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Gorbachev's reorganization and the Gorkom
BOHDAN HARASYMIW
Gorbachev’s Reorganization and the Gorkom
Part of M&hail
Gorbachev’s
overall program
of accelerating
the development
of the
USSR is a policy or campaign which he calls “reorganization” (perestroika, literally “reconstruction. ” ) This policy applies to all spheres of sociopolitical activity, and as such embraces the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). What does “reorganization” mean as applied to the party, and what does it entail? Is it succeeding ?’ Until more adequate information is available, some partial answers to these questions can be found through an examination of the impact of this reform in the case of the urban party organization, the gorkom.2 In order to help evaluate the significance of Gorbachev’s “reorganization,” a brief review of the tasks and structure of the gorkom as they stood before 1985 is useful. Among the numerous Khrushchevian organizational changes undone by Brezhnev (including reunification of the party apparat, rescinding the rule of automatic turnover of committee memberships, and abolition of the RSFSR Bureau and numerous other boards
and commissions),
was the restoration
of the departmental
gorkomy.3 Since then, every urban party committee organization; propaganda and agitation; industry
structure
in the
has had four major departments: and transportation; and general
(internal administration). Large cities have also had departments of: construction and urban economy; education and scientific institutions; (public) administration, trade and finance;
and, where appropriate,
agriculture.4
The “branch”
departments,
those
concerned with the economy, have had as their main responsibilities: (1) generally, influencing the performance of productive enterprises indirectly through the primary party organizations enterprises’
(PPOs)
performance
situated within them; and
(2) collecting
information
on these
innovative production capabilities; (3) uncovering as well as encouraging socialist emulation them,
methods and disseminating (competition among workers); (4) monitoring the performance of leading personnel and recommending their appointment; (5) drafting briefs and decisions concerning the performance
of enterprises
for the gorkom
bureau;
and (6) effecting
oversight
of the
1. An early, if not premature, effort to comment on this topic was made by Theodore H. Friedgut, Gorbachev and Party Reform, The Soviet and East European Research Centre, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Research Paper No. 62, Jerusalem, January 1986. 2. At its January 1987 Plenum, the CPSU Central Committee placed particular emphasis on the implementation of the pcresrroikn in personnel matters by gorkomy and raikomy, since this part of the apparat is in direct contact with the party’s primary units. See its resolution in Literafurnaiagawta, 4 February 1987, p. 2. The same point is also emphasized in Pravda, 12 March 1987, p. 1. In the present article the term gorkom, an acronym for gorodskoi komitet (city committee), is used to include references to gorraikomy (urban borough committees) as well. 3. Darrell P. Hammer, “B rez h nev and the Communist Party, ” in Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird (eds.), The Soviet Polity in theModem Era (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1984) pp. 196-98. 4. Gorkom, raikom parfii: opyf, formy i metody rabob (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1977), p. 294. STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM, VOL. XXI, 0039.3592/88/01
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No. 1, SPRING 1988, 61-70 of Southern
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STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
62
execution of party and governmental directives. 5 To do all of this, of course, every department itself had to be differentiated structurally, thus reflecting internally the specialization apparent in the gorkom office taken as a whole. On the eve of Gorbachev’s accession, the gorkom had an unquestionably complex structure and its personnel had clearly differentiated duties not only as between departments but also within them; concomitant with this differentation was the problem of coordination.6 One way for us to assess the policy of “reorganization ” will be to ascertain whether changes in the departmental structure of gorkomy have been introduced by Gorbachev, or new coordinating mechanisms have been put in place. Another will be to check for changes in the major tasks assigned to the gorkomy. were
planning
of the
gorkom’s
Under Brezhnev,
these major tasks
activities,
management of leading personnel or “cadres,” and checking up on the fulfilment of party directives.7 All of this was to serve the overall goal of increasing economic production. Along with differentiation in the structure of gorkomy has gone increased formalization. By 1985, already there were reports that the tasks of departments and the duties of personnel were being set down in regulations drawn up locally.* This was indicative of the increasing inflexibility of the apparat. Thus, there has developed a remarkable
complexity in both the structures and tasks of the urban party committees. Concomitant with this complexity have been problems of effective communication, excessive formalization and paperwork, and inertia, which Gorbachev’s perestroika is intended to remedy. Gorbachev’s Launched
nationwide
at the June part
“Reorganization” at the Twenty-Seventh
1986 Plenum of the Central
of Gorbachev’s
CPSU
Committee,
Congress
and given a further boost
the “reorganization”
campaign
is
of accelerating the development of the USSR and has as its ultimate objective to “ensure a new upsurge in all the dimensions
accordingly
program
of economic and social development. “g It is meant to reinvigorate the style of party work of the entire apparat, from top to bottom. As outlined by the General Secretary himself and propagated thereafter bodies from involvement
by Pravda, the most immediate targets are: to extricate party in practical administrative and economic decisions, and to
have them adopt a “political”
style of leadership
(i.e.,
to exert leadership
through the
PPOs rather than by giving commands directly to economic managers); to reduce their paperwork insulation from the public and to increase their real contact with people; to bring
about
a change
of attitude
among
intolerance
of shortcomings;
-between
the party and the people. lo
all apparatchiki,
mainly
to stimulate
an
and to increase the openness of communication-glasnost’
5. Ibid., p. 332. 6. For some examples of differentiation of personnel duties between and within departments, see Parfiinaia zhizn’, no. 13, 1975, pp. 25-32; and no. 22, 1973, p. 57. 0 n coordination, ibid., no. 12, 1975, p. 28; and no. 13, 1975, p. 26. 7. For details, see, for instance, ibid., no. 13, 1975, pp. 27-31; no. 22, 1973, pp. 58-61; no. 12, 1968, pp. 29-37; and Gwkom, raikompartii, pp. 369-83 and 396-409. 8. Partiinnia zhizn ‘, no. 14, 1985, pp. 44-5; and no. 15, 1985, p. 47. 9. Prauda, 25 June 1986, p. 1. See also Partiinaia zhim’, no. 6-7, 1986, pp. 62-5 and 92; no. 13, 1986, pp. 23-7; and Pravda, 13 March 1987, pp. 2-3. 10. Partiinaiarhim”, no. 13, 1986, pp. 24-5; and Ruuda, 25June 1986, p. 1. For similarstatements, seealso Prauda Ukminy, 28 January 1987, p. 2; Pmuda, 3 February 1987, p. 1; G. K. Kriuchkov, “Kadrovaiapolitika partii v usloviiakh perestroiki,” Voprosy is&i KPSS, no. 2, 1987, pp. 17-32; and Radians’ka Ukraina, 30 March 1986, p. 3.
Gorbachev’s Reorganization and the G?wkom
63
A whole series of ways has been prescribed for the party apparat to implement none of which entails genuine reorganization in the Gorbachev’s “reorganization,” sense of formal structural changes.” In the first place, the “reorganization” of party work requires a renewal of the content of the work of the apparat and its reorientation toward the current priority tasks (and by implication away from bureaucratic routine as an end in itself). These priority tasks include: “speeding up the tempos of scientifictechnical progress,
activization
of the human factor, strengthening
as the general level of organization
and self-discipline,
law and order as well
and strengthening
the policy of
and being thrifty. ” l2 In short, party work is to be linked with Gorbachev’s
economizing
overall policy of “accelerating”
the USSR’s
development.
