Government policy and pastoral land use in southwest Iran

Journal of Arid Environments (1981) 4, 253-267

Government policy and pastoral land use in southwest Iran*

Lois Beckt Accepted 20 October 1980 Government sponsored change in Iran in the 1960s and 1970s had great impact on the nomadic pastoralism of the Qashqa'i, A national land reform was implemented, pasturelands were nationalized, tribal leaders were removed from tribal affairs, and the government controlled land use and migrations. Because of political and economic disruption caused by pasture scarcity, government restrictions, and undermined tribal institutions, a continuation of viable nomadic pastoralism was impossible for most Qashqa'i. However, revolutionary conditions in 1979 allowed a rapid reversal of these circumstances, and many Qashqa'i resumed nomadic pastoralism.

Introduction Land reform, pasture nationalization, and military control combined to deprive Iran's Qashqa'i nomadic pastoralists of their customary livelihood at a time when the nation's population had rapidly increasing needs for pastoral products. The Pahlavi regime's neglect of indigenous agriculture and pastoralism was furthered by policies of tariff-protected and subsidized meat and dairy imports, was a contributing factor to the nation's many economic ills, and had a role in the revolutionary movement. The following discussion focuses on the impact of government policy on the land use of Qashqa'i nomadic pastoralists in the 1960s and 1970s. The Qashqa'i are Turkic-speaking nomadic pastoralists whose ancestors came from Central Asia and the Caucasus and settled in the Zagros mountains of southwest Iran, probably around the fifteenth century. At first a small group of Turkic peoples, they expanded with the increment of other Turkic groups as well as Lurs, Kurds, Arabs, Persians, and gypsies. A tribal confederation was formed and consisted of approximately 400,000 individuals by the twentieth century. There are five large Qashqa'i tribes and many small ones, most of which were headed by khans who succeeded to leadership by virtue of noble lineage status and sociopolitical ties, . The Qashqa'i herded sheep and goats and made seasonal migrations up to 350 miles in length between lowlands and highlands adjacent to and within the Zagros mountains. They were organized into flexible local groups based on ties of kinship, marriage, political alliance, and economics. Qashqa'i identity focused on political leaders and groups and on cultural, linguistic, and territorial criteria.

* This paper discusses non-elite Qashqa'i, unless otherwise indicated. Anthropologicalfield research was conducted during 18 months in 1970-1, three months in 1977,and a short visit in September 1979. Most of the research was conducted in one Qashqa'i subtribe, consisting of fully nomadic, sedentary, and settling households. Some research was conducted with one tribe's ruling elite. Extensive travel and interviewing throughout Qashqa'i territory and with Qashqa'i settled in towns helped to verify data as well as to provide new perspectives. A Fulbright-Hays Fellowship and a University of Utah FaCUlty Research Grant helped to support the research. t Department of Anthropology, Washington University, St Louis, MO 63130, U.S.A. 0140-1963/81/030253 + 15 $02.00/0

© 1981 Academic Press Inc. (London) Limited

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Almost all pastoral nomadic populations in Iran were subject to the enforced settlement schemes of Reza Shah (1925-41); many were not able to regain their nomadic patterns after his abdication. The Qashqa'i, however, quickly abandoned in 1941 the imposed settled life for a return to nomadism, and they remained nomadic for several decades. This paper helps to explain why the Qashqa'i-one of the last major nomadic groups in Iran-were rapidly settling in the 1970s, and why they were able rapidly to assume nomadism again once the Pahlavi regime collapsed. The decline of nomadism among the Qashqa'i was the most obvious and dramatic of many alterations in their life styles, but it was not as significant for them as were many other aspects of political and economic change. Government sponsored changes in the 1960s and 1970s directly affected the Qashqa'i: a national land reform program was introduced, pasturelands were nationalized, the khans' tribal responsibilities were legally removed, and control over land use and migrations was put under the military. Because of far-reaching political and economic disruption-pasture scarcity, government control, undermining of tribal organization, national economic pressures, and capitalist penetration--a continuation of nomadic pastoralism was virtually impossible for most Qashqa'i. Their unique adaptation to the physical and social landscape was disappearing as they became settled agriculturalists and migrant wage laborers. The impact of government policy

As soon as Qashqa'i leaders returned to power in Fars following Reza Shah's abdication in 1941, the Qashqa'i were viewed as a threat to the Iranian state. Lacking control over the large dispersed population, the government used the tribal khans as mediators, as it had done in the past. It assigned responsibility for tribal affairs to the khans and issued them firearms. However, Qashqa'i support of Mosaddeq, the oil-nationalizing Prime Minister, in 1951-3 lost them this power and support; the four top Qashqa'i khans were exiled from Iran in 1954-6. The government hoped that the removal of the paramount Qashqa'i leaders would end its problems with the tribe, but it underestimated the organization and resiliency of tribal leadership, for other Qashqa'i khans continued handling tribal affairs. The government assigned a military officer to the Amaleh tribe, which had been headed by the paramount leaders, and, in time, also to the major khans of the other Qashqa'i tribes. In some cases this constituted fairly effective control; in others the officers were dominated by the khans. In 1960 the government abolished the title of khan and its duties and powers (collection of taxes, assignment of land use, supervision of migrations, formation of armies, settlement of tribal disputes). The military officers' functions were increased, so that they were to direct tribal affairs with the khans' advice rather than to serve only as advisors. Again, the effect of this varied in the different tribes. Several years passed before military officers had much success in handling affairs, and in the meantime many tribespeople continued to respond to the khans in customary fashion. (For coverage of the pre-1962 period, see Oberling, 1974; Cottam, 1964; Garrod, 1946; Stauffer 1963.) What radically changed the government's role from supervision to control was the introduction of the national Land Reform Law in January 1962 and its Additional Articles in January 1963. Tribal disturbances, which broke out in Fars province in 1962 and 1963, were not so much in protest against land reform as against increasing government interference in tribal affairs (Lambton, 1969: 113). The killing of a land reform official near Qashqa'i territory in 1962 was interpreted by the government as a direct attack on its reform efforts, and Arsanjani, the Minister of Agriculture, ordered the immediate implementation of land reform in Fars. The government saw the disturbances as impediments to land reform and came down heavily on the Qashqa'i; it confiscated tribal firearms and demanded that the khans be removed from tribal affairs. The severity of punishment, in contrast to the level of disturbance, suggests that the government was using the occasion to counter the threat of tribal power in Fars. It depended on the quick implementation of land reform to prove the sincerity of its efforts to alter rural land tenure and rural economic structures, and it could

