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Homeland security rule
Homeland security rule News & Views
I
n April of 2007 the Department of Homeland Security (see the News and Views comments in volume 14 # 4) published its Chemical Security Rule. As originally written the rule was extremely onerous for all educational and research laboratories. Following the initial rule, DHS listened to the many, many comments it received and on November 2, 2007 a revised rule was posted on their website. The official Final Rule should be published in the Federal Register within days of that posting. The revised rule and the list of ‘‘Chemicals of Interest’’ are a significant improvement over the April version. The impact on the rule on the laboratory community will be much less widespread and for those it does impact will very likely only be a one-time activity. DHS removed all of the ‘‘present in any amount’’ trigger quantities. This was the issue that forced almost every laboratory to file a Top Screen report. Under the revised rule, specific triggers exist for each chemical of interest. The trigger levels are such that most laboratories will not be included. To appreciate the impact of the revised Rule, it is useful to look at the Appendix A table for a specific, common laboratory chemical, such as ammonium hydroxide. This information was extracted from Appendix A and reproduced in the accompanying table. The chemical of interest is ammonia at a concentration greater than 20%. DHS does not list a synonym, but aqueous ammonia and ammonium hydroxide certainly are correct. The CAS Number is selfexplanatory. DHS has divided the security threats into three groups: Release, Theft and Sabotage. For each threat, DHS has listed a Screening Threshold in pounds and when applicable, a minimum concentration. For this example, DHS only is regulating ammonium hydroxide at greater than 20% for a release security threat. The Screening Threshold is 20,000 pounds. Thus, while almost every laboratory has ammonium hydroxide in gallon bottles with concentrations above 20%, few, if any have an amount in excess of 20,000 pounds in a vessel. Finally, DHS lists the Security Issue as ‘‘Release—Toxic.’’ This category is important, since DHS states1 ‘‘. . . a facility need not include release-toxic, release-flammable, or release-explosive chemicals of interest that a facility manufactures, processes, or uses in a
laboratory at the facility under the supervision of a technically qualified individual2 as defined in 40 CFR 720.3’’. The EPA definition3 of a technically qualified individual which DHS has adopted is: ‘‘. . . a person or persons (1) who, because of education, training, or experience, or a combination of these factors, is capable of understanding the health and environmental risks associated with the chemical substance which is used under his or her supervision, (2) who is responsible for enforcing appropriate methods of conducting scientific experimentation, analysis, or chemical research to minimize such risks, and (3) who is responsible for the safety assessments and clearances related to the procurement, storage, use, and disposal of the chemical substance as may be appropriate or required within the scope of conducting a research and development activity.’’ Notice that the three clauses in this definition are connected with ‘‘and’’; therefore all three must apply to the person or persons designated. It is clear from this definition that this will impose the duty on the Principal Investigator or faculty member, not on the Environmental Health and Safety staff. There are many important details related to implementing this rule, such as the laboratory exemption cited above. The general procedure to follow is as outlined in the previous paragraphs looking at the entire campus or laboratory complex. Implementation of this rule will be markedly facilitated for any laboratory which has a robust inventory manager. With such a program, you should be able to work through each of the chemicals of interest and determine what your total inventory is. The revised Appendix A treats some of the chemical weapons in a very realistic manner. Soman (o-pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate) for example, is assigned a cumulative Screening Threshold Quantity of 100 g for Theft. This reflects the fact that even if a few grams of Soman are diverted into a chemical attack, the actual impact will be very low. This allows a laboratory to use this agent in research without filing a Top Screen. For facilities which are included, a Top Screen report must be filed within 60 days of the official publication in the Federal Register. This will correspond to approximately when this 2
1
1871-5532/$32.00 doi:10.1016/j.jchas.2007.11.010
6 CFR 27.203(b)(2).
3
Underline added for emphasis. 40 CFR 720.3.
