Governing global city regions in China and the West

Progress in Planning 73 (2010) 1–75 www.elsevier.com/locate/pplann

Governing global city regions in China and the West Ronald K. Vogel a,1,* a

Department of Political Science and Department of Urban and Public Affairs, Ford Hall 205, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292, USA

H.V. Savitch b,2 b

Department of Urban and Public Affairs, University of Louisville, 426 W. Bloom Street, Louisville, KY 40208, USA

Jiang Xu c,3, Anthony G.O. Yeh d,3 c

Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong d Department of Urban Planning and Design, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong

Weiping Wu e,4 e

Urban Studies and Planning & International Studies, Virginia Commonwealth University, 312 N. Shafer Street, Lafayette Hall 302, Richmond, VA 23284-2021, USA

Andrew Sancton f,5 f

Department of Political Science, Social Science Centre, The University of Western Ontario, 1151 Richmond Street, London, Ontario, N6A 5C2 Canada

Paul Kantor g,6 g

Department of Political Science Department, Fordham University, 441 E. Fordham Road, Bronx, NY 10458, USA

Peter Newman h,7 h

Department of Urban Development and Regeneration, School of Architecture and the Built Environment, University of Westminster, 35 Marylebone Rd, London NW1 5LS, UK

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 502 852 3312; fax: +1 502 852 7923. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R.K. Vogel), [email protected] (H.V. Savitch), [email protected] (J. Xu), [email protected] (A.G.O. Yeh), [email protected] (W. Wu), [email protected] (A. Sancton), [email protected] (P. Kantor), [email protected] (P. Newman), [email protected] (T. Tsukamoto), [email protected] (P.T.Y. Cheung), [email protected] (J. Shen), [email protected] (F. Wu), [email protected] (F. Zhang). 1 Guest Editor, author of Chapter 1 and Chapter 12. 2 Author of Chapter 2. 3 Authors of Chapter 3. 4 Author of Chapter 4. 5 Author of Chapter 5. 6 Author of Chapter 6. 7 Author of Chapter 7. 0305-9006/$ – see front matter # 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.progress.2009.12.001

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R.K. Vogel et al. / Progress in Planning 73 (2010) 1–75

Takashi Tsukamoto i,8 i

Department of Political Science, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 237 Graham Building, Greensboro, NC 27402-6170, USA

Peter T.Y. Cheung j,9 j

Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong

Jianfa Shen k,10 k

Department of Geography and Resource Management, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong

Fulong Wu l,11, Fangzhu Zhang m,11 m

l School of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3WA, UK Centre for Advanced Studies, Cardiff University, 44-45 Park Place, Cathays Park, Cardiff CF10 3BB, UK

Abstract As metropolitan regions continue to fuse into giant megalopolises, nations are confronted with new challenges for governing large metropolitan regions. This monograph addresses three main themes in the burgeoning study of global cities and regional governance in a comparative context. First, what is the importance of city regionalism in the world economy and how are they formed? Second, what is the politics of city regionalism and what political-administrative forms can it take? Third, are these processes the same in China and the West? # 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Metropolitan regions; Global cities; Regional governance

Contents Chapter 1. Governing global city regions in China and the West . . . . . . 1.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. Global cities, city regions, and regional governance . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. Politics of city regionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4. A question of scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5. City regions: China and the West? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6. Summary and conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 2. Rescaling for a global world. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. Global change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. Why re-scaling? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3. Types of territorial re-scaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4. Assessing different types of rescaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 3. Planning mega-city regions in China: rationales and policies . 3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. Why do mega-city regions matter in China? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8 9 10 11

Author of Chapter 8. Author of Chapter 9. Author of Chapter 10. Authors of Chapter 11.

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3.3. Planning institutions in mega-city regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. Pearl River Delta: fragmentation and regional strategic planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 4. Globalising in fragmented space: spatial expansion and the development process in Shanghai . . . . . . 4.1. Key drivers of spatial expansion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1. Spatial dispersion of local population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2. Rural–urban migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.3. Industrial relocation and expansion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.4. Global investment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. Fragmented expansion as product of increasingly market-driven development process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 5. Provinces, boundaries and the governance of Canadian city regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 6. Globalisation and governance in the New York region: managed pluralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2. Political coordination and cooperation in regional governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3. Managed pluralism in the New York region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1. ‘Weak state’ organisation in the metropolitan area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4. Concentration: New York City’s solar presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5. State as manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6. Managed pluralism in action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7. Policy biases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 7. Metropolitan governance in a global city region: the London experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2. Fragmentation, centralisation and mayoral government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3. Reimagining suburban London. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4. City region and its sub-regions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 8. Tokyo’s regionalism politics: glocalisation of a Japanese developmental state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2. Tokyo in the Japanese developmental state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3. Tokyo’s regionalism against capital relocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4. Governor Ishihara’s from-below politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5. Globalisation, regionalism and glocalisation of the Japanese developmental state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 9. Understanding cross-boundary cooperation in South China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2. Perspectives in understanding cross-boundary development in South China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.1. Global cities and global city regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.2. Policy coordination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.3. Towards policy coordination in south China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.4. Multi-level governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.5. Towards multi-level governance in south China? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 10. Assessing inter-city relations between Hong Kong and Shenzhen: the case of airport competition or cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1. Introduction: relative versus absolute competition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2. Changing relations between Hong Kong and Shenzhen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3. Airport development as city strategic projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4. Views from airlines, the public and airport users of Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5. Cooperation between HKIA and SBIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 11. China’s emerging city region governance: towards a research framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1. Theoretical perspectives on city region governance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2. Socialist redistributive regional policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3. Emergence of entrepreneurial urban governance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4. The entrepreneurial city in crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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11.5. Emerging city region governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5.1. Proliferation of spatial plans and strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5.2. Administrative annexation leading to ‘metropolitanisation’ . . . . 11.5.3. Building soft regional institutions, such as regional associations 11.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 12. The city region as a new state space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1. In the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2. East: Tokyo, Hong Kong and Shanghai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3. Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4. Shanghai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliographical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 1. Governing global city regions in China and the West Ronald K. Vogel 1.1. Introduction This volume addresses three main themes in the burgeoning study of global cities and regional governance. First, what is the importance of city regions in the world economy and how are they formed? Second, what is the politics of city regionalism and what politicaladministrative forms can it take? Third, are these processes the same in China and the West? We take a comparative approach throughout the volume, considering the experiences of China in a global perspective compared to those of the US, UK, Canada and Japan, with the aim of building a common knowledge base and theory. These themes are brought together in selected case studies, including Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tokyo, London, Toronto and New York, to bring a more holistic picture to world city governance. 1.2. Global cities, city regions, and regional governance Globalisation of industry and finance is associated with the rise of global or world cities. Scholars have promulgated a number of measures of global city status with substantial agreement that New York, London and Tokyo serve as the command and control centres of international trade and finance (Sassen, 1991). Recently, drawing on the work of Beaverstock, Taylor, and Smith (1999), Mastercard Worldwide (2008) has produced a ranking of cities in the Worldwide centers of commerce index 2008. The rankings were developed by a panel of distinguished researchers, including Saskia Sassen and

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62 63 63 63 63 64 64 65 66 66 66 67 68 73

Peter Taylor. The rankings were derived by examining 75 cities on seven different dimensions, including: (1) legal and political framework; (2) economic stability; (3) ease of doing business; (4) financial flow; (5) business centre; (6) knowledge creation and information flow; and (7) liveability. Any ranking of world cities is likely to raise theoretical and methodological issues concerning the choice of measures included and the way they were operationalised. For our purposes, the rankings identify the major global cities and ensure that we selected for further scrutiny those among the most highly ranked (see Table 1). Focusing on the top 50 global cities, we see that 14 are in North America, 22 in Europe, 10 in Asia with none in South America or Africa. Global or world cities share certain attributes. Employment is substantially based in services rather than in manufacturing. Multinational corporations housed in global cities require an extensive array of specialised support services, including financial, advertising, accounting and legal services. The spatial organisation of global cities is altered by the increasing concentration of corporate headquarters and support services in the central business districts crowding out other functions (Sassen, 1991). Manufacturing employment and backroom support services shift to the second and third ring suburbs, where land and taxes are lower (Savitch, 1988). Thus, economic globalisation contributes to a more spatially decentralised urban form or sprawl. At the same time, greater regional economic integration occurs as the previously separate and independent communities and urbanised areas are linked to the businesses in the urban core by movements of people, goods and services. Scholars and policy makers point to regionalism, if not metropolitan or regional government, as a major factor enhancing the economic competitiveness of

R.K. Vogel et al. / Progress in Planning 73 (2010) 1–75 Table 1 Ranking of world cities. 2008 rank

City

Index value

2008 rank

City

Index value

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

London New York Tokyo Singapore Chicago Hong Kong Paris Frankfurt Seoul Amsterdam

79.7 72.77 66.6 66.6 65.24 63.94 63.87 62.34 61.83 60.06

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Melbourne Bangkok Edinburgh Dubai Tel Aviv Lisbon Rome Mumbai Prague Kuala Lumpur

49.93 48.23 47.79 47.23 46.5 46.46 45.99 45.7 45.5 45.28

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Madrid Sydney Toronto Copenhagen Zurich Stockholm Los Angeles Philadelphia Osaka Milan

58.34 58.33 58.6 57.99 56.86 56.67 55.73 55.55 54.94 54.73

51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Moscow Budapest Santiago Mexico City Athens Sao Paulo Beijing Johannesburg Warsaw Shenzhen

44.99 44.52 44.49 43.33 43.25 42.7 42.52 42.04 41.26 40.04

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Boston Taipei Berlin Shanghai Atlanta Vienna Munich San Francisco Miami Brussels

54.0 53.32 53.22 52.89 52.86 52.52 52.52 52.39 52.33 52.6

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

New Delhi Bogota´ Buenos Aires Istanbul Rio de Janeiro Bangalore St Petersburg Jakarta Riyadh Cairo

39.22 38.27 37.76 36.14 35.9 35.78 35.55 35.4 35.37 35.29

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Dublin Montreal Hamburg Houston Dallas Washington DC Vancouver Barcelona Du¨sseldorf Geneva

51.77 51.6 51.53 51.3 51.25 51.59 51.1 50.9 50.42 50.13

71 72 73 74 75

Manila Chengdu Chongqing Beirut Caracas

35.15 33.84 33.13 31.81 26.11

Source: Mastercard Worldwide (2008: 20–21).

world cities (Savitch & Vogel, 1996; Scott, 2001; Peirce, 1993). Studies of governance in global cities have suggested that regional government played a major role in their development as global cities, both in terms of redesigning the city to meet the needs of global capital and in enhancing economic competitiveness through infrastructure development and government policies (Fainstein, 1994; Laquian, 2005; Savitch, 1988). Moreover, leading global cities such as Tokyo,

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London and New York are noted for their historically strong political integration in the form of metropolitan government. The political economy approach focuses attention on the interrelationship of politics and economics. We are interested in understanding how economic integration and political integration relate, and the cases provide a reference point to explore this in more depth. Logically, we can see that recognition of economic integration of the metropolitan region may evoke a political response as policy makers and business leaders see the benefit of greater regional cooperation to provide efficient and effective public services, enhance infrastructure, and address unintended negative externalities, such as air pollution or traffic congestion. On the other hand, creating regional political institutions or processes promotes policy coordination which might enhance the economic competitiveness of the metropolitan region through greater investments in infrastructure, improved public services, and lower business costs with greater access to labour and markets. The restoration of a metropolitan government in London is in large measure the result of government and private leaders agreeing that this global city needed greater strategic decision-making capacity to ensure the city’s economic competitiveness. Here, central officials chose to place this strategic function in a new regional government, although its scale still fails to match the larger urban region. In the case of Toronto, the provincial Ontario government took over the role of regional policy maker rather than place it in the hands of the newly amalgamated City of Toronto. Tokyo reflects another approach where the developmental state (Japan) creates a global city (Tokyo) as a vehicle of national economic development policy. In this instance, Tokyo was established as a metropolitan government as part of war-time centralisation and granted an extraordinary degree of autonomy compared to other Japanese cities and prefectures. Here, political integration and regional policy predates the emergence of a global city or economic integration. Political integration can take varying forms. We can identify four basic ideal type institutional responses, including consolidated government, multi-tiered arrangements, linked functions, and complex networks (Savitch & Vogel, 2000, 2006). The four approaches may be viewed as a continuum from regional government to regional governance. Regional governments represent old-style regionalism with a formal hierarchical structure created to set strategy and directly provide services. In contrast, regional governance involves structuring intergovernmental relations among

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existing institutions and private actors to achieve coordination and is thus more fluid and flexible (Barlow, 1991). The term ‘new regionalism’ highlights the evolving territorial scale from central city to metropolitan region, reflecting both economic and political integration (Savitch & Vogel, 2006). 1.3. Politics of city regionalism There is much consensus among scholars that territory and politics are being rescaled within nations, with evidence of a shift from national to regional and metropolitan levels (Brenner, 2004a, 2004b; Keating, 1998, 2001). Today, city regions, not central cities or even nation states, appear to be the relevant boundaries for competing in a world economy (Scott, 2001). There is also a rescaling process within metropolitan cities to create or strengthen metropolitan decision-making capacity and to shift downwards more local or neighbourhood services to new or reinvigorated lower units (Denters & Rose, 2005; Stoker, 2004). At the local and regional levels, this urban restructuring is leading to new governance arrangements for metropolitan areas (Hoffmann-Martinot & Sellers, 2005).12 In both East and West, we find much study of increasing economic integration and even new forms of political integration aimed at enhancing the core city’s economic competitiveness (see Laquian, 2005). Andrew Jonas and Kevin Ward (2007: 169), in a symposium on ‘City regions: new geographies of governance, democracy and social reproduction’, argue: recent revival of interest in city-regions has been constructed around a rather narrow set of empirical and theoretical issues relating to exchange, interspatial competition and globalization. The ‘new’ city-regionalism results in a reification of the cityregion as an autonomous political agent of the global space economy. We outline an alternative approach to investigating and understanding geographies of city-regionalism, highlighting: a politics of governance and state re-territorialization around the cityregion; the role of democracy and citizenship in cityregion politics; and tensions around social reproduction and sustainability across the city-region. 12 Although there is much evidence that city regions are the new geography of the world economy, the nation-state continues to play an important role in urban policy and development. National governments provide the regulatory framework for employment, support regional development efforts, underwrite and promote redevelopment and revitalisation, and help equalise resources across cities and regions (Savitch & Kantor, 2003: 1025).

Instead, they say there is a critical need to conceptualize the emergence of ‘city-regions’ as the product of a particular set of economic, cultural, environmental and political projects, each with their own logics. [T]here is a need to discover for which interests city-regions are necessary and for whom this new territoriality is merely contingent. (p. 169) Many writers on global cities overlook the formal jurisdictional boundaries of the global city. Thus, Saskia Sassen (1991) and Beaverstock et al. (1999) focus on global or world cities, but generally use this as an analytical concept rather than a well defined political jurisdiction with clear territorial boundaries. Little consideration is given to the formal (or even informal) governing arrangements in place—central-local, cityregional or public-private—that produce or maintain the city’s world city status. It is an open question whether world cities are planned or occur organically (Newman & Thornley, 2005). Cities may be elevated to world city status as a by-product of the companies and business activity located in their territory or as the result of specific investments in infrastructure, human capital development and urban design made by governments. 1.4. A question of scale Although scholars use terms such as ‘city’, ‘metropolis’, ‘city region’, or ‘region’ in their writings, the actual boundaries associated with these are often left undefined. This leads to a certain amount of confusion and lack of congruence between readily grasped concepts, such as ‘global cities’ or ‘metropolitan’ or ‘regional governance’, and real world empirical cases, such as New York, London or Tokyo. In the 19th and 20th century, municipal reform movements called for extending municipal boundaries to capture growth on the urban fringe. Reformers such as Charles Beard (1923) called for cities to be ‘metropolitan’ cities. Thus, we saw the growth of mega-cities, cities of over five million persons, as municipalities annexed neighbouring territory outright, absorbing villages and even cities on their borders. In other cases, new forms of metropolitan government were created to link the core city and larger metropolitan region. However, metropolitan governments established in the 19th and 20th centuries no longer encompass the full metropolis. The scale of urbanisation is now so vast that it is no longer feasible to simply extend municipal boundaries. As John Friedmann and John Miller (1965: 312) reported:

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the inherited form of the city no longer corresponds to reality. Current and projected trends . . . suggest a new element of spatial order is coming into being— the urban field—which will unify both core and periphery within a single matrix. Robert Bish (2001) views continued efforts to establish large-scale metropolitan city governments through amalgamation or redrawing boundaries as antiquated. Although we continue to refer to these as ‘metropolitan governments’ in scholarship, very few cases correspond to the actual city region as implied by the metropolitan label. Thus, H.V. Savitch and Ronald Vogel (1996) adopt the language of regional politics in the post-city age, since metropolitan governments are so rarely regional. Regional politics highlight the growing interdependence between the core city and suburban and exurban areas that surround them. In reality, global cities are global city regions, with the city and suburbs having a shared fate. There is pressure to cooperate on services and infrastructure to enhance economic competitiveness, which provides jobs and revenues for both the core global cities and their surrounding suburbs. However, disparities in race, ethnicity and income and attendant conflict over values may undermine regional cooperation. Thus, the post-city age is associated with a politics of reterritorialisation, as multiple governments and interests at the local, regional, state and national level seek to adjust to the new realities and seek advantage in the rescaling. Table 2 identifies the global cities and city regions under investigation in this study—New York, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Toronto—including their respective population, density and area. In all of these cases, the global cities are administratively governed by a metropolitan city government, whose boundaries were extended in the 20th century to capture the urban growth on the cities’ fringes. However, with the exception of Shanghai, the metropolis extends far beyond the municipal boundaries. The larger metropolis, which we refer to as city region, includes two or three times the population and thousands of square kilometres of additional land area.13 Only in Shanghai

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Florida, Gulden, & Mellander (2007) argue that larger megaregions better capture the metropolitan economy today. In most cases, these are much larger than the city region we focus on. The megaregions and corresponding population to our city regions are TorontoBuffalo-Rochester (22,100,000), Boston-New York-Washington (54,300,000), London-Leeds-Manchester (50,100,000), Greater Tokyo (55,100,000), Hong Kong-Shenzhen (44,900,000), and Shanghai mega-region (66,000,000).

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do we have a regional government that governs the larger city-region territory. Shanghai is an exception, because it operates as both a municipality and a provincial authority. In the other cases, there has been much ‘metropolitan’ reform, such as amalgamation in Toronto with the Toronto Metro (1998), reestablishment of a Greater London Authority overlaying the boroughs (2000), and transformation of administrative wards to fully fledged municipalities in central Tokyo with greater independence from Tokyo Metropolitan Government (1998). However, metropolitan reform aimed at enlarging the boundaries to cover the larger city region was rarely considered in our cases. In subsequent chapters, we consider whether governance arrangements exist for the larger city regions and whether these are adequate. 1.5. City regions: China and the West? Comparative analysis is becoming increasingly important in the study of urban politics (Denters & Mossberger, 2006; Digaetano & Strom, 2003; Kantor & Savitch, 2005; Pierre, 2005; Sellers, 2005). Approaches to comparative research may focus on: (1) political structure, such as type of intergovernmental relations (Sellers, 2002) or political economy (Savitch & Kantor, 2003); (2) political culture (Clark & Inglehart, 1998); and (3) rational actor analysis, such as regime theory (Stone, 1989). Alan DiGaetano and Elizabeth Strom (2003) call for integrating these three approaches. In effect, the shift from government to governance highlights the rescaling processes between central and local governments to meet the needs of metropolitan cities in the 21st century as they seek to position themselves in the world economy. Political leadership at national and local levels plays an important part, in that there are political choices about development strategy and institutional form shaped in large measure by political culture and ideology (Brenner, 2004a, 2004b; Clarke & Gaile, 1998). We seek to compare the governance of city regions in China and the West. The selection of cases—Tokyo, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Toronto, New York and London—are purposeful, in order to allow ‘focused comparison’ about the performance of regional government and governance and the apparent benefits (Denters & Mossberger, 2006: 561). Of course, Tokyo is not a Chinese city. We include Tokyo as a point of comparison for both the West and China. Tokyo as a global city is the product of a ‘state-centred politicalbureaucratic’ process, that is the developmental state, rather than a ‘market-centred’ process typical of the

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Table 2 City and city region scales.

City

Population Land area (sq km) Density (sq km) Governance

New York

London

Tokyo

Hong Kong

Shanghai

2,503,281 630 3,972 City of Toronto

8,363,710 785 10,657 City of New York

7,600,000 1,572 4,800 Greater London Authority

12,790,000 2,187 5,847 Tokyo Metropolitan Government

6,977,700 1,104 6,460 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

18,150,000 6,340 2,863 Shanghai municipality

Two-tier metropolitan government replaced by amalgamated City of Toronto in 1998

Five boroughs (counties) consolidated into NYC in 1898

Upper tier restored in 2000 overlaying 32 boroughs and Corporation of London

Two-tier metropolitan government with 23 wards (municipalities) in central Tokyo and cities and villages in Western Tokyo

Established in 1998 under ‘one country, two systems’

Municipality but with status of province

5,113,149 5,904 866 Ontario Province coordinates for GTA

18,815,988 12,615 1,492 2,000 local governments in NY-NJ-CT in system of managed pluralism with grudging recognition of NYC’s importance as global city

21,000,000 39,751 528 Central government coordinates for Greater South-East

31,714,000 7,627 4,158 Tokyo Metropolitan Government persuades central government to support its regional plan and supported by neighbouring prefects

48,000,000 42,824 1,121 Greater Pearl River Delta with horizontal coordination between Hong Kong and Guangdong province and vertical coordination with Beijing

18,150,000 6,340 2,863 Shanghai municipality operating with status of province

Sources: Statistics Canada, 2006 census; US Census Bureau, 2007, American Factfinder, State and Metropolitan Area data book; National Statistics Online, Regional trends, London, http:// www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/product.asp?vlnk=836 accessed 10 August 2009; Office for National Statistics, Greater London Authority, Focus on London 2007, Table 1.1; for Metro, Greater SouthEast (London, East, South East), Area: Office for National Statistics 2002, Population density, Office for National Statistics 2004, People and migration in regional profiles; Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Population of Tokyo 2007, http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/ENGLISH/PROFILE/overview03.htm (accessed 13 January 2010), metro population for 2005 from Statistical Handbook of Japan 2008; 2003 data from Invest Hong Kong and Department of Foreign Investment Promotion, Guangdong, The Greater Pearl River Delta, http://www.thegprd.com/about/index.html (accessed 13 January 2010).

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City region

Population Land area (sq km) Density (sq km) Government

Toronto

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West and captured by the global city thesis (Hill & Kim, 2000: 2177). In contrast, Hong Kong and Shanghai epitomise the market-centred process. We recognise of course that our comparison of China and the West is necessarily simplified. Our Chinese cases are actually Southeast China—Hong Kong and Shanghai. China is a large country and these two global city regions hardly capture the full picture of China. We extend our understanding of the Chinese experience by including an additional chapter on planning in Chinese city regions and another chapter directly assessing the applicability of western theories of governing global city regions (e.g., Brenner, 2004a, 2004b) in China. Our treatment of the West also derives from a limited number of cases: Toronto, New York and London. There is huge variation in the US, let alone summarising the UK and Canada by reference to one city region in each and assuming the rest of Western Europe as well. We recognise that this is gross oversimplification. Nonetheless, there are regional patterns that are identified in the literature. Josef Gugler (2004) argues a distinctive analytical and theoretical approach is needed to address ‘world cities beyond the West’ and highlights the inadequacy of the global city thesis in addressing emerging world cities in places like China. On the other hand, John Logan (2002) suggests that globalisation explains the emergence and role of global cities in China similar to those in the developed world. It would be more distorting to compare cities in the developed world against the global South and include Chinese cities in this category. As Table 1 reveals, a number of Chinese cities are in the top 50 ranking of global cities and none is from South America or Africa. Thus, the comparison of Chinese cities to that of the West will shed light on why global city regions emerge and how they are governed. Within Europe or North America, we find that local history and circumstances, in combination with social and economic forces, lead to distinctive patterns of governance. Today, we find fewer examples of large hierarchical metropolitan governments. In the West, there is a tendency to develop regional governance arrangements along the lines of the reconstituted Greater London Authority, with a focus on strategic development (Lefe`vre, 1998). There are notable exceptions, however, as the case of Toronto illustrates, where the former two-tier model was replaced with a large-scale amalgamation of the metro and the cities. In Tokyo, Shanghai and Hong Kong, we have large-scale metropolitan city governments. However, the scale of urbanisation has become so vast that we also find a trend towards developing greater coordination and govern-

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ance mechanisms to address regional infrastructure and services that extend beyond a single city region or where city regions cross state boundaries. We must consider whether these processes are the same in China and the West, and whether distinctive analytical and theoretical approaches are needed. The rise of global cities has led to debate about whether a single homogenised city form and culture is rising. Some scholars suggest that global cities lose their distinctiveness as the same set of international companies design, build, shape and market the city and the same set of consumer goods and products are available everywhere. Thus, a Starbucks can be found on just about every street corner in every global city and even non-global ones. It is not just that world cities share a single package of goods and services; they also reflect the same spatial organisation and city image. Indeed, they also pursue the same strategies to acquire or maintain their world city status, including hosting a major sports event or international festival to signal their new status, pursuing the same set of world renowned architects to design their world class museums and office towers, and tourist bubbles. Housing costs escalate to serve the needs of a growing and privileged expatriate community, alongside increased income inequality and spatial polarisation as the lower paid service workers struggle to make a living and find a place to live. Not all scholars agree that cities are converging. Although outwardly they may take on similar features, locals find a way to keep and promote their own culture and make their cities distinctive. Thus, Tokyo will never be confused with New York, or Beijing. Shared local history, culture and values often shine through, even as those trying to sell the city seek to drive them away. Indeed, historic preservation has become part of many world cities’ strategies to be competitive. Thus, the tourist industry, civic elite and neighbourhood residents often herald their local historical neighbourhoods and distinctive culture as community assets. Yet, there is often a tension between local residents’ desire for a good quality of life and those promoting mega development projects to better situate their city in the world economy or cater to the international businesses and their top corporate leaders. So, we will explore in China and the West whether there is convergence in the way city regions are governed and function, including their urban form and the built environment, development strategy, governmental interventions (non-intervention) in the economy, and type of governance arrangements. Moreover, are there viable development strategies that are nonconvergent, especially for cities in China?

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1.6. Summary and conclusion This volume seeks to directly consider whether city regionalism in the West and in China are comparable. In the West, there has been significant research on the new regionalism and the rescaling of the state in light of changed circumstances facing states in the world economy. Thus, new regionalism highlights the emerging city region as the result of a conscious decision by policy makers above (central) and below (local-regional) to enhance the city’s competitiveness in the world economy. Regional policy approaches and governance arrangements are thought critical to provide citizens in the cities and suburbs alike with a

good quality of life and high level of public services. Policy makers and leaders often argue that effective governance arrangements will lead to improved local quality of life and a healthy and vital economy. Critics point out that regionalism does not produce equity (Kantor, 2000) and can undermine local democracy (Boudreau, 2000; Imbroscio, 2006). In China, we see evidence of city regionalism as well, and there have been efforts to apply the same models in an Asian context (see Laquian, 2005). The question is whether these models are relevant or whether new theorising is required. Moreover, concerns about democracy are not as apparent in discussions about city regionalism in China.14

14 John Thornton (2008) suggests China’s greater support for ‘local elections, judicial independence, and oversight of Chinese Communist Party officials’ is promising. Independent candidates have now run for People’s Congresses in some cities, including Shenzhen, where two were elected in 2003 and 40,000 ran in 2006–07 nationwide. However, Thornton warns that Chinese views of democracy differ from those in the West.

