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Has strategy reached a dead-end?
122
Has Strategy Reached a Dead-end?
HAS STRATEGY
REACHED
A
DEAD-END? Lawrence
Freedman
For the moment strategy has effectively come to a dead-end. In future any radical departures in strategic thought will be prompted more by political change than innovation in weapons systems. Thus the tasks of strategic studies will lie more in the realm of political science than in traditional military science.
IN 1955 Bernard Brodie wrote an influential article, entitled “Strategy hits a dead-end”. l He raised this issue because of the leap in destructive power resulting from the development of thermonuclear weapons, the apparent impossibility of defence, and the large numbers of such weapons being stockpiled. The USA and the Soviet Union would soon have the power to destroy each other, and the incentives to use nuclear weapons as an instrument of national policy would decline dramatically. Two decades later a US Secretary of Defense, in a statement to Congress, once again asked “Has nuclear strategy not reached a dead-end ?” His answer was qualified: “As fu as the massive attacks that preoccupied LIS in the 1960s are concerned, that may well be the case”. However, he believed that a number of more limited contingencies could arise, which we should be prepared to deter. % He attempted to rescue strategy by proposing a capacity for smallscale selective strikes. This capacity is now well on the way to being available; yet a new Secretary of Defense does not seem to set great store by the options thus created. In this article I wish to raise this question once more, and to suggest a more definite answer. Strategy has been defined as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the end of policy”.3 This definition stresses the role of the political sphere as the source of strategic objectives while being noncommital about how the military means are to be employed. Strategy does not focus solely on battles, for the threat of military force can be as important as the use of military force in achieving objectives : even within war, objectives can often be achieved as much by avoiding battles as by engaging in them. Lawrence Chatham
Freedman is Hesd of the Policy Studies Unit at the Royal House, 10 St ~Jarnes’s Square, London SWlY 4LE, UK.
0016-3287/79/020122-10$02.00
$2 1979 IPC
Business
Press
Institute
of International
Affairs,
FUTURES
April 1979
Has Strategy Reached a Dead-end?
The scale of possible
123
destruction
The range of military means is vast and has been extended steadily, at each end of the spectrum of violence, over the 20th century. It is becoming more possible to destroy the smallest targets, often from a considerable distance. Systems are being developed to pick out targets at long distance, despite camouflage, 24 hours of the day and in any weather. At the other end of the spectrum, a single weapon can already destroy a city. The largest weapons actually deployed at the moment are carried by the Soviet SS-9 and SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and have explosive yields equivalent to 25 million tons of TNT (25 megatons). In the early 196Os, the Russians tested weapons of yields approaching 60 megatons, though a weapon of this size has never been made operational. Nor would it be at all cost-effective to do so; greater impact is gained by dividing up the yield and distributing it in a number of separate packages. Though no weapon has yet been devised that could, with one shot, destroy whole nations or continents (there was talk of such weapons in the 1950s and 196Os), the cumulative effects of the release of current arsenals would have virtually the same results. Weapons able to destroy large political and economic targets behind enemy lines have come to be described as ‘strategic’ arms. To demonstrate the full potential of their fledgling air forces and long-range aircraft, proponents spoke of strategic bombardment. The idea was that aircraft could attack the major cities of the enemy without having to defeat his military forces. Such attacks would panic the enemy into submission or, in an age when front-line combat depended on the industrial machine back home, impair the effective working of war industries. For either of these reasons, a mission could be decisive by itself and thus justified the adjective ‘strategic’. It was to be distinguished from mere ‘tactical’ bombardment in support of surface forces in combat. Having appropriated the adjective for a mission, the airmen used it to describe themselves (Strategic Air Command) and their weapons (strategic bombers). The balance
of terror is born
When nuclear weapons came along, they were understood in similar terms, as weapons that would be directed at the heartland of the enemy where they would have immediate and decisive effect. They too were ‘strategic’. With the growth of nuclear arsenals, the ‘strategic’ mission began to change. First the vulnerability of all facilities, no matter where placed, to nuclear attack meant that there was little possibility of continuing war production after the start of hostilities. This encouraged a higher level of war preparedness so as to be able to fight any war with forces in being. The purely terrorist aspect of strategic bombing therefore became strengthened and accentuated. It also became easier to implement, attempts at defence being futile. Yet this ease of terror made counterterror more possible. The growth of parallel nuclear forces in East and West created the probability of any war becoming mutual devastation; Robert Oppenheimer used the analogy, for the superpowers in the early 195Os, of two scorpions in a bottle. Eventually, a war in which nuclear weapons were to be used in this manner became known as a ‘strategic war’. Attempts were made to find alternative
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Has Strategy Reached a Dead-end?
