Government policy, innovation and economic growth

271

Government policy, innovation economic growth Lessons from a study of satellite communications

and

*

Morris TEU BAL

Edward STEINMUELLER Sumford lJnr~>ersiy, Stanford, CA 934W. Final

version

received

February

ll. .“.A

1981

The pnprr analyzes NASA’s imoivement in the de\-felopment of satellite communications technology. It begins by a historical acc( unt of the mairl developments which culminated into first commercialization of the technology in 1965. The description

highlights

It also provides

NASA’s

role iil accelerating

important

background

ing the COSIS of NASA’s

involvement

this process.

information and some

for measuraspects

of the

benerits. namely part of the ‘direcl’ benefits achieved in the initial applicalions segment (transatlantic voice communications). The paper then analyzes a number for the success of NASA’s involvement. the efficiency

of factors responsible both with respxt to

‘baseline’ technology

of the

arrived

at and with

respect to the transition from early R & D to commercialization. A comparison is also made with othrr less successful cases of governmeni

mtervention

to promote

new technologies.

’ Funds for the support of this study have been the NASA-AMES Research Center, Mofff:tt fornia, under Interchange No. NCA2-OR7455815. We are especially and

grateful

help in defining

Federal taking

R ,Sr D and satellite

to Harry

communications

has also given generously advice grateful.

and Our

to Harold

a project

encouragement. thanks

Hornby

allocated 5:, Field, Califor his advice

on the economic

impact

Goett

suggested

for

having

as a case study.

Harry

of hi,; ime and provided

of

Goett

important

Finr all tr’lis we are extremely

to P. Bar:;ellini,

L. Jaffe.

A. Jones

and

Professor Lusil,:nan for their cooperation a+ various stages of our work and to J. White. H. Halley. G. Allen Smith. D. Smith, J. Har., and Dr. R.T. Jones who projfided useful background inf xmation on the activities and Impacts of the National Aeroniautics and Space Administration. We appreciate the comments gested improvements

of two anonymous in an earlier draft.

Research Policy 1t (1982) North-Holland Publishing

referees

who

sug-

271-287 Compaq

0048-7333/&2/(iOOO-0000/$02.75

,0 1982 North-Holland

1. lntroductioa The path leading to the maturity of industrial sectors is generally associated with a deceleration in their rates of growth. This has been pointed out almost 50 years ago by Simon Kuzmts. An important implication of this trend is that any economy wishing to maintain its uggrt>glIfe growth rate should be able !o generate a continuous flow of new industries [ 11. Federal R Rr D may stimulate I,his process by inducing the private sector to undertake radical innovations which would other\viAe Ilot be undertaken or who:.e introduction lvould be seriously delayed. The red:lction in the technological and in the market risk of the innovations. consequent to Federal R & D programs. ma); counteract the forces responsible for deceleration. including the observed tendency of some established industries to follow an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary parth of technological drvel. opment. Our purpose; here is to illustrate .cnd give somt’ structure to the above in the context of and basec on the experience with satellite communication> In addition, we will attempt to measure somr’ aspects of the social benefits derived from this neu industry and to address the question of the chart of these benefits which may be attributable to NASA. The report is organized in three sections. Section 2 s a historical description of technola$ cal developm!:nts in communications satellites. It:. in tt:t emphasis is on f‘ie efforts whicl, culminated first comrr;erciaiization of the technology in !%5.

is made to &scribe the events in the c~~~tcr;t of our knolvledgc of innovation processes ,n genrral and 10 describe the activities and irnp;~ts of NASA. Section 3 addresses the issue of the benefits to society from NASA’s efforts in :,;ltcllitc communications. A dlstinc.ion is propo,ed heti\,ecn a ‘baseline’ communif:ation satellitc tcchq~logy and subsequent developments. An ;~rgumcnt is put to attribute ali th:: ec.)nomic hencfith of the former to NASA. A ~zc\mputalion of Finally, part of these bcncfits is al50 presented. Sectic,n 4 discusses some of the i:.surs which emerge

.At

from

~lctcfnpt

th,lr ca\e study.

2. A historical dc~elopment

and techuologicd

of communications

suney

of

the

satellites

The development of communication satellite technology and NASA’s involvement in the area can be broadly divided into three stage!;; invention, demonstration of feasibility. and commercial development. The invention stage includes a series of critical experiments which determined that no physical barriers to orbital transmission and reception of signals existed. In thr demonstration of feasibility stage a wide variety of system designs were tested with important knowledge and skillcreating implications for emerging supply companies such as Hughes and GTF1. Finally, with the development of the quasi-,,rivate communications companies COMSAT and INTELSAT, commercial users undertook the contracting of commercial satellite communications systems and a variety of ground StatioIi installations. a “reduction to pract:ct” of the new technology. NASA played an active role throughout its period of involvement. 1958 till :he early 1970s. in the development of the c~~mmuni~ation satellite technology by providing a research and development infrastructure and b? contracting for operating systems which steadil) increased in capabilrties and performance. NASA’s research and development decision making process invol+~ed a series of committees and solicited proposals which sought to define the major technological problems at each stage of the development 3rocess and to plan a series of design research .asks which would salve these problems. This ln‘rastructure also was a basis for determining the ialure Ol’ contract specifications when sp.;cific sysTerns were developed thus coordinating tc~chnologi-

cal policy with implementation. Communications satellites were vi:iualized in the 1950s as an alternative technology for coping with a basic constraint of terrestrial telecommunications, the curvature of the Earth. The Zarth’s curvature is a barrier because the propagation of electromagnetic radiation is linear. Before 1960 the available solutions were direct connection (undersea cables or a series of “links” on land) or high frequency radio transmission which utilizeui the reflectivity of the ionosphere to “bounce” signals over the horizon. The latter phenomenon of ionospheric reflectivity provided a basis for concenl about viability of satellite signal transmission hecause of the uncertainty of how efficiently signals could be sent through upper atmosphere layers. The SCORE launch demonstrated (ha! signals could indeed be transmitted and received with reasonable efficiency from an orbital position [2]. The next step in experimenting with the idea of satellite communications was the development of a passive reflector which would serve the same purpose as ionospheric reflection with more efficiency and reliability. The problems of cfficiencq aqd reliability had limited the growth oI intercontinental radio communications.

