Hazardscapes in reunified Germany

Environmental Hazards 1 (1999) 57}68

Hazardscapes in reuni"ed Germany Mark W. Corson* Department of Geology/Geography, Northwest Missouri State University, 800 University Drive, Maryville, MO 64468, USA

Abstract German reuni"cation had signi"cant political, economic, social, and environmental impacts. A major environmental impact involved changes to the German technological hazardscape (especially in the East). Hazardscapes are de"ned here as the spatial distribution and attributes of human engineered facilities such as industrial plants, military bases and power stations that contain or emit substances harmful to humans and the environment. The purpose of this paper is to explain how and why the German technological hazardscape changed after reuni"cation. A cursory analysis might ascribe hazardscape change to the application of strict West German environmental laws and sophisticated environmental protection technologies to the East. This paper contends, however, that it was a political economy rather than an environmental imperative that drove the changes to the hazardscape, and that this continuing con#ict may have serious repercussions on the future environmental health of eastern Germany.  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Germany; Reuni"cation; Hazards

1. Introduction Long-time residents of the city of Halle in eastern Germany tell stories about the terrible air pollution that plagued their city during the communist era. When cold winter air held the pollution from the nearby Leuna chemical works close to the ground, the haze was so thick that policemen put blinking lights on street corners so citizens could "nd their way around town. One hundred kilometers to the northwest of Halle lay the Colbitz}Letzlinger Heide * the largest military training area in Europe. For decades Soviet and Warsaw pact armies practiced live "re maneuvers with hundreds of tanks and artillery pieces. Warsaw Pact tank crews changed their oil by draining the contaminated waste oil directly into the ground. The Colbitz}Letzlinger Heide su!ered severe contamination from military activities and today remains littered with unexploded ordnance. Traveling south to the vicinity of the Czech border, one "nds mounds of contaminated mine tailings from the joint Soviet } East German uranium mining operations that fueled the Soviet nuclear arsenal. A generation of

* Tel.: #660-562-1672; fax: 660-562-1188. E-mail address: [email protected] (M.W. Corson).

East German uranium miners sacri"ced their health there and their legacy is an environmental catastrophe that will take years to cleanup. Reuni"cation had many signi"cant impacts on the political, social, economic, and environmental geography of Germany. A major environmental impact has been the changes evident in the German technological `hazardscapea (especially in the East) (Cutter, 1993). Hazardscapes in this context are de"ned as the spatial distribution and attributes of human engineered facilities such as industrial plants, military bases, and power stations that contain or emit substances harmful to humans and the environment. This paper explains how and why the technological hazardscape changed as a result of German reuni"cation in 1990. At "rst glance it seems evident that the application of tough West German environmental laws and the provision of sophisticated environmental protection technology forced the cleanup of antiquated East German industries. I will make the case, however, that it was a political economy rather than an environmental imperative that explains the change. After some brief background on how the hazardscape changed, I will use Renn's Social Arena Metaphor as a conceptual framework to explain the political and economic contexts of German hazardscape change. I will then address the issue of environmental remediation of remaining GDR

1464-2867/00/$ - see front matter  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 1 4 6 4 - 2 8 6 7 ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 0 9 - 1

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M.W. Corson / Environmental Hazards 1 (1999) 57}68

industrial sites. This second issue is the story of a continuing battle between a political}economic agenda and an environmental agenda that will have signi"cant consequences for the future environmental health of much of eastern Germany.

2. How the hazardscape changed Previous research (Corson, 1997) provides an empirical foundation for this study by addressing the question of whether or not the hazardscapes were di!erent in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and German Democratic Republic (GDR) (Fig. 1) prior to reuni"cation, and if so, what changes occurred after reuni"cation. Facility level toxic emission or content data is not available in Germany, so the aforementioned study used several indirect indicators of environmental health including four ambient atmospheric indicators, forest health, and biological river health. 2.1. Environmental conditions before reunixcation A geographic information system was used to compare FRG and GDR 1985 and 1988 atmospheric data provided by the German Federal Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt, 1994) to determine if the hazardscapes of the FRG and GDR were di!erent. All four atmospheric pollutant indicators showed statistically signi"cant di!erences at the 0.05 con"dence level between the FRG and GDR as shown in Table 1. These results are supported by 1988}1989 data published by the DDR Roundtable (Petschow, 1990) that show various atmospheric pollutants for the FRG and

Fig. 1. Germany today with its Lander subdivisions.

Table 1 Ambient atmospheric pollutant comparison FRG and GDR in micrograms per cubic meter

Dust Sulfur dioxide Ozone Nitrous oxides

Federal Republic of Germany (l/m)

German Democratic Republic (l/m)

42.8 37.9 44.8 31.4

70.7 83.5 40.1 21.1

GDR in both millions of tons and in kilograms per person (Table 2). This analysis supports the conclusion that the hazardscapes of the FRG and GDR were signi"cantly di!erent. The fact that the GDR had far higher dust and SO  concentrations is attributable to the use of brown coal as a primary energy source, while the FRG's higher ozone and NO concentrations are due to the larger number of  motor vehicles in use. Given the limitations of the four atmospheric pollution indicators both in terms of data quality and as being representative of the hazardscape, an analysis of other indicators of environmental health was necessary. These other indicators included forest damage, biological health of rivers, and the existence and extent of uranium and brown coal mining. Information provided by both the Federal Environmental Agency and the GDR Environmental Agency (Table 3) indicated that the GDR su!ered substantially greater forest damage than the FRG (Umweltbundesamt, 1994, Umweltbericht der DDR, 1990). A qualitative analysis of the map of Biological River Water Quality in 1990 showed the extent of pollution in East German rivers. The Elbe river running through the heart of eastern Germany was strongly fouled along most of its length. The Mulde and Saale rivers running through the East German chemical complexes were biologically dead due to the un"ltered dumping of toxic waste products (Umweltbundesamt, 1994). Other problems contributing to East Germany's poor water quality included inadequate treatment of industrial and domestic wastewater, and the uncontrolled discharge of organic waste products from farming. As a result of this pollution, almost one half of East German water was un"t for drinking and only partially useful for industrial purposes. Of the remaining water, fully 38% of it was only suitable for drinking after extensive treatment. While West Germany has enjoyed better water quality, there were areas such as the Ruhr and lower Main that were extremely fouled as late as 1975. In West Germany, however, a concerted cleanup e!ort over the last 25 years has made the Ruhr the cleanest `industriala river in Germany (Jones, 1994).

