- Email: [email protected]
Grammar and semantics in ‘axiomatic functionalist’ linguistics
Lingua 36 (1975),47-67 0 North-Holland Publishing Company
GRAMMAR AND SEMANTICS IN ‘AXIOMATIC FUNCTIONALIST’ LINGUISTICS Sandor G.J. HEKVEY Dept. of Linguistics, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Scotland, U.K.
Received November 197 3
Much space has been devoted in recent years to discussion of the hitherto unresolved controversy over the relation between syntax and semantics in transformational linguistics. In an approach as loosely integrated as the latter 1 , it seems not unlikely that the controversy will never be resolved by means of conclusive arguments from one or other of the factions. A deductive approach such as that of ‘axiomatic functionalism’ compares favourably with this situation, in that the relation of grammar to semantics though not a straightforward one, will, nevertheless, not lead to controversy that cannot be unequivocally solved by reasoning. With an eye to the internal comstency of the whole theory, and an eye to the external adequacy of that theory with regard to the description of languages (Mulder 1973, 1974), it is possible to reach a solution concerning the relation between grammar and semantics - a solution that uniquely satisfies the requirements for its adoption. The present article has an immedi te aim, and also an ulterior moltive. Its immediate aim is simply to offer a solution to the problem of the relation between grammar (syntax pills morphology) and semantics, in accordance with the theory of ‘axiomatic functionalism’. Its ulterior motive is to illustrate that a deductive approach to linguistic theory leads to clearcut theoretical solutions, where no such solutions have been forthcoming in other, non-deductive approaches, and that the vital ’ The fact that there are so many current versions of transformatlonahst theory IS, in my opinion, directly attrl%utable to fhe initial vagueness of the approach; the latter IS in ztself a mark c>fthe lack of theoretical integration, in spite of claims of explicitness and theoretical precision.
S.C.J. Herveyf’tlxiomatic pwtionalist’
linguistics
issue of thtb relation between ‘compartments’ of the theory can be settled in ‘axiomatic functionalism’ without meeting any ‘Frankensteins’ (McCawley 197 1) or ‘zombies’ (Katz 1973). A major feature of ‘axiomatic functionalism’ is the on tological distinction it draws and maintains throughout between ‘linguistic theory’ and ‘linguistic descriptions’ (Molder 1973). This distinction maintained between (t’ze theory of) ‘1anguJge’ and (the description of) a ‘language’ has, perhays, something of a Hjelmslevian flavour. A linguistic theory (a theory of *language’) is - as for Hjelmslev - a deductive calculus containing no ‘exls”,ential postulate’ (Hjelmslev 1953). Instead it contains: a small set of (general, arbitrary and appropriate) axioms from which deductions are made; a set of primitive terms used in statements in the theory, including the definitions of terms applied to notions in the theory; a set of theorems deduced from statements (axioms or theorems) in the theory; a set of definitions (using primitive or defined terms) for technical terms. Thus the statements found in the linguistic theory (and this is what characterises the theory, as opposed to ‘descriptions’ under that theory, as envisaged in ‘axiomatic functionalism’) are of only three kinds: a%oms, theorems, defi;?itions. All these statements are devoid of direct lempiricaZ content as they stand - they contain no ‘existential postulate’ (cf. Hjelmslev 1953). An axiom is intuitively accepted in the: first place, because it appears to state some general ‘fact’ whose tenability is not controversial, but is a matter of common sense; it is ultimately accepted because it leads to a theory which is found to be an adequate device in the producing of linguistic Ges?tiptions. Thus an axiom is arbitrary insofar as it is adopted on the intuit!; .: grounds of common sense, rather than being justifiable in logical terms; and it is appropriate insofar as it leads to a powerful and adequate linguistic theory2, 2 This use of the terms ‘arbitrary’ and ‘appropriate’ would seem to correspond closely to Hjelmslev’s use of the same terms in a similar context (Hjelmslev 1953).
S.G.J. Hervey/‘Axiorn.atic functionalist’ lingulstlcs
49
A theorem is valid purely by virtue of being logicallv deducible from primitive or derived statements in he theory. Definitions are arbitrary (though not unmotivated) in their choice of definiens; but they are appropriate in that the) refer to notions found in the theory, the necessity for these notions, itself, being often theorematic. As it will be readily seen, none of the statements in the tlzeo~_~requlrc. 01 are even capable of, empirical ‘verification’. At best they may be exemplified or illustrated by reference to speech-data from actual languages3. Linguistic theory takes a certain distance - by virtue of Its abstract nature and its generality -- from speech-data. A Zir2guisticdescriptiofz (i.e. the description of LIlanguage), on the other hand, refers to a par titular chosen set of speech-p!lenomena (though not usually to a finite corl_‘z~).The statements which it contains (or which it implies) are what ‘axiomatic functionalists’ would call scientific hypotheses. They are scientific in that they are not mereZ_v conjectural as some so-called hypotheses are, but are testable (Popper 1965, 4th ed.) in the light of the speech-data io which they refer, and of the properties they attribute to those speech-data. In order for such hypotheses to be testable, it is necessary, in the first place, to be able to interpret rhem comisteutZy arzd rrlzambigwu~~_v - in this the description must rely on the notions and definitions provided by the theory. (The adequacy of the theory is partly tested in its ability to provide sufficient notions and models for use in formulating descriptive hypotheses.) Secondly, the theory must provide valid principles in the light of which empirical testing of descriptive hypotheses is possible in a rigorous and consistent manner. hterpretability and testabilitv define the ‘scientific’ nature of descriptive statements. The contention that descriptive statements must have the nature of hypotheses arises from the conviction that empirical statements of a gullera1 nature can never be proved, though they may sometimes 1~ fazlsifitJd (Popper 1972)4. Thus ‘hypothesis’ carries the meaning of ‘statement that is not subject to positive proof, but is capable of empirical falsification’. Initially, before the question of falsification (attempted refutation) can arise, descriptive statements must be ‘justified’ by their inter3 If they lack such reference, they may be said to be vacuous -- but not invalid. 4 There is a sense in which some hypotheses are capable of proof, 1.e. by falsifying all the logical alternatives; however, this is not ‘empirical proof’ in the present sense, but rather a matter of validity in a loglcal sense.
50
S. G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomatr c finctionalist ’ linguistics
pretability in terms of, and consistency with, the theory (Mulder 1973, 1974). Hypotheses are either refuted (and, therefore, rejected), or they are upheld in the absence of refutation - i.e. if the data do not provide counter-evidence to what the hypotheses assert about them. Testability is, therefore, equated with potential forfizlsification,in accordance with a Popperian philosophy of science. Having sketched, in this long but necessary preamble, the ontological distinction between linguistic theory and linguistic descriptions (note the one-to-many relation that emphasizes the need for and the value of the separation between these levels (cf. Mulder 1973, 1974)), we can prediet that a discussion of the relation between grammar and semantics must come under two separate headings: (a) the relation of grammar and semantics in the linguistic theory; (b) the relation between grammatical desc-iptiol and semantic description. The former will clearly have implications for tht !atter, since the theory (in conjunction with speech-data) determines linguistic descriptions, but not vice versa. It is to the former I shA1 first turn my attention in the following discussion. The area of linguistic theory in which both grammar and semantics operate in functionalist (and related) approaches corresponds with what Martinet has termed the ‘first articulation’ of language -- what, in PIjelmslevian terminology, we might call tilz ylerematic plane (Hjelmslev 1970). What characterizes this area, in accordance both with Martinet and with Hjelmslev, is the fact that its entities are entities with both JFbrnzand meaning (pleremes), and that these entities include simple elemer.ts (for Martinet, the monemes) which may combine to form complex entities with both form and meaning. Furthermore, this plane whose entities entail a conventional relationship between ‘form’ and ‘meaning’ - contains entities that are convention-bound indices i.e. signa (Mulder and Hervey 197 1, 1972). The ‘first articulation’, or ‘plerematic plane’ - that is the linguistic plane on which signa operate - is an integral part of language, by virtue of the definition of the latter as a ‘semiotic system with a double articulation’s . ’ This definition originates from Martinet (Martinet 1960, 1962), .)ut has been given a different interpretation by Mulder (Mulde: 1968, 1969). See also Hervry 1972.
S. G.J. Herveyl’Axiomcltic jknctionalist ’ linguistics
51
We can distinguish three aspects within the theorvL that deals with the plerematic plane in language:
(1) the ‘structural’ aspect - in which signa are considered as complexes containing signa, or as constituents of Agrza; (2) the ‘phonological’ aspect - in which signa are related (via their ‘expressions’) to their phonological properties, i.e. to properties of form; (3) the ‘semantic’ aspect - in which signa are rel lted (via the denotata of their utterances) to their semantic properties, i.e. to properties of ‘meaning’. The ‘structural’ aspect is, itself, that part of the lijrguistic theory which corresponds to the theory of ‘grammar’, in the strict sense of that term as used in ‘axiomatic functionalism S. Within the theory of grammar we can further discriminate between the ‘articulation’ aspect7 - m which signa are articulated Into ordered component sigiza, i.e. are subjected to syntacric analysis - and the ‘simultaneity’ aspect - in which signa are analysed into simultaneous component sigw, i.e. are subjected to t3zorphological analysis (see especially Hervey and Mulder 1973; Mulder and Hervey forthcoming). We should note, therefore, that ‘g:*ammar’ (i.e. morphology and syntax) looks upon signa, not trom the point of view of their forms or then ‘meanings’, but from the point >f view of the comtrzrctrorzal rok thcv play in morphological arid syntactic structwe One of the corollaries of the latter Is that, for the purposes of grammar it is immaterial whether its entities are signs or s_vnzl/o,s - these being both subcategories of the category slgnum (Mulder and Hervey 197 1, 1972). The entities of grammar are sigrra that fulfil the requirement of being either elements combinable into complex signa or camp eses zontaining such elements. That is, although the entities of pr,immar are, by requirement, conventiondependent units of form and ‘meaning’ (necessary condition), they qualify specifically as grammats’cal entities by virtue of their conventionally determined combinabrlity and/or analysability in syntax and when there 1~no darqwr of 6 The term 1s sometimes used also by ‘axiomatic functionahsts confusion - in a wider sense to cover the who!e area of the plerematrc plane. phonological and plcrernatic’ ’ It is the relevance of this aspect on two different planes that characterizes ‘language’ as a special type of semiotic system with a ‘double artmlatlon’ (Mulder 1966, 1968, 1969; Mulder and Hervey 1974).