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not tolerate opposition. Other social groups, such as the religious and bazaar classes, leftists, and university students, also used the occasion of land reform to make general protests against the government. The 'tribal problem' was the one, however, that could be handled most easily. Lambton writes: There have been a number of side effects from land reform, affecting rural life and the country as a whole. The improvement which has occurred in security, notably in certain districts of Fars and other tribal areas, although not the direct result of land reform, is closely connected with it. If ... real or alleged opposition to the reform had not given the government an excuse for action, the government would probably not have been able to reduce the tribal leaders of Fars as rapidly and successfully as it did (1969: 351). Tribal khans, who saw that government policies were not likely to be reversed soon and who were increasingly cut off from tribal functions, adjusted their economic activities to compensate for losses in tribal revenue from land rents and herd taxes. With changes in land tenure in operation or anticipated (land reform was not effectively enforced in all locations simultaneously) and technological innovations in agriculture, the khans turned their efforts to orchards, mechanized agriculture, and gardens. Tribespeople see the early 1960s as a time of freedom, when the khans no longer taxed them or interfered in their land use, and when the government exerted little control over them. In 1963 military governorship over the Qashqa'i by the army was deemed ineffective, and authority for tribal affairs was passed to Disciplinary Officers (Afsaran-e Entezamat) of the gendarmerie, which had been given the authority to enforce land reform. An officer was assigned to each major Qashqa'i tribe, and gendarme posts were set' up in towns near winter and summer quarters for the policing of tribal activities. The major functions of these forces, other than political and military control, were land allocation and migration regulation, tasks formerly supervised by Qashqa'i khans and headmen. This force was not immediately effective but most tribespeople found it increasingly difficult to use pastures other than those formally assigned to them. Entezamat set the commencement date for each tribe's seasonal migrations, and gendarmes, stationed in small camps at passes and bottlenecks along the routes, policed Qashqa'i migrations. Migration schedules were determined by political rather than ecological factors, and flocks suffered accordingly, having to stay too long in summer pastures, being denied the use of peak-growth pasturage along the migration routes, and so forth. The celebration of the 2500 years of the Iranian monarchy, near Shiraz in 1971, forced the delay of the Qashqa'is' departure from their high altitude summer pastures for six weeks, and many animals died from lack of food and the autumn cold and wind. On occasion the migration's commencement date was unaccountably postponed. Length of encampment on the migration was also restricted by Entezamat and enforced by the gendarmerie; nomads could not camp longer than 48 hours in a single location. Villagers and landowners had only to notify local gendarmes that nomads were encamped, and a jeepload of gendarmes would soon appear to force their departure. From the mid-1960s, Iran's repressive secret police (SAVAK) had increasing surveillance over Qashqa'i activities. The effects of land reform were drastic for the Qashqa'i, No provision in the Land Reform Law, the Additional Articles, or the many amendments was made for the seasonal use of pastureland by nomads. Only individuals who had permanent occupancy of land (and who met other requirements) were considered qualified for land distribution. In some cases, settled villagers received deeds to the pasturelands near their villages which were traditionally used by them (Lambton, 1969: 235-236, 247). However, by 1966 no regulations had been issued governing pasture use (Lambton, 1969: 342). Qashqa'i nomads lacked yearround, regular occupancy of specific units of land and hence could not claim land under the new laws. It does need to be noted that the majority of Iran's villagers were not provided for through land reform either (Larnbton, 1969; Keddie, 1972; Hoaglund, 1973; Dillon, 1976). Qashqa'i who remained in one seasonal pasture area all year usually lacked the necessary verifying documents and were unahle to claim land under the new laws. Of the Qashqa'i and non-Qashqa'i who cultivated in winter and summer pastures, it was generally the