The ECHO program was based on this principle of a “passive” communications satellite. ECHO did provide ;I reliable means of “bouncing” signals over the horizon. However, ECHO by no means solved the problem of efficiency. ECHO proved thst the passive sate!lite approach led to a drastic limitation of power available to the receiving station because of the dispersion of transmitted and refll:c.ted siglnals. III the ECHO experiment OIIIJ one part ir: 10’” of the transmitted power (10 kW) wa> rlvailuble lo the receiving anttmna [2]. Oi COUTS~this limitation was known before ECHO’s launcn and ,the development of “active ’ satellite s4ystems was presumed to be the only really viable means of achieving substantial communicalions capability. The “active” communications satellite receives a signal and retransmits an amplified facsimile of the signal (usually with a frequent*? shift) [2]. The problems of active satellite dt+gn ar:‘ analogous t J designing teleconlii~ullic;Itic,ns links for terrestrial microwave systems uith the impor, ant added problems of the space envin:n-

mcnt.

weight constraints.

impossibilitv

power

Ilmitati~w~.

the fundamental

elements of NASA’s

demonstru-

(ion of a feasible satellite communications ogy and determined first

of NASA’s

mxj!;ior satellite programs,

could

satellite

NASA

was granted

authority

Defense

Department

design

not in

agrt;went

1961 to allot satellite

rese,rch

prohibited

1960

trolling

to \+orh

technological

[3]. Defrnce hrcauw

agreement abridged in

of

commune-

of the a.!iificult\ of ~cln-

acce~ to knowledge of >*Jch private]? demonstrated

n~logy.

by pioltecring

commercinl

by a great

occurred without

NASA

speculation

parties

to

\vould have

is of course counter-fact-

but

does

point

NASA/DOD

relations

may

to

InIlitary

dr\&pmcnt

exclusively

potential5

many

What

development.

Jc-

the tech-

the commercial

and this led tc>pressure

ual

in

terri-

interest.\ ma> hrtive

development

veloped hystemh. NASA.

allow

until

to engage in i:e’~~~nc’hroliou\

+.ate

cations satell~trs

on

proceed

had to be further

NASA

of the

U’orb

tory by reviwng in 1958 DOD/NASA [3]. This

technol-

the design problems

active

formerly

end

of maintenance. These pr~,hlemz uuc

have

out

hridgcd of

th;:t

;I barrio CC~IWI~LIII~-

cations satellites.

-.? .’ . RELA )’ The

RELA”.’

prt>gram .~uccrssfull~ pl,wwC’d

wrirs

of

na;tjoi

fil,\t

uses

of

innnvat1ons

Wave

Trclveling

a number

!+.‘Ctz.

of

da1 ;I transmitted,

improvements

including

[4]. The

fi3ts

ground

in

station

RELAY

other

the

0ptimiLation

subsystem

derstanding

as

of the radiation

space

environment

f,tud

Report

681 -6X7). Technical transmitter

(Picknrd

ON the

trchnrque data

communicnkn

well

and

enhancing

as

[4] pp.

1 I 1. 1 15 and

Rciclq~ 1 Froy~u~z characteristic5

SUJ dards (Pickard

[4] pp.

of the satellite \\ith cxistlnp

[4] pp. 116. I IS).

111sptte of serior .; problems kvith the pwtrr and

3

last

that

the TWT

container, mental this ;iswss

minute

the

discoveq

which

system

nrcessitatrd

as designed operate in a pressurized

RELAY

I did

The

goals.

progrnm

un-

(high energ? partii.lt’I

Lvert‘ chosen to conform

international

af

I misbion \{;I> de-

of

design

in

t>pch

sIgned to provide a great deal of sngintwing allwving

;I

r>f the

tube amplifiers

importan!

and

ant

should iiccL1rac~

by determining

IIUSI

accomplish of

dJt,r

he strzwd. of

il:.

cqwr1-

accumulated It \
rrhroadca~ting

the exact deviation\

b\

poaihlc

tk\

: .‘!I1 quit (‘1 rrrcri\ed

launch. Tht: basic problem of orbital placement W;IX solved in spite of thi4 failure: prclund :,tation tracking rrj.ealrd SYNCOM i had ci nearly idcal orhit. The failure of SYNCOM I to sc’r\‘c its

()j~e critical limitation of the ll~~~-~~ll~l~~~~ll~~~~ design of Io\ver pon’cr. such as RELAY I. \\:I, 11-1~neccssrtv for tracking (moveable) antennas. Thi> nccesssrily limited the number of facilitics rvhich could reliably receive ~:xttXded COIlln~unicatiom hecause of the high crtat of each staticjn. It also dictated a very high investment in 55atellitr systems if continuous comniun*cations were to ht2 an objecti\,e since it implied a siring of \atellitrs so that at least one sa,cllitc would always tbc ahove the relcvnnt receiving area. For these reasons, the po>sibility of a major re-de’ ign of the basic satellite-ground station system wa$ proposed by Dr. H. Rosen of Hughes [a]. Hughes was un:ible to sell this idea to the Department of Defen.,e or any corporation large cnouph to support the development costs beyond the exploratory stage accomplished at Hughes [9]. We may speculate that the major reason for the difficulty of selling the Hughes system was the risk of an entirely new system when a known. albeit expenGve. solution was knolvn to exist. It is also important that J. Pierce. of Bell Laboratorics expressed severe criticisms of the proposed geosynchronous :.atcJiite because its altitude would entail a delay in c ,nlrrrunications of 0.46 seconds which Pierce ‘>ellrved detrl.nental to “quality” of tclrcommunication service. However, NASA finally ~‘~1sable to support research in the area which led io the SYNC’OM I. In order to do this NASA had to obtain another agreement with DOD concerning gee-synchronous satellites. an area which had previously been the exclusive domain of DOD by agreement with NASA. Authorization was achieved in 1961 permitting NASA and Hughes to joint11 dcvclo;, the SYNCOM I satellite (see [3] p. 12). ‘fhe fundamental design problems of achieving :I 4vnchronous c>rhit and broadcc:s:ing a continuous higna1 to Earth were solved by Rosen and his rchearch group at Hughes. NASA awarded a controt to Hughes in Aqust 1961 leading to the February 1963 launch of SYNCOM I (see [3] p. 14). L’nfortunatelv a n trogen tank explosion destrovcd the con;munic;ltions capahilt\ during

