Housing reconstruction in Kosovo

Habitat International 26 (2002) 571–590

Housing reconstruction in Kosovo$ Corrado Minervini*,1 School of Technology, Architecture and Towns in Developing Countries, Polytechnic of Turin, Turin, Italy Received 21 January 2002; received in revised form 1 April 2002; accepted 8 April 2002

Abstract Housing reconstruction is one of the first steps towards environmental and economic recovery and development after a ‘complex emergency’. This paper presents the main aspects and experience of the Housing Reconstruction Programme (HRP) in Kosovo since its beginning in 1999 until 2001. The special reference to the Peja/Pec (Peja is the Kosovar name of the most western municipality in Kosovo whose Serbian name is Pec. In the paper both names (Peja and Pec) appear because of the uncertain political status of the country at the time at which the paper was written.) region helps to contextualise the case-study, giving concrete images of the HRP. Kosovo has been a special case because the United Nations has managed the entire reconstruction process since soon after the NATO bombing. A great many economic and human resources have been deployed, since the United Nations, the European Union and many international organisations have been thoroughly involved. This has created high expectations both in terms of quality and quantity of results and duration required to stabilise the tremendous hotbed represented by the Balkans. The previous deep involvement of the international community in Bosnia a few years before and in the same area of the Balkans has also created mutatis mutandis a comparable antecedent. The literature on the subject, in terms of manuals and articles, supports the analysis and criticism. The reconstruction process analysed ranges from damage assessment to housing reconstruction management and implementation, where implementation is not only intended as the physical reconstruction of the country but also the institutional and capacity building that the UN, the most important international organisation, has been creating in Kosovo. In spite of the bulk investment, not all the strategies and actions implemented can be considered successful. Certainly, some could even be considered best practices and hence are replicable. Among these is the Municipal Housing Committee (MHC), which has the lion’s share of the institutional bodies set up by the UN temporary government to manage housing reconstruction.

$ The opinions expressed by the author in this article are not necessarily those of the EU Department of Reconstruction in the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo. *Corresponding author. Tel.: +33-4-97071058; fax: +39-011-5646442. E-mail address: [email protected] (C. Minervini). 1 The author was Regional Housing Co-ordinator in the fourth European Union Pillar of the UNMIK in Kosovo.

0197-3975/02/$ - see front matter r 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 1 9 7 - 3 9 7 5 ( 0 2 ) 0 0 0 2 6 - 7

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Apparently the MHC has dealt with only the selection of beneficiaries. In fact the MHC has created an adequate peaceful and democratic environment in which housing reconstruction has taken place, as well as the allocation of housing assistance to minority families. Within the HRP the role of the NGOs has been crucial as always, but limited to a much more sectoral-specific involvement, contrary to the Bosnia experience. This has impeded the adoption of appropriate building technologies, a real participatory and integrated approach, and post emergency local development where housing and people (ethnics included) were pivotal. However today in Kosovo, the games have already been played, the decisions have been taken and development is somehow in progress. r 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Housing reconstruction management; Municipal housing; United Nations interim administration in Kosovo; Kosovo

1. Introduction From the political geography point of view, Kosovo belongs to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia whose capital city is Belgrade. After the 78-day NATO air campaign against the repressive Serbian regime, Kosovo became the UN’s first international experience of territorial government. Under Security Council Resolution 1244, the UN established an international security presence—the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), and an interim civil administration—the UN Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Endowed by the Security Council with broad authority to administer Kosovo, UNMIK fills the political and administrative vacuum left after the NATO air strike campaign. Therefore, at the moment (2002), Kosovo is a hybrid from the legal viewpoint. It is a state which has never existed, but which probably will. It is a country whose status has been temporarily suspended until an unknown date. Its temporary government is, for the first time in history, in the hands of the United Nations. UNMIK is a huge institutional organisation created to eliminate ethnic hatred, and to attempt reconciliation, reconstruction and political planning. UNMIK provides an interim civil administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions that can assume administrative responsibilities, pending a political settlement. In other words, UNMIK’s responsibilities include performance of basic civil administrative functions, support of humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, assuring the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, maintenance of law and order, organising and overseeing the development of provisional self-governing institutions, transferring authority to those institutions, facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status, and overseeing the transfer of authority from the provisional institutions to those established under a political settlement. The temporary government has been illuminated by the international experience of the United Nations Agencies, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union (EU). They make up UNMIK’s four pillars of humanitarian assistance2 under the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), civil administration under the United Nations 2

Since 2001, the First Pillar has been called ‘‘Police and Justice Affairs’’.

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itself, democratisation and institution building under the OSCE, and economic reconstruction and development under the European Union.3 Since the beginning in summer 1999, UNMIK has set up regulations and suggestions aiming to provide Kosovo with the minimum basic democratic environment ideally necessary for the transition. The administrative hubs of the UNMIK government were the thirty municipalities that made up Kosovo: a region of almost 11,000 km2, populated by less than two million inhabitants. The municipalities were established on the basis of UN Regulation 2000/45. It ‘‘establishes provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government at the municipal level as a step in the progressive transfer of administrative responsibilities from United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which will oversee and support the consolidation of these institutions.’’ On October 28, 2000, in a major step towards the development of provisional institutions, UNMIK organised the first free and fair elections in Kosovo, in which 79% of registered voters, including some minorities, turned out to elect representatives to 30 Municipal Assemblies. The 30 municipalities (run by an UNMIK international Municipal Administrator) and their elected assemblies enjoy a fully decentralised administration, which was intended for the purpose of assisting the management of such municipal issues as utilities, education, health care, reconstruction and development. The Municipal Administrators—of different ethnic origins— have had to accomplish a difficult task—that of managing to make the simplest rules of administration common sense and achieving compliance with rules of civilised and honest cooperation among locals and internationals. After NATO, Kosovo was devastated. It was a typical complex emergency situation characterised by the deliberate destruction of political, economic, social and environmental systems, rendering complex emergencies fundamentally more devastating than other disasters (Knight, 1998). Prior to that, Kosovo had suffered from overwhelming poverty, the disintegration of the middle class, a breakdown in the rule of law, a failure to protect minority rights, and the loss of property rights, both individually and collectively. Since the NATO bombing UNMIK has had to face a catastrophic situation comprising refugees and destruction, which was as widespread as 50% or even 70% of the inhabited areas. Most of the refugees returned to their place of origin immediately, aware that they would receive humanitarian assistance later on. The intervention of the multinational army task force was crucial and widespread. Since the day of so-called ‘‘liberation’’ from the Serbian military and paramilitary troops, the International Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been strong in ensuring safety, first in the civilian emergency and then also as regards future development. The main infrastructures have been restored, among them chiefly roadways and health care. The European Union has also played an important and multifaceted role in both the emergency and in the reconstruction of Kosovo. Apart from providing bilateral co-operation, it has been present in Kosovo through three main institutions. The European Agency of Reconstruction (EAR) almost completely subsidised physical rehabilitation. The International Management Group (IMG) immediately intervened to assess the war damage and to provide highly qualified technical assistance to the reconstruction efforts. After the initial focus on basic reconstruction, 3