52
S. G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomatic functionalist’ linguistics
morphology; i.e. by virtue of the syntactic and/or morphological relations the:7 enter into (sufficient condition). As for the semantic aspect of the plerematic plane, semantics is in principle capable of providing a theory for the description of the denotation of any wholly convention-bound index (Signum having a phonologically statable ‘form’ and a wholly fixed-conventional denotation ivithin a given language) (Mulder and Hervey 197 1, 1972) regardless of the question of its grammatical role in the language. Signa that are not signs, though they may belong to the plerematic plane of a language because they are endowed with grammatical function, fall outside the scope of the semantic theory. Thus, for instance, proper symbols (Mulder and Hervey 197 1, 1972) such as ‘John’, or ‘x’, or nonce-symbols (Mulder and Hervey 197 1, 1971,) such as ‘brillig’, may play a role as potential grammatical constituents in English; e.g., (a) Johrz kicked a goal (b) x equals t wo hundred and one (c) it was bri/Zig yesterday, don’t you think? but they are not entities for semantic descript on in a description of English, since their denotation is not wholly d :termined within the conventions of English. Thus the very reason why such signa as the above are not identified as signs (let alone as ‘linguis ic signs’ in English) is also the reason why the semantic properties of these signa (properties not wholly determined by the conventions of Engish) do not belong to the descriptive scope of linguistic semantics. To s: y that such signa are not semantic entities in language, is simply tautologous with the statement that they fall outside the descriptive scope of the semantic theory. Semantic drscription includes only the description of those aspects of meaning that are conventionally determinetl within the language that is being described. (This is theorematic, given the definition of scope entailed by defining Zar-zguageas a particular type of ‘system of conventions for communication’ -- i.e. ‘semiotic system’ (cf. Mulder 1966, 1968; Muldcr and Hervey forthc.). On13 the ‘lingurstic signs’ moper to the given language may constitute, therefore, valid objects in semantic description, i.e. semantic entities. If we examine the, implications of the requirement that semalztic entities are all and only the ‘linguistic sign; ’ of a given language, we find
S. G.J. Pkrvey f’Axiomatic functionalist’ linguistics
53
it strongly advisable to discriminate, in the first p!ace, between two potential criteria for determining what is ‘a linguistic sign in L’.: (a) ‘linguistic sign in L’ for ‘any sign having grammatically distinctive function* in L’; i.e. any siglltdt?zwhich belongs to the language by virtue of grammatical function. (b) ‘linguistic sign in L’ for ‘sign whose wholly-fixed information value (denotation) is determined ~iUzi~ the conventions of L’: i.e. any sign which belongs to the language by virtue of the lang~~a~~-bo~~nd nature of its relation to its denotation. are These criteria -- ‘grammatical and ‘denotational’, respect ivelv. irzdepemk~~t The fact that a given sigr~tn? has (may be demonstrattxl to have) grammatically distinctive function in a given language, does nof imply that the denotation of that sigma is determined within the conventions of that language. For instance, a sigfzrrrz2“l’arbitraire du signe’-, can be demonstrated to have a grammatically distinctive function in English, in, say, the syntagm “‘One of Saussure’s major tenets is I’lrrhitruiw clrr sigrw.” In tilis syntagm the sigclldm “l’arbitraire du signc” has become ;\ grammatical constituent of English, and thus, a ‘linguistic sign’ in English by criterion (a). No one could, however, cogently argue that the dtxotation of “l’arbitraire du signe” is a matter of the conventions of English By criterion (b) “l’arbitraire du sign& -- a ‘linguistic sign’ of French - is :;ot a linguistic sign of English. In this, 3nd similar instances, we are provided with a demonstration that being a ‘linguistic sign’ in L by the grammatic‘tl criterion does not entail being a ‘linguistic sign’ in _ hy the denotational criterion. If we can show that the converse entailment does not hold either, we will !lave demonstrated formally the independence of criteria (a) and (b) from one another. In the case of grammatical constituents that are in construction with 8 For the notions ‘distinctive function’ and ‘dlstmctive function Mulder and Hervey 1972; Hervey 1970 and forthcommg.
m grammar’
,ee Mulder
1968;
54
S G.J. Kervey/‘Axiomati~functionalist’ linguistics
one another, but which do not make up a complete and scif-contained complex that is capable, in its turn, of being a constituent in yet other constructions, we can find precisely the kind of instances l:hat we are Iloolkingfor. A construction such as ‘he liked’ is a partial, i”ilcomplete, and non-self-contained construction in precisely the sense that, although its 4ements ‘“he’and ‘liked’ are in a constructional relation with one another (roughly, a subject-predicative relation), the construction cannot be complete in the absence of a further constituent (roughly, an &XV), and cannot occur as a constituent in other constructions.9 Thus, ‘he liked’ cannot be demonstrated to be an entity in the grammar of English, nor be said to have ‘grammatical function’ either in the primitive sense of the term, or in its technical sense of grammatically distinctive fzrnction. Neither as a constituent with distinctive function by virtue of opposition to constituents with which it commutes, nor as a self-contamed grammatical complex in opposition to other self-contained grammatical complexes, can ‘he likes’ be said to be a grammatical entity in English. On the other hand, it seems eo be clearly the case that ‘he liked’ (with ‘he’ and ‘liked’ in a subject-predicative relation) has information value - nor is that information value the same as simply the information value of ‘he’ followed by the information value of ‘liked’, but rather a fzuzction of the two. Furthermore, whatever the information value of ‘he liked’ is, depends wholly and entirely on the conventions of English. Therefore, semantically speaking, the denotation of ‘he liked’ is a function of the denotation of “he and ‘liked’, and of course, of the constructional relation between ‘he’ and ‘liked’. In ofirer words, from a semantic point of view, he liked’ is just as much a linguistic sign m English as is ‘he came’, the type-difference between these two instances being of a grammatical, not of a semantic nature. Both ‘he liked’ and ‘he came’ are linguistic signs in English by the denotational criterion. However, the second is also a grammatical element (in fact a potential constituent) whereas the first is not a grammatical element (neither potential constituent, nor self-contained grammatical complex). This demonstrates what we have set out to show; namely that being a ‘linguistic sign’ in L by the denotational criterion does not entail being a ‘linguistic sign’ in L by the grammatical criterion. By this demonstration we have 9 “he ilked” 1s never a constltue;lt may be an tm.nediate constitw:nt
in English grammatical constructions, in a syntagm “if be liked it”.
though
“he liked
it”
S. G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomatic fhctionalist
’ linguistics
55
completed the proof of the independence of criteria (a) and (b) from one another. Wherever categories are established by independent criteria, it becomes necessary for the sake of clarity and rlgour, to use different terms for designating them. In the preceding I have referred loosely to ‘linguistic signs’ in L, established either by criterion (a) or criterion (b). As these are independent criteria, I propose, in the following, to designate the category established by criterion (a) by the term grurnrnatzcul e/mties in L; and the category established on the basis of criterion (3) by the term semantic entities in L. Concerning the designation of the term linguistic sigm in L a choictl must be made between two alternatives. That is to say, it must be decided whether to regard (a) the SM~YYZ of th e classes of gram,matical entities in L and senian Ltic entities in L as constituting the class of linguistic signs in L; or: (b) the product of the classes of grammatical entities in L and semantic entities in L as constituting the class of linguistic signs in L. One may try to argue, pragmatically, that both grammatic;il and semantic entities in L belong to tht: plerematic system of the language in question, and are, therefore, ‘linguistic’ in the context of that language. This might seem to constitute a practical reason (a reason having to do with the fact that in ordinary language we should equate ‘linguistic’. with ‘belonging to the language’) for designating the slrnz of grammatical entities in L and semantic entities in L by the term ii?zgMstic sigrrs iu L But we are at present engaged in evolving a theoretical calculus in which logical arguments take precedence over pragmatic ones. Consequently we shall? for logical reasons, have to op for restricting the term ‘lingulstic sign in L’ to the product of the classes of grammatical and semantic entities in L. Otherwise, we should, absurdly, (a) admit entities such as “he liked” to the full status of linguistic sign in English, although they have no grammatically distinctive function (see the definition of linguistic sign as a particular class of phonological fJrms, each one of them in its capacity of having one and the same distinctive function in grammar (expressiorz), together with its converse (content) in Mulder 1968, 1969, 197 1, 1972; Muldzr and Harvey 1972);
56
23.C.J. Hervey/‘Axiuma tic functionalist ’ linguistics
(b) admit entities such as “l’arbitraire du signe” to the full status of linguistic sign in English, when they clearly belong to French, even though they may be quoted in English speech; or, (c) what would be even more unfortunate, admit proper symbols such as ‘x’ to the status of linguistic sign in English, when the:y are not signs at all. We shall, therefore, give the following definition of ‘linguistic sign ir, L’ : ‘linguistic sien in L’ for ‘entity that fulfils both the condition of being a grammatical entity in L and the condition of being a semantic entity in L’. A common error that crops up in linguistics is the identification, or equation, on the basis of identity of ex,ensional reference, of units that have different theoretical status. Just SAA an error is made, for instance, when, as is commonly done (e.g. in Bloomfieldian approaches), one speaks of identity, or at least equivalence, between, say, the mor@ze,Yne “cat” and the word “cat”. This can never hold true if ‘morpheme’ and ‘word’ are distinct categories whose definitions are based on separate criteria. That there may happen to be some extrinsic entity ‘cat’ whilzh satisfies, in turn, the conditions for identification as a ‘morpheme’, as well as the conditions for identification as a ‘word’, makes not the slightest difference to the fact that the morpheme ‘cat’ is neither identical, nor equivalent, to the word ‘cat’ - the two being members af distinct and independently identified categories. We shall return to this point later on, when a solution will be offered to an apparent paradox involving this issue. For the time being, however, we are using this case as an analogy in a proposed solution of the relation between grammatical entities in L and semantic entities in L. In exactly the same way, and for the same logical (and, in fact, ontological) reasons it would be improper to permit a relation either of identity or of equivalence to hold between a specific grammatical entity and specific semantic entity. Yet in linguistic signs we find entities that satisfy, in turn, the conditions for being grammatical entities as well as the conditions for being semantic entities. May we then say that a grammatical entity, say, “tobacco”, in English, is at one and the same time a