x:lleIIite

communications purposes, in spite of an expenditure of $20 million to develop. m;:nbfacture, and laurch the satellite, would have been a severe blow to the development of an exclusively private satellite indu;tr!,. Because such risks were known b) NASA and direct payback was not an issue in the calculus of mission decision, NASA prepared and launched the backup satellite SYNCOM II in July of 1963 [3]. SYNCOM II was not designed to he a truly geostationary satellite hut rather to maintain an orbit which caused it to move a distanr,: of 33 degrees north and sot‘th of a,id perpendicular to the equator (see [3] p. 16). Midwest Research Institute has catalogued a long list of improvements incorporated in the SY NCOM I.1 program including technologies for transfer orbit, antenna array, automatic station keeping, and a variety of improvements in power and communications subsystems (see [3] p. 15 - 16). I .le major experimental purpose of SYNCOM II wa: to establish the feasibility of the semi-station.:ry orbit and provide engineering data on c:,mmunicatlons design SYNCOM II was so suecrssful in esrablishing the viability af synchronous satellites tha,: civilian communications satellite systems have subsequently uniformly heen of ‘he svnchronous design. Back in 1961. the viahilit.? of i synchrr;notus orhit solution was severely doubted. The ADVENT program, an Army synchronous satellite system. had been running into difficulties which eventually led to its demise. Thus. in the context of 1’36\, if SYNC’OM had not beer1 successful there is every reason to believe th&t the present predominant technology for communications satellit’e orbits. synchronous orbits. would have emerged at a much later date if at all [IO]. This success v$as the basis for taking mc:h of the risk out of d,:crloping commercial communication satellites. Tile SYNCOM Ii1 satellite. which achieved a near perfect geo stationary orbit in August of 1’464 was followed less than one year later byi INTELSAT I, the first commercial communications satellite [ 1 I]. The SYNCOM III achieved a truly geostationary orbit and demonstrated the technology \k:‘ automatic station keeping which WPS another link in the development of synchronous satellites. I’~u

:lapecth 0f thi5 station-keeping ?cwtant

further

1~

capability

dcwlopmcnts.

ground Iracking w25 inferior

in accuracy 1(.>in-orhit

btation keeping and the diwwq “ tri-axialiry,”

of the Iiarlh’h

pear shapcdnrss.

Lvhich rnrani

impulse power to preserve stationarity cantly less than originally cxpect::tions. mere

accurate than

position

the

u’as signifi-

anticipated.

on-board position

iuwxpected

wcre im-

the dihcc?\.cr\that

Contrlrrv

to

sensing \vas much

terrestrial

observarion.

accuracy of onhoard

sensing 2nd correction.

station

The

keeping.

set a standard

of

accuracy which would for several Fears focus technical eff,ort This

to improve

phrnnwa-wn

ground

aspect c>f technological terms

the 11llure of focusing inane;‘.

The

mtlchaniams

hy

potrntial

dards and specifications a pnrtiwlar

tracking.

change [ 121. In cconcmic

they provide a clear aandard quality

station

of focusing; is also an important

system

is that

which to mwsurc

user can use htan-

IO relate the cost of using

to its capabilities,

The

tatter

development ( the discovery of the pear-shapcdness of

Earth

(though

propriately

Ihe

analogy

is

more

ap-

an over ripe peach that has been picked

up firmly

in the horthern

hemisphere).

ample cf a rare but significant gineering.

the discovery

model. While

does not benefit

in en-

of a new physiclri

ple white engaged in solving well-defined

is an cx-

happening problems

princi-

txithin

much engineering

from a scientific

;1

\vorh

model (the phr-

nomena tire 100 complex to he completcl~

sprci-

fied or too new for thcorv to have caught up \\ith practice). l~rce

it is somewhat

modifk~tions

in

rare

for

enginwring

10

the models it does ust’. In

t.lis case the technology of geosynchoronous

satcl-

I~.es was a more attractive

option when thl: knowl-

edge about

state of

the physical

changed by empirical standards.

and specification

communications

the world

observation.

satellite

By

~~3s

1964.

of ;I particular

the

type of

were set and the major

questions

facing the commercial

the costs

they wwld

face in

drv&prrs

\\crc

implementing

the

technology rather than developing i::.. ‘The pattern of incremental earlier The

was apparent

development

W:;ve Tube

of incremental versus

2s

Traveling

9s well as changes aimed at

the specilic cntastrophc of SYNCOM

mad,e S),‘NCOM 111; solar

noted

program.

of a non-pressurized

amplifier

eliminating

improvrmer,t

in the SYNCOM

II an improved satellite. changes occurred nith

power in

collectors

SYNCOM

delivrrcd

II. bandwidth

I

A series

SYNCOM 32.5

~valls

went from

The contributions of the ATS program to techprogress in satellite communications arcs numel~ous and dislributed over a considerable number ol ~pecialily areas. Table ! itemizes sonic of these contributions. The specific intent of the .ATS program LV;IS tCJ explore IW.V technologies for application to later aatcllites. Among these techfor multiple ac_Y)rb. nologies 1ver~2 capabilities aircraft commLlnication. spin scan cameras (color ;md black and Lvhite). position \cnsing. operation in IIC’I\ frequency bands. and improvements in inl‘~;rm,itin;n codrng tichniqut’ (see 131 p. 23). ‘The I973 ATS-6 satellite ua5 an impctrtant hrcaktrhough 111achieving high orbital broadcast po\\cr and dralilutically reducing the size and cost of t:artt-;’ ha.4cs-I receivers [ 141. no!ogicnl

‘l‘iw most important observation ahout “iese I :chnical imprc>\~cments is that some of them “p;~ce” the developments in commercial satellite technology:. That is. NASA programs generalfiy led III the development of the major techn~~logical xdu:icvis ;o commercial hatrllite problems. III tahltl 2 wc have comparccl a series (?I” such major design solutions transfcr:cd from NXSA contract to commercial hatellite s\,stems (often constructed h\. the same contractorsi (see [3]. pp. 47--4X). The impc)rlance of NASA’s t~:chnolopical lr:~d is twofold. First. NASA had a :4gnificant id in cspericncc over the commercial sector and \%5’aspursuing

<)hjrctivrs 0: a more icchnological character (thus NASA was pl:rhaps less constrained by cost considrrations), Second, NASA appears to have adopted an expiicit policy of taking relatively large risks in order to extend technical capability whereas user firms such as COMSAT have been more cautious in their explorations of new technology. tending to make improvements within existing system design. The latter point is particularly relevant for current NAL;A policy.