HCIC (the Humanitarian Community Information Centre) Kosovo Encyclopaedia, June 2000.

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the fourth pillar of the provisional Kosovar government immediately shifted towards economic development and growth.

2. Damage assessment and emergency reconstruction In summer 1999, UNHCR and IMG led the damage survey on the basis of the fundamental disagreement. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Management Group (IMG),4 which relates to the accountability of European steering committee members, made a thorough survey of private and public property assets throughout Kosovo. Both agencies were experienced. The latter was founded to face the reconstruction activity in Bosnia in 1993. Since then, IMG has performed at maximum efficiency because of the high professional profile of its managers, engineers and architects. In Bosnia, IMG was the reference point for reconstruction activity. IMG made the damage assessment and fixed the reconstruction standards, monitored the implementing partners on behalf of the major donor, the European Union, and in co-ordination with the local administrations. As a surveyor, the UNHCR had had a totally different experience in Africa and in South and Central America, following ethnic and civil conflicts and natural disasters. The UNHCR’s wider surveying experience to a certain extent compensates for the highly efficient and more geographically specific experience of IMG. Surprisingly, as a matter of fact the two well-known and legitimised institutions presented two different surveys. Though they both based their damage assessment on some basic satellite data on the one hand, and on a direct visual estimation of damages on the other, the overall results attained in terms of total damaged and destroyed houses differed, as did their standard evaluations of damage. While IMG adopted four categories of damage, UNHCR divided the degree of damage into five levels. Experts and Municipal Technical Officers resolved to simplify these parameters into two categories: damaged and destroyed houses. The former were those ones included in IMG categories 2 and 3 and UNHCR categories 2, 3 and 4, while the latter were included in IMG category 4 and UNHCR category 5. While the damage categorisation was more or less solved, the difference in figures made people (from beneficiaries to municipal officers) confused and rather sceptical about the effectiveness of the two ‘‘reliable agencies’’ (Table 1). This created an atmosphere of mistrust between the assisted municipalities and the international UNMIK officers. Some municipality officers (internationals included) reacted and refused to accept any kind of ‘official’ damage assessment made by anyone else but themselves. Further assessments were made at the municipal level and new figures appeared, which were, of course, completely different from those of IMG and UNHCR. Moreover, some municipalities consequently also refused the housing reconstruction needs evaluation and the relative allocation, 4

Following the collapse of Yugoslavia and during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the International Management Group (IMG) was established in 1993 as a specialised intergovernmental agency in accordance with UN resolution 179, dated November 21, 1947. IMG addressed a variety of needs that could not be covered by other existing profit and non-profit organisations or institutions. The IMG management and operational structure is sectionalised and covers sectors such as housing, urbanism, transport, water management, solid waste management, energy, telecommunications, agriculture and Geographical Information Systems.

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Table 1 Damage assessment in Peja/Pec region Peja/Pec regiona IMG Destr

Tot

UNHCR

Municipal assessment

Average

Dam

Dam

Municipalities

Dam

1 Decan 2 Giakova 3 Istog 4 Klina 5 Peje Total

1882 3525 5407 2657 1700 2087 3787 2074 1796 2592 4388 2222 3362 3579 6941 2408 4499 6618 11117 4852 13239 18401 31640 14213

Destr Tot 1803 1545 1649 1235 3295 9527

4460 1882 3619 3025 3871 2223 3643 2256 8147 4981 23740 14367

Destr

Tot

Dam

Destr

Tot

3525 2475 2066 1580 4015 13661

5407 5500 4289 3836 8996 28028

2140 2951 5091 2266 2036 4302 2080 2102 4183 2675 2131 4807 4777 4643 9420 13940 13863 27803

a

Damage assessment is also available at the Humanitarian Community Information Center (HCIC) in Pristine. The reported figures on the damage assessment were supplied by the Directors of the Reconstruction Department of Peja/Pec region municipalities. The different reference categories established by IGM and UNHCR were superseded by two categories only: damaged houses (UNHCR cat. 2–4, and IMG cat. 2 and 3) and destroyed houses (UNHCR cat. 5 and IMG cat. 4).

as it was based on the ‘‘official’’ damage assessment. This was the first clash between the newly established Kosovar municipalities and the Department of Reconstruction: a basic conflict between the UN and EU departments, as the former managed the municipalities administratively while the latter managed reconstruction. Though damage assessment is a mere technical procedure, its mismanagement has triggered a chain reaction. It is widely known that for each building, damage assessment identifies a degree of damage on the basis of a preliminarily set-up scale. It is essential that its formats be standard so as to facilitate the process of analysis and collation among similar cases. Likewise, there should be a common understanding of the terminology used (ADPC 2000).5 Imprecise terminology, or different interpretations of it, can cause confusion6 by misleading the estimated total cost of the rehabilitation programme, and worse still the single allocation of war damaged houses to be repaired or rebuilt per municipality. Such a negative impact on the Kosovo Housing Reconstruction Programme was due to two-sided terminology and interpretations that made it unclear. In fact, the positions of the damage assessment schools of thought are not so conflicting as to prevent any likely agreement between IMG and the UN Agency. In any case they have had to 5

Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, Post-Disaster Damage Assessment and Need Analyses , Report 13 October, 2000- Second Draft. ADPC Workshop on Post-Disaster Assessment and Needs Analysis, Bangkok 24–28 April 2000. Documents produced by participants of the Workshop, and also drawn from a variety of other publications including the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Field Operations Guide, the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Field Handbook, the SPHERE Project, and the South Pacific Disaster Reduction Program’s Guide to Successful Damage Reporting. 6 Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, Post-Disaster Damage Assessment and Need Analyses , Report 13 October, 2000- Second Draft. ADPC Workshop on Post-Disaster Assessment and Needs Analysis, Bangkok 24–28 April 2000. Documents produced by participants of the Workshop, and also drawn from a variety of other publications including the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Field Operations Guide, the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Field Handbook, the SPHERE Project, and the South Pacific Disaster Reduction Program’s Guide to Successful Damage Reporting, p. 6.

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complete different parallel procedures. Whether this was due to a misunderstanding or to a lack of agreement is not known. What is extremely difficult to believe, however, is that UNMIK adopted and issued both methods and figures. This was to be interpreted as the first step towards a bad housing reconstruction practice. Despite this, in early autumn 1999, UNHCR, KFOR, the major international organisations and NGOs succeeded in organising a buffer reconstruction programme to cope with the first winter under the UNMIK government. A priority for the UNHCR humanitarian pillar in the first 6 months of UNMIK was to help the people of Kosovo through a particularly harsh winter. UNHCR, together with the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance and other partners, distributed shelter kits, and tools and materials to ensure that the residents of around 100,000 damaged or destroyed homes would have a roof over their heads. Emergency repair kits with which to insulate at least one room were provided to around 60,000 families. More than 12,000 expanded roofing kits of beams and heavy roofing plastic were distributed, with each kit providing shelter for up to 18 persons.7 The current reconstruction began in 2000 with 80 international NGOs present locally and a draft of the Reconstruction Guidelines issued in March. The Reconstruction Guidelines were set up by the Housing Directorate of the Department of Reconstruction (UNMIK EU pillar)8, addressed to municipalities and directed towards providing common rules for: * * * *

identification of beneficiaries; rehabilitation and reconstruction for damaged and destroyed houses; implementation procedures; and general co-ordination of activities and actors.

Between 1999 and 2000, more than one third of war-damaged houses were rehabilitated or rebuilt, mostly thanks to the substantial funds from the EAR. In 2001, the investment was considerably reduced (to 1/3 of the previous year’s) and the same percentage reduction from the previous year was adopted for 2002. Up until the 2001 reconstruction campaign, more than half of the houses destroyed or damaged by the war had been repaired or reconstructed by the Housing Reconstruction Programme (HRP).

3. Housing reconstruction management The housing sector is generally considered to be a catalyst for starting broad post-war intervention leading to sustainable development, particularly if the local population is involved (Hasic & Roberts, 1999). On the other hand, while the need to respond quickly to an emergency situation focuses attention on physical refugee settlement, resettlement or reconstruction, the 7

HCIC (the Humanitarian Community Information Centre) Kosovo Encyclopaedia, June 2000. The Department of Reconstruction is one of the Departments under the responsibility of the IV EU (Economic Reconstruction and Development) Pillar. The others are: Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Public Utility Department (PUD) and the Central Fiscal Authority (CFA). 8

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wider objective of maximising linkages with the local community and local economy is often neglected (Armstrong, 1991). Investment in the social capital of disaster-affected communities is the key to building sustainable recovery. Until now post-disaster reconstruction has focused too much on rebuilding programmes only, and though deprived of the social component even technical solutions do not take adequate account of the needs of the community. This may mean that reconstruction will not lead to recovery (Nilssen, 2001). The Housing Reconstruction vs Appropriate and Sustainable Development dichotomy, through grassroots community involvement, seems to find a solution in the fourth basic principle—out of twelve—guiding reconstruction planning in a post-war environment (Davis, 1986). It states and advises ‘‘Always assess and, if necessary, rebuild the building industry before rebuilding towns and cities’’. Applied research on suitable local building materials and the development of the building materials industry was not addressed in the reconstruction plans in post-war Nigeria (Awotona, 1992) and was not even conceived in Kosovo. Physical reconstruction began in the spring of 2000. The overwhelming majority of the building materials and components were imported from the neighbouring countries of Macedonia, Greece, Italy, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Germany. At the same time a basic survey of the building materials industry in the region was carried out only for the purpose of ‘‘commercialising’’ the largest building materials manufacturing companies on the international market. The small manufacturers in the construction sector begging help for an adequate and opportune reengineering of their production plants were totally ignored, as was the local market. The local building materials, of course, were expensive. The approach was definitive, liberal and probably justified by the need to avoid the negative impact of the self-reliant and self-sufficient economy impeding urban growth and development (Danermark, 1993), and above all the interference of the local mafia and the nearby Albanian mafia. In both cases the phantom of nearby Albania was particularly felt. The first impression was indeed that in Kosovo the general policy principles and macro-economic objectives inevitably led to avoidance of any kind of bad influence from Albania. On the contrary—some observed—the general international policy plan was to create a strategic industrial and economic growth pole in Kosovo (where the majority have Albanian culture and speak Albanian), diverting the Albanian exodus towards Kosovo instead of Europe. This may justify and explain the great commitment of the international community (mainly the European Union) to accelerate economic development based on a wider international commercialisation of economic assets and resources, neglecting the small scraps such as the local building construction economy, for instance. The adopted approach was fully confirmed by: (a) the enormous stock of building materials purchased outside Kosovo by THW (Technisches Hilfswerk—German Government Disaster Relief Organisation) immediately after the war to address the Housing Reconstruction Programme; (b) the breaks in the reconstruction activity during the clashes between the Macedonian Army and the UCK (Ushtria C - lirimtare e Kosov.es—Kosovo Liberation Army) in late spring and summer 2001, as the majority of the building materials convoys crossed the Macedonian border; and (c) the exclusive use of modern building construction technology based on reinforced concrete, to rebuild houses destroyed by the war wherever they were i.e. in urban or rural areas.

