- Email: [email protected]
Government information goes on-line
ABSTRACTS
J PRODINNOV MANAG
i993;7:1%-7il
nologies have matured to the point that R&D departments cannot comer markets. “Not invented here” must die, and most firms will be working out of technology pools rather than their own controlled inventories of technology. Inventions will more and more be market driven. Unfortunately, many managements weaken their own R&D capability by how they respond to threats of take-over, global restructuring, etc. They reorient their R&D to the short term. Consequently, another force leading to market-driven product innovation is the increasing inability of corporaiions to develop longerterm technological breakthroughs. This trend to market-driven innovation shows up in the demise of many corporate research labs. The author claims that after Bell & Howell dropped theirs, there was a “number” of successful innovations in the next decade, rather than the zero of the previous decade. Central R&D is too far from the marketplace. R&D shows several distinct trends at the moment. One is the popular simultaneous and parallel development approach. The author calls it multtictional (not multidisciplinary, as used in multiple sciences). The old linear model is far too slow and fraught with organizational barriers. Marketing must be in the act from the very beginning. The second characteristic of the moment is for ad hoc or changing R&D organization forms: teams for specific innovations. This leaves central R&D facilities to serve as technical resources responding to team needs. They are reactive, not proactive. The author also sees a restructuring of the very concept of R&D stemming from the services sector. There, the traditional manufacturing concept of R&D is not appropriate, yet there are major technological issues. They relate to information generation, processing, transmission and storage. Again, the nature of these businesses is such that the R&D work must be fully integrated into ongoing operations, not isolated or centralized. Government Information Goes On-Line, Henry H. Per&t, Jr., Z’ectrnobgy Review (NovemberDecember 1989), pp. 60-G “In January 1989, the Federal Maritime Commission asked for proposals to create new electronic tariff system that would allow anyone with a per-
167
sonal computer and modem to receive i&o=tion from the agency on-line.” And in the process, the FMC intensified a running debate about how government data should be made available to the public. On the one hand, public interest groups hail the agency’s ~roposd, saying it will improve public access to the FMC’s public information.But, private-sector data base firms argue that their businesses would be threatened. At the moment, these vendors package and resell such data (along with data from many other sources, including nongovemment). The vendors also claim that in fact the data will be less accessible than if included in their packages, and if the agencies themselves do it their service will be very poor. For example, official copies of Supreme Court decisions are not available until several years after the decisions are announced. The issue is a big one, given the amount and importance of government data. The Office of Management and Budget has argued that the government should not be in the electronic publishing business, at least not in the retail end of it. Wholesaling such data to the data base packagers is viewed as their proper role. The Patent OfIke up until recently reked to wholesale their data, instead selling it to individuals. But they lost a suit by a data vendor and now make tapes available. Public interest groups feel that the data base firmsare an unnecessary intervention, that lots of government data are not enough in demand to make vendors present them to the market. If the government only wholesales agency data, they in fact are denying access to whatever parts are no? considered profitable by the data base firms. Currently, some twenty-five agencies and court jurisdictions are either providing their data electronically or are planning to do so. For example, if one wants to see SEC data, there are two choices: go to the SEC reference room in Washington and use a terminal there, or pay a Subscriber fee to Disclosure Inc. For the US legal ntin her pay the Government code, it i or contact a private sector servic Ofike $6, that offers on-iine access. A few agencies are experimenting with an a~preach that involves selling software to users so the users can access governmental data via their own computers and modems. A few others Cur-
168
ABSTRACTS
J PRODINNOV MANAG 1990;7: m-70
rently supply some data on optical disks (CDROMs). It now appears we will end up with a multiple system that offers information several ways, depending on an analysis of each situation. If the agency has data in a form that can be accessed easily, and if no large vendor service is ready to do the job, the agency will retail the data. If the data need large-scale preparation, then the private sector will be invited to do it. Agencies that prepare on-line data for their own use will be encouraged to make it available to the public. Most people involved agree that the government will typically not do data distribution as well as or as cheaply as private services. Where Forecasters Go Wrong, Steven P. Schnaars, Across the Board (December 1989), pp. 38-45 In 1955 David Sarnoff (RCA Corporation) predicted that by 1980 we would see private fleets of helicopters clogging the airways, guided missiles being used to deliver mail, a lower crime rate, etc. Roughly 80% of all technological forecasts turn out to be wrong. But right now billions of dollars are riding on forecasts for high-definition television, smart cards and battery-powered cars; all could turn out to be terribly wrong. How can managers identify those forecasts that are most likely to be wrong? This article attempts to tell us. First, managers should be wary of any forecasts that predicts accelerating growth rates. This is also true of any forecast that predicts dra-
