Health and safety management in a changing organisation: Case study global steel company

Safety Science 74 (2015) 128–139

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Health and safety management in a changing organisation: Case study global steel company Maarit Koivupalo a,⇑, Marko Sulasalmi b,1, Philip Rodrigo a, Seppo Väyrynen c a

Outokumpu Oyj, Riihitontuntie 7, P.O. Box 140, FIN-02200 Espoo, Finland Metsä Fibre Oy Kemi Mill & Metsä Board Kemi Oy, FIN-94200 Kemi, Finland c Faculty of Technology, Industrial Engineering and Management, Work Science, P.O. Box 4610, FIN-90014 University of Oulu, Finland b

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 12 June 2014 Received in revised form 14 November 2014 Accepted 19 December 2014 Available online xxxx Keywords: Health and safety systems Health and safety management OHSAS 18001 Changing organisation Corporate social responsibility

a b s t r a c t When an organisation changes, grows, or new units join into a corporation, it generates challenges for health and safety (HS) management. There are different types of HS tools, systems, applications, forms and software which support HS management. The purpose of this research is to find out what kind of HS management practices and tools are used and what is required to manage HS efficiently within a global steel company’s (Nemployees = 15.000) different sites. All the sites (N = 6) had a health and safety management system, which was based on OHSAS 18001 requirements. Local HS management practices and tools varied significantly, but had similar backgrounds. Corporate HS management was based around HS standards, vision and principles, plans and targets. Similarly, it also followed OHSAS requirements. Some improvement needs have been identified for both the local and the corporate level HS management practices and tools. It is possible to manage HS in a continuously changing organisation. The foundations should be based on corporate HS standards, which should be outlined clearly – based on the desired end result complying with the external requirements. Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Companies have started to invest in human capital and to manage relationships with social stakeholders. Socially responsible companies want to exceed the demands set by law, and to be successful also in occupational health and safety, and environmental field (Montero et al., 2009). Organisations that have a continued success in improving their standards would actively pay attention to safety, health and environmental factors. To support HS (health and safety) practices, various IT (information technology) tools, systems, applications and software have been developed. HS practices, tools, systems, applications and software are frequently developed and tailored to a particular site’s or unit’s needs in global companies. This article makes reference to HS tools (IT tools that support HS management), these include: systems, applications, forms and software. When an organisation grows or new sites or units join together, it generates new challenges, e.g. what HS management practises ⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +358 401678020. 1

E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Koivupalo). Current position, former Outokumpu Stainless Oy.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2014.12.009 0925-7535/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

and tools should be used and what characteristics should they have? Or should there be one procedure within a whole corporation or should the individual sites choose their own practices? Managing a frequently changing organisation as a complete entity, and not as separate sites, is especially challenging. One question is how to make it run efficiently, when HS management methods and tools vary between the sites? The case study used for this research is a global steel industry company (Nemployees = 15.000), where organisations have recently been through a dramatic change. The sites are located in Europe, America and Asia. In detail, this research describes what kinds of HS management practices and tools are used at the different locations (sites). The main focus is in HS systems, but in some sites Environment and Quality (EQ) are integrated with HS system, and those will be discussed as closely related subjects. The scope is defined to health and safety, because the common organisational structure in the case company follows this definition. The hypothesis is that different HS management practices and multiple HS tools are currently in use. The purpose of this research is to find out what kind of HS management practices and tools are used in a global steel company’s different sites and which corporate HS management practices are used.

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The two main goals in this research are to identify what the requirements are to enable a changing manufacturing company to: 1. Manage HS efficiently. 2. Identify improvements for the current HS management practices and tools. Four research questions (RQ) were used to gather the information required for this study: RQ1: What kind of HS management practices and tools support HS management in continuously changing organisation? RQ2: What practises and tools are used for HS management in different sites in international corporation? RQ3: Are corporate HS standards and targets deployed to the local HS management practices? RQ4: Are higher level HS demands reflected to the corporate HS management? Research process is described in details in Fig. 1. Theoretical framework describes HS management and HS tools in general (RQ1). Empirical part is divided in two main sections (RQ2 and RQ3). The final goal is to find an answer to RQ4, and recommendations for local and corporate HS management procedures are given.

2. Literature review Safety management combines the management of methods, practices and human resources; it consists of continuous planning,

action and follow-up. Safety management includes both preventive and corrective actions in order to continuously improve the working environment (FIOH, 2006; Oedewald and Reiman, 2006). Internal factors of an organisation, i.e. social factors, must be taken into consideration. Social factors consist of human resources, handling of problems and conflicts of interest, as well as reconciliation of different goals, values and views (Hale et al., 1997). The reconciliations, dependence and interaction of technical and social systems should be taken into account when modelling the operations of an organisation (Gheorghe, 1996; Levä, 2003). The objective of safety management systems is to manage the planning and implementation of a company’s safety policy. A safety management system may include, for example, the setting and prioritising of the company’s safety goals as well as the development of safety programmes. Other important sectors are organisation and communication, which focuses on the definition of responsibilities and the creation of communication channels. A safety management system also aims for the management of examination and assessment (Oedewald and Reiman, 2006). Brauer (1994) concludes clearly and simply why engineers and industrial companies have to take care of safety: humanitarianism, law, and costs are the driving factors. Every safety action is based on a risk assessment. Safety management can be defined as making those plans and interventions which aim to control identified risks. To deploy demands as well as legislation demands companies use different management tools. Often these tools are developed or customised in different production unit, even so that general demands might be similar and universal. Best known and most adapted HS management system standard is Occupational health and safety management system

Changing organisation & change management Literature study: HS management (RQ1)

-

Empirical study: Local HS management (RQ2)

External requirements Corporate social responsibility - Sustainability - OHSAS 18001

Risk management Competence Communication

HS management - Planning and goals - Procedures and policies - Performance monitoring

Performance measurement and monitoring

Leadership and management Commitment

Organisation culture and safety culture

Participative methods

Reporting and investigation

Human resources

Audits Meetings and reviews

Human Computer Interaction

RQ3 Empirical study: Corporate HS management

RQ4

Corporate standards and targets

Fig. 1. Research process.