M.W. Corson / Environmental Hazards 1 (1999) 57}68

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Table 2 Atmospheric pollutant comparison FRG and GDR 1988}1989 FRG

Carbon monoxide Nitrous oxides Sulfur dioxide Dust

GDR

In millions of tons

In kilograms per person

In millions of tons

In kilograms per person

8.45 2.7 1.05 0.53

136 44 17 9

2.85 0.4 5.21 2.2

171 24 312 132

Table 3 Forest damage in the FRG and GDR

FRG 1989 GDR 1990

No damage (%)

Moderate damage (%)

Moderate to heavy damage (%)

47 34

37 30

16 36

Other di!erences between the FRG and GDR hazardscapes included the Wismut uranium mining operations and the extensive opencast brown coal mining operations of the GDR. The Wismut uranium mining operation was a joint Soviet}GDR venture that operated 28 facilities in southern Thuringia and Saxony (Umweltbundesamt, 1994). Wismut uranium supplied the fuel for the Soviet nuclear arsenal which to Soviet and East German minds justi"ed the toll exacted upon the environment and the mining populations. Additionally, the East German energy and industrial sectors were heavily reliant upon brown coal resulting in over 100 large opencast mines dotting the landscape of southeastern Germany. This coal was consumed un"ltered for residential heating and industrial energy production resulting in the high sulfur dioxide levels that plagued the GDR (interview with Ms. Bendig, 1996, Rothkirch and Hildebrand, 1994). While the FRG did have opencast brown coal mining in the Rhine Brown Coal Region, this coal was not used in households as in the GDR but rather in electric power stations equipped with e$cient "ltration systems. The existence and environmental impact of the brown coal and uranium mines in East Germany without counterpart in West Germany are also indicative of how the hazardscapes were di!erent. 2.2. Post reunixcation environmental health The second question was whether or not the hazardscape changed after reuni"cation. Two of the four atmospheric pollutant indicators showed major di!erences between the partition and reuni"cation eras. Sulfur dioxide showed a large decrease of 56.02% while ozone

showed an increase of 16.25%. Both sulfur dioxide and ozone were statistically signi"cant at the 0.05 con"dence level. Dust showed a decrease of 19.05% while NO  showed an increase of 2.24%. Dust and NO were not  statistically signi"cant at the 0.05 con"dence level. Forest health in West Germany is not uniform. The northwestern states of Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, North Rhein Westphalia, Hamburg, and Bremen have su!ered less forest damage than the remaining states in the south (Baden-WuK erttemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Saarland, Rheinland-Pfalz). The unfortunate trend, however, is that all West German forests are sustaining more damage rather than less. In eastern Germany, however, the trend is reversed with forest health improving (Baufeld and Krug, 1993, Umweltbundesamt, 1994). The biological health of all the major rivers in Germany has improved between the partition and reuni"cation eras. In the west this has been a continuing trend and e!orts to clean up the remaining `industriala rivers continue. In the East, however, there has been a signi"cant improvement in water quality due to several factors. In the agricultural areas such as the northeastern state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania water quality has improved due to a reduction in runo! and dumping of fertilizers, pesticides, and organic animal wastes. These reductions are due in large part to a reduction in agricultural activity due to the privatization of collective agriculture and improved environmental technologies and regulations. River water quality has improved in eastern industrial areas due to reduced industrial output and the installation of environmental protection technologies and regulations. Finally, the federal and state governments are making a signi"cant e!ort to improve water and wastewater treatment in the new federal states through the construction of many new state of the art treatment plants (Umweltbundesamt, 1994; Jones, 1994). The nuclear hazardscape in eastern Germany has undergone signi"cant change since reuni"cation as well. The GDR possessed six Soviet designed heavy water}light water nuclear power plants of the same design as that of the Chernobyl station. Federal authorities ordered these shut-down permanently shortly after

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reuni"cation. Additionally, the 28 sites associated with the joint Soviet}GDR Wismut uranium mining operation have ceased operation. The Wismut sites contain heaps of low level radioactive mine tailings that have had a detrimental a!ect on the health of residents in the surrounding communities and especially on the miners themselves. These facilities are now undergoing a very expensive remediation program that will take years to complete (Albrecht and Kiedrowski, 1991: Umweltbundesamt, 1994). The conventional energy sector in the East also saw signi"cant changes with reduced reliance on brown coal and increased use of oil, hard coal, and natural gas. Given these factors, this analysis led to the conclusion that the hazardscape has changed signi"cantly since reuni"cation. It was also evident that the majority of change both positive and negative took place in the area of the former GDR. The large decreases in pollutants were due to the closing of many of the worst polluters especially in the Leipzig}Halle}Bitterfeld Chemical Triangle (Fig. 2). These factories were closed primarily because they were not competitive in the new market economy. Other facilities that did remain in operation became subject to the

new environmental laws and were equipped with scrubbers and "lters to bring their emission levels within the legal limits. The Federal Ministry of the Environment estimated that 43% of the decrease in environmental pollutants was attributable to plant closures, 55% by reductions in industrial output, and only 2% to the installation of modern environmental technology (Raumordnungsbericht, 1991).