S. G.J. Herweyf’Axiornatic firnctronalist ’ lrrtgwsms
57
semantic entity in English - thereby affirming an identity, or ;lt least equivalence; between what are intrinsically different types of entity. established as they are by independent criteria? The answer is that such a solution would be logically absurd. Instend, one must establish SOIIIC more indirect - and also more general - relation between grammatical entities and semantic entities, i.e. a relation of ~O~T~~.S~~OIIC~CI~C‘C We can express this in the following manner: To a grammatical entity in L there may or may not cort~sponci ;I semantic entity in L (according to whether that entity is ;I ‘linguistic sign in L’). To a semantic entity in L there may or ra7ay not corrcsponrl ;I grammatical entity in L (according to whethei that entlty is H ‘lm~\iistrc sign in L’). The following instances will exemplify the possibili dence just mentioned:
t les ot‘
oorrespon-
(1) the entity ‘tobacce’ is a grammatical entity in English, to witch ‘tobacco’ is ;\ there corresponds a semantic entity in English linguistic sign m English ; (2) the entitil.’ ‘je ne sais quoi’ is a grammatical sntity 111EI1::lish. to ‘j, lrt’ UlS which no semantic entity corresponds in English quoi’ is not a linguistic sign in English; (3) the entity ‘house’ is a semantic entity m English, to wflich tht\rc “liousc” is ;111ncorresponds a grammatical entity in Engli4i guistic sign in English; (4) the entity ‘he liked’ is a semantic entity in English, to ~~h~c‘ilno ‘1~ liked’ is not ;I grammatical entity correspond $ I II English linguistic sign in English. An overwheiming advantage of regarding the relation between gr;~nlmatical entities and semantic etltities as one of clorr~spor1derlc.c (not of identity or equivalence) is that this offers a solution to what might otherwise constitute a paradox. Unlike identity or eql‘ivalence, correspondence of a more indirect kind does not need to be a one-to-one relation. This leaves free the possibility that
S. G.J. l?ervc~/‘Am~omtic functionalist ’ linguistics
58
semantic entity in L there may correspond more than one grammatical entity in LY
QO a
With the possibility of many-one correspondences between grammatical entities and semantic entities we can avoid what might otherwise prove to be a very troublesome pseudo-problem. This pseudioproblem could take the following form: In grammar (i.e. by using morphological and syntactic criteria) we can demonstrate that a given moneme, say ‘black’, a monomonematic word containing that moneme ‘black’, and a monomonematic synl’agrn containing that word, are three intrinsically different grammatical en tities (Hervey and Mulder 1973). Not only do these commute with different sets of other grammatical entities, thus having, qua grammatical entities diiferent distinctive functions in grammar,11 but they are, by definition, different subtypes of grammatical eAty. Using the theorems of sign identity established in semantics (Hervey 1970 and forthcoming), we can demonstrate that the moneme “black” is neither formally, nor denotationally different from the word “black”, or the syntagm “black”. That is to say, from the point of view of semantic theory, they constitute a unique sign, i.e. the same semanl;ic entity. If, therefore, semantic entities are identical with, or equivalent to, (stdnd in a necessarily oneto-one relation with) grammatical entities, theh we are faced with an insolub!: problem: either we posit that there is a single semantic entity “black”, and
deny that the moneme “black”, the word “black” and a syntagm “black” are different grammatical entities, in spite of the fact that they can be demonstrated to be intrinsically distinct grammatical entities; or we posit the moneme “black”, the word “black” and a syntagm “black” as three different grammatical entities, and deny. that there is only a unique semantic entity “black” (with a specific denotation), in spite of the fact that, by the theorems of signidentity, the latter conclusion is inescapable. r* We shall ign Jre the possibility that several semantic er tities may correspond to one grammdtrcal entity. Entities that are denotationally different (i.e. different semantic entities) are, by necessary rmpkation, also grammatically distinct from one another - that is to say, correspond :y distinct gra nmatical entities (Hervey 1970 arid forthcoming). The distinctive function of an element is determined by the set of other elements to which it is opposed by commutation in equivalent contexts.
S.G.J, Herwey/‘Axiomatic finctionalist’ linguistics
59
Thus we are truly on the horns of a dilemma, being presented with only two alternatives, both of which lead to an absurdity. As a result, we may consider it theorematic (proven by reductio ad adsurdum in the theory), that the relation between grammatical entity and semantic entity is not one of identity, or equivalence; indeed not necessarily a oneto-one relation. With the theory as outlined above, the possibility of many-one correspondence between grammatical entities and semantic entities gives a clearcut solution to the dilemma. We are free (a) to affirm, as indeed we can demonstrate, that the moneme ‘black’, the word ‘black’, and a syntagm “black’ are three distinct grammatical entities; (b) to posit that there is a single semantic entity ‘black’; and (c) to conclude that to the semantic entity ‘black’ there corresponci at least three distinct grammatical entities. In other words, “moneme”, “word” and “syntagm” are said to be subtypes ofgrammatical entity, but mt of semantic entity - a position perfectly tenable, given the independence of the notions grammatical entity and semantic entity. The distinction between different subtypes of grammatical entity will be irrelevant to, and will not affect, the identity of semantic entities. This is, indeed, as it should be. Grammatical theory and semantic theory are independent parts of linguistic theory. and there is no reason why criteria that are specific to grammar should be taken into consideration in semantics - any more than that strictly phonological criteria should be allowed to play a role in grammar. or vice versa.
Referring back to our example of “black”, the question arises as to whether one should speak of one Zingwstic sign “black”, or several (three or more) Zinghstic signs corresponding to the distinct grammatical subtypes. Firstly, the theorems of sign-identity (Hervey 1970 and forthcoming) take theoretical precedence over the grammatical sub-divisions into moneme, word, and syntagm, and according to these theorems there is no justification for setting up distinct linguistic signs, rather than a single linguistic sign “black”. On the contrary, if we posited distinct linguistic signs for the moneme “black”, the word “black”, and a syntagm “black”, respectively, then these linguistic signs would be hot/j homonyms afzd synonyms of one another - i.e. they would, absurdly,
60
S. G.J. ihvey / ‘Axkmatic jknctionalist ’ linguistics
be ‘distinct’ linguistic signs that were neither formally, nor denotationally distinct from one another. Secondly, in the present article linguistic sign has been interpreted as the entity in which corresponding grammatical and semantic entities coincide, Since however, more than one grammatical entity may correspond to a single semantic entity, it follows that several grammatical entities and a given semantic entity may coincide in a single linguistic sign That is to say, we should regard the semantic entity “black’ , and the grammatical entities ‘Wack” (moneme), “black” (word) and “black” (syntz:m) as coinciditl, * ;+1 .._ 2 single linguistic sign “black”. As a result, ther; an: t.4 o ways of looking at the grammatically distinctivz function of the Zmguistic sign “‘black” (see especially Mulder and Wervey 1972). We may say that, since the subtypes of grammatical entity “black’” (moncm.z). “blnck’ ” {tsord) and “black” (syntagm) coincide in the lhguistlc sig,t “black” (i.e. are not distinguished on the level of lmguistic sign), the g-ammatically distinctive function of the lingujsail the grammatical entities which it repret the distinctive functions of “black” d) and “black” (syntagmj In other words thie nting the grammatical entities in into all the grammatical oppositions which actually contract by commutation in grampkation, involve the correspondf grammatical oppositions (i.e. ctive function would not be directly contracted bv martic entity, but would pertain to lhem ding grammatical entity (or entities)). Alternatively, it could be argued that while grammatical entity e levd of grammatical oppositions, and semantic entity nguistic sign operates on a higher, and more ammar or semantics (i.e. on the highest e’, at which level grammar and semantics r?matic’ inventor which constitutes the oderail ~ys‘first art~culati~~n’of language. A corollary of this would be talk of hguistic signs, we should nc t speak ic (i.e. ‘grammatical’ in the narrow sense)1 t operate with inventories of Zin~!uistic Id, strictly speaking, not attribute a gleamion to linguistic signs, but speak, instt; ad, of
S. G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomatic finctionalist’ linguistics
61
the ‘distinctive’ function they contract by direct opposition to CCP members of the same ‘plerematic’ inventory. This type of function I have elsewhere referred to as ‘systemic function’ (Hervey 1970 and forthcoming). The systemic function of a ling~isGc s&n “black” would be determined by a set that is not co-extensive with the sum of the grammatically distinctive functions of “black” (moneme), “black” (word) and “black” (syntagm). Thus the ‘distinctive’ function of the linguistic sign “black” -- if identified with its systemic function --wo~rlclbe different from whs! it would be if it were identified with the sum of the grammatically distinctive functions of the grammatical entities represented by that linguistic sign. Furthermore, it may seem that a revision in the theory of ‘axiomatic functionalism would be necessary, in that, apparzntly, we ought no longer to define linguistic sign as 1~) R s and s R {p} (where {p) is a class of phonological forms, R is ‘in its capacity of having’, R is ‘of’, and s is a grammatically distinctive function). In the above formula (Mulder 1968, 1969, 197 i, 1973; Mulder and Hervey 1972), the value of s should, then, no longer be a grammatically distinctive function (measured in terms of oppositions in grammatical contexts) but, rather, a ~ystemicfunctiwz (measured in terms of oppositions in an inventory of first articulation elements). There are, as I have pointed out, advantages in both the above ways of looking at the ‘distinctive’ function of linguistic signs, and a choice between them wollld be hard to make. Fortunately, there seems o be no real reason why such a choice should have to be made, since the two alternatives are, I believe, not incompatible with one another as ‘different ways of looking at the same thing’. We may retain the definition of linguistic sign as ‘PI
Rs
and
sk{p}
using s as a symbol for ‘grammatically distinctive function’, since, although it is not strictly correct to say that linguistic sings directly contract oppositions in grainmatical contexts, linguistic signs do represent grammatical entities that have grammatically distinctive functions. Thus, indirectly, linguistic signs can be said to have grammatically distinctive function.