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Chapter 2. Rescaling for a global world H.V. Savitch 2.1. Global change Globalisation has magnified commercial intercourse between states. It has prompted nation-states to tear down trade barriers, to adopt common currencies and to make their boundaries permeable for greater exchange of capital and labour. Today, corporations are no longer national or international, but thoroughly multinational. Their products are made in different places—manufactured in one set of locales, assembled in another, marketed in still another and sold throughout the world. The lesson here is that capital and corporations have become modular and mobile. Both move with ease into various global locations, recreating parts of corporations in one place, moving capital to other places and drawing on labour from still other geographies. How do cities fit into this picture? Throughout history the growth of cities has been shaped by capital accumulation. The process is interactive. The interaction occurs as cities furnish the territory, the density and the infrastructure that facilitate the accumulation of capital. By the same token, cities are the outcomes of that very interaction—they reflect the wealth they have created. Globalisation and capital mobility changed this. Corporations and capital are much more likely to be managed by people who have few ties to the city, they are much more likely to have their offices and plants scattered in different locations, and they are much more likely to move frequently. Labour, too, has become more transient, with individuals changing jobs more frequently and stepping into new career patterns. The changes have left cities more vulnerable to massive shifts in capital and employment. Not only have corporations shifted their sights to cities around the globe, but they have sought new territorial venues in suburbs, edge cities and exurbs. In some countries corporations are apt to play localities off against one another, in order to achieve free land, infrastructure or tax abatements. In what has come to be called ‘place wars’, big city mayors now find themselves offering incentives to business in order to attract them (Haider, 1992). The chase for business has now assumed international proportions, with corporations moving headquarters to off-shore locations in order to avoid tax or transferring labour-intensive operations to low-wage nations. As if the process were not competitive enough, national governments have responded to these pressures

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by diminishing support for cities and decentralising political authority. The idea is to make government lean, more aggressive and prepared to compete in a marketcentred global economy. Despite the global crises of 2008–09, neo-liberalism still remains a dominant force in the developed world. In the UK even the Labour Party embraced some form of neo-liberal competitiveness through its adherence to a ‘third way’. In Germany Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats loosened government regulations and promoted self-reliance. Under Nicholas Sarkozy France moved towards a more market-driven economy. Formally socialist India and nominally communist China have become cheerleaders for neo-liberal economics, at least on an international level, where they offer discounted prices for manufactured goods. 2.2. Why re-scaling? My proposition is empirical and prescriptive. Territorial re-scaling not only occurs in response to global pressures, but should be pursued in order to cope with global pressures. By territorial re-scaling, I mean the remaking or the reconfiguration of land in order to exercise decisional and policy control. Re-scaling serves to restructure governance and ultimately power along particular geographical lines. Having reviewed governmental restructuring in Los Angeles and Toronto, Roger Keil (2000) concludes that similar types of rescaling can be used to accomplish diametrically opposing ends. His own position, endorsed by Neil Brenner (2002), is that territorial re-scaling is ‘place specific’ and adapted to suit a multitude of purposes, which are often contradictory. By Keil’s reckoning, both consolidated government and fragmentation ‘can lead to either more closed or more open political processes, to more or less equality and redistributive justice and to better or worse urban social and natural environments’ (Keil, 2000: 759). In short, for these authors re-scaling is neutral, to be used for any number of ends. Keil and Brenner might be correct in their assessments of the multiple purposes re-scaling can serve, but they also overlook the specifically instrumental functions of re-scaling and the best uses to which it can be put. Re-scaling is a tool and tools can be appropriately or inappropriately suited to the task. To take one apparent example, city consolidation is well suited for centralising power and establishing a strong directive force for metropolitan regions. Leaders may not choose to fully exploit that power or citizens may choose to resist it, but that does not put the tools themselves into doubt as much as how those tools are

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successfully utilised. By contrast, a rescaling that scatters power makes it more difficult for any single person to exercise command, but that does not mean that same structure cannot be manipulated to actually acquire power. More succinctly, there is no guarantee that re-scaling will yield a particular outcome, but different types of rescaling may be better at reaching particular outcomes than others. Tools do not have wills of their own, but people who use them do. Like other forms of organisation, re-scaling contains elements that enable certain people to shape decisions towards one goal and away from another. This can be done in several ways. For one, re-scaling establishes borders that mark off one jurisdiction from another. Territorial borders provide a context through which people experience the world and give it meaning. The space that we inhabit gives us identity, and the boundaries around that space define how we organise our economic, political, cultural and social lives. Spatial identity provides political motivation through which people act. Furthermore, once marked off territory may be used to lock in resources (defensive incorporation) or provide a wider tax base for sharing resources (re-distributive policies). It may be used to absorb revenue-producing industry, attract taxable property, and shift demographic balances. Changes in local boundaries also have great strategic significance, by determining the construction of new roads, utility lines, schools and other public institutions. Boundary change can influence planning and coordination. It has been used to gain advantages in awarding intergovernmental aid, in extracting political benefits and even in regulating social behaviour through controls over vice (Fleischmann, 1986). The simple act of including, excluding or diluting populations can radically alter positive or negative ‘spillovers’ or change the distribution of benefits to different groups (Feiock & Carr, 2000). The contours of local boundaries will also prompt citizens to self-exclude or self-include. Multiple ‘small box’ local governments make it possible for people to leave one jurisdiction in favour of another. Single, ‘big box’ governments make it more difficult to escape from a jurisdiction. Thus, in the former situation, citizens are more likely to express their discontent by exiting or ‘voting with their feet’; whereas in the latter they are more impelled to express preferences by voicing political opinions and engaging government (Hirschman, 1970; Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Second, re-scaling also formulates rules for allocating power. Those rules may pertain to single member jurisdictions or to at-large jurisdictions; they may share

power or unite it; and, they will grant or withdraw power to office holders. Rules of the game are crucial for catalysing different groups and social classes. Rules are never neutral. They animate some groups and mute others. Rules allow groups to form larger coalitions and they allow larger coalitions to govern and set policy direction for a given territory. Not least, rules set the agenda, formulate issues, and determine priorities. Making choices over whether to pursue policies that realise certain ‘moral values’ versus certain ‘economic values’ are not pure acts of a majority, but reflect the kind of majority that is formed around a particular issue. Some rules will favour some choices and other rules will discount them. Formulating an issue around ‘law and order’ permits one kind of ‘majority’ to coalesce; but formulating an issue around the ‘redistribution of income’ recruits a very different kind of ‘majority’. Territory provides the playing field upon which choices and rules are constructed. Outcomes can be shaped by how territories are divided, merged and recombined. Make no mistake about it. Consolidating, breaking up or coordinating a territory will influence a policy outcome. In London a congestion charge would have been far less likely without the existence of a unified mayor and a strategic authority to promote this controversial measure. By the same token, the large number of small independent communes in France prompts them to compete for public amenities, making it easier for swimming pools and sports centres to dot the urban landscape. Words like ‘influence’, ‘likely’ and ‘easier’ are used here because outcomes are far from guaranteed. Rather than determining outcomes, rescaling disposes localities towards adopting particular kinds of policies. It should also be noted that re-scaling may have entirely unintended consequences (Savitch, 1988). The original purpose for which a given re-scaling was adopted may be thwarted––not necessarily because re-scaling did not work, but because its operations may not be fully understood or not well used. We should realise, however, that the occurrence of unintended consequences affirms rather than negates the power of territorial rescaling. Finally, territorial re-scaling sets the scope for bureaucratic implementation. Outlining new territory determines the extent to which a locality exercises power, as well as the kind of regulations it can enforce. Infrastructure, schools, transportation and police operate over certain areas. Zoning regulations are bureaucratically enforced and determine how land is used, its value and its relationship to public priorities. The mere

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existence of these services, or threat of removing them, can galvanise the citizenry. In very tangible ways they determine government’s capacity to harness resources, operate efficiently, and respond to the citizenry. 2.3. Types of territorial re-scaling I begin with four ideal types of rescaling and later discuss the likely outcomes connected to each of them. Using these typologies, I suggest a number of basic rescaled governments. Some of these might establish vertical or hierarchical relationships between actors, while others might operate laterally across jurisdictions. The types can be specified as: (1) consolidated jurisdictions; (2) multi-tiered jurisdictions; (3) linked jurisdictions; and (4) jumped scales. Consolidating a jurisdiction is the most clear-cut type of re-scaling. Quite simply, consolidation abolishes and absorbs a smaller jurisdiction into another. In most instances absorption can be considerable. In the US, Louisville and Indianapolis found the newly consolidated city to have expanded more than severalfold to 300 or 400 square miles. Much the same enlargement occurred in Canada, where the city of Toronto found itself in a new territory of more than 250 square miles. Multi-tiered jurisdictions retain existing cities within a metropolitan area, but take from them a degree of authority to create a metropolitan tier. The idea of multitiered government is to create an ‘umbrella level’ of government in order to bring about greater cooperation between various localities. Seen another way, multitiered government not so much establishes ‘lower levels’ or ‘higher levels’ of authority, but different forms of governance designed to deal with ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ kinds of issues. Thus, day-to-day interactions with citizens in specific neighbourhoods (trash collection) would be a ‘narrow issue’, while periodic policy decisions covering large stretches of territory (environmental regulation) would constitute a ‘wide issue’.

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Ideally, small jurisdictions should be able to manage labour-intensive services, which call for close, day-today relationships between service deliverers and citizenconsumers (police, sanitation and housing services). By comparison, the metropolitan tier is supposed to deal better with far-reaching issues that cut across a number of local jurisdictions. These may include strategic planning or involve capital-intensive, regulatory or re-distributive functions (environmental issues, solid waste disposal, tax pooling and transportation). Cities as varied as Minneapolis and London operate under some kind of strategic umbrella, yet retain a high degree of local authority. Linked jurisdictions represent a more modest way of cooperating across a metropolitan area. The purest instance entails bilateral cooperation on a select number of functions, such as municipal services or tax sharing (Pittsburgh) economic development (Louisville 1986– 2003) or regional planning (Hanover). More significantly, the linked functions type focuses on existing offices and does not require an additional layer of government. Jumped scales represent a new and novel way of coping with global pressures and their formulation is just beginning to take shape (Smith, 1993). Jumped scales form alliances of cooperation across noncontiguous territories. Here we see cities transcending national boundaries in order to form long-term relationships. Jumping scales may begin with cultural exchanges and gradually grow into resource sharing and policy adoption. Along the Pacific edge of North America, Seattle and Vancouver have formed a cooperative nexus, while in the Mediterranean a troika has emerged between Marseilles, Genoa and Barcelona. Fig. 1 shows each of these types of re-scaling. Note, these types are listed on a continuum ranging from mono-centric to polycentric approaches to re-scaling. By mono-centric I mean single government, highly centralised government couched in large territorial areas (big box). By polycentric, I refer to multiple

Fig. 1. A continuum of re-scaled typologies.

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governments with pluralistic centres of power found in smaller territorial units (small box) but quite capable of acting across a broader breadth of territory. We are not simply talking about forms of governance, but about how different localities treat metropolitan cooperation. Generally speaking, a polycentric system favours lateral cooperation among similar localities and any collaboration is largely elicited by voluntary means. By comparison, a mono-centric system tends towards hierarchy and elicits cooperation by exercising its authority. For decades, a debate has raged over the comparative virtues of mono-centric versus polycentric rescaling (Ostrom, 2000). The question is: what are the capabilities possessed by these re-scaled types in coping with global pressures? Three of the best known measures for evaluating governmental performance are (1) efficiency, (2) accountability and (3) economic development. Efficiency is defined as inputs relative to outputs or as the costs of producing a service compared to the value obtained by that service. Accountability relates to the transparency of government and its performance, often judged by citizen voting, participation or surveys. Presumably, the more sensitive and alert a government is to popular demand, the more accountable it is. Finally, economic development deals with the capacity of a locality to attract jobs, investment and income growth. Whether any one or a combination of re-scaling tools is able to enhance benefits is an open question. The answers are neither comprehensive nor unequivocal, but we can get a hint about how these tools have worked given the empirical record. Before proceeding to the actual results of re-scaling, we should recognise that the propensity to adopt a particular kind of re-scaling depends upon the historical or cultural context of a society. Anglo-American and some Nordic countries are inclined to take a systematic approach and re-scale their territories through overarching legislation that eliminates old jurisdictions and replaces them with new ones. The Thatcher government did this rather abruptly in the 1980s, when it abolished several metropolitan councils and opted instead for smaller local governments that would be subject to influence from Whitehall. Latin countries in Europe take a more incremental approach to re-scaling, and are apt to add new jurisdictions to complement older ones. During the 1990s, France took exactly this approach by buttressing existing jurisdictions with another layer of metropolitan government (Baraize & Negrier, 2001). Re-scaling in Asia also follows historical/cultural variations. Japan and South Korea tend towards bureaucratic governance, and multi-tiered re-scaling

best suits that purpose. Accordingly, both Tokyo and Seoul are founded upon a combination of local wards and metropolitan institutions, led by a governor general and cadres of officials. The communist nations of China, Vietnam and North Korea concentrate power in state institutions. It stands to reason that capital cities like Beijing, Hanoi and Pyongyang would be staunchly mono-centric. By contrast, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have strong communal roots. While central governments in those nations are anxious to keep a strong grip, Jakarta, Bangkok and Manila have sometimes moved in a polycentric direction. Indeed, Mike Douglas (2006, 2008) has written about tensions between central and local authorities over the use of space. In Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines the struggle between central elites, seeking global status (‘globopolis’) and local citizens, seeking conviviality (‘cosmopolis’), has led to a certain amount of ‘downscaling’, so that decisions can be taken at a neighbourhoods level. As Douglas (2008) points out, the struggle is a difficult one because cities face global pressures for more development and this is likely to run roughshod across traditional neighbourhoods. 2.4. Assessing different types of rescaling Consolidation has widely been used to re-scale territories. The US has a long history of consolidating local governments going back to the 19th century. In the last 50 years large-scale consolidations have occurred in Nashville (1962), Jacksonville (1967), Indianapolis (1969), and Louisville (2003). In Canada, Toronto was merged in 1998 and Hamburg’s position as both an autonomous city and a Land took root in 1937. The evidence on consolidation tells us that many of its promises are unfulfilled. On the surface it would appear that one bureaucracy would be more efficient than multiple bureaucracies, and consolidation would yield benefits. Reality, however, is more complex. The smaller a bureaucracy the ‘flatter’ its structure, while larger bureaucracies have ‘taller’ structures. This means that multiple, small and flat bureaucracies have fewer layers of supervision and devote more attention to service provision. Also, when it comes to the provision of services, smaller, independent localities are bound to compete and learn from one another. A public marketplace of competitive local governments can create a healthy dynamic whose effects maximise efficiencies. Studies bear out much of these observations, showing that multiple, flat bureaucracies outperform a single, tall bureaucracy and numerous, small box localities work better than a single, big box government

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(Dolan, 1990; Ostrom, 2000; Parks & Whitaker, 1973; Schneider, 1989; Sjoquist, 1982). The National Research Council commissioned a review of this subject and concluded, ‘There is general agreement that consolidation has not reduced costs and, in fact, may have even increased total local expenditures. . ..’ (Altshuler, Morrill, Wolman, & Mitchell, 1999). Accountability is not as clear cut. On the one hand, surveys taken soon after consolidation show a degree of citizen satisfaction, with some transitions towards big box governance (Stephens & Wikstrom, 2000). On the other hand, citizen participation rates fall off in larger localities because citizens feel their vote has been diluted. Oliver (2001) found that citizen involvement was highest in small localities and decreased as cities became larger. The falloff is acute with racial minorities, especially when consolidation leads to the incorporation of heavily white suburbs with a predominantly black urban core (Carver, 1973; Swanson, 2000). When it comes to economic development, consolidated areas hold no apparent advantage. A well known investigation by two researchers found no relationship between economic development and consolidated governments. Their controlled study of 18 consolidated city-counties examined ‘annual growth in manufacturing, retail, and service establishments’ before and after consolidation (Feiock & Carr, 2000). Other researchers found that economic growth was a function of broader economic trends and not government reorganisation (Blair & Zhang, 1994). On the other hand, consolidated areas have been shown to control sprawl more effectively and often have higher bond ratings, allowing them to borrow money at lower interest rates (Lewis, 1996; Rusk, 2006). In sum, consolidation has been found to hold relatively few advantages related to efficiency, accountability or economic development. In the light of ever expanding metropolitan regions, consolidation turns out to be stagnant because it is unable to envelop newly urbanised areas that lie beyond the big box jurisdiction. Evidence shows that Americans continue to leap-frog over consolidated areas and settle outside their bounds (Savitch, VogeL, & Ye, 2009). Multi-tiered jurisdictions have a long legacy, both in Western Europe and in North America. Rescaling of this kind has existed in Minneapolis, Portland, London, Barcelona, Tokyo and, until recently, in Toronto. While metro government may appear to have reached a happy medium by combining localism with regionalism, it has encountered serious problems. For one, efforts to impose regional solutions on ‘locals’ have met resistance. Small

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cities dislike being told they must accept an unwanted incinerator or low income housing for the good of the metropolis. For another, metropolitan governments have been vetoed by state or provincial authorities, presumably for overstepping their bounds. Aggressive policies can engender resentment or fears of political competition. Politicians in state capitals may look askance at regional or ‘middle level’ politicians who can command sizeable constituencies. Sooner or later, metropolitan tiers often find themselves crushed between the grindstones of local and higher levels of government. On the issue of efficiency, evidence shows that some multi-tiered governments have not yet sorted out which functions are best managed at what levels. Tokyo has encountered this problem and its localities (wards) find themselves struggling with its metropolitan tier over funding for daily services (Vogel, 1999). Neither have the city of Miami and its metropolitan tier been able to reconcile differences over the best placement of municipal services (Gustely, 1977). In both the Tokyo and Miami cases, rigidities in the design of tiered arrangements prevent easy trial and error adaptation. By comparison, Minneapolis seems to have done reasonably well in sorting out different services, since most of the day-to-day labour-intensive services were left with the localities (Harrigan, 1996). Economic development and sprawl have fared somewhat better. Portland has done a good job of managing economic development while curtailing sprawl through its growth boundary; Minneapolis has succeeded in providing jobs for its impoverished population while building publicly assisted housing within its central counties; and, London has hosted a financial boom while discouraging commuting by suburban motorists and channelling them into public transit. In short, muti-tiered systems have gone some way in carving out the best configuration for services and redistributing economic opportunities, but performance remains uneven across different cities. Accountability seems not to have been affected one way or another (Altshuler et al., 1999; Dluhy, 1997; Harrigan, 1996). The big question for these systems is their political fragility and how that might affect long-term success. Linked functions are quite flexible. Over a period of time, functions can be added, deleted or shifted between governments. Their flexibility, however, is offset by tentativeness about their longevity. Citizens may view linked functions as a ‘band aid’ because it is not comprehensive. Louisville converted its linked function into a consolidated government and Pittsburgh is now entertaining the same idea (Savitch, Vogel, & Lin, 2010). In Europe, Rotterdam, Copenhagen and Rotter-

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dam eliminated institutions which sought to tie central cities with the larger metropolis (Brenner, 2004a, 2004b: 468). Overall, linked functions have proved to be quite workable. Pittsburgh and surrounding localities have improved efficiency by not duplicating services, while also taking advantage of small-scale services. For a time, Louisville maintained local accountability and was able to share taxes with its surrounding county— both profiting from the stimulation of a democratic give and take (Savitch & Vogel, 2004). Hanover and Dublin have continued to better themselves through cooperative strategic planning and economic development with their respective regions. The very incremental advantages provided by linked functions also create their disadvantages. Their gains are small and sure, but rarely if ever have they led to anything larger. No mechanism exists within the linked functions model to advance cooperation to much larger questions. Beyond some marginal benefits related to efficiency and economic development this model remains localised and has not yet been applied to global challenges. One very different kind of rescaling is the jumped scale. This type of rescaling is still in its infancy but it is also revolutionary. Indeed, jumped scales break the paradigm of re-scaling as strictly an affair between contiguous territories. Instead it focuses on building networks across large spaces. There is some evidence this has begun to materialise (Borja & Castells, 1999). Seattle and Vancouver have begun to collaborate on environmental issues; Marseille, Genoa and Barcelona have initiated an economic collaboration. Jumped scales are often facilitated through common business circuits, such as banking and finance (London, Paris and Frankfurt). Also, supra-national organisations (EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN) nurture collaboration among mayors, chambers of commerce and nongovernmental organisations. How well this type of re-scaling works is an open question. In theory the idea of jumped scales is well suited to meet the challenges of globalisation. This might be so because the broad contours and mutability of most re-scaling matches the same broad processes of globalisation. One could very well imagine transnational localities pooling resources, facilitating human resource training, and creating common tax policies in order to strengthen public bargaining with business. Jumping scales also holds the potential for creating a countervailing power to multinational mega-corporations. Cities that collaborate across international borders might be able to establish agreements and halt

the spread of bidding wars. They could share information on advanced technology and best practices. New levels of cooperation could be reached by setting up common policy evaluation units, to determine what strategies best suit different kinds of cities. Cities that jump scales could share evaluations on whether ‘supply side’ strategies yield benefits or whether there is sufficient demand for the construction of office towers vis-a`-vis building other facilities. Potentially, jumped scales could provide international capacity to plan more effectively for coming trends and in some ways temper the extreme vicissitudes of globalisation. 2.5. Conclusions Re-scaling offers different tools for potentially gaining a number of different advantages. Some qualifiers are in order. We emphasise the word ‘tools’ because there is nothing automatic about re-scaling and any result is a matter of how this tool is used. One way to understand re-scaling is by seeing it as establishing a structure of power, which makes it easier to accomplish certain goals, but whose fulfilment is up to human agency. Additionally, there is no one way to re-scale and there is no absolutely clear cut ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ method of adopting a particular scale. Instead, much depends on the values of policy makers and the objectives to be sought. Even then, tools will be used under differing conditions and with differing levels of skill. Next, what is appropriate for one city may not be appropriate for another. Not all cities are appreciably affected by globalisation and not all are in the throes of widespread competition. For those cities that do find themselves in a global, highly competitive arena, rescaling can be helpful. This is because business and particularly multinational corporations hold most of the advantages with regard to information and do use that information to extract gains from cities. Cities can best deal with those challenges by acquiring resources of their own. Judging from the evidence to date, the most hopeful prospects lie in flexible, polycentric re-scaling. This should allow cities to collect resources, build on their comparative advantage, and form mutually beneficial alliances. That polycentric re-scaling can best accomplish this should not come as a surprise. The global marketplace is itself a diffuse and self-regulating process and re-scaling should be no less adaptable. Linked functions and jumped scales hold considerable promise. However, we will never know their true effectiveness until cities begin to use these tools more extensively and with creativity.

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Chapter 3. Planning mega-city regions in China: rationales and policies Jiang Xu and Anthony G.O. Yeh 3.1. Introduction Since the economic reform in 1978, several trends have affected Chinese society. The primary development has been rapid urbanisation. Not only is more than onethird of the country’s population now living in cities, but the remaining population has become increasingly dependent on cities and towns for their economic survival and livelihood. Chinese experts predict that by 2050, the urban population is likely to reach at least one billion, with the urbanisation level soaring to over 75% and the urban sector contributing to over 95% of the national economy (Li, 2003: 11). Accordingly, more than 600 million people will shift from rural areas to urban districts (People’s Daily, 2002). Furthermore, projections show that there will probably be 50 ultra-large cities, each with populations of more than two million; over 150 big cities with populations of one to two million; 500 medium-sized cities; and 1,500 small cities (People’s Daily, 2002). While these figures are predictable, the forces of globalisation and mega-city region development will reinforce the role of cities and their regions as centres of production, consumption and social and political change. Urbanisation at such scale and speed has overwhelmed Chinese governments at various levels. For example, the flood of rural–urban migration has exacerbated the infrastructure burden of cities, and has led to tremendous growth of inadequately serviced urban areas, where millions of migrant workers lack sufficient access to basic urban services. There is also a pressing need to address the problems of widespread misapplication of land use, urban sprawl, traffic congestion and poor sanitation in all Chinese cities, especially those that are threatened by hasty and often uncontrolled growth, inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure, industrialisation, and increased vehicle ownership. To effectively address these problems, China redefines its urbanisation strategy to focus on developing urban agglomeration to replace the rampant urban sprawl (China Mayor Association, 2004). This brings the question of development and governance of mega-city regions to the forefront. 3.2. Why do mega-city regions matter in China? China’s mega-city regions are clusters of contiguous cities or metropolitan areas, such as the Pearl River

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Delta (PRD) in the south and Yangtze River Delta (YRD) on the eastern coast. These regions are administratively independent, but are intensively networked in various ways. They are developing phenomenally and each houses more than 50 million people in a rather small land area. In the past two decades, these regions have undergone significant transformation, due to market reform, globalisation and rapid urbanisation. Many cities and towns that were formerly peripheral or rural areas have developed into economic centres in their own right. The resultant polycentric spatial form has combined with the rise of urban entrepreneurialism, leading to a powerful force of decentralisation in territorial development. This accelerates the spreading of market mechanisms and the rearticulation of state functions to lower levels of politicoinstitutional organisations. In this sense, territorial development moves away from the pre-reform prototype to be increasingly attached to and embedded in places and territories on a sub-national scale (Xu & Yeh, 2009). This reform-imposed transition leads to an intensified inter-city competition for mobile capital. There are a number of negative externalities which arise from this type of regional formation, such as widespread imitation, redundant construction and environmental degradation. These externalities are very profound in their impacts. In response, different solutions have been proposed. Mainstream literature on urban economics supports the idea of using competition as a remedy to sustain growth, because hyper-competition leads to economic efficiency, which may automatically solve the problems of collective actions (Zhao, 2002). In this manner, state strategic concerns should be minimised (Xu, 2008). In contrast to this assortment of views, there are widespread concerns over the negative impacts of political fragmentation. There have been arguments that decentralisation and market reform have weakened the governing capacity of the central state, and that strategic plans should be made to enhance regulation and reduce these negative impacts (Liu, 2001). The motivations for these concerns are varied, but the objectives have typically been to reposition mega-city regions in the national and global economic landscapes, as well as to articulate a coordinative spatial mosaic for key development issues such as land use regulation, environmental protection and infrastructural provision. Regionalisation as a national strategy was incorporated into the country’s Ninth Five-Year-Plan (1999– 2000), which proposed seven trans-provincial economic regions, such as the Yangtze River Delta and Basin, the Bohai Rim, the North East Region and the North West

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Region. The Tenth Five-Year-Plan (2001–05) furthered the intention to develop the western part of the country through proposing regional projects, such as the Upper Yangtze River Basin Economic Corridor (i.e., Chengdu to Chongqing) and the Nanning-Guiyang-Kunming Economic Region. Although these centrally proposed projects have hardly been realised, the message from the central state to support regionalisation was clear, and this encouraged the development of many transprovincial or trans-municipal mega-city region projects, such as those in the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, Beihai Bay Area, Northeast Six Coastal Region and Taiwan Strait West (Yeh & Xu, 2008a). To explain what is behind the renewed interest in mega-city regions, Xu (2008) summarises three reasons why mega-city regions matter in China. First, for central and provincial governments, political fragmentation due to decentralisation has increasingly weakened their governing capacity. This has given rise to an urgent need to recompose state strategies for better regulation. Strategic planning at the mega-city region level has thus become a key political strategy to regain control and reassert functional importance of provincial and central governments in the growing complexity of local and regional economic governance. Second, provincially, planning mega-city regions can help strategically reposition these ‘regions’ in the national and global economic landscape. Third, provinces also rely on creating mega-city regions to obtain central policy support. Xu and Yeh (2009) argue that decentralisation does not necessarily mean the total decline of the central state in the post-reform era, because the central state’s role in strategic intervention is regaining its importance, although its dominance is now being decentralised. The approach is often ‘top down’, involving central attempts at strategic distribution of key projects, which are becoming extremely significant in local development. One major focus is on the location of large manufacturing projects. Policy tools include some direct measures, such as location control of firms and the movements of state-controlled industries and services. Indirect measures seek to increase the attraction of intended areas to inward investment by providing major infrastructure and preferential policies. Being an iconic region incorporated into national development plans (e.g., National Five-Year Plan) is an important indication of the central state’s support. Indeed, creating city regions is believed to be able to attract central attention because the PRD, YRD and Bihai New Region in Tianjin set positive examples for others regions to follow (Xu & Yeh, 2009). As interregional competition for national status increases,

provinces believe that new regional spaces can help them stand out strategically. Consequently, one novel characteristic of current mega-city region planning has been its explicit control and competitive orientation. Proposals have been justified as a means to regain government’s control over fragmented growth and reposition regions in the national and global economic landscape. In contrast to the 1980s, in which debates on regional cooperation simply focused on the issues of administrative coordination and city networking, current discussions have also been oriented towards the overarching priority of policy consolidation and promotion of structural competitiveness of regions. 3.3. Planning institutions in mega-city regions15 Regional development in China carries strong legacies of its socialist history. Under state socialism, horizontal linkages among jurisdictions were not considered important, with hierarchical linkages tending to predominate. This resulted in regions being dependent on the centre (Xu, 2008). The hierarchical system is still deeply embedded in the post-reform government structure, although city networking is a new policy area. The Chinese government is hierarchically organised at the central, provincial, prefecture, county, township and village levels. There is no formal government structure at the mega-city region level. This is perhaps similar to the situation in New York City, which lacks a formal regional government (see Chapter 6). National laws do not require cities to cooperate with adjacent jurisdictions, nor does the central state offer any incentives to forge such cooperation. If a mega-city region (e.g., PRD) contains jurisdictions under a single province, the provincial government can be a key facilitator to coordinate regional development. But if the region (e.g., YRD) extends to include jurisdictions under different provinces, the central state is essential in coordination. Theoretically, the central state and provinces can build on Chinese tradition to enforce coordination. However, the institutional structure for state intervention is problematic because the functions of regional planning are highly fragmented among different ministries (Xu, 2008).

