Grass-roots development in rural Thailand: A lost cause?

World Development,Vol. 19, No. 2/3, pp. 199-211, 1991. Printed in Great Britain.

0305-750X/91 $3.00 + 0.00 t~ 1991 Pergamon Press pie

Grass-Roots Development in Rural Thailand: A Lost Cause? JONATHAN RIGG*

School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London Summary. - - "Grass-roots" development policies have been embraced by governments, international agencies and NGOs alike as one of the most effective means of improving conditions and fostering growth in rural areas. However, in many cases there is a considerable discrepancy between word and deed, and it is rare to find grass-roots development policies being implemented in a coherent fashion. This article examines the reasons for this discrepancy with reference to rural development in Thailand. It is argued that although a centralized and inefficient bureaucracy, and entrenched interest groups, cause many of the problems of implementation, the hierarchical nature of Thai society provides much of the explanation. Further, it is argued that grass-roots ideologies, based upon conceptualizations of folk/peasant culture, may be no more in-tune with the aspirations of peasants than those orthodox strategies they aim to replace. As such, grass-roots development policies may be seen as being incompatible with the planning context, and thus face long-term and deep-seated constraints to effective implementation.

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N "Grass-roots" or "bottom-up" development ~ is an approach to development which has gathered increasing support over the past 20 years. The terms themselves have become akin to mantras. The philosophy which underlies the approach is that local people know to a far greater degree of sophistication than does the government what problems they face, and how best to solve them. Thus their knowledge should be secured in identifying those problems and in designing the policies to combat them. Not only that, but the self-same local populations should be directly involved in the implementation of the resulting policies so that their support can be assured and their expertise can be exploited. In this way, the balance of planning shifts from the planners to the "planned" who, after all, are the ones it is ostensibly designed to benefit. Planning agencies throughout the developing world have embraced this approach and have, to varying degrees, incorporated an element of grass-roots development into the plans. In Thailand, for example, the Fifth (1981-86) and Sixth (1987-91) National Economic and Social Development Plans both make prominent such concepts as "decentralization," "self-help," "participation" and "self-reliance." This paper will explore, with reference to the Thai experience,

some of the constraints that have restricted the implementation of the grass-roots development policies contained in the national development plans. In addition, it will also provide a critique of the "alternative" approaches to development promoted by some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The paper is not intended to arrive at any hard-and-fast conclusions regarding development in Thailand (and, by implication, development in other areas), but rather to air some thoughts about the possible areas of conflict and contradiction. Doubtless, those who have had direct experience of working in the Thai, and other, planning contexts will either be able to add more detail to the rather unstructured ideas that follow or, alternatively, to refute them.

2. T H E P L A N N I N G PROCESS IN T H A I L A N D Thailand's development planning has been based on a series of five-year economic and social development plans, the first beginning in 1961. The current Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan is set to run from 1987 to *I am grateful to The British Academy for its support and would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 199

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1991. These national development plans have become increasingly sophisticated documents as the Thai planning agency - - the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) - has become more adept and familiar with the art of planning. In addition, the plans have mirrored the changes and advances that have occurred in planning worldwide. For example, development is no~ seen in the Thai planning context as being a multidimensional process involving human as well as economic development; in addition, the plans have stressed increasingly the importance of targeting less advantaged areas and population groups: and finally, with reference to grass-roots dexelopment, they have also aimed to give greater responsibilities and power to those at the local level. As Turton notes regarding popular participation in development: "As with the term 'democracy', so with 'popular participation': everyone is for it, or at any rate, no one admits to being against it" (Turton, 1987, p. 11). The same could be said of many of the other elements of grass-roots development which are given considerable attention in both the Fifth and Sixth FiveYear National Development Plans. They have become articles of faith without which, it is often felt. successful development is unlikely to occur (see Hall, 1988, p. 91). The Fifth Plan (1981-86) was supposedly based on a "'new line "2 of development thinking, said to incorporate six main characteristics. Two of these refer to the decentralization of planning and the promotion of local initiative (NESDB, no date

[al, p 3): - - It stresses "poverty alleviation" for people in backward rural areas to enable them to help themselves and participate more actively in the production process and future national development activities. . . . development responsibilities will be further decentralized to provincial areas and local authorities in order to give them greater participation and promote more self-help development activities in rural development. -

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The Sixth Five-Year Plan, with its rural development element, takes this further still with the aim of encouraging the public to find "solutions to their own problems on the basis of self-reliance." In achieving this aim, "local organizations at the village and sub-district levels will be strengthened • . . local resources will be mobilized . . . [and] the people will be encouraged to solve their own and community p r o b l e m s . . . " (NESDB, no date [b], p. 338). Further, the plan hopes to disperse authority, encourage participation in development, integrate the efforts of government agencies and the public, and encourage the role of people's organizations (NESDB, no date [b], pp.