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specification OHSAS 18001 (2007). OHSAS 18001 specification contains a general demands for HS management system.

2.1. Successful HS management A good safety management system has a positive effect on the wider company performance, including: safety, competitiveness and economic-financial performance (Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2009). Companies want to assure customers of the high quality of their products and services, which has led to the implementation of quality management systems and standards, such as ISO 9000 for quality. In addition, responsible organisations have to take care of the well-being of their employees, working environment, the impact of operations on the local community, and the long term effects of their products. This has led e.g. to the implementation of environmental management systems (ISO 14000) and safety management systems (OHSAS 18001) (Levä, 2003; Wilkinson and Dale, 2007). Based on OHSAS 18001, ISO 45001 is under preparation and will be published in 2016. The standard is designed to help companies and organisations ensure the health and safety of the people who work for them (Bird, 2014). Quality management system fills the need of organisations to assure their customers that the company’s products and services satisfy the quality requirements. Organisation cannot ignore legislation and other drivers on environmental protection, and health and safety at work. These form a range of systems covering the environmental, health and safety management, which are separated but closely related to quality management. Therefore, an integrated management system addressing these three areas of management, as well as quality, has come to be of interest of business (Wilkinson and Dale, 2007). Hamidi et al. (2012) lists justifications to integrate HS, E and Q systems. The main reason is that there are many similarities, and integration reduces duplication and costs. They conclude that integrated management system focuses on team work. Continuous improvement of quality, environmental aspects and health and safety can help to ensure that a company’s leadership is committed to get on the continuous improvement journey towards sustainable development. In case of overall philosophy of organisations, Cecich and Hembarsky (1999) point out that if we apply the total quality management way of doing business, the management of safety must be integrated into the business culture in order for the business to be successful. Formerly, safety, along with quality control and assurance, were often considered as additional functions that were necessary, but relatively non-productive. Integration with lean management principles and HS management has been studied with encouraging results (e.g. Court et al., 2009; Nahmens and Ikuma, 2009; Rozenfeld et al., 2010). Gnoni et al. (2013) has applied the lean management approach to nearmiss management. Lean management in this context is more proactive approach compared to the traditional one. Safety level of organisation needs to be ‘‘pulled’’ by actual system requirement, and not ‘‘pushed’’ uniformly into workers and procedures. ‘‘Pull logic’’ needs to be applied to all phases of the system design. In addition, worker involvement starting from operational level is important to increase awareness, and HS department will be involved only as specialist. Chun and Bidanda (2013) reviewed sustainable manufacturing research evolution over the past 50 years. Sustainable manufacturing has become popular field of research and is now considered an essential research area that impacts different sectors of society. At first topics were related to workplace design, human factors and ergonomics (1960–1980). Since the 1980s, sustainability, IT, economy and quality issues have had remarkable role in research. For

past 10 years the focus has been in environmental challenges and green supply chains. Sustainability and corporate social responsibility covers many similar aspects and principles as health, safety, environment and quality management and sustainable manufacturing. ISO 26000 which is a Social responsibility standard provides guidance on how businesses and organisations can operate in a socially responsible way. This means acting in an ethical and transparent way that contributes to the health and welfare of society (ISO, 2010). Zink (2014) concludes his research that there is a need for a different understanding of the overall performance of a company which can be seen in following the discussion about corporate social responsibility. This will generate new chances for human factors including the three dimensions of sustainability: economic, ecological and social. 2.2. HS performance and tools World Steel Association (2013) states that the most successful steel companies are also the safest. Steel companies have been investing very much to health and safety, and overall trend is that the most of World Steel member companies have significantly improved their HS performance over the recent years. Safety performance indicators can be divided to leading and lagging indicators. Lagging indicators are gathered after losses have been incurred and cost assessments have been made (Grabowski et al., 2007). Leading indicators address the need to predict and act before an unwanted event (Hale, 2009). Growing number of safety professionals questions the value of lagging indicators and argue that lagging indicators do not provide enough information or insight to effectively avoid future accidents (e.g. Grabowski et al., 2007; Mengolinim and Debarberis, 2008; Hinze et al., 2013). Hinze et al. (2013) concludes that any firm that truly embraces the zero injury philosophy will consider the use of other measures than the traditional lagging indicators of safety performance. The need for change in the safety program is not realised until at least one injury has been sustained when evaluation is based on lagging indicators. Companies that track leading indicators will be able to maintain a more accurate assessment of the effectiveness of the safety program. Defined safety indicators are in important role if a company seeks to improve its safety culture. As Morrow et al. (2014) conclude, safety culture is correlated with concurrent measures of safety performance and may be related to future performance. The relationship between safety culture and safety performance is highly dependent on how and when both safety culture and safety performance are measured. The importance of preventive safety actions and investigating near misses is recognised by Bellamy et al. (2013) as well. They conclude that an analysis of a large number of incidents can support the quantification of underlying causes. Weak points must be recognised pro-actively to be able to prevent major accidents. The use of particular management tool is related to the stage of organisational improvement process. Tools which are presented in relation to specific need are better utilised compared with those without specific need at the time of the training. Well argumented training delivered by a credible trainer is also vital to success in the use of specific management tool. The complexity of the tools restricts their use to small number of people. More complex tools require active training and involvement of specialist. Management commitment is also notified as important key factor for management tool adoption (Bunney and Dale, 1997). Human–computer interaction (HCI) is studying the design, evaluation and implementation of interactive information systems and related phenomena. The aim is to make technology better sui-