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Information in this section was partially obtained from several interviews conducted in Beijing in June–July 2009 with government officials and planners of the National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development.

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The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is the agent that makes socioeconomic plans. These plans have been in operation since the pre-reform period, and have recently come to contain a strong spatial element. The NDRC is a central agency which is a half-level higher than other ministries, due to historical reasons. Socioeconomic planning therefore has the capacity to guide and constrain spatial plans made by other ministries. Socioeconomic plans are made to clarify the overall positioning of regions and major cities, provide blueprints for priority development areas, and find solutions for problems that are difficult for one city or one province to solve (Hu, 2006). More importantly, socioeconomic planning directly connects state resource allocation to spatial formation. The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) and its local subordinates, such as construction commissions and municipal urban planning departments, are the organisations responsible for physical planning. They prepare regional studies and plans to provide the necessary elements of spatial coordination, such as functional relationship between cities, distribution of regional infrastructure facilities, and other spatial elements like industrial space, transportation hubs, and wilderness and conservation areas. These plans give particular attention to population and region-wide environmental, social and economic issues, and have developed an extremely strong element of strategic consideration in recent years. The Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) and local land departments are entitled to prepare land use plans at all levels, but primarily address issues of farmland protection. In more recent years, new contents have been added to these plans to provide land use projection for major projects and demarcate different zones for regulation—an element contained within physical or spatial planning. Last but not least, the Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Transport, and Ministry of Environmental Protection each have their own regional plans to guide sectoral development. The fragmented functions of regional planning are attributed to inter-ministerial conflicts. The MOHURD dislikes the idea of two rival departments competing in the regional planning market; the NDRC and the MLR each claim that their plans have spatial elements and belong to upper level spatial plans. Simply, the structure has fundamental difficulties—the NDRC, the MOHURD and the MLR all have functions that overlap. The result is a demarcation dispute among the ministries. With such a flawed institutional structure, regional governance and planning may be

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subjected to strong influence by politics, weakening the power of central and provincial governments in regional coordination (Xu, 2008). 3.4. Pearl River Delta: fragmentation and regional strategic planning The Pearl River Delta is one of the most researched mega-city regions in China. It covers a land area of 54,744 km2, with a resident population of about 60 million, including floating population. The population size is equivalent to that of France. The PRD is composed of nine municipalities. It is arguably one of the regions with the highest degree of fragmentation in China. With the rise of urban entrepreneurialism, PRD cities began to adopt new competitive strategies in order to attract external capital. Localism becomes a severe problem. With this rapidly developing political environment, there are consequences of administrative fragmentation, such as increasing subsidies and giveaways to investors, and inefficient and uncoordinated duplication and oversupply of infrastructure. With overriding diversion of scarce public resources away from environmental and social concerns to economic growth, facilities and services become more and more acute. Several forces reinforce this trend of fragmentation in the PRD. First, the proliferation of laissez-faire economic culture has long established a trend of fragmentation, because a majority of economic power is delegated to cities, towns and villages. The second force is the decentralised land development. Normally, the state monopolises the primary land market and collectives are forbidden to sell or lease land to developers. These limitations, however, never constrain the spread of the black market, where primitive and very often ungovernable land transactions are pervasive. Guangdong is thus the first province to permit collectives to trade rural land with developers. This policy injects renewed incentives for bottom-up initiatives in spatial development. Third, a dispersed governance structure leads to even more fragmentation. The PRD has one of the most sophisticated jurisdictional structures in all of China. It includes two special administrative regions, i.e., Hong Kong and Macao, which are self-governing under ‘one-country, twosystems’. Guangdong has a provincial capital, Guangzhou, and two special economic zones, Shenzhen and Zhuhai. Guangzhou and Shenzhen are two subprovincial level cities which have been given a level of power higher than a prefecture but still lower than that of a province. Such special status means a high

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degree of autonomy. Sub-provincial municipalities are followed by seven prefecture-level cities. Below prefecture level are country-level divisions, which include eight county-level cities, two counties and 31 urban districts. This is followed by more than 230 towns. Jurisdictions at these different levels have idiosyncratic status and enjoy certain privileges in urban development and planning. The high-level fragmentation leads to tremendous difficulties for the provincial government in implementing regional development strategies. Since the late 1990s, the PRD, like many other Chinese regions, has been under increasing pressure to take a more proactive stance in the national economy. Inter-region competition for central resource and policy support is intensifying. The State Council approves the plans of the Tianjin Binhai New Area and the ChengduChongqing Region as free trade zones and experimental fields for further economic reform. Together with Pudong in Shanghai, they count as three new economic engines. This trend works against the previously exclusive advantage of Guangdong and the PRD; however, Guangdong believes that regional planning can make the PRD more competitive. From the late 1980s to 2008, seven regional strategic plans were produced in the PRD for better coordination. They were formulated by the Guangdong Provincial Government in collaboration with four different ministries—the NDRC, the MLR, the MOHURD, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). The NDRC created two regional plans (i.e., socioeconomic plans) in 1994 and 1998, in an attempt to coordinate growth in the PRD through state resource allocation, but they soon failed because market forces had become increasingly beyond state control. The MLR formulated a regional plan in 2005, primarily to address the issue of farmland protection, while the MEP’s 2003 plan reflects growing concerns over environmental issues. The MOHURD prepared two plans, in 1990 and 1994, to offer state guidance on functional and spatial distribution of the PRD cities. However, these plans were doomed because they were intended to manipulate regional spatial development, such as city size, superficially, which is difficult to control even in a centrally planned system (Wu, Xu, & Yeh, 2007). They offered no concrete measures to link the planned spatiality with the resource allocation of national economic planning, the enforcement of development control, or any tangible socioeconomic policies. In 2004, Guangdong, in collaboration with the MOHURD, established another regional plan which is widely known as the PRD Urban Cluster Coordinated

Development Plan (UCCDP). An UCCDP Ordinance was also promulgated in 2006 to enforce plan implementation. The UCCDP was considered the most significant among all plans for the PRD before 2009. The UCCDP proposes a number of planning strategies to address the PRD’s challenges. These strategies tackle issues in relation to objective, population, land use, spatial policies, infrastructure, environment and major action plans. The population in the PRD is expected to grow, and this will be associated with an upward pressure on increased sprawling land use, inadequate infrastructure, and a declining natural environment. The UCCDP proposes to address these challenges through rapid economic growth, integrated provision of infrastructure, and better top-down regulation. For instance, the plan emphasises policies on integrated service provision and transportation. It provides guidance on how to provide an integrated and balanced transport system, stressing the need to maintain and improve transportation networks, and to facilitate inter-city transit systems. The economic justifications of this transport system have been closely intertwined with escalating inter-region competition. The YRD, one of the most formidable competitors of the PRD, has made an ambitious transport system plan. It is believed that the stalled expansion of the transport infrastructure will place the PRD in a disadvantageous position among regional economies for central policy inclination and capital investment. For better top-down regulation, the UCCDP defines nine policy zones, which are under four different levels of spatial regulation (Table 3). The central idea is to amplify the supervisory and regulatory functions of the central and provincial governments. For example, regional open spaces and transport corridors are under supervisory governance that are subject to the strictest top-down control. Cities and towns in these areas are no longer allowed to make independent investment decisions, nor can they alter defined uses. Such a planning approach has the potential to divert development away from ecologically sensitive areas. Spatial guidance for individual cities is also articulated, so that the development of cities is in accordance with regional spatial strategies. Planning coordination through the UCCDP has undoubtedly created tension, particularly with the hyper-competitive environment likely to prevail and with local interests being undermined to various degrees. The plan tends to increase rather than address inequality, leading to dissatisfaction among cities. Guangzhou holds certain privileges in the UCCDP. This has been particularly evident in the establishment of Nansha, an industrial site in the ecologically sensitive

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Table 3 A hierarchical order of controlling space formation: policy zones, spatial regulations and spatial policies in the Pearl River Delta. Regulation level

Policy zone

Spatial policies

Level 1—Supervisory governance (Jianguan xing guanzhi)

- Regional open space - Regional transport corridor

- Provincial government: enforceable supervision through legislation and administration - Municipalities: daily management and implementation - No plans are allowed to propose revisions to defined open space and transport corridor

Level 2—Regulative governance (tiaokong xing guangzhi)

- Regional clusters for elementary industrial sectors and assembling heavy manufacturing industry - Regional transportation hubs

- Provincial government: provides specific regulative requirements on development nature, size, environmental conditions and building standards - Municipalities: development - To strictly control development that does not accord with overall regional objectives and defined functions in UCCDP

Level 3—Coordinative governance (xietiao xing guangzhi)

- Coordinative region for intercity planning and development - Development region for trans-border cooperation between HK, Macao and Guangdong

- Related municipalities: jointly make plans to ensure coordination in areas such as functional distribution, transport infrastructure, public facilities, and open space - Related municipalities: daily administration in a negotiable and cooperative environment - Provincial government: release orders to rectify development that does not accord with UCCDP and is harmful to nearby cities - HK, Macao and Guangdong Joint Conference: problems arising from trans-border cooperation

Level 4—Conductive governance (zhiying xing guangzhi)

- Economic regeneration regions - Urban advancement regions - General policy regions

- Provincial government: guides cities to make low tier plans - Local governments: advance socio-economic growth and improve living environment in accordance with various planning policies

Source: Xu, 2008.

centre of Guangzhou. However, Guangzhou has been allowed to build a heavy industrial zone there to accommodate investors from the automobile, steel, mechanical equipment, electronics and petrochemical products industries. The UCCDP deliberately classifies Nansha as an area under conductive governance, and this is subject to the least top-down supervision and planning control. Guangdong believes that placing development focus on Guangzhou, the provincial capital, can increase economic efficiency to better reposition the PRD. This has already caused direct confrontation in territorial coordination (Zou, 2006). Other concerns have been brought to attention due to the fact that the UCCDP was established by the MOHURD. The plan was not fully supported by the NDRC and the MLR, the two organisations that control state resources (i.e., capital and land), which are critical in plan implementation. It is likely that this situation will result in a planning battle (Hu, 2006). What Hu described as a ‘planning battle’ could be best understood as an intensifying conflict between different ministries over whose plan should be placed as the top priority (Zou, 2006). Worse still, the UCCDP was not approved by the State Council because the central government had the opinion that regional plans should be made by the

NDRC, which is the agency half a level higher than other ministries and entitled to coordinate different ministries and their sectoral plans. In 2009, Guangdong Province, under the leadership of a new Party Secretary, invited the NDRC to make another socioeconomic outline plan for the PRD. The 2009 outline plan has become quite influential because it is more or less seen to have reflected central policy intention. The plan has widely been used as a political tool by the provincial government to restructure the regional economy and reposition the province, including the PRD, in the national economic landscape. However, the NRDC’s 2009 plan takes an overview approach and does not articulate policies into concrete spatial strategies. One overriding concern is the lack of attention paid to important regional issues, such as cross-boundary coordination (see Chapter 9 for details), social problems, and sensible spatial strategies of different cities. Also, the plan’s failure to highlight institutional reform to address inter-scalar tension and inter-city coordination is viewed as a major oversight. The plan alone is inadequate to promote territorial development. It is therefore crucial that the NDRC play a more proactive role to coordinate fragmented sectoral development and to ensure a consistent policy in a mega-city region.

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3.5. Conclusion Political fragmentation in mega-city regions has brought questions of regional governance and planning to the fore. Using the case of Pearl River Delta as an example, this chapter argues that the mismatch between fragmented administrative boundaries and functionaleconomic territory in mega-city regions requires the development of a proper institutional structure and a strategic vision to plan these regions in their entirety. Regional strategic planning is an important tool for this purpose. This chapter illustrates that regional strategic planning is more than a mechanism for controlling land use and coordinating development; it becomes a means for the central and provincial governments to reposition regions and to reassert their functional importance in the local and regional governance. This alternative agenda of planning may generate a confrontation between the province and localities. Regional governance and planning in China carry strong legacies of former state socialism. Institutionally, there is a general lack of administrative structures to forge horizontal networking, and the dominant linkages are hierarchically organised. This gap in the formal political structure is further exacerbated by a concerted effort in planning, because the function of regional planning and governance is fragmented among different ministries. This results in inter-ministerial rivalries in regional development. Without a properly designed institutional structure, regional strategies are difficult to

implement effectively. This weakens the top-down governing capacity. Thus, scholars have started a heated debate on the correct planning and/or governance institution for megacity regions. Proponents of ‘big government’ and ‘functional consolidation’ argue for municipal annexation, mergers and consolidation to cope with pressures which incumbent local officials and their administrative areas have been unable to handle. A ‘neo-liberal approach’ promotes ‘survival of the fittest’ and localisms are encouraged to adopt political fragmentation. Between these two extremes is the ‘governance approach’, which argues for the importance of the interactive process in regional governance and planning. However, the difficulty in its actual implementation is that it is very clearly related to the question of fundamental government reform and even political transformation in China, where, traditionally, there has been a lack of an organised civil society. Another frequently used approach is the ‘informal approach’, which underpins the importance of a voluntary process in regional governance and planning (see Chapter 9 for a detailed case on cross-boundary cooperation in southern China and Yeh & Xu, 2008 for a case on the Pan-PRD cooperation). The informal institution is flexible, but quite unpredictable, with a loosely organised structure with limited capacity to address broader issues. No matter which direction China decides to take, the central state will continue to play a critical role in the transition towards a more market-oriented economy.

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Chapter 4. Globalising in fragmented space: spatial expansion and the development process in Shanghai Weiping Wu Market forces are increasingly the dominant force behind urban processes in China, particularly in housing and land development. There is evidence that the importance of location, which was irrelevant in socialist cities without land markets, has led to the emergence of a land rent gradient similar to that of cities in capitalist systems (Ma, 2003). Local government has also become the key stakeholder in urban development under China’s steady fiscal decentralisation. Working out a development strategy that can stimulate growth and expand the revenue base is an essential goal for local government, because its investment capacity depends on such revenues. Local government, to a certain extent, has become a local developmentalist state with its own policy preferences. Two additional considerations motivate it to facilitate urban growth: exhibiting achievements to the central government and promoting economic development to serve local interests (Zhang, 2002; Zhu, 1999, 2000). Perhaps no other Chinese city can better demonstrate this dynamic than its largest metropolis, Shanghai. The city’s spatial and land use patterns have changed steadily during the reform era and under globalising influences. This chapter explores the interplay of development strategy and urban form, and examines such key drivers of spatial expansion as industrial restructuring, global investment, and rural–urban migration. It synthesises major spatial patterns in the past two decades, particularly those of the local population, migrant population, and industrial and foreign investment activities. Data are primarily drawn from the 2000 Population Census and 1996 Basic Establishment Census. Shanghai’s multi-pronged development strategy since the early 1990s clearly reflects its quest to compete in the global economy and to become a regional hub in Asia (Yusuf & Wu, 2002). Industrial restructuring has been ongoing in order to acquire some of the functions commonly associated with global city status, including finance, transnational corporate headquarter functions, global services, transport, information, and cultural activities (Friedmann, 1998; Sassen, 1991). Another continuing effort has been to build links with the global economy by improving the physical and social infrastructure to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). These efforts have not only spatial dimensions built in, but also clear implications for spatial development. Industrial restructuring, for instance,

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has been accompanied by land-use policies, inducing a shift of industry away from the urban core and permitting mixed commercial and residential use of prime urban land. Industrial consolidation and FDI promotion have also called for the creation of new production space, primarily in the form of Economic and Technology Development Zones (ETDZs). Accelerated urban growth has led to an increasing concentration of economic functions on the outskirts of the city. Also, there has been substantial housing construction in new suburban areas and satellite towns. Compounding this process of spatial expansion is the large influx of rural–urban migrants, who have concentrated primarily in suburbs just outside the urban core. Hence, in the urban fringe there is an increasing juxtaposition of high-tech zones, new commercial housing projects, resettlement housing for central-city residents, migrant communities, and rural villages (Wu, 2002b). This chapter shows that the city’s footprint is expanding more than necessary because of fragmented spatial development in the urban fringe. Industrial use is probably most responsible for the non-contiguous and leap-frog expansion. Such patterns are a product of the increasingly market-driven development process, compounded by a strong developmentalist local state interested in pursuing growth. 4.1. Key drivers of spatial expansion With a population of 18.15 million (including 4.67 million migrants) and land area of 6,340 square kilometres,16 the Shanghai metropolitan area is governed by the Shanghai Municipal Government, equivalent to a provincial government because of Shanghai’s special administrative status. More or less following an inverse concentric pattern, Shanghai has a central city that had long been the residential core, with some of the highest population densities in the world (in the range of 50,000– 60,000 people per square kilometre in some neighbourhoods; see Wu, 2008). Recent expansion, however, has begun to lead to a loss in density and an increase in travel time. For instance, average trip distances by all modes increased from 4.9 kilometres in 1995 to 6.9 kilometres in 2004. Many more trips, at longer distances, originate from the inner and outer suburbs (World Bank, 2008). Urban expansion is in particular characterised by fragmentation, with small dense areas in the urban fringe (see Fig. 2). There is a lack of consolidation into large contiguous parcels for both urban and non-urban

16

Retrieved on 10 August 2009 from http://www.stats-sh.gov.cn/.

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Fig. 2. Development patterns in Shanghai. Source: http://geology.com/world-cities/shanghai-china.shtml (Retrieved on 2 September 2008).

(mostly agricultural) uses. Below, I elaborate on four of the key drivers of such patterns: spatial dispersion of local residents, industrial relocation, global investment, and rural–urban migration. 4.1.1. Spatial dispersion of local population Shanghai’s residential patterns have changed steadily during the reform era, with the combined effect of central-city redevelopment, new housing construction, and the satellite-town programme. As a result, inner suburban subdistricts immediately outside the central city are accommodating a large number of local residents at a fairly high level of density, even though the central city remains the residential core (see Fig. 3). About two-thirds of local residents lived within a radius of 20 kilometres of the city centre and close to half within 10 kilometres in the year 2000. But between 1997 and 2000, the innermost distance band (0–10 kilometres) lost nearly five per cent of its local population. The most drastic change occurred in the 10–20 kilometre band—a sharp rise of 45% (Wu, 2008). Redevelopment within and new housing construction outside the central city are two important mechanisms of such deconcentration. Under market reforms, previously residential central areas are increasingly under pressure for redevelopment, largely for commercial and office uses. Outside the central city, there has been substantial housing construction in new suburban areas and satellite towns. Many areas in the inner suburb, in particular, are experiencing rapid transition from rural to urban uses (often referred to as rural–urban transitional areas or chengxiang jiehebu). The satellite-town programme, launched after the 1950s, primarily for the purpose of industrial develop-

Fig. 3. Local population, 2000. Source: SFPCO (2002).

ment, has begun to attract more population since the 1980s (accommodating about two-thirds of a million residents in 1990—see Wu, 2008). 4.1.2. Rural–urban migration China’s unprecedented waves of rural–urban migration have propelled the growth and expansion of its large cities. Shanghai alone houses in excess of four million migrants. At the turn of the 1980s, when the migrant influx first began, the central, oldest part of city was the chosen residential location of most new arrivals. In the mid-1980s, when Shanghai enumerated the migrant population for the first time, a larger proportion (over 40%) lived in the central city than in the inner suburb (Wang, 1995). The 2000 Population Census shows that migrants remain attracted to more central locations, as more than 70% of them still live within a radius of 20 kilometres of the city centre (see Fig. 4). The spatial distribution of migrants has experienced a gradual shift, however, mirroring a trend in a number of cities elsewhere in developing countries undergoing continuing urbanisation. With urban expansion and downtown redevelopment, the inner suburb has become a more important receiving area for migrants since the early 1990s (Zhang, 1998). Central-city housing is becoming less attractive to migrants, due to commercial redevelopment and in turn the rapid rise of costs. The largest number of migrants (close to 40%) now

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Fig. 4. Migrant population, 2000. Source: SFPCO (2002).

Fig. 5. Number of industrial establishments, 1996. Source: SBECO (1997).

concentrate in the 10–20 kilometre band (inner suburb), based on the 2000 Census data (see Fig. 4). This shift also coincides with the deconcentration trend seen in Shanghai’s local population. A number of subdistricts immediately flanking the central-city boundary are now residential centres for both migrants and, to some extent, the locals. On the other hand, the emerging pattern of migrant concentration in the inner suburb lags behind the pace with which industrial establishments have been relocated out of the central city.

residents to the inner suburb, as population increases in specific districts where major industrial development is in progress (Walcott & Pannell, 2006). Industrial fragmentation, however, has extended to the metropolitan level (see Fig. 5), aggravated by the haphazard location of township enterprises across suburban districts (Wu, 2008). Industries now are increasingly located in the outskirts of the metropolitan area. About 27% of the land is currently for industrial use, a level much higher than the average for other large Chinese cities (about 15–20%). In fact, Shanghai has among the highest percentage of land zones for industrial and warehouse use in China (World Bank, 2008). This may be attributable to the fact that nearly 44% of Shanghai’s industrial land use is scattered and not in concentrated forms, such as industrial parks. Similarly, the productivity level of industrial land (often measured by output value per unit of land) is lower than that in some comparable cities (Xiong & Luo, 2000).

4.1.3. Industrial relocation and expansion To solve problems associated with fragmented industrial land use in the urban core, Shanghai has relied on relocating factories in the central city to the suburbs. A number of industrial parks or ETDZs have been created (mostly in the inner suburb), including Jinqiao Export Processing Zone (EPZ) and Zhangjiang High-Tech Park in Pudong, Minhang ETDZ, Hongqiao ETDZ, and Caohejing High-Tech Park (Yusuf & Wu, 2002). This process of industrial relocation, albeit slow and with mixed results, has freed up a significant amount of space in the central city and led to an industrial concentration in the inner suburb. Between 1991 and 2004, land allocated to industrial use in the central city decreased by 42%, from 45 to 26 square kilometres (World Bank, 2008). Industrial deconcentration may have contributed to the spread of local

4.1.4. Global investment Helping Shanghai to plant industrial roots in the early 20th century, foreign investment is now a major force pushing the city ahead with systematic change. Because of its industrial depth, modernising infrastructure, and skilled workforce, Shanghai has outpaced other Chinese cities in the race to attract FDI. Reflecting

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4.2. Fragmented expansion as product of increasingly market-driven development process

Fig. 6. Number of foreign-invested establishments, 1996. Source: SBECO (1997).

the city’s drive to rejuvenate its mature industrial base, manufacturing sectors are attracting more foreign investors, including many of the Fortune 500 companies, such as Alcatel, Volkswagen, General Motors, NEC, DuPont and IBM (Yusuf & Wu, 2002). Funding from overseas sources has also been instrumental in the building of the city’s new subway system, new industrial districts, and the hotel and other facilities. High-tech parks and ETDZs are the favoured locations for foreign invested enterprises, because of their more modern infrastructure. With the exception of Hongqiao ETDZ, these locations are outside the urban core and in the inner suburb. The distribution of foreign-invested enterprises, as a result, is dispersed, although less so than overall industrial fragmentation (see Fig. 6). Today, planners have a rather passive position in dealing with foreign investors (Wu, 1998). Such local policies as tax incentives and land provision are all efforts appealing to foreign investors. Provision of cheap land, in particular, is a basic instrument for local government to induce foreign investment. One tactic is the creation of special development zones, which allow flexible planning control or virtually autonomous rights of land subdivision, and concession in land premium (F. Wu, 1999; W. Wu, 1999; Zhu, 1994). A problematic feature is that foreign investors often negotiate directly with senior government officials, and their investment remains unknown to the planning authority until a late stage.