62
S. GJ kkrvery/‘Aximnatic finctionalist ’ linguistics
At the same time, we may also retain the idea that there is a higher ‘plerematic’ level on which we may generalise our findings both in grammar and in semantics;, in the form of inventories oi linguistic signs. Thus we may continue to loo’k upon ‘linguistic sign’ as a notion proper to that ‘plerematic level on which ‘distinctive’ function is a matter of (direct oppositions betjween members of the inventory of linguistic signs. That is to say, the definition of linguistic sign in terms of ‘systemic function’ can be included as an alternative definition. We can now sum up our conclusions concerning the relation of grammar and semantics in the lirquistic theory: (a) grammar and semantics are complementary, but mutually independent sections of that part of the linguistic th zory which deals with the study of the ‘plerematic ( ‘fht articulation’) plane; __S_ (b) the notions and entities of grammar and semantics are independent and distinct from one another, but correspondences can be set up between them via the overa!: pierematic inventory; tc) grammar deals with the grammatical extiries of !anguage - of which ‘moneme’, ‘word’ and ‘syntagm are subtypes - and with the constructional relations into which these may enter; ld) semantics deals with the semar,f,ic entities of language, between w%ch it sets up relations on the basis of their respective denotations; !t’) ‘grammatical entity’ and ‘semantic entity’ may coincide in the notion ‘iinguistic sign’, in such a way that one or more grammatical entities may correspond to one semantic entity; (f) the overall inventory of the signs of a given language is constituted of all and only its linguistic signs, that is signs in which at least one grammatical sign coincides with one and only one semantic sign. As far as grammatical and semantic descriptions are concerned, the folio * g point can be mad: in general, as a conclusion drawn from the ation between grammatical theory and semantic theory: descripiion and semantic description are independent of but are intetgrated in that both are dependent on an inory whose notions and theorems are derived from a single f axioms. Therefore, we may emphasize that nothing in iQe sv-
%.G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomatic functionalist ’ linguistics
63
mantie description should actually contradict the grammatical description, and vice versa. For this reason, for instance, statements in the grammatical description may have to be altered if they lead to the absurd conclusion (i.e. a conclusion ruled out by the theory) that a given grammatical entity corresponds to more than one (denotationally distinct) semantic entity. That the theories of grammar and semantics are mutually independent (while both are dependent on the axioms and definitions of the same integrated theory), does not mean that they may not and should not be in applied in conjunction with one another in a linguistic descriptiwz particular for cross-checking, and independent ‘corroboration’ of the decisions made in one or other part of the description. Phonology and grammar too are independent, yet in a phonological description it is useful to know that forms of a language may be grammatically differential. In a grammatical description, too, actual statements of allomorpl’zy (Molder 1966, 1968, 1969, 197 1, 1973; Mulder and +rvey 1972) -different phonological forms in their capacity of having the same grammatically distinctive function are allomorphs (members) of one sign -presuppose the ability to describe the phonological features of the language under consideration. These are instances in which (logically) mutually independent subdisciplines of the linguistic theory -- the links between which are specified by the theory -- come to be applied, when it comes to linguistic descriptions, at least partly in conjunction with one another. In a similar way, when it comes to linguistic descriptions (as opposed to arguments in the theory itself) certain parts of grammar and of semantics may be applied in conjunction with one another and as aids to one another, in certain theoretically permissible ways.‘* Apart from the formal relation between grammatical description and semantic description, as determined by the linguistic theory, there may be certain ad hoc and purely pragmatic connections between t’le two. Strictly speaking, the scope of semantic description extends also to semantic entities that cannot be regarded as linguistic signs (becduse l2 4n instance of this is the use grammatical description may make of semantically based decrsions about homonymy. The theory permits this, since homonyms are linguistic srgns which qua semantic entities are different from one another, and a single grammatical enlrty cannot correspond to two or more semantic entities to form one linguistic sign - instead several grammat&l signs must be distinguished in such a way that at least one of them corresponds to each semantic entity, thereby forming distinct homonymous linguistic signs.
64
S. G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomaticfunctionalist’ r!inguisbcs
they do not correspond to grammatical entities). FCT practical reasons howli:ver, we may wish to restrict semantic inventories (which are in principle infinite) in various ways. In the first place, we may wish to distinguish between ‘marginal’ and ‘central’ semantic entities according to whether they may be regarded as fully fledged linguistic signs or not _- so that the scope of the description may be limited (ad hoc) to the ‘central’ ones. This involves a purely practical use of grammatical criteria. We shall call ‘ten tral’ only those semantic entities that correspotid to at least one grammatical entity, and restrict our semantic description to this grammatically selected subcategory of semantic entities. Similarly, grammatical description may borrow semantic criteria for an ad hoc limitation of its scope, by eliminating (from, say,, a description of English) such ‘marginal’ grammatical f.ntities as, say, “l’arbitraire du signe”, or H2S04, on the grounds that no semantic entity of English corresponds LOthem, and that they are, therefore, not capable of being regarded as linguistic signs. In the second place, in the restriction of semantic inventories - which has a practical Idvantage, since it is always easier to systematize 3 more limited inventory than a more extensive one - we may make another ad hoc use of grammatical criteria. In principle, semantic features can be assigned to any semantic entity, yet in practice it is more economical (and more feasible) to assign semantic features only to sets of entities that correspond to monemes and words, excluding those entities that correspond only ‘cosyntagms. In this way we can obtain a restricted inventory, for the ‘&for of syntactic recursivity which infinitely multiplies the inventory of syntagrns, and therefore of semantic entities corresponding to syntagms, does nJt operate on monemes or within words. Restricting a semantic description to only those semantic entities which correspond to monemes and words of a language, constitutes a pragmatic application - and a useful one - in a semantic description, of notions that actually belong to grammar. The dichotomies between ( 1) simple sign and complex sign ; (2) morphological complex and syntactic complex are actually defined in grammar (in the narrow sense of the term). Yet these apparently purely grammatical considerations cut across both grammar 2nd semantics, since they directly affect the notion
S.G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomatic
functionaht
’ hn~lsttcs
65
‘Wuisltic s&z’, not merely the notion ‘grammatical entity’. It is th :orematic in axiomatic functionalist theory (cf. Hervey 1970 and fort1 lcoming) that no linguistic sign may be bollz simple urlcl complex. OI bottz a morphological and a syntactic co plex. That is to say, although more than one grammatical entity may correspond to a single semantic entity, provided that they coincide in one and the same hguistic sigfz, this cannot be the case when it comes to grammatical entities that differ by virtue of the “simple--complex”, or the “morpliological complex syntactic: complex” dichotomies. In such cases the different grammatical entities coincide a priori, each with a different semantic entity, constituting differem Ziuglristic signs In other words, even without resorting to semantic criteria, we can deduce the non-identity of two semantic entities from the fact that we can draw a “simple - complex”, or a “morpho!ogical complex-syntactic complex” dichotomy between the grammatical signs that correspond to them respectively. III this we find a case of a grammatical demonstration that has a valid influence, vi;l the notion ‘linguistic sigd which it directly affects, upon semantic description. This case is comparable to the valid influence of semantic demonstration of homonymy (cf. fn. 12) upon grammatical description. If the denotational theorems of semantics (Hervey 1970 and forthcoming) require that, for denotational reasons, a number of homonyms should be set up in the place of what, on grammatical grounds, may appear to constitute a single linguistic sign (i.e. the converse cannot be demonstrated in grammar), then each of the homonymous semantic entities will require to be considered as a separate linguistic sign in its own right. Thus the grammatical entities corresponding to distinct homonyms are, by implication, also distinct grammatical entities - not the same grammatical entity corresponding to several semantic entities united in one lin 1ruist ic sign. As we see in the above, grammatical t Icory may affect semantic dcscriptions, and serIfantic theory may aft ct grammatical descriptions, on the vital issue of the identification of items in the inventory of semantic entities and grammatical entities respectively. But it may do so only viu the notion ‘linguistic sign’ in which, according to the theory, grammatical entities may coincide with semantic entities. That is to say, it would be more correct to regard these cases not as instances where semantics depe:lcIs upon grammar or grammar upon semantics, but rather as instances whee both semakcs and grammar depend on one and he same notion ‘linguistic sign’ whrch dominates both semantics and grammar, being a
66
S. G..I Hervey/‘Axiomaticfunctionalist’ linguistics
notion of the highest plerematic generality (on a level where the separation and independence of grammar and scllmantics ceases to operate). The theory lays down clearly and explicitly how arguments may, via the notion ‘linguistic sign’, be carried over from grammar to semantics or vice vemz. This., however, does not alter th, general principle that grammatical theory and semantic theory are independent sub-theories of ‘axiomatic functionalist’ linguistic theory. The problem of identity concerning items in grammar and in sele linguistic signs in which grammatical entimantics, as well 2,s ties and semantic c-ntities coincide (i.e. the question of the correspondences between grammatical and semantic entities) has been, if not completely ignorizl, at least considerably underestimated in some recent, especially tr;:nsf~imational generative, linguistic approaches. IdentitvI of lexkal formativ
References Harvey, S.G.J., 1970. Functional semantics; a linguistic theory, with application to Pekingese. Oxford: Oxford Univ. (D. Phil. thesis). Harvey, S.G.J., forthcoming. Axiomatic semantics. Hervey, S.G.J., 1972. Mulder’s ‘axiomPLic linguistics’. Lingua 28 (4), 348-379. Hervey, S.G.J., 1973. Reflections on J.J. Katz, ‘The semantic component of a linguistic descriptlon’ (in Katz 1970). Lmgua 31, 297-329. Hervey, S.G.J. and J.W.F. Mulder, 1973. Pseudo-composites and pseudo-words: sufficient and necessary criteria for morphological analysis. La Linguistique 9 (l}. HJelmslev, L., 1953. Prolegomena to a theory of language. Wisconsin: Univ. of Wisconsin.
S.G.J. Herveyl’hiornatie
firmtiorlalist’ linguistics
67
Hjelmslev, L., 1970. Language: an introduction, Wisconsin: Univ. of Wtsconsin. Katz, J.J., 1971. Interpretive semantics meets Frankenstein. Fourdatlons of Language 7. Martmet, A., 1960. Elements de linguistique g&&ale. Paris. Martinet, A., 1962. A functional view of language. London: Oxford Unrv. Press. McCawley, J.D., 1971. Interpretive semantics meets the zombies: a discussion of the controversy about deep structure. Foundations of Language (7). Muider, J.W.F., 1966. Sets and relations in phonology; a theory of linguistic description, with specia! reference to Pekingese. Oxford: Oxford Univ. (D.Phil. thesis). Mulder, J.W.F., 1968. Sets and relations in phonology; an axiomatic approach to the tlescrrption of speech. London: Oxford Univ. Press. Mulder, J.W.F., 5,969. On the art of definition, the aouble articulation of language, and some of the consequences. Forum for Modern Language Studies ‘4 (2). Mulder, J.W.F., 1973. From sound to denotation. Folia Linguistrca IV. Mulder, J W.F., 1974. Descriptive adequacy m phonology, and the vowel phonemes of the Scottish dialects of Angus and Perthshire compared with the Southern English system La Linguistique. Mctlder, J.W.F. and S.C.J Hervey, 197 1 I*ldex and Signum. Semiotrca IV (4). Mulder. J.W.F. and S.G.Y. Herve) , 1972. TheNaryof the. lingurstic sign Janua Lrnguarum Series Minor. The Hiague: ~Mouton. Mu&~, J.W.1‘. aiad S.G 3. Her~ey, forthcoming. Language as a system of systems. La L.tnguistlque. POp’trC,K.R.: ‘f965 TIie logrt, cf screntiflc discovery. Lmclo;l (4th ed.). Popila r, K..:., 1972. f bjes;tnve knowledge: an evolctronary approach. London: Oxford Univ. Press.