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settled non-Qashqa'i who understood land reform procedures, who first registered the land in their own names, and who received deeds to it. Land reform officials often visited land when Qashqa'i users were in other seasonal pastures, and again they lost out in land registration. Some Sangsari in northcentral Iran moved in 1963 into the traditional rangelands of the Chubdari, who had recently settled, and received official grazing permits to it. 'The Chubdari, who were unlettered and had little knowledge of official procedures, did not contest this process until too late' (Spooner, 1976: 89). Fazel and Afshar Naderi report that some Boir Ahmad settled in order to guard land claims until the registration of land title was established and that 'once the security of title was assured there was at least a partial return to nomadism' (Fazel & Afshar Naderi, 1976: 39). Tapper states that someShahsevan in northwest Iran hoped to maintain rights to land by dry-farming good pastures (Tapper, 1979: 274). In Qashqa'i areas, however, it was predominately settled non-Qashqa'i who engaged in cultivation of pastures and in land-expropriating practices and who then received title to land. The Qashqa'i report that bribery of land reform officials was prevalent during the early years of reform, but its actual extent will never be known. Lambton's account of land reform provides some evidence for bribery and corruption, but her general view is that most land reform officials were honest and genuinely concerned with the law's intentions. However, her book lacks information on the status of land reform in areas occupied by triballyorganized pastoral nomads. She does state that land reform was more difficult to implement in Fars and in the south than in other areas (Lambton, 1969). The absence of active Qashqa'i political leaders was crucial, for had khans still been actively involved in tribal affairs, they could have prevented many abuses and loss of lands. The abortive land reform of 1960 had suggested forestalling measures to many landowners, which were utilized even after the 1962-3 laws had gone into effect. Violations were difficult to prove. Owners subdivided landholdings and deeds among family members to prevent confiscation. Since orchards, gardens, mechanized agricultural lands, woodlands, and areas serviced by motor pumps were exempt from land reform, some owners pre-dated their efforts in these directions. Especially detrimental to the Qashqa'i were those who rushed to buy tractors and plow large tracts of land by mechanized means with the use of wage laborers. In Qashqa'i areas these were usually non-Qashqa'i, but some Qashqa'i khans also engaged in such practices. This was illegal, and the land was often not theirs even by customary right. But due to military control of the Qashqa'i and their migrations, these practices went largely unnoticed and unprevented until the land had been deeded to those who had mechanized. Much land was plowed but never planted, even to this day. With vegetation and topsoil turned under, wind erosion worked quickly, and natural pasturage was destroyed. Land reform encouraged the widespread expansion of cultivation at the expense of grazing land in all Qashqa'i areas. Previously uncultivated land outside the range of existing village water supplies was opened for distribution by land reform officials, and many individuals received rights to cultivate new land. Their efforts were facilitated by the availability of new agricultural technology, such as implements, chemical fertilizers, and motor pumps. The areas of best soil and moisture conditions for both grazing and crops passed from pastoral to agricultural use, and many Qashqa'i lost their best land and were left with inferior, arid tracts. New cultivation often occurred in areas unsuited to agriculture, and soil erosion, especially after dryland farming was attempted, resulted. For the neighboring Boir Ahmad area, Fazel notes the 'mindless conversion of valuable pastures to less profitable farm plots,' which he considers the most damaging aspects of land reform there (Fazel, 1971: 219). And Tapper notes that the obviously unprofitable dryland farming done on pasturelands by some Shahs evan in northwest Iran was intended to secure land rights (Tapper 1979: 274). In the Qashqa'i area, many new cultivators brought in motor pumps in order to utilize ground water for irrigation, which lowered the water table and had other degrading effects on the environment (Case Study, 1977: 12). That agricultural expansion was allowed indicates the

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importance the government placed on a settled, agricultural rather than a nomadic, pastoral life. Cultivation of Qashqa'i pastures also led to conflict between field owners (generally nonQashqa'i) and animal owners (Qashqa'i). The Qashqa'i had a difficult time keeping their animals out of fields, which were rarely walled or protected, and state authorities tended to favor agriculturalists' claims over those of nomads. The effects of land reform were combined, to the further detriment of Qashqa'i pastoralism, with those of the Forest and Range Nationalization Law of 1963. These were the first two principles of the 'revolution of the Shah and the people' (formerly titled the White Revolution). (The nation's water resources were nationalized in 1967.) According to the Forest and Range Nationalization Law, all natural rangelands now belonged to the government, except for those surrounding villages. Village rangelands were defined as twice the size of a village's cultivated lands. Lands nationalized included desert and mountainous land, in addition to actual forests and rangelands, and all lands uncultivated and lying outside the service of village water supplies. This comprised 76 per cent of Iran's total area. Included in the nationalization were almost all Qashqa'i pastures. The government began to collect taxes on herd animals sold to state-run slaughterhouses, on the grounds that grazing had been done 'free' on state land. The Forest and Range Organization of the Ministry of Agriculture was made responsible for allocating and controlling national rangelands, and was aided by the newly-established (1967) Ministry of Natural Resources, which was responsible for the protection and correct use of natural resources such as forests, rangelands, soils, watersheds, and wildlife (Iranfar, 1970: 76-78). The reservation of lands marked for government programs such as range improvement, livestock feed development, wildlife conservation, watershed protection, sanddune stabilization, and recreational use (Sandford, 1977: 6-12) also affected some Qashqa'i areas, notably the Dasht Arjan area west of Shiraz, established as a hunting preserve sponsored by the Shah's brother and off limits to traditional users-both villagers and nomads. These programs either restricted livestock numbers and periods of use or totally excluded them from the areas concerned (Sandford, 1977: 7-11). Improved rangelands were not reopened for use, because the Forest and Range Organization believed it could not enforce range-management regulations on the original users. The Organization favored the establishment of corporations, 'to whom large blocks of grazing land can be allocated on a fixed-term contract subject to specific development (investment) and operating (. . . approved range-management practices) conditions' (Sandford, 1977: 10). Commercial and state-owned enterprises and capital-holding groups were favored over individual pastoralists. 'In future allocations of licenses to use both improved and unimproved grazing land these corporations will be given favored treatment; and it appears that individuals or pastoral societies that refuse or are slow to form corporations may lose their present grazing permits' (Sandford, 1977: 10). Until the early 1960s, the Qashqa'i held and defended land collectively. Although some agricultural land was formally registered in khans' names, control over almost all Qashqa'i territory depended on political and military strength rather than written deeds. The khans allocated specific units of winter and summer grazing land to the subtribes on a seasonal or longer-term basis. Individuals and groups secured rights to tribal land through payment of taxes and other expressions of political loyalty to tribal leaders. Well-organized groups with effective leaders were able to increase land and members, while weak groups lost land and members. Groups could change their political affiliations and territories, and land beyond confines of tribal boundaries could also be utilized. The viability of nomadic pastoralism hinged on such flexible arrangements in land use. Tribal leaders were essential in the overall pattern of land use and in negotiating land disputes between individuals, between tribal groups, and between Qashqa'i and non-Qashqa'i (see Lambton, 1953). The removal of top tribal leaders, the annexation of Qashqa'i land by non-Qashqa'i cultivators, and the nationalization of rangelands changed these patterns. Qashqa'i nomads