The emerging patterns of spatial expansion and fragmentation are no doubt the result of the city’s rapid modernisation and development during the reform era. Since the 1980s, substantial investment from both public and private sources has poured into sectors previously termed unproductive under the command economy, such as housing and offices. In addition, comprehensive development or large residential development projects have replaced sector-based, project-specific development. Prior to reform, state-owned work units (danwei) were an important socialist institution and provided public housing to their employees as a part of social welfare. By allowing these units to retreat from direct land development, comprehensive development reduces the traditional tie between workplace and residence in the urban space. New residential communities in turn have become much larger and are often located in the peripheral areas (Yeh & Wu, 1996). The frenzy of development has occurred under an increasingly decentralised land management and planning system. Under the Shanghai Municipal Government, there are 18 district units, 17 with urban designation (district, or qu) and one rural (county, or xian). The adoption of a two-tier structure of urban management has led to a highly aggressive role of district governments in the process of urban development. They have gained substantial power to regulate development, including project approval and registration, and issuing of planning and building permits and land leasing certificates (F. Wu, 1999; W. Wu, 1999; Wu, 2002a). Further devolution has given their subordinates, subdistrict governments, a number of regulatory functions, including approval of housing development plans, site occupation licensing, and levying penalties for illegal construction (Wu, 2002a). Many development activities actually take place at the district level, where market forces may have a much stronger influence in formulating a development agenda. With the authority of managing local revenue and land, many district governments have adopted pro-growth policies and have become business partners themselves with real estate and other companies (Zhang, 2002). However, in mid-2000 the city enacted a new regulation, depriving all district governments of the approval right of land leasing. Instead the Shanghai Municipal Housing and Land Administration had the sole authority, and could stop the leasing approval of land for such projects as shopping malls, entertainment centres, golf courses, and grade A villas and office buildings (Yusuf & Wu, 2002). But a recent mandate has

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again decentralised such approval right back down to district governments. Even efforts to recentralise land control fall short of slowing down the overall pace of development because of the agency of local governments (particularly at the district level). Public-owned development companies have been established by either municipal or district governments with public money. They dominate the primary land market, acquiring and selling land of nonurban uses or existing urban land to developers. Funded by public money, quasi-public development companies are often set up under the name of an independent business. This is a safe way for government agencies to generate revenue without direct involvement in business (Zhang, 2002). The establishment of the land leasing system has strengthened the status of the municipality as the most powerful manager of state land. Since land is the most valuable commodity under the control of a municipal government, generating revenues from leasing land use rights and charging land use fees has become a popular local practice (Wu, 1998; Zhang, 2000). The continued dominance of administrative land allocation in the dual land systems has fostered a grey market, taking substantial income away from the state. This is primarily due to the large difference between market land prices and the relatively low cost of administrative allocation (Xie, Ghanbari Parsa, & Redding, 2002). Local governments often are reluctant to transfer landuse rights by transparent forms of bidding and auction at market rates, because more revenues from such sales would have to be remitted to the central government. So transfers through behind-the-door negotiation is favoured (Zhu, 2002). To rein in such local maneouvres, the central government mandated in 2005 that all land transactions go through public bidding (zhao pai gua). But this recent move has yet to show a substantial impact on altering land development patterns. As the land-lease system has gradually allowed local governments to gain control of state land, alliances between local governments and land leaseholds have been formed as well. Negotiated land leasing becomes an instrument for local governments to manage the city. The change in the land-use system and massive capital flowing into the built environment has raised potential rent. Through relocating residents and changing land uses, developers could make huge profits (Li, 1997; F. Wu, 1999; W. Wu, 1999; Zhang, 2000; Zhu, 1994). If a site is planned for redevelopment, sitting tenants need to be compensated. Instead of direct negotiation between public projects and farmers in land acquisition, the

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municipal government can first acquire land and then transfer the use right to projects involved. This approach speeds up land acquisition through a standard compensation procedure and encourages the sharing of common facilities (Wu, 1998, 2002a). With land reform, state work units have joined the real-estate business, partially to retain the development rights of their existing land (F. Wu, 1999; W. Wu, 1999; Zhu, 2002). The involvement of these units and local governments complicates the development process. Real-estate development companies are connected with various government branches through formal institutional linkages and/or informal personal contacts. They are often required to undertake functions of welfare provision as well as profit generation (F. Wu, 1999; W. Wu, 1999). This system co-exists with commercialised urban development. Many development projects are undertaken by companies owned either by one of the district governments or a large work unit. As a result of this rising array of stakeholders in the development process, planning often assumes a passive role, following rather than leading the pattern of land development. Planners are usually under great pressure from local governments to play an active role in the competition with other local jurisdictions for capital and industries. The common pro-development interest has bound local bureaucracy and developers into an informal coalition. The constantly shifting balances of power between the government and economic interests have also complicated the implementation of urban plans. Efforts of planners are often blocked by illdefined enforcement procedures and numerous concessions made to high-profile developments (Gaubatz, 1999; Xie et al., 2002; Zhu, 1999). 4.3. Conclusion Shanghai’s built-up area is expanding steadily, as a result of economic growth, industrial consolidation, global investment, and rural–urban migration. The footprint of the city grows more than necessary because of fragmentation in urbanisation in the city fringe. Beyond the compact core, development tends to be noncontiguous and leap-frogging. Industrial use is probably most responsible for the loss of density at the metropolitan level. Given the long period of growth ahead, such development patterns will translate into large losses in terms of land consumption. A World Bank study (2008) shows that the intensity of land use in Shanghai is actually quite low by international standards, even though it has increased over time. In particular, land allocation to industrial use is between

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two to three times that in comparable global cities elsewhere with functioning land markets. At the root of fragmented expansion is the increasingly market-driven development process that collides with government interests. Local government has become a key stakeholder in urban development, seeking a development strategy that can stimulate growth and expand its revenue base. Since land is the most valuable commodity under the control of the municipal government, generating revenues from leasing land use rights and charging land use fees has become a popular local practice. On the other hand, the local state’s very weak planning capacity and hunger for revenue and foreign investment undermine its ability to exercise control over land use. In its current practice, land leasing and transfer also are driven by the short-

term interests of local governments, instead of longterm land management strategies. With rising income and increasing availability of the private car, no doubt there is demand for suburban living. Given China’s unprecedented rate of economic growth and pace of urbanisation, spatial expansion in its cities is likely to continue steadily. With an already intense population–land ratio, following the path of suburbanisation and urban sprawl as seen in some industrialised countries is not an option for its cities. Increased land use efficiency can come from more infill development, higher density, and more contiguous expansion. But more importantly, it calls into question how the new developmentalist local state ought to build a more transparent land market, on the one hand, and a stronger capacity for planning and development control, on the other.

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Chapter 5. Provinces, boundaries and the governance of Canadian city regions Andrew Sancton Canadians have a longstanding reputation for engaging in constant debate and conflict about the nature of their federation. Among students of city governance, we have a reputation for developing highly innovative systems for the governance of city regions, first with the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto and then with the Greater Vancouver Regional District (now Metro Vancouver). As city regions become increasingly important as the sites of economic activity and innovation, it is probably not surprising that debates about Canadian federalism and city region governance have grown into each other. This phenomenon has taken a number of different forms; for example, there are frequent demands that cities become formally recognised in the constitution and that they be granted increased financial and legal authority. The most dramatic demand of this nature is that the territories of our largest cities be somehow carved out of our existing provinces, so as to create city-states (or, more accurately, city-provinces) within the Canadian federation. This chapter is concerned with explaining why such a development is neither possible nor desirable. In so doing, it aims to show how Canadian provinces are becoming crucial mechanisms for city region governance. Such an approach is at odds with much current thinking about city regions, including some that is expressed in this volume. The more common view is that city regions require their own powerful, multifunctional governmental institutions. In the Canadian context at least, provinces are unlikely to allow such institutions to emerge, in part because provinces are becoming increasingly well equipped themselves to become the main governments for city regions. The intellectual bases of recent proposals for enhanced political status for Canadian cities derive largely from the late Jane Jacobs and her friends and followers in Toronto.17 The impact of such proposals has certainly been enhanced by the ever-growing intellectual and popular attention to the notion that ‘global cities’ are increasingly replacing nation-states as the centres of command for the global economy. But

17 The importance of this group for the ‘cities movement’ in Canada merits its own paper. The proposals for enhanced political status mainly emanated from Toronto, and it is quite easy to see the connections between most of their authors and Jacobs. For an account of Jacobs’ influence, see Broadbent (2008: 5–12 and 72).

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even much of this literature owes its origins to Jacobs’ work, especially Cities and the wealth of nations (1984). In this book, Jacobs argued persuasively that the economies of nation-states were artificial statistical abstracts; real and innovative economies were based in city regions.18 City regions which themselves comprised a nation-state (such as Singapore) were fortunate; city regions that were part of vast nation-states such as the United States and Canada were much less so. The problem for cities in these large countries was that prosperity in one place would tend to bolster the exchange rate of the national currency just a time when the need in other cities might be for a lower exchange rate. A perfect example of this phenomenon is evident in Canada today: the energy-driven economy in Calgary and Edmonton drives up the value of the Canadian dollar just at the time when the manufacturing economy of the Toronto area seems to require a lower dollar. Jacobs’ solution was for each city region to have its own currency. She was notoriously vague about how this might come about, but there is no evidence that she wanted systematically to redraw the world’s political map, carefully delineating where one city region began and another ended. At the time she wrote Cities and the wealth of nations, we tended to think that each nationstate needed its own currency. A quarter of a century later, ancient countries in Europe share a currency with old enemies; China—the emerging economic superpower— has three (the mainland, Hong Kong and Macau) or four (if we include Taiwan). Ideas about currencies and nation-states have changed. But, significantly, no one has taken up Jacobs’ argument that we need more currencies in the world, not fewer. Indeed, the tides of change are surely going in the opposite direction. The important point for this chapter, however, is that Jacobs’ Toronto followers seem to have been quite content to forget about currencies19 and argue instead that cities need more authority—of just about any kind that they can get. Because cities have an institutional existence in the form of municipalities, the simplest

18 Jonas and Ward (2007: 171) refer to Jacobs’ 1984 analysis of the role of city regions as ‘prescient’ in relation to the later emergence of the literature on global cities. Her earlier work was much more concerned with facilitating human connection and intimacy in central cities. For a discussion of how all her work relates to municipal government, see Sancton (2000). 19 It is true that they have supported the emergence of ‘local’ or ‘complementary’ currencies, such as ‘Toronto Dollars’ and ‘Ithaca Hours’, but these are not designed as replacements for national currencies, which was Jacobs’ original proposal in Cities and the wealth of nations.

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version of this argument is that central-city municipalities need more authority, so as to grapple more effectively with all the challenges of contemporary urban life. There is much justification for such a position, because every zoning decision in the city of Toronto, despite its massive amalgamation in 1998, can be appealed on its merits to a provincial quasi-judicial body that is fully empowered to replace the council’s judgement with its own (Chipman, 2002). In this regard, a case can easily be made that the city of Toronto is the weakest large central-city municipality in North America, notwithstanding the recent passage by the Ontario legislature of the Stronger City of Toronto for a Stronger Ontario Act, a law that does grant the city its own charter and some new taxation authority, while doing nothing to enhance its authority over everyday zoning matters. But the obvious problem with granting more legal authority to central-city municipalities is that municipal boundaries rarely match the boundaries of entire city regions. This is certainly true for Canada’s three largest city regions—Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver—much less so for some other city regions—notably Calgary, Winnipeg and Halifax. In Cities and the wealth of nations, Jacobs was clearly concerned with city regions, not with the arbitrary legal territories of centre cities. At its heart, her work is simply not relevant to legalistic disputes about the relative legal authority of one kind of municipality in relation to another. There are, however, even more significant practical political problems in suggesting that entire city regions should have more authority. In Toronto, there is no institutional manifestation of the city region, so there is no institution to which increased authority can be allocated. In Montreal and Vancouver, such institutions exist (the Montreal Metropolitan Community [MMC] and Metro Vancouver, respectively) but there is little support from anywhere for making them more powerful, certainly not from elected representatives of existing municipalities. Unlike the MMC, Metro Vancouver does provide important urban services, but the secret to its success and longevity—as almost all observers acknowledge—is that it does not try to compete with, or usurp the roles of, its constituent municipalities (Sancton, 2005). The absence of politically strong institutional manifestations of these three city regions, especially in Toronto, no doubt explains why there have been proposals to create new provinces instead. This idea is most closely associated with Alan Broadbent, a successful Toronto investor and philanthropist, who has done a great deal in recent years to try

to implement many of Jane Jacobs’ most important ideas. In 2001 the group he leads adopted ‘The Greater Toronto Charter’, whose first article stated: That the Toronto Region form an order of government that is a full partner of the Federal and Provincial Governments of Canada, entitled to participate in discussions of an inter-governmental nature and in Canada’s system of inter-regional transfer payments (Broadbent et al., 2005: 40). The remaining four articles very briefly outlined the functional, financial and democratic responsibilities of the region. The boundaries of the region were not defined in the charter itself, apparently because David Crombie, a former Toronto mayor, warned the group that ‘people would waste all their time and energy arguing boundaries, and have nothing left for principles and policy’ (Broadbent, 2002: 3). Writing in 2003, Broadbent provided remarkable detail about how he would restructure the Canadian federation. Each of his various options involves breaking up Ontario by creating a new ‘city-state of Toronto’, whose boundaries would attempt to capture the area generally known as the ‘Golden Horseshoe’, the shape of which is formed by the western tip of Lake Ontario. For Broadbent, the area stretches inland to Kitchener-Waterloo in the west and to the AllistonShelburne area to the north. He goes on: Some thought has been given, by Jane Jacobs and others, to the creation of a new province of Southern Ontario, which would draw a line [sic] between Oshawa and Midland, and treat all of the Golden Horseshoe and south-western Ontario as a new province. This would have the advantage of including almost all of industrialized Ontario, including London, Windsor, and Sarnia, but would also include a lot of rural Ontario, particularly its prime farm land. However, on the principle of including similar areas within boundaries, this proposal does not work as well as a Golden Horseshoe based city state (Broadbent, 2003: 24). By 2005, Broadbent’s position appeared to be moderating. He asked only that ‘an expanded Toronto Region should have essentially the powers of a province’ and that, although its ‘geography is arguable it likely includes the Golden Horseshoe around the western end of Lake Ontario’ (Broadbent, 2005: 6). In the same publication in which Broadbent makes this statement, another participant, Don Stevenson, a former Ontario deputy minister, wrote: ‘An argument can be made that almost any proportion of Southern Ontario is

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Toronto’s economic region but it is difficult to imagine any local accountability to a body beyond the limits of the GTA [Greater Toronto Area]’ (Stevenson, 2005: 28)—an area considerably smaller than Broadbent’s Golden Horseshoe. Confusion reigned. Broadbent was referring to an entity that was to be like a province and Stevenson—and others in the group—was still conceiving the Toronto region as some form of metropolitan or regional government within the general paradigm of local government.20 In his 2008 book, Urban nation, Broadbent advocates provincial status for the city regions of Montreal and Vancouver, as well as Toronto. Because reaching constitutional agreement on the establishment of new provinces would be almost impossible, he suggests that individual provinces could grant autonomy to city regions such that they would have all the powers of the province, thereby creating a kind of province within a province. He acknowledges that ‘The boundary issue is tricky’ (Broadbent, 2008: 124), but claims that it can be overcome for each city region by one of three mechanisms: arbitrary provincial legislation; determination by impartial appointed commissions or by the Senate of Canada; or by knitting together the boundaries of various functional bodies—especially regional transit authorities—that have evolved incrementally over the years. It is clear that the second of these three options is his preferred choice (Broadbent, 2008: 202–205). But what Broadbent fails to note in Urban nation is that the Ontario government has now taken over the land-use and infrastructure planning functions for the Toronto city region. This was made clear in 2003, soon after the election of a new Liberal provincial government. A year earlier (February 2002), the Progressive Conservative government had appointed a Central Ontario Smart Growth Panel, whose functions were purely advisory. The panel’s report formed the basis of much of what the Liberals implemented, although the Liberal approach was more centralised than the plan contemplated by the panel. The territory assigned to the panel for its recommendations was determined by the provincial government. Since the panel’s role was purely advisory, most people paid little attention to the boundaries it suggested.

20 There was another layer of confusion as well. While Broadbent and Stevenson were writing in a collection entitled Towards a new City of Toronto Act, the province of Ontario and the city of Toronto were negotiating about a new statutory framework for the City (the City of Toronto Act). These negotiations had nothing whatever to do with governmental arrangements for any geographical version of a larger Toronto region.

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Larry Bourne, one of Canada’s foremost urban geographers, has pointed out that the construction of the Central Ontario Zone corresponds to no known geographical principles: The building blocks used to define the region—the old counties—are in many instances no longer useful as geographical containers. Nor is it a ‘functional region’ in the sense that it is based on integration or linkage criteria, such as the daily journey to work (used to delimit the CMAS) or weekly recreational travel (often called the urban field). Nor does it represent the service hinterland of Toronto or of the other urban nodes. It also incorporates distinctively different physical and socio-economic landscapes. As an additional reservation, only limited data sources and almost no analytical studies cover the Central Ontario Zone. Thus, there is no accumulated history of empirical research or policy studies (Bourne, 2003: 7–8). Bourne also points out that the zone contains nine separate urban nodes: Toronto, Hamilton, Oshawa, Kitchener-Waterloo, St Catharines-Niagara, Peterborough, Guelph, Barrie and Brantford. Whatever its virtues for the purposes of large-scale regional planning, it is scarcely surprising that the Central Ontario Zone evokes no feelings of regional or political attachment among its residents.21 In 2003, the Liberal government adopted a territory with almost exactly the same boundaries for its planning initiative in the Toronto city region, but started calling it the Greater Golden Horseshoe (GGH). One of the most remarkable features of the Liberal policy was that its definition of the GGH received virtually no public attention. Had the Liberals been establishing a new form of metropolitan government with such boundaries, this could not possibly have been the case. But who in Ontario ever gets excited about how the provincial government organises itself territorially for its own purposes? These boundaries have turned out to be of immense significance, especially for large property owners. The

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Richard Florida has developed an even more territorially expansive version of the Toronto ‘mega-region’. He claims that it stretches from ‘from Waterloo, and London, Ontario, through Toronto eastward to Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City and down to Syracuse, Ithaca, and Utica in the United States’. Although he refers to this mega-region as being ‘bi-national’ (United States and Canada), he makes no other reference to Quebec in the entire book, except to note that ‘Montreal is home to Cirque de Soleil and a world-class music scene that produced the Arcade Fire, one of the leading and most successful bands of the early 2000s’ (Florida, 2008: 52–53).

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newly established Greenbelt is all well within the GGH, and much of it had already been protected by other provincial legislation (Ontario, 2005). Much more significant is the Places to Grow Act, which was approved by the Ontario legislature in 2005. This legislation gives an Ontario cabinet minister the authority to establish ‘growth plans’ for designated areas in Ontario. Such plans establish the basic rules of municipal land-use planning within that territory. The growth plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe was promulgated by the Ontario government in June 2006 (Ontario, 2006). It lays down elaborate rules by which the anticipated 3.7 million new residents in the GGH will be accommodated between implementation of the plan (2006) and 2031. The main theme of the plan is intensification. By the year 2015, 40% of all new residential development in each single- and upper-tier municipality will be required to take place within established built-up areas. Meanwhile, there will also be specific intensification targets for both jobs and residents within designated growth centres and new greenfield developments. Despite the importance of the Greater Golden Horseshoe, there is virtually no awareness among the general public that such a territorial entity even exists. Its boundaries were established without any public discussion or debate. The land-use policies that have been announced for this area have attracted the attention of developers, environmentalists and municipal officials, but there has been virtually no public controversy about them—which is remarkable, given the explicit aim of the policy to intensify urban development throughout the territory of the GGH. It is easy to imagine how different things would have been if the provincial government had in 2003 announced plans to establish a GGH council, comprised of directly elected members or municipal delegates, and stated that it would ask such a council to develop a plan to accommodate 3.7 million new residents over 25 years. We would probably still be debating the potential territorial boundaries of the new GGH, and feelings would be running high in peripheral communities about whether they would gain or lose from being included. Mobilising majority support for intensification within such a council would not have been an easy task. Why is the Ontario government so interested in the GGH? The explanation is simple: any Ontario-wide perspective on infrastructure and the built environment must of necessity focus on a territory that roughly matches its territory of the GGH, which is already home to more than half the population of Ontario and which is expected to be the location of almost all future population growth.

But what allows the provincial legislature—dominated as it is by members from the GGH—to make decisions that probably could not have been made elsewhere? There are a few reasons. First, because the boundaries of the GGH did not relate to any new institutions (proclaiming the GGH growth plan required no decisions about institutions) and had no immediate impact on the everyday life of residents, they attracted almost no media or public scrutiny. Second, the decision to pursue the GGH growth plan was clearly made at the highest levels of the Liberal government—that is, by the premier and his cabinet. Because Ontario operates within a parliamentary system (unlike non-partisan municipal councils), once the decision was made, it could not be overturned, because the Liberals held a majority within the legislature. In any event, ‘doing something about sprawl’ was in theory politically attractive. It will take a few years before the policy translates into building particular high-density developments in opposition to the wishes of nearby residents. The real test for the policy will be the extent to which it survives such opposition. This is why it is far too early to decide whether the policy is effective or not. My claim is only that the policy would not even have been agreed to—let alone implemented—had its subject matter been delegated to some new ‘local’ authority especially established to govern the GGH. In 2007, Places to Grow won the prestigious Daniel Burnham Award for a Comprehensive Plan from the American Planning Association (APA). Significantly, the APA stated that it is ‘the first time a Canadian region’ has won the award. Its press release continued: ‘This plan is a landmark comprehensive plan that is both visionary and pragmatic. . ..It provides a strategic, innovative and coordinated approach to sustainable growth and development for 110 different municipalities (APA, 2006)’. It is hard to imagine a more dramatic recognition of the fact that the province of Ontario has clearly established itself as the ‘comprehensive’ planner for the Toronto city region. The provincial adoption of an anti-sprawl policy explains why there have been no public claims by anyone—including anyone who once advocated for a more autonomous Toronto city region—that the government of Ontario has been trampling on local autonomy or on the potential for city region autonomy. The people who had advocated for more autonomy for the Toronto city region are generally the same ones who are now most supportive of strong anti-sprawl policies. Because the province is delivering on such policies, they seem content. At some point, we might well hear stronger objections from residents and businesses

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whose interests have allegedly been harmed, but right now the issues are too obscure and complicated to receive much attention. In a less dramatic way, similar stories can be told for Montreal and Vancouver: their respective provincial governments are increasingly taking over the most important decisions that are shaping the evolution of each city region. Boundaries are less of an intellectual puzzle than Toronto, but politically they are just as sensitive. In the almost inconceivable circumstances in which the Montreal Metropolitan Community or Metro Vancouver were established as city-provinces, we would not be looking at a mere territorial enlargement of the city of Montreal or the city of Vancouver. Instead, we would be looking at a quite new political entity, one completely dominated by residents of inner and outer suburbs. It is far from clear how such an entity would improve the quality of urban life, especially in the central city. Canadian provinces are the kind of intermediate mechanisms between the national state and the local municipality that other countries sorely lack or have only recently created. Perhaps because provinces have been with us for so long and have had ample opportunity to err and to annoy, they are (outside Quebec and perhaps Alberta and British Columbia) often seen as the level of government we can do without. As globalisation spurs economic activity in our growing city regions and sucks people off the land and out of resource-based communities, there is a certain logic to the claim that

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provinces are outmoded. After all, when the provinces joined Canada, their primary functions related to resources and agriculture. Lakes, rocks and trees still comprise most of their respective territories. But, more than any other institution, they are now in the process of becoming the much-needed governments of our city regions. Whether such a model is relevant for other countries depends on the nature of their existing territorial subdivisions. The ‘autonomous’ community of Madrid in Spain is both a ‘province’ within the Spanish federation and a city region government with boundaries that fit well with common perceptions of the territorial extent of the city region (Lefe`vre, 2008: 177– 178). In contrast, there is no territorial subdivision within the UK that in any way captures the London city region. In the US, the territories of many city regions cross state boundaries, making the Canadian model suggested here quite impractical. The outward expansion of major city regions is driven by economic forces that are often closely linked to globalisation. But institutional responses to outward expansion are determined by the pre-existing institutional arrangements of each nation-state. What works in Canada will not necessarily be relevant elsewhere. Nor will it likely be possible to replicate Madrid’s experience. For most fast-growing city regions, drawing politically acceptable institutional boundaries around their outer limits is extremely difficult, and probably impossible.

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Chapter 6. Globalisation and governance in the New York region: managed pluralism Paul Kantor 6.1. Introduction In Tokyo, China’s Pearl River Delta, Shanghai and elsewhere in Asia, experimentation with greater governmental devolution is raising uncertainty about the wisdom of abandoning traditions of centralised regional governance. Indeed, several contributors to this volume question the promise of this style of government for better planning of Asian metropolitan areas. Can politically fragmented metropolitan regions undertake effective responses to the problems of global economic change? Is ‘entrepreneurial’ style governance able to achieve regional economic competitiveness, obtain governmental efficiencies, and address emerging social inequalities? The experience of the New York tri-state region provides some tentative answers to these questions. This region manages the forces of globalisation and competes in the international marketplace without a well organised system of governance that can impose much regional political cooperation. Nevertheless, the economy of the New York region remains highly competitive; governments in the metropolitan area obtain a degree of political coordination for regional objectives—albeit with undeniable flaws and political biases. Let us explore how. The region incorporates part of Southern Connecticut, Northern New Jersey and lower New York State, where more than 2,000 local governments—including school boards, villages, cities, various special districts and other incorporated state agencies—usually have considerable responsibility for raising their own revenues and for spending them (Fig. 7). Further, a powerful tradition of preserving local governmental prerogatives and extensive reliance on independent state agencies to represent state governmental interests in the region add to its fragmented governmental character. The private sector has been unable or unwilling to make up for the deficit in public sector cooperation in regional affairs. Not only does the region lack a visible chamber of commerce, but New York City’s business community does not display much leadership in addressing many issues of regional scope. Since the days of David Rockefeller decades ago, New York City business leaders have become less engaged in local or regional political affairs (Berg, 2007; Fainstein, 2001). Although current Mayor Michael Bloomberg is a wealthy business man, he does not seek to represent the city’s corporate community. Other prominent business

Fig. 7. New York’s CMSA: New York City, near counties and distant counties.

leaders are usually developers with limited interests in public policy outside of real estate and tax matters (Moody, 2007). The city’s major business organisation, the Partnership for New York City, often speaks out on issues linked to the New York City economy, but usually has far less to say about the region. The Partnership heavily represents the city’s financial and corporate sector, which is strongly oriented to international business and governmental networks. The metropolitan area’s fragmented system of government is often regarded by critics as an Achilles’ heel, threatening the competitiveness of the region’s economy (Benjamin & Nathan, 2001; Brenner, 2004a, 2004b). Yet New York City is a global command post and the tri-state economy is highly competitive internationally. Indeed, the city and the region are powerful magnets to immigrants and world business. It appears that the regional economy succeeds while its governmental order remains dysfunctional. How is this possible? 6.2. Political coordination and cooperation in regional governance This apparent contradiction is deceptive. Governance is far less disorganised than it appears. It is true that institutions capable of building sustained regional political cooperation do not prevail in the New York metro area because there is no central governmental authority. Yet a pluralist system of political coordination provides considerable regional policy coherence on some issues, although in imperfect ways.

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Coordination arises from widely shared expectations and practices that are institutionalised enough to shape political behaviour among political actors (Lindblom, 1988; March & Olsen, 1989). Shared rules of the game guide the behaviour of decision makers, much as in international politics where nations act strategically in respect to each other in order to pursue power and common goals, despite a fragmented political world order (Keohane, 1982; Waltz, 1979). In a regional context, however, governmental actors compete in ways that also accommodate relatively unchanging characteristics of the state and local political landscape to bring about territorial governance (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Kantor, 2006). From this perspective, the New York region displays a pattern of managed pluralism that arises from three overlapping features:  A ‘weak state’ organisation of government that imposes competition among local governments to maximise internal advantages and preserve political autonomy whenever possible.  Relative concentration of political and economic resources in one major actor—New York City— making virtually all political bargaining of regional consequence function in counterpoint with the moves and claims of New York City.  Management of regional governmental relations by superior (most often state) governmental agencies acting to address market failures among competing local governments, counterbalance the power of New York City, and safeguard compelling state interests in regional development. Over time these three forces interact to sustain a system of territorial governance dominated by diffuse coalition building and widely shared political authority. Yet it is also tempered by the constant presence of higher level governmental power centres seeking to manage some of the consequences of intergovernmental competition as they compete to advance their own political agendas. The result: a system of regional governance that often achieves a degree of policy direction, but in disjointed and episodic ways. 6.3. Managed pluralism in the New York region 6.3.1. ‘Weak state’ organisation in the metropolitan area Extensive governmental decentralisation characterises the three states, 32 counties and more than 2,000 local governments constituting the New York

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region. Although state aid programmes provide some levelling of tax resources, this region remains characterised by severe inequalities of resources among communities. In this ‘weak state’ context (Skowronek, 1982), political fragmentation creates widespread intergovernmental economic competition; local governments seek to achieve tax, services and private sector gains or suffer losses of economic and political advantage. Thus, economic development policies are strongly shaped by competition within this marketplace of governments. Control over land use and development tends to be highly decentralised within the metropolitan region, a power that the local governments use to serve their strategic economic interests. Since most local revenue raising capabilities are linked to the value of property within particular communities, local governments typically pursue highly exclusionary development policies to enhance their revenue bases. In practice, this means trying to attract higher income families, large houses on big lots and, if necessary, only clean businesses, such as shopping malls and corporate office parks (Danielson & Doig, 1982). It also means keeping out the ‘undesirables’, meaning lower income families, racial minorities, multi-family housing, publically assisted housing and other things that place service burdens on governments or repel dominant taxpayer groups. As a result, the New York region remains highly segregated by race and class, because of years of selective population dispersal from New York City and some older inner ring suburbs to wealthier and whiter parts of the suburban periphery (Berg & Kantor, 1996). Local governments rely on territorial segregation of minority and poor populations to manage tensions associated with these inequalities. These groups tend to be confined to central city areas and older suburbs. Competition among governments within the metropolis sorts out housing and job opportunities in ways that provide exclusive bedroom enclaves for Manhattanbound executives and cheap housing in limited areas for suburban domestic workers. Not surprisingly, proposals to expand suburban housing and job opportunities through regional intervention attract little support. Well institutionalised traditions of localism among big and small governments, the resistance of wealthy communities, and the reluctance of state governments to challenge many of the discriminatory features of the system, reinforce expectations of city-suburban autonomy action (Benjamin & Nathan, 2001). In effect, governmental acceptance of social inequalities in housing, schools and other services is the dominant regional policy (Kantor, 2008).