GRAMMAR AND SEMANTICS IN ‘AXIOMATIC FUNCTIONALIST’ LINGUISTICS Sandor G.J. HEKVEY Dept. of Linguistics, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Scotland, U.K.
Received November 197 3
Much space has been devoted in recent years to discussion of the hitherto unresolved controversy over the relation between syntax and semantics in transformational linguistics. In an approach as loosely integrated as the latter 1 , it seems not unlikely that the controversy will never be resolved by means of conclusive arguments from one or other of the factions. A deductive approach such as that of ‘axiomatic functionalism’ compares favourably with this situation, in that the relation of grammar to semantics though not a straightforward one, will, nevertheless, not lead to controversy that cannot be unequivocally solved by reasoning. With an eye to the internal comstency of the whole theory, and an eye to the external adequacy of that theory with regard to the description of languages (Mulder 1973, 1974), it is possible to reach a solution concerning the relation between grammar and semantics - a solution that uniquely satisfies the requirements for its adoption. The present article has an immedi te aim, and also an ulterior moltive. Its immediate aim is simply to offer a solution to the problem of the relation between grammar (syntax pills morphology) and semantics, in accordance with the theory of ‘axiomatic functionalism’. Its ulterior motive is to illustrate that a deductive approach to linguistic theory leads to clearcut theoretical solutions, where no such solutions have been forthcoming in other, non-deductive approaches, and that the vital ’ The fact that there are so many current versions of transformatlonahst theory IS, in my opinion, directly attrl%utable to fhe initial vagueness of the approach; the latter IS in ztself a mark c>fthe lack of theoretical integration, in spite of claims of explicitness and theoretical precision.
S.C.J. Herveyf’tlxiomatic pwtionalist’
linguistics
issue of thtb relation between ‘compartments’ of the theory can be settled in ‘axiomatic functionalism’ without meeting any ‘Frankensteins’ (McCawley 197 1) or ‘zombies’ (Katz 1973). A major feature of ‘axiomatic functionalism’ is the on tological distinction it draws and maintains throughout between ‘linguistic theory’ and ‘linguistic descriptions’ (Molder 1973). This distinction maintained between (t’ze theory of) ‘1anguJge’ and (the description of) a ‘language’ has, perhays, something of a Hjelmslevian flavour. A linguistic theory (a theory of *language’) is - as for Hjelmslev - a deductive calculus containing no ‘exls”,ential postulate’ (Hjelmslev 1953). Instead it contains: a small set of (general, arbitrary and appropriate) axioms from which deductions are made; a set of primitive terms used in statements in the theory, including the definitions of terms applied to notions in the theory; a set of theorems deduced from statements (axioms or theorems) in the theory; a set of definitions (using primitive or defined terms) for technical terms. Thus the statements found in the linguistic theory (and this is what characterises the theory, as opposed to ‘descriptions’ under that theory, as envisaged in ‘axiomatic functionalism’) are of only three kinds: a%oms, theorems, defi;?itions. All these statements are devoid of direct lempiricaZ content as they stand - they contain no ‘existential postulate’ (cf. Hjelmslev 1953). An axiom is intuitively accepted in the: first place, because it appears to state some general ‘fact’ whose tenability is not controversial, but is a matter of common sense; it is ultimately accepted because it leads to a theory which is found to be an adequate device in the producing of linguistic Ges?tiptions. Thus an axiom is arbitrary insofar as it is adopted on the intuit!; .: grounds of common sense, rather than being justifiable in logical terms; and it is appropriate insofar as it leads to a powerful and adequate linguistic theory2, 2 This use of the terms ‘arbitrary’ and ‘appropriate’ would seem to correspond closely to Hjelmslev’s use of the same terms in a similar context (Hjelmslev 1953).
S.G.J. Hervey/‘Axiorn.atic functionalist’ lingulstlcs
49
A theorem is valid purely by virtue of being logicallv deducible from primitive or derived statements in he theory. Definitions are arbitrary (though not unmotivated) in their choice of definiens; but they are appropriate in that the) refer to notions found in the theory, the necessity for these notions, itself, being often theorematic. As it will be readily seen, none of the statements in the tlzeo~_~requlrc. 01 are even capable of, empirical ‘verification’. At best they may be exemplified or illustrated by reference to speech-data from actual languages3. Linguistic theory takes a certain distance - by virtue of Its abstract nature and its generality -- from speech-data. A Zir2guisticdescriptiofz (i.e. the description of LIlanguage), on the other hand, refers to a par titular chosen set of speech-p!lenomena (though not usually to a finite corl_‘z~).The statements which it contains (or which it implies) are what ‘axiomatic functionalists’ would call scientific hypotheses. They are scientific in that they are not mereZ_v conjectural as some so-called hypotheses are, but are testable (Popper 1965, 4th ed.) in the light of the speech-data io which they refer, and of the properties they attribute to those speech-data. In order for such hypotheses to be testable, it is necessary, in the first place, to be able to interpret rhem comisteutZy arzd rrlzambigwu~~_v - in this the description must rely on the notions and definitions provided by the theory. (The adequacy of the theory is partly tested in its ability to provide sufficient notions and models for use in formulating descriptive hypotheses.) Secondly, the theory must provide valid principles in the light of which empirical testing of descriptive hypotheses is possible in a rigorous and consistent manner. hterpretability and testabilitv define the ‘scientific’ nature of descriptive statements. The contention that descriptive statements must have the nature of hypotheses arises from the conviction that empirical statements of a gullera1 nature can never be proved, though they may sometimes 1~ fazlsifitJd (Popper 1972)4. Thus ‘hypothesis’ carries the meaning of ‘statement that is not subject to positive proof, but is capable of empirical falsification’. Initially, before the question of falsification (attempted refutation) can arise, descriptive statements must be ‘justified’ by their inter3 If they lack such reference, they may be said to be vacuous -- but not invalid. 4 There is a sense in which some hypotheses are capable of proof, 1.e. by falsifying all the logical alternatives; however, this is not ‘empirical proof’ in the present sense, but rather a matter of validity in a loglcal sense.
50
S. G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomatr c finctionalist ’ linguistics
pretability in terms of, and consistency with, the theory (Mulder 1973, 1974). Hypotheses are either refuted (and, therefore, rejected), or they are upheld in the absence of refutation - i.e. if the data do not provide counter-evidence to what the hypotheses assert about them. Testability is, therefore, equated with potential forfizlsification,in accordance with a Popperian philosophy of science. Having sketched, in this long but necessary preamble, the ontological distinction between linguistic theory and linguistic descriptions (note the one-to-many relation that emphasizes the need for and the value of the separation between these levels (cf. Mulder 1973, 1974)), we can prediet that a discussion of the relation between grammar and semantics must come under two separate headings: (a) the relation of grammar and semantics in the linguistic theory; (b) the relation between grammatical desc-iptiol and semantic description. The former will clearly have implications for tht !atter, since the theory (in conjunction with speech-data) determines linguistic descriptions, but not vice versa. It is to the former I shA1 first turn my attention in the following discussion. The area of linguistic theory in which both grammar and semantics operate in functionalist (and related) approaches corresponds with what Martinet has termed the ‘first articulation’ of language -- what, in PIjelmslevian terminology, we might call tilz ylerematic plane (Hjelmslev 1970). What characterizes this area, in accordance both with Martinet and with Hjelmslev, is the fact that its entities are entities with both JFbrnzand meaning (pleremes), and that these entities include simple elemer.ts (for Martinet, the monemes) which may combine to form complex entities with both form and meaning. Furthermore, this plane whose entities entail a conventional relationship between ‘form’ and ‘meaning’ - contains entities that are convention-bound indices i.e. signa (Mulder and Hervey 197 1, 1972). The ‘first articulation’, or ‘plerematic plane’ - that is the linguistic plane on which signa operate - is an integral part of language, by virtue of the definition of the latter as a ‘semiotic system with a double articulation’s . ’ This definition originates from Martinet (Martinet 1960, 1962), .)ut has been given a different interpretation by Mulder (Mulde: 1968, 1969). See also Hervry 1972.
S. G.J. Herveyl’Axiomcltic jknctionalist ’ linguistics
51
We can distinguish three aspects within the theorvL that deals with the plerematic plane in language:
(1) the ‘structural’ aspect - in which signa are considered as complexes containing signa, or as constituents of Agrza; (2) the ‘phonological’ aspect - in which signa are related (via their ‘expressions’) to their phonological properties, i.e. to properties of form; (3) the ‘semantic’ aspect - in which signa are rel lted (via the denotata of their utterances) to their semantic properties, i.e. to properties of ‘meaning’. The ‘structural’ aspect is, itself, that part of the lijrguistic theory which corresponds to the theory of ‘grammar’, in the strict sense of that term as used in ‘axiomatic functionalism S. Within the theory of grammar we can further discriminate between the ‘articulation’ aspect7 - m which signa are articulated Into ordered component sigiza, i.e. are subjected to syntacric analysis - and the ‘simultaneity’ aspect - in which signa are analysed into simultaneous component sigw, i.e. are subjected to t3zorphological analysis (see especially Hervey and Mulder 1973; Mulder and Hervey forthcoming). We should note, therefore, that ‘g:*ammar’ (i.e. morphology and syntax) looks upon signa, not trom the point of view of their forms or then ‘meanings’, but from the point >f view of the comtrzrctrorzal rok thcv play in morphological arid syntactic structwe One of the corollaries of the latter Is that, for the purposes of grammar it is immaterial whether its entities are signs or s_vnzl/o,s - these being both subcategories of the category slgnum (Mulder and Hervey 197 1, 1972). The entities of grammar are sigrra that fulfil the requirement of being either elements combinable into complex signa or camp eses zontaining such elements. That is, although the entities of pr,immar are, by requirement, conventiondependent units of form and ‘meaning’ (necessary condition), they qualify specifically as grammats’cal entities by virtue of their conventionally determined combinabrlity and/or analysability in syntax and when there 1~no darqwr of 6 The term 1s sometimes used also by ‘axiomatic functionahsts confusion - in a wider sense to cover the who!e area of the plerematrc plane. phonological and plcrernatic’ ’ It is the relevance of this aspect on two different planes that characterizes ‘language’ as a special type of semiotic system with a ‘double artmlatlon’ (Mulder 1966, 1968, 1969; Mulder and Hervey 1974).