337-347; also see NESDB, no date [c], p. 17). Ultimately, the plan's objective is that "they [the rural population] should be able to attain selfreliance, participate in developing their own standard of living and determine the course of their lives based on the criteria of basic minimum needs" (NESDB, no date [b], p. 346). These developmental aims are very laudable, but have they been reflected in practice? A short answer would be: rarely. For although the act of planning has apparently been enthusiastically embraced by the Thai state (if the quantity of paperwork is anything to go by), there is little evidence that the plans produced - - however carefully - - do more than provide a broad indicator for those who are provided with the task of implementation. As a World Bank report revealingly observed: There is . . . little evidence that Thailand's development plans systematically guide or govern the actions of departments or, for that matter, the cabinet itself, in the day-to-day ~conduct of government affairs. Although national development plans should never be treated in mixed economies as binding and inflexible statements of government intentions, the frequency and extent to which development plans appear to be disregarded in the allocation of administrative and financial resources and in the introduction of new policies, programs and projects is indicative of a lack of full commitment to the concept of development planning. In recent years it has become increasingly difficult to discern a sense of direction and purpose in public sector behavior that is in any way comparable to its stated intentions and objectives (IBRD, 1978, p. 28). The reasons why development plans in Thailand are rarely implemented in any systematic fashion are numerous. Of great importance are the nature and functioning of the Thai bureaucracy and Thai society. After being produced by the NESDB, a national development plan has to run an obstacle course of influential interest groups - - among them the army, politicians and civil servants. Opposition by any one of these interest groups may lead to an element of the plan being shelved - - although it is true that at different times each group has wielded varying degrees of power. Interestingly, the balance of power has recently shifted in favor of the politicians backed by advice from a small group of academics - - Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan's so-called Kitchen Cabinet. The NESDB, which dominated planning under the previous prime minister, Prem Tinsulanond (replaced by Chatichai in August 1988), appears to have lost much of its influence (see Handley, 1988; Sricharatchanya, 1989a, 1989b; Prasithrathsint, 1987, pp. 29 and 46-50). Whereas the

GRASS-ROOTS DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND NESDB used to report directly to Prem, it now communicates through one of the ministers in the prime minister's office (Sricharatchanya, 1989c, p. 26). This has implications for the implementation of the Sixth Plan which largely reflects the NESDB view of development and still has two years to run. Suchart Prasith-rathsint (1987, p. 36) also points out that the rural development sections of the Fifth and the Sixth Five-Year Plans were designed by a "maverick" group within the NESDB. As such they are particularly prone to modification. Having been broadly cleared by these groups, the policies and projects are then implemented by the respective ministries and departments. At this level, there is once again the potential that a policy may be changed or discarded. Individual ministries, and to a lesser extent departments, are highly centralized and independent (Prasithrathsint, 1987, p. 73). Ministers can ignore planning objectives presented by the NESDB and pursue policies of their own. It is significant in this regard that the national development plans lack statutory enforcement and are not binding in terms of budget allocation. This "provides much leeway to the line ministries to interpret and exploit the plan as a useful reference only when they find it beneficial to do so" (Prasith-rathsint, 1987, p. 17). Indicative of the centralization of power is the extreme degree of overlap and duplication that occurs among ministries. Demaine (1986, p. 107) notes that there are 10 agencies involved in the construction of rural roads, and six concerned with the provision of water supply facilities in rural areas. Ministries tend to operate as "kingdoms" in competition with other ministries for funds and influence, and they rarely cooperate with one another in a coherent fashion. This naturally runs counter to the systematic implementation of a plan. Indeed, one of the criticisms that can be leveled at the Sixth Plan is that it assumes that ministries will cooperate to a far greater degree than experience tells us is likely. Prasith-rathsint summarizes the problems of implementation as follows: the development plans laid down by the NESDB still lack a clear objective; in particular there are no measures to guarantee the success of its plans when they are implemented. Planning and plan-modification made by the basic operating units at the ministerial, bureau and department levels usually result in the outcome deviating from the intended objective set by the NESDB. Each unit will go its own way with very little effort to coordinate its plans with other agencies (1987, p. 59). •

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Thus, the first hurdle that a policy of grassroots development has to overcome is to be accepted by an array of concerned interest

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groups and the ministries or departments which are to be involved in its implementation. Generally, the priorities and perspectives of these interest groups (the politicians) differ from those of the planners (the technocrats) who draw up the policies. The general philosophy of grassroots development may be lost in the process. One last point: in no small sense, centrally planned grass-roots development is a contradiction in terms. It is axiomatic that truly decentralized development incorporating popular participation and fostering village self-reliance cannot be decreed from above. Any level of state involvement implies some degree of control. The motivation, as well as the action, must be generated at the local level. The commitment of Thailand's national development plans to the ideals of grass-roots development should be viewed with healthy skepticism.