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were now required by law to obtain land rights through government channels rather than through traditional tribal rights and customs. The government, realizing difficulties in dealing with the vast, dispersed population, used the traditional tribal headmen as its mediators. Headmen, who formerly had mediated between supporters and khans, now became more indispensable to their affiliated tribespeople for the negotiation of land and migration rights and for government relations. By the mid-1960s, each tribal headman was receiving land use and migration schedules for his subtribe from the gendarmerie Disciplinary Officer (Afsar-e Entezamat) assigned to his tribe to administer the policies of the Forest and Range Organization of the Ministry of Agriculture. In most cases customary winter and summer pastures of each Qashqa'i subtribe were recognized. The headman was required to submit the names of the land-using households in his section, and he was issued a' deed for the land in question. (This deed later became the legal basis for land use.) There were difficulties. Entezamat authorities fixed the use of one winter and one summer pasture and prohibited use of alternative pastures, which greatly threatened pastoral production. Households had always utilized other pastures prior and subsequent to residence in favorite pastures, and alternative pastures were needed in case of poor ecological conditions in the customary areas. The authorities fixed the identity and number of households using each section, which disrupted traditionally flexible patterns. Until the 1960s, occupants of winter and summer pastures changed from year to year in response to ecological, economic, political and social conditions. Although the core group of a seasonal pasture was usually stable, others, such as those related by marriage or maternal ties or by political or economic ties, would come to and depart from the area as needs changed. Such flexibility was now virtually ended. Headmen could add individuals at their own discretion, but subtracting them was more difficult, since those removed could appeal for gendarme support. Some headmen registered land with Entezamat authorities in their own or in relatives' names, which allowed them to exert political force over dependent households. As years passed under the new rules, household proliferation-resulting from normal processes of household division-put pressure on already limited pastures. Parents who permitted their economically independent children to share pastures brought about crowding and overgrazing. The gendarmes had no way of handling this except to consider independent children as part of the parental household. This presented difficulties when the parents settled or died and their children competed for the space. The main purpose of the Disciplinary Officers and their gendarme posts was not land allocation but military and political control over the Qashqa'i, and in 1975 highly placed government officials determined that, since the 'tribe' no longer existed (they felt), there was no longer need for these overseeing forces, which were summarily removed. From the government's view, the Qashqa'i were henceforth to be considered as any rural population, under regular gendarme authority in case of political disturbances and land conflict. There were immediate results. Control of migration schedules and routes suddenly ceased, and the Qashqa'i once again could move according to ecological and economic needs instead of government whim, However, expanding cultivation, agribusiness ventures, irrigation projects (especially in the Marv Dasht plain), and paved roads increasingly blocked their migration routes. Other consequences of the demise of Entezamat control were not helpful to the Qashqa'i, Nomadic households, which had previously acquired land through tribal structures, were now required to secure individual land-use permits from the government. Headmen were stripped of their recently-acquired authority. The records of Entezamat were passed to the urban offices of the Ministries of Agriculture and Natural Resources, where permits for seasonal use of pasturelands were issued to requesting households. This licensing system, although in theory universal, was said to cover about 40 per cent of Iran's range and pasturelands in 1977 (Sandford, 1977: 5), but I would suspect that the actual percentage was less than this. Rights to particular areas were determined by previous usage under Entezamat

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control. Many nomads could not secure permits, because their names and locations had not been formally recorded by Entezamat. Ministry officials visited some seasonal pastures and asked households to assemble their herds for counting, in order to assign land and record boundaries on the basis of herd size. One report states that grazing permits were to be issued 'on the basis of a quick look at the area and common sense' (Sandford, 1977: 5), but in most cases no officials saw the lands in question. Only 'grazing land' (marta'), defined as land above water channels, was available for permits. Land below this level was classified as cultivable land (mazra'eh) and was denied to the nomads, even though it had often been grazed and cultivated by them: Instead, it was deeded through land reform to non-Qashqa'i villagers and even townspeople. Grazing lands were generally assigned to traditional users, but in terms of the number of animals currently on them, so that some nomads were given expanded units and others lost land. Occasional grazers and those who were not of the location's dominant kinship group were not assigned land and were forced to leave. Another detrimental change caused by the 1975 regulations concerned Qashqa'i settlement. In the past, Qashqa'i nomads had built houses, cultivated, planted orchards and gardens, and established seasonal or permanent residence on their tribal land. (Those who had done this prior to 1962 were likely to have been entitled to the land under land reform laws.) However, the new permits prohibited these activities and allowed only seasonal and pastoral use of land. No houses, walls, or construction of any kind were allowed; no fields could be sowed or trees planted. In the summer of 1977 I observed army personnel cutting down a tiny stand of trees that had been planted by an agriculturalist along a water course on Qashqa'i pastureland. Not many miles away army personnel were planting trees in a reforestation program. Such new prohibitions were economically crippling, for many Qashqa'i needed to take such steps in order to subsist. Only agriculture (with the required land deeds) would preserve land claims in the face of advancing outside encroachments (Sandford, 1976: 46). Also, agricultural production would allow them to meet demands of the market economy. Houses and animal dwellings would protect against the severe climatic conditions experienced in permanent residence. However, under the new laws, the Qashqa'i could not engage in any permanent or non-pastoral activities on lands traditionally theirs for generations. They were not even permitted to buy these lands for their own permanent use. Government policies of the 1960s and 1970s denied land to many Qashqa'i and restricted the land use of all. Aside from 'tribal containment', government policy aimed to restrict the number of animals using rangelands. Policy-makers in Tehran, many of whom had never visited the countryside and who were unaware of land-use patterns among pastoral nomads, stated that Iran was rapidly being denuded of vegetation, that the great deserts were expanding-and that it was the pastoralists' fault (Sandford, 1977: Case Study, 1977). One factor behind the new government taxes on herd animals sold in cities was to control the number of flocks in the countryside. But my own observations support those who state that village-based timbering, firewood collecting, and charcoal burning have been more at fault in deforestation in the Middle East than have nomads' animals (for example, Barth, 1975; Bates, 1973). Policy makers were often guilty of cultural prejudices concerning rural and especially tribal people-which should be seen in the context of the increasing gap in the rates of socioeconomic change between urban and rural areas in Iran (Case Study, 1977: 57). Communication between the government and rural populations in Iran was poor (Sandford, 1977: 12). Programs for rangeland use in Iran emphasized desertification, not social and economic problems. While it was obvious that these programs, if they had been successful, might have dealt with some aspects of environmental degradation and might have helped some individuals, they did not speak to the needs of whole pastoral populations. As one expert notes, I believe that we are in danger of ... demanding ever more drastic powers to impose technical solutions (in terms of stocking rates, periods of use and protection, etc.) which will be of great immediate injury to many pastoralists while of very uncertain long term ecological or economic benefit to anyone other than to those who may be ahle to rccolonise land from