3. Social arena metaphor The how and why of hazardscape change in reuni"ed Germany is multifaceted. Using Renn's Social Arena Metaphor as a conceptual framework, I acquired the data for this study through interviews with German federal, state, and local government o$cials, academics, industry representatives, and citizens. These interviews were supplemented with library research and site visits. This section will brie#y set out Renn's Social Arena Metaphor and describe the German social arena in which this story unfolds. Renn's (1992) social arena metaphor describes the symbolic location where political action in#uences society's collective decision or policy-making process, i.e. it describes the political actions of social actors trying to in#uence speci"c issues. The Social Arena Metaphor is based on the political concept of arena policies and the theory of resource mobilization. Its strength is its focus on political debates and the behavior of each actor in those debates. The success or failure of each group can be measured by the amount of in#uence it has exerted on the "nal decision or policy. 3.1. Initial conceptualization

Fig. 2. Major GDR industrial areas circa 1970. Current state boundaries are shown for clarity. Note the Halle}Leipzig}Bitterfeld &Chemical Triangle' with its concentration of opencast brown coal mines and chemical plants.

Holding center stage (Fig. 3) in the social arena are the principal actors consisting of those groups in society that seek to in#uence policy. Some groups are focused on multiple issues and are thus involved in several di!erent arenas, while others are focused on only a single issue in one arena. In order for actors to operate within the arena they must mobilize various combinations of the "ve social resources of money, power, social in#uence, value commitment, and evidence. These social resources are used to gain attention and public support, to in#uence the arena rules, and to score in competition with other actors. These social resources help the actors to be more in#uential, and while their accumulation may be the "nal goal of an actor, they are usually used by actors as the means to accomplish speci"c objectives. The Social Arena Metaphor is based on the assumption that organizations and individuals can in#uence the policy process only if they have su$cient resources. In modern democratic and pluralistic societies, principal actors need a combination of resources to be successful in an arena.

M.W. Corson / Environmental Hazards 1 (1999) 57}68

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show their support of or displeasure with various actors. A key part of the political process is to mobilize social support from other actors and to in#uence public opinion. Social arenas contain structural constraints that result from the political interplay of the various actors. These structural constraints often make the "nal decision or policy incompatible with the values of the participating groups such that the compromise outcome is equally distasteful if grudgingly acceptable to all. Arenas, therefore, are often non-linear or indeterminate systems and as such arena theory is normally not a sound basis for prediction. It is, however, very useful for explanation and policy analysis as will be demonstrated in the following analysis. 3.2. The German case Fig. 3. Renn's Social Arena Metaphor (After Renn, 1992, p. 183). Social ¹heories of Risk, Orwin Renn/Editors Sheldon Krimsky and Dominic Golding. Copyright  1992 by Sheldon Krimsky and Dominic Golding. Reproduced with permission of Greenwood Publishing Group. inc., Westport, CT.

Neither money nor power alone is su$cient to shape policy. Each arena is characterized by a set of formal and informal rules. Formal rules are determined and monitored by an enforcement agency and consist of laws, acts, and mandated procedures. Informal rules are developed and learned by the actors through the process of their interaction and includes regulatory styles, the political climate of group interaction, and role expectations. The rule enforcement agency ensures that all actors in the arena follow the formal rules and it often coordinates and facilitates interaction and negotiation. In many cases the rule enforcement agency is also the ultimate decision-making authority. In the United States, with its adversarial policy style, the rule enforcers often regard themselves primarily as brokers or mediators. In the European Policy Model the rule enforcers are often regarded as sovereign administrators who are consulted and advised by the various social actors. While the arenas are regulated by norms and rules that limit the range of options, some actors may decide to ignore some of the rules if they feel their public support will not diminish and if the rule enforcer is perceived as being too weak to impose e!ective sanctions. Issue ampli"ers are the `professional theater criticsa who observe the actions on stage, talk to the principal actors, interpret their "ndings, and report to the audience. Through this communications process they in#uence the resource allocation process and the ability of each actor to mobilize public support within the arena. The audience consists of individuals and other social groups who might be in#uenced to enter the arena and to

The German social arena changed signi"cantly after reuni"cation with the addition of six new La( nder and 17 million new citizens few of which had any signi"cant experience with the now dominant western political culture. In many cases less experienced westerners found expanded career opportunities in the new La( nder governments while some easterners who had been politically marginalized by the previous regime found themselves elevated to positions of power. The result was a decidedly uneven contest within the social arena. Additionally, the subsequent dramas in the social arena were acted out before the backdrop of the environmental legacy of the GDR's industrial policy, and the move to privatize former state industries with the attendant economic and social dislocations. The German social arena can be conceptualized as indicated in Fig. 4. The rule enforcers, i.e. the agencies with "nal decision-making or con#ict resolution power, are the Federal Chancellor and the court system. The Federal Chancellor's decision-making power is circumscribed by the input of the political institutions of the upper (Bundesrat) and lower (Bundestag) houses of the federal legislature. The primary issue ampli"er is the press. The slant of the German press is normally determined by their particular ideological orientation (i.e. conservative, liberal, socialist, etc.) and by their spatial focus whether that be regional or national. Potential stakeholders are those social groups representing the concerns of the general public. These groups include the very powerful labor unions, citizens groups, non-governmental organizations, state and local governments and other interested groups that intently watch the drama unfold amongst the actors within the social arena. Orbiting around the rule enforcers are the principal actors of the Trusteeship Authority (Treuhand Anstalt or THA), the Federal Ministry of Finance, the governments of the new federal states, the investors, and the Federal

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M.W. Corson / Environmental Hazards 1 (1999) 57}68

Fig. 4. The German social arena.

Ministry of the Environment. While the various players had their own agendas, all agreed that the former GDR industrial base had to be privatized as a major step in integrating the new federal states into the western market economy. The issue was how this would be done and who would bene"t and who would su!er. The THA as the agency responsible for this privatization would prove to be the key actor in this social drama.