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This approach conflicts with the tentative promotion of informal economic activities, with an emphasis on small-scale and family businesses, encouraged by the existing literature (Keating, 1994; Hasic & Roberts, 1999). Moreover, the adopted building technology did not allow users to build their homes with selfhelp as most Kosovars had in the past. In fact, mainly in the rural areas the locals used to build up their homes using traditional building technology, which is adobe reinforced with recurrent horizontal wooden boards. Hence, the approach also conflicts with the conviction that the HRP should not attempt to rectify chronic needs,9 as the mud brick houses were replaced with reinforced concrete constructions. Before the war, charming and proportionate examples of vernacular architecture in adobe were spread all over the country, and in terms of ancient beauty they competed with the more renowned kulas or 19th century solid stone buildings. Nowadays, the architectural environment (rural and urban) has been definitively changed in favour of disproportionate reinforced concrete skeletons, which are liberally interpreted by house owners as such technology allows. Banned by the civil building constructions, the adobe houses were considered overall ‘‘not appropriate’’ and not applicable to the HRP for Kosovo. We wonder whether scientific research and experimental studies on improved and hybrid technologies related to mud brick houses were foreign to decision-makers, or the objectives to pursue in Kosovo were totally different. After the NATO bombing and the so-called ‘‘liberation’’, only building construction companies specialised in casting reinforced concrete could manage most of the housing reconstruction. The users seldom ‘‘participated’’ in the housing reconstruction. Their participation consisted in finishing the house details (partial participation), and/or hiring a building contractor for the clearance of rubble, the laying of the foundations and so on. The latter should not be called participation, but rather deferment. In this respect, the approach to reconstruction was neither participative nor cost saving, though generally users, in both project conception and implementation, contribute significantly to cost savings, resource mobilisation and the efficient use of resources (Schubeler, 1996). Only some rare NGOs working with their own funds, independently implemented real participatory projects, thus helping people to help themselves. The rest of the Kosovar community involved in the Housing Reconstruction Programme did not even feel the involvement, as the human resources mobilised were external instead of local, and the approach was capital intensive rather than human intensive. In a post conflict area, communities are potentially more receptive to initiatives that introduced sustainable development practices, particularly if they were directly involved. This was noted and stressed just a few years earlier, in an analysis of the Bosnia and Herzegovina casestudy (Hasic & Roberts, 1999). The Kosovar community would have been even more receptive due to past experience when the whole Kosovar community spontaneously established a parallel underground system at the educational and economic levels. This system allowed them to survive the oppression of the Serb Government and Army for 10 years, and was possible because Kosovar society was already strongly organised with clannish structures.

9

Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, Post-Disaster Damage Assessment and Need Analyses , Report 13 October, 2000- Second Draft, p. 5.

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This strong and invincible sense of community was not exploited at all in the housing reconstruction process. The reason for this is two-fold: *

*

firstly because the construction technology system adopted in Kosovo housing reconstruction needed only skilled labour (supplied from outside the community, as well as the building materials and related technology coming from abroad) and secondly because only a few houses per village were selected to be repaired or rebuilt, thus creating a strong sense of envy among the unassisted remainder of the target village community.

One more reason may be that the clannish Kosovar society was considered by donors to be a barrier to the transparent and democratic allocation of houses to be repaired or reconstructed. This may be true. As a matter of fact, housing assistance was not available for all, but rather for those families matching some specific criteria (see beneficiary selection) which in most cases conflicted with the chieftain’s view and opinion. However, even a target clannish society could have suggested a way to make participation active. The donors sought neither likely co-operation with the grassroots society nor a meeting point with the existing clannish social structure. The seventh principle proposed by I. Davis states ‘‘At every possible point, involve the local population that has survived the war in the planning process and rebuilding activity’’ (Davis, 1986). Although the research and related literature, conferences, congresses, meetings and seminars, and thousands of papers have always extensively encouraged the participatory approach, and although since the 1970s the paradigm of community development has promoted people’s involvement in projects—meaning that local people have an important role to play in decisionmaking, planning, implementing of plans, and taking an active role in ‘evaluation’ (Cohen & Uphoff, 1980), Davis’ seventh principle was not even considered, in spite of all this. As a result of housing reconstruction intervention in Kosovo, the original sense of community was endangered as disparities in living standards were created between those families benefiting from housing assistance and those continuing to live in adobe houses though they were not damaged during the war. It seemed that macro-economic decisions were affecting both the developments of the local building construction industry and participatory post-war building reconstruction, with two side effects: (a) a definitive modification of the architectural panorama in favour of reinforced concrete technology, without sustainable and appropriate building construction alternatives and (b) the creation of a modern society whose sustainability was sought in external aid and substantial external capital investment.

4. The municipal housing committee On the institutional side, reconstruction management is less problematical than damage assessment and political and macro-economic options for physical reconstruction.