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which the traditional pastoralists have been excluded; and such beneficiaries will benefit only by grabbing what already existed rather than from any overall increment in output (Sandford, 1977: 21-22). With regard to the government policy of nationalization of pastures, Katouzian comments, [It] may have been a wise policy for the maintenance of their long-term fertility as well as supervision over the use and allocation of this agricultural resource. What in practice happened was not nationalisation in that sense, but expropriation and exclusion (Katouzian, 1978: 367).

Government concern about environmental degradation, especially overgrazing, was particularly misplaced in light of the resulting increased pressure on pastoral resources in Qashqa'i areas due to the impact of land reform, land nationalization, and removal of tribal leadership. Contrary to the belief that nomadic pastoralists have disregard for the physical environment, most Qashqa'i practiced careful range management by rotating grazing areas, avoiding overgrazing, restricting camels' foraging, constructing water catchment basins to improve grazing, and cultivating (or buying) forage crops. However, nomads who had insufficient land to support their herds put increased pressure on existing resources, overgrazed, and destroyed vegetation previously left undisturbed, such as trees and shrubs. Ungrazed vegetation was often cut, dried, and carried away for future use. These practices had immediate and long-term ecological effects. Those nomads who received land deeds in 1975 attempted to conserve resources, despite the increased herd sizes needed for economic support, while those denied deeds ceased to care much about resource conservation. A study of rangeland nationalization in northern Iran showed it reduced the pastoralists' sense of ecological responsibility and removed an element of personal investment, which resulted in environmental damage (Case Study, 1977: 14). To compensate for pasture shortage, some Qashqa'i rented grazing land from other Qashqa'i or from villagers who owned or had rights to pastureland. A 1971 law which prohibited herdowners from renting grazing land from others was not enforced. Renters lacked long-term interest in the tracts and tended to misuse them. Some Qashqa'i who received more land than needed rented space to others. Some Qashqa'i who were in the process of settling did not inform the authorities, so that they could keep their grazing permits, rent their pastures to others, and retain the option to put their own herds on them in the future. In a matter of a few years, land rents and new regulations had turned formerly tribal, corporate land into private property with explicit monetary value. Those who sought land had to discover new methods of paying for it. Military control over the Qashqa'i opened tribal lands to non-Qashqa'i pastoralists, which further depleted vegetation available to Qashqa'i herds and increased overgrazing. Three categories of people were involved. Commercial stock raisers were the first to enter Qashqa'i pastures. Wealthy merchants and landowners, often without a background in stock raising, invested in flocks or acquired flocks through default on debts and hired non-tribal shepherds to graze them in Qashqa'i pastures. Grazing patterns differed from those of the Qashqa'i; the newcomers entered pastures before and after Qashqa'i occupancy, which ensured that there was little vegetation for Qashqa'i animals. Disarmed, under military control, and lacking government support, the Qashqa'i were not able effectively to challenge these armed herders. A 1971 law which prohibited use of nationalized land by herders without grazing permits and with flocks of over 200 was not enforced, and few Qashqa'i could guard their seasonal pastures all year against trespassing herders. Also, involvements with government authorities and courts were still difficult for most Qashqa'i, and they lacked effective mediators. These large commercial herds were a major factor in the impoverishment of pastoral resources and in the settlement of many Qashqa'i. Dillon also notes the conflict between family economy pastoralism and commercial herding in the Kerman area (1976). The second category to enter Qashqa'i pasturelands consisted of village pastoralists, who were reasonably confident that their flocks would no longer be raided. The Qashqa'i de-

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pended on seasonal use of specific areas, but village pastoralists increasingly used these same areas almost all year, so that ?n the Qashqa'is' arrival little vegetation remained. Villagers traditionally owned a few animals, but as the countryside became militarily secure they increased their flocks as well as sales of pastoral products and became competitors not only for land but also in the marketplace. With larger herds, additional grazing beyond the village periphery was sought, which resulted in further encroachment on Qashqa'i pasturage. From midsummer to midwinter and especially during the fall migration, Qashqa'i flocks had always depended heavily on grazing the stubble of harvested village fields. With increased village pastoralism, this reliance was jeopardized, and the Qashqa'i were forced to produce and buy fodder, which consumed money and effort and involved transport difficulties. The third category to enter Qashqa'i pastures consisted of Qashqa'i and non-Qashqa'i pastoralists who had no legal land rights; they sought temporary grazing wherever possible. Possessing only small herds, they traveled in single households or in pairs. Fearing detection, they moved on after brief periods of grazing. While the impact of any single herd was minor, the combination of all these 'illegal' grazers decreased the chances that even Qashqa'i nomads with legal land rights would find adequate pastures.