3. T H E T H A I B U R E A U C R A C Y : HIERARCHICAL AND PATERNALISTIC At this point it is necessary to look at the operation of the Thai bureaucracy (and later on, at Thai society), for it is arguable that even given the acceptance of a decentralized grass-roots development policy by all concerned in the higher reaches of government, the demands of that policy are incompatible with the way in which the Thai bureaucracy functions (for various analyses of the Thai bureaucracy see: Riggs, 1966; Siffin, 1966; Mosel, 1957; Rubin, 1974; IBRD, 1978, pp. 123-130). The Thai bureaucracy has often been seen to mirror Thai society and to be highly centralized and paternalistic. The progress of a young civil servant in Thailand is best guaranteed if he secures the support of an influential patron. The success of the patron or luukphi as he (rarely she) rises through the bureaucracy will correspondingly lead to the success of his client or luuknong. The client, in turn, will likewise be involved in similar patron-client relationships with individuals below him. In this way, lines of authority and control are highly hierarchical, with clients best ensuring progress for themselves through pleasing their respective patrons (see Haas, 1979, pp. 84-95). For example, and with reference to rural development and the bureaucracy in Northern Thailand: "The line nature of the bureaucracy meant that individual awards were obtained by pleasing a ministerial superior and not simply by accomplishing a task useful for the area" (Rubin, 1974, pp. 42-43). This system allows little room for initiative, and decisions are usually taken so that they

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correspond to the wishes, or the perceived wishes, of those above. In the final analysis, this normally means the wishes of those in Bangkok. The failure to involve local people in development and to promote local initiative - - arising out of the hierarchical bureaucratic structure - has even been used to help explain the failure to stem the growth of the communist insurgency in Thailand during the late 1970s and early 1980s (e.g., Snitwongse, 1985, pp. 251-255). Naturally, the demands of bottom-up development lie uneasily in this bureaucratic structure, and it is doubtful if the decentralization of authority to provincial, district and local levels as contained in the Fifth and Sixth National Development Plans has actually occurred in any systematic fashion. Prasith-rathsint for example, notes that local government units have remained tightly controlled by the center and that the Ministries of the Interior and of Finance have been reluctant to devolve power to the local level (1987, p. 75). Organizationally, there has been little change in the traditional top-down flow of information, and the structure of decision making remains centralized in the ministries in Bangkok (Prasithrathsint, 1987, pp. 76-77). Of course, it is possible that if patrons declare that they wish to see greater decentralization, then their clients carry it out as part of the patron-client system. However, although at a superficial level the plans for decentralization may thus be enacted, the core of decision making still lies with those above. The raison d'etre for decentralization - - that those at the local level have greater authority in making and taking decisions - - will not be met, and little autonomy will ensue. Changing the manner in which the bureaucracy functions is not simply a question of issuing a few memoranda or starting some timeand-motion studies. The "problem" (if it can be thought of as such) is deep seated and long term, and is derived from the structure of Thai society, which is similarly highly paternalistic. Admittedly, the bases of patron-clientage have changed somewhat as Thailand has modernized and has become more tightly integrated into the world economic and political order (see below). But, patron-clientage "still seems to be the prevalent social pattern within the Thai civil and military bureaucracy. Clientage networks appear to be the main feature for the bureaucratic elite to maintain extended groups of loyal followers" (Bechstedt, 1988, p. 155, emphasis in original). That bureaucracy should reflect society is scarcely surprising. As Hall notes, in general terms, "operational and cultural considerations are bound up with the social and political structures within which development takes place" (Hall,

1988, p. 96). With this in mind it is probably more sensible (and certainly easier) to redesign the policies rather than to redesign the society - although, as a result, they may be rendered somewhat less effective. Let us assume, however, that a particular rural development project with a grass-roots format has successfully run the obstacle course of interest groups, ministries, and departments and has survived relatively unscathed. Let us also assume that this project is then embraced at the district level and given the support of an enlightened and confident naay amphoe (district officer). Is the policy then likely to be implemented as intended?

4. POLICY I M P L E M E N T A T I O N A T T H E V I L L A G E LEVEL Like the bureaucracy, village society in Thailand is also hierarchical and paternalistic (see: Hanks, 1972, 1975; Potter, 1976, pp. 147223). 3 Traditionally in any community, three people were of utmost importance: the phuuyaybaan (headman), the abbot (or senior monk), and the teacher. The kamnan or commune headman was also influential, especially as it was he who represented the link between the lowest levels of government and the village. In recent years these traditional village leaders have been joined, as village life has become increasingly commercialized and differentiated, by additional patrons who owe their position in village society to their economic power. 4 Indeed, village power relations have become considerably more complex and the traditional system of authority somewhat subsumed by the processes of agrarian change that are currently underway throughout Thailand (Douglass, 1984, pp. 91-97). As Bechstedt explains, today "it is money and the access to profits, shares and stocks that distinguishes those who are in power from those who are not" (1988, p. 156). The more influential of these patrons are sometimes able to attract numerous clients on the basis of reciprocity so that an "entourage" or khana (clique) is created, and beyond that, a "circle" (Hanks, 1975, pp. 200207). It should be stressed that the entourage (and circle) are not groups of equals, but owe their existence to, and are centered upon, a single individual: the patron. 5 When a new project is to be introduced in to a village, it must first receive the blessing of the phuuyaybaan and kamnan who operate through the village committee and tambon council (see Turton, 1987, pp. 79-87 for an account of their