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6.4. Concentration: New York City’s solar presence

6.5. State as manager

New York City acts like a sun in a regional solar system made up of many lesser parts. All governments in this system are directly or indirectly affected by the reality of Gotham as the region’s dominant economic engine pulling in a highly skilled white collar workforce from scattered suburban locations every day. New satellite service economies in the region’s rapidly growing suburban periphery have challenged Manhattan’s premier position in recent decades. Nevertheless, strong economic growth at the centre and at the periphery has characterised the metropolitan economy since the 1990s (Kantor, 2008). From a governance perspective, however, virtually all important economic developments in the region happen in counterpoint to the activities of the city. For example, the price of prime office space throughout the region is invariably compared with and often affected by prices in New York City. Similarly, the enormous concentration of people in New York City also gives the city important political leverage throughout the region, and even within New York State. Although the city’s political representation in the state capital has ebbed in recent years, as a result of demographic changes and reapportionment, the city’s political claims and interests are almost always recognised and anticipated in decisions that affect the region (Pecorella & Stonecash, 2006). Other governmental actors in regional struggles must win support in New York City or they must be prepared to join coalitions to challenge New York City’s political power. Nevertheless, the metropolitan area’s political fragmentation diffuses political power to such an extent that New York City leaders are unable to achieve many regional objectives without the support of other local governments as well as state government officials. For instance, Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s recent proposal for a system of congestion pricing in parts of Manhattan failed to launch in 2008 due to the opposition or indifference of suburban and state interests, who held critical assets that he needed for the scheme. The New York State legislature denied him the new taxing authority required for the levies on cars going into Manhattan; most legislators who voted the proposal down were responding to voters and drivers in the suburbs, who opposed this as a tax on them. Even if the proposal had passed, issues remained about its successful implementation by suburban governments, whose parking facilities were needed to encourage more commuters to take mass transit (Confessore, 2008).

Since this marketplace of governments lacks much capacity to promote many important region-wide needs for public goods, such as transportation and environmental regulation, these matters routinely get shifted upwards to involve higher level governments, particularly at the state level. State officials share compelling interests in many regional issues that affect economic development. The economy of the region is the major source of jobs and revenues for New York State, and it plays a huge role in the economic wellbeing of New Jersey, particularly its northern communities. Suburban electorates look to state officials to contain New York City’s regional ambitions and to sort out inter-governmental differences. Yet this does not mean that issues that spill beyond the borders of local communities are settled by officials at higher governmental levels. State intervention mobilises another level of fragmented and overlapping governmental policy making that expands the decision-making arena but does not change it. A multitude of agencies representing state governmental interests, known as public benefit corporations (PBCs), dominate this level of decision making. They range from small independent authorities that run housing complexes, sports arenas and other particular services within or across other local governmental jurisdictions, to much larger PBCs, whose activities invariably have considerable regional implications. Among the latter are four powerful institutions. The four most powerful include the giant bi-state Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ), the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), New Jersey Transit (NJT), and the New York Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC). For example, PANYNJ runs the airports, the seaport, some mass transit operations to New Jersey, as well as several bridges and tunnels. It is also a powerful developer. The MTA owns and operates New York City’s public mass transit, including subways and buses, and also the commuter rail system that runs from the city eastwards to Long Island and north across the Connecticut border. In addition it operates, through a subsidiary, seven toll bridges and tunnels. The Empire State Development Corp is New York State’s lead development agency, empowered to build and participate in urban development projects all over New York State. It is authorised to borrow on its own account and may override local governmental restrictions, such as zoning and building regulations, in order to get its job done. These public corporations compete to survive as bureaucratic organisations saddled with special

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functions, but they look to their respective state governors and legislatures as well as to the local governments for crucial support (Savitch & Kantor, 2002). Because the respective state governors appoint nearly all of the PBC governing boards, these institutions tend to be highly responsive to gubernatorial political ambitions. Further, even though they are officially independent, some PBCs are actually dependent on legislative appropriations to carry out their projects or must seek state governmental approval to borrow in the bond market in order to finance their activities. The political success of the public corporations is also contingent on maintaining at least the acquiescence of citizens and local governments within the region, whose votes matter in the state capitals. Consequently, the agencies invariably pay attention to cultivating alliances among the local governments, especially New York City, in carrying out their work. Typically, the big PBCs succeed in juggling the pressures of local government electorates with their constant need for access to the state capitals. 6.6. Managed pluralism in action In effect, this bi-level patchwork of governments has a very stable base that pulls together by virtue of intergovernmental rivalry. Competitive pressures and local governmental autonomy sustain highly exclusionary social policies. Yet it also has a less stable political apex of governments that struggle to define regional agendas in light of their own special agency interests and pressures from elected state officials. While extensive regional intergovernmental cooperation is rare, this pluralist system can sometimes support fairly coherent regional policies in certain areas of public policy. Political convergence happens when the benefits of coordination among the various governments, agencies, interest groups and officials become highly diffuse, allowing a winning alliance to isolate sources of opposition (Benjamin & Nathan, 2001: 91–177; Berg, 2007). For example, in recent years there has been considerable convergence among major players over the need for new transportation infrastructure investment (Kantor, 2008). The region’s various transportation agencies, the city of New York, and the governors and legislators of New York and New Jersey have advanced a series of mass transit megaprojects to improve travel and access into Manhattan. It includes two subway extensions, a freight tunnel from New Jersey, improved Long Island rail commuter access, a new transit hub and other related projects, most of which have been on the drawing

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boards for years. For many years lack of funding, flat project revenues and disagreement among key policy makers undermined the prospects of collaboration. A fragile coalition to launch these projects emerged since the mid-1990s, however. This coalition capitalised on the region’s economic resurgence, the availability of more state and federal funds after 9/11, and leadership changes that encouraged easier consensus building. In particular, the region’s upbeat economy has enabled the major transportation agencies to invest in expansion of the transportation infrastructure without taking on large transit deficits for maintenance operations. Since nearly all of the big transit projects are planned to be in Manhattan and are dedicated to overcoming access bottlenecks in the ‘solar centre’, opposition from suburban communities and commuters is marginal. Equally important, these proposals constitute a ‘Christmas tree’ of megaprojects that almost simultaneously promises some benefits to appreciative constituencies in the state capitals and to communities throughout the metropolitan area. In effect, policy convergence is hardly random or haphazard, even though it is highly bounded. There are well entrenched patterns of governance. In the lower tier of governance, the preservation of local government prerogatives, the separation of economic from social policies, and the limited intervention of state governments prevail and usually go unchallenged. Widely shared political and economic benefits associated with local autonomy in land use and housing (especially within suburbia) discourage attempts to change the status quo. Stable competition among governmental actors disciplines conformity to policies dedicated to maximising internal benefits. In the upper tier of coordination, where environmental, economic and infrastructure matters spill beyond local government borders, state agencies routinely intervene. Sporadic and unstable intergovernmental competition is the norm. Extensive coalition building is almost always necessary to sustain common changes in regional policies. Thus, the region’s pluralist system displays both stability as well as discontinuity. Vast areas of public policy remain outside much political contention, while other policies are not. The system lurches from issue to issue and periodically obtains a considerable degree of convergence, bringing about major changes in the regional policy agenda. 6.7. Policy biases Managed pluralism has salient policy biases. It promotes economic competitiveness, while responding

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more slowly to the region’s social fallout. Economic threats more easily mobilise key governmental actors, including those state officials and interests outside the region, who share a stake in the growth and prosperity of the tri-state economy. Consequently, policies to promote growth or limit threats to regional competitiveness attract more political support and precipitate fewer intergovernmental divisions. The public benefit corporations, though appointed by governors, are deliberately organised to be less accessible to public pressure, in order to operate like a business. In contrast, the region’s territorial political fragmentation presents forbidding obstacles for coalition building to change most social policies, such as housing or education. Governmental fragmentation organises the voices of local electorates, but makes it difficult to mobilise excluded groups in scattered jurisdictions.

Further, the limited fiscal resources of the many local governments discourage joint attention to redistributive activities Managed pluralism also favours short-term deal making. When power is so fragmented and disorganised, it is difficult to promote long-term planning and policy agendas. It is a highly reactive system of governance, providing few rewards for anticipatory policy making. Nevertheless, it has a huge capacity for mobilising political support for regional policy changes that appeal to broad coalitions, especially when they include important New York City interests, along with other communities in the region. The New York metropolitan area struggles for global competitiveness and social justice with a deeply flawed, but sometimes quite coordinated, system of governance.

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Chapter 7. Metropolitan governance in a global city region: the London experiment Peter Newman 7.1. Introduction The long running story of London government is one of changing institutions (Inwood, 2005) and ‘recurrent experiment’ (Pimlott & Rao, 2002). To understand the changing government of London, academic accounts and political commentary tend to focus on unstable relationships between national governments and the particular local institutional arrangements they have created. Other capital cities, Paris notably, also have a troubled relationship with national power, though commentators would point to relative institutional stability since 1977 and to the constitutional authority of city government, in contrast to the three different sets of arrangements for the government of London in that period. The continuing story of central–local relationships is clearly important to understanding the government of London and, currently, we could usefully focus on how a new Conservative mayor of the city can engage with a Labour government. But these government–city tensions and party political rivalries only give a limited insight into the government of London and we need also to focus on a complex institutional landscape, including 32 borough councils, the City Corporation, numerous public–private partnerships, privatised government agencies and companies delivering essential services. The boundary of Greater London was fixed in 1963, but over 40 years the influence of the city economy has stretched well beyond those limits. In addition to examining the dynamic institutional mix within London, we need to look across the administrative border to how London gets on with its neighbours in the wider city region. In the first part of the chapter we review the recent period of institutional change. We then turn to questions about regional and sub-regional coordination and integration. Whilst, as set out in Chapter 1, the rescaling of governance is clearly a global concern, we find that cityregional government in London is as yet far from effective, and the emerging governance of the Thames Gateway to the east of London reveals familiar tensions between national and sub-national scales. Effective governance at city region scale may be functionally necessary (Scott, 2001) but has not yet been achieved. In writing about London, many academics have argued against the claims of general theories of ‘global city regions’ or ‘global cities’. For example, in their wide-

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ranging review of economic and social forces, Buck, Gordon, Hall, Harloe, and Kleinman (2002) argue that, rather than focusing on London as a global city, we should remember the national orientation of much of its economy and its capital city role. Edwards (2002), among others, has argued against the polarisation thesis in the global city literature, and pointed to the importance of national policy in sustaining inequalities. How well London is captured by general theories is widely debated. Perhaps more important, however, has been the impact of the concepts of world or global city on public policy choices. For 20 years, the ‘world city’ card has been played by public and private sectors in London in their special pleading for public money. National government agreed in the early 1990s that London was the ‘UK’s number one asset’ and the flow of public investment into transport and other infrastructure reflects the success of the argument for investing in the ‘world city’. The dominant perspective on world city London has a central London bias—focused on the global hubs of the City and Canary Wharf. But as we move beyond the centre we also find London world city reinterpreted as a driver of public policy in, for example, both the marketing of suburbs and further refined and redeployed in regional growth strategy. We explore the reach and impact of the world city in public policy and how actors make sense of and make possible the messy and complex governance of the city. 7.2. Fragmentation, centralisation and mayoral government We start with a brief review of recent institutional changes. The city-wide Greater London Council created in 1963 was abolished in 1986. Formal powers were devolved to the London boroughs and the creation of numerous borough-led agencies, public–private partnerships, central government-directed regeneration agencies and business-led London-wide and sub-regional alliances established a fragmented system of governance (Newman & Thornley, 1997). Alongside this fragmentation was strong central control and direction through control of local government finance and through control of appointments to numerous agencies. The call for reform of London government during the 1990s pointed to other cities (notably New York and Barcelona) where ‘strong’ mayors were seen to bring success in international competition. What, campaigners argued, was needed was a ‘voice for London’. Reform in 2000 created a directly elected mayor and an elected London-wide assembly, but this was seen as a ‘weak’

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mayor model of city government in comparison with other cities (Travers, 2004). Mayor and central government came into conflict, notably over the mechanism for upgrading the tube network, but the mayor found strong allies in the private sector London Business Board (West, Scanlon, Thornley, & Rydin, 2003). The perceived success of the congestion charge zone and the mayor’s personal popularity caused government to rethink its hostility to London. Whereas the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit had argued that the new London governance could not easily ‘focus on its strategic needs’ (PMSU, 2003), by the time of the 2004 election London government was declared to be a successful experiment and Mayor Livingstone was welcomed back into the Labour Party. Winning the Olympic bid gave further evidence of success of the mayor, now a signatory to the IOC contract for the 2012 Games. Subsequent renegotiation of the scope of the mayor’s powers brought new strategic planning tools, control of a house-building budget, and other powers, over cultural institutions, for example. The new model of mayoral government came into effect in early 2008. The ‘weak’ mayor identified in 2000 now had substantial authority over planning and large urban renewal projects and was becoming stronger, backing business first but, through cultural strategy, the embellishment of some public spaces and a continuous series of celebratory events, also securing a wider popularity. As a ‘voice for London’ mayoral government seemed to be working. Linking the period of fragmented governance in the 1990s and the regime of Ken Livingstone from 2000 to 2008 is the theme of world city London. The public– private London Pride Partnership had put London’s world city economy as the first priority in its strategy for the capital (LPP, 1995). Through his alliance with the City and the London Business Board, the financial core and London’s ‘global hubs’ dominated the mayor’s strategies. The mayor’s approval of tall buildings in the central area was driven by the desire to assert London’s competitive position and the additional surveillance and security offered by the congestion charging zone further enhanced London’s offer. The mayor prioritised central London and wanted to shift the centre eastwards if government would pay for it. The Olympic bid provided that opportunity, securing government funds for land reclamation and for upgrades to public transport. With the eastward shift given by the Olympics, government could now be committed to the expensive Crossrail scheme linking Heathrow and the City. However, the particular representation of London world city and the spatial and investment bias towards

central London could be seen as a weakness in the governance of a large, diverse and complex metropolis. Rapid demographic change and ‘hyperdiversity’ are having complex impacts on London’s geography. It is clear that structural change has different impacts in different parts of the city (for example, Dench et al., 2006; Phelps, Parsons, Ballas, & Dowling, 2006) and has some notable impacts on electoral politics. National (2005), borough (2006) and mayoral (2008) elections record the decline of support for the Labour Party, but party attachment varies across London. We could contrast, for example, the culturally diverse (55% minority populations) borough of Brent, where Asian and other minorities are represented in Labour, Conservative and Liberal Parties, with the borough of Barking and Dagenham (73% white British) where Labour competes with the British National Party (BNP). London’s ethnic diversity, changing economy and changing housing markets contribute a less predictable formal politics, and have led to some reassessment of policy priorities, especially for those localities beyond central London. Since 2000 the (central London) world city and direction of resources to the ‘East London’ Olympics gives planning a particular direction, with relatively little interest in developments in other places ‘off the map’. However, new perspectives on the government of London are emerging and it is these that we focus on in the next section of the chapter. Within London, there is some evidence of a growing interest in the outer suburbs (Gordon, 2006; Mayor of London, 2007; Potts, Falk, & Kochan, 2007). Some groupings of London boroughs have displayed a new enthusiasm for ‘sub-regional’ planning and policy in reaction to mayoral strategy. Additionally there is debate about whether London is part of a ‘city region’, ‘mega-region’ or ‘polycentric region’ (see Budd, 2006), but wide agreement that the London economy reaches across administrative boundaries and that substantial strategic issues—airport planning, land for house building—need a wider regional imagination. 7.3. Reimagining suburban London From a top-down regional planning perspective, the mayor’s plans define policy for five sub-regions of London. These sub-regions stretch from the centre to the metropolitan boundary. However, there is little work on the coherence of these spaces or interactions between them (EIP, 2007) or on the appropriateness of policy at these scales. Among world cities, London is unique in having a second tier of government, with substantial responsibilities and resources. Some commentators are

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concerned that the emergence of a ‘strong metropolitan mayor’ might generate conflict between the tiers of London government (Young, 2006: 380). However, in the run up to the 2008 election the mayor appeared at events organised by suburban lobbies, ‘admitting’ that in the past the inner city had enjoyed more funding (Planning, 2007a). The new strategic planning arrangements have reinvigorated and re-politicised planning as a policy field in the London boroughs. Some borough leaders argued for stronger powers for the Assembly to moderate the mayor’s plans (Early, 2006). Commentary on the 2008 mayoral election pointed to the ‘highly aggressive’ suburban strategy of Boris Johnson (The Guardian, 2008). The results show high turnout and strong Conservative support in some suburban boroughs. Since the Conservative Party regained political control in 2002, the borough of Barnet has pursued a pro-growth agenda, styling itself as the ‘Voice of the Suburbs’ (planninginlondon.com, 2008), promoting growth within the borough and through sub-regional alliances. In relation to Londonwide issues the council has also been amongst the most vociferous critics of the proposed Crossrail scheme, for

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example, arguing that its residents will shoulder much of the costs but enjoy few of the benefits. However, Barnet also claims a share in the world city, styling itself a ‘city suburb of a world city’, supplying skilled workers to the City and linking development corridors. In the northern suburbs, the response to Londonwide planning has been to reimagine sub-regions. The sub-regional North London Strategic Alliance was originally an idea of the mayor, but the benefits of joint lobbying became apparent to the boroughs. What was initially an alliance of immediate neighbours now imagines development corridors linking central London with regional centres and highlighting the need for local transport investment. Sub-regional lobbying has produced some results in securing access to national development funds and fostering large private development projects to add 60,000 population and 27,000 jobs to the borough of Barnet by 2026. Aspects of this new interest in suburban London were visible in the revision of the London Plan in 2008 (see Fig. 8). The voice of the suburbs has become more audible. How will the new mayor respond? An early, controversial, appointment was a new planning advisor

Fig. 8. 2008 London Plan, mapping some of the links into the neighbouring regions.

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from a London borough. The mayor is armed with the new planning powers granted in 2008, but we may expect the mayor’s local interventions to be limited and the powers neglected, allowing some boroughs to pursue their sub-regional ambitions. ‘City-centric’ world city policy diverts our attention from suburban and other issues. Since the early 1990s, during the experiment following abolition of the GLC and during the mayoral experiment, the public sector and private players lobbying for central London and its essential infrastructure focused the attention of researchers. But we need a broader understanding of how, for example, the gap between centre and suburb exposes economic and spatial challenges and drives city-regional politics. Changing relationships between mayor and boroughs offer confirming evidence of the continuing experimental character of London government, but to understand the changing experiment we need to pay close attention to the ways in which actors in the multi-level and multi-actor institutions of governance perceive opportunities and adjust to change. We need to take this discussion beyond the boundaries of the Greater London Authority (GLA). Outside London, new regional-scale planning and economic development bodies have been created during the past 10 years, with further reform in 2008. The London regional economy now stretches across three administrative regions, each competing for central government resources. There is some evidence of new perspectives emerging on how to understand the governance of the London city region. In particular, there is interest in ‘fuzzy’ boundaries and lack of ‘coordination’ (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009), and the ‘tangled’ and overlapping institutions of government (Allen & Cochrane, 2007) in the wider region beyond the GLA boundary. In this next section we look briefly at the extremely tangled and fuzzy city-regional governance of the Thames Gateway. 22 7.4. City region and its sub-regions The Thames Gateway is one of a number of nationally designated ‘Sustainable Communities Growth Areas’ in south east England. The area stretches

22 Some suggest that the Greater South East—London, the South East, and East—is the functional city region (see LSE London Development Workshop, 10 June 2009: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/londonDevelopmentWorkshops/lselondondevelopmentworkshops3/Greater%20South%20East/TheGreaterSouthEast.htm (accessed 13 January 2008). Since there have been no significant steps to establish a governance framework for this territory, I focus instead on the Thames Gateway.

for 40 miles along the Thames estuary to the east of London, incorporating some heavy industrial plant, many former industrial sites, outworn port facilities and numerous small towns. Through providing 225,000 jobs and 160,000 homes, with a £9bn budget for 2008–11, the government’s objective for the Thames Gateway is to help ‘consolidate London’s position in global economic competition’ (CLG, 2007). The world city argument reaches into the region, but government has not been clear about how this ‘consolidation’ might be achieved. Relationships between central government and the regional and local tiers in the Thames Gateway are undergoing continual change. The area crosses three English regions (Greater London, the East of England north of the river and the South East to the south of the Thames). Each region has its own strategic plan and economic development agency, with its own regional economic strategy. In addition to the tier of regional governance are 19 local authorities in addition to the GLA. Management of the area has always been complex and controversial. In 2003 it was proposed that a Cabinet Committee chaired by the prime minister would oversee the development of the Gateway. More recently, responsibility for coordination of regeneration in the Thames Gateway has been through the Cabinet Committee on Housing and Planning. The Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) has also recently established a Thames Gateway Directorate. The governance of the Thames Gateway is further complicated by the array of sub-regional agencies. In London and in the neighbouring county of Essex, Urban Development Corporations have been established to take strategic decisions and with resources to bring forward land for development. In addition to the Urban Development Corporations there is the Olympic Development Authority, with its own priorities concerning the development of the infrastructure required for 2012 across the extensive Olympic Park in Stratford. The economic strategy for the Thames Gateway focuses on four ‘transformers’—Canary Wharf (financial services), Stratford City (shopping, commercial and Olympics), Ebbsfleet (shopping and housing) and London Gateway (deep water container port). The two ‘transformers’ located within London—Canary Wharf and Stratford—offer by far the better prospects for contributing to the Gateway’s employment target. Ebbsfleet offers high-speed rail connection to mainland and some projects have started, but the new London Gateway port is a distant prospect. The two London projects have more connection to central London and other global cities than to the rest of east London and the further reaches of the Thames Gateway and London

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mayors support the Gateway idea, in so far as it supports plans for the east London sub-region. Mayors have made only limited connection with neighbouring authorities. Within London planning, strategy has to fall in with government’s plans for the Thames Gateway, and the addition of a London Thames Gateway Development Corporation and the London Thames Gateway Partnership adds complexity to strategy making for the east of the city. The subregional strategies included in the London Plan reflect multiple interests, in the Thames Gateway in the east and the alliance of boroughs and other partners across north London. The 2008 London Plan incorporated subregional planning and aimed to integrate economic and transport planning at this scale. Whether a new mayor would want to impose sub-regional strategy on boroughs remains to be seen. The mayor may want to endorse borough views rather than impose a Londonwide perspective. But in east London, national strategy will continue to play a significant role as government strives to develop the Thames Gateway. This complex web of authorities and agencies in east London and in the wider Thames Gateway has been the subject of significant criticism. The Public Accounts Committee criticised CLG for its ‘weak’ management (House of Commons, 2007: 2). The Thames Gateway programme was argued to lack ‘comprehensive’, ‘measurable’ objectives and was suffering from an ‘unclear’ delivery chain. In December 2007, in the wake of these criticisms and disagreements with the mayor of London, the director of the Thames Gateway Directorate resigned (Planning, 2007b). That this messy regional planning continues to function is, according to Allmendinger and Haughton (2007), due to the guiding and controlling hand of central government, which sets targets for the numerous sub-national agencies, specifies the conduct of partnership arrangements between them, and controls funding. Thus,

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outside London we see the fragmentation and centralisation that characterised London before 2000. Regional planning is weak; infrastructure follows market choices, leaving substantial problems of coordination for fragmented and tangled institutions of governance. The governance of the Thames Gateway is complex, constantly changing as national, regional and local scales adjust to each other and to the development market. Consolidating the world city is clearly challenging work. 7.5. Conclusion We might suggest that all world cities or world city regions struggle to find governance arrangements suited to their perception of the challenges of global competition. But nonetheless the world city story line dominates policy debate. To understand how this works in the case of London, we need a form of analysis that can understand the interactions and interdependence of the multiple levels and multiple actors involved in metropolitan governance, calculate political opportunities, and interpret and work with ideas of the world city. In recent years in London, planning policy has interpreted world city policy as tall buildings, fast trains and spectacular events. However, the spatiality of the world city, the complex interactions between, for example, the financial core and the suburban homes of the producers of economic advantage, or the established global hubs and the spaces for new global connectivity, set more challenging problems for cityregional governance. A Conservative mayor may be more sensitive to diverse demands within London, but perhaps less interested in city-wide strategy or in engaging with neighbours in the wider region. We can be sure that in this process, representation of the competitive world city will continue to influence the development of the city region.

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Chapter 8. Tokyo’s regionalism politics: glocalisation of a Japanese developmental state Takashi Tsukamoto 8.1. Introduction This chapter explains how metropolitan regionalism emerged in Tokyo around the turn of the century and how it was meant to accomplish Tokyo’s specific political goals. In effect, it was part of from-below politics, negotiated between national political leaders and their most powerful local government, through which Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) Governor Ishihara challenged the spatial premises of the Japanese developmental state. The result of TMG’s politics did not stop in the Tokyo region. It stimulated regionalism in Osaka, Japan’s struggling second metropolis. Regionalism in Tokyo and Osaka, each of which pursued its own local state interest, contributes to the ‘glocalisation’ of the Japanese developmental state. This experience illustrates a variance to the neoliberalism theory of state glocalisation posited by Brenner (2004a, 2004b) among others. 8.2. Tokyo in the Japanese developmental state Tokyo has been a spatial contradiction of the Japanese developmental state. It symbolised the country’s dynamic growth but undermined balance in national development. It served the nation as its capital, but it rebelled against the state when the latter found the former had grown too large. Tokyo’s once declined population exploded in the post-war period (see Fig. 9). The state’s economic

Fig. 10. Population changes, Tokyo and its neighbours. Data source: Statistics Bureau (2008b).

development policy was accountable for this. The Tokyo bay was one of the three locations where the state planned massive industrial material production complexes in the 1950s and 1960s for national economic reconstruction. But this was not all; Tokyo had a special advantage over the rest of Japan. Tokyo was the command and control centre of the Japanese developmental state. Central elite bureaucracy extensively regulated industries from the capital. This made Tokyo the place to be for information gathering and lobbying, which were important in Japan’s informal decisionmaking practices. Concentrations of decision making in Tokyo created not only agglomeration economy effects, but also Japan’s Tokyo centrism culture (Sakaiya, 1992), which further fed growth into Tokyo. From around 1960, Tokyo’s population increase slowed, spilling over to the surrounding prefectures, Kanagawa, Saitama and Chiba (see Fig. 10). The difference between Tokyo’s daytime population and its residential population widened until the mid-1990s,

Fig. 9. Population, Tokyo and its neighbours. Data source: Statistics Bureau (2008a). Note: 1945–71 contain only 46 prefectures. Okinawa was added in 1972.

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Table 4 Tokyo’s shares in the region, population and jobs.