matic change. Avoid those who talk of “new eras” and “turbulent times.” The evidence seems to be that things are changing more slowly today, with the 1980s being a time of remarkable economic and social stability. Some published research has found that “damp and depressing forecasts” (at the time) turned out to be the most accurate. Moreover, the author challenges us to find instances where firms successfully predicted longterm trends and acted upon them. In fact, most success traces to incremental change, with continued improvement over time, Second, avoid any forecast where the forecaster is in love with the technology. The author cites projections for synthetic and other forms of totally new foods as an example. Because there
are proteins in petroleum, people long ago forecast that we would stop burning such a good source of food. Another example of technology blinding is the home shopping market, with Penny’s Telaction and Warner-Amax’s CUBE cited. Currently, IBM and Sears are taking a very slow approach on Prodigy, and it may have a better chance. A third weakness of technological forecasters is their boundless enthusiasm. They spot visions that do not materialize, or they overpredict trends. Forecasts for the computer, the microwave oven and the videocassette tape recorder were all way off their mark. Even the fax machine was invented nearly a hundred years ago, and we had to wait until the past few years for machines that made better and cheaper copies. The author points out that forecasts generated through a Delphi study “did not seem to do any better than those that were not.” Lastly, managers should watch out for forecasts that rely on underlying technological changes yet do not clearly identify needs for them.
consumer
The best overall strategy is to emphasize flexibility of response and adaptability to unexpected events, rather than trying to anticipate them. And it would seem better to speed lots of new products to market, depending on “power in numbers rather than power in forecasting.” The author cites the running shoe industry as an example of firms which do just that. Does the Engineer Forget the User?, Knut Holt, Design Studies (July 1989), pp. 163-168
This author, a long-time engineer and professor at the University of Trondheim (Norway), opened the article by confessing his early years i:r design work where he was concerned only about the engineering of the products and not at all about the consumer’s use of them. He posed the topic of this article by asking whether things have changed. Clearly, this is not an empirical paper, though the author did survey the literature. From one study on the subject, the author quotes a comment: “It appears that most products are developed by 30-year-old men with full strength in their hands and excellent vision.” And he cites some other studies that claim designers only rarely find out what the needs of the user are.
J PRODINNOV MANAG
i993;7:1%-7il
nologies have matured to the point that R&D departments cannot comer markets. “Not invented here” must die, and most firms will be working out of technology pools rather than their own controlled inventories of technology. Inventions will more and more be market driven. Unfortunately, many managements weaken their own R&D capability by how they respond to threats of take-over, global restructuring, etc. They reorient their R&D to the short term. Consequently, another force leading to market-driven product innovation is the increasing inability of corporaiions to develop longerterm technological breakthroughs. This trend to market-driven innovation shows up in the demise of many corporate research labs. The author claims that after Bell & Howell dropped theirs, there was a “number” of successful innovations in the next decade, rather than the zero of the previous decade. Central R&D is too far from the marketplace. R&D shows several distinct trends at the moment. One is the popular simultaneous and parallel development approach. The author calls it multtictional (not multidisciplinary, as used in multiple sciences). The old linear model is far too slow and fraught with organizational barriers. Marketing must be in the act from the very beginning. The second characteristic of the moment is for ad hoc or changing R&D organization forms: teams for specific innovations. This leaves central R&D facilities to serve as technical resources responding to team needs. They are reactive, not proactive. The author also sees a restructuring of the very concept of R&D stemming from the services sector. There, the traditional manufacturing concept of R&D is not appropriate, yet there are major technological issues. They relate to information generation, processing, transmission and storage. Again, the nature of these businesses is such that the R&D work must be fully integrated into ongoing operations, not isolated or centralized. Government Information Goes On-Line, Henry H. Per&t, Jr., Z’ectrnobgy Review (NovemberDecember 1989), pp. 60-G “In January 1989, the Federal Maritime Commission asked for proposals to create new electronic tariff system that would allow anyone with a per-
167