ß Division of Chemical Health and Safety of the American Chemical Society Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
37
38
X 20,000 20 7664-41-7 Ammonia (conc. 20% or greater)
Synonym Chemical Release Theft Sabotage Security Issue Abstract Minimum Screening Release— Release— Release— Theft— Theft— Theft— Sabotage/ Minimum Screening Minimum Screening Service Concentration Threshold Concentration Threshold Concentration Threshold Toxic Flammables Explosives CW/CWP WME EXP/IEDP Contamination (CAS) # (%) Quantities (%) Quantities (%) Quantities (in pounds (in pounds) unless otherwise noted)
where the DHS may not already recognize a security risk. For those locations, the DHS can request a Top Screen report or can request a Security Vulnerability Analysis. Many sites that the Times editorial implies are not included in the DHS Rule have already conducted a vulnerability assessment and have implemented security programs. The Times also contends that the DHS Rule does not protect shipments from being stolen. The editorial states: ‘‘If 450 pounds of chlorine are stolen, enough to cause mass casualties, the theft need not be reported. Chlorine has been used by insurgents in Iraq, and it is high on the list of chemicals that should be kept out of terrorists’ hands.’’ Again, the Times ignores the Department of Transportation requirements (49 CFR 171.800) which requires transportation security plans for shipments including a single cylinder of chlorine. The chemical industry has nothing to gain by allowing itself to become the target of an act of terrorism. The industry has been implementing security programs in earnest since 2001. While more remains to be done, the security vulnerability of the chemical enterprise is realistic and protective. The DHS Rule will bring more facilities under this security umbrella and this will result in a more secure homeland.
Chemicals of Interest (COI)
commentary is published. Research facilities can request an extension to the filing period. Non-research facilities which are covered must file the Top Screen in a timely manner. This Rule will contribute to the overall protection of the U.S. from chemical-based terrorism. On November 7, 2007, the New York Times published an editorial which was highly critical of the DHS Chemical Security Rule. The editorial makes claims which are misleading at best or incorrect. For example, the Times states: ‘‘The rules the department issued last week are far too lax about when facilities need to report stockpiles of chemicals like chlorine, fluorine and hydrogen fluoride to the government. According to the new rules, which watered-down proposed rules that the department had released in April, a chemical plant does not have to report the storage of 2,499 pounds of chlorine, even if it is located in a populated area – or across from an elementary school.’’ While true, the Times ignores the impact of the EPA Risk Management Plan requirement which does require reporting of this quantity of chlorine and results in a significant reduction in the risks associated with handling the chemical. The editorial also ignores the fact that the quantities in the DHS rule are designed to notify the DHS of the presence of chemicals at locations
Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, January/February 2008
I
n April of 2007 the Department of Homeland Security (see the News and Views comments in volume 14 # 4) published its Chemical Security Rule. As originally written the rule was extremely onerous for all educational and research laboratories. Following the initial rule, DHS listened to the many, many comments it received and on November 2, 2007 a revised rule was posted on their website. The official Final Rule should be published in the Federal Register within days of that posting. The revised rule and the list of ‘‘Chemicals of Interest’’ are a significant improvement over the April version. The impact on the rule on the laboratory community will be much less widespread and for those it does impact will very likely only be a one-time activity. DHS removed all of the ‘‘present in any amount’’ trigger quantities. This was the issue that forced almost every laboratory to file a Top Screen report. Under the revised rule, specific triggers exist for each chemical of interest. The trigger levels are such that most laboratories will not be included. To appreciate the impact of the revised Rule, it is useful to look at the Appendix A table for a specific, common laboratory chemical, such as ammonium hydroxide. This information was extracted from Appendix A and reproduced in the accompanying table. The chemical of interest is ammonia at a concentration greater than 20%. DHS does not list a synonym, but aqueous ammonia and ammonium hydroxide certainly are correct. The CAS Number is selfexplanatory. DHS has divided the security threats into three groups: Release, Theft and Sabotage. For each threat, DHS has listed a Screening Threshold in pounds and when applicable, a minimum concentration. For this example, DHS only is regulating ammonium hydroxide at greater than 20% for a release security threat. The Screening Threshold is 20,000 pounds. Thus, while almost every laboratory has ammonium hydroxide in gallon bottles with concentrations above 20%, few, if any have an amount in excess of 20,000 pounds in a vessel. Finally, DHS lists the Security Issue as ‘‘Release—Toxic.’’ This category is important, since DHS states1 ‘‘. . . a facility need not include release-toxic, release-flammable, or release-explosive chemicals of interest that a facility manufactures, processes, or uses in a