Diversifying economies Major changes in the Qashqa'i household economy, which included a diversification of economic activity-especially in non-pastoral pursuits-resulted from pasture scarcity and other pressures (for a discussion of household economies, the market's impact, urban and overseas wage labor, and education, see Beck, 1980a, 1981). Prior to the early 1960s, many households cultivated wheat and barley in winter and summer pastures, but in insufficient quantities to satisfy yearly needs. (Bread made of wheat flour was the staple food.) Cultivation decreased a household's reliance on external sources of grain. However, with increased demands for supplemental animal fodder and rapid increases in market grain prices, households sought ways to produce more and to acquire cash for its purchase. Household personnel and time were increasingly expended in agriculture, and one or more members lived separately from the family in order to cultivate crops. This resulted in cooperative herding arrangements between households. Coordination of pastoral and agricultural economies tended to benefit both parties. Those assigned to pastoral functions maintained the pack animals, permits, and contacts necessary for pastoralism, while those in charge of agriculture bought or rented land and equipment and expanded urban and market ties. Such Qashqa'i were adapting more successfully to economic and political change than those who did not diversify their economies. 'The buoyancy of the pastoral sector in [the economy of households with mixed economies] may make ... mixedeconomy farmers more prosperous than their more purely agricultural fellows, even if they tend to occupy much more marginal areas' (Barth, 1973: 15). Needs for agricultural products and accompanying changes in labor and residence were pressures for sedentarization. Many families planned to build houses where they secured or hoped to secure cultivation rights. Investment in land for fruit orchards (apple, orange, lime, date) involved other changes in household economy and labor, and those who established orchards tended to settle nearby. Only wealthy Qashqa'i could afford orchards, since a large initial and long-term capital investment was required for land purchase, saplings, fertilizer, spraying equipment, fencing and irrigation materials, and labor to plant and tend the trees. The government's Agricultural Bank offered low-interest loans for such development, as did new cooperatives established by the government in a few tribal areas, but few nomads possessed the means or networks to secure them. Loans from some cooperatives had to be repaid in six months, an inhibiting factor for those without a cash inflow. Cooperatives were government sponsored and controlled. They were set up through the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperation (created in 1967) and until the revolution were handled through the Cooperatives and Rural Affairs division of the Ministry of Agriculture. Another inhibiting factor was the long-term investment of capital and labor before a marketable crop was produced. 19

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Hired agricultural labor, an activity rarely found among the Qashqa'i before the 1960s, even among the poor, became an important source of cash income. The seasonal nature of agriculture required additional hands for concentrated periods, as during plowing, planting, and harvesting. The expansion of agriculture and orchards into Qashqa'i pastures brought such jobs closer to the nomads. Other non-pastoral work involving use of tribal land was done primarily by Qashqa'i who owned few animals and had been a means to ensure continuing nomadism. Even those with as few as five goats could continue to migrate and reside with kin in traditional pastures. The natural environment was utilized for gathering and preparing natural substances, which were then sold in towns or cities. Charcoal production was profitable since demand and price were high. Commercial fuels were more expensive and difficult to transport, and wood and other natural fuels were less available. The government outlawed tree-cutting on and plant removal from nationalized land, but because of the ineffective enforcing of the laws and the corruption of some enforcing forest rangers, the tree line retreated further every year from settled areas. Qashqa'i and others who cut trees and prepared charcoal for sale ran the risk of fines and imprisonment. Firewood was also collected and sold, but this too was a government-restricted activity. Wood was bulky, easily seen, and had a lower price than charcoal, all of which discouraged its collection for sale. Another profitable non-pastoral activity was the summertime collection and sale of gum tragacanth (katira), a major Iranian export. Katira cutters exposed the roots of the boteh (shrub), made a slash, and then returned a week later to collect the hardened sap. The government tried to restrict production and gain revenue by requiring cutters to have permits, which were increasingly difficult and expensive to obtain. Nomads with grazing rights demanded fees from cutters who wanted to work their lands, which further diminished income. Other activity included the collection and sale of wild almonds, pistachios, shrub and tree sap, mushrooms, truffles, herbs, natural dyes, and so forth. With trees and vegetation decreasing, areas with such resources were fewer and harder to find. Reeds growing in salt marshes in winter pastures were cut and sold to makers of window blinds, mats, and baskets. Opium production used to be an extremely lucrative activity, but the last Pahlavi government strictly controlled its production by requiring permits. Violation of rules brought imprisonment and heavy fines, and most Qashqa'i abandoned such work. Pasture nationalization and land use regulations outlawed many non-pastoral subsistence efforts and made others difficult. Prior to the 1970s, the poor of most Qashqa'i pasture groups had usually been low-status distant kin or nonkin, who acquired land through political loyalty and service to leaders. As long as tribal leaders controlled pastures and needed political support, such loyalty was sufficient to secure poor households the use of land. But as the government removed the rights of high tribal leaders, the poor became subject to lower leaders, who usually favored close kin over nonkin when land became scarce. Then, when the government defined pastoral land use on an individual basis, the poor again lost out; few had regular residence ties and most lacked documents to prove residence and use. Therefore, most nomads who subsisted on non-pastoral activities were forced off the land. Because of their poverty and their close contacts with the marketplace due to the sale of non-pastoral commodities, these were the first Qashqa'i to take on urban wage labor. Nonpastoral activity decreased in Qashqa'i areas, although those performing such work now tended to come from higher economic levels and, increasingly, from the rural, non-tribal poor. With the area under military control, the rural non-tribal poor no longer feared expulsion by tribal occupants, and they increased their own efforts to exploit natural resources. Thus, change in the economic and political climate generated two new movement patterns: Qashqa'i migrations out of tribal territory and counter-migrations of non-Qashqa'i (nonpastoral workers, commercial and village herders, agriculturalists) into the area. Until the 1960s, Qashqa'i households had as primary economic concerns animal care

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and grain cultivation, but land restrictions and cash and market demands transformed their strategies. Recent political and economic change meant change in relations of production; kin-based relations were penetrated and undermined by capitalist relations. Individuals who were paid wages by sources outside the household no longer contributed directly to pastoral production. Household productive activity was increasingly regulated by, and geared toward, market and capitalist forces. Vertical, asymmetrical economic relations-such as those with moneylenders, merchants, urban employers! and capitalist st,ock raisers-increasingly had more impact on Qashqa'i households than did kinship and tribal ties. Economic differentiation among the Qashqa'i increased as tribal institutions were disrupted, as households and groups responded differently to new conditions, and as pastoralism was abandoned for other livelihoods. Patterns of economic stratification were in flux. For example, hired shepherds, who formerly were locked into asymmetrical contractual relations with their employers, now had chances for well-paying jobs, partly because the wage relations in herding facilitated their proletarianization in urban areas (Beck, 1980a, 1981). The process of sedentarization