Thus reoriented,
the center
of party work is to be transferred out of the offices of the committees into the PPOs. Political (i.e., persuasive instead of dictatorial) methods of leadership, mobilization and education are to be employed. The primary component of “reorganization” is a different focus and style of work rather than a restructuring of the apparat. A second component involves the search for new approaches to the solution of current problems.
of party committees in uncovering “more but, significantly, no ready recipes are available or offered for the apparatchiki to follow. l3 It will be up to the party workers themselves to generalize from the successful practical examples as these come to light. is an attempt to reorient public consciousThe third aspect of the “reorganization” effective
More independence
forms and methods
is demanded
of leadership,”
ness toward the so-called new ideas involved in the renewal of the entire system. This includes the reeducation of cadres accustomed to thinking in terms of extensive rather than intensive
methods of production.
It means a greater role for Marxism-Leninism
as the scientific theory providing direction out of the current situation and into the future, and an expansion of the activities of the party’s propaganda apparatus. In fourth place is an admonition to increase attention to the person and to his needs and demands.
What the authorities
through more effectively maintaining earlier
component
reorientation
have in mind here is the raising of labor productivity discipline and law and order. Here again, as in an the prescription is one of attitudinal
of the “reorganization,”
and the transfer of the center of activity of the party into the midst of the
toiling masses, into the PPOs and the working collectives. is a cadres policy responding Another component of the “reorganization” needs and putting an end to the “trust in cadres” and “stability of cadres” Brezhnev.
It means that personnel
unable to implement
to current poiicies of
the general “reorganization”
policy of Gorbachev should be fired. This is the area to which the January 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee devoted its attention, and the only aspect of Gorbachev’s policy which really entails restructuring. i4 According to the General Secretary, several lessons have been learned from the past: there is a need for fresh forces in positions of responsibility; greater tempering in political theory is required of cadres; stability can be carried too far, even though it is desirable; more responsibility and accountability is needed from persons in authority; and, finally, the democratic bases of personnel or cadres work have to be expanded. Gorbachev’s prescription based on all of this is the 11. This and the following six paragraphs draw on L. N. Ponomarev and E. N. Tarasov, “Partiinaia rabota v usloviiakh perestroiki,” VoprosyistoriiKPSS, no. 1, 1987, pp. 3-18. See also Pravda, 13 March 1987, p. 3. 12. Ponomarev and Tarasov, ibid., p. 6. 13. Ibid., p. 7. 14. Raudo Ukrainy, 28 January 1987.
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
64
election of leading personnel, beginning with economic enterprises, but including also party secretaries-at first on the primary level, eventually even at the center. Apart from urging the selection of managers and secretaries by their collectives in multicandidate
elections,
it is noteworthy
that Gorbachev
declined to offer practical solutions
to cadre problems. As the sixth component of the “reorganization” placing emphasis on the psychological reconstruction
the central party press has been of cadres. l5 This is acknowledged
to be the most difficult aspect of the p~estroik~, involving as it does a change in consciousness and manner of thinking. The desirable attitudes of party apparatchiki are those required
by the Party Rules:
a willingness to work with the people and to listen to
public opinion. The principal undesirable attitude, both social and individual, is said to be authoritarianism which paralyzes initiative and creates a harmful passivity.i6 Leadership style also has to be improved, rejuvenated, and made more dynamic, energetic, and competent. This is the seventh component of theperestroika. It means that words have to be matched with deeds, long-range tasks have to be reconciled with the short range, actions have to be concrete, and shortcomings dealt with in a business-like manner. Leadership
is more openness-glasnost’--which
is
conceived of as a monitoring device. It also involves opening up party operations rank-and-ale as well as to the unaf~liated public: more open party meetings,
to the more
interesting
style can be improved
themes
at public “political
if there
days,”
more involvement
of the public in the
selection of personnel, and more regular reports to the public by party officials.17 Here one may discern that the party leadership is endeavoring to activate public scrutiny over its lower-level
officials,
who are well protected
the intervening layers of bureaucracy. emphasized that this public scrutiny
from effective direction
from the top by
Indeed, one Pravda article intimated as much and would be an effective way to evaluate officials’
execution
of the “reorganization” policy itself. I8 is a misnomer for Gorbachev’s policy of rejuvenatSo far, the term “reorganization” ing the party apparat. No new or different goals have been set for the CPSU; no new tasks for the apparat.
The goals and tasks all have historical
precedents
and have long
been a part of the declared objectives of the party. No changes have been proposed to the structure of this apparat, such as abolition of committees, the further differentiation of committees, or creation of new coordinating bodies. Further formalization within the apparat has neither been accelerated nor slowed down. None of these elements has even been addressed, at least not publicly. The perestroika essentially prescribes only changes of style and attitudes. The sole exception has to do with elections. Here the power relations between (1) the public and the rank-and-file of the party, on the one hand, and the CPSU apparat, on the other; (2) the manager and the work collective; and (3) the party secretary and the committee or bureau, are liable to be altered, but Gorbachev has not yet proposed scrapping the nomenkluturu system. He is not so much restructuring the apparat, in other words, as trying to improve its operation by attacking certain bureau1.5. Ponomarev
and Tarasov, op. cit., note 11, pp. 12-13. See also Prauda,13 October 1986, p. 1. 16. See the emphasis on this in Z&z Vostoka, 21 January 1987, p. 3, and with regard to the state apparatus, in A. V. Obolonskii, “Biurokraticheskaia deformatsiia soznaniia i bor’ba s biurokratizmom,” Souetskoe pwdarstuo iprovo, no. 1, 1987, pp. 52-61. 17. Partiinaia r/&n’, no. 11, 1985, pp. 38-9; and no. 12, 1985, p. 14. For more on glasnost’ and party work, see ibid., no. 22-23, 1985, p. 107; and Prauda, 3 November 1986, p. 1. 18. Prauda, 31 October 1986, p. 3.
Gorbachev’s Reorganization cratic maladies-as
he and his commentators
and the Go&m
65
have actually said, and as we shall see in
the next section.
Defects in the Party Apparat Following the General Secretary’s lead, the central press has identified the defects for which the proposed changes and renewed emphases should act as remedies. These are clustered around the following themes: (1) the isolation of the apparat from real life, excessive paperwork, inertia, and careerism; (2) decision-making-crisis management instead of stable political
leadership,
and bureaucratic
delays instead of businesslike
disposition of problems; (3) podmena-the displacement of state and economic decisionmakers by the party apparatchiki; (4) elections- links haves to be reestablished between leaders and followers,
the formalism
of elections
has to be done away with, and no
elected official should be above criticism; (5) the cadres system-needs improvement, backgrounds are important, new personnel are needed, and technocratic criteria are not sufficient for appointment but must be joined by political criteria; and (6) centralism-was important in the 193Os, but is no longer appropriate, hence party work has to be transferred to the PPOs, and the isolation of PPOs from the apparat has to be overcome.
lg To remedy these, the tools to be used are glasnost ‘, democratization
rutizatsia),
and personnel
changes,
Only in the area of elections reorganization.
but not, it should be emphasized,
of party secretaries
can we see anything
And even there it is a matter of expanding
(&ok-
reorganization. approaching
the scope of participation
rather than, say, discarding the nomenklaturu system. Under that system the selection of candidacies for election is a prerogative of the party apparat: a candidate chosen by the guardians of the nomenklaturu, the apparatchiki, is presented to the meeting of the acclaimed. Under the perestroika, two or more collective and is (usually) elected-i.e., candidates,
selected by the nomenklatura overseers
as before,
will be presented
to the
collective which will actually be able to make a choice. This broadening of participation in the final selection of local party secretaries is intended to bolster the authority of secretaries chosen, as well as to reorient their sense of responsibility away from their bureaucratic superiors and colleagues and towards the rank-and-file. There is an implicit notion also in this of breaking up thereby the informal exclusiveness of the nomenklutura circle, including
clientelistic
and kinship links.20
Mixed Results of “Reorganization” In the first year of its existence the policy of “reorganization” appeared to have achieved mixed results. The litany of obstacles to its implementation was virtually endless,
and none of the major
defects of the apparat
was eradicated,
according
to
episodic reports carried in the party press sampled for this article. By way of illustration, consider the following. A model urban raikom first secretary from Volgograd claimed that secretaries who went to the factories to give an account of themselves (as opposed to 19. These points have been distilled from: Pravda, 25 June 1986, p. 1; 1 March 1987, p. 2; 2 March 1987, p. 2; 3 March 1987, pp. 1-2; and 13 March 1987, p. 2; Portiimzia zhizn’, no. 24, 1986, p. 24; no. 2, 1987, p.31;no.4,1987,pp.68-9;andno.5, 1987,p.27;andPonomarevandTarasov,op.cit.,notell,pp.5and 8. 20. Partiinaiazhizn’, no. 2, 1987, p. 30; Raudo, 24 February 1987, p. 2; and Kommunist Ukrainy, no. 4,1987, p. 84.