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The crucial role of an institutional structure which clearly defines responsibilities for each of the elements in the reconstruction programme has been considered of paramount importance since 1986 (Davis, 1986),10 and was confirmed ten years later by the World Bank (World Bank, 1996). In Kosovo, the establishment and development of an institutional body directly related to housing reconstruction was conceived at the very beginning of the reconstruction activity in 1999. Its name was Municipal Housing Committee (MHC) and it was planned to be within the Municipalities, but under the guidance of the Housing Directorate. The Housing Directorate is one of the several directorates making up the Department of Reconstruction11 (in turn within the fourth EU pillar of UNMIK). ‘‘It is responsible for the normalisation of the housing situation in Kosovo so that the most vulnerable population –particularly minorities–is adequately housed.’’12 The Housing Directorate also established strict building guidelines for housing reconstruction, that all donors have agreed to follow in order to ensure equity in the reconstruction effort and to maximise the value of the reconstruction. In addition, procedures were established through which families could register with their municipal council. At the operative municipal level, therefore, it is mainly the MHC that manages the Housing Reconstruction Programme. It works as an institutional body at the Kosovar Municipal Administrations level in order to establish a sound environment within which the HRP can be promoted and implemented. This secure environment was initially intended to be democratic and transparent according to the reference guide to the Housing Reconstruction (HR) Guidelines, that clearly define the procedures to be followed to identify beneficiaries or allocate houses (to be repaired or rebuilt) to the most vulnerable families13 in the municipalities. Hence, in theory the MHC was independent from the political influence of the local parties. It seemed to be just a reference technical body devoted only to reconstruction purposes, in other words, a simple and objective mechanism with which to allocate housing assistance to the most needy families. In practice, the real and hidden objective of the MHC might be sought in institutional and capacity building actions, providing the Municipal Officers with adequate moral authority and technical competence to run the very delicate issue of housing assistance in a reconstruction programme independently. Housing assistance is in fact addressed only to those families in need, whose houses were affected by the war. Therefore, beneficiaries were meant to be a limited number of Kosovar families. The fight to obtain almost 12,000 US dollars was tough, and political pressure repeatedly attempted to intrude the MHC, sometimes successfully. In Bosnia, such an institutional body with two-fold objectives was not established. 10

Principle 6: Effective and rapid reconstruction requires a role-casting operation by central and/or regional government leaders. 11 The Department of Reconstruction was established by UNMIK regulation 2000/19. The Department may make policy recommendations on the formulation of an overall strategy for reconstruction in Kosovo, and a public reconstruction investment programme. 12 HCIC (the Humanitarian Community Information Centre) 2001. 13 HR Guidelines 2001, paragraph 3.4.

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Both the Return and Reconstruction Programmes were directly inspired and tied to Article 1 of the Seventh Annex of the Dayton Peace Agreement.14 Soon after the first phase of providing shelter to refugees, the so-called linking first aid to development phase saw the NGOs as the main actors in tackling physical reconstruction, the reintegration of the minority return, and job opportunity creation. As stated in a note by ECHO (European Community Humanitarian Organisation) to its Implementing Partners,15 from 1996 to 1999 the NGOs operating in the field in Bosnia and Herzegovina had to pursue the multifaceted objectives with the external help of the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF)16—a very variegated international entity essentially supervising and acting in favour of the fulfilment of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The Municipalities, in turn, participated in the HRP when the NGO notified them of their incipient physical and social intervention, the need to free the occupied houses, and the requirement for bureaucratic actions such as the checking of technical documents and the signing of the tripartite agreement documents. Contrary to the case of Kosovo, where a temporary government was immediately established, in Bosnia, soon after the war, the local government was weak enough to let the NGOs have a prominent role within the whole reconstruction activity. As a matter of fact, the NGOs in Bosnia were much more involved in the overall problems of their specific area and they acted with a multidisciplinary approach. In Kosovo the NGOs were rigorously selected after the first emergency phase. At the beginning of 2001, the EAR—the actual main donor of the HRP—drastically reduced the number of NGOs to less than half that of the previous year. Those selected had their role relegated to assuring correct construction from the technical and administrative points of view. Another relatively small, but extremely hard and contradictory task, consisted in fostering the target community to propose some of its community members as probable housing beneficiaries—the winners of the reconstruction lottery. This was a hard and contradictory task due to the reluctance of the village or neighbourhood communities to immediately comply from scratch with rules that even in Europe are rather innovative such as the gender balance. Such a compulsory rule was literally imposed on the Village Reconstruction Committee, and the NGOs were responsible for making it respected and fruitful, despite the stable male-chauvinist Kosovar society. In fact the NGOs ignored the ‘‘imposition’’ and mediated the modern societal assumptions with the local communities’ traditional way of living. Besides that the NGOs followed the suggestions of the 14 The Dayton Peace Agreement was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, USA and signed on 21 November 1995 by the representatives of the parties involved in the 1992–1995 Balkan war. On 14 December the agreement was ratified in Paris. The signatories of the agreement were from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 15 Note to ECHO’s Implementing Partners in Bosnia and Herzegovina New Monitoring and Project Support Procedures, Return and Rehabilitation projects Rev A, 21 June 1999. 16 The RRTF (the Reconstruction and Return Task Force) comprises the OHR, UNHCR, the European Commission (EC), the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the governments of Germany, the United States and the Netherlands, the World Bank, the United Nations Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and its International Police Task Force (IPTF), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International Management Group (IMG), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC) and SFOR (Stabilisation Force).