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ted for its users (Oulasvirta, 2011). Successful management tools should be available, immediately accessible, web-based, secure and easy to use. Even the best systems and tools always need some refining and adjusting on the basis of feedback from users. Tools are only effective if they respond to users’ needs and are user friendly (Conger and Fulmer, 2003). Gnoni et al. (2013) concluded that a software tool that could integrate near-miss reporting and the analysis phase would be helpful, especially if there is large number of near misses reported. Agnello et al. (2012) noticed that there is a gap between safety documents and real operation, and it could be major drawback for a successful safety management system. The study of near misses may be exploited to revive documents and involve much more workers in plant safety; they presented a new software tool for near-miss management, which included analysing the incidents. Douglas et al. (2014) emphasised the importance of a proactive safety reporting culture, where near miss reporting is a key factor. If there are plans to improve the current reporting culture or system, it is important to understand the current practices first. Areas of improvement must be determined, and feedback collected from the users. It would then be possible to interview the people involved in creating the reports, which could then be followed up with a series of workshops before finalising the system. 2.3. Changing organisations and organisation culture Productive safety management involves two types of change: systems change and behavioural change. Company has four system factors that are applicable to all activities of the company: processes (e.g. risk management practices), technology (e.g. safety and monitoring equipment), physical environment (e.g. physical environment audits) and human resources (e.g. communication systems). These factors form the elements of systems change, and behavioural change is needed to create an internal business environment which allows systems change to translate into improved organisational safety, performance and quality through the competencies, vigilance and resourcefulness of employees (Mol, 2003). Changes in organisations can occur by personnel changes, operations optimising or corporate acquisitions. Changing organisation is always a challenge to corporate management. Safety management systems like OHSAS 18001 (2007) require processes and operation that have strict change control. Phelps et al. (2007) reviewed the framework of growing organisations. They discovered two main dimensions in this framework. First is typology of key issues that are likely to be faced in all growing firms. The second dimension concerns organisation ability to absorb and use new knowledge. They summarised that there is no standard linear sequence of stages or problems, but there are some key issues that all growing firms can expect to encounter. What a growing firm needs to success is recognising these key issues and absorbing knowledge to provide solutions for oncoming challenges. Paton and McCalman (2000) describe change as one of the constants of history. Successful individuals, nations and enterprises have ability to effectively manage and exploit change situations. To survive enterprises need effective and progressive management of change. Change management includes evaluating, planning and implementing operational, tactical and strategic actions. They point out that in change situations systems and sub-systems created to ensure the accomplishment of organisational goals need to be analysed and operate in harmony. The knowledge of worker and operating environment must be supported through IT solutions which facilitate communication, sharing and growth. Paton and McCalman (2000) also emphasis that processes by which

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change should take place and issues that need to be considered by management can be described. But eventually there is no ready route map to purchase for every organisation that leads to successful outcome. Aguilar and Hewage (2013) approach changing organisation and safety related information database from multiple construction project’s point of view. They state that when more responsibilities are added to a project, appropriate information flow and communication between the involved parties is essential for the successful completion of a project. According to their study information and communication technology systems have usually focused on providing solutions for individual projects or companies. The best solution would be if company uses a given system in all its projects and shares safety performance indicators of each project with the managerial teams of all the projects. Growing complexity of systems and organisations requires approach to safety which goes beyond the simple rational analysis of technical systems, organisational patterns and procedures, to account for the dynamics of processes and actions that influence or are directly involved in safety according to Zwetsloot et al. (2013). They also state that safety management in complex and dynamic situation is a challenge, wherein planning is complemented by resilience and managing the unexpected. Hence, risk awareness and safety culture are essential complements to safety management system. It is important also to internalise the requirements of safety management system into organisational culture and the daily routines of individual employees, so the staff will know how to integrate the system with their own duties (Chen and Chen, 2012). Standard based safety management system can be seen as a tool for management, but high levels of safety requires also internal commitment to safety at every organisational level. It is really important to have participation from every organisation level in the generation of safety. Participative leadership supports when combining safety and reliability with job satisfaction (Zwetsloot et al., 2013, 2014). Similarly Wachter and Yorio (2013) concluded that it is not enough to mechanically implement the requirements of safety management system by issuing policies, plans, procedures, and processes. They may not guarantee alone ultimate safety performance success. It is important to remember, that effectiveness of a safety management system and its practices in reducing accident rates depends on the levels of safety-focused cognitive and emotional worker engagement. Safety management system practices can be designed and implemented to promote and enhance worker engagement, putting workers at the centre of safety management systems. 3. Empirical material and methods The empirical study, as a part of the research process (Fig. 1), is qualitative and the method used is a Case study. Cross-Case Synthesis was used as a technique to analyse multiple cases. Each one of the individual cases was treated as a separate study. The goal was to give a precise picture of the situation and the study is descriptive in nature (Yin, 2009). Semi-structured interviews were made to HS(EQ) Heads and Managers (later Safety Manager) in different sites during 2013. The size of sites varied between 120 and 3.300. The total number of employees in interviewed organisations was about 7.470, which represented about half of the whole company (number of the employees in the end of 2013 was about 15.000). The organisation had changed significantly at the beginning of 2013, when several new sites joined company. There were additional organisational changes, when part of the sites left the company in 2013. Therefore, the organisation used for this case study was continually changing, some sites were previously a part of larger organisations

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Table 1 Investigated sites and representatives. Site

Interviewee

Location

Number of employees

A B

Europe Europe

2.200 120

Asia

500

Europe

3.300

E

Head, Occupational Safety Manager, Health & Safety & Environment Manager, HSE Interpreter Head, Occupational Safety and Health Head, Strategic Occupational Safety Manager, Health & Safety