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM
66
doing so only in the context of the bureau or committee plenum) frequently did so in an uninteresting, formalistic manner.21 In another gorkom implementation of the perestroika produced what in Stalin’s time would have been called formalism of a new, higher type. “Thus,” its first secretary wrote, “in connection with reports, criticism now resounds practically everywhere, and people are openly expressing their opinions. The leaders thank these Communists for expressing their observations, but . . . they do nothing to improve the situation.“22 Another gorkom first secretary was unable to answer detailed questions at an obkom plenum about the operation of an enterprise because he had not examined the situation for himself, but continued to rely on information
predigested
for him by his underlings.
He was publicly scorned in a front-
page Pravda editorial.23 In the Ukraine, a manifestly unsuitable candidate was acclaimed as gorkom first secretary, instead of there being a choice from two or more.24 The old styles of leadership andpodmena were said to be still prevalent in Riga, Perm’, and in the Ukraine.25
Secretaries
were reported as hiding behind the backs of managers
(instead of
exercising leadership.)*6 There were still too many reports and too much paperwork.*’ An opinion survey among Communists in Leningrad showed that over 60 per cent of them were unaware of or could not discern any radical reorganization Even the most important
gorkom in the country,
Moscow,
in party work.*s
was unable to overcome
all
of its old problems within the first 12 months of the “reorganization.” At its February 1987 plenum it was reported that: only one quarter of the apparatchiki of the raikomy unable to bear the overload connected with the current “acceleration” effort had been fired, there was excessive departmentalism and inadequate coordination in the gorkom itself, practical steps had not been taken to reorganize ideological work, contacts with the raikomy were insufficient, the cadres’ work was unsystematic, the initiative of subordinate units was overwhelmed by gorkom directives, crisis management prevailed over political guidance, the party apparatchiki were still locked away in their offices instead of visiting the workplaces, and the new psychology had still not emerged among the cadres.2g In order to enforce and set an example, party officials, such as those in Kirghizia and the Dnepropetrovsk-Dneprodzerzhinsk region, 3o have been fired or otherwise disciplined for failure to implement the spirit and letter of the perestroika. Even as highly placed an individual escape censure
as the first secretary
and, ultimately,
dismissal.
of Frunze raikom in Moscow
was unable to
In the charges against him it was reported
that under his direction: the party raikom is not ensuring and methods collectives.
of party work,
Raikom
plenums
a sharp turn toward the renewal of the forms
and is not strengthening and party meetings
its ties to the working
are conducted
in a spirit of
21. Pravda, 9 October 1986, p. 2. 22. Partiinaia zhizn’, no. 13, 1986, p. 49. 23. Pm&, 3 November 1986, p. 1. 24. Pravda Ukrainy, 18 March 1987, p. 2. 25. Pmuda, 23 August 1986, p. 2; and 12 December 1986, pp. 1-2. 26. Ibid., 24 February 1987, p. 2. 27. Ibid., 16 February 1987, p. 2; Radians’ka Ukraina, 30 March 1987, p. 3. 28. Prouda, 17 November 1986, p. 1. 29. Ibid., 24 February 1987, p. 2. 30. Partiinnia zhhizn‘, no. 20, 1986, pp. 22-5; and no. 21, 1986, p. 33. For other examples apparatchiki, see also Ponomarev and Tarasov, op. cit., note 11, p. 11.
of firings of
Gorbachev’s Reorganization and the Gorkom complacency.
Conditions
of businesslike, open exchange of opinions have not
been created at these meetings;
raikom secretaries
as well as Soviet and economic directive manner of formulating as before.
Decisions
their fulfilment
managers,
and heads of departments,
remain
beyond
questions and over-organization
adopted by the raikom
is weak.
67
Rank-and-file
are not concrete;
Communists
informed about the work of the raikom and its bureau.
criticism.
The
predominate monitoring
of
and the aktiu are not Critical articles in the
press are acknowledged by the raikom with the greatest of pain.31 Evidently,
the Gorbachev
leadership
is serious
about
the need for change
in the
operation of the apparat. Many thousands of apparatchiki and others in responsible positions have been replaced, but it remains to be seen if this political system will work differently with different personnel or whether it has a momentum of its own. At the beginning of 1987, one of the main party journals summed up its impressions as to the reasons for the sluggishness
with which the perestroika was proceeding.
In the
absence of better data, its perceptions as to the general causes of this slowness at least provide us with the official viewpoint even if not an objective analysis of the situation. It cited these reasons:
(1) an inability
still more personnel changes; perestroika; (3) a disjunction
to shake off the inertia of past practices,
(2) lack of appreciation
requiring
of the new ideas associated with the
between words and deeds, a failure to follow up decisions
instead with practical execution of them; (4) a tendency to await instructions exercising initiative; (5) the preponderance of so-called administrative-economic
of
methods of party leadership (e.g., directives given in terms of tons and rubles) over political ones; and (6) involvement in the perestroika confined to the upper levels and not yet having incorporated
the gorkomy,
raikomy and primary party organizations.32
habits die hard, particularly in bureaucratic organizations. Alongside the shortcomings, there have also been some advances in implementing
Old the
“reorganization.” Several localities have reported contested elections for the position of raikom or gorkom first as well as unranked secretary, and two or more candidates are now being considered for appointment to nomenklatura posts.33 The system of verifying qualifications known as attestatsiia, hitherto used on technical personnel in industrial enterprises, is apparently being extended to the party apparatchiki.34 Meetings of party committees and bureaus have been revamped so that participants are informed in advance about the agenda and reports, and so that real discussion can take place instead of the reading of set speeches. 35 Paperwork has been reduced, and secretaries and other apparatchiki rely less for information on written reports than on their own direct observations office,
gained
from visits to the workplaces.
and no report,”
progress of the struggle
“No
information
supplied to an
wrote the Riga first secretary, in all its nuances.
people. . . . “36 All of these developments
“can truly and fully reflect the For that the party worker has to go to the
are commonsensical
in view of the moderniza-
31. Partiimiazhizn’, no. 18, 1986, p. 41. 32. Ponomarev and Tarasov, op. cit., note 11, pp. 17-18. 33. Ibid., p. 11; Partiinaia zhizn’, no. 5, 1987, pp. 32ff; Radians’ka Ukraina, 20 February
1987, p. 3; and 8 March 1987, p. 2; Prwda, 10 February 1987, p. 2; and 1 March 1987, p. 2. 34. Zaria Vostoka, 18 January 1987, p. 2; and V. A. Bobkov, “Partiinye kadry: Opyt, problemy, suzhdeniia,” Vopmy istorii KPSS, no. 5, 1987, p. 24. 35. Partiinaia rhim’, no. 15, 1986, p. 46; and no. 3, 1987, p. 24; Ravda, 3 November 1986, p. 1; and 16 February 1987, p. 2; and A. Iakutin, “Rasshiriaem glasnost’ v partiinoi rabote,” Kommunist Sovetskoi L&i, no. 3, 1986, p. 94. 36. Ruvaia, 23 August 1986, p. 2. See also ibid., 5 August 1986, p. 2; Iakutin, op. cit., note 35, p. 96; and Ponomarev and Tarasov, op. cit., note 11, p, 10.