GRASS-ROOTS DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND operation). These two institutions tend to be dominated by the economically rich and the politically powerful. If the phuuyaybaan is unwilling to lend his support to a project then it is unlikely that it will be supported enthusiastically by the general village population. There may well exist conflicts and differences of opinion among the various village leaders - - and in some cases the headman may be relatively uninfluential. Nevertheless, projects are very rarely assessed in a democratic fashion, and the opinions and desires of individuals and cliques are extremely influential. 6 These village leaders may aim to act in such a way that their decisions reflect the opinions of the village in general, and many headmen, teachers and abbots have the interests of "their" village at heart. But the method is not one which is compatible with the needs and approach of grass-roots development. It is centered on individuals who impose their decisions on the group. What may be perceived to be in the general interest of the village from the perspective of the village leader(s) is likely to be considerably at variance with the perceptions of many other members of the village. Turton's account of the operation of a tambon council describes a decision-making process which is highly authoritarian: "1 talk, you listen" is considered the council's mode of communication. Detailed information and explanation is avoided; villagers are thus impeded from learning about council procedures. Instructions ensuing from the council often take the form "such and such a project will take place; you will go and shovel earth on such and such a day for a wage of so much per day" . . . (Turton, 1987, p. 87). In a similar fashion, when government officials visit villages to discover their views, these are translated by the village leaders, not by the villagers. It is notable that even when a group of villagers are being informally interviewed there will be individuals who will take on the responsibility of answering for the group as a whole. Those who disagree with what is being said on their behalf are likely to remain silent, and will probably only reveal their doubts in private afterwards. Submission to authority and conformity is the norm in such circumstances (Bechstedt, 1988, p. 154). If a project ever attempted to circumvent this system and "go straight to the people," it would be likely to result in conflict. When projects are implemented, they are rarely the product of local initiative. This is clear in Trinutchakorn's account of his experiences as an educated and highly committed development worker in the Northeastern region. He recounts his reaction to the failure of a child center which he managed:

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I reached the conclusion that this problem [malnourishment among children during the dry season] would not be solved by setting up a day-care center but by raising the income of the villagers. So I set up a youth-group for chicken-raising and a parents group for onion growing, a rice bank and a cooperative store. I guessed that if the villagers had a higher income, the day-care center would have a better prospect. If they had money, they would be able to buy good food for their children. I used various ways and means to organize the villagers. They were very helpful, sympathetic and willing to organize themselves (Trinutchakorn, 1986, pp. 107108). The importance of this quote is that it clearly demonstrates that it was the development worker himself who identified the problem and then conceived, organized and managed the projects. The villagers were merely willing receivers. This does not just reflect the author's methods. "Development" is seen by Thai villagers as a form of largesse offered by the state (or a better educated/wealthier outsider) as part of the patron/client bargain. Simplistically, the state may be seen in the Thai context as the ultimate client. Villagers do not see much of a direct role for themselves in the formulation and implementation of the projects, and are largely passive in this respect. Village-level development activities which are claimed to be in the "popular participation" mold, are invariably better characterized as mere "mass mobilization" (Samudavanija, 1985, p. 7), while "self-reliance" has often tended to be seen as, and to become, a form of "forced labor" (Tapp, 1988, p. 9; see Hall, 1988, p. 94). The activity, be it the construction of a road or a village library, may involve large numbers of villagers but it rarely deviates from the model by which the state (or client) determines the policy, designs the project, allocates the funds and manages its implementation. In his village study conducted in the province of Uthaithani in the Lower North region, Hirsch talks of the "bureaucratizatiOn" of village procedure, and argues that institutions which are purportedly participatory are really merely a means by which the state has gained entry into the village, so that the village is "articulated" by the state: "Supposedly participatory institutions become channels of access from state into village, facilitating bureaucratic administration but also involving key villagers in that administration" (Hirsch, 1989, p. 47; see also Hall, 1988, pp. 91 and 94). This perspective is also supported by Goulet who characterizes state-promoted participation as a means by which the authorities can get "subordinates to help them achieve their own purposes" (1989, p. 186). All this is not to say that villagers in Thailand

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do not exhibit initiative and self-reliance. Groups of villagers will often decide to come together to dig a pond, build a road, or mend a dam. But the manner in which these community activities are decided upon and organized is wholly different from the demands of grass-roots development. Tongyou (1986) argues at length that selfreliance and self-help in the traditional village context are at variance with the same concepts as promoted by the government. However, even development ideologies designed with the express purpose of being "culturally sensitive" may end up divorced from the village roots upon which they claim to be based. In Thailand, just such an approach is the Wattanatham Chumchon 7 ideology (of which Tongyou was a major architect), which has been embraced by a number of NGOs. This ideology claims to be centered upon folk/peasant culture and to have developed from local conceptions of "development" (or antidevelopment/counterdevelopment - - see Nartsupha, 1988). However, it might be more accurately portrayed as an elitist reinterpretation of that (externally perceived) culture. Selective notions of village self-reliance, cooperation and participation have been coopted by academics (and then by the state) and placed within an entirely new, alien framework. The ideology masquerades as village based and oriented, yet it is little different in the manner in which it has been designed from the orthodox development strategies it aims to replace. The problem is that village life and the aspirations of villagers in Thailand, and in all developing countries, are fundamentally different from those that existed as recently as 20 years ago. The bases upon which traditional village life and livelihood were founded are arguably incompatible with the modern, commercial world. With this in mind, drawing upon populist conceptions of rural life (even faithfully), and incorporating them into rural development strategies, may well be a blind alley with little to offer rural people who rarely (rightly or wrongly) wish to return to the "good old days." Villagers' lack of enthusiasm for many of these grass-roots development strategies - - and the need to impose them on unwilling "participants" may be contrasted with the speed with which commercial farming has been embraced in Thailand and elsewhere (see Rigg, 1987). Just as with more orthodox approaches, it is important that "grass-roots" development be compatible with the aspirations, motivations and general outlook of those it is designed to benefit (see Cernea, 1987, p. 7). The dilemma for bottom-up, grassroots developmentalists is that they are placed in the position of either adapting their beliefs to the