4. The underlying causes of hazardscape change There are two processes that have had or will have the most signi"cant impacts on the development of reuni"ed Germany's hazardscape. The "rst is the battle over privatizing the GDR's industrial base. The outcome of this issue explains much of the hazardscape change since reuni"cation. The second involves the environmental cleanup and privatization of the remaining GDR properties. This is a current issue that has not yet been resolved, yet has signi"cant implications for eastern Germany's future environmental health. 4.1. Privatizing the eastern industrial base After reuni"cation, it was evident that the relic socialist economy of the new La( nder would require massive restructuring through privatization. In March of 1990, the last communist government of the GDR established the Treuhand Anstalt (THA) or Trustee Authority just days before the "rst free election. The agency sta! consisted largely of communist holdovers and it did little more than o!er minority shares in East German state enterprises to foreign investors.

In June of 1990 the THA came under West German control with the installation of Detlev-Karsten Rohwedder as its director. Rohwedder had been the head of a major chemical company and had a reputation for salvaging troubled companies (Conradt, 1993). Article 25 of the Einigungsvertrag (Uni"cation Treaty) said, `the THA shall be charged with restructuring and privatizing the former publicly owned enterprises to bring them into line with the requirements of a competitive economya. The THA's new task was to liquidate the GDR's 9000 state enterprises by turning them into private enterprises able to compete in the world market place, closing them down, or, in some cases, modernizing a "rm and selling it to a private, usually foreign, owner. The THA was a largely independent public corporation under the general supervision of the Federal Ministry of Finance in Bonn. Originally, the THA was intended to be self"nancing through its sale of state owned properties, but it was soon evident that the THA faced an almost insurmountable task that would require massive funding from the Federal Government. The THA found that the 126 Kombinate and other state enterprises that had constituted 90% of the GDR economy were over-specialized in industrial production, technologically outdated, ine$cient, and poorly managed. Finding buyers for many "rms proved to be impossible and these "rms were closed. The THA eventually found itself with the con#icting economic priority of minimizing its expenditures and the political priority of protecting jobs and preventing social unrest. The two actors creating the THA's dilemma were the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF in German) and the new state governments. The ministry was nominally responsible for the THA and was shocked to discover that the supposedly revenue generating THA was in fact going to be a major liability. As the cost of reuni"cation became evident, the BMF pressured the THA to control the costs of privatizing the former GDR industrial base. The result was numerous plant closures and work force reductions that signi"cantly contributed to the high unemployment rate and economic dis-location su!ered by eastern Germans. The new state governments were very concerned with the e!ects of this massive unemployment and the associated potential for social unrest and a political shift away from the Christian Democrats. Young people and those nearing retirement were particularly ill-a!ected by the employment situation. By 1991, the state governments were dealing with a resurgence of right-wing extremism including many high pro"le cases of violence against foreigners. The new state governments feared either a breakdown in the social order or at least an electoral backlash if this economic situation persisted. Thus, they pressured the federal government and the THA to slow the plant closings and prop up critical eastern industrial sectors.

M.W. Corson / Environmental Hazards 1 (1999) 57}68

By 1991 the THA was being heavily criticized by the eastern public and press as a job killer, and in the west as a very expensive social cushion. While plant closings were painful enough, sales of "rms to foreign investors often resulted in job losses of 80}90% in the bloated work forces. The breakup and sale of the Leunawerk chemical complex near Halle resulted in a reduction in the workforce from 30,000 workers to 3000 workers. The THA's e!orts to prevent plant closings by subsidizing eastern industries were widely criticized in the west (where the people were footing the bill for the subsidies). In 1990, the THA was DM 4 billion in debt for subsidies. By 1992, this "gure had risen to DM 20 billion and by 1994, the debt was DM 60 billion. This debt was in addition to the debt load inherited from the Kombinats such that the THA's total debt was DM 250 billion. Dissatisfaction with the THA culminated in tragedy in April 1992 when the director, Detlev Rohwedder, a Social Democrat, was assassinated by Red Army Faction terrorist at his home in western Germany (Jones, 1994). Presuming a buyer could be found for a THA property, there were two other obstacles to completing the sale. First, there was the issue of claims on property that had been seized by either the Nazi or Communist regimes. This issue was resolved to a large extent when the federal government passed a law giving priority of ownership to investors. Successful claimants were later compensated by the federal government. The second issue was that of environmental liability. Many of the eastern industrial sites had pollution legacies dating back for 150 years or more. West German environmental law held that the polluter should pay for the cleanup, but the polluter was the now defunct state of the GDR. The THA found that it could not sell the properties unless the government was willing to exempt the purchasers from liability for environmental cleanup, yet the properties still required remediation. According to the `exemption clausea of the Uni"cation Treaty, investors in the new states who purchase facilities for economic redevelopment purposes are not liable for damages caused prior to 1 July 1990. The purpose of the exemption clause is to prevent the problem of contaminated sites from turning away potential investors in the new federal states. In 1992, the federal government and the new La( nder agreed on a new "nancing formula for environmental cleanup. The agreement required that for small projects of less than DM 100 million the purchasers would pay 10% while the THA and state governments would split the remaining cost 60/40. Some 23 large projects were to cost in excess of DM 100 million for remediation and the cost for these was split 75/25 between the THA and state governments (interviews with Mr. Von der Decken and Mr. Stietzel, 1996). Thus, the THA responsibility for "nancing environmental cleanup costs involved even greater expenditures in addition to the THA's subsidy and debt expenses.