68
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
tion of the Soviet Union since Stalin’s day when the original procedures were instituted. Today there is an abundance of technically qualified and politically reliable people from among whom “leading cadres” can be chosen, by open competition if need be; Soviet citizens-including even party activists-are literate and do not have to have reports read to them; and there is a greater degree of personal mobility which can facilitate more face-to-face contact between the leaders and the masses.
Limitations of Gorbachev’s “Reorganization” For all the talk about “revolutionary renewal” associated with the perestroika, Gorbachev’s “reorganization” thus far appears as a mild and not very meaningful reform. This is because, when we look at the urban party apparat, virtually nothing has been touched and the basic principles of party organization
remain unaltered.
Instead of
creating new structures, Gorbachev has chosen to reactivate existing ones, for example, the network of auditing commissions. Their mandate has been broadened to include monitoring
the performance
in line with Gorbachev’s
of the apparat rather than just auditing accounts.38 This is emphasis,
expressed
at the January
1987 Plenum,
on the
greater need for strengthening oversight (kontrol’) and reinforcing policing bodies.3g In leaving the party structure much the same Gorbachev may have learned the lesson offered by Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. The overall goals and tasks remain: to speed up economic organize
and educate
the public
in execution
of that
development; objective.40
to mobilize,
Success
of the
perestroika, as it has always been for party work, is measured by indicators of economic production, even by Gorbachev himself. 41 While it has always been assumed to exist, the link between production
and party work has never been proven or tested. It may be
spurious or nonexistent. The CPSU, it seems to me, does not really know if party work is effective. Thus by continuing to rely on this unproven assumption, rather than either testing, discarding or replacing it, Gorbachev is changing nothing which bears on the criteria of effectiveness of his own policy of perestroika and which would constitute a genuine reform or improvement of the political system more generally. In one respect, however, Gorbachev seems in principle to be on the right track and in practice to be determined as well. He has said that “a man can only bring about order in his home if he feels himself master of it. “42 This is the starting-point for the policy of “democratization. ’ ’ It is good industrial psychology: the employee who feels he has a stake and a say in the enterprise address to the January
is happier,
more motivated and more productive.
1987 Central Committee
Plenum,
Gorbachev
In his
proposed not only
the election of administrative and supervisory personnel in production enterprises, but also, as already noted, of party secretaries from the primary level to the union republic. The Central Committee endorsed the former, but not the latter.43 It is a measure of his 37. See G. Smirnov, “Revoliutsionnaia sut’ obnovleniia,” Pravda, 13 March 1987, pp. ‘2-3. 38. See Partiinaia rhizn ‘, no. 16, 1984, pp. 28-32; no. 6-7, 1986, pp. 161-62; no. 13, 1986, pp. 38-9; no. 15, 1986, pp. 13-19; and no. 16, 1986, pp. 29-32. 39. Pravda Ukrainy, 28January 1987, pp. 4-5. 40. Pravda Ukrainy, 28 January 1987, p. 5; and Ponomarev and Tarasov, op. cit., note 11, p. 9. 41. Ponomarev and Tarasov, op. cit., note 11, p, 7; Radians’ka Ukraina, 30 March 1986, p. 3; Rauda Ukminy, 28 January 1987, p. 2; Prauda, 24 February 1987, p. 2. 42. Praudo Ukrainy, 28 January 1987, p. 2. 43. Compare Raudn Ukrainy, 28 January 1987, p. 3 (Gorbachev’s proposal) with Litnatumaia gazeta, 4 February 1987, p. 2 (the CC resolution.)
Gorbachev’s Reorganization and the Gorkom determination
that in spite of this opposition,
election of party secretaries,
69
he is going ahead with the reform of the
as the various examples previously cited here from several
raikomy and gorkomy attest. Whether from caution or due to political opposition, Gorbachev’s perestroika of the apparat is thus a rather timid reform. A more meaningful reform would address fundamentals rather than style. It would, for instance, replace the arbitrariness cadres system with legal norms, as has been proposed for the governmental in the USSR.** And a really radical reform would do the unthinkable:
of the whole bureaucracy discard the
doctrine of the leading role of the party; introduce competitive elections; make the governing party accountable and responsible; cut the link between the CPSU and the coercive apparatus; and eliminate the nomenklatura system.45
Conclusions The “reorganization”
policy introduced
openness in the operations places by the apparatchiki, of party secretaries,
by M&hail
of the urban party apparat.
Gorbachev
does entail a greater
It means more visits to the work-
a change of leadership style for these personnel,
and a broadening
of participation
the election
in deciding cadres questions.
has been adopted primarily to correct some glaring bureaucratic do with information distortion, low organizational effectiveness,
It
pathologies, having to and corruption. There
may be some subsidiary purposes: to move the party out of direct involvement in governmental administration (at which it has proven itself incompetent) and to a more indirect position of political leadership; to set an example in the implementation of the perestroika; to reestablish the relevance and authority of the CPSU; to break up clientelistic ties; to break the apparat out of its isolation from society; and to increase the sense of responsibility of party officials. Available evidence indicates that the results of implementing the policy so far have been mixed. Preventing the full implementation
of the perestroika are such factors as bureaucratic
inertia,
the absence of new
measures of effectiveness, and the fact that formalization (inflexibility) unchecked and at odds with the openness (flexibility) of perestroika.
is proceeding
By way of answering the questions posed at the outset, we may say that, strictly speaking, a “reorganization” of the gorkom apparat has not been effected. In response to the directive that “the center of party work should be transferred to the primary party organizations, ” there may be some decentralization in the offing, but the other elements of the CPSU’s structure-size, complexity and formalization-are unaffected. The departmental arrangement of gorkomy has not only not been altered, but no such thing has been even hinted at. Therefore, virtually none of the processes within the apparat can have been affected. It is therefore liable to continue to operate much as before. The only exceptions might be as a result of the limited decentralization. The power of the apparat is being reduced to the benefit of the party rank-and-file as well as the general public, and hence presumably of the CPSU leadership. There will be some effect on decision-making-more decisions will be made by gorkom committees and bureaus instead of the secretaries acting alone, and more by the PPOs instead of the 44. Iu. A. Rozenbaum, “Sistema raboty s kadrami v usloviiakh perestroiki,” Souetskocgosudarstuo iprauo, 12, 1986, pp. 11-20. 45. A Canadian reporter in Magadan interviewed the obkom first secretary regarding the perestroika. “Asked what reforms have involved the KGB secret police, he [the secretary] replied, ‘We have nothing to change between the KGB and the party. ’ ” GlobeandMail(Toronto)(National edition), 7 April 1987, p. AlO. no.
70 gorkom apparatchiki.
STUDIESIN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM Economic
managers
should get more autonomy
from the party
apparat, since the gorkomy must now work through the PPOs instead of directly with enterprise managers. Very little “restructuring” or “reorganization” is actually associated with the perestroika, which rather seeks to promote a change of attitudes and style. It is a reorientation,
not a reorganization.