52
S. G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomatic functionalist’ linguistics
morphology; i.e. by virtue of the syntactic and/or morphological relations the:7 enter into (sufficient condition). As for the semantic aspect of the plerematic plane, semantics is in principle capable of providing a theory for the description of the denotation of any wholly convention-bound index (Signum having a phonologically statable ‘form’ and a wholly fixed-conventional denotation ivithin a given language) (Mulder and Hervey 197 1, 1972) regardless of the question of its grammatical role in the language. Signa that are not signs, though they may belong to the plerematic plane of a language because they are endowed with grammatical function, fall outside the scope of the semantic theory. Thus, for instance, proper symbols (Mulder and Hervey 197 1, 1972) such as ‘John’, or ‘x’, or nonce-symbols (Mulder and Hervey 197 1, 1971,) such as ‘brillig’, may play a role as potential grammatical constituents in English; e.g., (a) Johrz kicked a goal (b) x equals t wo hundred and one (c) it was bri/Zig yesterday, don’t you think? but they are not entities for semantic descript on in a description of English, since their denotation is not wholly d :termined within the conventions of English. Thus the very reason why such signa as the above are not identified as signs (let alone as ‘linguis ic signs’ in English) is also the reason why the semantic properties of these signa (properties not wholly determined by the conventions of Engish) do not belong to the descriptive scope of linguistic semantics. To s: y that such signa are not semantic entities in language, is simply tautologous with the statement that they fall outside the descriptive scope of the semantic theory. Semantic drscription includes only the description of those aspects of meaning that are conventionally determinetl within the language that is being described. (This is theorematic, given the definition of scope entailed by defining Zar-zguageas a particular type of ‘system of conventions for communication’ -- i.e. ‘semiotic system’ (cf. Mulder 1966, 1968; Muldcr and Hervey forthc.). On13 the ‘lingurstic signs’ moper to the given language may constitute, therefore, valid objects in semantic description, i.e. semantic entities. If we examine the, implications of the requirement that semalztic entities are all and only the ‘linguistic sign; ’ of a given language, we find
S. G.J. Pkrvey f’Axiomatic functionalist’ linguistics
53
it strongly advisable to discriminate, in the first p!ace, between two potential criteria for determining what is ‘a linguistic sign in L’.: (a) ‘linguistic sign in L’ for ‘any sign having grammatically distinctive function* in L’; i.e. any siglltdt?zwhich belongs to the language by virtue of grammatical function. (b) ‘linguistic sign in L’ for ‘sign whose wholly-fixed information value (denotation) is determined ~iUzi~ the conventions of L’: i.e. any sign which belongs to the language by virtue of the lang~~a~~-bo~~nd nature of its relation to its denotation. are These criteria -- ‘grammatical and ‘denotational’, respect ivelv. irzdepemk~~t The fact that a given sigr~tn? has (may be demonstrattxl to have) grammatically distinctive function in a given language, does nof imply that the denotation of that sigma is determined within the conventions of that language. For instance, a sigfzrrrz2“l’arbitraire du signe’-, can be demonstrated to have a grammatically distinctive function in English, in, say, the syntagm “‘One of Saussure’s major tenets is I’lrrhitruiw clrr sigrw.” In tilis syntagm the sigclldm “l’arbitraire du signc” has become ;\ grammatical constituent of English, and thus, a ‘linguistic sign’ in English by criterion (a). No one could, however, cogently argue that the dtxotation of “l’arbitraire du signe” is a matter of the conventions of English By criterion (b) “l’arbitraire du sign& -- a ‘linguistic sign’ of French - is :;ot a linguistic sign of English. In this, 3nd similar instances, we are provided with a demonstration that being a ‘linguistic sign’ in L by the grammatic‘tl criterion does not entail being a ‘linguistic sign’ in _ hy the denotational criterion. If we can show that the converse entailment does not hold either, we will !lave demonstrated formally the independence of criteria (a) and (b) from one another. In the case of grammatical constituents that are in construction with 8 For the notions ‘distinctive function’ and ‘dlstmctive function Mulder and Hervey 1972; Hervey 1970 and forthcommg.
m grammar’
,ee Mulder
1968;
54
S G.J. Kervey/‘Axiomati~functionalist’ linguistics
one another, but which do not make up a complete and scif-contained complex that is capable, in its turn, of being a constituent in yet other constructions, we can find precisely the kind of instances l:hat we are Iloolkingfor. A construction such as ‘he liked’ is a partial, i”ilcomplete, and non-self-contained construction in precisely the sense that, although its 4ements ‘“he’and ‘liked’ are in a constructional relation with one another (roughly, a subject-predicative relation), the construction cannot be complete in the absence of a further constituent (roughly, an &XV), and cannot occur as a constituent in other constructions.9 Thus, ‘he liked’ cannot be demonstrated to be an entity in the grammar of English, nor be said to have ‘grammatical function’ either in the primitive sense of the term, or in its technical sense of grammatically distinctive fzrnction. Neither as a constituent with distinctive function by virtue of opposition to constituents with which it commutes, nor as a self-contamed grammatical complex in opposition to other self-contained grammatical complexes, can ‘he likes’ be said to be a grammatical entity in English. On the other hand, it seems eo be clearly the case that ‘he liked’ (with ‘he’ and ‘liked’ in a subject-predicative relation) has information value - nor is that information value the same as simply the information value of ‘he’ followed by the information value of ‘liked’, but rather a fzuzction of the two. Furthermore, whatever the information value of ‘he liked’ is, depends wholly and entirely on the conventions of English. Therefore, semantically speaking, the denotation of ‘he liked’ is a function of the denotation of “he and ‘liked’, and of course, of the constructional relation between ‘he’ and ‘liked’. In ofirer words, from a semantic point of view, he liked’ is just as much a linguistic sign m English as is ‘he came’, the type-difference between these two instances being of a grammatical, not of a semantic nature. Both ‘he liked’ and ‘he came’ are linguistic signs in English by the denotational criterion. However, the second is also a grammatical element (in fact a potential constituent) whereas the first is not a grammatical element (neither potential constituent, nor self-contained grammatical complex). This demonstrates what we have set out to show; namely that being a ‘linguistic sign’ in L by the denotational criterion does not entail being a ‘linguistic sign’ in L by the grammatical criterion. By this demonstration we have 9 “he ilked” 1s never a constltue;lt may be an tm.nediate constitw:nt
in English grammatical constructions, in a syntagm “if be liked it”.
though
“he liked
it”
S. G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomatic fhctionalist
’ linguistics
55
completed the proof of the independence of criteria (a) and (b) from one another. Wherever categories are established by independent criteria, it becomes necessary for the sake of clarity and rlgour, to use different terms for designating them. In the preceding I have referred loosely to ‘linguistic signs’ in L, established either by criterion (a) or criterion (b). As these are independent criteria, I propose, in the following, to designate the category established by criterion (a) by the term grurnrnatzcul e/mties in L; and the category established on the basis of criterion (3) by the term semantic entities in L. Concerning the designation of the term linguistic sigm in L a choictl must be made between two alternatives. That is to say, it must be decided whether to regard (a) the SM~YYZ of th e classes of gram,matical entities in L and senian Ltic entities in L as constituting the class of linguistic signs in L; or: (b) the product of the classes of grammatical entities in L and semantic entities in L as constituting the class of linguistic signs in L. One may try to argue, pragmatically, that both grammatic;il and semantic entities in L belong to tht: plerematic system of the language in question, and are, therefore, ‘linguistic’ in the context of that language. This might seem to constitute a practical reason (a reason having to do with the fact that in ordinary language we should equate ‘linguistic’. with ‘belonging to the language’) for designating the slrnz of grammatical entities in L and semantic entities in L by the term ii?zgMstic sigrrs iu L But we are at present engaged in evolving a theoretical calculus in which logical arguments take precedence over pragmatic ones. Consequently we shall? for logical reasons, have to op for restricting the term ‘lingulstic sign in L’ to the product of the classes of grammatical and semantic entities in L. Otherwise, we should, absurdly, (a) admit entities such as “he liked” to the full status of linguistic sign in English, although they have no grammatically distinctive function (see the definition of linguistic sign as a particular class of phonological fJrms, each one of them in its capacity of having one and the same distinctive function in grammar (expressiorz), together with its converse (content) in Mulder 1968, 1969, 197 1, 1972; Muldzr and Harvey 1972);
56
23.C.J. Hervey/‘Axiuma tic functionalist ’ linguistics
(b) admit entities such as “l’arbitraire du signe” to the full status of linguistic sign in English, when they clearly belong to French, even though they may be quoted in English speech; or, (c) what would be even more unfortunate, admit proper symbols such as ‘x’ to the status of linguistic sign in English, when the:y are not signs at all. We shall, therefore, give the following definition of ‘linguistic sign ir, L’ : ‘linguistic sien in L’ for ‘entity that fulfils both the condition of being a grammatical entity in L and the condition of being a semantic entity in L’. A common error that crops up in linguistics is the identification, or equation, on the basis of identity of ex,ensional reference, of units that have different theoretical status. Just SAA an error is made, for instance, when, as is commonly done (e.g. in Bloomfieldian approaches), one speaks of identity, or at least equivalence, between, say, the mor@ze,Yne “cat” and the word “cat”. This can never hold true if ‘morpheme’ and ‘word’ are distinct categories whose definitions are based on separate criteria. That there may happen to be some extrinsic entity ‘cat’ whilzh satisfies, in turn, the conditions for identification as a ‘morpheme’, as well as the conditions for identification as a ‘word’, makes not the slightest difference to the fact that the morpheme ‘cat’ is neither identical, nor equivalent, to the word ‘cat’ - the two being members af distinct and independently identified categories. We shall return to this point later on, when a solution will be offered to an apparent paradox involving this issue. For the time being, however, we are using this case as an analogy in a proposed solution of the relation between grammatical entities in L and semantic entities in L. In exactly the same way, and for the same logical (and, in fact, ontological) reasons it would be improper to permit a relation either of identity or of equivalence to hold between a specific grammatical entity and specific semantic entity. Yet in linguistic signs we find entities that satisfy, in turn, the conditions for being grammatical entities as well as the conditions for being semantic entities. May we then say that a grammatical entity, say, “tobacco”, in English, is at one and the same time a