At the beginning of the 1960s, the majority of Qashqa'i were nomadic and pastoral and lacked permanent settlements. They spent approximately four months in lowland winter pastures, two months migrating in spring to highland summer pastures, three months residing in summer pastures, and three months migrating back again in the fall to winter pastures. Their occupation of seasonal pastures was not fixed in single locations; rather, households made a series of moves within areas. Diversity in livelihood and life style was common, for households regularly adjusted their patterns to household developmental cycles and other factors. Flexibility was essential to viable economies and to the continuing economic survival of the Qashqa'i. Some Qashqa'i lived in houses in winter and summer pastures and migrated in the spring and fall; some lived in tents and did not migrate; and some lived in villages in winter and in tents at higher altitudes in summer. A few Qashqa'i lived in tents and practiced only agriculture; others lived in houses and practiced only pastoralism. Some Qashqa'i families were split into sedentary and nomadic parts, others into agricultural and pastoral parts. And a few Qashqa'i migrated who owned no sheep and goats at all. The changes of the 1960s and 1970s undercut such flexible patterns, forced the end of large-scale migration, and led to the predominance of three patterns: (1) sedentarization in villages; (2) continuation of impoverished nomadic pastoralism; and (3) migration to towns and cities for wage labor. Most Qashqa'i settled or made plans to do so, and subsisted by combining flock raising with agriculture. Some Qashqa'i, usually owing to poverty, COIltinued in year-round nomadic pastoralism without immediate plans or the needed capital for settlement. They tended small herds which usually belonged partially or totally to others and received a cash wage; they also did seasonal wage labor and other non-pastoral work. Other Qashqa'i settled individually or with families in towns and cities. This too was a response to poverty; they performed low-paid work and lived and worked in oppressive conditions. These Qashqa'i blended into the unemployed and underemployed populations of every town and city of the region, and their residences were part of large, crowded squatter settlements. Many lived in tattered tents, shacks and underground holes covered with cardboard and tin. Most Qashqa'i settled near their traditional winter or summer pastures, in villages consisting of previously-settled tribespeople or in settlements they created. Some Qashqa'i settled individually but most settled with relatives and in groups. The winter and summer locations of the Qashqa'i stretch over a huge expanse of land, which consists of a variety of altitudes and landscapes. Place of settlement depended on land availability, prior local affiliations, and forms of production. Winter and summer pasture areas presented different but serious climatic problems, with intolerable heat and no water and vegetation in most winter areas in the summer, and terribly cold weather, heavy snow, and wind in most summer

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areas in the winter. The ideal location, halfway between the two areas at middle altitudes, was already heavily populated, owned by others, and increasingly expensive. Under Reza Shah, almost all Qashqa'i were forced to settle in unsuitable locations. (Some nomads secured government permits during this time to migrate between seasonal pastures, but complete households could not accompany the herds.) With his abdication, most Qashqa'i returned to full nomadic pastoralism, with the exception of some in the oilfield areas where jobs had been secured. In times of economic and political hardship since 1941, some Qashqa'i temporarily or permanently settled again-either in the same location as during Reza Shah's time or in a more suitable place. Severe droughts in 1959-64 and again in 1970-1 led to the settlement of some Qashqa'i. As subtribes changed territories over time, they left a few settlers in each of their former locations. However, as the government gained control of tribal land use, such mobility was forbidden, and settling sub tribes were often forced to stay near their last location. By 1978 Qashqa'i territory contained hundreds of tiny settlements, which usually consisted of a few stone or mud-brick houses set down ·like tents in an encampment. Some Qashqa'i who settled before 1970 successfully adjusted to the end of nomadism. At first they sharecropped or rented agricultural land. Later, they bought land from the government or from large holders who were anxious to sell at prices higher than what would be received through government land reform. (If the Qashqa'i had waited for the lower prices of government redistribution, they would not have been entitled to the land.) Many Qashqa'i joined or formed helpful cooperatives, which centered on orchards, grain cultivation, wells, irrigation, tractors and other implements, with Persians, Lurs, or other settled Qashqa'i in the vicinity. Their new partners often assisted with building houses and urban contacts. Houses could also be rented or bought from villagers who migrated to the city. The settlers often continued in pastoralism by sending their herds to higher altitudes in the summer or on the full migration. Occasionally, whole families moved to tents at higher altitudes in the summer to escape the heat, dust, and flies of the settlement. Many lived yearround in tents erected by their houses, which they used for storage and weaving. The tempo and patterns of settlement, however, recently underwent a marked change. Many Qashqa'i, pressured by the forces described, wanted to settle but were unable to find affordable land. Under duress and lacking other options, they bought small house plots in established non-Qashqa'i villages or towns near winter or summer pastures. Previously, land for houses and fields (or orchards) was secured in a single location, so settlement could be economically viable. Construction materials were expensive and subject to national shortages, and some who could afford land purchase could not afford the additional expenses. How these new settlers intended to survive was not clear, and was a vocal concern of many Qashqa'i. Some expected to earn money as agricultural workers, following previous settlers, but the proliferation of available workers meant that many remained unemployed or were forced' into low-paying urban wage labor. Many intended to continue pastoralism by sending someone on the migration with the herds. Most hoped eventually to buy land for agriculture and orchards, but as land prices rapidly escalated, this became more difficult. Even small house plots were increasingly unattainable, with prices doubling yearly in many areas. Although many Qashqa'i expressed regret about having to buy land for houses only, they were pleased that at least this economic venture was not a loss. They could sell the land at any time for profit. The government's Office of Tribal Settlement (under the Ministry of Housing and Development) in Shiraz offered no real assistance to the Qashqa'i, Government loans were supposedly available for settlement, but securing them was virtually impossible for most, and formal requests took years to travel through channels. Acquiring government help hinged on effective mediators who had officialcontacts, cash and favors for bribes, and time to spend in the city. Some tribal headmen used their networks and political sophistication to find land for their groups. They coordinated the purchase as well as the spatial arrangement of houses and