Gorbachev’s Reorganization and the Gorkom
Part of M&hail
Gorbachev’s
overall program
of accelerating
the development
of the
USSR is a policy or campaign which he calls “reorganization” (perestroika, literally “reconstruction. ” ) This policy applies to all spheres of sociopolitical activity, and as such embraces the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). What does “reorganization” mean as applied to the party, and what does it entail? Is it succeeding ?’ Until more adequate information is available, some partial answers to these questions can be found through an examination of the impact of this reform in the case of the urban party organization, the gorkom.2 In order to help evaluate the significance of Gorbachev’s “reorganization,” a brief review of the tasks and structure of the gorkom as they stood before 1985 is useful. Among the numerous Khrushchevian organizational changes undone by Brezhnev (including reunification of the party apparat, rescinding the rule of automatic turnover of committee memberships, and abolition of the RSFSR Bureau and numerous other boards
and commissions),
was the restoration
of the departmental
gorkomy.3 Since then, every urban party committee organization; propaganda and agitation; industry
structure
in the
has had four major departments: and transportation; and general
(internal administration). Large cities have also had departments of: construction and urban economy; education and scientific institutions; (public) administration, trade and finance;
and, where appropriate,
agriculture.4
The “branch”
departments,
those
concerned with the economy, have had as their main responsibilities: (1) generally, influencing the performance of productive enterprises indirectly through the primary party organizations enterprises’
(PPOs)
performance
situated within them; and
(2) collecting
information
on these
innovative production capabilities; (3) uncovering as well as encouraging socialist emulation them,
methods and disseminating (competition among workers); (4) monitoring the performance of leading personnel and recommending their appointment; (5) drafting briefs and decisions concerning the performance
of enterprises
for the gorkom
bureau;
and (6) effecting
oversight
of the
1. An early, if not premature, effort to comment on this topic was made by Theodore H. Friedgut, Gorbachev and Party Reform, The Soviet and East European Research Centre, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Research Paper No. 62, Jerusalem, January 1986. 2. At its January 1987 Plenum, the CPSU Central Committee placed particular emphasis on the implementation of the pcresrroikn in personnel matters by gorkomy and raikomy, since this part of the apparat is in direct contact with the party’s primary units. See its resolution in Literafurnaiagawta, 4 February 1987, p. 2. The same point is also emphasized in Pravda, 12 March 1987, p. 1. In the present article the term gorkom, an acronym for gorodskoi komitet (city committee), is used to include references to gorraikomy (urban borough committees) as well. 3. Darrell P. Hammer, “B rez h nev and the Communist Party, ” in Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird (eds.), The Soviet Polity in theModem Era (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1984) pp. 196-98. 4. Gorkom, raikom parfii: opyf, formy i metody rabob (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1977), p. 294. STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM, VOL. XXI, 0039.3592/88/01
0061-10
$03.00
0
1988 University
No. 1, SPRING 1988, 61-70 of Southern
California
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
62
execution of party and governmental directives. 5 To do all of this, of course, every department itself had to be differentiated structurally, thus reflecting internally the specialization apparent in the gorkom office taken as a whole. On the eve of Gorbachev’s accession, the gorkom had an unquestionably complex structure and its personnel had clearly differentiated duties not only as between departments but also within them; concomitant with this differentation was the problem of coordination.6 One way for us to assess the policy of “reorganization ” will be to ascertain whether changes in the departmental structure of gorkomy have been introduced by Gorbachev, or new coordinating mechanisms have been put in place. Another will be to check for changes in the major tasks assigned to the gorkomy. were
planning
of the
gorkom’s
Under Brezhnev,
these major tasks
activities,
management of leading personnel or “cadres,” and checking up on the fulfilment of party directives.7 All of this was to serve the overall goal of increasing economic production. Along with differentiation in the structure of gorkomy has gone increased formalization. By 1985, already there were reports that the tasks of departments and the duties of personnel were being set down in regulations drawn up locally.* This was indicative of the increasing inflexibility of the apparat. Thus, there has developed a remarkable
complexity in both the structures and tasks of the urban party committees. Concomitant with this complexity have been problems of effective communication, excessive formalization and paperwork, and inertia, which Gorbachev’s perestroika is intended to remedy. Gorbachev’s Launched
nationwide
at the June part
“Reorganization” at the Twenty-Seventh
1986 Plenum of the Central
of Gorbachev’s
CPSU
Committee,
Congress
and given a further boost
the “reorganization”
campaign
is
of accelerating the development of the USSR and has as its ultimate objective to “ensure a new upsurge in all the dimensions
accordingly
program
of economic and social development. “g It is meant to reinvigorate the style of party work of the entire apparat, from top to bottom. As outlined by the General Secretary himself and propagated thereafter bodies from involvement
by Pravda, the most immediate targets are: to extricate party in practical administrative and economic decisions, and to
have them adopt a “political”
style of leadership
(i.e.,
to exert leadership
through the
PPOs rather than by giving commands directly to economic managers); to reduce their paperwork insulation from the public and to increase their real contact with people; to bring
about
a change
of attitude
among
intolerance
of shortcomings;
-between
the party and the people. lo
all apparatchiki,
mainly
to stimulate
an
and to increase the openness of communication-glasnost’
5. Ibid., p. 332. 6. For some examples of differentiation of personnel duties between and within departments, see Parfiinaia zhizn’, no. 13, 1975, pp. 25-32; and no. 22, 1973, p. 57. 0 n coordination, ibid., no. 12, 1975, p. 28; and no. 13, 1975, p. 26. 7. For details, see, for instance, ibid., no. 13, 1975, pp. 27-31; no. 22, 1973, pp. 58-61; no. 12, 1968, pp. 29-37; and Gwkom, raikompartii, pp. 369-83 and 396-409. 8. Partiinnia zhizn ‘, no. 14, 1985, pp. 44-5; and no. 15, 1985, p. 47. 9. Prauda, 25 June 1986, p. 1. See also Partiinaia zhim’, no. 6-7, 1986, pp. 62-5 and 92; no. 13, 1986, pp. 23-7; and Pravda, 13 March 1987, pp. 2-3. 10. Partiinaiarhim”, no. 13, 1986, pp. 24-5; and Ruuda, 25June 1986, p. 1. For similarstatements, seealso Prauda Ukminy, 28 January 1987, p. 2; Pmuda, 3 February 1987, p. 1; G. K. Kriuchkov, “Kadrovaiapolitika partii v usloviiakh perestroiki,” Voprosy is&i KPSS, no. 2, 1987, pp. 17-32; and Radians’ka Ukraina, 30 March 1986, p. 3.
Gorbachev’s Reorganization and the G?wkom
63
A whole series of ways has been prescribed for the party apparat to implement none of which entails genuine reorganization in the Gorbachev’s “reorganization,” sense of formal structural changes.” In the first place, the “reorganization” of party work requires a renewal of the content of the work of the apparat and its reorientation toward the current priority tasks (and by implication away from bureaucratic routine as an end in itself). These priority tasks include: “speeding up the tempos of scientifictechnical progress,
activization
of the human factor, strengthening
as the general level of organization
and self-discipline,
law and order as well
and strengthening
the policy of
and being thrifty. ” l2 In short, party work is to be linked with Gorbachev’s
economizing
overall policy of “accelerating”
the USSR’s
development.