800

F

Manager, EHSQ

North America Europe

C D

550

and had been for decades, whereas, some sites were relatively new to the industry all experiencing continuous changes during this research project. Table 1 shows summary of the investigated sites, locations and interviewees (the country was different in each interview although the continent was the same). Interviewees were chosen based on their experience and knowledge. The main criterion was that interviewee should know all the HS management practices and tools which were used in their sites. Usually, one interviewee represented each site. Language created a challenge for some of the interviews. It was possible that different expressions and words might be used in different locations. Due to this uncertainty, in one interview there was an interpreter. In another interview there were two interviewees due to personnel and organisation change at the time of the interview. Prior to the interviews commencing all questions were e-mailed to the interviewees, in order understand their current practices and get preliminary answers from them. Interviews were made in English, except one which was made in Finnish. In that exceptional interview, questions were still presented in English using the Appendix. Conversations were recorded and transcribed for analysis and the data was organised based on OHSAS structure. The interviews were carried out by using video conference equipment. The length of an interview varied between 2 and 4 h. Interview questions are presented in Appendix, and they were structured based on OHSAS 18001 (2007) main elements (later OHSAS). Emergency preparedness and legal and other requirements sections were excluded due to the different legal requirements in each country. Internal corporate HS material was reviewed systematically. This documentation included HS standards, vision and principles and HS indicators. The objective of this analysis was to find profound knowledge through a single case. In practice this study utilised Cunningham’s four intensive methods; narrative, tabling, explanatory and interpretive case, for the making of a case study described in Järvinen and Järvinen (2000). The first part of the empirical study provided information about HS management practises and tools in different sites (RQ2). The second part of the empirical study was based on the analysis of the internal material. The aim was to create a comparison between the local practises and corporate HS standards and targets inside the case company (RQ3). The purpose of the entire research was to define development targets to the existing practices (RQ4). 4. Results 4.1. Local HS practices and tools One site had an official OHSAS 18001 certificate, but all sites had a safety management system in place, which was based on

OHSAS elements. Several sites considered applying for a formal certificate in the near future, but they had identified some development targets to work towards before applying. 4.1.1. Risk management All sites applied hazard identification and risk assessment practices, and basic level risks were assessed at each site. Methods were tailored for different purposes and different perspectives for risk assessments were also used. Two sites used basic assessment methods, but four of them were using more detailed systems. One site had significantly detailed process descriptions of different assessment methods they used. Half of the sites were using different methods of risk assessments for different risks. For example simple analysis method for smaller tasks, HAZOP analysis, process risks analysis and machine risk analysis were used in addition to standard work risk assessments. There were two arrangements for the responsible party. A HS department was responsible for risk assessments in two sites, but usually the responsibility was assigned to a production manager or a production engineer. Within in all the sites there were also internal and external specialists participating in the assessments. HS professionals were usually participating as a normal procedure to support the production or engineering manager. Blue collar employees also participated in risk assessments. The HS department was always responsible for maintaining the system. Risk assessments were then stored to different systems. Some of the sites had them stored on an intranet as text documents and half of the sites had a separate system for risk assessments. Also public drives were used to save the documents. Although HS professionals had a possibility to update and maintain the system, review process was partly line organisation’s responsibility. In practice, review process varied a lot. Half of the sites had automatic schedules in the system for review, and half of them had possibility to decide themselves how often the review was necessary. There were noted differences on how sites evaluated contractor risks. The general goal was to treat contractors and personnel equally. The responsibility of in-depth risk assessments lies on the contractor companies, and usually the principal company required it. All company employees could see the finished risk assessments on each site. Usually risk assessments were used as a tool for the HS professional’s and operational personnel. Work instructions were based on risk assessments in a few of the sites and they were used for introductions when describing what hazards certain tasks have. In addition to internal use, risk assessments were used externally for example to inform the authorities of identified hazards. 4.1.2. Competence Sites had many different HS trainings, which were usually held by HS professionals and human resources (HR) department. In some cases external specialists were used as well. Usually the basic introduction to HS is carried out in the form of lectures, with the more in-depth and specialised HS training sessions consisting of group participation. HR departments had training record databases in place, and the systems used differed for each site. Contractor’s training records were usually located on different databases. For contractors, a short induction was required, and for own personnel, requirements were determined precisely. Safety instructions and work instructions were available for everyone. The information was available on: the intranet, public storage or other applications which was designed especially for safety and work instructions. Responsibility of updating and maintaining the instructions varied between production organisation and HS professionals.

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4.1.3. Communication Each site had access to the intranet which was extensively used for safety communication. HS materials which were kept updated communicated the safety vision, politics, safety instructions, safety statistics and different HS forms. All the sites were using or in a transition period to start to use common corporate intranet. In addition to the intranet, there were many different tools for safety communications: meetings, e-mail messages, face-to-face discussions, and telephone discussions. One tool mentioned and thought of as one of the most effective tools in several sites was the notice board. These included electronic screens and traditional notice boards with paper notices. 4.1.4. Performance All sites were required to report safety statistics. Reporting procedures were similar across all the sites. Each site calculated their safety performance at least once a month, but a few of them followed the most important indicators more frequently, even daily. A common example of real time follow up in the leading indicators category was the hazard and near miss notice follow up in morning meetings, these were the responsibility of the line manager. Another example of the real time follow up in the category of lagging indicators was lost time injury (LTI). Some sites also compared the relation between lagging indicator (e.g. LTIFR) with leading indicator (e.g. hazard notice frequency). There was some confusion in the new sites how each indicator was defined (corporate requirement), especially between hazards and near-misses. The targets were set at least to LTIFR, but some sites had defined specific targets also for other lagging indicators and leading indicators. Each site used similar spreadsheet software to follow up the performance. The data was gathered manually by calculating the number of notices and events, or in bigger sites from their HS reporting system. The company has determined which leading and lagging safety indicators need to be followed (see Section 4.2.2). In addition to common corporate safety indicators, sites had many different local indicators which were followed. They focused to some theme (for example contractor safety or personal protective equipment) each year and varied indicators which presented with higher visibility. At the time of the interviews, there was a transition process going on, and for half of the sites there were additional steps before the numbers were added to the corporate system. HS performance reporting process is described in Fig. 2. 4.1.5. Reporting and investigation The LTIs were reported to corporate distribution using a predetermined process on each site. However, the system which was used for local HS reporting varied. Spreadsheet and word processing software forms were used generally. Three sites had particular HS reporting system, which included for example hazard and injury reporting. Separate reporting and investigation forms could be stored to these HS reporting systems as an attachment, but they had their own prepared forms as a part of the system. One site had a separate system for actions, and two of the safety reporting systems included. Hazard and injury reporting and investigation as a workflow were similar in all sites (Fig. 3). Investigation in the case of injuries was made using predefined investigation form. Injury investigation normally followed corporate injury investigation standard, however hazard and near miss incident investigation practices varied between the sites. Some sites were using the same investigation procedure as for injuries, but some sites used a simpler investigation. After each investigation, preventive and corrective actions were defined and completed. Overall a follow up was made by either a manager or a HS professional, and the incidents were communicated further for information.