3. NASA’s

contribution:

Cost-benefit

analysis

The history of satellite communicatir;ns technology (s.c.t.) a::id of NASA’s role suggests that it may be useful t,;, distinguish between two periods: the period prior to the first commercialization of s.c.t. in 1965 and the period after 1965 1151. We will argue that NASA’s contribution was decisice in the first period and therefore that the direct benefits from the s.c.t. of 1965 - henceforth termed the baseline satellite communications technology, h.s.c.t. - should be Jui!~ attributed to NASA. A preliminary calculation of these direct benefits, for the first sub-market telephony between the U.S. and Europe ,Nill follow. After 1965, the direct contribution of NASA seems to be rather small. rt&rtivc to its contribution in the previous period and probably tc the contribution of the companies directly participating in the commercial exploitation of S.C.I. N.ISA’s contribution is basically an indirect one - <)f having been responsible for the b.s.c.t.. upon wllich the dramatic improvements in s.c.t. occurred. ;l process which enabled rhe grad-

ual diffusion

of this technology

among

;in

increas-

ingly wide spectrum of applications. It ivill he argued that existing co5t benefit analIsis is. I-J\ it.si’lf, inadequate to evaluate these bencfit3. the reason being our lack of an adequate conceptual framework which will consider (I) the timing of introduction of new technologies by the private

sectnr. (2) the competitive reaction of existing technologies to the threat:; posed by new rechnologies: and (3) the external economies ,Nhich any application pro\ ides to those firms engaged in subsequent

applications.

Without NAC A’s involvemezi. ~hr introduction of the b.s.c.t. u .)u/d have been delayed. at Ieast br:,ond the date where its efficiency was surpahJscd by that of the alternative cable technology [ 161. The technological history of NASA’s involvement in s.c.t.. is proof of the criticality of this involvement for the emergence of the b.s.c.t. The opinion of experts prior to NASA’s involvement Land after failure of the AD\,‘ENT program was ovek,whelmingiy pessimistic about rhs prospects of a commerclaliy viable synchronous satellite communications system. The MRI study (carried out in 1470) si,ltes: “Only slightly more than 10 year!, ago. many experts had serious doubts that: satellites could survive in space. and operate long enough to paw out; th,e quality of satellite communications transmissions would bt: acceptable; and that the cc .t of satellite systems would be competitive wi’h traditional earth-based communication.”

131 This outlook was lar$,ely responsible for Dr. Harold Rosen’s inability to “sell” the idea of a synchronous satellite to either a military or a civilian ager-t; NASA’s taking over of the project was essential for the successful development of s.c.t.. at least during the 1960s [IO]. Some quantitative evidence on expenditures on R & D and engineering efforts also bears upon the previous conclusion. NASA’s expenditures on s.c.t. between 1960 and 1965 dwarf that of any other agency or firm potentially interested in a viable commercial system. Hughes’ accumulated expenditures prior to NASA’s taking over the synchronous satellite project amounted to approximately I million dollars [IO]. The accumulated expenditure of

SYNC’OM

ATS-I

ATS-I

SYNC‘OM

(Altilde

(Low encrg~

(Electronic

( Broadband

hcnwrs)

proton

phased array)

25 Milr)

ATS-I

damape)

ATS-III

(

(Spin ~a~,lhill-

(Mechanically

ATS-III

/ation)

&spun

(Dual

II

array)

III

ATS-I moclc)

(PVIWICI ccrn~rol; (Polang Irtrirude) SYNCOM

III

AI-S-i

SR&7 power

II

(Tri axdlity

(RF

and pr:ivity

hirndling)

(Shapd

pcltellllal)

(RFI

crwr3gc)

problem;

(I Ical

SK&T (High

SK&T arc’2

output

TWTs)

pipr

cooling) A?%F&G

(Low

ATS-F thruhr

Al%F&G power

arrays)

jets)

SK%‘1

(30 II deploy-

ATS-V

ahlc array)

(200 \\a11

(Slip rings)

SR&T (Flcxrhlc

(Hi@,

TWT

hod\

I2 GH,)

CffCClh)

(Multipactmg high power

PF

components) .AT:s-lll

SYNC‘OM

ATS-I-

ATS-I

III

ATS-III (On

hoard

processing) (40 watl L band)

tion ant! maintenance cos:ts, administration costs, ground station investment costs (fol the salellite c~nly). tails (for ;*ahk onI\,). and possibly profits 2nd taxes. Lashc j UIC~O~en’s figures for tht: cha ‘e of 5atrllite inve tment costs over tota: cost; for Intellsut were 4 percent and 43 percent for the TAT-5 and TA.1 ‘-6, respectively [2U]. There ‘ore. use of satellite investment costs and cable in\ ‘tment costs in ou,’ calculation is ~_~~~bably ind,cative of the relatio iship between total satellite costs and total cable costs [Zl].

(2) Period:

The

relevant

period

ends

witk the

mlnimum of two dates - the expected data of introduction of the b.s.c.t.. under the assumption of no NASA involvement, and the actual daie when Cable Technology in use became more efficient than the b.s.c.t. Table 3 qhows the relative efficiencies of the various TAT cables. The design life of these cirbles is 20 year!. The efficiency of the INTELSAT I technology is given by the figures below [22!: --~_ Investment, $9 000.000 InvestrrLt cost per Design life. 1.5 years capacity circuit, Circuit capacity. 240 per Fetrr, $25.000 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, _ _ _ _ _

.~_.__ SpJcc

-__.__ lxth

wgmcnt

wgnwnt

--. Channel

Down-link

ground-station

C’p-!ink

~~rcwnd-~tatt~~n

capacity

frequerq

tranzmlt

frrquenck

rt’ca\c

antenna

SYIWOM

II & 111

AT!+I (Buvlding

SYNCUM

II & III

feed .)

ATS-I

A-E-V block)

(C‘a5wgrdrn

dntrnnd

(Millimeter

waves)

ATS-III

( PWIJC~mon~~pulwt

(C‘hannrliration)

SRJrT

AX-F

ATS-V

SK&T

II (SHF and

ATS-I’

ATS-I mcler

(Sm311 and

mrlli-

tranqxwtahle)

*ilrt

propagati’on)

ATS- I

SYNC-Oh1

AT%.-III

AT-S-III

AT!;- F

ATS-F

(\‘HFI

(L’HFI (L-hand)

SYNC’OXZ III ATS-I (AKINC’I A N-III (OfIt!,

To find the present value of the investment cost per satellite capacity circuit for a 20-year period the cost figure which has to be compared with unit circuit cable costs of the last column of table 3 we take the PV of $25.000 per yca~ for a period of 20 years discounted at 10 perlzent interest rate, PVS: PVS = 25,000

1 - U/l.lP’ 0.1 i

I,

_ 213 ooo * .