Thus reoriented,
the center
of party work is to be transferred out of the offices of the committees into the PPOs. Political (i.e., persuasive instead of dictatorial) methods of leadership, mobilization and education are to be employed. The primary component of “reorganization” is a different focus and style of work rather than a restructuring of the apparat. A second component involves the search for new approaches to the solution of current problems.
of party committees in uncovering “more but, significantly, no ready recipes are available or offered for the apparatchiki to follow. l3 It will be up to the party workers themselves to generalize from the successful practical examples as these come to light. is an attempt to reorient public consciousThe third aspect of the “reorganization” effective
More independence
forms and methods
is demanded
of leadership,”
ness toward the so-called new ideas involved in the renewal of the entire system. This includes the reeducation of cadres accustomed to thinking in terms of extensive rather than intensive
methods of production.
It means a greater role for Marxism-Leninism
as the scientific theory providing direction out of the current situation and into the future, and an expansion of the activities of the party’s propaganda apparatus. In fourth place is an admonition to increase attention to the person and to his needs and demands.
What the authorities
through more effectively maintaining earlier
component
reorientation
have in mind here is the raising of labor productivity discipline and law and order. Here again, as in an the prescription is one of attitudinal
of the “reorganization,”
and the transfer of the center of activity of the party into the midst of the
toiling masses, into the PPOs and the working collectives. is a cadres policy responding Another component of the “reorganization” needs and putting an end to the “trust in cadres” and “stability of cadres” Brezhnev.
It means that personnel
unable to implement
to current poiicies of
the general “reorganization”
policy of Gorbachev should be fired. This is the area to which the January 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee devoted its attention, and the only aspect of Gorbachev’s policy which really entails restructuring. i4 According to the General Secretary, several lessons have been learned from the past: there is a need for fresh forces in positions of responsibility; greater tempering in political theory is required of cadres; stability can be carried too far, even though it is desirable; more responsibility and accountability is needed from persons in authority; and, finally, the democratic bases of personnel or cadres work have to be expanded. Gorbachev’s prescription based on all of this is the 11. This and the following six paragraphs draw on L. N. Ponomarev and E. N. Tarasov, “Partiinaia rabota v usloviiakh perestroiki,” VoprosyistoriiKPSS, no. 1, 1987, pp. 3-18. See also Pravda, 13 March 1987, p. 3. 12. Ponomarev and Tarasov, ibid., p. 6. 13. Ibid., p. 7. 14. Raudo Ukrainy, 28 January 1987.
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
64
election of leading personnel, beginning with economic enterprises, but including also party secretaries-at first on the primary level, eventually even at the center. Apart from urging the selection of managers and secretaries by their collectives in multicandidate
elections,
it is noteworthy
that Gorbachev
declined to offer practical solutions
to cadre problems. As the sixth component of the “reorganization” placing emphasis on the psychological reconstruction
the central party press has been of cadres. l5 This is acknowledged
to be the most difficult aspect of the p~estroik~, involving as it does a change in consciousness and manner of thinking. The desirable attitudes of party apparatchiki are those required
by the Party Rules:
a willingness to work with the people and to listen to
public opinion. The principal undesirable attitude, both social and individual, is said to be authoritarianism which paralyzes initiative and creates a harmful passivity.i6 Leadership style also has to be improved, rejuvenated, and made more dynamic, energetic, and competent. This is the seventh component of theperestroika. It means that words have to be matched with deeds, long-range tasks have to be reconciled with the short range, actions have to be concrete, and shortcomings dealt with in a business-like manner. Leadership
is more openness-glasnost’--which
is
conceived of as a monitoring device. It also involves opening up party operations rank-and-ale as well as to the unaf~liated public: more open party meetings,
to the more
interesting
style can be improved
themes
at public “political
if there
days,”
more involvement
of the public in the
selection of personnel, and more regular reports to the public by party officials.17 Here one may discern that the party leadership is endeavoring to activate public scrutiny over its lower-level
officials,
who are well protected
the intervening layers of bureaucracy. emphasized that this public scrutiny
from effective direction
from the top by
Indeed, one Pravda article intimated as much and would be an effective way to evaluate officials’
execution
of the “reorganization” policy itself. I8 is a misnomer for Gorbachev’s policy of rejuvenatSo far, the term “reorganization” ing the party apparat. No new or different goals have been set for the CPSU; no new tasks for the apparat.
The goals and tasks all have historical
precedents
and have long
been a part of the declared objectives of the party. No changes have been proposed to the structure of this apparat, such as abolition of committees, the further differentiation of committees, or creation of new coordinating bodies. Further formalization within the apparat has neither been accelerated nor slowed down. None of these elements has even been addressed, at least not publicly. The perestroika essentially prescribes only changes of style and attitudes. The sole exception has to do with elections. Here the power relations between (1) the public and the rank-and-file of the party, on the one hand, and the CPSU apparat, on the other; (2) the manager and the work collective; and (3) the party secretary and the committee or bureau, are liable to be altered, but Gorbachev has not yet proposed scrapping the nomenkluturu system. He is not so much restructuring the apparat, in other words, as trying to improve its operation by attacking certain bureau1.5. Ponomarev
and Tarasov, op. cit., note 11, pp. 12-13. See also Prauda,13 October 1986, p. 1. 16. See the emphasis on this in Z&z Vostoka, 21 January 1987, p. 3, and with regard to the state apparatus, in A. V. Obolonskii, “Biurokraticheskaia deformatsiia soznaniia i bor’ba s biurokratizmom,” Souetskoe pwdarstuo iprovo, no. 1, 1987, pp. 52-61. 17. Partiinaia r/&n’, no. 11, 1985, pp. 38-9; and no. 12, 1985, p. 14. For more on glasnost’ and party work, see ibid., no. 22-23, 1985, p. 107; and Prauda, 3 November 1986, p. 1. 18. Prauda, 31 October 1986, p. 3.
Gorbachev’s Reorganization cratic maladies-as
he and his commentators
and the Go&m
65
have actually said, and as we shall see in
the next section.
Defects in the Party Apparat Following the General Secretary’s lead, the central press has identified the defects for which the proposed changes and renewed emphases should act as remedies. These are clustered around the following themes: (1) the isolation of the apparat from real life, excessive paperwork, inertia, and careerism; (2) decision-making-crisis management instead of stable political
leadership,
and bureaucratic
delays instead of businesslike
disposition of problems; (3) podmena-the displacement of state and economic decisionmakers by the party apparatchiki; (4) elections- links haves to be reestablished between leaders and followers,
the formalism
of elections
has to be done away with, and no
elected official should be above criticism; (5) the cadres system-needs improvement, backgrounds are important, new personnel are needed, and technocratic criteria are not sufficient for appointment but must be joined by political criteria; and (6) centralism-was important in the 193Os, but is no longer appropriate, hence party work has to be transferred to the PPOs, and the isolation of PPOs from the apparat has to be overcome.
lg To remedy these, the tools to be used are glasnost ‘, democratization
rutizatsia),
and personnel
changes,
Only in the area of elections reorganization.
but not, it should be emphasized,
of party secretaries
can we see anything
And even there it is a matter of expanding
(&ok-
reorganization. approaching
the scope of participation
rather than, say, discarding the nomenklaturu system. Under that system the selection of candidacies for election is a prerogative of the party apparat: a candidate chosen by the guardians of the nomenklaturu, the apparatchiki, is presented to the meeting of the acclaimed. Under the perestroika, two or more collective and is (usually) elected-i.e., candidates,
selected by the nomenklatura overseers
as before,
will be presented
to the
collective which will actually be able to make a choice. This broadening of participation in the final selection of local party secretaries is intended to bolster the authority of secretaries chosen, as well as to reorient their sense of responsibility away from their bureaucratic superiors and colleagues and towards the rank-and-file. There is an implicit notion also in this of breaking up thereby the informal exclusiveness of the nomenklutura circle, including
clientelistic
and kinship links.20
Mixed Results of “Reorganization” In the first year of its existence the policy of “reorganization” appeared to have achieved mixed results. The litany of obstacles to its implementation was virtually endless,
and none of the major
defects of the apparat
was eradicated,
according
to
episodic reports carried in the party press sampled for this article. By way of illustration, consider the following. A model urban raikom first secretary from Volgograd claimed that secretaries who went to the factories to give an account of themselves (as opposed to 19. These points have been distilled from: Pravda, 25 June 1986, p. 1; 1 March 1987, p. 2; 2 March 1987, p. 2; 3 March 1987, pp. 1-2; and 13 March 1987, p. 2; Portiimzia zhizn’, no. 24, 1986, p. 24; no. 2, 1987, p.31;no.4,1987,pp.68-9;andno.5, 1987,p.27;andPonomarevandTarasov,op.cit.,notell,pp.5and 8. 20. Partiinaiazhizn’, no. 2, 1987, p. 30; Raudo, 24 February 1987, p. 2; and Kommunist Ukrainy, no. 4,1987, p. 84.