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The outcome of this battle left no clear institutional winners or losers. The THA succeeded in divesting itself of the majority of the 11,000 properties it eventually identi"ed as being for sale and it did contribute to the beginnings of economic growth in the new federal states. On the other hand, the THA was widely unpopular in both the east and west such that it was plagued by low institutional morale and high personnel turnover that culminated with the assassination of its director. The THA was reorganized as a federal agency directly under the Federal Ministry of Finance and renamed the Federal Agency for Special Reuni"cation Functions (commonly known as BvS for its German acronym). The Federal Ministry of Finance failed in its cost control scheme as THA spending and debt mounted. THA spending, however, was only one component of the overall reuni"cation costs. These costs would prove to be far greater than anticipated once the desperate state of the GDR's economy was revealed. The governments of the new federal states also saw a mixed outcome. On the one hand, unemployment skyrocketed to a high of 35% resulting in severe economic and social problems and some social unrest (especially among the youth). On the other hand, the new federal states were the bene"ciaries of massive investment from the federal government and a generous social safety net. It appears the worst economic dislocation is over and prospects for economic growth in the social-market economy have improved.While the majority of the THA projects have been privatized, a major issue concerning the environmental remediation of the remaining THA properties looms. This issue has signi"cant implications for the continued development of the hazardscape in eastern Germany.

4.2. Environmental remediation of the remaining BvS properties The second process a!ecting hazardscape change was the environmental clean-up of remaining state properties. The principal actors in this arena were: the Federal Ministry of Finance and its subordinate agency the Federal Agency for Special Reuni"cation Activities (BvS); The Federal Ministry of the Environment and its scienti"c research arm * The Federal Environmental Agency; the La( nder governments represented primarily by the state environmental ministries and the state "nance ministries; and the buyers of the BvS properties. The major environmental issue that remains in the eastern La( nder is between the Federal Ministry of Finance and operationally BvS, the La( nder governments, and the Federal Ministry of the Environment. The issue is over the extent to which the remaining BvS projects (especially the 23 large projects) will be cleaned up before the purchasers are released from liability.

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M.W. Corson / Environmental Hazards 1 (1999) 57}68

The problem is that the La( nder are responsible and liable for human health and environmental quality and should make the decision as to how safe is safe enough. The BvS, however, has the majority of the funding for environmental cleanup and is also under severe pressure to minimize or eliminate its spending on these projects. BvS has taken the position that only acute contamination that is a direct threat to drinking water should be remediated using the least expensive and least extensive methods (barriers, etc.). The dilemma for these governmental actors is balancing environmental cleanup cost against available "nancial resources in light of a fundamental policy of all German governments that states `the interests of society must not be disturbeda. The federal government understands this to mean that health and environment must be protected, but taxes cannot be raised to politically unacceptable levels to pay for the cleanup. The question is what is the potential for disturbance of societal interests if the barriers fail or contaminated groundwater stocks are eventually needed for human use? The Federal Ministry of Finance in Bonn is focused on Germany's budget problems and future participation in the European Monetary Union. The Ministry committed 10 billion DM a year for the six years from 1991 to 1997. These expenditures, however, were budgeted based on an economic forecast of constant growth. When the economy slumped shortly after reuni"cation, the Finance Ministry sought to cut spending across the board. The Federal Ministry of Finance is represented in this arena by the BvS. The BvS has the mission to privatize the remaining state enterprises of the former GDR and to facilitate the economic development of the new La( nder. BvS's role in this arena has been to guarantee the limitation of investor liability for environmental damage caused prior to 1 July 1991. The Director of Environmental Protection and Contaminated Sites for BvS stated that their priority is to maximize employment in safe industries in the new La( nder. By safe, they meant long-term employment in survivable industries. BvS recognized that di!erent actors have di!erent de"nitions of danger and thus di!erent views on the extent to which sites should be remediated. It is interesting to note that BvS's Director of Environmental Protection and Contaminated Sites never once mentioned environmental protection as a priority (interview with Mr. Von der Decken). Preceding paragraphs have detailed BvS's troubled history as the Trusteeship Authority, the assassination of its second director by the Red Army Faction, and the criticism to which it was subjected in both eastern and western Germany. The THA was supposed to operate only for a few years so it underwent constant personnel turnover because its employees saw it as a temporary job. BvS has now had seven generations of project managers which has resulted in a loss of institutional knowledge and has meant that La( nder representatives are constantly

getting new and inexperienced BvS partners. The latest batch of BvS managers sees their role in a federal agency under the Finance Ministry as being more long term and they have embraced their new marching orders to minimize spending. In 1990}1991 the extent of the environmental legacy of the GDR was unknown and all the actors thought the cleanup could be accomplished for a reasonable amount. By 1993}1994, however, the environmental damage assessments showed that the cleanup would be far more expensive than originally envisioned. Concurrently, with this realization came a major economic slump with high unemployment and slow-to-no economic growth. It was during this period that the third generation leadership of BvS got the word from the Finance Ministry to minimize or eliminate spending on environmental cleanup. There were even suggestions that the BvS leadership was given bonuses as an incentive to save money (Wirtschaftswoche, 1996). Since 1994 BvS has taken the position that only immediate hazards to drinking water require remediation and that the least expensive measures on the most limited scale would be funded. These measures usually involved mechanical processes such as the installation of a barrier rather than the more extensive and expensive procedures such as contaminated soil removal and chemical or thermal treatment. BvS said that more extensive remediation was simply too expensive and that they were willing to accept contamination of groundwater not used for drinking. In 1996, BvS was accused of instituting a systemic e!ort to delay paying claims for environmental cleanup by adding additional after-the-fact requirements, including requirements for long monitoring periods (Wirtschaftswoche, 1996). The Federal Ministry of the Environment represents the federal government's point of view but also takes it as its duty to understand and support the La( nder environmental views. The former CDU Environmental Minister and her sta! recognized that the federal government has no legal liability for damages of former GDR properties but that the La( nder have both legal responsibility and the authority to protect human health and the environment. The Federal Ministry of the Environment has technical competence and provides advice and consultation to the La( nder. The Deputy Director General of the Directorate for Soil Protection and Clean-up of Contaminated Sites suggested that the Federal Ministry for the Environment was something like King John of Scotland who was a king with no land of his own. While they have no money with which to in#uence the arena, they do have technical competence and limited authority (they have veto authority over large project cleanup plans) and thus act as a referee between BvS and the La( nder. He further suggested that the Federal Ministry for the Environment was the only federal agency the La( nder could trust (interview with Dr. Holzworth).