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4.1.6. Audits Audit procedures varied a lot between different sites. Some sites had very detailed auditing schedules for each year, which included both internal and external audits. In addition, contractor audits were made. For example one site carried out contractor audits in co-operation with other local process industry companies using the HSEQ AP method (Väyrynen et al., 2012). The number of different types of audits was significant in half of the sites. Audit documents were stored in databases or public computer drives. Two units saved the audit reports to the local reporting system, where they had other HS documents. Text documents and spreadsheets were generally used. HS professionals had access to update and maintain the system. Interviewees differed on how they understood the term audit. Some sites calculated walkthroughs with check list as one audit type, and some sites thought that only scheduled audits performed by a formal auditor (internal or external) classified as an actual audit.

4.1.7. Meetings and reviews All of the sites had various different meetings and reviews which included HS topics in their agenda. Most of the sites held separate HS meetings. Some sites integrated HS with operations and in these meetings HS topics were usually the first item in the agenda. One site integrated quality and environmental with operations and HS Meetings were arranged weekly, monthly and quarterly. Meetings were scheduled and arranged with a predefined agenda. Participants varied based on the type of meeting, but were from either the local department or a line manager. Meeting and review documents were stored in databases or public computer drives. Text documents and presentations were generally used. HS professionals had access to update and maintain the system. 4.1.8. Characteristics of HS tools Interviewees identified many preferred characteristics for HS tools. The most desirable characteristics were user-friendliness, manageability and multipurpose usage: – User-friendly  Illustrative  Visible for everyone  Transparent  Everyone knows how it works  Simple to use and easy to learn – Designed for multipurpose  No need to have numerous different HS systems  No overlapping issues with E and Q – Easily manageable  Flexible  Maintenance in own hands  Easy to edit and possible to make own changes  Tailored for own purposes – Time and cost effective On the other hand, many challenges and concerns with existing HS tools were identified by the interviewees: – Increasing amount of different IT tools and personnel’s lacking IT skills creates a challenge. Can they really learn to use all the different tools if they are using them seldom? – It should be possible to modify the system by oneself. – There should be more HS training to ensure that skills are at the requisite level.

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Corporate safety reporting system

Local safety reporting system

Spreadsheets, reporting system

Site A: Safety Manager

Controller

Site B: Safety Manager

Controller

Site F: Safety Manager

Controller

Data combination

Monthly local safety reports Site C: Safety Manager Spreadsheets, reporting system

Additional editing: Data modification as compatible with corporate system

Site D: Safety Manager

Monthly corporate safety report

Site E: Safety Manager

Fig. 2. HS reporting process.

Incident

LTI

Reporting Supported by the local HS department Corporate wide rapid reporting (local senior management)

NonLTI Nearmiss

Local systems (everyone / supervisor)

Hazard

Investigation Section manager, production manager or supervisor

Actions Everyone

Communication Safety professionals Learning Everyone

Follow up Management and safety professionals

Fig. 3. Hazard and injury reporting process (Non-LTI = workplace injury without absence).

– There are too many automatic notices from different IT systems (not only HS). If a notice does not say exactly what to do, receivers do not bother to find out what is required. Automatic notices with no real content do not mean anything for the receiver. – It is not possible to solve the existing problems in the current system, cost is too high. – Everyone should be able to participate. – Risk assessments are not in HS reporting system. – There is a need to have a more efficient and automated system. Challenges and concerns reflected the other side of the wanted characteristics, and there was obviously a demand for improvements. Current HS tools did not cover all the requirements, which were set by HS management by corporate HS requirements (c.f. Section 4.2). Main weaknesses were related to HS reporting and risk management tools and the high number of separate tools, which were not-compatible with each other.

4.2. Corporate HS management 4.2.1. Safety vision and plan Corporate safety vision promoted the theme of Safety First and the target was to build a safety culture where all accidents were preventable. The phrase ‘‘Safety fist – everyone, every time, everywhere’’ was widely communicated through the organisation with four safety principles. Safety starts with me – all employees should take ownership for their safety and for colleagues around them and the leaders should take a key role modelling responsibility and never a walk by approach to safety. Safety before volume – employees’ safety should not be compromised for additional production or sales, and all employees were empowered to stop any production activity at any time if they were concerned for their safety or for the safety of others.