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM
66
doing so only in the context of the bureau or committee plenum) frequently did so in an uninteresting, formalistic manner.21 In another gorkom implementation of the perestroika produced what in Stalin’s time would have been called formalism of a new, higher type. “Thus,” its first secretary wrote, “in connection with reports, criticism now resounds practically everywhere, and people are openly expressing their opinions. The leaders thank these Communists for expressing their observations, but . . . they do nothing to improve the situation.“22 Another gorkom first secretary was unable to answer detailed questions at an obkom plenum about the operation of an enterprise because he had not examined the situation for himself, but continued to rely on information
predigested
for him by his underlings.
He was publicly scorned in a front-
page Pravda editorial.23 In the Ukraine, a manifestly unsuitable candidate was acclaimed as gorkom first secretary, instead of there being a choice from two or more.24 The old styles of leadership andpodmena were said to be still prevalent in Riga, Perm’, and in the Ukraine.25
Secretaries
were reported as hiding behind the backs of managers
(instead of
exercising leadership.)*6 There were still too many reports and too much paperwork.*’ An opinion survey among Communists in Leningrad showed that over 60 per cent of them were unaware of or could not discern any radical reorganization Even the most important
gorkom in the country,
Moscow,
in party work.*s
was unable to overcome
all
of its old problems within the first 12 months of the “reorganization.” At its February 1987 plenum it was reported that: only one quarter of the apparatchiki of the raikomy unable to bear the overload connected with the current “acceleration” effort had been fired, there was excessive departmentalism and inadequate coordination in the gorkom itself, practical steps had not been taken to reorganize ideological work, contacts with the raikomy were insufficient, the cadres’ work was unsystematic, the initiative of subordinate units was overwhelmed by gorkom directives, crisis management prevailed over political guidance, the party apparatchiki were still locked away in their offices instead of visiting the workplaces, and the new psychology had still not emerged among the cadres.2g In order to enforce and set an example, party officials, such as those in Kirghizia and the Dnepropetrovsk-Dneprodzerzhinsk region, 3o have been fired or otherwise disciplined for failure to implement the spirit and letter of the perestroika. Even as highly placed an individual escape censure
as the first secretary
and, ultimately,
dismissal.
of Frunze raikom in Moscow
was unable to
In the charges against him it was reported
that under his direction: the party raikom is not ensuring and methods collectives.
of party work,
Raikom
plenums
a sharp turn toward the renewal of the forms
and is not strengthening and party meetings
its ties to the working
are conducted
in a spirit of
21. Pravda, 9 October 1986, p. 2. 22. Partiinaia zhizn’, no. 13, 1986, p. 49. 23. Pm&, 3 November 1986, p. 1. 24. Pravda Ukrainy, 18 March 1987, p. 2. 25. Pmuda, 23 August 1986, p. 2; and 12 December 1986, pp. 1-2. 26. Ibid., 24 February 1987, p. 2. 27. Ibid., 16 February 1987, p. 2; Radians’ka Ukraina, 30 March 1987, p. 3. 28. Prouda, 17 November 1986, p. 1. 29. Ibid., 24 February 1987, p. 2. 30. Partiinnia zhhizn‘, no. 20, 1986, pp. 22-5; and no. 21, 1986, p. 33. For other examples apparatchiki, see also Ponomarev and Tarasov, op. cit., note 11, p. 11.
of firings of
Gorbachev’s Reorganization and the Gorkom complacency.
Conditions
of businesslike, open exchange of opinions have not
been created at these meetings;
raikom secretaries
as well as Soviet and economic directive manner of formulating as before.
Decisions
their fulfilment
managers,
and heads of departments,
remain
beyond
questions and over-organization
adopted by the raikom
is weak.
67
Rank-and-file
are not concrete;
Communists
informed about the work of the raikom and its bureau.
criticism.
The
predominate monitoring
of
and the aktiu are not Critical articles in the
press are acknowledged by the raikom with the greatest of pain.31 Evidently,
the Gorbachev
leadership
is serious
about
the need for change
in the
operation of the apparat. Many thousands of apparatchiki and others in responsible positions have been replaced, but it remains to be seen if this political system will work differently with different personnel or whether it has a momentum of its own. At the beginning of 1987, one of the main party journals summed up its impressions as to the reasons for the sluggishness
with which the perestroika was proceeding.
In the
absence of better data, its perceptions as to the general causes of this slowness at least provide us with the official viewpoint even if not an objective analysis of the situation. It cited these reasons:
(1) an inability
still more personnel changes; perestroika; (3) a disjunction
to shake off the inertia of past practices,
(2) lack of appreciation
requiring
of the new ideas associated with the
between words and deeds, a failure to follow up decisions
instead with practical execution of them; (4) a tendency to await instructions exercising initiative; (5) the preponderance of so-called administrative-economic
of
methods of party leadership (e.g., directives given in terms of tons and rubles) over political ones; and (6) involvement in the perestroika confined to the upper levels and not yet having incorporated
the gorkomy,
raikomy and primary party organizations.32
habits die hard, particularly in bureaucratic organizations. Alongside the shortcomings, there have also been some advances in implementing
Old the
“reorganization.” Several localities have reported contested elections for the position of raikom or gorkom first as well as unranked secretary, and two or more candidates are now being considered for appointment to nomenklatura posts.33 The system of verifying qualifications known as attestatsiia, hitherto used on technical personnel in industrial enterprises, is apparently being extended to the party apparatchiki.34 Meetings of party committees and bureaus have been revamped so that participants are informed in advance about the agenda and reports, and so that real discussion can take place instead of the reading of set speeches. 35 Paperwork has been reduced, and secretaries and other apparatchiki rely less for information on written reports than on their own direct observations office,
gained
from visits to the workplaces.
and no report,”
progress of the struggle
“No
information
supplied to an
wrote the Riga first secretary, in all its nuances.
people. . . . “36 All of these developments
“can truly and fully reflect the For that the party worker has to go to the
are commonsensical
in view of the moderniza-
31. Partiimiazhizn’, no. 18, 1986, p. 41. 32. Ponomarev and Tarasov, op. cit., note 11, pp. 17-18. 33. Ibid., p. 11; Partiinaia zhizn’, no. 5, 1987, pp. 32ff; Radians’ka Ukraina, 20 February
1987, p. 3; and 8 March 1987, p. 2; Prwda, 10 February 1987, p. 2; and 1 March 1987, p. 2. 34. Zaria Vostoka, 18 January 1987, p. 2; and V. A. Bobkov, “Partiinye kadry: Opyt, problemy, suzhdeniia,” Vopmy istorii KPSS, no. 5, 1987, p. 24. 35. Partiinaia rhim’, no. 15, 1986, p. 46; and no. 3, 1987, p. 24; Ravda, 3 November 1986, p. 1; and 16 February 1987, p. 2; and A. Iakutin, “Rasshiriaem glasnost’ v partiinoi rabote,” Kommunist Sovetskoi L&i, no. 3, 1986, p. 94. 36. Ruvaia, 23 August 1986, p. 2. See also ibid., 5 August 1986, p. 2; Iakutin, op. cit., note 35, p. 96; and Ponomarev and Tarasov, op. cit., note 11, p, 10.