.\‘I S-i’

_____Ysdr

Lengtlh (nautical

Inilial Invest-

de\)

mcnt

In~edn-13~8

C’ircuir Upacllr

cm1 p:r ;lllcrn.ll; circuil

__ 1956 I Y5Y lY63 lYh5 I’)70 I’)76

2.2hX 2.531

44.9 42.0

3.514 3.509

46.4

3.600

I9 I .o 2YO.O

”

(4) Unit resource savings: Point (ii) above implies [26] that 0ur calculations implicity ,sre made on the assumption that cables are perfectly divisible in capacity while indivisible in lifetime. This is unrealistic but enables us to avoid the problem of having to decide the titning of introducti’on of the

Tahlc4 SaLc!iite circuits .-- U.S. ~Europe --- ~--_-----_-

,!elcphony

”

- _-

! 965 1970. WC dcL+drd to calculate reWurce sav~ngb over the volume of satellite trafiic in ZISC r,ither than over satellite circuit cq~~ir~~. The former would bc closer to the amount that TAT-4 cables would have I.O substitute had the h.s.c.t. not been available. The calculation based on satellite circuit capacity is also made for reference purpo~1~‘s.Some additional assumptions are implied when using this measure: (i) Satellite circuits in ~-se during the period wou!d not be substantially low ‘r had no improvements beyond the b.s.c.t. occured; (ii) the additional cable circuits of the TAT-4 type that would be installed in the absence of the b.x.c.t. are roughly equal to the satellite circuits actually used during the period [25].

XX0 X75

4X 4X

46.0 X7.0

3.44 I 3.692

IYX5 h

--

____

__.

_-_

141 i3X

329

X45 4.r)w

IO3 4x

I ?.rNO

333

?.4 h

h

-

--

addition;:; TAT-4 tcchnoi~~gy cables which would have been laid had Ihe b.s.c.t. not become available. In any case, it is doubtful whether our calculations would have bel:n significantly altered had that decision-making been explicitly taken into account. Under our assumptions, 20-year circuit resource savings, discounted, equals the difference between: (a) unit circuits costs with TAT-4 technology. which are paid at the time the additional cable would be instai!ed. and (b) PVs = 213.000. This amounts to $120.1’;00.

The Culdution: The above elements of analysis enable us to compute the direct impact of NASA’s involvement in satellite communications technology in its first commercial application: telephony along the U.S. -Europe route. Table 5 indicates the procedure followed. Note that the resources saved in any particular year depend on the additional satellite circuits used or installed during that year, and not on the absolute number 0.’ circuits [27]. The present value of the resources saved is

uh-market ---

I965

1966

1967

64 64

72 8

165 x7

242 71

464 222

240 240

240 0

240 0

I.500 1,260

1.500

---

-~___

lY6X

~~-.--

1969

I970

0

5cxl Yb 6.000 3.470

$49.5 million when the calculation is based ~jn satellite circuits in use during the period. and $421.23 million when it is based on capacity. $49.5 million is, in our opinion, a lower bound to the resources saved from the first application of the b.s.c.t. There are a number of factors which would raise the figure: (a) the assumption that cable technology iv;ts independent of satellite technology. Experience tells US that slevelopments in cable technology were consider:.Sly accelerated by the introduction of satellite techlaology. This would tend to lengthen tbc period were the benefits from the b.s.c.t. should bt computed. ‘b) the unit circuit savings from the availabi!ity cf the b.s.c.t. are higher than computed due to the Lower design life of satellites relative to cables. Thus, after 1.5 years of life. a b.s.c.t. circuit could be substituted for a more efficient satellite technology, and so on throughout the 20 years of cl;ble life. Part of these. additional savings should be attributed to the b.s.c.t. because they would have occurred even without additional R & D and engineering resources explicitly allocated to improve the b.s.c.t., i.e.. through oper;tting experience. learning by doing in the producti,?n of hardware. and unpriced externalities received irom other sectors 1281. In our opinion, both of these I’acturs certainly outweigh by far an:, possible over-estimate in the

\,olume c>f satellite circu>th il: use \\ hich \\~~ld have been substituted b!. l.ablch in the ;th.\cncc of the

b.s.c.t.

The direct benefits front introducing thrs IJ.LC.I. the IL.!% f:uropc teleinto its first application I;hrmy sub-market. reprryl:nt , n import;mt share of :.tll the NASA expenditures itXading IO thih frchnolt qy. This share is :\t lea\t ;I third. and prohabl> much more. This is a rctnarkut~le achievement for the foilowing reasons: ( I() Satellite communications technology is a m;L_,or technoloq or innovation [29] ‘\I post-World War II indtl- :rial society. Yt is sufficient to look at the set of .wttiaE and potential applications of this technology in order to realize this fact (30). (2) The full impact of thih (like any) rnajcjr technology on econorn! (and sctciety) will makt itself felt only after ;I re;l>ol ahlb long period of time !3 I]. The direct impact anal> XJ previously refers orply to one sub-market tort?spending to one ;ipplication. i.e.. part of interniltional telephone trunklng. the first application &own in table 6. We doubt that we mav find caxe\ where the first direct impact of the huselinte tec!lnological level of a major innovation Lovered one third or one half of the co,:,ts lvithin h year>. NASA’s over-all contribution ni;b\ 1~ di\ &tf into three parts:

Data coll~~c.tion and relay High quality.

high

speed fnc:imilr One-wq

Satellite-lo,3atellile rcLi\

de@ tal

data distribution; financial Time

sharing

service.r

Meetin@ and polling Information

networks

Law and justice MedIcal and scientific:

(1) The resource savings due to the b.s.c.t..

in the first sub-market and in subsequent sub-markets or applications penetrated by it. The share of ~~111 resource savings due to (21 post-b.s.c.t. whicll >ilould i)e attributal-it to NASA. (3) The share of the value to society derived from the satisfaction of previously unmet needs. The first part is calculable and quantitative. it probably does not go very much beyond the international telephony sub-market because improvements beyond the baseline technology were essential for most of the subsequent diffusions of s.c.t. Cost-benefit analysis can be appropriately used here. The second and third components are ex,. tremziy difficult to calculate for the following reasons: (a) The technology beyond the b.s.c.t. is dut: to the joint action of the following factors 01’

agents: NASA as the agent responsible for the introduction of the b.s.c.t. upon which subsequent impr0vemen.s are based [32]. NASA as a contributory agent to post-b.s.c.t. [33]. commercial firms. INTELSAT and COMSAT, as contributors to post-b.s.c.t. (b) The diffusion of p3st-b.s.c.t. within and across sub-markets and applications depends 031 technology adoption and switching decisions of prikate firms. These decisions ai:e influenced by the pattern of unpriced benefits (externalities) generated in the various applications, especially the initial ones. Moreover, the third component requires some radically new roois or analysis. presumably a theory of needs [34]. Our empirical and theoretical knowledge of these processes is slight. This kaobvledge is essential for evaluating the impact of n?trjor innovations and the possible share which may be a.ttributabie