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No shortcuts – all employees should stop and think before taking actions in the sites, production tasks in the company had been risk assessed and a safety working procedure developed. No repeats – root causes and learnings from any incidents should be completely understood and counter-measures should be implemented and shared to all other sites in the company to ensure that the incident could not happen again. Vision and principles highlighted everyone’s role and the responsibility when building a safer workplace. It gave a statement that safety should take the first priority and risks should not be ignored. It followed the idea for continuous improvement and learning. The corporate safety development plan focused on three core themes (1) safety systems and processes, (2) employee ownership of safety and (3) safety leadership. Development in these three key areas allowed a number of sites to make a sustainable step change in safety performance and provided a positive benchmark for the development in other sites. (1) Safety systems and processes: The company involved in this case study had several corporate HS standards, which were the foundation for their safety management process (see Section 4.2.3 for more details). (2) Employee ownership: Actions in each site were slightly different based on their historical development. The common development activities were safety training, hazard spotting, peer observations and trade union involvement. (3) Safety leadership: Safety leadership focused on the development of the role modelling behaviours of the leaders and supervisors through the development of roles and responsibilities, leadership training and by executing safety behavioural observations. All sites worked to common key performance indicators and most senior management and operational leaders were set safety related key performance indicators as part of the target setting process each year.

4.2.2. HS indicators Corporate had defined leading and lagging HS indicators which were monitored monthly (Table 2). Leading indicators were predictive, and the purpose was to prevent unwanted incidents before anything happens. For example near-misses were defined as preventive, because near-miss reporting included always investigation, analysis and corrective actions. Hazards were determined as less serious situations than nearmisses, and hazards did not need as detailed investigation.

4.2.3. HS standards Corporate standards were focusing on HS leadership, risk management, safety processes and safety development (Fig. 4). Comparison between the OHSAS elements and the corporate HS standards is presented in Fig. 5 (the standards under development are excluded).

Table 2 Leading and lagging HS indicators. Leading indicator

Lagging indicator

Number of near-miss notices Number of hazard notices Number of safety behavioural observation notices Safety training to personnel

Number of Number of Number of (Non-LTI) Number of Number of injuries Number of

fatalities lost time injuries (LTI) non-lost time injuries occupational diseases sick leave days due to total sick leave days

HS leadership Safety processes Incident investigation (accidents and near miss incidents) Definitions for reporting Communications * Risk management Risk assessment Working at heights Manual handling Confined spaces Contractor safety Isolation of equipment (lock out – tack out) * Safety development Safety behavioural observation Training and competence * HS audit *

* Under development

Fig. 4. Corporate HS standards.

The corporate safety vision and principles together with the safety development plan determined the framework and covered the main OHSAS elements. Corporate HS standards completed the system by giving more detailed requirements for the elements. Although HS leadership covered partly similar aspects as competence and communication, HS standards for competence and communication were needed. There was a definite need for a HS audit standard, which was not covered in other standards at any level. Documentation was covered from the essential elements, but there was an opportunity for improvements in the control of documents. Monthly corporate HS reporting offered equivalent details for the management review in the corporate level, but there was not any systematic standard for it. Operational control was covered from contractor’s side in standards (as a part of other standards), but there was not any formal and comprehensive standard for this element. Change management from HS perspective was not covered at corporate level. Locally it was covered in those sites which had formal OHSAS certificate or advanced HS IT tools.

4.3. Comparison between corporate and local HS management Both corporate HS requirements and the local HS practices and tools determined how each site could improve their safety culture and performance. Terms ‘‘safety’’ and ‘‘HS’’ were used widely, but there was not uniform one term that is describing health and safety issues in the company. Even the corporate HS standards had some inconsistencies in terminology. Risk assessment practices were well-established on each of the sites, a wide variety of methods were used and the HS management system was based around it. The various sites had created systems that were suitable for them. Corporate hazard assessment standards and local procedures covered mainly the same aspects and the standards for risk management supported the local procedures well. The amount and variety of different local risk assessment methods was high, but in some cases the quality of assessments needed improvements. In addition to the general corporate risk assessment standard, corporate risk management standards covered the main risks identified. There were a large number of different risk management standards, and the significant role of risk management for HS management was observed. However, there was a lack of well-functioning risk assessment tools in some sites, and it could be possible to offer a common tool for the sites. Responsibility for risk assessments should be assigned to the

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(o)

O

O

(o)

(o)

(o)

O

Management review

O

Audits

O

Nonconformities and actions

O

Incident investigation

(o)

Performance measurement and monitoring

O

Operational control, including visitors and contractors

Documentation, control of documents

O

Participation and consultation

Corporate safety development plan

O

Communication

O

Competence, training, awareness

O

Resources, roles, responsibility, accountability and authority

Planning, including hazard identification and setting the objectives

Corporate safety vision and principles

Objectives and programme

General requirements, policy

OHSAS main elements

Corporate HS standards HS leadership

(o)

Risk assessment

O

Working at heights

O

Manual handling

O

Confined spaces

O

Contractor safety

O

Safety behavioural observation

(o)

(o)

Incident investigation O

Definitions for reporting

(o)

O

O (o)

O

Fig. 5. Comparison between corporate HS standards and OHSAS elements. Orange cell with (o) indicates that it was partly covered and green cell with s indicates that it was entirely covered. If the cell is white, the element was not covered. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

production organisation and be supported by HS professionals in all sites. Safety training was mentioned in the corporate safety development plan, but a separate standard did not exist. Corporate-wide HS training program had not been developed, but the amount of local HS training sessions was high. Local training sessions focused often to HS principles, safety management and responsibilities. HS tools were not in important role, but it was recognised as one development need in the interviews. General corporate HS trainings could cover the main HS principles and be used as a communication tool to improve safety attitudes and to create a uniform safety culture within the whole company. There was lot of HS communication in progress from the corporate functions and locally as well. The distinction between the local and corporate communication was not formally defined, and there was not any combined standard, plan or instructions for HS communication. The corporation had defined a wide range of HS indicators and the sites reported them monthly as required. All sites followed these indicators, but they had also many local indicators as mentioned in Section 4.1.4. In addition to monitoring the indicators in the beginning of the next month, LTIs were monitored real time at corporate level similarly with the local process. Although some local sites had determined their own targets for other HS indicators, there was not corporate level target for other indicators besides lost time injury frequency. The first step towards common corporate HS data gathering system was taken after the interviews, and the main goal was to eliminate any unnecessary steps and to have a more automated system in place. Corporate level safety reporting system was in a transitional stage and in its current format it was too complex. Local sites had different systems which were not all congruent with the corporate system. Even though