Tokyo’s daytime pop. (000) Tokyo’s pop. (000) Difference Tokyo’s job share to the region (%) a Tokyo’s pop. share to the region (%)a Difference (%)

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

na 11,410 – 59.9 47.3 12.6

13360 11,670 1,690 58.8 43.2 15.6

13,490 11,620 1,870 56.3 40.5 15.8

14,000 11,830 2,170 54.3 39.1 15.2

14,480 11,860 2,620 53.1 37.3 15.8

14,570 11,770 2,800 52.1 36.1 16.0

14,670 12,060 2,610 51.6 36.1 15.5

14,950 12,580 2,370 52.3 36.5 15.8

Data source: Statistics Bureau (2008a) (Tokyo’s pop.), (2008b) (Employments in Tokyo and its region), and TMG (2008) (Tokyo’s daytime pop.). a Measurement years are 1972, 1975, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2006.

while Tokyo’s population proportion in the region declined until 2000 (see Table 4). Also, jobs have been increasing faster in the surrounding areas than in Tokyo. Yet, despite the strong suburbanisation, the differences between the shares of Tokyo’s jobs and populations have been consistent, indicating Tokyo’s strength as the economic centre in the region. Overall, these findings indicate a socioeconomic regionalisation of Tokyo since the 1960s. Indeed, state bureaucracy responded by implementing regional planning, which included four more prefectures to the three adjacent prefectures of TMG to define the Capital Region (see Fig. 11). Tokyo’s rapid growth meant redistribution of its wealth to the rest of the nation through the developmental state system, which pursued balanced develop-

ment in addition to efficient growth. However, the redistribution system was largely controlled by informal triangular networks of legislators, administrators and special interests connecting the central government and local communities (Kamo, 1993). The more dominant Tokyo became in the 1960s and 1970s, the harder the state tried to disperse the concentrated economy while, at the same time, the less efficient the redistribution looked to urban corporate interests, which were increasingly concentrated in Tokyo. To make matters worse, the triangular subsystem had rural biases and an inherently corrupt nature. The conflict between Tokyo-based corporate interests and the spatial egalitarianism that underlay the Japanese developmental state became a major political

Fig. 11. Regionalism territories of Tokyo and Osaka.

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issue in the 1980s, when then Prime Minister Nakasone insisted on revitalising Tokyo as Japan’s world city against the balanced national development value (Kamo, 1993). Making this spatial conflict of interest complicated was the fact that the value conflicts existed within Japan’s perennial ruling party, the Japan Liberal Democratic party (LDP). Nakasone, an LDP member, was a neo-liberalism-inspired reformist against the LDP’s mainstream old guard politicians tightly connected to the central bureaucracy, rural communities and the businesses that benefited from redistributional public spending projects. Nakasone’s insistence on Tokyo’s redevelopment and deregulatory reform had ironic consequences: the ‘Tokyo uni-polar concentration problems’ and the bubble economy of the 1980s; subsequent legislation to relocate capital functions from Tokyo to restore a national balance in 1992; and, finally, the burst of the bubble and ensuing recession of the 1990s (Honma, 1999). Government reform was attempted during the 1990s towards ‘small government’. But when the recovering economy regressed for the worse in 1997, the ruling LDP resorted to its traditional stimulus spending on public works across the nation, producing a massive budget deficit. 8.3. Tokyo’s regionalism against capital relocation Against this political background, Shintaroˆ Ishihara, an outspoken reformist and Nakasone’s prote´ge´, emerged on the political frontline to run for the 1999 TMG gubernatorial race, declaring, ‘Change Japan from Tokyo’. His return from retirement after 25 years of parliament membership was unexpected but, running as an independent, he scored a decisive victory. Opposition to the relocation of capital was central to his campaign platform. Once in office, he implemented multi-faceted efforts to overturn the capital relocation. Among these was a regional urban development plan. Ishihara recognised that only a regional approach could address Tokyo’s problems identified as reasons for the capital relocation.23,24 Subsequently, the Capital Region Megalopolis Plan (CRMP) was devised as TMG’s counterargument to the capital relocation plan

(Saito & Thornley, 2003) as well as its attempt to take regional planning initiatives away from state bureaucracy. The CRMP’s territory was defined by an outer circular bypass currently under construction, which cut off the rural west end of TMG and the rural halves of Tokyo’s three neighbouring prefectures (see Fig. 11). With this, CRMP disregarded the central state’s geographic authority, ignoring the existing jurisdictions of prefectures and the spatial definition of the ‘capital region’ described above. As will be explained later, this urban-oriented regionalism contrasts with that of Osaka. TMG tried to establish a new definition of its city region, with CRMP’s land use plans, policy for regional urban functions, and its image as ‘Japan’s capital in the 21st century’, with phrases such as ‘the world’s largest city-region with a 33 million population’ and ‘its GDP is equivalent to countries such as the United Kingdom’ (TMG, 2001). The regional land use and transportation plans featured circular networks between four identified subcentres25 to divert traffic going through Tokyo’s massive CBDs while connecting them for agglomeration effects. Other key regional programmes of the CRMP included airport upgrading, regional emergency preparedness, state capital function backup-system development, and air and water quality improvements (TMG, 2001). These were to address Tokyo’s functional weaknesses— i.e., the main reasons for the capital relocation: overcrowding, traffic congestion, poor air quality, susceptibility to earthquake, and poor access to the international airport. When TMG shared the plan with its neighbouring prefectures to gain cooperation, the neighbours did not welcome Tokyo’s planning over their jurisdictions. The neighbouring governments were traditionally wary of Tokyo, which dominated them socially as well as economically. For the longtime residents of the neighbouring prefectures, the rapid urbanisation meant Tokyoisation of their communities, many of which continued to be agricultural. For their downtown interests, Tokyo’s more sophisticated counterparts were their formidable direct competitors. Nevertheless, the neighbouring public leaders had to strongly oppose the capital relocation. During the Conference of the Heads

23

Personal interview with a senior TMG administrator. The main arguments for capital relocation include: restructuring of the centralised political system; diffusion of the Tokyo-centric economy and culture; the limits of Tokyo’s capacity (extreme population density, transportation congestion and various urban dysfunctions), vulnerability to disaster, and overall land use improvement (Toki, 2003). 24

25

These sub-centres, dispersed in Tokyo’s neighbouring three prefectures, were created as a result of the capital function dispersion plan implemented in the 1980s. It was a regional approach conceived by TMG and augmented by the state planners to alleviate Tokyo’s over-congestion and the Tokyo uni-polar concentrations, which constituted major rationales for the capital relocation.

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of the Seven Prefectures-Municipalities26 of the capital region (a.k.a. the Capital Region Summit) held in 2002, the attendant seven local leaders jointly declared the Resolution to Appeal for the Capital Region Regeneration, which reads: The capital region with its 33 million population is the greatest metropolitan region in the world. . .As such, it has been contributing to the development of this country as its political and economic centre. Nevertheless, the Diet is still discussing the capital function relocation policy. . . To regenerate Japan, what we need to do now is not the capital relocation. . .but the revitalisation of the capital region. . . (TMG, 2002; author’s translation). Although key neighbouring governments refused to explicitly cooperate with Tokyo for the CRMP, they did agree to its political goals: to oppose the capital relocation and demand state urban revitalisation in the region. The fact of the matter was that Tokyo’s development and its capital status were vital to the neighbours’ economies.27 State urban redevelopment in the region would help them as much as Tokyo. The eight local leaders repeated the same appeals to the national government during the annual Capital Region Summits from 1999 to the early 2000s. 8.4. Governor Ishihara’s from-below politics Before Ishihara became the TMG governor, LDP Prime Minister Keizoˆ Obuchi had announced his support for the capital relocation plan in his inaugural speech in January 1999 (Osaka, 2002) but died unexpectedly in April 2000. The succeeding Prime Minister Mori, another LDP senior and relocation supporter, suffered a crushing defeat in a general election in June. Urban voters were critical of Obuchi’s old-style big-spending politics that favoured rural regions (Ohtake, 2003). Particularly, the loss of four prominent LDP incumbents in Tokyo districts sent shock waves. This election result put legislators in a very difficult position to continue advocating the relocation. They were facing voters’ cynicism of government which grew during the ‘lost decade’ of

26 A regular forum among the leaders of the capital region’s four prefectures (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama and Chiba) and thee major cities (Yokohama, Kawasaki and Chiba). Saitama City was added in 2003. It started in 1979 on a much smaller scale, mainly for service delivery cooperation. 27 From personal interviews with administrators of TMG’s seven neighbouring governments of the capital region.

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the 1990s. Also, the 1990s recession and concomitant budget deficits made the relocation a politically sensitive issue against general public sentiments (Osaka, 2002). As for supporters of relocation, the three candidate communities selected for the new capital and their parliamentary representatives determinedly continued campaigning for the relocation by making an alliance among themselves. However, the most formidable would be the central ministries, because the relocation plan had been stipulated by law. For example, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism confirmed the need for the capital relocation and called for its swift progress in the latest National Comprehensive Development Plan (an authoritative national land use plan) published in 1998. Thus, the opponents had reasons to continue campaigning. Prime Minister Mori and Governor Ishihara, who was a bitter critic of LDP during the gubernatorial election, with a large urban following, met privately in September 2000 to discuss the ensuing TMG assembly election and Upper House election. Shortly after the meeting, Mori’s Minister of Land Development announced that the capital relocation policy should be repealed and Tokyo reinvested (Mainichi, 2000). In the following year, Mori announced plans to create a new cabinet office for urban revitalisation, while Ishihara discussed with the chairman of the LDP’s policy committee the introduction of the CRMP to the new cabinet office as its programme (Tokyo, 2001). In public, Ishihara described the capital relocation as the LDP’s old pork barrel politics. He also connected Japan’s dire economic conditions with Tokyo’s declining urban global competitiveness. He then argued that the state must revitalise Tokyo for higher competitiveness because only a stronger Tokyo could pull the nation out of the recession (Yamane, 2000). His argument was essentially a realignment of the spatial interests between Tokyo and the state. He tried to equalise the spatiality of Tokyo and that of the Japanese state by emphasising the economic centrality of the former in the latter (Nagahara, 2000). It was a ‘jump scale’ by a city to control the national agenda. This can be seen in the ‘Resolution to Appeal for the Capital Region Regeneration’ quoted above. The central government apparently heeded the Tokyo-as-the-national-engine discourse. Prime Minister Koizumi, who succeeded Mori in 2001, announced the establishment of the urban revitalisation cabinet office. He explained the purpose: ‘We will raise the international competitiveness and attractiveness of our

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cities through urban revitalisation and land transactions. To this end, we will soon set up the Urban Revitalisation Headquarters. . .’ (PMJCO, 2001; author’s translation). The objectives of the new urban agency included, ‘to direct the public sector’s capital and expertise to our cities, particularly to large metropolitan areas’ and ‘to create world cities that are internationally competitive’ (URH, 2001). In reality, Tokyo’s revitalisation was the purpose of this urban policy (Igarashi & Ogawa, 2003). The state has been constructing the circular road networks and implementing airport upgrading, as TMG envisaged in CRMP. Prime Minister Koizumi, who was originally a proponent of the capital relocation, announced an indefinite postponement of the relocation in 2002. He went on to make a series of government reforms, including decentralisation, deregulation and privatisation, all of which favoured Tokyo vis-a`-vis the rest of Japan. 8.5. Globalisation, regionalism and glocalisation of the Japanese developmental state Tokyo’s economic functions started to emerge as Japan’s leading global or world city in the 1970s. By the end of the 1980s, Tokyo was clearly the favoured site of global command-and-control for Japanese transnational corporations (Kamo, 2000). Companies rooted in Japan’s second city Osaka notably began shifting their headquarter functions to Tokyo in the 1980s (Abe & Yamazaki, 2004). Socioeconomic regionalisation involving Tokyo and its neighbouring communities strengthened from the 1970s onwards. However, recognition of the expanded global city region did not occur until Ishihara’s assertiveness in 1999. After the arrival of Ishihara, local leaders in the Tokyo region repeatedly demanded higher local autonomy from the state. In 2006, the members of the Capital Region Summit boosted regionalism by setting up another arena, the Capital Region Union Forum (CRUF), which included private sector leaders in its members. The aim was to improve regional policy implementation by involving the private sector in the decision-making process. The state’s Tokyo-oriented development policy greatly alarmed leaders in Osaka, where elite business organisations had historically been active in regionalism efforts. Since the 1950s, they had repeatedly proposed to the central government higher local autonomy. Nevertheless, regionalism in Osaka proved to be very difficult. In addition to strong intra-regional local government rivalries and desires to preserve existing organisational structures, the public sector leaders did not wish to antagonise the central bureau-

cracy. The prefecture governors were often former elite central bureaucrats. Thus, they were largely embedded in the triangular LDP subgovernment system, through which local governments would lobby for major state investments, such as an international airport and more freeways.28 However, the state’s clear leaning on Tokyo under the Koizumi administration changed the attitudes of the Osaka area’s public sector leaders. Regionalism became an urgent agenda because of their now stronger desire for local autonomy and development.29 In 2008, after years of regional organisation-building efforts led by the elite business organisations, local pubic leaders agreed with their private counterparts to form a regional government, the Kansai Regional Union (KRU), which will have a state-sanctioned political authority. In contrast to Tokyo’s urban function-oriented regionalism, Osaka’s regionalism is expansive, including 10 prefectures, four major cities and six business organisations (see Fig. 9). It will override the state’s regional planning zone for the Osaka area by two more prefectures—perhaps too remote from Osaka to call them part of the region centring on Osaka. This expansiveness reveals the nature of the KRU—a coalition of governments towards local statism attempting to muster power from sheer size against the concentration of political and economic resources in Tokyo. 8.6. Conclusion Despite decades of intermittent neo-liberal reform efforts, Japan has yet to give up its developmental state regulation. After Koizumi’s departure, each of his two successors carrying on the reform agenda lasted barely a year under low public approval ratings. Last Prime Minister Aso tried to revert to the LDP public spending politics and to equal national development to appease voters, who were largely disillusioned by the brunt of Koizumi neo-liberal reform. Regardless, state rescaling has been moving on at the local level led by urban leaders in Tokyo and Osaka. Other locales are following. Regionalism began as local politics of scale to enhance their positions in the framework of the Japanese developmental state, independent of the stateinitiated regional planning, which started earlier based

28

From personal interviews with Osaka area’s local government administrators. 29 From personal interviews with Osaka area’s local government administrators.

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on socioeconomic regionalisation. The globalising economy accentuated spatial unevenness, which was exacerbated by the LDP’s mixed policy during the 80s. The Japanese developmental state eventually decided to respond with the capital relocation plan according to its balanced development value. But TMG Governor Ishihara counteracted and ended up stimulating regional localism in other parts of Japan. As in many other places of the world, Japanese local leaders began calling for regional cooperation and consolidation to devise economic development policy, such as international tourism, urban quality of life and mass gentrification projects. The Japanese experience contains nuanced differences to the state neoliberalisation approach to explain state glocalisation, most prominently developed by Brenner (2004a, 2004b), which tends to neglect local strategic actions to influence the state regulation from below. Japan’s state neoliberal reform efforts tend to revert to developmental state regulation. However, the

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politics of local actors, responding to changing economic environments in pursuit of local self-interests, press the once coherent developmental state towards a decentralised glocalisation state. Tensions have been accumulating, not only between the urban interests of metropolitan scales and the rural interests demanding reassertion of the national scale, but also between winning major urban regions and waning counterparts. The LDP, caught between the conflicting scalar interests, found neither a political nor economic solution and lost the August 2009 election. Uncertainty remains in Japanese politics, but globalisation as a rhetorical strategy will certainly be part of the coming political debates in search of a new Japanese political system and its spatiality. Scalar characteristics of the state will take shape from such debates and, as the Tokyo case reveals, urban politics will play an important role. To understand the nature and process of state rescaling and neo-liberalisation, one must also examine intergovernmental relations and frombelow urban politics.

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Chapter 9. Understanding cross-boundary cooperation in South China Peter T. Y. Cheung 9.1. Introduction The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the HKSAR) was established in 1997 in the People’s Republic of China, under the policy of ‘one country, two systems’. Hong Kong can maintain its own system of governance and enjoy a high degree of autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. The socioeconomic interactions between Hong Kong and the neighbouring Pearl River Delta (the PRD) have developed rapidly in the past decade (Enright, Scott, & Chang, 2005). The HKSAR government and its counterparts in Guangdong province have established many intergovernmental mechanisms to manage cross-boundary policy issues, such as economic development, infrastructure and public health since 1997 (Cheung, 2006). Despite difficulties experienced initially, such mechanisms were further expanded in 2003. This chapter does not seek to detail the evolution of such cross-boundary cooperation. Instead, different analytical frameworks—namely global cities and global city regions, policy coordination and multi-level governance—would be used to interpret the cross-boundary relations between Hong Kong and the PRD since 1997. 9.2. Perspectives in understanding cross-boundary development in South China 9.2.1. Global cities and global city regions One common approach to studying cross-boundary development in south China is the global cities and global city regions perspective. Globalisation has impacted profoundly on cities and regions, but they have in turned played an important role in shaping the world economy (Sassen, 2001a, 2001b, 2005; Scott, Agnew, Soja, & Storper, 2001). Studies of global cities and city regions examine such new spatial and economic configurations in the global economy. According to Sassen, the evolution of a global city results from the demand for a control centre for global business and the demand for specialised finance and business services. Global cities play a pivotal role in servicing these firms as command centres of the global economy. Cities that excel in business and financial services further facilitate the agglomeration of such businesses by attracting other firms to their jurisdictions. Similarly, global city regions have emerged as

new spatial and economic formations in the world economy. According to Scott (2001), large city regions provide the ‘territorial platforms’ from which networks of companies compete in the world markets (Scott et al., 2001: 15). Clustering in a city region allows firms to access information, human capital, suppliers and business opportunities flexibly and to enhance their creativity and innovation in order to respond to the uncertainties and competition in the global markets. In short, global city regions serve as ‘dynamic local networks of economic relationships caught up in more extended world-wide webs of inter-regional competition and exchange’ (Scott et al., 2001: 18). Driven by global market competition, the development of south China in the past 30 years is characterised by the relocation of Hong Kong’s manufacturing across the boundary, its own transformation into a service economy, and the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in Guangdong province, especially in areas neighbouring Hong Kong, where labour and land are comparatively much cheaper. Lin observes that with Hong Kong serving as the control centre and the PRD as the hinterland, a distinct ‘global city region’ is ‘quickly taking shape’ (Lin, 2003: 100). Shen points out that economic cooperation between Hong Kong and the PRD is characterised by a ‘bottom-up approach’ driven by the local residents and businessmen between 1979 and 2001 (Shen, 2003). Unlike other regional production systems, the cross-boundary cooperation between Hong Kong and the mainland has several distinguishing features, such as close demographic and cultural ties between the two areas, intensity of cross-border interactions, and China’s adoption of open door policy in 1978 and Hong Kong’s reunion with China in 1997 (Shen, 2003: 14). Other studies suggest that Hong Kong has established its position as a primary provider of business and financial services in south China (Yeh, 2005). Hong Kong’s position as a global city is confirmed by its prominence in aviation networks, telecommunications, financial services and the exercise of command and control functions by a large number of regional headquarters (Yeh, 2005). Key command and control functions of a global city are still being played by Hong Kong, although other services can gradually be delivered by Shenzhen and Guangzhou (Breitung & Gu¨nter, 2006). The cities in the PRD are mainly connected to the global economy through Hong Kong’s international links. However, as China further opens up, these localities would maximise their direct access to the global market. Hence the Greater PRD, comprising the PRD, Hong Kong and Macao is at best an emerging

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global city region. Other key cities in the PRD, such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen, are jumpstarting their service sectors, hence the intense competition may prevent Hong Kong from consolidating its once dominant position. These studies on global cities and global city regions have shed important light on the emergence of the Greater PRD and its growing polycentrism. However, as intergovernmental interactions have become more prominent, this perspective cannot fully capture the complexities in the crossboundary relations between Hong Kong and the PRD. Two other approaches—policy coordination and multilevel governance—can also be employed to offer new perspectives. 9.2.2. Policy coordination Coordination problems arise from specialisation of modern governments along both vertical and horizontal dimensions (Peters, 1998, 2007). According to Peters, coordination has two common meanings. First, coordination refers to the extent to which the activities of organisations take into account those of other organisations. Second, coordination refers to policy integration, meaning that the consequences of policy choices on the full range of activities of other organisations and programmes have been considered in the evaluation of these policy options, in order to achieve consistency among different policy areas. The distinction between vertical and horizontal coordination is particularly pertinent in ‘multi-level governance’involving different layers of supranational, national and subnational governmental authorities. Further, cooperation is difficult ‘when two organisations perform the same task (redundancy), when no organisation performs a necessary task (lacunae), and when policies with the same clients (including the entire society as the clients) have different goals and requirements (incoherence)’ (Peters, 1998: 303). If interorganisational cooperation between different levels of government is often hard to achieve, such coordination would be even more challenging for two jurisdictions with different economic, administrative and legal systems, as in the Hong Kong–PRD region. 9.2.3. Towards policy coordination in south China The coordination perspective is useful in studying the growing cross-boundary intergovernmental interactions in south China (Cheung, 2006). The high-level Hong Kong/Guangdong Cooperation Joint Conference (the HKGDCJC) was established in 1998 to provide a framework for managing cross-boundary cooperation. Initially, the Chief Secretary for Administration (the

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CS), the second ranking official in Hong Kong, was responsible for this task during the 1998–2001 period. But these efforts had not been particularly successful in this period, when closer integration with the mainland was considered politically sensitive. Since mid-2001, other initiatives have been proposed, such as the extension of boundary crossing hours and infrastructural coordination. Cross-boundary cooperation with the mainland cuts across different bureaucratic turfs in Hong Kong. In order to better coordinate the various agencies, a special unit was created to help senior officials in Hong Kong monitor the implementation of cross-boundary initiatives and review its existing policies and arrangements. In August 2003, the Joint Conference was upgraded to the level of the heads of administration, as they will be presided over by Guangdong’s governor and the chief executive (the CE). An executive vice-governor and the CS will be responsible for steering the cooperation. A total of 22 expert groups were consolidated under the HKGDCJC, to achieve more coherence in intergovernmental cooperation over priorities such as economic and infrastructural development, tourism, and infectious diseases. Both vertical and horizontal coordination have been attempted by Hong Kong in recent years in order to expedite cross-boundary cooperation. Such efforts are considered necessary by the HKSAR government in order to benefit from China’s economic ascent and to resolve cross-boundary problems. Vertical integration is achieved by relying upon a higher level of government (namely the central government in Beijing) to resolve intergovernmental differences. Horizontal coordination is achieved by working closely with provincial counterparts to resolve cross-boundary policy issues. As the central and provincial authorities in the mainland remain powerful, reliance upon the market or other means of coordination is simply not viable. The following examples show that intergovernmental coordination constitutes a key element of crossboundary development in south China. A. Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). After being prompted by the business community, the HKSAR government has become active in lobbying the central government for a free trade agreement since 2001, in order to tap the ‘first-mover’ advantage for Hong Kong after China’s WTO accession. From Beijing’s perspective, China’s WTO accession may seriously erode Hong Kong’s role as a gateway between the mainland and the world economy. The CEPA Agreement, signed in June 2003, hence provides for the entry of products of Hong Kong origin

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to the mainland with zero-tariff, and has facilitated the entry of Hong Kong service suppliers to the mainland since January 2004, about two years before China opened up in accordance with the WTO schedule. The Agreement has since been further broadened and encompassed six rounds of policy relaxation measures. B. Coordination with regional and national plans. In view of China’s rapid growth, the HKSAR government actively participated in the Pan-PRD regional cooperation, a network spearheading regional cooperation in nine provinces (Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Fujian, Hunan, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan) and the two special administrative regions (SARs) (Hong Kong and Macao). For the first time since 1997, the HKSAR government also requested the central authorities to incorporate Hong Kong into the 11th National Five Year Plan (FYP) in 2006 and proposed recommendations on economic cooperation and transportation to complement the plan. C. Coordination in urban planning. Since the HKSAR operates under ‘one country, two systems’, it is politically sensitive for mainland governments to incorporate Hong Kong into their regional plans. The participation of Hong Kong in Guangdong’s urban planning was minimal until around 2005 (Yang, 2005a). However, the Guangdong authorities had tried to achieve coordinated development within the PRD by building a light rail system and a highways network and coordinating the clustering of cities in the PRD. In view of the exclusion of Hong Kong in such processes, the HKSAR government began actively to participate in regional planning, for instance, by raising the issue in the HKGDCJC in May 2004. A major joint study was later launched by both sides in late 2005 to examine planning coordination and other related issues. D. Coordination of infrastructural development. In view of the duplication of infrastructural facilities in south China, the HKSAR government tried to work with Guangdong and requested that the central authorities coordinate cross-boundary infrastructure, such as the construction of the Hong Kong-ShenzhenGuangzhou Express Rail Link to improve Hong Kong’s links to the PRD, and the planning of the Hong KongZhuhai-Macau Bridge to improve connectivity with the western PRD. The bridge was perceived by Guangdong as mainly benefiting Hong Kong, hence the provincial government has no longer been enthusiastic about the project in recent years. Only after the intensive lobbying of Beijing by the HKSAR government and a change in Guangdong’s top leadership in late 2007 could both sides agree to build the bridge in early 2008.