4. ksues emerging

from

kASA’s

imolvement

in

C.S. technology

Another aspect of NASA’\ acti\lt) concrlrn* the accumulation of J bnt9s ledge hd\e for cnginccrtng de\@. Tbi\ is an cffectl\c \\+I\ of stimuIat.ng I!X coml~lelcialszatinn of 3 techncllogv xincc 11 rn.i\

con:riderahl> rt!dJce the wart c>f finding AI (~~ptiSUCCC~~in the transition from earl, R Sr II (and baielinc technol ‘gy development) to cor,rmrrcialization can be iIscribed to LL numher of factor>. First. a suhsta~ tial portion of the R Br D and pr~~totypr development and building was prr-

formed by subcontractors such as Hughes which subsequently supplied the first (and subsequent) user(s) [36J. To a significant extent there was no need for explicitly transferring the design and manufacturing oapabilitics from Government to c#Jmmericai use. Second, experimentation by NASA of a variety of different satellite systems prior to commercialization led to a cost effective first commercialization of this major new tcchnoiJ’gY. !n this respect it is highly significant that NASA attemptetl C.S. programs of its own, over and beyond the jupport it provided to the proc,ram% undertaken by industry. The additional F: & 0 widened Lonsidcrably the range of technols\$es available for commercialization. and considerabr: reduced costs. Without NASA’s support, fil-st sommercialization would probably have rmbodied AT & T’s [37] low altitude system invoiving large numbers of satellites. instead of the edormously cheaper synchronous satrliite alternative invoi.Jing only up to three satellites. Third, the fact tilzt NASA sponsored ~@cutions R 8 D after having arrived at the basic design solution to S.C. synchronous satellites. This is important for two reasons: first, there are indivisibiiities in this research, since it is most economical. to ur,dertake a very wide spectrum of applications eu:oeriments together in the context of a givec program than it is to perform a series of indivi.iual experiments ezch one suited to the needs of a particular customer; second, there are spin-offs (externalities) flowing from research primarily useful for some applications \A:hich benefit other applica-

mum pornr deal?n frlr a particular applic;ttictn. Thus. the accumulated data hail rc*prtt\znt\ .I hnowledge infrahtructurr riemcnt I($ tnr InJu\tr\. which should he diffferrntiatcd from t,mplhlc capital infrastruc,turr components. In S.C. ;I 4uhataratial accum~td;lti~~n 0i knot\ ledge ;icc~mp.~nicd the RELAY and SYNCOM Programs. The? enhanced the understanding of the (high energ!, part~clc) sp:ice environment and enabled the optimlzsiian of c’omrnuni~:atic~n and other suh~~~t~ws.

Prior to prool’ of fc..lhihilit> of a basic dwpn s’olution. expected pri\ate hencflts ma\ he lsw .knd risks high so expected private utiliti of R & I) ma>’ easily be negative. Expcctcd wc1a1 utilit!. ho\vever, may be po5itil.c due to rxtcrnalitic> and 1owl:r social risk: relative to pritate rihh% ;\fter ;I basic design solution is arri\.cd at. the pr!\.itt* profitability (colnmercial rihh) of ~ub~qur:nt R 8: D whose objective is IO optimiLc. ad;lpt aud improve such a design incc*eascs (drcr~a~~\) [3’J]. Under these cctnditions. ‘baseline tetchnolog~ * R 81:D should be: sp,.msorrd by the (~jovrrnnlcnt x.vhiKe subsequent R & D should be left to the private sector. The above reasoning tvould hat-e ied N.&S.-\ t1.l launch RELAI’ and once its fsasibiiit> \~a> Fr~~~~d tc improve upon it in conjunction u.ith the pri\.itc sector. But \vhy did NASA undertake the Sj’SCO&I Program which led to a more effecti\e basic design solution? -The anhwer lies in the gap cr~\at~d ht:twdzn the social and private expected uuht> once the synchronous satellite idea became available. Given that there already existed a psn~~ed basic design (RELAY-type active satellite s>>tcmx) and tha: the nen proposed design V.X \er\ rihh> for private firms, the latter would not ha\.~‘und~r-

ta\,cn the pr+~t. at least as early ;lj NASA did. !,oci;il utility of the proH
have made sense. L’.T the development r)f a even before !hc full non-synchronous 5.c.

role of Government sponsorerl R & D mav have to bt: enhanced duri:.g depressictns rather than being reduced. Finally. foreign Governments. continued support of certain technologies may justify. in certain cases. enhanced (and possibly redirected) public support at home. We do not know of any rigorous criteria for identifying these cases in practice.

u,i.s full\ nzalized. Fcticr;tI supp.)rt for S.C. technology mdy be juhtifiecl e\i’n hr$ond the stage of first commercialir;itit>n. for ;I ..ariety of reasons. Firht. yrlvate firma may have :I tendency to risk. incrcmcntal R & D only and ptzrfc>rm lc)i\ ni;~. nr@:ct longer term research on technologie3. even when these offer a positive social utilit?. In thc:4e c~t~c~. governments should step in. The currctlt con:,er\atism of the satellite communications coinmercial sector and potential for significant (if rishy) advailce is observed by P.L. Bargellini of COMSAT in presenting a table of potential imprcwmmts based on new technologies. He commelits: “Table 3. xvhich summarizes the situation re\~!als at least four arcas in which the new technc11.~~ has not been tried. Since some of the:,e tcchnoiogies appear quite promising, it is a;>proprla:i: to hope that the im3asse between iile rrquilements of operational systems and the !‘c’ed for cxpcriment will be broken. The soonr’r ihis il~paase is over$:ome the better; hotvevt r. tht bUC’ 3.5 of “coli\,rntional” Latellite systems dnd spacecraft design appear~s to have been partidIly responsiljle for slowing down exrerime*- .I programs. This situation is not surprisin since it has occurred many times in the past 7’ other fields of technology where large investments in oper;&or?ai systems retarded the introq>uctior of ..jsystems and components based on new technologies. notwithstanding the potenti;il promise. [40]. Second. the gap bt tween private and soci;ll C.XJeL?c(i utility (including the risk and benefit ap?r( priability factors) of developing new technolog es nlay comeivably increase during depressions. The ca.%h-flow problems of firms may deter them more than in normal times lrom undertaking R S: D. On &he other hand, the lapid introduction and diffusicn of new technologies may be critical to overcome the d=pre*;sion. On both counts the