the local systems were different, data input to the corporate system was arranged. Local reporting in general was functioning better and its workflow was simpler. Corporate HS standard Definitions for safety reporting determined the details for LTI and serious near-miss reporting and the reporting followed the standard well. Investigation and analysis of the cause were required, and the details were determined in the Incident investigation standard. Local accident reporting and investigation systems varied and there was not any specific tool that was used in all the sites. The cause of an accident was presented, but in some reports it was not accurately the root cause. The current systems integrated incident reporting and analysis systematically in some sites, but not in all. Some sites had extremely detailed documented investigation method and analysis, but some sites documented only the main points. There were many different types of HS audits, internal and external, across the sites. Audit related documentation was local and there were many different IT tools available. Corporate was in a process of creating an internal HS audit standard and system, and there was a clear need for that. Formal HS audit standards and systems should assist when aiming towards to a common understanding of the content and definition of HS audit. As well, the sites should learn more from each other’s best practices. There were numerous local meetings which included HS issues and it was a good practice for the sites to be able to tailor the meetings so they were suitable for them. It was functioning systematically, and all the sites had the necessary meetings in place. There were different local management reviews on the sites, but there was not any formal and systematic corporate management review process. Monthly and quartile corporate HS reports were offered, and the content was at some level comparable with management review input.

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5. Discussion 5.1. General This research contributes new information from the changing global organisation’s perspective to HS management research. Continuous changes in the case organisation with many types of different sites created a challenge how to manage HS as complete entity. As well, the local legal requirements varied significantly because the sites were located across different continents. It was justified to ask how corporate can manage HS successfully in a continuously changing organisation if practices and tools vary between the sites significantly? Change management is required in OHSAS standard. The literature recognises change management as one key element for successful organisations. Change management should be taken into account also in IT systems and communication (Paton and McCalman, 2000; Aguilar and Hewage, 2013). However, the change management practices were not extensively carried out in the case company. It would be important to make sure that the change situations are adequately managed, when change is actually the permanent stage. Local HS practices and tools varied a lot as the hypothesis assumed, but they were based on the common understanding of successful HS management (e.g. Zink, 2014; Hale et al., 1997; Gnoni et al., 2013). With clearly determined and comprehensive corporate HS standards and targets, the objective of a preventive safety culture and zero injury philosophy could be reached. Corporate HS standards are required to determine and describe the processes of a desired HS management. Practices and tools can vary between the sites if the basis and the end result is the same following the corporate HS standards. Common HS and welfare standards have been developed recently (OHSAS, 2007; Bird, 2014; ISO, 2010), and the internal corporate HS standards should be based on a higher level of standards. Main HS standards have been created in the case company, but all the local sites were not fully adopting them. In addition, few standards were under development when the interviews were made. Capability towards OHSAS standards for the current HS management in the case company was evaluated at a high level, and it would be possible to certify OHSAS to all sites after some development which is described in Section 5.2. It is clear, that the current standard development is aiming to fill the gaps between OHSAS requirements and the corporate HS management practices (c.f. Fig. 4, standards under development). Corporate HS systems and processes are still under determination and development, but HS management in general is in a good basic level. Nevertheless, the systems and processes are only the first step, and the commitment and engagement defines the ultimate success (c.f. Zwetsloot et al., 2013, 2014; Wachter and Yorio, 2013). In corporate level, a common IT system for HS management could be useful, but it should have enough tailoring possibilities. Choosing a HS tool requires detailed and specific comparison between the best practices from the industry, literature and the local and corporate HS management demands. Following the principles discovered by Douglas et al. (2014), the first step is to define and understand the current practices and needs. HS tools can be effective only if they respond to the users’ needs. Participative methods and human–computer interaction should be part of the development and useful features of the existing tools should be taken into account. User friendliness, availability and accessibility should be some of the important aspects to consider when choosing or developing HS tool. Insufficient IT skills were a concern recognised by the interviewees. Having numerous complex IT tools could lead to a situation

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where certain tools are not used, which in turn could mean some of these tools could have assets that are not exploited by the users. To avoid this, the tools should be simple, launching should be considered carefully and comprehensive trainings should be carried out. As Bunney and Dale (1997) stated, the more complex the tool the fewer users there must be, users must use it more frequently and the training should be comprehensive. Also, enough time should be offered to adopt and understand the meaning, and to provide the necessary resources. It is not necessary for all units to use the same tool, but if there are separate local systems, they should provide the data in the format that it fulfils corporate requirements and it is easily converted for that purpose. Generally, HS tools need to support preventive safety reporting culture and corporate HS requirements. There were several different systems that responded to this requirement at an adequate level, but especially the continuous need for manageability, user-friendliness and a tool having a multipurpose use were considered not to be achieved at the moment. Dangerous situations may be unnoticeable even for many years before they trigger an accident due to some failure. It is essential to define leading indicators and to use systematic HS tools to test preparedness when a major accident occurs in similar situations. The current corporate level HS indicators provide a good combination of performance indicators for monitoring HS. As Morrow et al. (2014) concluded safety performance is correlated with concurrent measures of safety performance. Thus, the targets for leading indicators should be created to assist in developing HS in a more proactive direction, and the large number of incident reports supports the quantification of underlying causes. The findings in this research support the previous studies (Bellamy et al., 2013; Gnoni et al., 2013; Douglas et al., 2014). Communication, leadership and social factors were seen as a significant role for successful HS management. Users, sites and interaction between employees are different in global environment. In addition to technical elements of HS management, safety culture, risk awareness and behavioural change creates a stable foundation to improve safety performance in the future. The main focus should be addressed to behavioural change and safety culture to achieve the next level HS performance. As also Zanko and Dawson (2012) indicate: expand the focus from tools, techniques and practices to theoretical concerns and combine them with empirical study. 5.2. Recommendations Corporate HS standards and targets are deployed to the local HS management practices and tools at an adequate level, there are some improvements that are needed and recommendations which would support the local sites when moving towards a more preventive and uniform HS culture in the corporate. In addition, some gaps between OHSAS requirements were discovered. For the corporate, there is a need to: – Complete the missing standards and deploy them. – Make sure that the existing standards are adopted at a sufficient level. – Improve the current standards continuously based on the experiences. – Improve the control of HS documents and define management review practices. – Ensure that operational control is at an adequate level. – Determine targets for wider scale of lagging indicators and especially for leading HS indicators. – Use uniform terminology for HS. – Implement common HS training.