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agricultural land, and some financed the purchase of agricultural machinery. Other headmen were unwilling or unable to function in this manner. One headman was determined to continue full pastoral nomadism despite .the gradual dropping out of group members who owned few animals, were heavily in debt, and felt there was no purpose in migrating. He soon became the only member of his group who had not purchased land for settlement. His supporters were attracted to a rival, who had settled twenty years previously because of a fight between the two men. The rival had, successfully settled, owned land, and was able to extend to the new settlers his good contacts with landowners and merchants. Migration patterns for many Qashqa'i changed. Fewer.complete households migrated. Women and young children of settling families tended to remain in one place all year while several males migrated with the herds. They carried only enough equipment and supplies to live on and slept in small canvas pup-tents rather than using the heavier goat-hair tents. They used donkeys and mules as pack animals rather than camels. These herders were aware that life had changed dramatically for them. They lamented that, 'we are just shepherds now. We are only conducting business. We have left our "life" behind.' And they identified themselves with the term used for the professional non-tribal herders who trespassed on their lands. A transitional phase for many Qashqa'i involved motor transport and the elimination of the long, 60--:90 day seasonal migration through the Zagros mountains. The herds continued to make the regular migration, but at a quickened pace with one or more ~dult males, while other family members and household equipment were transported by rented minibuses and trucks to new seasonal pastures in a day or two, by an out-of-the-way circular route on the only available graveled and paved roads. In one observed group, the six-week period between the departure of the herds and the motorized migration found the men gossiping and arguing, largely from idleness, and the women weaving at a furious pace and feeling angry about the trespass of men in their own domestic domains during the day. Sometimes the herd animals were moved by truck, which was expensive and unproductive, since there was usually insufficient grazing and water upon their untimely arrival at new pastures. The separation of households and herds during the spring migration meant that families were cut off from milk products as a food supply and an important market item. Milk flow is at its heaviest level in the spring, but the few men and boys who accompanied the herds could not milk and process dairy products, and baby animals were allowed to drink their fill of mother's milk and were fat upon arrival at summer pastures. Qashqa'i who no longer migrated also lost out in the collection of natural resources and wild foods. Dry vegetation provided fuel, and hardwoods supplied the raw material for tent, weaving and animal equipment. Commercial fuels and manufactured products were expensive substitutes. Gathered plants and minerals were used in dyeing wool, but Qashqa'i women increasingly relied on expensive, inferior chemical dyes. Much food eaten during the five months of migration a year, in addition to food processed and stored for the other seven months, was gathered from' passage through different ecological zones: acorns, almonds, pistachios, artichokes, mushrooms, truffles, onions, garlic, rhubarb, berries, grapes, partridges, bird eggs and so forth. This food was especially important for young girls, who were not properly fed, and for women and girls, who were ~ot a.lways given the opportunity to share the rice and occasional meat eaten by men. The migration had also provided access to many kinds of wild game, although the government's confiscation of most firearms in 1963 made game meat less available. Since most milk products were market-oriented rather than home-consumed, the lack of gathered and hunted food was an additional loss. Increasingly, foodstuffs and equipment were purchased from the market, which demanded an increased cash inflow. Changes in lifestyle, especially those connected with the migration, meant that pack animals (camels, mules, donkeys, horses) were no longer needed. Their continued upkeep was expensive, and households sold most of them. An indication of the extent and rapidity of sedentarization was the many donkeys abandoned to wander in the countryside. Their

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market price was so low, because of the glut on the market, that many individuals did not attempt to sell them. Transport camels were sold to urban butchers for meat. Yet, without pack animals, households had a difficult time returning, temporarily or permanently, to nomadism. The flexibility once possible in the now-settled, now-nomadic, lifestyle seemed to be gone.

The Iranian revolution 1978-9 Many Qashqa'i rapidly reassumed nomadism when the Pahlavi regime collapsed in January 1979 (Beck, 1980b). With loss of government control, the Qashqa'i asserted their political autonomy and in particular their rights to use customary pastures. Many Qashqa'i .who had sedentarized began to migrate again, and many Qashqa'i who had become urban wage laborers went back in the mountains. Land reform and pasture nationalization, which detrimentally affected nomadic pastoralists, were closely associated with what is now regarded as the illegal regime of the Shah, and some individuals and groups reclaimed their lands. Revolutionary Committees and Guards-two new institutions set up in the Islamic Republic to run local affairs until a government was formalized--did not support these moves, and there were conflicts with the Qashqa'i. The Qashqa'i, heavily rearmed, with their political institutions back in operation and their leaders back in position, were quite successful in keeping Revolutionary Committees and Guards out of tribal territory. Nasir Khan Qashqa'i, the paramount tribal leader who was exiled from Iran in 1954, returned to Iran shortly before the Shah's ouster, in order to reestablish political power and authority. That he and other Qashqa'i leaders have not had complete success is largely due to continuing unsettled conditions in Iran and in this strategic area of the world.

Summary This paper has detailed the effects of government sponsored change on the land use of the Qashqa'i of Iran. It has shown that the once much-heralded reforms of the Shah resulted in debilitating economic conditions for this important rural population. Without leaders or functioning tribal structures, the Qashqa'i became extremely vulnerable to political and economic change at the national level. With the collapse of the government, however, their political institutions were rapidly revitalized. What is not clear at this point, however, is what will happen when a strong central government again appears on the scene.

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