch was reduced, there was a strong tendency for F to also reduce also. A small sentinel fishery was allowed in the area, taking no more than 8% of the Irish quota. This sentinel fishery was not a significant contributor to overall F. However in permitting a number of small vessels to take a remunerative annual catch, a positive attitude was engendered within the fishery. This counterbalanced expansionary tendencies elsewhere in the fleet. The existence of the sentinel fishery discouraged the larger segments of the fleet from seeking access, as had happened when the earlier box closure was abandoned in 2004.
Fig. 2. Weighted average mean weight at age of fish at spawning time, weighted by catch numbers across all ages. Dark shading indicates the collapse periods, starting with the first year where SSB < Blim and ending in the last year where advice for no fishing was given by ICES.
change was to reduce the participation in the fishery at a time of decreasing boat-quotas, reducing the risk of TAC overshoot (unaccounted mortality by slippage etc.) and reducing the strain on the local management structures, and on the control regime. Measures 1–3 were abandoned in 2005, due to frustration within the local committee that its efforts were not having the desired impact [7] though by then the stock had collapsed to below the limit biomass reference point. However, with hindsight, it can be seen that the closed area appears to have been having an impact by reducing F. When it was abandoned, F increased again (Fig. 4). A key institutional development took place in 2006. This was the European Commission advance TAC decision rule policy proposal. In the CFP, TAC setting is a sole competency of the Council of Fisheries Ministers [9]. Before 2006, there was a tendency for TACs for this stock to be set in excess of advised levels, (Fig. 5). Indeed this was the norm
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Table 2 History of scientific advice (left section), local rebuilding actions developed by the consultation committee, from 2000, (middle section), and the basis and outcome of TAC setting by the European Union (right section). Negotiation (within European Council) without prior TAC decision rule; CP: European Commission proposed TAC decision rule acted upon by European Council; RP: Rebuilidng Plan followed by European Council. Season
ICES scientific advice
Box closure and duration
Minimum size with moving on procedure
“Use it or lose it” licensing
% TAC diverted from spawning time
Advance EC TAC proposal
Basis of EC TAC
% TAC change
2000/2001
Maintain recent F Maintain recent F −45% in TAC. Large catch reduction −15% in TAC. −15% in TAC −49% in TAC. RP or no fishery RP or no fishery RP or no fishery RP RP or Fmsy
None
None
Yes
–
No
Negotiation
0
Part of season
23 cm
Yes
–
No
Negotiation
−5
All season Part of season
25 cm 23 cm
No No
9% 15%
No No
Negotiation Negotiation
−35 0
None None None All seasona All seasona All seasona All seasona All seasona
None None None None None None None None
No No No No No No No No
30% – – – – – – –
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Negotiation Negotiation Negotiation CP (−15%) CP (−15%) RP, CP(−25%) RP (+72%) RP (+30%)
0 0 −15 −15 −15 −25 +72 +30
2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012 a
sentinel fishery allocated 8% of Irish quota, for small boats only.
Fig. 3. No of vessels recording > 200 t of herring per year, 2000–2012.
Coupled with the reduction in licenses in the fishery, it eased the problem of allocating reducing quotas and generally reduced adversity in the industry to rebuilding initiatives. The reduced number of boats probably made enforcement of the TAC and other measures easier. The committee's rebuilding efforts intensified from 2007, as it became clear that the Commission TAC decision policy was reducing the chances of TACs being set in excess of the advice. A first rebuilding plan was drafted in 2007, and a second one in 2008 meeting the favour of the EC authorities, and being implemented from 2009. Table 3 shows the terms of the formal plan. It consisted of a Harvest Control Rule (HCR), a formalised decision rule defining the level of F to be applied in future, given the current position of SSB and F relative to their reference values. It also contained a closed area provision, a sentinel fishery and a clause defining when the plan would be considered to have been successfully completed. The draft plan was the de facto management plan from 2009, though due to institutional complexities within the EU, it never had any legal standing. The TAC setting mechanism for 2009 corresponded with the stated policy of the European Commission and was adopted by the Council. Meanwhile, the closed area provision of the plan was implemented by Irish legislation from 2009 onwards, having been established on a voluntary basis since 2007. SSB increased progressively from low to high levels during the second collapse, with several good recruitments being recorded in 2005, 2007 and 2009. The stock had achieved the defined rebuilding target by 2010.