needs and expectations of villagers or of assuming that their knowledge is somehow superior. The latter, of course, is not only highly condescending, but is totally at odds with the purpose of "going to the people" in the first place. The way out of this dilemma for some development workers is to educate villagers. Chatthip Nartsupha, another proponent of the Wattanatham Chumchon ideology, is quoted as calling this the "preparation of the people's idea" (Verhagen, 1987, p. 108), a process in which "village intellectuals" (or "organic intellectuals") encourage their fellow villagers "to reflect on their own history and on the way the challenges and temptations posed by modern society, have changed their lives . . ." (Verhagen, 1987, p. 126). Interestingly, development workers are envisaged playing a role in this process, presumably by selecting those village intellectuals who fit in with their motives, outlook and objectives. 8 This process of education has been more widely termed peasant "conscientization." Hall's comments are pertinent to the Thai case: It is an educational method which assumes, implicitly at least, that the poor have an imperfect knowledge of their own reality and that their social and political awareness must be heightened as a basis for group action in pursuit of development goals, . . Community "animators" or "facilitators" often adopt a manipulatory role, consciously or otherwise, and seek to impose their politicised view of the world on to the poor, taking for granted a higher degree of collective agreement over goals and ignoring internal conflicts (Hall, 1988, p. 106). For the sake of the general argument, the discussion so far has taken a rather simplistic, undifferentiated and essentialist view of Thai society. Patronage and patron-client ties are not peculiar to Thailand. They exist in every country of the world and have a bearing upon economic activity in every country. In China, guanxi (special relationships) ensure entry into certain occupations and access to luxury goods; in Britain, the "old boy network" serves to provide those in London with certain advantages; while in Papua New Guinea, the wantok ("one talk") system furnishes individuals from the same language group with improved access to employment opportunities (Fahey, 1987, p. 55). The question is one of degree - - and especially in the contrast between the Western developed nations (where most of the ideals of grass-roots development have their origin) and the rest of the world. In Thailand, patron-client links are more pervasive and have greater power in explaining why certain villages or individuals become involved (and succeed) in certain activities. A recent

GRASS-ROOTS DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND agroecosystem study conducted in the Northeastern region of Thailand illustrates the extent to which such links have an impact at the village level: Informants report, however, that employment at the [reforestation] project is not open but dependent on connections with the employees already in place (SUAN, 1987, p. 24). Sugar mills purchase on a quota basis and through a fairly closed network of suppliers. Farmers without proper contact are unable to sell directly to mills, particularly if the crop bulk is small (SUAN, 1987, p. 32). The second shortcoming of the foregoing discussion of village society and life is that it has painted a rather undifferentiated picture of rural Thailand. There are, of course, great variations among communities in the skills and commitment of the government officials with which the villagers have contact. There are also enormous differences in the degree to which tillage leaders are "in touch" with the wishes and aspirations of their fellows. However, this should not detract from the basic point that grass-roots development is hard to foster in the Thai context. As Pira Sudham says in his novel Monsoon Country: If our headman and his group took half or threefourths of the relief fund, the foreign aid, the budgets for road construction, for building dams, then very little could reach the people, very little could be done to improve the roads, to build the reservoirs, to fight disease and to lessen the hardship of the people as a whole . . . . What could the teacher achieve by telling us, dumb poor children of the poor, that our leaders were stealing, building their power bases, and using their positions for their own gain. After all, the men voted for those who paid them (Sudham, 1988, p. 86). 9 5. A G R A S S - R O O T S D E V E L O P M E N T PROJECT: C B I R D The Community Based Integrated Rural Development Project (CBIRD) was initiated in July 1981 in 60 villages covering two provinces in the Northeastern region of Thailand. ~0 The project was within the overall control of the Population and Community Development Association (PDA), a government department which has received a great deal of acclaim for its success in promoting family planning in Thailand. Indeed, its original director - - the charismatic Mechai Viravaidya - - has acquired virtual celebrity status. C B I R D ' s approach was firmly within the grass-roots mold, as is clear from the project summary: "Projects are likely to succeed when designed in partnership with villagers, focusing