E. Recent central and provincial initiatives. Since late 2008, the central and provincial governments have reasserted their commitment to repositioning the PRD as a key economic region in China’s reform drive and to deepening regional coordination and economic integration (National Reform & Development Commission, 2009). The promulgation of ‘The outline of the plan for the reform and development of the Pearl River Delta (2008–2020)’ in late 2008 by the National Reform and Development Commission of the central government is profoundly important in reaffirming the pioneering role played by Guangdong province in past and future reform. Specifically, this comprehensive document encourages further social, economic and administrative reforms and stresses the support of the central and provincial governments in facilitating the division of labour between Hong Kong and the PRD and consolidating Hong Kong’s key position as an international finance, trading, shipping, logistics and high value-added service centre. Closer coordination over economic cooperation, regional planning and the ongoing cross-boundary infrastructural projects would be expedited. Most importantly, the State Council and its ministries will oversee the implementation of such efforts together with the provincial government, to improve coordination. Through enhancing both vertical coordination with central ministries and horizontal coordination within Guangdong and between the PRD and Hong Kong and Macao, this policy framework has established an unprecedented platform to facilitate spatial, social and economic integration in south China by creating more policy space and incentives for these areas to work together (Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, 2009). While there are obvious competing interests in a decentralised region like south China and the implementation of this policy can only be assessed a few years later, such an ambitious initiative under the auspice of the central government is nonetheless path-breaking in promoting regional cooperation within the PRD, as well as between the PRD, Hong Kong and Macao. 9.2.4. Multi-level governance The dispersal of authority from central states to both supranational institutions and to regional and local governments and the proliferation of public–private networks are widely recognised as salient characteristics of contemporary governance. The multi-level governance approach has been specially applied to the European Union (Bache & Flinders, 2004; Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 2003; Marks & Hooghe, 2004). While ‘multi-level’ refers to the ‘increased interdependence of

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governments operating at different territorial levels’, ‘governance’ is about the ‘growing interdependence between governments and non-governmental actors at various territorial levels’ (Bache & Flinders, 2004: 3). Bache and Flinders capture the key themes in the literature as the ‘increased participation of non-state actors’, the increasing difficulties in identifying the ‘discrete or nested territorial levels of decision making’ as a result of ‘complex and overlapping networks’, the transformation of the role of the state in coordination, steering and networking in order to protect and enhance state autonomy, and the challenges to democratic accountability (Bache & Flinders, 2004: 197). Hooghe and Marks (2003) have articulated two distinct types of multi-level governance. Type I refers to generalpurpose jurisdictions with non-intersecting memberships, characterised by a limited number of jurisdictional levels and a system-wide, durable framework such as a legislature, an executive and a court system. Type II is composed of ‘special-purpose jurisdictions that tailor membership, rules of operation, and functions to a particular policy problem’ (Marks & Hooghe, 2004: 28). They are task-specific rather than general-purpose, and are intended to be flexible rather than durable (Hooghe & Marks, 2003: 238). Being task-driven, Type II multi-level governance is quite common in crossborder regions (Marks & Hooghe, 2004: 24). 9.2.5. Towards multi-level governance in south China? The multi-level governance approach has also been applied in studying the cross-boundary cooperation in south China, even though its conditions differ from those in Europe (Sasuga, 2004; Yang, 2005a, 2005b). Yang argues that cross-border interactions in south China have, since 1997, transformed from a market-led to an institution-based process. The growth of intergovernmental mechanisms exemplifies such an evolution. Decision making in the Hong Kong-PRD region involves not only a wide array of governmental actors at different levels, but also a host of businesses and local residents (Yang, 2005a: 2164). The existence of multiple levels of governments in the PRD has greatly complicated regional cooperation (Yang, 2005a: 2158). Regional cooperation in south China is similar to the Type II model advanced by Hooghe and Marks, which highlights the role of ‘task-specific, intersecting and flexible jurisdictions’ (Yang, 2005a). In the absence of a regional authority to mediate differences, Beijing still plays a critical role in cross-boundary coordination between Hong Kong and the PRD. Other scholars have also applied this perspective in studying the interactions

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among the different levels of government and business actors in south China. In his study of Japanese and Taiwanese investment, Sasuga examines the ‘fluid and flexible system of multilevel governance’ exemplified by the entrepreneurial strategies of Guangdong’s provincial and subprovincial governments in attracting foreign investment and the networking between foreign firms, especially in electronics, with these local governments (Sasuga, 2004: 161–162). However, in view of the constant changes in central policies, the frequent administrative changes in the PRD, and the onset of the global financial tsunami since 2008, how a special multi-level governance framework spanning across ‘one country, two systems’ may emerge in south China remains to be seen. 9.3. Conclusions This section attempts a preliminary assessment of these different perspectives on cross-boundary cooperation in south China. Various studies have illustrated the characteristics of the Greater PRD as an incipient global city region. While this perspective is useful in understanding the past decades, its application is constrained by the following conditions. First, the multiple jurisdictions in the Greater PRD have hampered a clear division of labour among the competing cities based on market coordination. Despite Hong Kong’s strengths in services, legal system and regulatory framework, whether it can be sustained as the premier centre for services in south China and perform its command and control functions in the longer run remains to be seen. China’s further opening up, the high cost of operation in Hong Kong, and the differences between the Hong Kong and mainland legal systems, among other factors, are crucial in shaping such a trajectory. Second, the powerful role played by entrepreneurial local governments in south China suggests that political consideration is as important as economic gain in explaining government behaviour, because local leaders equate their achievements with short-term local economic development. The fragmentation of China’s planning bureaucracies also does not facilitate coordinated regional governance (Yeh & Xu, 2008b). Hence it would be difficult for these localities to coordinate among themselves or with Hong Kong to achieve long-term, sustainable regional development, unless there are other political or economic incentives to foster cooperation. The duplication of infrastructure and the rivalry over logistics development have become obvious problems in the Greater PRD. Hence other approaches could also be used to appreciate the growing

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role of intergovernmental interactions in cross-boundary development in south China. The policy coordination perspective holds great promise in studying cross-boundary relations between Hong Kong and the PRD. First, the HKSAR government has been experimenting with various institutional forms to achieve intraorganisational and intergovernmental coherence in managing cross-boundary relations, as shown in the reshuffling of its own agencies and the development of intergovernmental mechanisms in dealing with such issues. Second, the HKSAR government has not only expanded its horizontal coordination with Guangdong province to resolve cross-boundary problems, but also increasingly sought vertical coordination with and assistance from Beijing because the competing interests between Hong Kong and Guangdong could not be easily resolved. These actions reflect purposive efforts by Hong Kong to achieve a higher degree of cross-boundary coordination under ‘one country, two systems’. The recent central policy on reform and development planning of the PRD provides a new impetus for boosting policy coordination in this region. Under the guidance of the central and provincial authorities, whether such efforts in coordination would be effective constitutes a key policy challenge and research question in the near future. Last but not least, the central government in China is no longer as powerful as in the pre-reform era in dictating local economic development and regional coordination. After three decades of decentralisation, local governments in south China have become very aggressive in attracting foreign investment and skillful in dealing with their provincial or central government agencies. Interactions among these different levels and the business sectors provide a fascinating story of how

economic development and infrastructural coordination have been pursued by different state and non-state actors. Nonetheless, strictly applying the multi-level governance approach developed in the European context is problematic. First, the approach lacks a clear theory to explain the pattern of interactions among the state and non-state actors operating at different territorial tiers. Specification of hypotheses based on the model, especially with reference to the Chinese context, would be critical. Second, while the Chinese central state is no longer as commanding as before, it still dominates personnel appointments and arbitration of disputes among the subnational governments from time to time. Whether a unique form of multi-level governance has indeed taken shape in south China merits more research. The three perspectives discussed above are, nonetheless, not necessarily mutually exclusive because they offer insights into different aspects of the dynamic cross-boundary cooperation in south China. No single perspective can fully grasp the intricacies of the economic and political processes at work. For instance, a focus on intragovernmental and intergovernmental coordination can be incorporated into a study adopting a multi-level governance analysis of cross-border cooperation in south China. By doing so, the institutional obstacles in inhibiting coordination at each governmental level can be better appreciated. If we are interested in the politics among the competing local governments and non-governmental actors, it would be necessary to examine the different layers of political interactions, the stakes and strategies of each player, and how their strengths have shaped outcomes. Hence, more empirical research and conceptual refinement would be needed to explain the dynamics of crossboundary relations in south China.

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Chapter 10. Assessing inter-city relations between Hong Kong and Shenzhen: the case of airport competition or cooperation Jianfa Shen 10.1. Introduction: relative versus absolute competition In the age of globalisation, inter-city competition has been intensified, resulting in ‘destructive interplace competition’ (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). In the context of the PRD and YRD, Chen (2007: 195) argued that ‘inter-local or intra-regional competition breeds fragmentation or even disintegration‘. However, cities and city regions may also cooperate to enhance their competitive advantages (Heeg, Klagge, & Ossenbrugge, 2003; see also Chapter 1 of this volume). But issues of competition and cooperation have been studied separately. The changing relation between Hong Kong and Shenzhen provides a good case for the study of intercity competition and cooperation. This chapter will examine this issue using the case of Hong Kong and Shenzhen airports. Inter-city competition is a very popular term. This chapter argues that relative competition and absolute competition should be differentiated. First, relative competition refers to the comparison of aggregated indicators between cities. The development of a city will not harm another city under relative competition. GDP, FDI (foreign direct investment) and export are often considered key indicators of urban competitiveness or strength. When a less advanced city B is catching up on an advanced city A, city A perceives competition pressure from city B. But one cannot draw the conclusion that city B is growing at the expense of city A. Second, absolute competition refers to the situation of win or loss. City B grows at the expense of city A. To determine whether city A and city B are in direct competition, inter-city competition at the sector or firm level should be considered. In the age of globalisation and regional integration, spatial boundary is blurred as many firms may operate and consumers may use services in both cities that are perceived to be in competition. 10.2. Changing relations between Hong Kong and Shenzhen Since 1978, due to the economic complementarities and comparative advantages of Hong Kong and mainland China, a spatial division of labour has been established, generally called ‘front shop and back

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factory model’ (Shen, 2008; Sit, 1998). Hong Kong has become a prominent service centre. It enjoyed substantial economic growth over the past three decades, except during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–2000. Hong Kong’s GDP per capita increased from US$5,966 in 1981 to US$26,095 in 2005 (Census and Statistics Department, 2006). Shenzhen city was established in 1979. Its GDP per capita increased from US$829 to US$7,422 in 2005 (Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2007). Shenzhen is the major recipient of the FDI from Hong Kong, accounting for 16.5% of total FDI from Hong Kong to mainland China in 2005. Shenzhen’s export grew from US$9.9 billion to US$101.5 billion in 1991–2005. Its export to Hong Kong grew from US$9.3 billion to US$45.1 billion in that period. Shenzhen is catching up with Hong Kong quickly. Shenzhen’s export overtook Hong Kong’s domestic export in 1998. Shenzhen’s total export in 2006 reached the level of Hong Kong in 1993 and was equivalent to 42.96% of the level of Hong Kong in 2006. With the development of high-tech industry and service sectors in Shenzhen, the economic relationship between Hong Kong and Shenzhen is in flux. Hong Kong has increasing concerns over the growth of a container port and airport in Shenzhen. 10.3. Airport development as city strategic projects In Greater PRD, there are five international airports, including Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA), Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport (GBIA), Shenzhen Baoan International Airport (SBIA), Macau International Airport and Zhuhai Airport. The five airports are considered to be the result of infrastructure duplication due to inter-city competition for such strategic infrastructure (Song, 2002). HKIA is the leading international airport in the region, with the largest passenger and air cargo throughputs (Table 5). GBIA is designated as one of Table 5 Main indicators of HKIA and SBIA in 2007. Indicator

HKIA

SBIA

Passenger throughput (million) Rank in the world Air cargo throughput (million tons) Rank in the world Mainland cities with direct flights Non-mainland cities with direct flights

47.80 14 3.70 2 40 115

12.06 63 0.62 33 68 34

Sources: Airports Council International (2008); HKIA (2008); SBIA (2008a, 2008b).

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the three aviation hubs in mainland China. It has the potential to compete with HKIA in the long term. SBIA concentrates on domestic flights to mainland cities, but its expanding air cargo services may also compete with HKIA over time. There is an intricate relationship between HKIA and SBIA. HKIA is run by Airport Authority Hong Kong (AAHK), which is owned by the HKSAR government. Making profit is not its main objective, but the government is keen to maintain the leading position of HKIA in the interests of the Hong Kong economy. Given the rapid growth of GBIA and SBIA, seeking cooperation with SBIA for a regional division of labour has been a strategy of AAHK for some years. SBIA is operated by Shenzhen Airport Company Ltd. (SAC) and 54.64% of the company is owned ultimately by the Shenzhen government (SBIA, 2008a). Developing a strong airport and container port is a key development strategy of Shenzhen. First, ‘The strategic planning of medium- and long-term development of Shenzhen airport’ completed in 2006, proposed to develop SBIA as the air cargo gateway of south China. Second, the Shenzhen government introduced a policy of providing financial incentives to airlines for expanding air cargo services in January 2007. The total support was over RMB 20 million in 2007 (SBIA, 2008b). With strong government support, SBIA is expanding its facilities and services. Its second runway and terminal 3 will begin operation by 2011. Its annual passenger handling capacity will reach 36 million by 2015 (Passenger Terminaltoday.com, 2008). There is no doubt that relative competition exists as the two airports compare with each other on passenger and cargo throughputs. Such relative competition often gets attention from the government and the public. But is there absolute competition? Is SBIA growing at the expense of HKIA? Certainly, the passenger and cargo throughputs in HKIA continue to grow, which indicates that the rapid growth in SBIA is not having a negative impact on HKIA so far. Each airport has its own immediate hinterland. Local residents usually choose the nearest airport. HKIA and SBIA duplicate some flight services to mainland cities. But differences in cost, service quality and airport accessibility currently allow each airport to attract its own passengers. In the long term, the two airports may still compete with each other to capture passengers unless there is effective cooperation and coordination. The future growth of HKIA and SBIA depends ultimately on the economic growth and logistics needs of the region. More importantly, does airport competition necessarily mean inter-city competition, with negative

impacts on the urban economy and the public? Clearly, the airport relationship should not be analysed only from the perspectives of airport authorities and airlines; the airport users and public interest should also be taken into consideration. This chapter will adopt a comprehensive approach to examine the issue. 10.4. Views from airlines, the public and airport users of Hong Kong The growth of an airport is related to some important actors, such as governments, airports, airlines, businesses and residents. While airports may compete with each other, airlines also compete in the same airport and the broader regional, national and global aviation market (Barrett, 2004). Government policies would affect the planning, construction and expansion of HKIA and SBIA. Airlines’ flight rights are also heavily regulated by governments. Thus the interests of the airports and their home carriers are closely coupled and this intensifies airport competition. The home carriers—Cathay Pacific and Dragonair in HKIA, and Shenzhen Branch of China Southern Airline and Shenzhen Airline in SBIA—are restricted to operating in respective airports. Airport development will affect these airlines directly. Dragonair’s flight services largely duplicate SBIA’s domestic flights. According to an interview in previous thesis research, Dragonair is not in favour of the integration of HKIA and SBIA. It is argued that such integration may not be able to attract more passengers to use HKIA, and the lower domestic fare in SBIA may shift price-sensitive passengers from HKIA to SBIA (Lin, 2005: 94). Dragonair became a whole subsidiary of Cathay Pacific in 2006 and its strategy would largely follow Cathay Pacific. Cathay Pacific mainly offers international flights, which are not offered in SBIA. It supports complementary cooperation with SBIA to connect its international flights with SBIA’s domestic flights. Cathay Pacific also keenly supports the expansion of HKIA. Its Chief Executive, Tony Tyler, said: ‘Hubs like Guangzhou and Shanghai are planning third, fourth and even fifth runways. Hong Kong faces the very real danger of gifting our competitive advantage away unless we move quickly and decisively on the third runway.’ Otherwise, HKIA will become sidelined as other regional hubs predominate (Cathay Pacific, 2008). While there was an understanding of the need to support the coordination of the future development of aviation services in the delta region, he stressed that this should not happen at the expense of the Hong Kong hub. Commenting on plans

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to develop a rail link between HKIA and SBIA, Mr Tyler said that, while this could address some of Hong Kong’s needs, it would at best be complementary to a third runway at HKIA. ‘The rail link certainly would not be a substitute for that third runway’ (Cathay Pacific, 2008). Cathay Pacific is very clear in defending its interest in HKIA and in airport cooperation. Clearly, airlines and even airports will put their own interests first in the process of cooperation or competition. Both Shenzhen Branch of China Southern Airline and Shenzhen Airline declined to reveal their views on the integration of the two airports. As mentioned previously, SBIA is expanding its facilities as well as air cargo services. Airport cooperation has focused on the operational arrangements for flight transfer, connection and the rail link. No real deal has been achieved on the strategic planning of the two airports. The door for future competition remains wide open. An expert from Zhongshan University pointed out that a government arrangement will not ensure smooth airport cooperation. It is necessary to achieve the cooperation by means of market mechanisms, such as holding shares from each other (Lin, 2005: 96). Due to complicated relations among cities, governments, airports, airlines and airport users, it cannot be assumed that the interests of a city as a whole can be fully represented by its government, airport and airlines. The question of whether HKIA and SBIA should compete or cooperate should also consider the needs and interests of the city as a whole, and the airport users. Views from residents would represent the interests of the city as a whole, their companies’ interests and individuals’ interests as passengers, respectively. A telephone survey was conducted from 13 to 15 March 2008 among Hong Kong residents. The survey covered a random sample of 514 respondents aged 18 or above, with a response rate of 51.8%. The respondents are divided into two groups, 43 managers/administrators, to

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reflect business needs, and 466 ordinary residents, to reflect public and individual interests. Five residents with some missing values were excluded. According to the survey, 96% of the respondents think that maintaining the leading role of HKIA in passenger and cargo transportation is important/very important for the Hong Kong economy (Table 6). Some 62% of responds agree/strongly agree that the development of SBIA will affect the position of HKIA. The perception of competition between HKIA and SBIA is strong in Hong Kong society. For policies/potential policies to enhance HKIA’s competitiveness, providing financial assistance to AAHK and airlines, and building the third runway are supported by 62% of respondents. Thus residents are mostly conscious of competition and are willing to use taxpayers’ money to support HKIA. There is no significant difference in these views between the managers/administrators and ordinary residents. Nevertheless, 13.7% of Hong Kong residents are users of both HKIA and SBIA. Managers/administrators (35.7%) are more likely to use both airports than ordinary residents (11.7%). Expanding services in both airports are beneficial to them. Respondents are asked whether they accept that more Hong Kong residents use SBIA. The answer is very positive: 76.4% accept using SBIA to go to mainland cities and 59.8% accept using SBIA to go to overseas cities (Table 7). There is significant difference in using SBIA to go to mainland cities between the managers/administrators and ordinary residents. It is very acceptable to over 18.6% of managers/administrators, but to only 3.7% of ordinary residents. The managers/administrators may have benefited from many flight services in SBIA to mainland cities. Overall, Hong Kong residents consider SBIA another choice for their travel to mainland cities and even international cities. From the perspective of business and ordinary airport users, competition

Table 6 Importance to Hong Kong economy of the leading role in air transport of passengers and cargo (%). Importance

Not very important Not important Important Very important Don’t know Number of respondents Chi-square

Passenger transport

Cargo transport

MA

OR

Total

MA

OR

Total

0.0 0.0 39.5 60.5 0.0 43

0.2 1.3 55.2 41.6 1.7 466 6.398*

0.2 1.2 53.8 43.2 1.6 509

0.0 2.3 44.2 53.5 0.0 43

0.2 2.1 58.2 38.4 1.1 466 4.162*

0.2 2.2 57.0 39.7 1.0 509

MA: Managers/administrators; OR: Ordinary residents. * Ch-square insignificant at 0.05 level.

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Table 7 Do you accept using SBIA to mainland and overseas cities? (%) Attitude

Very unacceptable Unacceptable Acceptable Very acceptable Don’t know Number of respondents Chi-square

Mainland cities

Overseas cities

MA

OR

Total

MA

OR

Total

2.3 16.3 58.1 18.6 4.7 43

1.1 17.4 72.7 3.7 5.2 465 19.609

1.2 17.3 71.5 4.9 5.1 508

2.3 37.2 44.2 7.0 9.3 43

2.4 28.6 57.6 3.0 8.4 465 4.143*

2.4 29.3 56.5 3.3 8.5 508

MA: Managers and administrators; OR: Ordinary residents. * Ch-square insignificant at 0.05 level.

between two airports is not an issue. On the other hand, competition for passengers is not keen between HKIA and SBIA. Only 1.6% of the respondents, both of whom are ordinary residents, only use SBIA. The majority of the respondents, 65.5%, only use HKIA, with no significant difference between the managers/administrators and ordinary residents. 10.5. Cooperation between HKIA and SBIA Generally, the Shenzhen government has been more active than the Hong Kong government regarding intercity cooperation until recently. Airport cooperation is an exception. The Hong Kong side has been very active, while the Shenzhen side has been less responsive until recently. The HKSAR government and the public have formed a consensus to strengthen cooperation with Shenzhen and PRD, ongoing since 2003. The Hong Kong and Shenzhen governments have formally agreed to embark on deep inter-city cooperation, aiming to form a Hong Kong-Shenzhen metropolis. In the case of airports, the two cities have ample opportunities to cooperate. For example, HKIA may benefit from frequent domestic flights in SBIA so that it can concentrate on international flights, due to limited landing capacity. SBIA helps bring mainland tourists to Hong Kong. Among 13.60 million tourists from the mainland to Hong Kong, three million came via SBIA in 2006 (SBIA, 2007). The sea link between SBIA and HKIA was opened in 2003 to serve transfer passengers, reducing travel time to 45 min by sea. On the second meeting of the task force on Hong Kong and Shenzhen airport cooperation, on 19 May 2008, the two airports signed the ‘Framework Agreement on the Cooperation of Passenger Transport in Shenzhen and Hong Kong Airports’ and ‘Memorandum on the Cooperation of Freight Transport in Shenzhen and Hong Kong Airports’. The ‘Hong Kong-Shenzhen Flight Connec-

tion’ project was launched on 9 October 2008, so that passengers can make transfer arrangements in both airports (SBIA, 2008c). One major initiative is to build a direct rail link between the two airports. In November 2008, the Party Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in Shenzhen city, Mr Liu, emphasised that the airport cooperation should be implemented steadily (SBIA, 2008d). The public also supports the airport cooperation. According to our survey, 58.9% of respondents agree that Hong Kong will face more competition if HKIA and SBIA do not cooperate. Regarding policies for airport cooperation, the majority of the respondents support three policies: improving ground transportation to SBIA (84.9%), building a railway to link the two airports (64.5%), and establishing a joint corporation for the two airports (67.7%). There is no significant difference in these views between the managers/ administrators and ordinary residents. 10.6. Conclusion This chapter attempts to assess whether there is absolute or relative competition between Hong Kong and Shenzhen airports. It reveals a strong sense of ‘competition’ between the two airports and two cities. Both Hong Kong and Shenzhen governments play active roles in airport development. The operators of HKIA and SBIA, AAHK and SAC are the major players, backed by their governments. SAC has not been keen on airport cooperation until recently. AAHK has been seeking cooperation with SBIA, aiming to consolidate the strength of HKIA. The interests of the airports and their home carriers are closely coupled. Cathay Pacific strongly supports the further expansion of HKIA, as it does not have flight rights in SBIA. Dragonair was not positive about airport cooperation, due to duplication and competition with SBIA’s

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domestic flights. The perception of competition between HKIA and SBIA is also strong in Hong Kong society. However, it is observed that relative competition prevails between the two airports and two cities. Absolute competition between the two airports is not serious currently. HKIA does not lose too many passengers to SBIA, as Hong Kong residents prefer to use HKIA. The passenger and cargo throughputs in both airports have been growing. On the other hand, HKIA and SBIA have engaged in various kinds of cooperation. Enjoying a wide international service network, Cathay Pacific supports the cooperation of HKIA and

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SBIA. The Hong Kong government plays a leading role in initiating such cooperation. The public in Hong Kong strongly supports airport cooperation. Hong Kong’s managers/administrators and ordinary residents are willing to use SBIA to travel to mainland and international cities. However, the ongoing cooperation does not rule out all competition. Existing airport cooperation focuses on the operational arrangements for flight transfer and the rail link. No real deal has been achieved on the strategic planning of the two airports. Absolute competition may emerge if the capacity and service quality in the two airports changes in the future without effective coordination.

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Chapter 11. China’s emerging city region governance: towards a research framework Fulong Wu and Fangzhu Zhang Market-oriented economic reform marked the failure of conventional regional policies in China and the rise of urban entrepreneurialism. Within the city, this urban entrepreneurialism has become a powerful driving force that is turning the local government into a marketfriendly agent, forming an alliance with capital. Governance thus continues to downscale towards the bottom tier of the administrative hierarchy (Wu, 2002a). In this aspect, China’s urban entrepreneurialism shares some similarities with neo-liberalisation in the West. But at the same time, such entrepreneurialism has led to a series of crises which expose the limitations of the downscaling of governance. Inter-jurisdiction competition exacerbates redundant infrastructure development; the sale of land encroaches on rural land and ecological degradation; social inequalities build up tensions. The aim of this chapter is to describe the conditions that led to emerging city region governance in China. The intention is to provide a framework for further empirical analysis.

particular scale—the city region—in response to the political economy of market transformation and its ‘failure’ at the city scale. Therefore, our approach is similar to Jonas and Ward (2007), who see city region governance as a scale-building process, rather than a necessary outcome of global production. Also following Brenner (2004a, 2004b), we propose a framework for analysing China’s changing regional governance (see Table 8). We aim to contextualise the issue of fierce inter-city competition in China’s market reform, which has led to a changing scale of governance. This changing scale is reflected in the consequent emerging discourse of inter-city cooperation. Seeing this, we hope to go beyond the current policy debates within China, especially in the profession of city and regional planning, which narrowly understand the issue of regional governance as a problem of a lack of coordination between different governments and cities. This confined understanding prescribes a simplistic solution to a regional problem, i.e. to strengthen communication and create better coordination. This study builds upon previous regional inequality studies (e.g. Fan, 1997; Wei, 2000) and change governance (Ma, 2005; Wu, 2002a), and extends its attention to the new politics around the building of region.

11.1. Theoretical perspectives on city region governance

11.2. Socialist redistributive regional policies

The theoretical development has been addressed in previous chapters. This chapter does not provide a comprehensive review—rather, we aim to summarise major aspects of change in the West and compare them with the Chinese context. The development of ‘metropolitan regionalism’ in the USA has been reviewed by Brenner (2002). Central to his discussion is the idea that so-called metropolitan regionalism is not a consolidated regional coalition. Rather, it reflects a ‘‘‘new politics of scale’’, in which local, state-level and federal institutions and actors, as well as local social movements, are struggling to adjust to diverse restructuring processes that are unsettling inherited patterns of territorial and scalar organisation within major US city-regions’ (p. 3). This theoretical stance is particularly useful for addressing Chinese regional governance, because it does not treat regional governance as an established and pre-given form. Rather, it is seen as the result of contested politics to cope with some overarching transformation—in this case, neoliberal state restructuring. Following the notion of ‘state spatiality’ (Brenner, 2004a, 2004b), we attempt to understand how urban and region governance in China is constructed at the

In the planned economy, the city was not a substantial unit for economic organisation (Wu, 2007). Organisation and coordination were achieved through the hierarchal (ministerial) system. For example, factories in two localities could be coordinated and in fact were forced to make a division of labour, because they both belonged to the same industrial bureau or ministry that coordinated their production. More precisely speaking, this was achieved through industrial sector plans. It would be impossible to build two airports in the same area, because the planning of airports, project registration and budget allocation were carried out by the same administrative sector (while within the Pearl River Delta there are several airports built in close proximity, which has led to over-competition in the post-reform period). However, after investment channels were diversified, when localities became the city builders, the problem of lack of coordination emerged. The mechanism of resource allocation under state socialism is the command economy. It required resource-rich regions to transfer their resources at a compulsorily low price to production regions, and also

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Table 8 Transformation of regional governance in China. Historical formation

Form of state spatial selectivity

Form of urban-regional regulation

Major conflicts and contradictions

State socialism, 1949–1978

The national scale of statehood as overarching governance.

Managerialism achieved through hierarchical planning coordination in the planned economy. Redistributive urban and regional policies to counter the side-effects or even impasse of accumulation in the shortage economy. Imbalanced regional resource allocation and capital extraction from the rural and resource-rich regions through state compulsory purchase.

Urban–rural dualism.

Rising localities, in particular the city as the basic organisational form of development. Dominance of large cities, especially growth of core cities at expense of its region.

Urban entrepreneurialism.

Fierce inter-city competition.

City-leading-county administrative system reform. Devolution of planning control within the metropolitan area.

Uncoordinated and redundant infrastructure development. Environmental degradation, especially encroachment of rural land.

Downscaling towards grassroots; smaller units to maintain social stability: ‘communities building’ at intra-urban scale. Up-scaling towards the city-region, but this scale is only a layer of ‘soft institution’ without legislation or administrative power.

Consolidation of controlling mechanism, land quotes and promotion of cadres.

The city region as an ‘imagined community’ but continues to see conflicting and diverse interests. Region-building is achieved through both top-down and bottom-up processes, but the central government lacks full commitment towards a region; and local governance lacks a participatory political legitimisation process.