ways of using nuclear weapons, without these devastating consequences. In particular there was interest in employing nuclear weapons solely to influence the course of a land battle, with a minimum of collateral damage. Such nuclear weapons, designed for battlefield use, came to be known as ‘tactical nuclear weapons’. It was soon found that the use of these weapons might be as horrific, at least for the region in which the battle was fought, and so would in no way be permitted purely for tactical reasons. Nevertheless, the name stuck. The use of ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical’ in this way is a corruption of their original meanings. There cannot be either a nontactical weapon or a nonstrategic war, for the use of every weapon involves tactics and the lighting of every war involves strategy. The power
of conventional
weapons
Unfortunately, the misuse of these terms is now well-established, eg in strategic arms limitation talks. Apart from creating the erroneous impression that wars being fought solely with conventional weapons somehow do not involve strategy, there is also the suggestion that strategic arms should be the sole focus of strategic thought. In terms of the experience of the past three decades, the emphasis ought to be exactly the reverse. Actual military activity in the modern world has been with conventional weapons, often of the lowest individual destructive capabilities. Most people who have died in warfare over the past three decades have been killed with old-fashioned rifles and machine-guns; and many with even cruder implements. In the guerilla struggles of the Third world and the secessionist wars in Africa, the most sophisticated modern weapons appear but rarely. The more set-piece wars, particularly in the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, have demonstrated the powers of conventional weaponry. The effectiveness of antitank and antiaircraft weapons in the Yom Kipur war had a considerable impact on the development of ideas on conventional war. Nuclear
fascination
Nevertheless, apart from occasional moments, such as when liberation struggles were fashionable or when the war in Vietnam demanded overriding attention, nonnuclear strategic problems have never stimulated the massive literature and persistent fascination devoted to those in the nuclear realm. Though this has resulted in a remarkably incomplete understanding of many vital aspects of contemporary international conflict, the reasons for the nuclear bias in strategic thought are understandable and, in many ways, legitimate. First, the stakes involved in nuclear war for our societies are of an order of magnitude that demands attention. The salience of the issues involved has encouraged the growth of a large community of politicians, officials, academics, military men, and journalists who keep the debate going. Second, the problems posed by nuclear strategy are particularly intriguing and challenging. The thankful lack of experience of nuclear warfare, since 1945, has rendered highly speculative all thoughts on the likely causes of nuclear war, its course, and its finale. On the other hand, the weapons involved and the physical consequences of their detonation are well known. Indeed, technical details on warheads, delivery systems, and basing modes, often of the sort that
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would once have deserved the highest classification, are widely distributed. The pace of technological change ensures that there is always something new questions of how, of interest for discussion, even though th,p fundamental when, and why to use these weapons remain matters for inference and conjecture. Third, though the awfulness of the weapons and the inescapable vulnerability of all to nuclear attack suggests the degradation of their use as instruments of policy, for reasons to be partly explained below there remains a desire to exploit them to the full in the construction of security policies. The problem of gaining military advantage or effective deterrence from a nuclear arsenal in conditions of apparent stalemate has preoccupied some of the best minds of our age. The nuclear stalemate supports the current international order and this is why it is impossible to discuss contemporary military affairs without paying regard to the state of the balance of terror. The initial character of the Yom Kipur war was to a large extent determined by the nature of the new conventional weapons and the effective tactics of the Arabs; and the conclusion was shaped by the desire of the superpowers to avoid direct confrontation with each other, while ensuring that their clients did not suffer total defeat. The major consequence of the nuclear stalemate appears to be the imposition of major constraints on the extent of any military struggle in which the interests of both superpowers are in some way directly engaged, though of course fighting within these constraints can be extremely violent. This results in something of a freezing of existing political relationships. Once any conflict takes on an East-West character, it is harder to resolve it by military means. This is by no means an unfortunate state of affairs. It put a premium on diplomatic rather than military skills, and spares us many of the horrors of total war. When the incentives for the two superpowers, who still represent antagonistic and irreconcilable ideologies, all point in the direction of avoiding a military clash, a certain stability is introduced into world affairs. If in some way the stalemate could be broken, and one power could threaten the other with impunity, knowing that a nuclear attack by him would not be followed by a comparable attack on him, then the whole international order could be transformed dramatically. If the existence of a balance of terror underpins the status quo, and this status quo is by no means unacceptable, why worry about searching for some new strategy? European peace and doubtful
deterrents
The main stimulus for the persistent search is that the countries of the Atlantic Alliance have set themselves an insoluble problem, related to the objective of deterrence. Deterrence is about securing a negative-enemy inactivity. For this reason, we are not sure, for example in Europe, whether the Soviet Union is actually being deterred from aggression, and if so, what particular capabilities do the deterring and how fragile this relationship is to changes in capabilities or intentions. The uncertainty as to what secures deterrence compounds the manifold uncertainties already surroundin g nuclear strategy. There is a consensus amongst strategists that nuclear weapons effectively deter an adversary
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Has Strategy Reached a Dead-end?
from launching a nuclear attack against one’s own country. What is in doubt is how far this deterrent effect can be extended to cover nonnuclear attacks on third parties. To be more specific, is it realistic to expect a US President to risk the viability of his own country by launching a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union in the event of a Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe? It is difficult to answer positively and be convincing, yet this is precisely what NATO expects of a US President. NATO doctrine relies on the fear of nuclear exchanges to dissuade the Kremlin from risking any major military attack on Western Europe. It is felt that nothing can be done to match the conventional capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, so NATO must rely on a nuclear deterrent. This defeatism is not simply a question of the expense of building up NATO’s forces to match those of the Warsaw Pact, though that is a factor. It is also because Western Europeans fear conventional war almost as much as nuclear war. There is concern that if the risks of nuclear attack were reduced, by indicating a readiness to fight a conventional war, then the temptation to test Western wills and capabilities would grow. Conventional war would be devastating to Europe though the USA might be left intact. Thus Europeans suspect that the occasional US suggestions for major improvements in conventional defences are designed more to spare the United States any sacrifice than to bolster the deterrent. Finally, the absence of a clear link between the US nuclear arsenal and the defence of Europe would leave the Europeans vulnerable to intimidation by the Soviet nuclear arsenal. To counter this, either the British