68
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
tion of the Soviet Union since Stalin’s day when the original procedures were instituted. Today there is an abundance of technically qualified and politically reliable people from among whom “leading cadres” can be chosen, by open competition if need be; Soviet citizens-including even party activists-are literate and do not have to have reports read to them; and there is a greater degree of personal mobility which can facilitate more face-to-face contact between the leaders and the masses.
Limitations of Gorbachev’s “Reorganization” For all the talk about “revolutionary renewal” associated with the perestroika, Gorbachev’s “reorganization” thus far appears as a mild and not very meaningful reform. This is because, when we look at the urban party apparat, virtually nothing has been touched and the basic principles of party organization
remain unaltered.
Instead of
creating new structures, Gorbachev has chosen to reactivate existing ones, for example, the network of auditing commissions. Their mandate has been broadened to include monitoring
the performance
in line with Gorbachev’s
of the apparat rather than just auditing accounts.38 This is emphasis,
expressed
at the January
1987 Plenum,
on the
greater need for strengthening oversight (kontrol’) and reinforcing policing bodies.3g In leaving the party structure much the same Gorbachev may have learned the lesson offered by Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. The overall goals and tasks remain: to speed up economic organize
and educate
the public
in execution
of that
development; objective.40
to mobilize,
Success
of the
perestroika, as it has always been for party work, is measured by indicators of economic production, even by Gorbachev himself. 41 While it has always been assumed to exist, the link between production
and party work has never been proven or tested. It may be
spurious or nonexistent. The CPSU, it seems to me, does not really know if party work is effective. Thus by continuing to rely on this unproven assumption, rather than either testing, discarding or replacing it, Gorbachev is changing nothing which bears on the criteria of effectiveness of his own policy of perestroika and which would constitute a genuine reform or improvement of the political system more generally. In one respect, however, Gorbachev seems in principle to be on the right track and in practice to be determined as well. He has said that “a man can only bring about order in his home if he feels himself master of it. “42 This is the starting-point for the policy of “democratization. ’ ’ It is good industrial psychology: the employee who feels he has a stake and a say in the enterprise address to the January
is happier,
more motivated and more productive.
1987 Central Committee
Plenum,
Gorbachev
In his
proposed not only
the election of administrative and supervisory personnel in production enterprises, but also, as already noted, of party secretaries from the primary level to the union republic. The Central Committee endorsed the former, but not the latter.43 It is a measure of his 37. See G. Smirnov, “Revoliutsionnaia sut’ obnovleniia,” Pravda, 13 March 1987, pp. ‘2-3. 38. See Partiinaia rhizn ‘, no. 16, 1984, pp. 28-32; no. 6-7, 1986, pp. 161-62; no. 13, 1986, pp. 38-9; no. 15, 1986, pp. 13-19; and no. 16, 1986, pp. 29-32. 39. Pravda Ukrainy, 28January 1987, pp. 4-5. 40. Pravda Ukrainy, 28 January 1987, p. 5; and Ponomarev and Tarasov, op. cit., note 11, p. 9. 41. Ponomarev and Tarasov, op. cit., note 11, p, 7; Radians’ka Ukraina, 30 March 1986, p. 3; Rauda Ukminy, 28 January 1987, p. 2; Prauda, 24 February 1987, p. 2. 42. Praudo Ukrainy, 28 January 1987, p. 2. 43. Compare Raudn Ukrainy, 28 January 1987, p. 3 (Gorbachev’s proposal) with Litnatumaia gazeta, 4 February 1987, p. 2 (the CC resolution.)
Gorbachev’s Reorganization and the Gorkom determination
that in spite of this opposition,
election of party secretaries,
69
he is going ahead with the reform of the
as the various examples previously cited here from several
raikomy and gorkomy attest. Whether from caution or due to political opposition, Gorbachev’s perestroika of the apparat is thus a rather timid reform. A more meaningful reform would address fundamentals rather than style. It would, for instance, replace the arbitrariness cadres system with legal norms, as has been proposed for the governmental in the USSR.** And a really radical reform would do the unthinkable:
of the whole bureaucracy discard the
doctrine of the leading role of the party; introduce competitive elections; make the governing party accountable and responsible; cut the link between the CPSU and the coercive apparatus; and eliminate the nomenklatura system.45
Conclusions The “reorganization”
policy introduced
openness in the operations places by the apparatchiki, of party secretaries,
by M&hail
of the urban party apparat.
Gorbachev
does entail a greater
It means more visits to the work-
a change of leadership style for these personnel,
and a broadening
of participation
the election
in deciding cadres questions.
has been adopted primarily to correct some glaring bureaucratic do with information distortion, low organizational effectiveness,
It
pathologies, having to and corruption. There
may be some subsidiary purposes: to move the party out of direct involvement in governmental administration (at which it has proven itself incompetent) and to a more indirect position of political leadership; to set an example in the implementation of the perestroika; to reestablish the relevance and authority of the CPSU; to break up clientelistic ties; to break the apparat out of its isolation from society; and to increase the sense of responsibility of party officials. Available evidence indicates that the results of implementing the policy so far have been mixed. Preventing the full implementation
of the perestroika are such factors as bureaucratic
inertia,
the absence of new
measures of effectiveness, and the fact that formalization (inflexibility) unchecked and at odds with the openness (flexibility) of perestroika.
is proceeding
By way of answering the questions posed at the outset, we may say that, strictly speaking, a “reorganization” of the gorkom apparat has not been effected. In response to the directive that “the center of party work should be transferred to the primary party organizations, ” there may be some decentralization in the offing, but the other elements of the CPSU’s structure-size, complexity and formalization-are unaffected. The departmental arrangement of gorkomy has not only not been altered, but no such thing has been even hinted at. Therefore, virtually none of the processes within the apparat can have been affected. It is therefore liable to continue to operate much as before. The only exceptions might be as a result of the limited decentralization. The power of the apparat is being reduced to the benefit of the party rank-and-file as well as the general public, and hence presumably of the CPSU leadership. There will be some effect on decision-making-more decisions will be made by gorkom committees and bureaus instead of the secretaries acting alone, and more by the PPOs instead of the 44. Iu. A. Rozenbaum, “Sistema raboty s kadrami v usloviiakh perestroiki,” Souetskocgosudarstuo iprauo, 12, 1986, pp. 11-20. 45. A Canadian reporter in Magadan interviewed the obkom first secretary regarding the perestroika. “Asked what reforms have involved the KGB secret police, he [the secretary] replied, ‘We have nothing to change between the KGB and the party. ’ ” GlobeandMail(Toronto)(National edition), 7 April 1987, p. AlO. no.
70 gorkom apparatchiki.
STUDIESIN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM Economic
managers
should get more autonomy
from the party
apparat, since the gorkomy must now work through the PPOs instead of directly with enterprise managers. Very little “restructuring” or “reorganization” is actually associated with the perestroika, which rather seeks to promote a change of attitudes and style. It is a reorientation,
not a reorganization.