Fig. 4. Above, mean fishing mortality, F (2−5) as estimated by ICES benchmark assessments 2015. Full closure indicated by solid black symbol, partial closure by grey symbols and no closure by open symbols. Dashed line indicates F0.1 which became the target F in the rebuilding plan. Below, total catch and catch in closed box over same period (1999–2011).
3.3. Management strategy evaluation It can be seen from Fig. 8 that in the absence of good recruitment, the precautionary target would not have been attained, and with continued risk of stock collapse. This confirms the view that improved recruitment was implicated in the recent recovery. The additional value of management action can be gauged by examining the scenarios presented in Fig. 8. If catches had not been reduced there would not have been recovery, even if recruitment was good from 2000 onwards. In the absence of the EC Commission TAC decision rule process, if
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Fig. 5. Advised and observed catch in relation to the TAC implemented. Top left, advised catch in relation to implemented TAC, top right, observed catch in relation to implemented TAC, bottom left, advised TAC in relation to implemented TAC, bottom right, TAC in relation to observed catch.
to very low rates. The earlier closure efforts were also decreasing F, before they were abandoned. The closed area was an agent for reducing F. Ironically its initial intention was, as cautioned against elsewhere [15], as an alternative to reducing catch. The sentinel fishery generated a very low F, reflecting the conclusion from a recent review [16] that sentinel fisheries are usually counterproductive unless F is trivial. Stock collapse usually results from a failure of governance and recovery plans are unlikely to work without addressing the underlying governance structure [14]. Such change did take place in this instance, contributing administrative conditions favourable for recovery. The EC Common Fisheries Policy was in gestation at the time of the first collapse, and though there were catch controls, no overarching policy existed to incentivise good practice. The second rebuilding benefitted from improved governance. In particular, the European Commission's decision rule policy, for 2007 onwards, acted as a catalyst for better governance at a national and local level within Ireland. Before 2006, there was a tradition of TACs being set in excess of advised levels, (Fig. 5). Thereafter, TACs were continually reduced by the European authorities. The new Commission TAC proposal initiative of 2006 had an important bearing on this. The existence, in Ireland, of a stakeholder consultation committee, and the culture of stakeholder engagement, existing since the 1980s, provided the environment in which rebuilding plans could be developed. The initiation of the regional Advisory Councils, whereby stakeholders concerns could be brought to bear in EU management, from 2004 onwards, provided a conduit from local management committee to the EU authorities. However, the Commission TAC decision proposal was the catalyst for more intense efforts towards rebuilding. Without the Commission initiative, the local stakeholders’ efforts may not have reached fruition. The initial local rebuilding efforts of 2001–2005 were abandoned because stakeholders felt that no matter what painful measures were taken, there was no positive effect [7]. However the closed area was indeed having an impact before it was abandoned. Another problem was that no definitive stock assessment was available to measure stock
catches continued to be set by political negotiation without an underlying decision rule for low stock size, the stock would not have recovered, and would have stabilised in a non-recovery phase with high risk of further stock collapse, even under an optimistic recruitment option. The importance of the Commission initiative is further underlined in Fig. 9. Under an optimistic recruitment regime the continuance of the old approach to setting TACs, would not have yielded recovery. Taking the evidence that the effect of the closed box was to reduce fishing mortality (Fig. 5 and 6), it can be concluded that even if recruitment was favourable, the box closure was a necessary addition. Finally, by way of comparison, the early recovery, from 1980 onwards was evaluated under a pessimistic recruitment regime. Results of this scenario in Fig. 10, show no recovery, even with catches remaining lower than they were observed to be. This shows that the first recovery was mediated by improved recruitment and that the modest changes to fisheries management in the 1980s would not have been successful if recruitment remained at 1970s levels. The weakness of the 1980s fisheries management regime can be seen from Fig. 5 that the TAC was not restrictive on outtake throughout the 1980s, nor indeed was the scientific advice implemented in TAC setting. 4. Discussion Studies of rebuilding note that ultimate success usually requires prompt reductions in fishing mortality [13–16]. Recovery in this case was ensued through a process of reductions in catch and F, through changes in governance and local industry-led initiatives. The strong relationship between the two parameters (Fig. 7) meant that reductions in catch were successful at reducing F. Catch decreased for a while under the earlier rebuilding efforts, but then increased again. Sustained reductions in catch from 2004 onwards reduced F. Though F was being reduced by decreasing catches, it was when accompanied by an area closure, form 2007, that it was brought down 167
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Table 3 Text of the rebuilding plan as agreed in 2008. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
6.