and French nuclear arsenals would have to be pooled in some new European defence community, or else individual powers would feel obliged to make their own arrangements. These could involve either some sort of accommodation with the Soviet Union or the possession of individual nuclear arsenals. If the power in question were West Germany, either of these moves would have far-reaching consequences. This jumble of concerns relates more to the cohesion of the alliance and the fears of major political realignments (such as renewed isolationism in the USA, or a Germany that had become unified, nuclear, Eastern orientated, or even all three), than to a credible nuclear strategy. Any pressure to resolve the resultant tension between the ends and means of NATO strategy has been dampened by the fact that, since the acquisition of East European satellites in the 194Os, there has been no Soviet attack on Western Europe. This is despite the fact that many have convinced themselves that the Soviet Union is impelled by some deep historical forces to attempt to gain control of the whole world. Of course, it may well be that Soviet ambitions are more modest than NATO theology would have us suppose and that deterrence has succeeded because there has been nothing to deter. Nevertheless, the peace and stability of Europe during the last 30 years, in contrast to many other regions of the world, indicates that the current strategy may be viable even if, when put to the strict logical tests, it lacks credibility. Evaluating
the arsenals
A further dampening factor results from the desire, than the desire to find a credible strategy for NATO,
as strong if not stronger to reduce to a minimum
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the risks of nuclear war. For example during the recent debate over enhanced radiation weapons (the neutron bomb) the proponents argued that the lack of associated collateral damage would make these weapons easier to use and so would strengthen nuclear deterrence. For the same reason, the opponents criticised it; the ease of use could result in a faster slide into a nuclear conflict in the event of a European war. What is virtue for one is vice for the other. In general, it has been felt that if both sides are likely to be in a position to assure destruction of the other, then stability can be enhanced by both sides making clear that they are not pursuing a decisive military advantage. Though such a pursuit may be futile, the other side could well feel obliged to take steps to preserve his position, so stimulating an arms race and the accentuation of mutual threat perceptions. This is, in essence, the basis for arms control efforts, in particular the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The aim is managerial rather than radical, to stabilise the balance of terror at the existing level, rather than to move to a qualitatively new type of military relationship through the elimination of nuclear weapons. Without going into the detail of the negotiations, one can note that while they have succeeded in emphasising the hopelessness of a drive for a ‘victory’ in nuclear war, they have also focused attention onto the political effects of visible asymmetries in nuclear force levels. Perhaps because long negotiations on sensitive matters encourage a microscopic analysis of comparative advantage in every component of the force structure and because negotiators always have to explain why this matters, during the decade of SALT, increasing concern has been expressed over the political value of superiority in indicators of strategic strength. This is despite the fact that such superiority cannot be turned into military advantage. The argument is that this is realised only by strategic sophisticates, and that most politicians, be they allies, adversaries, or neutrals, can be overimpressed by observing that the USA has only 75”/, of the number of missiles possessed by the USSR. This is a perilous line of argument to follow, for there are many ways of measuring strategic strength. The most realistic in military terms can be extremely arcane and complicated. If these indicators are virtually unintelligible to the layman they are unlikely to influence his political attitudes and behaviour. Meanwhile the more blatant indicators are many and various, and often contradictory in the impressions they give. The USA has more warheads but less delivery vehicles than the USSR, greater missile accuracy but less megatonnage, less ICBMs but more bombers, and so on. Depending on the preferred measure, the military ‘balance’ can shift from side to side, alternatively looking perilous or comfortable. The most difficult question, however, is not what the best measure is, but whether or not there is a general relationship between these measures, official and public opinion, and international behaviour. The human element Political factors would be paramount even if there were a total breakdown in East-West relations, and the Soviet Union decided that there was a need or an opportunity to launch an attack on NATO. The major theorists of the nuclear age, and in particular Thomas Schelling, the most imaginative and influential
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f&s Strategy Reached a Dead-end.3
of them all, have assumed that a nuclear war would be more a contest of resolve than a struggle for military advantage. Neither side can eliminate the risk of virtually total destruction : as they both begin to move, however gingerly, along the road of nuclear exchanges, the comparative toleration of this risk will prove decisive. One can search for determinants of resolve in national character (backbone) and the strength of the social and political order; or in clever tactics designed to make moves up the escalatory ladder easier for your side, presenting the adversary with a starker choice at each stage between ‘humiliation and holocaust’ ; or, more probably, in the relative interests at stake in the conflict. Finally, in a situation when neither can ‘win’ the war, therefore ruling out unconditional surrender by either side, the settlement of the conflict would have to be negotiated, even to the overbearing roar of nuclear explosions. So politics would have to be in command. The main thrust of my argument thus far is that the relationship of mutual assured destruction, in which each superpower has confidence in his ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other even after absorbing a surprise first strike, has encouraged the tendency to Iook at individual weapons systems, and indeed whole force structures, more in terms of their political functions than in terms of likely performance in battle. These political functions relate to the preservation of the existing international order, particularly at the point where the First and Second worlds meet, because there is a fear of change, Change can undermine alliances or create new conflicts of interests. Within NATO, nuclear-weapons policies are related to fears of Western Europe being abandoned to its fate by the USA or a frustrated Germany cutting itself loose from its ties to allies and partners and reasserting itself as a force in international relations. Meanwhile, the nuclear arsenals of each superpower condition all contact between the powers, encouraging the search for some ~~~~s ~~~~n~~rn. Increases in these arsenals, or extra-tough bargaining in arms-control negotiations can be used to symbolise a commitment to prevent the other power from unduly extending his sphere of influence, or to register disapproval of some departure from international norms. If we can imagine actual nuclear exchanges, then there seem to be grounds for presuming that each volley will be motivated as much by a desire to make some painful political point or to improve a bargaining position, as by a desire to gain some meaningiess advantage or to accept fatalistically the descent into Armageddon. If this argument is accepted, then the tasks for strategic studies in the future are to be more in the realm of political science than traditional military science. Yet the most cursory glance at the contemporary literature reveals a succession of crude political assumptions and assertions, and a preoccupation with the properties of new weapons systems at various stages in their life cycles. In terms of the quality of strategic thought, this concentration on technicalities can only be justified by evidence of new systems transforming, in some way, military or political relations.