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on community problems and desired practices. Villagers should be given an active role in implementation of activities in their own communities" (CBIRD, no date, p. 1). However, numerous aspects of the management of t h e project were at odds with a truly decentralized, grass-roots approach: (a) Project design: The project was preceded by a survey ("social preparation") to record villagers' views and thus to help design the project format. But this was not followed by any further survey and there was no formal system for recording the criticisms and suggestions of participants. The membership of the various groups were reacting to CBIRD's suggestions rather than vice versa. (b) Selection of participants: Participants in the project's various Mum or groups H were vetted by CBIRD and also by each village's headman, who was asked if they were "suitable." This was in order to conform to the system of village relations in Thailand and gave considerable veto power to the headman. (c) Villager participation~involvement: The project was designed to foster self-reliance. But management was clearly the preserve of the project officials and there was little room for initiative on the part of the participants. For example: members of the pig group received their piglets, protein supplement, "grower feed" and drugs from the project. Pens were largely built by CBIRD to its own specifications. Marketing of the pigs was performed by project officials at a time of their choice and the payments to farmers did not reflect the value of each pig. 12 After marketing, pens had to be disinfected and then checked by a CBIRD official before a further batch of piglets was delivered. Failure to do this would delay delively. In short, virtually every aspect of the rearing of the pigs was controlled by the project. (d) No-risk clause: Any losses incurred were not passed on to the participants but were borne by the project. This made the activities very attractive to the villagers but arguably removed them from the realities of the marketplace. Whether all the groups would continue to operate after CBIRD had withdrawn its support was doubtful. The CBIRD project also illustrates the tendency for Thai departments and ministries to duplicate functions and to operate independently of other sections of the bureaucracy. In order to overcome the conflicts that occur among departments, CBIRD attempted to meet all its requirements internally and rarely had to secure outside assistance. This meant that the project accentuated the tendency toward role duplication - -

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even at the local level. In the case of the village studied there were, for example, four government departments supplying chemical fertilizers to farmers. In addition, the lack of communication between CBIRD and other agencies resulted in some accidental duplication. For example, it was not until a year had elapsed that the CBIRD management realized that another government grass-roots development project ( k o r s o r c h o r - the Rm~_l Job Creation Programme, see Surarerks, 1986) had dug a fish pond in the village and that its aims, methods and objectives overlapped with CBIRD's fish-pond project. The CBIRD project, although it was partially successful in meeting some of its objectives was hardly a project "designed in partnership with villagers who were given an active role in implementation of activities in their own communities" (CBIRD, no date, p. 1). This failure truly to gauge villagers' opinions and to involve them in project design and implementation (in spite of what may be said in the various documents) is not peculiar to CBIRD but is a feature of the great majority of development projects in Thailand. As Nanthasuwan observed in a general discussion of village development: "Although the principle of some plans stresses villagers' participation, and outsiders have requested villagers' participation, they have never asked villagers to think and carry out their own plans or to decide for themselves" (Nanthasuwan, 1986, p. 24).

6. DISCUSSION (a) Critique This paper has been written in order to air some thoughts about the possible constraints to Western-style (for want of a better term) grassroots development in Thailand. The discussion has centered on two areas: first, on governmentdirected attempts to foster grass-roots development; and second, on the efforts of NGOs. The latter analysis has paid particular attention to the Wattanatham Chumchon ideology - an approach which is currently much in vogue. With regard to state-directed efforts, it is argued that throughout the entire planning structure from the NESDB to implementation at the local level, a truly decentralized, grass-roots development approach comes into conflict with bureaucratic methods and Thai society. Even when projects are ostensibly designed to promote village participation, closer examination reveals that it rarely occurs in a coherent fashion• The blame, if it is to be apportioned, lies with the

desire to implement policies which are arguably inappropriate to the planning context. Turton, in a study of participation in development, concluded that: Paradoxically, development plans are often said to fail precisely because of social and cultural factors • . . Yet these social and cultural factors a r e accorded an extremely restricted place in the devising, implementation or evaluation of development plans . . . [They] are integral, sometimes dominant, aspects of every stage of the development process (Turton, 1987, p. 120). Rubin, in his analysis of rural development and the Thai bureaucracy in Northern Thailand, went further to state that one of the two major lessons to be learned from his research was that: "Many of the practical and material problems of rural development are attributable to the Thai perspectives concerning proper superior-inferior relations" (Rubin, 1974, p. 92). There may also be a problem connected with the interpretation of some of the terms referred to in Thailand's development plans. Those examining the plans assume one thing in the light of their training; the Thai planners themselves, recognizing the nature of Thai society, assume something rather different. Terms such as "selfhelp" and "popular participation" have never been defined. It is as if those who have drawn up the plans have merely reached for their glossary of development terms and incorporated them into their documents. They have jumped upon the grass-roots bandwagon (possibly in part due to outside pressures) but realize that it travels a Thai road. This problem of interpretation and translation has been noted by Hirsch with respect to the word "participation." Officials use the expression k a a n k h a o m a a m i i s u a n r u a m - - to come in and take part - - and by this they mean a willingness on the part of villagers to become involved in projects initiated by government agencies. Hirsch states that the term "is devoid of the principles of initiative, variety or spontaneity that alternative interpretations of participation stress" (Hirsch, 1989, p. 51). That said, even academics are unsure what they mean by participation. Goulet writes that giving a precise operational definition is extremely difficult (Goulet, 1989, p. 165). Although this paper has looked specifically at grass-roots development in a single country, the experience of Thailand does have implications for development elsewhere. The unsuccessful decentralization of developmental activities to the local level and the failure of local-level participation in those development activities are common problems. These problems have usually been seen to reflect inadequacies in the bureau-