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For the local sites, there is a need to: – Ensure that change management practices are established. – Investigate incidents more precisely, especially the serious incidents. – Determine the actual root causes for the incidents. – Learn from other site’s incidents and good practices. – Make sure that the responsibilities for HS management are assigned to the correct party. – Ensure that continuous trainings for HS tools are arranged.

5.3. Limitation, evaluation and future research Research findings can be generalised at some level for a similar continuously changing organisation which has paid attention to HS and corporate social responsibility. With the same set up similar research could be performed in many types of organisations. Depending on the organisation type and HS maturity level, the results would differ. The study has been made from the corporate perspective, and the local perspective would presumably reveal new interesting aspects for the topic. The study could be repeated with the same results. Experimental reliability is high although the number of interviewees in each unit was limited. Stable HS management practices and tools made it possible to assume that the local Safety Managers would know and be aware of all the used practices and tools in their site. From the corporate perspective, the material is written and there is no risk for interpreting the material differently. Comparison between the corporate HS standards and OHSAS elements should reveal similar results. However, there is a need for a more detailed investigation to be able to determine a definitive map and stage between the standards and the elements. These results should be seen as preliminary high level description. There is research for health, safety, environment, quality and sustainability issues from many different aspects. There are a variety of expressions in use which concerns the terms for HS system, tool, application and software. HS tools are usually commercial products and literature covers mainly higher levels of the systems, and does not focus on one detailed area. For example there is a lot of HS management research, but the studies do not evaluate systematically what type of IT tool is the most effective for risk management and assessment for different types of organisations. There is obviously a need for further investigation within the case company. The need for a common risk management and HS reporting tool and the required characteristics of it should be found out. Also, synergy benefits with environment and quality practices could be the next step to reduce overlapping practices and similar work around the systems. It would be interesting to investigate smartphones for safety monitoring on the sites. Kim et al. (2013) for example lists requirements of mobile computing applications: information sufficiency, fast communication and advantageous visualisation. In total, the research revealed a number of interesting future research topics and internal development needs, which would support the case organisation with its continuous HS improvement.

6. Conclusions Clearly safety is taken seriously by the case organisation and it is emphasised. HS practices and tools were in good basic level and the next step is to find out how to achieve even better HS performance, which supports the overall company performance: economic, ecological and social. Management support of the HS efforts and well-being of employees is seen as an important asset.

Some improvement needs for the local and corporate level HS management practices and tools were discovered. HS practices and tools varied significantly between the sites and there was not any common practice or tool in use. In addition, there was variation on how deeply the corporate HS standards were adopted within the sites: some of the sites were exceeding the demands, but some were below the standards. Corporate HS management was based on HS standards, vision and principles, plan and targets. Corporate HS management followed mostly OHSAS requirements. The need for some additional corporate HS standards and targets for leading HS indicators was recognised. It is possible to manage HS in a continuously changing organisation if the foundation is based on the corporate HS standards. HS standards should be determined clearly based on the desired end result complying with the external requirements. Acknowledgements We want to express our gratitude to all interviewees whom participated in this research and thank the case company for all the resources provided. We are also grateful for all of the comments we have received during the writing process. Appendix A. Interview questions 1. Hazard identification, risk assessment and risk control (Risk management) a. What risk assessment systems and methods are in use? b. Who is responsible of the risk assessments? c. Who are the participants? d. What operations’ risks have been assessed? e. Where the assessments are saved, what is the system? f. Is there a systematic way for action follow up (including responsible persons and schedule)? g. How are risks related to contractor activities controlled? h. Who updates and maintains the system? i. Who are the users of risk assessments? j. In what situations risk assessments are used? 2. Competence, training and awareness (Competence) a. What HS training system is in use? b. Where completed courses are archived, and is the system separate from HS system, e.g. in HR system? c. Is there a separate system for contractors? d. What is the system in use for HS instructions? e. Who is responsible for updating and reviewing them? 3. Communication a. What is the Intranet in use, and what HS related material is presented there? b. What other HS communication channels are in use? 4. Performance measurement and monitoring (Performance) a. Who is responsible for HS performance statistic? b. How often is it made? c. What is the system? d. What are the indicators and how are they determined? 5. Injury and hazard reporting and investigation (Reporting and investigation) a. Who are the persons responsible for hazard and injury reporting? b. How workplace injury and hazard is defined? c. What reporting system is in use? d. What incidents are reported to this system? e. How investigation is made? 6. HS system audits (Audits) a. Are there regular HS system audits (internal and/or external)?

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b. How often audits are scheduled? c. What system is used to archive audit reports? 7. HS meetings and management reviews (Meetings and reviews) a. What HS meetings organised? Separately or as a part of other meetings. b. How often these meetings are arranged? c. Who are the participants and who has the main responsibility of them? 8. Other HS systems and tools a. What other HS systems and tools are in use? b. Is there a system to archive these documents? 9. What are the most useful HS tools in use at the moment? 10. What improvements to existing HS tools you would wish to have?

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