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Under the German Basic Law, the states have legal responsibility and authority for human health and safety and for environmental protection. In this arena, the state governments face an internal con#ict between their state environmental ministries and their state "nance ministries. State environmental ministries want more extensive and permanent remediation measures for the BvS properties (especially the large projects) such as soil removal and/or chemical or thermal treatments. Additionally, they would like to treat all or, at least, the most serious threats to ground water and not just immediate threats to drinking water. Understandably, the state environmental ministries take a longer and more stringent view on how safe is safe enough. They worry that BvS's method is a short-term solution that will cause problems in the future when contaminated ground water stocks are needed by expanding communities. They also worry that barriers on contaminated sites require long-term monitoring to alert authorities to a breach and that this monitoring is not being done. Even the state environmental ministries, however, have a dilemma. They are legally responsible for environmental regulation enforcement so they hold investors to their agreements and insist on observance of environmental laws. Investors, however, are caught between BvS's unwillingness to pay the federal government's share of cleanup costs and the state environmental ministries enforcement actions. The fear of the states is that strict enforcement of environmental regulations will cause investors to develop their new facilities on undamaged and precious green space rather than redeveloping already contaminated former industrial sites (interview with Ms. BoK rner, 1996). State "nance ministries are largely sympathetic to environmental issues but their priorities are the state economy and budgetary restraint. The new La( nder are "nancially strapped and have di$culty paying their 25}40% share of the cleanup cost of BvS projects. On the other hand, the state "nance ministries welcome the jobs, investment, and taxes that the redevelopment of the former GDR industrial sites bring. The state "nance ministries also balk at fronting the total cleanup cost and waiting on an uncooperative BvS for reimbursement. Finally, the ministries are concerned about driving away investors with stringent environmental enforcement and BvS delays and thus are less concerned about fostering economic development on green space (which avoids the BvS problem but is environmentally unfriendly). The investors have several goals which include: turning a pro"t, penetrating eastern markets, taking advantage of a skilled and still lower wage workforce, and avoiding environmental liability. Investors are drawn to redevelop former GDR industrial sites because they are often well located and may have existing facilities and infrastructure that the investor can redevelop for minimal cost. The biggest drawback to redeveloping a site, however, is the

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potential for environmental liability and thus the investors seek the best deal to minimize this cost. Most investors pay 10% of the cleanup cost on BvS properties to ensure they have an interest in keeping costs under control. The decision for the investors is whether the incentives to redevelop BvS properties are a better business proposition than building on green space. Many companies that opted to redevelop a BvS property have gotten caught between state enforcement of environmental cleanup requirements and BvS's unwillingness to pay its share of the claims. The result has been that a number of investors have taken BvS to court and won. The courts have ruled that BvS's additional requirements for reimbursement were unfair and not in accordance with the aim of the original plan (Wirtschaftswoche, 1996, interview with Mr. Schreiber, 1996). The question arises as to why the states have not taken BvS to court. The o$cial answer is that the federal and state governments have an understanding of fealty and are supposed to be true and loyal to each other and not work their problems out in a confrontational manner. Representatives of the Federal Ministry of the Environment suggested that Germany cannot a!ord to have environmental cleanup programs delayed by years of litigation and that an administrative agreement between the federal government and the new states to maximize investment in the East as quickly as possible was speci"cally intended to avoid lengthy court battles (interview with Dr. Sanden). An alternative view provided by the Sachsen State Ministry for Environment and Land Development, held that the state governments are afraid to take on BvS and, by extension, the politically powerful Federal Ministry of Finance. Their fear is that, even if they win the court battle, there could be negative repercussions in other federal-state dealings later on. State environmental o$cials from Berlin and Sachsen}Anhalt concurred with the Sachsen view (interview with Dr. Nebel and Mr. Naumann). The above discussion highlights a potentially signi"cant problem for the Germans in redeveloping and remediating former GDR industrial sites. Essentially, the "nancing agreement between BvS and the states does not work in the current economic environment. Rather than reevaluating the agreement, BvS is sabotaging the process with its delaying tactics. There is currently no con#ict resolution mechanism other than the courts so there is at best a slowdown and at worst a standstill in remediation of the BvS sites. This issue has interrelated environmental and economic problems that could have a negative a!ect on the interests of all of the actors. The environmental problem involves using limited and inexpensive remediation measures such as barriers on only immediate hazards to drinking water, and the potential long-term costs in terms of lost ground water resources and future threats to human health. The economic problem involves BvS's unwillingness to pay its debts

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producing both a disincentive to redevelop the very properties it is charged with selling, and an incentive to develop on green space which does BvS no good and is environmentally unfriendly. While the states have the responsibility and authority to decide how safe is safe enough, BvS has the money. The Germans have a saying that `money is mightya * meaning, in this case, that BvS has the power to decide how safe is safe enough while having no responsibility or liability for the consequences of that decision (interviews with Ms. BoK rner, Dr. Nebel, and Mr. Schreiber).