GRASS-ROOTS DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND cracy and the planning agencies. Many analysts seem to believe that a more efficient, less corrupt and, by implication, more "Western" system would overcome the constraints to effective implementation. Certainly, and this is no less true of Thailand, bureaucracies and planning and development agencies could be substantially improved. But, this may not be enough to foster decentra!ized, grass-roots development. In Thailand, grass-roots development confronts an array of impediments to implementation which extends beyond the inadequacies of government to the people themselves. The same is true of countries other than Thailand. Looking to the usual whipping-boy may help little in either understanding or rectifying the problem. Huntington's assessment of a participatory project among the Dinka of Sudan is a case in point (Huntington, 1988). He notes that the project failed in its objectives and was ultimately cancelled because of problems which are in many ways similar to those I have noted in the case of Thailand. He argues that the project and other participatory organizations came into conflict with existing power structures, were sometimes antithetical to the traditional cultural systems, and suffered from the factionalism endemic in the area. In addition, Huntington notes that the very term "participation" was interpreted differently by the donor agencies and the recipient governments (Huntington, 1988, p. 100). He writes: From afar one may see in rural Africa an equality and uniformity born of poverty. But such a view is misleading, for the uniformity is often riven with deep factions and is bitterly competitive. . . . Local participation is not easily organized in [such] resource-starved and factious areas of fragile nation-states (Huntington, 1988, p. 99). Implicit in many of the grass-roots development strategies promoted by NGOs, and crucial to their success, is the concept of empowerment (see Oakley, 1984, pp. 25-27; Hall, 1988, pp. 9596). If those at the local level are to determine their futures, they must have the m e a n s - the power. In a country such as Thailand, this would entail certain structural changes. However, to bring about such structural change itself requires that those taking the action have power in the first place. This is not to say that those without power cannot achieve power, but to illustrate the difficulties of promoting change and following ideals that run against the grain of the existing social, political and economic structure. It is surely true of most countries that those with power are unlikely readily to give it up. In view of this, it should scarcely be surprising when the participation and decentralization promised in

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government development plans turn out to be rather diluted and h o l l o w . . The second area of discussion was grass-roots development as promoted by NGOs, and particularly the Wattanatham Chumchon ideology. In this respect, it is questionable whether strategies which claim to be based on popular conceptions of peasant culture (often actually misconceptions) are an appropriate base for "development" in a rapidly changing rural world. Most ethnoscientific knowledge is based on precapitalist systems, while most farmers in Thailand are adapting to a situation in which the market has a significant and expanding role. With reference to populist methods of land management, Blaikie and Brookfield note: "Simply, the problems which small farmers and pastoralists face today are an overlapping but a different and shifting set from those which 'ethno-scientific' land management set out to solve" (1987, p. 244). Researchers and villagers sometimes appear to be traveling in opposite directions - - the researcher is going back in time to discover the past (although this is often vehemently denied), while the people themselves are looking forward to embrace the future. The only ones left in rural communities who might find such conceptions of rural life attractive may well be those who have failed to benefit from orthodox, capitalist development: in other words, the poor. But targeting only the poor with such policies and programs, rather than having the effect of narrowing differentials between income groups and regions, could further accentuate the "dualistic" nature of the village economy. Boeke's vision would exist in microcosm, with the majority of villagers becoming increasingly commercialized and consumer-oriented, while a minority would be cocooned in a low-input, low-output system of production based upon an archaic, romantic view of the past. (b) Proposals This summary discussion has stressed the shortcomings of grass-roots development, presenting the difficulties of implementing such an approach in Thailand. No suggestions have been made as to how the circle can be squared. Although I am not qualified to present anything but a very limited, inadequate consideration of possible answers to the problems I have set out, it is clearly necessary that some attempt be made, for there are those who doubt the utility of some of the critiques of grass-roots development. Cernea, for example, with reference to group action, states that due to wrong interpretation,