Effective nuclear defence remains impossible The most significant development would be one which permitted contemplate a recognisable military victory in a nuclear war.
one side to
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It has always been understood that such a victory would require the ability to disarm the adversary by a surprise first strike, block any forces that survive and are launched in retaliation, and absorb the damage imposed by those that penetrate defences. Though progress is conceivable in each of these three tasks, the difficulties are formidable. Land-based ICBMs and slow-reacting bombers may become vulnerable, but large numbers of submarines will be difficult to find for some time to come. Even if individual systems could be targeted with some confidence, the boldest military planner would balk at the problem of an all-encompassing simultaneous attack. Unlike the USA, the USSR has an extensive air defence system, but both sides agreed at SALT to restrict to minimal levels their antiballisticmissile systems, which they had anyway found to be technically difficult and extremely expensive. There has been talk of future ‘exotic’ systems based on particle-beam and laser technologies, and there are unsubstantiated rumours that the USSR has been making progress in this area. Despite the rumours, there seems little reason to believe that an effective ballistic missile defence will be operational this century or well into the next. Nor have ways been found to protect civilians against nuclear attack: the USSR has put some effort into protecting key industries and providing for the evacuation of cities but this can make a difference only at the margins. Thus there are strong grounds for asserting that the essence of the balance of terror will be impervious to technological advances. Developments in conventional weapons might have more promise. Inspired by the impressive performance of ‘smart’ bombs in Vietnam and antitank and antiaircraft weapons in the Middle East, some have hoped to construct a new defence posture out of large numbers of cheap but highly effective weapons that could individually threaten the expensive components of a conventional offensive force, tanks and aircraft. Such a posture could release NATO from dependence on nuclear threats and thus make deterrence a less fraught business. This notion is attractive and not wholly implausible. However, for the moment it exaggerates the quality of the new technologies and the many tactical problems in their use. Furthermore there are grave uncertainties concerning the capacity of soldiers to cope with the likely battlefield environment of the future, with no place to hide, no time to rest, and no fixed lines, even without the intervention of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless there is reason to expect greater exploration of new conventional military options for NATO in the future. A third possibility is the design of some ‘technical fix’ to the problem of resolve. This would be a development that created the possibility of an intermediate military advantage, thereby putting the onus on the other side to escalate the violence; but this still could not preclude the danger of nuclear devastation. One much discussed possibility is the capacity to ‘take out’ the other side’s fixed land-based ICBMs. Deprived of ICBMs the victim would be unable to mount a comparable ‘counterforce’ response: the only option would be to attack cities, which would involve signing the death warrant for his own cities. The main problem with this scenario is that an attack on ICBM sites would not be experienced as a ‘surgical’ strike, directed solely against military targets,
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Has Strategy Reached a Dead-end?
but would cause such associated death and destruction that it might as well be a countercity attack. In recent years, much US effort has been put into the development of a wide range of nuclear options, from the most precise to the most indiscriminate, to make them available to some future President for use in moments of crisis. Whether or not a wide choice of options will inject extra credibility into a US deterrent posture is hard to say. It might be expected that the political circumstances that have engendered the crisis would be the main determinants of its outcome. One area where we can note the impact of new technologies with greater confidence is that of arms control. Arms control negotiations (mainly SALT) have become the major means by which the superpower strategic relationship is arranged and adjusted. Successful arms control measures rely on readily accountable systems; ie each system falls into a distinct category, the numbers of which can be verified by reconnaissance satellites. The more systems become versatile, with a variety of warheads at a variety of ranges for a variety of missions, and the more systems become mobile and so harder to count, the more difficult arms control will be. The new long-range cruise missile exemplifies these problems. For this reason we may expect only modest achievements from future negotiations, and arms control may decline in importance. On the other hand, as the arms control habit is now wellestablished, the current pattern of prolonged negotiations on intractable issues may persist. If SALT succeeds in creating a symmetry between the USA and the USSR, albeit somewhat artificial in intercontinental systems, then there is reason to expect that attention will shift to those systems of shorter range based in the European theatre. This process is already underway with a growing sensitivity to the preponderance in Europe of Soviet missiles and bombers of medium and intermediate range. As the force structures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are so completely different in this area, any attempt to create or demonstrate the appearance of symmetry will be extraordinarily difficult. The
shifting
sands
of politics
From the above comments it can be seen that there will be plenty to keep strategic theorists and pundits in business for some time to come. Yet there is little on the horizon that would indicate a dramatic transformation of the East-West strategic balance. The changes will be in details and the shifts in doctrine will, essentially, be marginal. The difficult questions will remain in the speculative area of higher political psychology, the capacity of statesmen to cope with an extreme form of stress, or in the everyday management of relations within and between blocs. Given this, there is no doubt that a healthy development in strategic studies would be a more searching inquiry into the political assumptions upon which so much of strategy rests. This becomes particularly important when one recognises that the balance of terror, upon which so much in the current international order depends, is based on a particular arrangement of political relations, as much as on the quality and quantity of the respective nuclear arsenals. Movements in these
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political relations, such as a growing indifference in southern Europe to NATO, or a break up of the Soviet empire in eastern Europe, or the development of new regional power centres with their own nuclear weapons (of which China is the most obvious), or simply the development of a whole set of international problems and disputes which are beyond the control of either superpower and to which East-West relations are irrelevant, could well undermine the basis of current strategy. If real innovation in strategic thought is to rely on technological change then it could well have reached a dead-end; if it starts to address the problems of nuclear arsenals in a world of political change then there remains much more work to be done. References
1. Bernard Brodie, “Strategy hits a dead-end”, Hargers, October 1955. 3. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department FYl970, 5 February 1975, pages ii-4 3. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London, Faber page 334.