5. Conclusions This paper details factors that explain Germany's post-reuni"cation hazardscape change. Previous research used an empirical approach to demonstrate that the hazardscapes of the FRG and GDR were di!erent prior to reuni"cation and that the hazardscape changed mostly for the better with the advent of reuni"cation. The subsequent analysis using Renn's Social Arena Metaphor explained why much of this change took place, and the sociopolitical dynamics of hazardscape change. The analysis of the GDR industrial base privatization issue refutes the conventional wisdom that the hazardscape change was due to an environmental explanation, i.e. the application of western environmental law and technology. The hazardscape change was actually due to a political economy explanation as exempli"ed by the THA's con#icting requirements to privatize or liquidate "rms and minimize costs, while protecting jobs and preventing social unrest. The environmental actors in this arena played a minor role, but events transpired in such a way as to facilitate the environmental agenda. The issue of privatizing the GDR industrial base also demonstrates how the social arena often produces compromise outcomes that all of the principle actors ultimately "nd sub-optimal but acceptable. If the rule enforcers/decision makers and the audience "nd the outcome satisfactory, then the arena has produced a successful outcome. In the case of privatizing the GDR industrial base, the majority of the former GDR properties were privatized at very high cost but the government avoided social and economic collapse in the new federal states. Compromises of this type are characteristic of the German political system. As Nonnenmacher (1993) notes: On the surface, German politics is shaped by party competition. But in Bonn, nobody plays zero-sum games: there is no situation where the winner would take all. By history, constitution and mentality, German politics, much as German society, is set for consensus. The major political forces each get their fair share in power, in political participation, and "nancial bene"ts.

The second issue concerning the remediation of the remaining BvS properties demonstrates that power relationships in the new Germany are not equal. In this case the economic imperative is over-riding the environmental imperative as a politically experienced and powerful, western dominated "nance actor is over-ruling the prerogative of an inexperienced and politically weak environmental actor. The self-declared referee (The Federal Ministry for the Environment) su!ers from both internal and external constraints. The internal constraint is the uneven power relationship between the environment and "nance, which causes the Environmental Ministry to perceive that they must avoid open con#ict with the politically powerful Finance Ministry. The external constraint has to do with the social resources available to the Environmental Ministry. The Environmental Ministry has no funds with which to in#uence the issue and their only power is their ability to veto remediation plans for the large projects (a politically unacceptable option). Their remaining resources of social in#uence and evidence pale in comparison to the social resources (money and power) of the Finance Ministry. The emerging issue of BvS's unwillingness to pay their share of the environmental cleanup cost has perhaps the greatest potential impact of the hazardscape. The BvS policy of delaying payments in order to save money poses a serious danger that the arena will produce an outcome that was unanticipated and equally damaging to the interests of actors, rule enforcers, and audience. The BvS's tactics may convince potential investors to go elsewhere or to develop their enterprises on undeveloped (and uncontaminated) land. This would leave BvS with unsold properties, and leave the states with contaminated sites that continue to pose an environmental hazard. Everyone understands that it is not "nancially possible to cleanup contaminated sites to the extent that they would be suitable for `multiple usesa such as residential, commercial, or recreational use. Rather, remediation can only be done to make them safe for continued industrial use, and sites that are remediated and not sold remain vacant and generate no income. This is a bad outcome for everybody. The obvious suggestion is for the actors to re-negotiate their remediation plan and "nancing agreement in light of current "scal realities. The danger is that the current focus on economic development will result in the false economy of limited remediation and subsequent contamination of ground water resources that will hinder the future development of reuni"ed Germany.

6. Postscript Most of the research for this article were completed in 1996. In 1998 a major political shift occurred in Germany with the ousting of long-time Christian Democratic leader Helmut Kohl and the election of Social Democrat

M.W. Corson / Environmental Hazards 1 (1999) 57}68

Gerhard Schroeder. Schroeder took the unprecedented step of establishing a coalition government with the Green party thus bringing the environmental party into the government for the "rst time. The Greens brought to this new `Red}Greena coalition a wide-ranging and ambitious environmental agenda, and it appeared that the environmental imperative could become, if not primary, at least a much higher priority. Recent state election results, however, show this was not to be. Gerhard Schroeder and his Social Democrats "nally overcame 16 years of conservative rule by focusing on jobs and economic reform. They promised to overcome `sixteen years of conservative stagnationa and used the rhetoric of Tony Blair's `Third Waya to promise economic restructuring and job creation without destroying the social-welfare state. The hard negotiations that brought the Greens into the coalition gave the new government strong environmental credentials and an ambitious agenda. The Green agenda included: a radical proposal to completely phase out nuclear energy in Germany, a new `ecologya tax, plans to reduce private automobile travel and increase use of public transportation (especially rail), and a plan to impose speed limits on the Autobahn to reduce pollutants suspected of causing Waldsterben or forests death. A new Environmental Minister, Herr Trittin, replaced Frau Merkel (who became the Secretary General of the now opposition Christian Democratic Union). One of the "rst acts of the new government was to shelve the conservative plan to phase out the BvS thus ensuring that the so-called `Treuhanda companies with a viable business plan could continue to receive government subsidies (Bundesregierung, 1999). Disunity soon began to plague not only the new coalition but also the political parties themselves. Chancellor Schroeder was always something of an outsider to the old guard Social Democrats and despite his early dabbling with Marxism and environmental causes was widely seen to be a `pal of industry.a His policy shift from a focus on job creation to one of economic restructuring through budget austerity measures alienated the left wing of his party and many workers and pensioners who were fearful of the prospect of reduced social welfare programs. Schroeder's austerity plan also meant there would be fewer resources for the environmental remediation projects and thus even greater pressure to reduce the scope and costs of the cleanup. The Green Party had traditionally been more of a protest movement than a political party and their loose style of grass roots power and collective leadership made it di$cult to propose policy or accept compromise with one voice. Joschka Fisher, foreign minister and one of the Greens' main leaders, has been "ghting to consolidate control of the party so that it can successfully function as a junior partner in the coalition. Policy shifts, party and coalition dis-unity, necessary but widely unpopular policies, and eastern German