7.
For 2009, the TAC shall be reduced by 25% relative to the current year (2008). In 2010 and subsequent years, the TAC shall be set equal to a fishing mortality of F0.1. If, in the opinion of ICES and STECF, the catch should be reduced to the lowest possible level, the TAC for the following year will be reduced by 25%. Division VIIaS will be closed to herring fishing for 2009, 2010 and 2011. A small-scale sentinel fishery will be permitted in the closed area, Division VIIaS. This fishery shall be confined to vessels, of no more than 65 feet in length. A maximum catch limitation of 8% of the Irish quota shall be exclusively allocated to this sentinel fishery. Every three years from the date of entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall request ICES and STECF to evaluate the progress of this rebuilding plan. When the SSB is deemed to have recovered to a size equal to or greater than Bpa in three consecutive years, the rebuilding plan will be superseded by a long-term management plan.
Fig. 6. Top, overall mean fishing mortality (F) for 2–5 winter ring fish, middle partial mean F from closure area, with dark line indicating that the closure was implemented and the pale line that it was not. F0.1 indicated by hatched line in each case. Below, total catch (pale) and catch taken from the closed area (dark) over same period (1999–2011). Fig. 8. Various what-if scenario testing drivers for the second recovery. Upper panel (SSB over time from 2000, with limit reference point, solid line and precautionary target, hatched line), lower panel, risk of SSB < Blim during same period.
development. Most importantly, however, there was no overarching policy framework in Europe to incentivise continuing with these measures. The Commission TAC-decision rule initiative, from 2006, incentivised positive actions by the local stakeholders committee and the Pelagic AC, copper-fastening the rebuilding efforts thenceforth. Between the initial steps in 2001 and the final plan, in 2008, a process developed which in itself contributed to rebuilding. The process finally led stakeholders and managers to agree a plan with a single course of action. This reduced the institutional/political likelihood of TACs being set too high. This process, culminating in the final plan, was successful in reducing fishing mortality to lowest levels in the time series, and was accompanied by increases in the stock to well above the precautionary levels. The differences between the two stock recovery periods highlight important aspects of the second recovery. Fishing mortality remained
Fig. 7. Relationship between recorded catch and fishing mortality (F2-5 winter ring) during 1999–2009, r2=0.94.
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very high after the stock recovered the first time. High F was only sustained by a prolonged period of above average recruitment in the 1980s and early 1990s. In contrast F was already decreasing during the second collapse, concomitant with decreased TACs and catches, better enforcement [7], and especially from 2007, the closure area. Some of the lessons learned here can be transferred to other recovery situations. However, this stock has minimal interaction with other stocks of herring and is caught in a single species fishery. Therefore its rebuilding may not apply directly to fisheries for mixed stocks, for higher trophic level species and or where other multi-species interactions need to be considered. Nevertheless, the procedural lessons are clear. In particular, local stakeholder engagement was central to rebuilding efforts. The changes in governance and consultation at an EC level provided a more productive environment for local initiatives to come to fruition. This overarching governance superstructure was a key to success. Local stakeholder rebuilding efforts are likely to struggle in the absence of overarching governance structures. Another lesson is in managing the expectations of the local stakeholders. This proved difficult and initiatives were abandoned, some of which could have led to earlier success. The more proactive role of the European Commission, in proposing TACs before the negotiation process began, brought renewed vigour to stakeholder initiatives, leading to an agreed management approach, which has been adhered to by all parties since. In this case a single stakeholder committee in one EU member state represented almost the entire catching sector. Where several local stakeholder groups exist in one or several countries, having differing views on how to proceed, the chance of success is diminished. However the structures exist through the Regional Advisory Councils [9] and these should be tested fully in other situations.