FUTURES
April IS78
Report, and
FYl976
Faber,
and 1968),
Has Strategy Reached a Dead-end?
HAS STRATEGY
REACHED
A
DEAD-END? Lawrence
Freedman
For the moment strategy has effectively come to a dead-end. In future any radical departures in strategic thought will be prompted more by political change than innovation in weapons systems. Thus the tasks of strategic studies will lie more in the realm of political science than in traditional military science.
IN 1955 Bernard Brodie wrote an influential article, entitled “Strategy hits a dead-end”. l He raised this issue because of the leap in destructive power resulting from the development of thermonuclear weapons, the apparent impossibility of defence, and the large numbers of such weapons being stockpiled. The USA and the Soviet Union would soon have the power to destroy each other, and the incentives to use nuclear weapons as an instrument of national policy would decline dramatically. Two decades later a US Secretary of Defense, in a statement to Congress, once again asked “Has nuclear strategy not reached a dead-end ?” His answer was qualified: “As fu as the massive attacks that preoccupied LIS in the 1960s are concerned, that may well be the case”. However, he believed that a number of more limited contingencies could arise, which we should be prepared to deter. % He attempted to rescue strategy by proposing a capacity for smallscale selective strikes. This capacity is now well on the way to being available; yet a new Secretary of Defense does not seem to set great store by the options thus created. In this article I wish to raise this question once more, and to suggest a more definite answer. Strategy has been defined as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the end of policy”.3 This definition stresses the role of the political sphere as the source of strategic objectives while being noncommital about how the military means are to be employed. Strategy does not focus solely on battles, for the threat of military force can be as important as the use of military force in achieving objectives : even within war, objectives can often be achieved as much by avoiding battles as by engaging in them. Lawrence Chatham
Freedman is Hesd of the Policy Studies Unit at the Royal House, 10 St ~Jarnes’s Square, London SWlY 4LE, UK.
0016-3287/79/020122-10$02.00
$2 1979 IPC
Business
Press
Institute
of International
Affairs,
FUTURES
April 1979
Has Strategy Reached a Dead-end?
The scale of possible
123
destruction
The range of military means is vast and has been extended steadily, at each end of the spectrum of violence, over the 20th century. It is becoming more possible to destroy the smallest targets, often from a considerable distance. Systems are being developed to pick out targets at long distance, despite camouflage, 24 hours of the day and in any weather. At the other end of the spectrum, a single weapon can already destroy a city. The largest weapons actually deployed at the moment are carried by the Soviet SS-9 and SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and have explosive yields equivalent to 25 million tons of TNT (25 megatons). In the early 196Os, the Russians tested weapons of yields approaching 60 megatons, though a weapon of this size has never been made operational. Nor would it be at all cost-effective to do so; greater impact is gained by dividing up the yield and distributing it in a number of separate packages. Though no weapon has yet been devised that could, with one shot, destroy whole nations or continents (there was talk of such weapons in the 1950s and 196Os), the cumulative effects of the release of current arsenals would have virtually the same results. Weapons able to destroy large political and economic targets behind enemy lines have come to be described as ‘strategic’ arms. To demonstrate the full potential of their fledgling air forces and long-range aircraft, proponents spoke of strategic bombardment. The idea was that aircraft could attack the major cities of the enemy without having to defeat his military forces. Such attacks would panic the enemy into submission or, in an age when front-line combat depended on the industrial machine back home, impair the effective working of war industries. For either of these reasons, a mission could be decisive by itself and thus justified the adjective ‘strategic’. It was to be distinguished from mere ‘tactical’ bombardment in support of surface forces in combat. Having appropriated the adjective for a mission, the airmen used it to describe themselves (Strategic Air Command) and their weapons (strategic bombers). The balance
of terror is born
When nuclear weapons came along, they were understood in similar terms, as weapons that would be directed at the heartland of the enemy where they would have immediate and decisive effect. They too were ‘strategic’. With the growth of nuclear arsenals, the ‘strategic’ mission began to change. First the vulnerability of all facilities, no matter where placed, to nuclear attack meant that there was little possibility of continuing war production after the start of hostilities. This encouraged a higher level of war preparedness so as to be able to fight any war with forces in being. The purely terrorist aspect of strategic bombing therefore became strengthened and accentuated. It also became easier to implement, attempts at defence being futile. Yet this ease of terror made counterterror more possible. The growth of parallel nuclear forces in East and West created the probability of any war becoming mutual devastation; Robert Oppenheimer used the analogy, for the superpowers in the early 195Os, of two scorpions in a bottle. Eventually, a war in which nuclear weapons were to be used in this manner became known as a ‘strategic war’. Attempts were made to find alternative
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Has Strategy Reached a Dead-end?