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frustration with the outcome of uni"cation took their toll on the Red}Green Coalition in recent German state elections. Both the Social Democrats and the Greens lost substantial support and/or their power in elections in Brandenburg, Saarland, and Thuringia. The September 1999 elections in Saxony saw the SPD and Greens su!er even further losses with the SPD losing 6% support (from 16.6% of the vote to 11%) and the Greens going from 4.1 to 2%. Schroeder's austerity plan, while considered necessary by the conservatives and moderate left, has outraged many pensioners and workers. Additionally, the SPD has su!ered in the eastern states because of anger over the consequences of reuni"cation. Ten years after reuni"cation unemployment still remains at 20% (it is higher if `make-worka programs are discounted). Eastern German productivity is only 56.1% of western German productivity and eastern German unit labor costs are 124% of western German unit labor costs. While the CDU has seen some increase in support in the East, the big winner has been the Party of Democratic Socialism (reformed communists) which has picked up much of the lost SPD support. The Greens have su!ered in large part because of the unpopularity of their actual policy initiatives and the perception that they have had little impact on the policies of the coalition. Their e!ort to eliminate nuclear power in Germany was met by strong protest from the German energy industry and demands for massive compensation for the projected costs of shutting down powerplants (Media Sources, 1999). (Ironically recent privatization of the energy industry means Germans get electricity 20% cheaper but the energy comes from less safe and secure French nuclear powerplants.) The `ecology taxa, while seen as well intentioned was an additional burden on an already heavily taxed population. Finally, the issue of speed limits on the German autobahn for most Germans was simply a non-issue. Thus, the economic imperative remains primary despite the early environmental promises of the Red} Green coalition. The left is primarily concerned with the maintenance of the social welfare state and the creation of jobs. The right is concerned with economic and social restructuring that will ensure Germany's global competitiveness. Easterners are concerned about economic redevelopment and jobs so they can catch up with the West, and Westerners are tired of paying for the East to catch up. Many Germans understand and accept the need to protect the environment to a point. In the "nal analysis, however, economic concerns win out over environmental concerns every time (Glaser, 1999). So little has changed and the hazardscape of reuni"ed Germany is much as it was in 1996. The forecasts, given Herr Schroeder's austerity plan, is for further constraints on funding for environmental remediation projects and acceptance of more limited remediation goals.

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Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge the research grants provided by the University of South Carolina Department of Geography and the Graduate School of the University of South Carolina. Additionally, I would like to thank Silvia Reppe of the German Federal Environmental Agency and Dr. RuK diger Glaser of the University of WuK rzburg for their assistance while conducting my research, and Dr. Julian Minghi and Dr. Susan Cutter for their helpful comments. References Albrecht, H.F., Kiedrowski, R., 1991. Kernenergie in Deutschland, Verlag Ullstein GmbH, Berlin. Baufeld, M., Krug, A., 1993. Es war einmal der Wald: Das WaldsterbenBilanz einer Ohnmacht (Bund fact sheet). Bund fuK r Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Bonn. Bundesregierung, 1999. German Federal Government Press Release 12-08-99. The Economic Situation in Eastern Germany. Bonn. Conradt, D.P., 1993. The German Polity, 5th Edition. Longman, New York. Corson, M., 1997. Hazardscapes in Reuni"ed Germany. University of South Carolina Doctoral Dissertation, University Micro"lms Inc., Ann Arbor. Cutter, S.H., 1993. Living with Risk. Arnold, New York. Jones, A., 1994. The New Germany: A Human Geography. Wiley, New York. Kohl, H. et al., 1970. OG konomische Geographie der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. VEB Herman Haack, Leipzig. Nonnenmacher, G., 1993. In: Weidenfeld, W., Janning, J. (Eds.), Europe in Global Change. Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, GuK tersloh. Petschow et al., 1990. Roundtable (DDR) 1990 Overview. Umwelt Report DDR. Westermann, Frankfurt am Main. Raumordnungsbericht, 1991. Bundesministerium fuK r Raumordnung, Bonn. Rothkirch, U., Hildebrand, F. 1994. Braunkohlesanierung Ost. Bonn, Bundesumweltmeinisterium. Renn, O., 1992. The Social Arena Concept and Risk Debates. In: Krimsky, S., Golding, D. (Eds.), Social Theories of Risk. Praeger, London. Umweltbericht der DDR, 1990. Verlag Visuell, Berlin.

Umweltbundesamt, 1994. Daten zur Umwelt 1992/93. Erich Schmidt Verlag GmbH and Co., Berlin. Wirtschaftswoche, 1996. Eine Art Oberzenzor, Vol. 8, pp. 29}30.

Media sources Financial Times January}September 1999. New York Times January}September 1999.

Interviews All interviews, unless otherwise noted, were conducted during the author's "eld work from 16 September to 30 October 1996. Bendig, F. Brown coal remediation specialist. Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn. BoK rner, Susanna. Contaminated Lands Section, Sachsen State Ministry for Environment and Land Development, Dresden. Glaser, Dr. RuK diger, Professor of Geography in the Geographic Institute at the University of WuK rzburg. E-mail correspondence August}September 1999. Holzwarth, Dr. Fritz. Deputy Director-General of the Directorate of Soil Protection and Clean-up of Contaminated Sites, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn. Naumann, H. Administration for City Development and Environmental Protection, Berlin. Nebel, Dr. JuK rgen. Contaminated Lands Section Leader. SachsenAnhalt Ministry for Land Development, Agriculture, and Environment, Magdeburg. Sanden, Dr. Joachim. Deputy Head of Division WA III 1 (Legislation on the Clean-up of Contaminated Sites and on Soil Conservation, Financing of the Clean-up of Contaminated Sites), Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn. Schreiber, Ulrich. Environmental Lawyer, Sachsen State Ministry for Environment and Land Development, Dresden. Stietzel, Dr. Hans-Hoachim. Division WA III 3 (Recording, Assessment and Clean-up of Contaminated Sites) (NATO Fellow studying &Evaluation of Demonstrated and Emerging Technologies for Treatment of Contaminated Land and Groundwater' * speci"cally the 23 BvS Large Projects). Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn. Von der Decken, Claus. Director of Environmental Protection and Contaminated Site Remediation for the Federal Agency for Special Reuni"cation Functions (BvS), Berlin.