State work-units as the essential scale of production and social production. Absence of the ‘municipality’ as the provider of collective consumption. Early market reformist regime, 1979–2001

Post-WTO market society, 2001–present

Spatial plans, especially the centrally-initiated coordination plan for larger city regions, locally formed ‘urban and town clusters plans’, provincial formulated sub-regional plans. Administrative annexation to pacify contention between nearby administrative units. Building regional soft institutions, such as mayors meeting, joint regional forum/councils.

demanded production regions to turn over their revenue to the state. In other words, the state extracted most revenue from production regions. It was this mechanism that laid down the basis of regional inequalities under state socialism. The industrial sector policies tend to emphasise the relocation of heavy industries to the remote and inner regions, for the sake of national defence in the Cold War. The so-called ‘Third Front’ created scattered industrial districts, largely outside the local production system. The intention of this redistribution of industries was to be part of overall import-substitute and industrially-prioritised strategies, rather than to achieve the objective of regionally balanced development. Regional policies therefore had to be adopted to counter such a tendency of increasing spatial inequality,

Regional inequalities based on socialist internal division of labour.

so as to make the system sustainable. Regional policies were thus redistributive, or literally, as said in Chinese literature, ‘blood transfusion’. Under state socialism, such macro-regional inequalities had never been resolved, despite some concern of the senior leadership, in particular Mao Zedong. Regional inequalities, just like rural–urban dualism, were major problems, according to Mao. But these problems were deeply embedded in state socialism. Just as in the sphere of social reproduction (Nee, 1991), the state performed redistributive functions in regional development. It was essentially a ‘redistributive state’. Ironically, just like the debate over urban-biased or rural-biased urbanisation in the literature of China’s urbanisation (Lin, 1998), the state did not favour the rural areas, though it adopted anti-urbanism policies. This is the basic feature of state-

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led industrialisation (Wu, 2007). The state proposed many policies, such as the Peoples’ Communes and the Great Leap Forward, to transform rural areas. But these policies failed and did not help the development of rural areas. In regional development, the redistributive regional policy was a counter reaction towards regional inequalities that were created by state industrial policies in addition to national strategic industrial allocation. To sum up, the ‘redistributive’ regional policy was a necessary state governance strategy to address its predatory resource allocation under the planned economy. 11.3. Emergence of entrepreneurial urban governance In Western Europe, Brenner (2004a, 2004b) provides a comprehensive review of restructuring state spaces and the emergence of urban entrepreneurialism, following the seminal account of Lefebvre (2002[1978]) about capitalist states necessarily surviving in space, and Harvey, 1989 analysis of the transformation of governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. He emphasises that this change is a reaction towards Fordist crisis and the rise of globalisation strategies. Brenner (2004b: 471) particularly points out that the dismantling of western municipal Keynesianism and entrepreneurial urban strategies in the 1980s ‘were articulated under conditions in which neoliberal policy orthodoxies were acquiring an unprecedented influence, leading to the systematic marginalization of traditional national compensatory regional policies’. In China, the national condition was economic reform initiated in 1979, starting a series of market developments. This ‘growth first’ mentality is a key parameter for fostering an ideological foundation for entrepreneurial governance. In the organisational aspect, economic devolution is extensively documented by sociologists (Walder, 1995) and economists (Qian & Weingast, 1997). Ma (2005) and Shen (2005) examine the development of urban scale through administrative adjustment. Wu (2002a) analyses the downscaling of urban governance towards urban districts within the municipality. Zhu (1999) and Zhang (2002) describe the consequent pro-growth coalition and land politics. More recently, there has been an emerging literature of Chinese urban and regional governance (e.g., Wu, 2002a; Wu & Zhang, 2007, 2008; Xu & Yeh, 2005). To sum up, since the 1990s we have seen weakened hierarchical control and an established city-based entrepreneurial governance. The post-reform economic landscape is consistently characterised by economic

devolution and rising local entrepreneurialism, which has led to fierce intercity competition. 11.4. The entrepreneurial city in crisis At the turn of this century, the limitation of the entrepreneurial city has begun to be revealed. China’s entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) led to a boom of export-oriented industries in the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta and other major coastal cities. Along with China’s transformation into a world factory, external and internal constraints began to show themselves. Externally, the export-oriented development of labour-intensive products caused trade friction; and internally, cities engaged in no-win fierce inter-city competition, causing the construction of redundant infrastructure and industries, at the expense of the environment. The failure of ‘regional policy’ is in part attributed to the downscaling of governance to the city scale. The GDPism sets up an explicit economic target for local governments. This pressure leads to further allocation of targets down the administrative hierarchy. In Chinese, this is known as dividing the task to the lower layer of government (cengceng fenjie or, literally, dividing the overall growth target and disaggregating the divided targets along the tier); because official appointment is closely related to, and in fact based on, the performance of GDP growth, local actors are given incentives together with discretionary power. Such downscaling defeats the possibility of inter-city coordination, as each locality wants to develop its projects inside its territory, so as to expand the tax base. Recently we have seen the strengthening of regulatory control. For example, in land management, a series of consolidation policies have been put forward, such as the quotas of land and ‘basic agricultural land’ system. But the major change occurs at the regional level. In the next section, we turn to a series of regionbuilding practices. 11.5. Emerging city region governance The problematic fierce inter-city competition has been recognised by both competing city governments and the central government. To cope with the crisis of entrepreneurial cities, three major instruments have evolved from their original purpose of serving local entrepreneurialism. These are: spatial strategic plans; administrative annexation; and the development of regional soft institutions.

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11.5.1. Proliferation of spatial plans and strategies To achieve better inter-city coordination, the government has recently been keen to promote spatial plans and development strategies across a wider region. The new plans include the National Urban System Plan, the Pearl River Delta Coordination Plan, the Urban System Plan of the Yangtze River Delta, led by the Ministry of Construction, and the Yangtze River Delta Regional Plan, led by National Development (NDRC). It is hoped that these plans will be approved by the National Peoples’ Congress, so as to gain statutory status. The national urban system plan prepared by the Chinese Academy of Urban Planning and Design (CAUPD), for example, is currently more like a research than a statutory plan. Its status in the planning system is not totally clear; neither is how the plan would be implemented. There is a wide range of new spatial strategic plans prepared by local governments. Increasingly these plans are used to foster regional coordination and governance. However, the making of some spatial strategic plans is still detached from the actual politics of development, and hence their implementation becomes questionable. Nevertheless, there is interesting progress in the development of spatial plans. 11.5.2. Administrative annexation leading to ‘metropolitanisation’ The major administrative change is annexation of counties into the core city, or the so-called ‘city-leadingcounty’ system (Ma, 2005). By assigning counties near the core city to its leadership, the core city is allowed to tap into the resources of its hinterland. While administrative annexation helped to support the core city, increasingly it is used to solve inter-city conflicts, or to pacify friction between different administrative units (Zhang & Wu, 2006). Administrative annexation based on the core city has led to ‘metropolitanisation’. This consolidates the core local government, to create a larger tax base for funding infrastructure or to pool resources involving different tiers of the state, and help to leverage foreign investment. 11.5.3. Building soft regional institutions, such as regional associations Fierce inter-city competition is harmful for individual cities. There have been some spontaneous activities to develop some coordination mechanisms. In 1996, the Coordination Association of Urban Economies in the

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Yangtze River Delta (YRD) was established. The mayors of the cities are the members of this association (Luo & Shen, 2007), which developed cooperation in transport, tourism and human resources management. In 2000, the Forum of Economic Collaboration between Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang was developed to form the channel of communication between senior officials of these provincial-level governments. Another example is the development of the so-called ‘Pan-Pearl River Delta’ (Pan-PRD), which represents just such an effort of building regional soft institutions. The Pan-PRD includes nine provinces (Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian and Hainan) and two special administrative regions (SARs) (i.e., Hong Kong and Macao) (see chapters in this issue about PRD and Hong Kong). Hence the Pan-PRD is also known as nine + two, which covers one-fifth of the land area and one-third of the population, 40% of GDP, and 58% of FDI in China (Yeung, 2005). However, the central government’s attitude towards Pan-PRD is ambiguous, because the scale of Pan-PRD is too large to create a regional governance body; to do so would forge some substantial local power, which might challenge the central government. Indeed, PanPRD is only formed on the basis of loosely assembled parties and lacks the mechanisms of binding and enforcement. Pan-PRD is therefore neither an upscaling of the provincial government to a regional scale, nor the downscaling of the central government towards a large region. 11.6. Conclusion Today in China, we are seeing the revival of ‘regional’ policies, but they are constructed at a different scale—the city region. The formation of city-based region policies is driven by two separate but interrelated forces. Jonas and Ward (2007: 176) argue that ‘the emergence of city-regions [is] as the product of a particular set of economic, cultural, environmental and political projects, each with their own logics’. In the Chinese context, there are two contradictory logics: first, entrepreneurial governance continues and extends from the city-based to a regionalbased scale. Secondly, the state’s reaction to the ramifications of entrepreneurial cities is to consolidate a regulatory space at the regional level, which leads to emerging city region governance.

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CHAPTER 12. The city region as a new state space Ronald K. Vogel There is much discussion of global city regions as ‘new state spaces’ in global governance. Our comparative focus on the US, Canada, the UK, Japan and China confirms that the city region has emerged as a central territorial scale in the world economy. States actively pursue policies to foster greater regional integration. However, there is much less evidence of the city region as an autonomous political scale within and across nationstates. As Jonas and Ward (2007) suggest, the territory of the city region exhibits signs of regional policies, but many of these policies are selective decisions of regional agencies or higher level regional or central governments. Let us briefly review the cases covered in this monograph. 12.1. In the West Scholars have noted for the past decade the emergence of new regionalism (Savitch & Vogel, 1996, 2000), metropolitan governance without government (Barlow, 1991; Lefe`vre, 1998), global city regions (Scott, 2001), new state spaces, reterritorialisation, and rescaling (Brenner, 2004a). Scholars and policy makers alike are struggling to understand and adapt the new state space, the city region, to the existing framework of local and regional governance in light of dramatic changes in international trade and the rise of global cities. In the West, this rescaling is linked to massive economic restructuring, including deindustrialisation and the rise of the new service economy, and growing concerns about urban decline and out-of-control sprawl. Neil Brenner (2004b) describes ‘state rescaling . . . as an expression, medium, and outcome of diverse political strategies designed to enhance the place and territoryspecific competitive advantages of particular subnational political jurisdictions’. Chapter 2 identified a number of rescaling strategies states employ to enhance the economic competitiveness of their global cities. New York City (Chapter 6) reflects the polycentric model dominant in the US. Surprisingly, we saw that the ‘region manages the forces of globalisation and competes in the international marketplace without a well organised system of governance that can impose regional political cooperation’. Although in the late 18th century, a monocentric regional government was created by the consolidation of Manhattan with the boroughs, sprawling suburbanisation over the 20th century means the scale no longer corresponds to

metropolis. There is no metropolitan government for the city region, nor even a clear framework of governance. Rather, regional development policy results from selective regional agencies or public benefit corporations, such as the Port Authority, the Metropolitan Planning Authority and the New York Empire State Development Corporation, strongly influenced by the governors of the states of New Jersey and New York. Thus, the two state governments through the public benefit corporations can use these to ‘safeguard compelling state interests in regional development’. This is most evident in regional transportation policies. There is a politics of governance and state reterritorialisation occurring within the larger city region, but this does not add up to a new autonomous global city region scale, except as a sporadic and temporary object of pluralist bargaining. Political integration has not kept pace with economic integration and there is little indication that it will be strengthened in the future. Although this has proven sufficient to ensure NYC remains a competitive global city, it is insufficient to address issues of social justice, such as spatial inequality, or to adopt redistributive policy. In contrast to New York, London has seen the restoration of metropolitan or regional government (Chapter 7). However, while the regional scale has been restored, the scope of authority is much more focused on strategic policies to promote world city London. Yet, even with a regional government in place, ‘there is a complex institutional landscape, including 32 borough councils, the City Corporation, numerous public– private partnerships, privatised government agencies and companies delivering essential services’. The regional economy also extends well beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of the Greater London Authority (GLA). The chapter reviewing London reveals that effective governance of the larger London city region is still lacking. Interestingly, we see that London effectively plays the ‘‘‘world city’’ card’ to win greater support from the central government for infrastructure and transportation investment. The strong mayor in London has so far proven successful. The former radical Ken Livingstone proved remarkably adept at forging ties with the business community and advancing a corporate-centred development strategy focused on central London. The recent defeat of Ken Livingstone by Conservative Boris Johnson resulted from a ‘‘‘highly aggressive’’ suburban strategy’. A new state scale for regional planning has been designated to further cement London’s competitiveness in the world economy and shift development eastwards. The Thames Gateway project focuses on ‘three English

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regions and spans 19 local authorities, in addition to the GLA’. There is no single governing body, but rather various cabinet committees and sub-regional agencies, as well as development corporations and an Olympic Development Authority. There is little coordination and regional planning is weak. This new scale may be the object of governments, but can hardly be viewed as an autonomous city region. The case of London does not seem much different from New York. Toronto (Chapter 5) illustrates an alternative model of governing city regions to that of New York or London. Many agree that a new territorial scale is needed to ensure the economic competitiveness of Canada’s major global cities—Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal. A strong movement occurred to elevate the status of cities in the federal constitution and even to create a Toronto city state. In large measure, this new state space has been accepted and is now the object of more focused regional development. However, there is no new political jurisdiction created to plan and govern this scale. Rather, the provincial governments themselves directly plan and administer the regional scale. The global cities still have an extensive and significant role in planning their strategies to compete in the world economy. However, they have been rebuffed in their efforts to bring the larger region under their authority. As the case of Toronto reveals, although Toronto’s authority has been augmented, Ontario, not Toronto, decides the significant planning issues, including land use and infrastructure in the Toronto city region. Indeed, the Toronto city region is just one of several nodes of the Greater Golden Horseshoe (GGH). Ontario has adopted a Greenbelt within the GGH and retains the authority to develop growth plans to receive close to four million new residents in the next several decades, with the primary objective of preventing sprawl. This is not multi-level governance, but direct provincial administration for this new territorial scale with little public awareness. The chapter suggests that a multi-level governance arrangement or cooperative regional governance council would have had difficulty agreeing on a plan, and debate over the regional boundaries might have forestalled its creation in the first place. As the chapter concludes, in Canada the provinces ‘are now in the process of becoming the much-needed governments of our city regions’. 12.2. East: Tokyo, Hong Kong and Shanghai Economic reform in China unleashed rapid urbanisation in the last two decades. As Chapter 3 discussed, this has led to a polycentric spatial form not unlike that

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in the US. Not surprisingly, it has also led to intense competition among cities for growth, development and revenues. Several concerns arise related to the sprawl, including increasing political fragmentation and the need to better plan urban regions. At the same time, the central government is seeking to distribute economic activities more rationally across regions in China. There is not a political jurisdiction for the city region. There are few mechanisms to coordinate regional policy that cross jurisdictions, although the central government continues to intervene to pursue national objectives, but not in a coordinated fashion. The national ministries pursue separate objectives and compete with these interministerial conflicts reflected in regional planning. After examining Tokyo as a point of contrast in Asia, we will review the cases of Hong Kong and Shanghai. Tokyo (Chapter 8) is perhaps the epitome of a strong integrated metropolitan government with a wide scale, with more than 12 million people directly under its authority. Yet, even in Tokyo, the new regional state scale cannot be contained in this vessel. A larger metropolitan region exists with a loose regional institutional base: the Metropolitan Summit, including Tokyo and its three neighbouring prefectures. The Metropolitan Summit provides a platform to forge a unified regional position, but has only a weak institutional base. In reality, regional policy is set by the Governor of Tokyo Metropolitan Government, in alliance with the Prime Minister, to designate global city Tokyo as the centrepiece of Japan’s national economy, in the same way that London serves for the UK. Just as in London and New York, Tokyo officials use the global city as the rationale for a privileged share of infrastructure investment. Historically, Tokyo’s wealth was redistributed throughout the nation, consistent with national values favouring reducing inequality and subsidising rural communities. Increasing pressure to open its markets and adopt neo-liberal trade policies, as well as the bubble bursting in the 1980s, made it more difficult to keep the bargain. Fiscal crisis at the national level, coupled with pressure from Tokyo, led to a new bargain to greatly reduce the redistributive policies and concentrate infrastructure and investment in Tokyo as the nation’s leading global city. The strategy is to more tightly integrate the Tokyo metropolis, with Tokyo succeeding in persuading the central government to accept its agenda as the national agenda. A new state space has emerged, with governance resulting from a partnership between the prime minister and the Governor of Tokyo. Here the city region under the global city metropolitan government has used national power to extend its reach and successfully pursue a regional development policy.

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12.3. Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta Hong Kong is actually the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the People’s Republic of China ‘one country, two systems’ agreement set up as part of the British return of Hong Kong. Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy from the mainland under this arrangement. In the decade since the handover, there has been considerable economic integration between Hong Kong and the adjacent Pearl River Delta of the mainland. Initially, after the turnover in 1998, there was reluctance in Hong Kong towards greater political integration as the populace feared greater control by China. The selection of a new Chief Executive in Hong Kong led to renewed efforts to forge closer regional ties. The basis for greater regionalism is a series of intergovernmental agreements and mechanisms between Hong Kong and Guangdong province in 2003. The Governor of Guangdong and the Chief Executive in Hong Kong have set up a framework for the two governments to meet regularly and establish common policies for economic development, infrastructure, tourism and public health (e.g., SARS). Hong Kong officials also work through Beijing to address some regional development issues. Chapter 9 reviews the specific mechanisms of coordination, including the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which allows Hong Kong products to enter the mainland without tariffs. Hong Kong is now also included in regional and national plans in the mainland, including the 11th National Five Year Plan. Hong Kong and Guangdong have launched a joint study of regional planning. In addition, Hong Kong and Guangdong are seeking greater coordination in infrastructure in the border areas, in order to better integrate rail, highways and bridges to ease movement of people and goods. Chapter 10 reports on the case of Shenzhen, just a short distance from Hong Kong, which is now in a position to compete with Hong Kong. Yet, the two cities have actually found that cooperation on airports may serve both their interests. Even before the return of Hong Kong, the Pearl River Delta had become Hong Kong’s factory. Hong Kong also serves as the link between Chinese cities and the world economy although, in the longer run, Hong Kong could be eclipsed by China’s new global cities, such as Shanghai. Certainly, there is not a single autonomous regional government encompassing Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta. Economic integration certainly preceded political integration. However, regional

political integration is occurring through cooperative agreements between Hong Kong and Guangdong Province and Hong Kong and Beijing. The city region as a territorial unit is cohering in the policy-making arenas but not as a single regional political entity. Indeed, it does appear that a new state space has emerged, not just as the focus of development decisions, but with a set of enduring political arrangements to guide development decisions. In addition, there are increasing social and business ties underscoring a regional identity that is also linked through a shared culture and language (Cantonese) that has outlasted the past half century of Cold War politics. 12.4. Shanghai The case of Shanghai reveals the growing role of market forces. Shanghai has adapted to the market and remains an important player. Although national economic reform opened the door to international investment, regional rather than national forces are increasingly shaping local land development and urban form. Fiscal decentralisation is strengthening the local and regional governments, which may eclipse the centre in the future. However, more centralised revenue collection since 1994 has left many local governments in need of more extra-budgetary sources. Shanghai is sprawling, with the central core housing the service sector, commercial activity and affluent residents, and the periphery housing new high-tech industries and large housing developments. Heavy manufacturing is shifting to the hinterlands. Planning is weak, with local governments seeking to enhance revenues by creating their own development companies. Not unlike cities in the US, the market is eclipsing the state in shaping the urban form. However, an important distinction is that Shanghai also enjoys the status of province. Thus, the municipal boundaries coincide with the regional boundaries and the city does have the ability to limit the sprawl if it desired. 12.5. Conclusion In Chapter 1, we asked: what is the importance of global city regions in the world economy and how are they are formed? Neil Brenner theorises that ‘new state spaces’ are evolving as a function of economic restructuring and globalisation in the Western world. A new economic order based in neo-liberal ideology embraces free trade, de-regulation, and limited government, and is organised around the city region rather than the nation-state. The decline of the metro model belies

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the need for greater coordination and cooperation to ensure the competitiveness of global city regions. Thus, we see greater reliance on a governance approach. However, Andrew Jonas and Kevin Ward (2007) caution us that we must look to the actual politics of city regionalism rather than assume city regions are ‘autonomous’. Rather, they argue that a different regional scale may evolve in different policy areas. The review of China and the West in this volume, specifically the cases of London, New York, Toronto, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Shanghai, provide an empirical reference set to explore the politics of city regionalism. It does appear that a city region governance framework has evolved in these locations, albeit incomplete and imperfect. However, only in the case of Shanghai does the city region correspond to the municipal boundaries. Still, the world cities under consideration have been able to compete effectively in the world economy and even attain some semblance of regional policy. The strongest examples of a city region defining and implementing a global city strategy appear to be London and Tokyo. Hong Kong and Guangdong Province have also developed a clear set of agreements and forged a number of collaborative policies. While Hong Kong does not dictate regional policy, it certainly has a strong role in shaping these policies. Even New York, which clearly lacks a city region political framework, has through pluralist bargaining managed to ensure a modicum of regional policy to support its global aspirations. The exception may be Toronto, which appears to be a case of the provincial government assuming responsibility for city region policy from above, with little consultation of the city region or its local governments. Shanghai has the potential, given it is a municipality and a province. However, its development strategy relies on embracing the market and it has not been willing to engage in strong planning. Certainly, the politics of city regionalism and the administrative forms it takes are a function of the specific historical, cultural and political circumstances and geography of city regions. Globalisation has not led to a distinct form of regional government. However, we do find that all of the global city regions considered struggle to develop an effective system of regional governance to address common problems and globalisation. In the last decade, the scale of urbanisation has outpaced that of governments to adjust their boundaries. Governance, rather than government, is the key focus of policy makers. Turning to the question of China versus the West, we find at one level the forces driving change and the

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responses are not dissimilar. In both East and West, globalisation is shaping patterns of urban development, undermining distinctive local cultures, and leading to greater inequalities. Wide acceptance of free trade policies and neo-conservative ideologies apparent in the West are also embraced in China. At least three factors separate the responses to globalisation. First, in China, democracy is only a recent and emerging concern and to date does not greatly impinge on the decision-making process of national, regional or local governmental actors. Second, the stage of development in China is still low compared to the West, although catching up. Third, and perhaps the most important point to make, however, is that the contexts of rescaling in the West and China are quite different. In China, there is a strong national state that is regulating and mediating the market. In the West, the nation-state is increasingly leaving this to the markets, not without criticism. China is still in a position to dictate which city regions emerge and what role they play in the world economy. However, as the case of Shanghai revealed, entrepreneurialism and unleashed market forces are weakening state controls and over time the centre can be expected to play less of a role. Acknowledgements The papers in this volume stem from a three-day workshop on Governing Global City-regions in China and the West, held at the University of Hong Kong, 2–4 June 2008. I am indebted to the Fulbright programme, which supported my year as a Visiting Professor in American Studies at the University of Hong Kong. I am especially grateful to Dr Dixon Wong Heung Wah, Head of The School of Modern Languages and Cultures, University of Hong Kong, and Dr Glenn Shive, Executive Director of Hong Kong-America Center, for providing generous financial support and advice. In addition, great assistance and encouragement were provided by Professor Kam Louie, Dean of Faculty of Arts, University of Hong Kong, The US Consulate General in Hong Kong & Macau, and Ms Josephine Kwok, programme assistant in the School of Modern Languages and Cultures, University of Hong Kong. The research presented in Chapter 3 is supported by the General Research Fund of the Research Grants Council of HKSAR (Project code: CUHK453609), the South China Programme of Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (Project code: 6902649), the Mrs Li Ka Shing Fund and Strategic Research Theme in

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Bibliographical details Peter T.Y. Cheung is associate professor and director of the MPA Programme in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Washington, Seattle. He is also the coordinator of the Greater Pearl River Delta and Hong Kong Research Area of the Strategic Research Theme on Contemporary China Studies at the University of Hong Kong. His research focuses on the relations between the central government in Beijing and Hong Kong, cross-boundary cooperation in south China and the politics of policy making in Hong Kong. Paul Kantor (PhD University of Chicago) is professor of political science at Fordham University in New York City. He is author of numerous articles and books on American politics, comparative urban politics, and economic development, including The dependent city revisited and co-author of Cities in the international marketplace: the political economy of urban development in North America and Western Europe. Kantor was the Fulbright John Marshall Distinguished Chair in Political Science (Hungary) in 2005–06 and served as Fulbright Senior Specialist Scholar at universities in Italy and the Netherlands. He is former President of the American Political Science Association Urban Politics Section.

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Peter Newman is professor of comparative urban planning at the University of Westminster in London. He has written widely on urban governance and planning. He is co-author of two books on policy and planning in European cities (Urban planning in Europe, Routledge, 1996, and Governance of Europe’s city regions, Routledge, 2002) and has written on the planning challenges facing world cities in North America and Asia (Planning world cities, Palgrave, 2005, and Century Publishing Group, 2010). In 2006–07 he was Professeur invite´ at the Institut d’Urbanisme de Paris, University of Paris XII. Andrew Sancton, a native of Montreal, received his doctoral degree in politics from Oxford University in 1978. Most of his academic career has been spent at the University of Western Ontario in London, where he is a professor in the Department of Political Science. He was Chair of the Department from 2000 until 2005. He is now director of the Department’s Local Government Program, which offers undergraduate and graduate education in public administration for municipal managers. Professor Sancton’s latest book, The limits of boundaries: why city-regions cannot be self-governing, was one of five books shortlisted for the Donner Prize for the best book in Canadian public policy in 2008. H. V. Savitch is the Brown and Williamson Distinguished Research Professor, School of Urban and Public Affairs, University of Louisville. He has published 10 books on urban development, public policy and regional governance. His latest work is entitled Cities in a time of terror: space, territory and local resilience. His more than 80 articles have appeared in leading journals, collected works and research outlets. Savitch served as a consultant to numerous governmental agencies. He has been a Lady Davis Fellow at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel) and a visiting scholar at the National Institute for Scientific Research (France). He has also been a Fulbright Scholar, including a most recent assignment at the University of Chile, in Santiago. Jianfa Shen is professor in the Department of Geography and Resource Management in The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Director of Urban and Regional Development in Pacific Asia Programme, Hong Kong Institute of AsiaPacific Studies. His research interests include urbanisation, migration, urban and regional development/governance in China. He has undertaken research funded by the Hong Kong Research Grant Council and the Central Policy Unit of HKSAR government. His co-edited books include Resource management, urbanization and governance in Hong Kong and the Zhujiang Delta and The Pan-Pearl River Delta: an emerging regional economy in a globalizing China (The Chinese University Press). Takashi Tsukamoto is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. His research interests include comparative urban politics, globalisation and cities, and regional governance. A recent co-authored work is included in Governing cities in a global era: urban innovation, competition, and democratic reform (Palgrave). Ronald K. Vogel is professor of political science and urban and public affairs and chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Louisville. He heads the Comparative Urban Politics group in the American Political Science Association. In 2007–08 he was a Fulbright Scholar in American Studies at the University of Hong Kong and in 1997–98 at the Centre for Urban Studies at Tokyo Metropolitan University. He is co-author with John Harrigan of Political change in the metropolis, soon to be in its ninth edition. He is currently working on a book with Hank Savitch that compares rescaling of cities around the world. Fulong Wu is professor of East Asian planning and development at Cardiff University. His main research specialities include urban and regional governance and Chinese cities. He is co-editor (with Laurence Ma) of Restructuring the Chinese city (Routledge, 2005), editor of Globalization and the Chinese city (Routledge, 2006), China’s emerging cities (Routledge, 2007) and co-author (with Jiang Xu and Anthony Gar-On Yeh) of Urban development in post-reform China: state, market, and space (Routledge, 2007). Weiping Wu is a professor in the programmes of Urban Studies and Planning, and International Studies at Virginia Commonwealth University. She conducts research and publishes widely in the areas of urban economic geography, local innovation and university-industry linkage, migrant housing and settlement, and China’s urban development.

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A consultant to the World Bank since 1994, she also is an editor of the Journal of Planning Education and Research. She has published four books, including Pioneering economic reform in China’s Special Economic Zones, The dynamics of urban growth in three Chinese cities, Local dynamics in a globalizing world, and Facets of globalization: international and local dimensions of development. Jiang Xu is assistant professor of the Department of Geography and Resource Management, the Chinese University of Hong Kong. She is an urban and regional specialist, and is leading research projects in intercity competition and cooperation as well as urban and regional governance in China. Dr Xu has published widely on urban and regional development in leading international journals and co-authored the book, Urban development in post reform China: state, market and space (Routledge, 2007) (with F. Wu and Anthony G.O. Yeh). She is the recipient of the 2008 Research Output Prize of the University of Hong Kong. Anthony Yeh is academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and chair professor and head of the Department of Urban Planning and Design and Director of the Centre of Urban Studies and Urban Planning of the University of Hong Kong. His main areas of specialisation are in urban development and planning in Hong Kong and China and the applications of GIS in urban and regional planning. At present, he is Secretary-General of the Asian Planning Schools Association and Asia GIS Association. He is on the editorial boards of key international and Chinese journals and has published over 30 books and monographs and over 180 academic journal papers and book chapters. He received the 2008 UN-HABITAT Lecture Award for his outstanding and sustained contribution to research, thinking and practice in the human settlements field. Fangzhu Zhang is a research associate with the Centre for Advanced Studies at Cardiff University. Her main research interests include innovation and regional development in China. She co-edited a special issue on ‘Planning the Chinese city’ in Town Planning Review (2008) and published an article in Regional Studies.