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"rash and unwarranted generalizations are made about the ineffectiveness of groups and the futility of organizing them" (Cernea, 1987, p. 14). As a result, he argues, fewer resources are directed at group formation, so more fail, so their reputation declines further - - and as a result the criticisms become self-fulfilling prophesies. Although this does sound ominously like a case of having your cake and eating it too, some constructive comments are required. The first point to reiterate is that rural Thailand has had successfully functioning local-level organizations for centuries. Perhaps the best researched are the village irrigation associations which maintain and administer the muang fai (traditional irrigation systems) of Northern Thailand, and which date back at least to the 13th century (lshii, 1978, pp. 19--23). All users of each irrigation system belong to an association, and they elect or appoint one of their number to become the pan meng or dike headman (sometimes called a hua naa muang fai) who is responsible for managing the upkeep of the dam (fai) and associated ditches and canals (Ishii, 1978, p. 20; Lando, no date, pp. 69-80). These associations have ensured that the village irrigation systems of Northern Thailand have operated efficiently and successfully over the long term. In contrast to these traditional organizations or groups, of which there are a number (e.g. community labor groups), those established by the state have usually functioned poorly. The Mum (groups) rarely have a community raison d'dtre. Farmers join not because they perceive community action as the most effective means to better their position, but because membership often brings certain advantages such as access to cheap credit or subsidized fertilizers. This was true of the klum associated with the CBIRD project and has also been noted elsewhere in Thailand. For example, Garforth, who has conducted research into such Mum in the Northern region, argues that traditional groups which have evolved spontaneously and in response to a real need offer the most scope for promoting participation and cooperation (Garforth, 1989). H e found that most of the state-sponsored organizations were performing poorly. The implication is that the Thai government and NGOs need to build on traditional village

structures - - not create new ones. Given the nature of Thai village society, it is very likely that these organizations will be hierarchical and will exhibit the sort of patron-client ties discussed earlier. They will also have changed somewhat as a result of the process of commercialization and monetization. However, such groups will have power, will have a basis on which cooperation and participation can be further developed, and will fit into the existing village structure(s). The view that development efforts should pay heed to traditional organizations has been developed by Cernea (1986). He does not ask that such organizations be idealized, which has been the case with the Wattanatham Chumchon ideology, but that they be utilized (Cernea, 1986, p. 250). The second point I would like to develop concerns the distinction that is made between "top-down" and "bottom-up" development. The former is bad, and to be avoided; the latter, good, and to be promoted. This rather polarized, and absolutist view of the two approaches commonly leads to the perception that they are mutually exclusive. Most aspects of development, by their very nature, must be disseminated from the top. New technology, education, modern health facilities, credit organizations and marketing structures rarely develop at the grassroots. The point, surely, is that policies and programs implemented from above must be balanced by a flow of information (and participation) from below. The "expert knows best" view has been widely rejected; the "'locals know best" view still has some supporters. A balance of local and expert, supported by exchange of information between the top and bottom, is required (Fujisaka and Garrity, 1988, p. 191; Paul, 1989). A similar, rather polarized perspective on participation has also developed: either you have it, or you don't. But again, there are degrees of participation, and different projects require different levels of local involvement (see Cohen and Uphoff, 1980). If people were less concerned with ideology, consciousness raising and empowerment, and more concerned with the achievement of development, then the practicalities and purpose of promoting grass-roots development would become clearer and its achievement easier.

NOTES 1. In the context of this paper, "grass-roots" development refers to a group of linked concepts and policies (local participation, self-reliance, self-help, decentralization) and is used in an inexact manner. See Chambers (1983) for an analysis of many of the issues

and problems which have led to the growth of grassroots perspectives, and Cernea (1985) for a wide selection of articles on grass-roots development. Also s e e Cohen and Uphoff (1980).

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2. Although possibly "new" in the Thai context, the ideas and methods are hardly new when viewed internationally.

7. Wattanatham Chumchon may be translated roughly as "People's Culture" or "Community Culture."

3. See also Noranitipadungkarn (1970) for an analysis of power relations in two urban tambons (communes), and Rabibhadana (1978) on patron-client ties in a Bangkok slum community.

8. Verhagen writes: "The term 'organic intellectuals' as used by Chattip refers to a type of village inhabitant who possesses an analytical mind, combined with a sense of history. It has no connection with the level of school education" (Verhagen, 1987, p. 127).

4. Of course, these two groups of patrons - - the "traditional" and the "modern" - - are not mutually exclusive and in many cases the men and women who hold the offices of phuuyaybaan and kamnan are also rich. It has often been observed that no longer are the best individuals elected to these positions, but those who are able to buy the largest number of votes. 5. This view of Thai society as being based upon patron-client relationships, and above them the entourage and circle, has been exhaustively discussed by scholars of Thailand. Although there remains considerable disagreement over many of the aspects of this formulation, the essential premise - - that Thai society is highly hierarchical and is based upon what might be broadly termed patron-client relationships - - has been widely accepted. 6. In India, numerous studies of village irrigation have noted that when pump sets are introduced into a village they are invariably located - - following village meetings - - closest to the land of the wealthier and more powerful households.

9. During the lead-up to the Thai general election in July 1988, there were numerous reports in the newspapers that some headmen were instructing their villagers to vote for particular candidates. There were also reports that candidates were giving "gifts" of food and cash to encourage villagers to support them. Admittedly, some voters said that they took everything they were offered, promising to vote for the candidate who was providing the gifts, and then made their own choice on the day of the election itself. 10. The information contained in this section is derived from a study conducted in one of the target villages during 1981-82 (Rigg, 1985). 11. For example: Pig Group, Commercial Chicken Group, Village Chicken Group, Duck Group, Rabbit Group, Silk Weaving Group, Economic Stoves Group, etc, 12. The project subsidized some farmers and penalized others in order to narrow the range of returns received by each participant.

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