ways of using nuclear weapons, without these devastating consequences. In particular there was interest in employing nuclear weapons solely to influence the course of a land battle, with a minimum of collateral damage. Such nuclear weapons, designed for battlefield use, came to be known as ‘tactical nuclear weapons’. It was soon found that the use of these weapons might be as horrific, at least for the region in which the battle was fought, and so would in no way be permitted purely for tactical reasons. Nevertheless, the name stuck. The use of ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical’ in this way is a corruption of their original meanings. There cannot be either a nontactical weapon or a nonstrategic war, for the use of every weapon involves tactics and the lighting of every war involves strategy. The power
of conventional
weapons
Unfortunately, the misuse of these terms is now well-established, eg in strategic arms limitation talks. Apart from creating the erroneous impression that wars being fought solely with conventional weapons somehow do not involve strategy, there is also the suggestion that strategic arms should be the sole focus of strategic thought. In terms of the experience of the past three decades, the emphasis ought to be exactly the reverse. Actual military activity in the modern world has been with conventional weapons, often of the lowest individual destructive capabilities. Most people who have died in warfare over the past three decades have been killed with old-fashioned rifles and machine-guns; and many with even cruder implements. In the guerilla struggles of the Third world and the secessionist wars in Africa, the most sophisticated modern weapons appear but rarely. The more set-piece wars, particularly in the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, have demonstrated the powers of conventional weaponry. The effectiveness of antitank and antiaircraft weapons in the Yom Kipur war had a considerable impact on the development of ideas on conventional war. Nuclear
fascination
Nevertheless, apart from occasional moments, such as when liberation struggles were fashionable or when the war in Vietnam demanded overriding attention, nonnuclear strategic problems have never stimulated the massive literature and persistent fascination devoted to those in the nuclear realm. Though this has resulted in a remarkably incomplete understanding of many vital aspects of contemporary international conflict, the reasons for the nuclear bias in strategic thought are understandable and, in many ways, legitimate. First, the stakes involved in nuclear war for our societies are of an order of magnitude that demands attention. The salience of the issues involved has encouraged the growth of a large community of politicians, officials, academics, military men, and journalists who keep the debate going. Second, the problems posed by nuclear strategy are particularly intriguing and challenging. The thankful lack of experience of nuclear warfare, since 1945, has rendered highly speculative all thoughts on the likely causes of nuclear war, its course, and its finale. On the other hand, the weapons involved and the physical consequences of their detonation are well known. Indeed, technical details on warheads, delivery systems, and basing modes, often of the sort that
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would once have deserved the highest classification, are widely distributed. The pace of technological change ensures that there is always something new questions of how, of interest for discussion, even though th,p fundamental when, and why to use these weapons remain matters for inference and conjecture. Third, though the awfulness of the weapons and the inescapable vulnerability of all to nuclear attack suggests the degradation of their use as instruments of policy, for reasons to be partly explained below there remains a desire to exploit them to the full in the construction of security policies. The problem of gaining military advantage or effective deterrence from a nuclear arsenal in conditions of apparent stalemate has preoccupied some of the best minds of our age. The nuclear stalemate supports the current international order and this is why it is impossible to discuss contemporary military affairs without paying regard to the state of the balance of terror. The initial character of the Yom Kipur war was to a large extent determined by the nature of the new conventional weapons and the effective tactics of the Arabs; and the conclusion was shaped by the desire of the superpowers to avoid direct confrontation with each other, while ensuring that their clients did not suffer total defeat. The major consequence of the nuclear stalemate appears to be the imposition of major constraints on the extent of any military struggle in which the interests of both superpowers are in some way directly engaged, though of course fighting within these constraints can be extremely violent. This results in something of a freezing of existing political relationships. Once any conflict takes on an East-West character, it is harder to resolve it by military means. This is by no means an unfortunate state of affairs. It put a premium on diplomatic rather than military skills, and spares us many of the horrors of total war. When the incentives for the two superpowers, who still represent antagonistic and irreconcilable ideologies, all point in the direction of avoiding a military clash, a certain stability is introduced into world affairs. If in some way the stalemate could be broken, and one power could threaten the other with impunity, knowing that a nuclear attack by him would not be followed by a comparable attack on him, then the whole international order could be transformed dramatically. If the existence of a balance of terror underpins the status quo, and this status quo is by no means unacceptable, why worry about searching for some new strategy? European peace and doubtful
deterrents
The main stimulus for the persistent search is that the countries of the Atlantic Alliance have set themselves an insoluble problem, related to the objective of deterrence. Deterrence is about securing a negative-enemy inactivity. For this reason, we are not sure, for example in Europe, whether the Soviet Union is actually being deterred from aggression, and if so, what particular capabilities do the deterring and how fragile this relationship is to changes in capabilities or intentions. The uncertainty as to what secures deterrence compounds the manifold uncertainties already surroundin g nuclear strategy. There is a consensus amongst strategists that nuclear weapons effectively deter an adversary
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from launching a nuclear attack against one’s own country. What is in doubt is how far this deterrent effect can be extended to cover nonnuclear attacks on third parties. To be more specific, is it realistic to expect a US President to risk the viability of his own country by launching a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union in the event of a Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe? It is difficult to answer positively and be convincing, yet this is precisely what NATO expects of a US President. NATO doctrine relies on the fear of nuclear exchanges to dissuade the Kremlin from risking any major military attack on Western Europe. It is felt that nothing can be done to match the conventional capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, so NATO must rely on a nuclear deterrent. This defeatism is not simply a question of the expense of building up NATO’s forces to match those of the Warsaw Pact, though that is a factor. It is also because Western Europeans fear conventional war almost as much as nuclear war. There is concern that if the risks of nuclear attack were reduced, by indicating a readiness to fight a conventional war, then the temptation to test Western wills and capabilities would grow. Conventional war would be devastating to Europe though the USA might be left intact. Thus Europeans suspect that the occasional US suggestions for major improvements in conventional defences are designed more to spare the United States any sacrifice than to bolster the deterrent. Finally, the absence of a clear link between the US nuclear arsenal and the defence of Europe would leave the Europeans vulnerable to intimidation by the Soviet nuclear arsenal. To counter this, either the British