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Housing Reconstruction Guidelines consisting of a thorough on-site social assessment only of the families included in the lists previously drawn up (see Section 5). Apart from the EU ‘‘impositions’’, the role of the NGOs in Kosovo was pivotal and crucial as usual. It was intended to be much more sectoral than previously in Bosnia, where the NGOs had had to deal with income-generating aspects in addition to technical projects, and where the social tasks were not related to the beneficiary selection procedure only, but also to the reintegration of returnees (see footnote 15). In Bosnia the authoritative and legitimacy role of the reconstruction process was mainly played by the NGOs. The presence of the international organisations was limited to setting the general guidelines and monitoring the housing reconstruction activities, while the Municipalities acted diffidently in the beginning in particular. On the other hand in Kosovo, only the MCH had the right and the responsible duty to take final, irreversible decisions on housing reconstruction activity. Taking into consideration that even the Municipal Assembly decisions had to be ratified by the Municipal Administrators (UNMIK international personnel rotating and running de facto the municipalities in Kosovo), the MHC— in some cases chaired by locals—had the competent power to take any relevant decision on what made some families lucky rather than others, rejecting the technical documentation in cases that did not respond to the formal, substantial requirements stated in the Guidelines. The MHC was the institutional focal point for potential beneficiaries, NGOs, Local Government and the Interim Central Government. Its overall objectives were clearly stated by the Guidelines as: (a) To enhance the capacity of the Municipality to run cross-sector post-emergency reconstruction and development of the municipal areas; (b) To co-ordinate, link and merge various kinds of national and international projects and initiatives; (c) To create positive dynamics and synergies in the municipality and to develop durable, sustainable solutions to improve the lives of the inhabitants; (d) To assist and support the agencies and NGOs, implementing housing reconstruction projects in every way; (e) To support the demands for capacity building of the municipal authorities; (f) To verify and approve beneficiaries as proposed by implementing NGOs for reconstruction assistance; and (g) To ensure that the requested documentation for housing (re)construction follows the requirements, with the MHC receiving assistance from the Municipal Department for Urbanism. The MHC was attended by heterogeneous entities, directly and indirectly involved in the Housing Reconstruction process: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The Municipal Administrator who in theory chairs the meetings; The representatives of the Housing Reconstruction Coordination Unit; The main NGOs involved in the HRP; The Municipal Department chiefs (Department of Reconstruction, Cadastral Department, Urbanism, Social Welfare etc.); 5. International Municipal Officers working for the integration of minorities in the Local Community;

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6. Generally not more than two representatives of the Municipal Assembly; and 7. Associations and other institutions such as UNHCR, OSCE and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Initially (at the beginning of the HRP in 2000), different conflicting interests converged on the MHC: those of the local administrations aiming to satisfy family housing needs, and the NGOs attempting to gain the greatest advantages in terms of the easiest procedures and least interference in the beneficiary selection and HRP implementation phase. On the other hand, the newly elected representatives of the Municipal Assembly (particularly those allowed to attend the MHC) had to show gratitude to their voters, and sometimes together with other MHC local members attempted to take advantage of their position by proposing friends and relatives as beneficiaries. At the same time the international administrators were proud to perform highly efficient management and social justice criteria in housing allocation, though the hard facts show that the best MHC performances are attributable to those chaired by locals appointed by the Municipal Administrators. It is questionable whether the MHC model as such might be replicable in other contexts without the UN administrative structure and institutional authority in place. It is, however, clear that the MHC’s compliance with the rules set in the Guidelines and making a fair selection of the most deserving vulnerable families had to achieve two hidden and essential objectives: (a) compliance with the most elementary rules of transparency and (b) guided practice of the elementary exercise of democracy. The MHC has given the participants the genuine impression that the institutions have been built satisfactorily and that they are performing perfectly well. It has thus emphasised the basic institutional and governmental role of the international agencies, and the role of the Municipalities that UNMIK immediately set up thanks to resolution 2045.17 The locally elected administrators who have been involved in the MHC were initially sceptical, but their rapid change of attitude has been quite impressive. At the beginning they seemed timid, diffident, and aggressive at the same time. Their modest interest was obvious. At the end of the HRP they all were proud to have learned the rules of the game, and to realise that the game was— at least apparently—working well. This game intrigued the participants as they discovered that the responsibility for selection of beneficiaries depended on a complex system of rules, and not upon a single person or a single organisation (i.e. the single MHC members or the NGOs). For this reason, those same NGOs (especially those who stayed for a long period) were keener to attend the MHC meetings rather than to stick to the instruction Manual only, even if it had been issued by their donors, such as the European Agency of Reconstruction (the main reconstruction donor in Kosovo). 17

The municipalities were established on the basis of regulation 0.2000/45. It ‘‘establishes provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government at the municipal level as a step in the progressive transfer of administrative responsibilities from United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which will oversee and support the consolidation of these institutions.’’

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During the MHC meeting every single problem the NGOs encountered in the field was brought in and promptly discussed i.e. the arrogance of the village leaders, the lies of potential beneficiaries responding to the social assessment, the difficulties of materials provisioning during the Macedonian turmoil, the threats from the those who did not received housing assistance, and last but not least, the relationship with the donors. The link between the MHC and the main housing reconstruction donors was assured by the Housing Co-ordination Unit (regional representatives of the Housing Directory, attending the MHC) which refers to the Central Housing Committee (CHC) through the Housing Directory central office.

MHC Municipal Housing Committee

HD Housing Directorate

CHC Central Housing Committee

In other words, the decision-making funding committee (the CHC) was two steps ahead of the MHC. Quite often, whatever had to be communicated to the CHC (documented requests, problems with implementing partners, operative suggestions and so forth) was first passed to the Housing Directorate, which unilaterally screened the messages passed and eventually included them in the ‘‘any other issues’’ of the CHC agenda. The Regional Housing Co-ordinators have never been invited to attend CHC meetings. Perhaps due to long bureaucratic (and inefficient) communication along the MHC-Regional Housing Co-ordination Unit-Housing Directorate-CHC line, the way through was somewhat blocked most of the time. As a result, the Municipal Department Administrators tried to contact the CHC members directly, and donors opted to bypass top-down communication, informing the implementing partner who then reported to the MHC. In conclusion, the MHC was however an important and successful experience that might easily be considered a best practice of the post-emergency Housing Reconstruction Programme. It was conceived and has been working as a structural part of the United Nations system, temporarily displaced to manage the reconstruction of politically uncertain areas. In any case it has suffered from the bulky, heavy bureaucratic system that most of the time has impeded efficient vertical communication and the adoption of very quick-impact professional actions. The general overview of the HRP assigns a definitive favourable opinion to the MHC. It has guaranteed: 1. A peaceful and impartial approach to beneficiary selection; 2. The enthusiastic interest of the locals in their own problems, and the interest in minority groups; 3. The building up of a sense of community (within the MHC itself and in the so-called Village Reconstruction Committee); and

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4. An understanding of what democracy is (not only a word, but a collective action with an awareness of the delicate situation concerning the selection of beneficiaries.