Fig. 9. Test scenario for absence of EC TAC decision rule from 2008. Upper panel (SSB over time from 2008, with limit reference point, solid line and precautionary target, hatched line), lower panel, risk of SSB < Blim during same period.
5. Conclusions The rebuilding was not simply good fortune, neither was it due entirely to the rebuilding plan. Rather, it resulted from a prolonged period of administrative and institutional change, culminating in the rebuilding plan. This process brought fishing mortality under control and created an environment where the natural ability of the stock to rebound was harnessed. If there was good fortune in improved recruitments, then better governance increased their chances of survival. The presence of a rebuilding plan, which has since been replaced by a long term management plan, should provide a framework to mitigate risk of collapse in future. If so, then proactive harvesting will take the place of reactive measures to restore a depleted resource. This success of the overall process agrees with the observation [13,17] that conversion of advice into policy through a transparent, participatory process is central to achieving fisheries sustainability.
Acknowledgements This work was funded by the Irish Marine Institute. The manuscript was improved by inputs from the review and editorial process, which are gratefully acknowledged. The findings and conclusions in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Marine Institute. Articles published stand on their own scientific merit, and will be considered along with other work in the Marine Institute's advisory and policy-making processes. Neither the Marine Institute nor the authors accept any responsibility whatsoever for loss or damage occasioned, or claimed to have been occasioned, in part or in full as a consequence of any person acting or refraining from acting, as a result of a matter contained in this publication. All or part of this publication may be reproduced without further permission, provided the source is acknowledged.
Fig. 10. What-if scenario testing if recruitment remained depressed as during 1970 s. Upper panel (SSB over time from 1980, with limit reference point, solid line and precautionary target, hatched line), lower panel, risk of SSB < Blim during same period.
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[9] R. Churchill, D. Owen, The EC Common Fisheries Policy, Oxford Univeristy Press, 2010. [10] European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the Council on Fishing Opportunities for 2007. Com 2006 (499). European Commission; 2006. [11] D. O’Sullivan, E. O’Keefe, A. Berry, O.Tully, M. Clarke, An Inventory of Irish Herring Spawning Grounds. Irish Fisheries Bulletin No. 42; 2013. [12] M. Clarke A. Egan J.P. Molloy, A Survey of nursery grounds for Celtic Sea and VIIj herring. Irish Fisheries Investigations No. 22; 2010. [13] J. Brodziak, S.X. Cadrin, C.M. Legault, S.A. Murawski, Goals and strategies for rebuilding New England groundfish stocks, Fish. Res. 94 (2008) 355–366. [14] C. Hammer, O.S. Kjesbu, G.H. Kruse, P. Shelton, Rebuilding depleted fish stocks: biology, ecology, social science and management strategies, ICES J. Mar. Sci. 67 (2010) 1825–1829. [15] J.W. Horwood, J.H. Nichols, S. Milligan, Evaluation of closed areas for fish stock conservation, J. Appl. Ecol. 35 (6) (1998) 893–903. [16] S.A. Murawski, Rebuilding depleted fish stocks: the good, the bad, and, mostly, the ugly, ICES J. Mar. Sci. 67 (2010) 1830–1840. [17] C. Mora, R.A. Myers, M. Coll, S. Libralato, T.J. Pitcher, R.U. Sumalia, D. Zeller, R. Wtason, K.J. Gatson, B. Worm, Management effectiveness of the worlds marine fisheries, PLoS Biol. (2009) 7e1000131.
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