and French nuclear arsenals would have to be pooled in some new European defence community, or else individual powers would feel obliged to make their own arrangements. These could involve either some sort of accommodation with the Soviet Union or the possession of individual nuclear arsenals. If the power in question were West Germany, either of these moves would have far-reaching consequences. This jumble of concerns relates more to the cohesion of the alliance and the fears of major political realignments (such as renewed isolationism in the USA, or a Germany that had become unified, nuclear, Eastern orientated, or even all three), than to a credible nuclear strategy. Any pressure to resolve the resultant tension between the ends and means of NATO strategy has been dampened by the fact that, since the acquisition of East European satellites in the 194Os, there has been no Soviet attack on Western Europe. This is despite the fact that many have convinced themselves that the Soviet Union is impelled by some deep historical forces to attempt to gain control of the whole world. Of course, it may well be that Soviet ambitions are more modest than NATO theology would have us suppose and that deterrence has succeeded because there has been nothing to deter. Nevertheless, the peace and stability of Europe during the last 30 years, in contrast to many other regions of the world, indicates that the current strategy may be viable even if, when put to the strict logical tests, it lacks credibility. Evaluating
the arsenals
A further dampening factor results from the desire, than the desire to find a credible strategy for NATO,
as strong if not stronger to reduce to a minimum
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the risks of nuclear war. For example during the recent debate over enhanced radiation weapons (the neutron bomb) the proponents argued that the lack of associated collateral damage would make these weapons easier to use and so would strengthen nuclear deterrence. For the same reason, the opponents criticised it; the ease of use could result in a faster slide into a nuclear conflict in the event of a European war. What is virtue for one is vice for the other. In general, it has been felt that if both sides are likely to be in a position to assure destruction of the other, then stability can be enhanced by both sides making clear that they are not pursuing a decisive military advantage. Though such a pursuit may be futile, the other side could well feel obliged to take steps to preserve his position, so stimulating an arms race and the accentuation of mutual threat perceptions. This is, in essence, the basis for arms control efforts, in particular the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The aim is managerial rather than radical, to stabilise the balance of terror at the existing level, rather than to move to a qualitatively new type of military relationship through the elimination of nuclear weapons. Without going into the detail of the negotiations, one can note that while they have succeeded in emphasising the hopelessness of a drive for a ‘victory’ in nuclear war, they have also focused attention onto the political effects of visible asymmetries in nuclear force levels. Perhaps because long negotiations on sensitive matters encourage a microscopic analysis of comparative advantage in every component of the force structure and because negotiators always have to explain why this matters, during the decade of SALT, increasing concern has been expressed over the political value of superiority in indicators of strategic strength. This is despite the fact that such superiority cannot be turned into military advantage. The argument is that this is realised only by strategic sophisticates, and that most politicians, be they allies, adversaries, or neutrals, can be overimpressed by observing that the USA has only 75”/, of the number of missiles possessed by the USSR. This is a perilous line of argument to follow, for there are many ways of measuring strategic strength. The most realistic in military terms can be extremely arcane and complicated. If these indicators are virtually unintelligible to the layman they are unlikely to influence his political attitudes and behaviour. Meanwhile the more blatant indicators are many and various, and often contradictory in the impressions they give. The USA has more warheads but less delivery vehicles than the USSR, greater missile accuracy but less megatonnage, less ICBMs but more bombers, and so on. Depending on the preferred measure, the military ‘balance’ can shift from side to side, alternatively looking perilous or comfortable. The most difficult question, however, is not what the best measure is, but whether or not there is a general relationship between these measures, official and public opinion, and international behaviour. The human element Political factors would be paramount even if there were a total breakdown in East-West relations, and the Soviet Union decided that there was a need or an opportunity to launch an attack on NATO. The major theorists of the nuclear age, and in particular Thomas Schelling, the most imaginative and influential
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of them all, have assumed that a nuclear war would be more a contest of resolve than a struggle for military advantage. Neither side can eliminate the risk of virtually total destruction : as they both begin to move, however gingerly, along the road of nuclear exchanges, the comparative toleration of this risk will prove decisive. One can search for determinants of resolve in national character (backbone) and the strength of the social and political order; or in clever tactics designed to make moves up the escalatory ladder easier for your side, presenting the adversary with a starker choice at each stage between ‘humiliation and holocaust’ ; or, more probably, in the relative interests at stake in the conflict. Finally, in a situation when neither can ‘win’ the war, therefore ruling out unconditional surrender by either side, the settlement of the conflict would have to be negotiated, even to the overbearing roar of nuclear explosions. So politics would have to be in command. The main thrust of my argument thus far is that the relationship of mutual assured destruction, in which each superpower has confidence in his ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other even after absorbing a surprise first strike, has encouraged the tendency to Iook at individual weapons systems, and indeed whole force structures, more in terms of their political functions than in terms of likely performance in battle. These political functions relate to the preservation of the existing international order, particularly at the point where the First and Second worlds meet, because there is a fear of change, Change can undermine alliances or create new conflicts of interests. Within NATO, nuclear-weapons policies are related to fears of Western Europe being abandoned to its fate by the USA or a frustrated Germany cutting itself loose from its ties to allies and partners and reasserting itself as a force in international relations. Meanwhile, the nuclear arsenals of each superpower condition all contact between the powers, encouraging the search for some ~~~~s ~~~~n~~rn. Increases in these arsenals, or extra-tough bargaining in arms-control negotiations can be used to symbolise a commitment to prevent the other power from unduly extending his sphere of influence, or to register disapproval of some departure from international norms. If we can imagine actual nuclear exchanges, then there seem to be grounds for presuming that each volley will be motivated as much by a desire to make some painful political point or to improve a bargaining position, as by a desire to gain some meaningiess advantage or to accept fatalistically the descent into Armageddon. If this argument is accepted, then the tasks for strategic studies in the future are to be more in the realm of political science than traditional military science. Yet the most cursory glance at the contemporary literature reveals a succession of crude political assumptions and assertions, and a preoccupation with the properties of new weapons systems at various stages in their life cycles. In terms of the quality of strategic thought, this concentration on technicalities can only be justified by evidence of new systems transforming, in some way, military or political relations.