NASA’s support of S.C. R & D had a m,.l,jor cffcct on thh: structure of the industry. and this i4 bscause of the variety of role:; it played within the innovation process. If NASA had simply subsidized part of the ongoing R & D efforts of industry then it is likely that the domination of AT & T on both domestic and international t*ommunications would have continued. This is because AT B T was the only private company which h,uJ already undertaken a considerable R & Ti effort of its own and was capable to proceed through commercialization of its non-synchronous system. i’he fact that NASA - beyond supporting TELST&R - undertook programs of its own such as RELAY and more important]} the successful SYNCOM Program (based on the Hughes idea of synchronous sa!ellites) opened up both the communications and the satellite and communications rquipment markets. Thus. transatlantic telcphclne via satellite turned out to be owned and operated by an international consortium - INTE.LSAT and the U.S. part by a private,‘public ccrporation with a relatively broad-based ownersh,p (COMSAT). Similarly. the technological preconditions were created for rhc FCC’s 1972 decis,on assuring multiple-entry into the U.S. domestic. S.C. market. (Finally. NASA contracting created hardware and system expertise in a wide variety of firms such as Hughes. RCA. etc.) The first commercial application or ’ ML” of S.C. was the transmission of telephone and TV sig.ials across the Atlantic. In the early 1960s this was the only possible commercial application given the high cost of the existing medium and low altitude satellite systems, e.g., based on AT & T’s TELSTAK. The existing supplier of telephone services in this market was AT & T (via underwater cnjtes) alld the eventual supplier was INTELSAT. AT 8.z T h;:ld a 29 percrnt share of COMSAT. the compa:ly

representing

the U.S. in that consortium.

tion to the suppliers ttzchnology’).

In addi-

of S.C. services (‘users

we have the ‘final

sides of the Atlantic

represented

u:,ers’

of the

on

by 3 vxiety

both of

government

agencies. From all this it is clear -that the issue of NASA’s relationship with the ‘users’ is a complex one. Some ‘ user’-related aspects which were important for the success in the transfer or commercialization of the technology include (I) Support of the R & D programs of existing suppliers of services (i.e.. of AT & T’s TELSTAR Program) without neglecting experimentation with other technolc,lgirs. (2) Increa! ing cooperation ::ith European countries to coordinate experimentation. This started with

ICHO and continued with RELAY. 1961 the telecommunication agencies of the J.K. and France agreed to build the ground stations for these P-.qrriments. This pattern of NASA Ional cooperation with the ‘final sponsored into, users’ of the f rst commercial system, enormously accelerated and faciljtated the establishment of INTELSAT. Moreover. the chain of ground sta(ions built was one of the foundations of the global system (see Smith [37]) and presumably explains the speed of the technology transfer process . . In

5. Concluding I marks The paper is an attempt at evaluating the COIItri,>ution ot’ NASA to the emcrgaence af the S.C. indc.lstry. It coinbines aspects of the quaiitati\,r ilistory of the technology and a partial quantitative Analysis of the costs and benefits of NAS.4.s invoi\.emcnt. Prior studies, to our knowledge. have generally emphasized one or the other, so it n1a) be useful to consider the advantages of combining both. Two specific features of the work include: ( 1) A distinction between base-line technology development a;ld subsequent technological devrlopment. The distinction is important because the qualitative case histories show that the contribution of NAS 4 is clear and direct in the former and indirect in the 1a:ter. Therefore, a partial and relatively standared cost-benefit analysis of NASA’s involvement appears as a possibility. Our present too!s of analysis do not permit us. how-

technoiogy transfer issue sinrze firm:, like siemens which first commercialized did not t)a>e their technology 011 contr:.icts with the Government but on their own R & D efforts. Finally. the user of the new technology in the West German case was a relatively clearly defined entity .- utilities or combinations of utilities and its role in choosing the technology to be used was paramount. In tleither case is this the situation with respect to : .c. P-&ably due to very special in~ti;utinnal and tecklnological characteristics of the industry. NASA acd other U.S. agencies played a much more active role both in arriving at the optimal baseline technology and in determining the particular nature ,Jf the technology user who ;vould own and operate the first system on a commercial scale. These characteristics may a1so limit the applicability of NASA’s experience to (:ther instances of Government sul;port of large tligh-technology projects. significant

[I21

N.

Rosenberg,

Inducemrnt

I131

The

Direction

Mrch::nisms

Rosenberg

(ed.).

Universilv

Press. Camhridge.

the course

amined

h.rveral flight

other

on an identification of

advanrage

(6) (Novrmher.

rrcchani?m.

I x11thi:,

parlance.

The u-phase

and

phase

in

the

phase.

S. Kuznrtr.

(San Fransisco

/~uz.

und Profits

Prop.ss National

Science

That

is, heyond

of an industry.

K Iznrts’s cycle

initi:ll

and

Technr logical

in: P. Kel y

rent I(mde&r

i nd

to

ap-

NSF’s

Innovation

M.

A Crrfr d

Kranzbcrg

Kearew

q

Cur-

P,-ess. 19’15 j; J. Enos, ,Perro-

(MIT

Prt ,s. Cambridge.

Found,ltion.

Washington.

Mass.,

Inrerucrron

in the Innoootion

Science Foundation.

[I61

A Eli 1 I

hstwcen the n-phase

mno\.tiion

Growth.

Scrence und Techndogv

References

fEEE

8: .~.:wrn.~

proc-ss

also to S

TL’L.~~o/c>~I
1962);

might

and Performance.

to Enos’a distinction

correspond\

Economic

(eds.)

We

is to NASA’s

and so is the hrst course. of ac~lon. Description

and the /?-phase of the innovatibjn

‘innovative’

In

centered

1975).

This corresponds

phcation

ex-

auto-

program.

rnech.!nisrn

Trunxuc~rrons on A erospwc~ trnd Elearon

[ISI

authors

issurs ;.nd the needed

the planning

Redisch. ATS-6

N.

or resolve these issues was the

suggest. to u,e economic comparative

tie

irlcluding

the SETI

of technological

operative

W.M.

and

of a planning

IO clarify

in:

IOX- 125. study

programs

control

experimentation focus

1976)

NASA

surface

Change:

Ue\lces.

O,I Te~hnoh~,:~, (Cambridge

of the present

each. the deve!opmcnt

(141

Focusing

Perspecrrces

During mated

of Technological

and

Ber~~ven

Prows

D.C..