5. The selection of beneficiaries The HRP did not assume that everybody was a ‘‘helpless victim’’ requiring every possible kind of assistance. The beneficiaries of the HRP were only the most vulnerable families whose houses had been affected by war.18 Whereas in Bosnia the UNHCR lists were simply verified by the NGOs and then revised and eventually approved by the assisted municipality, in Kosovo the beneficiary selection procedure carried out by the MHC was a complex, but not complicated procedure. In Kosovo the beneficiary selection was a rather mechanical19 procedure. It was conceived in such a way as to free it as much as possible from the personal interests of the MHC members. It was therefore articulated in different subsequent steps: 1. Setting up the list of potential beneficiaries identified by the most important and reliable organisations, either international or local, such as UNHCR, IOM, OSCE and various NGOs; 2. Listing the beneficiaries proposed by the Village Reconstruction Committee (a sort of community-based organisation at the village or neighbourhood level); 3. On-site social assessment by the NGOs of those families who obtained the highest score in the previous two steps; and 4. MHC evaluation aimed at final approval. In some municipalities a score calculation was proposed in an Excel worksheet format so as to emphasise the algorithmic features of beneficiary selection. On the other hand, the social assessment evaluation made by the NGOs, aimed at the socioeconomic evaluation of identified potential beneficiary families was also confirmed by the Village Reconstruction Committee. Twelve parameters made up the basis of the social assessment: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 18 19

No. of family members. No. of children under 12. No. of elderly members. No. of handicapped and chronically ill members. No. of female-headed families. Living in their own damaged house. Occupying someone else’s house. Living with extended families. Living in an isolated community. Living in temporary community shelters. Living in tents, prefabs or with a host family. Household income. HR Guidelines 2001, paragraphs 3.3 and 3.3.1. HR Guidelines 2001, paragraph 3.4.

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Table 2 Averages and percentages per municipality of the Social Assessment Evaluations of housing assisted families Peja Region Municipalities

No. of family members

No. of children under 12

No. of elderly members

No. of handicapped or chronically ill members

No. of femaleheaded families

Living in their own damaged house

Living in Temporary Community Shelter

Living in tent, prefab or host family

Decan Giakova Peje Klina Istog Reg. average

7.0 7.7 6.9 7.7 6.7 7.3

2.1 2.0 1.7 2.8 2.3 2.2

1.8 2.4 0.5 0.1 0.1 1.0

0.5 0.1 0.6 0.04 0.03 0,3

9.8% 8.1% 20.6% 7.5% 1.8% 9.9%

20.4% 11.7% 13.23% 15.7% 12.4% 14,6%

9.4% 6.0% 1.94% 1% 0.9% 3.6%

53.2% 39% 25.2% 10.5% 16.5% 27.7%

Data extracted from the final report of the 2001 HRP in Peia/Pec Region.

In some MHCs of the Peja/Pec region, in order to check the actual right of a proposed beneficiary family to be definitively assisted, and to make the evaluation even more mechanical, the Regional Housing Co-ordination Unit adopted statistical data extracted from previous social assessments on families, which have subsequently been assisted in the same or other municipalities of the region. These statistical figures were then to be compared with the social assessment results of the proposed beneficiary families submitted to the MHC for final approval. The internationals, but also the MHC participants who were not very familiar with the social environment, could evaluate every single family case proposed for housing assistance on the basis of whether or not it matched the regional or municipal average. Again these methods were set up and diffused in order to encourage aseptic rather than biased evaluations (Table 2). At the end of the reconstruction season, this method has also revealed a clear picture of the poverty conditions in the municipalities, since—by definition—the benefiting families were also the most vulnerable people. The poverty indicators in turn establish the reference points for the remaining HR allocation per each municipality.

6. Minorities The integration of minorities within the almost mono-racial Kosovar post-war society has been a crucial issue.20 The HRP has been among other things a thorough test bench for such a question, for both the local and international community in Kosovo. The Dayton Peace Agreement stated that in Bosnia not only refugees, but also Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), should be able to repatriate to their pre-war country and home of origin. The implicit objective was the reversal of ethnic cleansing via promotion of the return of populations that had been forcibly displaced during the war (Phuong, 2000). Such an ambitious 20

Section 2, Observance of internationally recognised standards, UNMIK Regulation no. 1, 1999.