Effective nuclear defence remains impossible The most significant development would be one which permitted contemplate a recognisable military victory in a nuclear war.
one side to
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It has always been understood that such a victory would require the ability to disarm the adversary by a surprise first strike, block any forces that survive and are launched in retaliation, and absorb the damage imposed by those that penetrate defences. Though progress is conceivable in each of these three tasks, the difficulties are formidable. Land-based ICBMs and slow-reacting bombers may become vulnerable, but large numbers of submarines will be difficult to find for some time to come. Even if individual systems could be targeted with some confidence, the boldest military planner would balk at the problem of an all-encompassing simultaneous attack. Unlike the USA, the USSR has an extensive air defence system, but both sides agreed at SALT to restrict to minimal levels their antiballisticmissile systems, which they had anyway found to be technically difficult and extremely expensive. There has been talk of future ‘exotic’ systems based on particle-beam and laser technologies, and there are unsubstantiated rumours that the USSR has been making progress in this area. Despite the rumours, there seems little reason to believe that an effective ballistic missile defence will be operational this century or well into the next. Nor have ways been found to protect civilians against nuclear attack: the USSR has put some effort into protecting key industries and providing for the evacuation of cities but this can make a difference only at the margins. Thus there are strong grounds for asserting that the essence of the balance of terror will be impervious to technological advances. Developments in conventional weapons might have more promise. Inspired by the impressive performance of ‘smart’ bombs in Vietnam and antitank and antiaircraft weapons in the Middle East, some have hoped to construct a new defence posture out of large numbers of cheap but highly effective weapons that could individually threaten the expensive components of a conventional offensive force, tanks and aircraft. Such a posture could release NATO from dependence on nuclear threats and thus make deterrence a less fraught business. This notion is attractive and not wholly implausible. However, for the moment it exaggerates the quality of the new technologies and the many tactical problems in their use. Furthermore there are grave uncertainties concerning the capacity of soldiers to cope with the likely battlefield environment of the future, with no place to hide, no time to rest, and no fixed lines, even without the intervention of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless there is reason to expect greater exploration of new conventional military options for NATO in the future. A third possibility is the design of some ‘technical fix’ to the problem of resolve. This would be a development that created the possibility of an intermediate military advantage, thereby putting the onus on the other side to escalate the violence; but this still could not preclude the danger of nuclear devastation. One much discussed possibility is the capacity to ‘take out’ the other side’s fixed land-based ICBMs. Deprived of ICBMs the victim would be unable to mount a comparable ‘counterforce’ response: the only option would be to attack cities, which would involve signing the death warrant for his own cities. The main problem with this scenario is that an attack on ICBM sites would not be experienced as a ‘surgical’ strike, directed solely against military targets,
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but would cause such associated death and destruction that it might as well be a countercity attack. In recent years, much US effort has been put into the development of a wide range of nuclear options, from the most precise to the most indiscriminate, to make them available to some future President for use in moments of crisis. Whether or not a wide choice of options will inject extra credibility into a US deterrent posture is hard to say. It might be expected that the political circumstances that have engendered the crisis would be the main determinants of its outcome. One area where we can note the impact of new technologies with greater confidence is that of arms control. Arms control negotiations (mainly SALT) have become the major means by which the superpower strategic relationship is arranged and adjusted. Successful arms control measures rely on readily accountable systems; ie each system falls into a distinct category, the numbers of which can be verified by reconnaissance satellites. The more systems become versatile, with a variety of warheads at a variety of ranges for a variety of missions, and the more systems become mobile and so harder to count, the more difficult arms control will be. The new long-range cruise missile exemplifies these problems. For this reason we may expect only modest achievements from future negotiations, and arms control may decline in importance. On the other hand, as the arms control habit is now wellestablished, the current pattern of prolonged negotiations on intractable issues may persist. If SALT succeeds in creating a symmetry between the USA and the USSR, albeit somewhat artificial in intercontinental systems, then there is reason to expect that attention will shift to those systems of shorter range based in the European theatre. This process is already underway with a growing sensitivity to the preponderance in Europe of Soviet missiles and bombers of medium and intermediate range. As the force structures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are so completely different in this area, any attempt to create or demonstrate the appearance of symmetry will be extraordinarily difficult. The
shifting
sands
of politics
From the above comments it can be seen that there will be plenty to keep strategic theorists and pundits in business for some time to come. Yet there is little on the horizon that would indicate a dramatic transformation of the East-West strategic balance. The changes will be in details and the shifts in doctrine will, essentially, be marginal. The difficult questions will remain in the speculative area of higher political psychology, the capacity of statesmen to cope with an extreme form of stress, or in the everyday management of relations within and between blocs. Given this, there is no doubt that a healthy development in strategic studies would be a more searching inquiry into the political assumptions upon which so much of strategy rests. This becomes particularly important when one recognises that the balance of terror, upon which so much in the current international order depends, is based on a particular arrangement of political relations, as much as on the quality and quantity of the respective nuclear arsenals. Movements in these
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political relations, such as a growing indifference in southern Europe to NATO, or a break up of the Soviet empire in eastern Europe, or the development of new regional power centres with their own nuclear weapons (of which China is the most obvious), or simply the development of a whole set of international problems and disputes which are beyond the control of either superpower and to which East-West relations are irrelevant, could well undermine the basis of current strategy. If real innovation in strategic thought is to rely on technological change then it could well have reached a dead-end; if it starts to address the problems of nuclear arsenals in a world of political change then there remains much more work to be done. References
1. Bernard Brodie, “Strategy hits a dead-end”, Hargers, October 1955. 3. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department FYl970, 5 February 1975, pages ii-4 3. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London, Faber page 334.
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Report, and
FYl976
Faber,
and 1968),