laboratory at the facility under the supervision of a technically qualified individual2 as defined in 40 CFR 720.3’’. The EPA definition3 of a technically qualified individual which DHS has adopted is: ‘‘. . . a person or persons (1) who, because of education, training, or experience, or a combination of these factors, is capable of understanding the health and environmental risks associated with the chemical substance which is used under his or her supervision, (2) who is responsible for enforcing appropriate methods of conducting scientific experimentation, analysis, or chemical research to minimize such risks, and (3) who is responsible for the safety assessments and clearances related to the procurement, storage, use, and disposal of the chemical substance as may be appropriate or required within the scope of conducting a research and development activity.’’ Notice that the three clauses in this definition are connected with ‘‘and’’; therefore all three must apply to the person or persons designated. It is clear from this definition that this will impose the duty on the Principal Investigator or faculty member, not on the Environmental Health and Safety staff. There are many important details related to implementing this rule, such as the laboratory exemption cited above. The general procedure to follow is as outlined in the previous paragraphs looking at the entire campus or laboratory complex. Implementation of this rule will be markedly facilitated for any laboratory which has a robust inventory manager. With such a program, you should be able to work through each of the chemicals of interest and determine what your total inventory is. The revised Appendix A treats some of the chemical weapons in a very realistic manner. Soman (o-pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate) for example, is assigned a cumulative Screening Threshold Quantity of 100 g for Theft. This reflects the fact that even if a few grams of Soman are diverted into a chemical attack, the actual impact will be very low. This allows a laboratory to use this agent in research without filing a Top Screen. For facilities which are included, a Top Screen report must be filed within 60 days of the official publication in the Federal Register. This will correspond to approximately when this 2
1
1871-5532/$32.00 doi:10.1016/j.jchas.2007.11.010
6 CFR 27.203(b)(2).
3
Underline added for emphasis. 40 CFR 720.3.
ß Division of Chemical Health and Safety of the American Chemical Society Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
37
38
X 20,000 20 7664-41-7 Ammonia (conc. 20% or greater)
Synonym Chemical Release Theft Sabotage Security Issue Abstract Minimum Screening Release— Release— Release— Theft— Theft— Theft— Sabotage/ Minimum Screening Minimum Screening Service Concentration Threshold Concentration Threshold Concentration Threshold Toxic Flammables Explosives CW/CWP WME EXP/IEDP Contamination (CAS) # (%) Quantities (%) Quantities (%) Quantities (in pounds (in pounds) unless otherwise noted)
where the DHS may not already recognize a security risk. For those locations, the DHS can request a Top Screen report or can request a Security Vulnerability Analysis. Many sites that the Times editorial implies are not included in the DHS Rule have already conducted a vulnerability assessment and have implemented security programs. The Times also contends that the DHS Rule does not protect shipments from being stolen. The editorial states: ‘‘If 450 pounds of chlorine are stolen, enough to cause mass casualties, the theft need not be reported. Chlorine has been used by insurgents in Iraq, and it is high on the list of chemicals that should be kept out of terrorists’ hands.’’ Again, the Times ignores the Department of Transportation requirements (49 CFR 171.800) which requires transportation security plans for shipments including a single cylinder of chlorine. The chemical industry has nothing to gain by allowing itself to become the target of an act of terrorism. The industry has been implementing security programs in earnest since 2001. While more remains to be done, the security vulnerability of the chemical enterprise is realistic and protective. The DHS Rule will bring more facilities under this security umbrella and this will result in a more secure homeland.
Chemicals of Interest (COI)
commentary is published. Research facilities can request an extension to the filing period. Non-research facilities which are covered must file the Top Screen in a timely manner. This Rule will contribute to the overall protection of the U.S. from chemical-based terrorism. On November 7, 2007, the New York Times published an editorial which was highly critical of the DHS Chemical Security Rule. The editorial makes claims which are misleading at best or incorrect. For example, the Times states: ‘‘The rules the department issued last week are far too lax about when facilities need to report stockpiles of chemicals like chlorine, fluorine and hydrogen fluoride to the government. According to the new rules, which watered-down proposed rules that the department had released in April, a chemical plant does not have to report the storage of 2,499 pounds of chlorine, even if it is located in a populated area – or across from an elementary school.’’ While true, the Times ignores the impact of the EPA Risk Management Plan requirement which does require reporting of this quantity of chlorine and results in a significant reduction in the risks associated with handling the chemical. The editorial also ignores the fact that the quantities in the DHS rule are designed to notify the DHS of the presence of chemicals at locations
Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, January/February 2008