S. G.J. Herweyf’Axiornatic firnctronalist ’ lrrtgwsms
57
semantic entity in English - thereby affirming an identity, or ;lt least equivalence; between what are intrinsically different types of entity. established as they are by independent criteria? The answer is that such a solution would be logically absurd. Instend, one must establish SOIIIC more indirect - and also more general - relation between grammatical entities and semantic entities, i.e. a relation of ~O~T~~.S~~OIIC~CI~C‘C We can express this in the following manner: To a grammatical entity in L there may or may not cort~sponci ;I semantic entity in L (according to whether that entity is ;I ‘linguistic sign in L’). To a semantic entity in L there may or ra7ay not corrcsponrl ;I grammatical entity in L (according to whethei that entlty is H ‘lm~\iistrc sign in L’). The following instances will exemplify the possibili dence just mentioned:
t les ot‘
oorrespon-
(1) the entity ‘tobacce’ is a grammatical entity in English, to witch ‘tobacco’ is ;\ there corresponds a semantic entity in English linguistic sign m English ; (2) the entitil.’ ‘je ne sais quoi’ is a grammatical sntity 111EI1::lish. to ‘j, lrt’ UlS which no semantic entity corresponds in English quoi’ is not a linguistic sign in English; (3) the entity ‘house’ is a semantic entity m English, to wflich tht\rc “liousc” is ;111ncorresponds a grammatical entity in Engli4i guistic sign in English; (4) the entity ‘he liked’ is a semantic entity in English, to ~~h~c‘ilno ‘1~ liked’ is not ;I grammatical entity correspond $ I II English linguistic sign in English. An overwheiming advantage of regarding the relation between gr;~nlmatical entities and semantic etltities as one of clorr~spor1derlc.c (not of identity or equivalence) is that this offers a solution to what might otherwise constitute a paradox. Unlike identity or eql‘ivalence, correspondence of a more indirect kind does not need to be a one-to-one relation. This leaves free the possibility that
S. G.J. l?ervc~/‘Am~omtic functionalist ’ linguistics
58
semantic entity in L there may correspond more than one grammatical entity in LY
QO a
With the possibility of many-one correspondences between grammatical entities and semantic entities we can avoid what might otherwise prove to be a very troublesome pseudo-problem. This pseudioproblem could take the following form: In grammar (i.e. by using morphological and syntactic criteria) we can demonstrate that a given moneme, say ‘black’, a monomonematic word containing that moneme ‘black’, and a monomonematic synl’agrn containing that word, are three intrinsically different grammatical en tities (Hervey and Mulder 1973). Not only do these commute with different sets of other grammatical entities, thus having, qua grammatical entities diiferent distinctive functions in grammar,11 but they are, by definition, different subtypes of grammatical eAty. Using the theorems of sign identity established in semantics (Hervey 1970 and forthcoming), we can demonstrate that the moneme “black” is neither formally, nor denotationally different from the word “black”, or the syntagm “black”. That is to say, from the point of view of semantic theory, they constitute a unique sign, i.e. the same semanl;ic entity. If, therefore, semantic entities are identical with, or equivalent to, (stdnd in a necessarily oneto-one relation with) grammatical entities, theh we are faced with an insolub!: problem: either we posit that there is a single semantic entity “black”, and
deny that the moneme “black”, the word “black” and a syntagm “black” are different grammatical entities, in spite of the fact that they can be demonstrated to be intrinsically distinct grammatical entities; or we posit the moneme “black”, the word “black” and a syntagm “black” as three different grammatical entities, and deny. that there is only a unique semantic entity “black” (with a specific denotation), in spite of the fact that, by the theorems of signidentity, the latter conclusion is inescapable. r* We shall ign Jre the possibility that several semantic er tities may correspond to one grammdtrcal entity. Entities that are denotationally different (i.e. different semantic entities) are, by necessary rmpkation, also grammatically distinct from one another - that is to say, correspond :y distinct gra nmatical entities (Hervey 1970 arid forthcoming). The distinctive function of an element is determined by the set of other elements to which it is opposed by commutation in equivalent contexts.
S.G.J, Herwey/‘Axiomatic finctionalist’ linguistics
59
Thus we are truly on the horns of a dilemma, being presented with only two alternatives, both of which lead to an absurdity. As a result, we may consider it theorematic (proven by reductio ad adsurdum in the theory), that the relation between grammatical entity and semantic entity is not one of identity, or equivalence; indeed not necessarily a oneto-one relation. With the theory as outlined above, the possibility of many-one correspondence between grammatical entities and semantic entities gives a clearcut solution to the dilemma. We are free (a) to affirm, as indeed we can demonstrate, that the moneme ‘black’, the word ‘black’, and a syntagm “black’ are three distinct grammatical entities; (b) to posit that there is a single semantic entity ‘black’; and (c) to conclude that to the semantic entity ‘black’ there corresponci at least three distinct grammatical entities. In other words, “moneme”, “word” and “syntagm” are said to be subtypes ofgrammatical entity, but mt of semantic entity - a position perfectly tenable, given the independence of the notions grammatical entity and semantic entity. The distinction between different subtypes of grammatical entity will be irrelevant to, and will not affect, the identity of semantic entities. This is, indeed, as it should be. Grammatical theory and semantic theory are independent parts of linguistic theory. and there is no reason why criteria that are specific to grammar should be taken into consideration in semantics - any more than that strictly phonological criteria should be allowed to play a role in grammar. or vice versa.
Referring back to our example of “black”, the question arises as to whether one should speak of one Zingwstic sign “black”, or several (three or more) Zinghstic signs corresponding to the distinct grammatical subtypes. Firstly, the theorems of sign-identity (Hervey 1970 and forthcoming) take theoretical precedence over the grammatical sub-divisions into moneme, word, and syntagm, and according to these theorems there is no justification for setting up distinct linguistic signs, rather than a single linguistic sign “black”. On the contrary, if we posited distinct linguistic signs for the moneme “black”, the word “black”, and a syntagm “black”, respectively, then these linguistic signs would be hot/j homonyms afzd synonyms of one another - i.e. they would, absurdly,
60
S. G.J. ihvey / ‘Axkmatic jknctionalist ’ linguistics
be ‘distinct’ linguistic signs that were neither formally, nor denotationally distinct from one another. Secondly, in the present article linguistic sign has been interpreted as the entity in which corresponding grammatical and semantic entities coincide, Since however, more than one grammatical entity may correspond to a single semantic entity, it follows that several grammatical entities and a given semantic entity may coincide in a single linguistic sign That is to say, we should regard the semantic entity “black’ , and the grammatical entities ‘Wack” (moneme), “black” (word) and “black” (syntz:m) as coinciditl, * ;+1 .._ 2 single linguistic sign “black”. As a result, ther; an: t.4 o ways of looking at the grammatically distinctivz function of the Zmguistic sign “‘black” (see especially Mulder and Wervey 1972). We may say that, since the subtypes of grammatical entity “black’” (moncm.z). “blnck’ ” {tsord) and “black” (syntagm) coincide in the lhguistlc sig,t “black” (i.e. are not distinguished on the level of lmguistic sign), the g-ammatically distinctive function of the lingujsail the grammatical entities which it repret the distinctive functions of “black” d) and “black” (syntagmj In other words thie nting the grammatical entities in into all the grammatical oppositions which actually contract by commutation in grampkation, involve the correspondf grammatical oppositions (i.e. ctive function would not be directly contracted bv martic entity, but would pertain to lhem ding grammatical entity (or entities)). Alternatively, it could be argued that while grammatical entity e levd of grammatical oppositions, and semantic entity nguistic sign operates on a higher, and more ammar or semantics (i.e. on the highest e’, at which level grammar and semantics r?matic’ inventor which constitutes the oderail ~ys‘first art~culati~~n’of language. A corollary of this would be talk of hguistic signs, we should nc t speak ic (i.e. ‘grammatical’ in the narrow sense)1 t operate with inventories of Zin~!uistic Id, strictly speaking, not attribute a gleamion to linguistic signs, but speak, instt; ad, of
S. G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomatic finctionalist’ linguistics
61
the ‘distinctive’ function they contract by direct opposition to CCP members of the same ‘plerematic’ inventory. This type of function I have elsewhere referred to as ‘systemic function’ (Hervey 1970 and forthcoming). The systemic function of a ling~isGc s&n “black” would be determined by a set that is not co-extensive with the sum of the grammatically distinctive functions of “black” (moneme), “black” (word) and “black” (syntagm). Thus the ‘distinctive’ function of the linguistic sign “black” -- if identified with its systemic function --wo~rlclbe different from whs! it would be if it were identified with the sum of the grammatically distinctive functions of the grammatical entities represented by that linguistic sign. Furthermore, it may seem that a revision in the theory of ‘axiomatic functionalism would be necessary, in that, apparzntly, we ought no longer to define linguistic sign as 1~) R s and s R {p} (where {p) is a class of phonological forms, R is ‘in its capacity of having’, R is ‘of’, and s is a grammatically distinctive function). In the above formula (Mulder 1968, 1969, 197 i, 1973; Mulder and Hervey 1972), the value of s should, then, no longer be a grammatically distinctive function (measured in terms of oppositions in grammatical contexts) but, rather, a ~ystemicfunctiwz (measured in terms of oppositions in an inventory of first articulation elements). There are, as I have pointed out, advantages in both the above ways of looking at the ‘distinctive’ function of linguistic signs, and a choice between them wollld be hard to make. Fortunately, there seems o be no real reason why such a choice should have to be made, since the two alternatives are, I believe, not incompatible with one another as ‘different ways of looking at the same thing’. We may retain the definition of linguistic sign as ‘PI
Rs
and
sk{p}
using s as a symbol for ‘grammatically distinctive function’, since, although it is not strictly correct to say that linguistic sings directly contract oppositions in grainmatical contexts, linguistic signs do represent grammatical entities that have grammatically distinctive functions. Thus, indirectly, linguistic signs can be said to have grammatically distinctive function.