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and explicit commitment to ensure that each refugee or IDP be able to return to pre-war accommodation was taken in Bosnia in the aftermath of ethnic cleansing, which resulted in the creation of almost entirely homogenous territories in communities which had been ethnically mixed. In Kosovo the situation was not very different. After the NATO bombing, Serbs and other minorities (Roma, Ashkali, Bosniaks, Egyptians) ran away or were forcibly obliged to leave the country to seek refuge, mainly in Serbia and Montenegro. The HRP devoted particular attention and special programmes to the minority groups. In this regard the HRP Guidelines 2001 (Section 3.3.2) state that the objective ‘‘(y) is to support and promote co-existence and reconciliation in communities with mixed ethnic backgrounds and single ethnic communities, through a balanced allocation of reconstruction activities in minority communities and the surrounding majority areas. This is in order to support stability, sustainability, security and the future development of the society.’’ In order to guarantee a ‘‘balanced allocation of reconstruction activities in minority communities and the surrounding majority areas (y) (only) a fair and substantial proportion of the total efforts’’ have been recommended. In other words a percentage of projects for minorities were implemented compared with the proportion of minority ethnic groups within the Municipal community. In spite of this, the EAR, made the achievement of 10% minority rehabilitation—within the benefited community—compulsory to its NGOs . Such a discrepancy between the HR Guidelines 2001 on one side and the Donor Manual on the other has once again determined unclear objectives for MHC management. Against all the odds, the identification and selection of vulnerable ethnic minority families proceeded apparently regularly within the beneficiary selection process, though special attention was devoted to them mainly because of the bitter grudge left by the war and also because of the good practice of respecting minority groups. In each MHC, the minority groups have been represented by: 1. Local Community Officers (LCO) (UNMIK international staff working in the Municipalities); 2. Local representatives of the main ethnic minority groups; and 3. Representatives of international organisations such as OSCE and UNHCR. All of them specifically contributed to focus due attention on minority issues, and to identify vulnerable minorities in need of housing assistance. As of the end of October 2001, almost 6% of the total number of vulnerable and war-damaged affected cases (the highest Kosovo-wide) have been approved by the MHC and have benefited from housing assistance in the Peja/Pec region. This reflects the approximate figure of minority ethnic groups in the region.21 Special Projects were not included. Only one Special Programme was implemented in 2001. It was aimed at the Serb return to the Peja/Pec region, creating a new enclave under the surveillance and responsibility of the KFOR. After a Preliminary Rapid Damage Assessment (PRDA) to estimate the rough repair and reconstruction costs of the villages for which the Serb return was planned, donors allocated the funds and implementing partners started reconstruction. The MHC was bypassed. 21

In Klina, for instance, minority families represent 1.6% of the overall population, whereas 4.4% of the total beneficiaries have been approved by the MHC this year.

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The return occurred and the new enclave was created. Not surprisingly, the local majority—the Kosovar Albanians—demonstrated against the Serb Return project from which they were totally excluded: they were not involved and would not have received any benefit from it. Far away from this is the recent experience in Bosnia, where programmes of income generation and local capacity building were conditional on the acceptance, by the municipality, of the return of minorities. Minority returns in those Bosnian municipalities are now also seen as a way of improving the living conditions of the majority population (Hallerga( rd, 1998). The NGOs were far away from implementing integrated projects for return, as were the MHC that had to take over such a delicate task. Though ‘‘minorities projects shall normally be processed through the MHC and follow similar procedures to majority area projects’’ (see footnote 21) apparently regardless of the Special Projects and with any exception to be processed by the Municipal Administrators (International), the opportunity was not taken to fulfil the general and specific objectives stated in the Reconstruction Guidelines and to aim for the reintegration of vulnerable minorities within the local community22, ‘‘(y) in line with the overall UNMIK policy of stabilising minority communities and of working towards the establishment of conditions conducive to return’’(see footnote 22). For this reason, the Special Programme for Serb Return, though accepted in principle, has been strongly criticised because it did not show any regard for the above-mentioned objectives and actions recommended in the HRP Guidelines 2001. In fact, the HR Guidelines have inspired and prompted the management of the whole HRP. The MHC has been its best practice, where all efforts towards the establishment of simple democratic actions have been successfully made, and where NGOs (local and international) were involved, as well as the main stakeholders of the reconstruction and development process. That would have been the best place to properly negotiate the Serb Return and to manage Serb integration The extensive experience gained in Bosnia aimed at ethnic reconciliation has shown that the thorough involvement of the NGOs in this specific matter has facilitated the return of minorities, once the appropriate strategic actions and cautions had been taken, such as: *

* *

*

Gradual creation of opportunities for opposing ethnic family groups to meet, such as children’s summer camps; Economic opportunities; Participation in common activities for the reconstruction of community services such as schools, libraries or social centres; and Self-aided reconstruction of community services.

The role of the NGO has been always that of a buffer position between the communities, in the effort to integrate the families into real-life occupation. The role of the MHC was to create room for capacity building of the future municipal officers, and to build up the institutional milestones of democracy. The local MHC members were ready to tackle the reintegration problems. The clear signs of their availability were manifest during an urban planning exercise where the Serb community was involved and was asked to talk about technical issues only. This was a great step forward, and it is a pity that nobody noted it. 22

HR Guidelines 2001, paragraph 3.3.2.

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7. Conclusions The HRP in Kosovo has been a noteworthy experience. Analytical criticism has been necessary in order to make this experience understood and to pick up the best practices from it. The unavoidable mistakes and the incomprehensible decisions taken throughout the entire reconstruction process must at least be made intelligible. Hopefully the MHC has a future wherever postemergency reconstruction pursues the setting up of the simplest rules of democracy in order to make a town start breathing and living again. Among the other issues carried out by the MHC, a method has been identified as appropriate. The practice of mechanical actions, like the algorithm, could be considered a way to recover from the excessive excited exaltation brought about by the war. In Kosovo the war was fought house-to-house. Everybody was involved, no one was excluded. During the war there was fear, and afterwards came a domination of the sense of omnipotence that keeps exaltation high. Both render people blind and arrogant at the same time. Mechanical actions and algorithms bring people back to normality and give them a view of different values that were considered dead—first of all of democracy and the sense of community. The MHC has been a unique experience. In Bosnia, on the contrary, the best practice is in fact represented by the NGOs actions. Their strategic territorial position and their integrated and participatory approach addressed to refugees and IDPs is to be kept in mind. In Kosovo we must also keep in mind the double counting for damage assessment and the related regrettable consequences. Doubts remain about the decisions taken for economic recovery in Kosovo. The technologies adopted for physical rehabilitation and the features of the entire reconstruction process are linked to macro-economic motivations. It is inconceivable that the policy-makers of the Kosovo reconstruction strategies did not take into consideration the appropriateness of technologies such as the old and innovative adobe, and did not help the local building materials producers in the first instance. Among the reported experiences, the temporary government of the United Nations is certainly replicable, though it should be rephrased and better reconceived. Its presence has given reliability to the whole Kosovo reconstruction process, as most people still believe in the UN.

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