sonal computer and modem to receive i&o=tion from the agency on-line.” And in the process, the FMC intensified a running debate about how government data should be made available to the public. On the one hand, public interest groups hail the agency’s ~roposd, saying it will improve public access to the FMC’s public information.But, private-sector data base firms argue that their businesses would be threatened. At the moment, these vendors package and resell such data (along with data from many other sources, including nongovemment). The vendors also claim that in fact the data will be less accessible than if included in their packages, and if the agencies themselves do it their service will be very poor. For example, official copies of Supreme Court decisions are not available until several years after the decisions are announced. The issue is a big one, given the amount and importance of government data. The Office of Management and Budget has argued that the government should not be in the electronic publishing business, at least not in the retail end of it. Wholesaling such data to the data base packagers is viewed as their proper role. The Patent OfIke up until recently reked to wholesale their data, instead selling it to individuals. But they lost a suit by a data vendor and now make tapes available. Public interest groups feel that the data base firmsare an unnecessary intervention, that lots of government data are not enough in demand to make vendors present them to the market. If the government only wholesales agency data, they in fact are denying access to whatever parts are no? considered profitable by the data base firms. Currently, some twenty-five agencies and court jurisdictions are either providing their data electronically or are planning to do so. For example, if one wants to see SEC data, there are two choices: go to the SEC reference room in Washington and use a terminal there, or pay a Subscriber fee to Disclosure Inc. For the US legal ntin her pay the Government code, it i or contact a private sector servic Ofike $6, that offers on-iine access. A few agencies are experimenting with an a~preach that involves selling software to users so the users can access governmental data via their own computers and modems. A few others Cur-
168
ABSTRACTS
J PRODINNOV MANAG 1990;7: m-70
rently supply some data on optical disks (CDROMs). It now appears we will end up with a multiple system that offers information several ways, depending on an analysis of each situation. If the agency has data in a form that can be accessed easily, and if no large vendor service is ready to do the job, the agency will retail the data. If the data need large-scale preparation, then the private sector will be invited to do it. Agencies that prepare on-line data for their own use will be encouraged to make it available to the public. Most people involved agree that the government will typically not do data distribution as well as or as cheaply as private services. Where Forecasters Go Wrong, Steven P. Schnaars, Across the Board (December 1989), pp. 38-45 In 1955 David Sarnoff (RCA Corporation) predicted that by 1980 we would see private fleets of helicopters clogging the airways, guided missiles being used to deliver mail, a lower crime rate, etc. Roughly 80% of all technological forecasts turn out to be wrong. But right now billions of dollars are riding on forecasts for high-definition television, smart cards and battery-powered cars; all could turn out to be terribly wrong. How can managers identify those forecasts that are most likely to be wrong? This article attempts to tell us. First, managers should be wary of any forecasts that predicts accelerating growth rates. This is also true of any forecast that predicts dra-
matic change. Avoid those who talk of “new eras” and “turbulent times.” The evidence seems to be that things are changing more slowly today, with the 1980s being a time of remarkable economic and social stability. Some published research has found that “damp and depressing forecasts” (at the time) turned out to be the most accurate. Moreover, the author challenges us to find instances where firms successfully predicted longterm trends and acted upon them. In fact, most success traces to incremental change, with continued improvement over time, Second, avoid any forecast where the forecaster is in love with the technology. The author cites projections for synthetic and other forms of totally new foods as an example. Because there
are proteins in petroleum, people long ago forecast that we would stop burning such a good source of food. Another example of technology blinding is the home shopping market, with Penny’s Telaction and Warner-Amax’s CUBE cited. Currently, IBM and Sears are taking a very slow approach on Prodigy, and it may have a better chance. A third weakness of technological forecasters is their boundless enthusiasm. They spot visions that do not materialize, or they overpredict trends. Forecasts for the computer, the microwave oven and the videocassette tape recorder were all way off their mark. Even the fax machine was invented nearly a hundred years ago, and we had to wait until the past few years for machines that made better and cheaper copies. The author points out that forecasts generated through a Delphi study “did not seem to do any better than those that were not.” Lastly, managers should watch out for forecasts that rely on underlying technological changes yet do not clearly identify needs for them.
consumer
The best overall strategy is to emphasize flexibility of response and adaptability to unexpected events, rather than trying to anticipate them. And it would seem better to speed lots of new products to market, depending on “power in numbers rather than power in forecasting.” The author cites the running shoe industry as an example of firms which do just that. Does the Engineer Forget the User?, Knut Holt, Design Studies (July 1989), pp. 163-168
This author, a long-time engineer and professor at the University of Trondheim (Norway), opened the article by confessing his early years i:r design work where he was concerned only about the engineering of the products and not at all about the consumer’s use of them. He posed the topic of this article by asking whether things have changed. Clearly, this is not an empirical paper, though the author did survey the literature. From one study on the subject, the author quotes a comment: “It appears that most products are developed by 30-year-old men with full strength in their hands and excellent vision.” And he cites some other studies that claim designers only rarely find out what the needs of the user are.