62
S. GJ kkrvery/‘Aximnatic finctionalist ’ linguistics
At the same time, we may also retain the idea that there is a higher ‘plerematic’ level on which we may generalise our findings both in grammar and in semantics;, in the form of inventories oi linguistic signs. Thus we may continue to loo’k upon ‘linguistic sign’ as a notion proper to that ‘plerematic level on which ‘distinctive’ function is a matter of (direct oppositions betjween members of the inventory of linguistic signs. That is to say, the definition of linguistic sign in terms of ‘systemic function’ can be included as an alternative definition. We can now sum up our conclusions concerning the relation of grammar and semantics in the lirquistic theory: (a) grammar and semantics are complementary, but mutually independent sections of that part of the linguistic th zory which deals with the study of the ‘plerematic ( ‘fht articulation’) plane; __S_ (b) the notions and entities of grammar and semantics are independent and distinct from one another, but correspondences can be set up between them via the overa!: pierematic inventory; tc) grammar deals with the grammatical extiries of !anguage - of which ‘moneme’, ‘word’ and ‘syntagm are subtypes - and with the constructional relations into which these may enter; ld) semantics deals with the semar,f,ic entities of language, between w%ch it sets up relations on the basis of their respective denotations; !t’) ‘grammatical entity’ and ‘semantic entity’ may coincide in the notion ‘iinguistic sign’, in such a way that one or more grammatical entities may correspond to one semantic entity; (f) the overall inventory of the signs of a given language is constituted of all and only its linguistic signs, that is signs in which at least one grammatical sign coincides with one and only one semantic sign. As far as grammatical and semantic descriptions are concerned, the folio * g point can be mad: in general, as a conclusion drawn from the ation between grammatical theory and semantic theory: descripiion and semantic description are independent of but are intetgrated in that both are dependent on an inory whose notions and theorems are derived from a single f axioms. Therefore, we may emphasize that nothing in iQe sv-
%.G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomatic functionalist ’ linguistics
63
mantie description should actually contradict the grammatical description, and vice versa. For this reason, for instance, statements in the grammatical description may have to be altered if they lead to the absurd conclusion (i.e. a conclusion ruled out by the theory) that a given grammatical entity corresponds to more than one (denotationally distinct) semantic entity. That the theories of grammar and semantics are mutually independent (while both are dependent on the axioms and definitions of the same integrated theory), does not mean that they may not and should not be in applied in conjunction with one another in a linguistic descriptiwz particular for cross-checking, and independent ‘corroboration’ of the decisions made in one or other part of the description. Phonology and grammar too are independent, yet in a phonological description it is useful to know that forms of a language may be grammatically differential. In a grammatical description, too, actual statements of allomorpl’zy (Molder 1966, 1968, 1969, 197 1, 1973; Mulder and +rvey 1972) -different phonological forms in their capacity of having the same grammatically distinctive function are allomorphs (members) of one sign -presuppose the ability to describe the phonological features of the language under consideration. These are instances in which (logically) mutually independent subdisciplines of the linguistic theory -- the links between which are specified by the theory -- come to be applied, when it comes to linguistic descriptions, at least partly in conjunction with one another. In a similar way, when it comes to linguistic descriptions (as opposed to arguments in the theory itself) certain parts of grammar and of semantics may be applied in conjunction with one another and as aids to one another, in certain theoretically permissible ways.‘* Apart from the formal relation between grammatical description and semantic description, as determined by the linguistic theory, there may be certain ad hoc and purely pragmatic connections between t’le two. Strictly speaking, the scope of semantic description extends also to semantic entities that cannot be regarded as linguistic signs (becduse l2 4n instance of this is the use grammatical description may make of semantically based decrsions about homonymy. The theory permits this, since homonyms are linguistic srgns which qua semantic entities are different from one another, and a single grammatical enlrty cannot correspond to two or more semantic entities to form one linguistic sign - instead several grammat&l signs must be distinguished in such a way that at least one of them corresponds to each semantic entity, thereby forming distinct homonymous linguistic signs.
64
S. G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomaticfunctionalist’ r!inguisbcs
they do not correspond to grammatical entities). FCT practical reasons howli:ver, we may wish to restrict semantic inventories (which are in principle infinite) in various ways. In the first place, we may wish to distinguish between ‘marginal’ and ‘central’ semantic entities according to whether they may be regarded as fully fledged linguistic signs or not _- so that the scope of the description may be limited (ad hoc) to the ‘central’ ones. This involves a purely practical use of grammatical criteria. We shall call ‘ten tral’ only those semantic entities that correspotid to at least one grammatical entity, and restrict our semantic description to this grammatically selected subcategory of semantic entities. Similarly, grammatical description may borrow semantic criteria for an ad hoc limitation of its scope, by eliminating (from, say,, a description of English) such ‘marginal’ grammatical f.ntities as, say, “l’arbitraire du signe”, or H2S04, on the grounds that no semantic entity of English corresponds LOthem, and that they are, therefore, not capable of being regarded as linguistic signs. In the second place, in the restriction of semantic inventories - which has a practical Idvantage, since it is always easier to systematize 3 more limited inventory than a more extensive one - we may make another ad hoc use of grammatical criteria. In principle, semantic features can be assigned to any semantic entity, yet in practice it is more economical (and more feasible) to assign semantic features only to sets of entities that correspond to monemes and words, excluding those entities that correspond only ‘cosyntagms. In this way we can obtain a restricted inventory, for the ‘&for of syntactic recursivity which infinitely multiplies the inventory of syntagrns, and therefore of semantic entities corresponding to syntagms, does nJt operate on monemes or within words. Restricting a semantic description to only those semantic entities which correspond to monemes and words of a language, constitutes a pragmatic application - and a useful one - in a semantic description, of notions that actually belong to grammar. The dichotomies between ( 1) simple sign and complex sign ; (2) morphological complex and syntactic complex are actually defined in grammar (in the narrow sense of the term). Yet these apparently purely grammatical considerations cut across both grammar 2nd semantics, since they directly affect the notion
S.G.J. Hervey/‘Axiomatic
functionaht
’ hn~lsttcs
65
‘Wuisltic s&z’, not merely the notion ‘grammatical entity’. It is th :orematic in axiomatic functionalist theory (cf. Hervey 1970 and fort1 lcoming) that no linguistic sign may be bollz simple urlcl complex. OI bottz a morphological and a syntactic co plex. That is to say, although more than one grammatical entity may correspond to a single semantic entity, provided that they coincide in one and the same hguistic sigfz, this cannot be the case when it comes to grammatical entities that differ by virtue of the “simple--complex”, or the “morpliological complex syntactic: complex” dichotomies. In such cases the different grammatical entities coincide a priori, each with a different semantic entity, constituting differem Ziuglristic signs In other words, even without resorting to semantic criteria, we can deduce the non-identity of two semantic entities from the fact that we can draw a “simple - complex”, or a “morpho!ogical complex-syntactic complex” dichotomy between the grammatical signs that correspond to them respectively. III this we find a case of a grammatical demonstration that has a valid influence, vi;l the notion ‘linguistic sigd which it directly affects, upon semantic description. This case is comparable to the valid influence of semantic demonstration of homonymy (cf. fn. 12) upon grammatical description. If the denotational theorems of semantics (Hervey 1970 and forthcoming) require that, for denotational reasons, a number of homonyms should be set up in the place of what, on grammatical grounds, may appear to constitute a single linguistic sign (i.e. the converse cannot be demonstrated in grammar), then each of the homonymous semantic entities will require to be considered as a separate linguistic sign in its own right. Thus the grammatical entities corresponding to distinct homonyms are, by implication, also distinct grammatical entities - not the same grammatical entity corresponding to several semantic entities united in one lin 1ruist ic sign. As we see in the above, grammatical t Icory may affect semantic dcscriptions, and serIfantic theory may aft ct grammatical descriptions, on the vital issue of the identification of items in the inventory of semantic entities and grammatical entities respectively. But it may do so only viu the notion ‘linguistic sign’ in which, according to the theory, grammatical entities may coincide with semantic entities. That is to say, it would be more correct to regard these cases not as instances where semantics depe:lcIs upon grammar or grammar upon semantics, but rather as instances whee both semakcs and grammar depend on one and he same notion ‘linguistic sign’ whrch dominates both semantics and grammar, being a
66
S. G..I Hervey/‘Axiomaticfunctionalist’ linguistics
notion of the highest plerematic generality (on a level where the separation and independence of grammar and scllmantics ceases to operate). The theory lays down clearly and explicitly how arguments may, via the notion ‘linguistic sign’, be carried over from grammar to semantics or vice vemz. This., however, does not alter th, general principle that grammatical theory and semantic theory are independent sub-theories of ‘axiomatic functionalist’ linguistic theory. The problem of identity concerning items in grammar and in sele linguistic signs in which grammatical entimantics, as well 2,s ties and semantic c-ntities coincide (i.e. the question of the correspondences between grammatical and semantic entities) has been, if not completely ignorizl, at least considerably underestimated in some recent, especially tr;:nsf~imational generative, linguistic approaches. IdentitvI of lexkal formativ
References Harvey, S.G.J., 1970. Functional semantics; a linguistic theory, with application to Pekingese. Oxford: Oxford Univ. (D. Phil. thesis). Harvey, S.G.J., forthcoming. Axiomatic semantics. Hervey, S.G.J., 1972. Mulder’s ‘axiomPLic linguistics’. Lingua 28 (4), 348-379. Hervey, S.G.J., 1973. Reflections on J.J. Katz, ‘The semantic component of a linguistic descriptlon’ (in Katz 1970). Lmgua 31, 297-329. Hervey, S.G.J. and J.W.F. Mulder, 1973. Pseudo-composites and pseudo-words: sufficient and necessary criteria for morphological analysis. La Linguistique 9 (l}. HJelmslev, L., 1953. Prolegomena to a theory of language. Wisconsin: Univ. of Wisconsin.
S.G.J. Herveyl’hiornatie
firmtiorlalist’ linguistics
67
Hjelmslev, L., 1970. Language: an introduction, Wisconsin: Univ. of Wtsconsin. Katz, J.J., 1971. Interpretive semantics meets Frankenstein. Fourdatlons of Language 7. Martmet, A., 1960. Elements de linguistique g&&ale. Paris. Martinet, A., 1962. A functional view of language. London: Oxford Unrv. Press. McCawley, J.D., 1971. Interpretive semantics meets the zombies: a discussion of the controversy about deep structure. Foundations of Language (7). Muider, J.W.F., 1966. Sets and relations in phonology; a theory of linguistic description, with specia! reference to Pekingese. Oxford: Oxford Univ. (D.Phil. thesis). Mulder, J.W.F., 1968. Sets and relations in phonology; an axiomatic approach to the tlescrrption of speech. London: Oxford Univ. Press. Mulder, J.W.F., 5,969. On the art of definition, the aouble articulation of language, and some of the consequences. Forum for Modern Language Studies ‘4 (2). Mulder, J.W.F., 1973. From sound to denotation. Folia Linguistrca IV. Mulder, J W.F., 1974. Descriptive adequacy m phonology, and the vowel phonemes of the Scottish dialects of Angus and Perthshire compared with the Southern English system La Linguistique. Mctlder, J.W.F. and S.C.J Hervey, 197 1 I*ldex and Signum. Semiotrca IV (4). Mulder. J.W.F. and S.G.Y. Herve) , 1972. TheNaryof the. lingurstic sign Janua Lrnguarum Series Minor. The Hiague: ~Mouton. Mu&~, J.W.1‘. aiad S.G 3. Her~ey, forthcoming. Language as a system of systems. La L.tnguistlque. POp’trC,K.R.: ‘f965 TIie logrt, cf screntiflc discovery. Lmclo;l (4th ed.). Popila r, K..:., 1972. f bjes;tnve knowledge: an evolctronary approach. London: Oxford Univ. Press.