(Na :ional

1973 j,

1970. the year when the TAT-5

cable uas

laid across :he Atlantic.

1171

The

data

‘l’ans

were obtained

of Goddard

expenditures pond

amounted

ECHO.

SYNCOM. and

experiments.

Tllr

not by NASA.

MRI

communications htes amounted Interview Center,

1191 1201

Alton

October

1978.

EC ,won,,c .\ , Krvue

t Novcmbcr.

C~unuclrennt~

‘f’tc~,,,rnn,ryuc~

I

I (4,

York.

[22]

1969) 570.-579.

Global [23]

TELSTAR

preceded

[24]

H.

An

Wood

Satellite

$29 and

of delay

spending

on

and G ciatelSpace

and

echo

(see section

rrdunda.ncy

on

Fucrhfres

in our

Flight the

I).

Policy. May

alternative and C.

.Srudr

197 I). c;il
of

in a sense we takt, the into

account

fit *as

Communications. Systems Conference, Decision,

6th

is $30.000.

Effect \eness

COMSAT

Corp.;

September

and Cables AIAA

hlontreal.

in

paper 1975.

in Intrrcon-

Communications Canada,

Cornmumcations

and the Problem

.ree B.

Cost

F. 26th Congress.

Role of Satellites

B. Owen. The lcternational TAT-6

figure

Reher,

Communications.

The

tinental

Rosen, July. 197X. to the general market,

include

paid by DOD

Goddard

of 1aunc.h failure

at the I.A.

Satellite

u\e and not a\allable

frequency

S. Ramji,

with Dr. H. Rosen. July, 1975. I hut was only in limited

of

costs although

presented

with Dr.H.

INTELSAT

SYNCOM

hasis. See Iniernutionul

however,

See [3]. p. 56.

[‘dl Inter\ll,w Interview

I ]‘)I [lrl

Jones

the effects

investment

Edelson.

1963).

the

and support%

zero).

IX1 H Ro\en. Synchronous C‘ommunrcat~on
about

exclude,

actual

as and

the costs of

to the ATS-F

of Telecommunications

\atellitr 171 1l.c‘. kludler and J.E. Tilron. Rrscarch .md De~elopmenr (‘oats as a Barrier to Entr). The C‘ut. udrtrn Journul (I/

prier

million.

to $137 million.

On a present-value We

of

presumably

those he-

distributed

$43.6

include

of voice communication>

(Office

I?]1

million.

reports that total NASA

satellites

with

Especially quality

costs

stations

proJected

(inc’.lding

RELAY.

Costs

Development

Total

launch vehicle. ground operations

million on ground

[‘Xl

to $130.7

million.

Project

Center.

programs

$19 million.

$68

:.pacecraft,

Ihe

Flight

on the three

1965)

follows:

from

Space

1976.

Industry.

of Regulated

th:

Uiligopoly

(Departmtxt July.

of Ec~~~~rnrc.s. St.lnf~~rd I:n!\t

rvt!.

reb 14

lY76).

[?S] If (i) doeh lwt hold then pari 01’ the direct WC ascribe

to the

p<,st-h.s.c.t.

~cchnc~logy.

[Zh] Over

and

demand [27] This

hrkond

the

effects

for telephone

is because

rather

h.a.c.1. \\oulil

circuits

really

CI~ the pra

we calculate

sa,ing:, cir,xith.

life for B new

design life hetaecn technology:

01

ela>tlclt~

111

rouie.

per ?I)-\ear

circuit

issue here is thr allocat~cw 1.11the rexcwrc’c’

savings from substituting design

vl~lcll

in the mam Atlantic

than savings per I-year

[2X] The theoretical

bcncfit\

he the rc\ult

an older trchnol<:g,

~echnolngq

wth

with ;I I~wg

;L re ativel!

two htagcs in the hibtor.

the !wccline

technclney

ah~~rt

01 the ncu

and the post-baseline

improvements. 1291 For

the definition

Ew7orm

Grcwrir

Cambridge. [30]

See T&le

of maJor of

tvla!~.

lY7l)

6. which

is taken

have hecome re!-cant

[32]

100 tears

major

innovatior~s.

for the full impact

[33)

For example. If satellite time).

a generation

meas

as the

It is not surprihin:.

to tha

tllc markrt lo;4

work.

cial communications

therefore.

on rezourcc1,

need. Benefits

should

such a netal

rhat we hate

nc, rc;ll

trchnol-

.stutl;~. Ior cxsmplc.

rccuwmic

stawn5

inlpact.

of C’0MISA.I

Thc\e

:

grw

arrived

and channel capdcitb ): ae

of firms augmented were subsequently markets

by th& applied

firms


intcrxtlt)li to commrr-

are also reavded.

However.

issues for ;I ~1s~. benefit

;lnJlx\l\

not yet been addwaed. at

WNCCM

the subsequent applications de\rloped

Inth ~,f

etc. Case !.tudie!. of jww trchn~)-

[36] This wab the case not only with respect to the xxic solution

from Job.

found

commumcatlon\

The MKI

.md revenues

the basic methodological have apparently

un:, ~tlhflcd nwd

This may be il \‘tx!I’ difficult

for haroware.

capabilities

with NASA

r.itc ~11

program

value of mee!lng

of direct

tb : bystem (ground

;L‘fall’

it Dale> not saw

ory ;b u major ib..wvation. invcslments

he rc-

1~1;I region fcv the t”lr\t

seriiccs

analcsilr of satellite

rcterb to mesure:

for

~)f current

two ma:, *till

a prevxwly

directly

society’s point (>f view

clude

applicatior~s w

t~rc\h

Even all~luing

in the b.s.c.t.

by definition

he csrimated

it:slf.

to bc felt in the cccxxwiy.

telephone

devoted

Add~tl<~~.~l

4tilger
as a result of the ATS

technology

then

cxt-hcnefil

[3] stud!.

should at least he artrihutrll

(e.g.. providing

I’rcr.

engine. few cuample.

in the various

tc~ its investment

previously

from

aam

quired

[34]

cr\lty

333.

to manifest

lead timts

For this NASA

me S. Ku/n~t\. Iin

since.

shorter

return

(iSI

pp. 314

The full impact of Walt’s more than

f Harvard

pal ential or at vmou~

apphcatlons. [3l]

innovation

h'trrrons

hut ail,,> ulth

K Sr 11 (4TS)

in the latter were :llso located

and had immediate

commerci.ll

dr~_rn

rqxct

ICI

The capahilirle*. 111011: con~ract~v implic,ltions.

It I\