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How Arabs see the West
How Arabs See the West A.J. Almaney
11 A.J. A l m a n e y is Professor o f Managem e n t at DePaul University in Chicago a n d t h e a u t h o r o f n u m e r o u s articles.
Those planning to do business with the Arab world should know how the Arabs came to perceive the West in the way they do. usinesses which deal in international markets need as much information as they can find about those they b u y from and sell to. The ambitious economic development programs in the oil-producing Arab countries have transformed the area into one of the fastest growing markets in the world. The area is being coveted b y American, European, and Asian firms, with each vying to capture a bigger slice of this lucrative market. Clearly, the American businessman's ability to compete successfully in such a highly sought-after market depends on more than the provision of quality products and services. It is also contingent on h o w the businessman deals with the Arabs, which, in turn, depends on the type of knowledge he has about the Arabs' value systems, customs, expectations, sensitivities, and perceptions of themselves and of the world around them. I intend here to explore one crucial aspect of the Arabs' behavior, namely, their perception of the West, or, more accurately, the
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factors which have conditioned the manner in which the Arabs have come to perceive the West. The businessman's knowledge as to how he is perceived b y the Arabs, and why, can serve to protect him from being caught off guard b y anything the Arabs might say or do. More importantly, he will be more able to understand the rationale behind the behavior, to anticipate the behavior, and to deal with it appropriately. It is necessary to state at this point that the Arabs generally exhibit mixed feelings toward the West. These feelings are at once an admiration and resentment or "love and hate. ''1 Most Arabs show a great admiration for Western ways. They admire the West's affluence, technology, consumer goods, educational system, music, and the like. The Arabs' admiration is, however, frequently overshadowed b y the stronger and deeper sentiments of resentment and suspicion. 1. Charles Adams, "How to Talk Business with Arabs," Forbes, September 15, 1974: 106-109. Business Horizons ] September-October 1982
A number of forces have combined to produce the Arabs' negative perception of the West. Here, we will focus on five such forces, namely: (1) Western colonialism, (2) the creation of the State of Israel, (3) the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956, (4) the West's negative image of the Arabs, and (5) the superior attitude Westerners operating in the Middle East have generally exhibited toward the Arabs on the interpersonal level. Western Colonialism
ne of the principal factors Ishaping the Arabs' perception of the West is their history of subjugation to Western colonialism. Following the disintegration of the Islamic Empire in the fifteenth century, the Arabs came under the rule of the Ottoman Turks. When T u r k e y entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers, the Arabs realized that the defeat of Turkey and her allies would result in the partition of the O t t o m a n Empire. So that their lands would not be divided as spoils of war, and in order to realize their aspirations for independence, the Arabs reached an understanding with Great Britain, the world's superpower at the time. Accordingly, Great Britain promised to grant the Arabs their independence in return for the Arabs' military support for the Allies in the Middle East. While Great Britain was negotiating with Sherif Husein, keeper of the holy places in Mecca and Medina and the Arabs' leader at the time, a secret political arrangement known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement had been reached among the Allies to carve up the Ottoman Empire. When the war ended with the defeat of Turkey, all Arab provinces were placed under British and French control. The Sykes-Picot Agreement became known to the Arabs when its contents were revealed by the
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Bolshevik government of Russia. A the war effort at a time when pall of disillusionment fell over the Great Britain urgently needed Arabs when they discovered that every possible source of support. ''3 promises of freedom made during The British thought that if an the war were now to be sacrificed alliance could be contracted with to European political claims in the worldwide Zionist interests, it region. World War I revealed to the might strengthen the pro-Allied Arabs the Machiavellian char- sentiments of m a n y influential acteristic of Western power Jews in Europe and in the U.S. politics, namely, readiness to With the tremors of the Sykespromise anything to further a Picot Agreement still being felt Western cause. The Arabs felt throughout the Arab world, the double-crossed. That the war Arabs received another jolt when ended with Arab lands being they learned of the West's scheme divided into British and French to establish a Jewish state in their spheres of influence "seemed to midst. When Sherif Husein sought most Arabs to provide clear and clarification from the British reincontrovertible proof of British, garding the Balfour Declaration, he indeed of Western, perfidy. ''2 was assured that Great Britain's Although the Arabs have finally promise to the Zionists would be managed to rid themselves of Euro- implemented only insofar as it did pean :domination, they continue to not impinge on the right and freeview the West's "broken promises" dom of the inhabitants of Palas manifestations of its untrust- estine. worthiness and unreliability. The ultimate establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 hurt the Arabs deeply. To the Arabs, Israel The Creation of Israel symbolized the last trace of the " ~ A T hile Arab nationalists hated Western influence and the V V were striving to extricate chief base of Western imperialist them selves from the interests in the Middle East. With Turkish hold, Zionist Jewish their suspicion of the West now leaders were diligently working to reinforced, the Arabs became conobtain the right to establish a vinced of the West's "treacherous" true self. Jewish state in Palestine. The U.S. was not spared the The Zionists realized that to achieve their end, they had to Arabs' wrath. The strong support secure the official backing of one the Zionists received from the or more of the great powers. American government in the first Basing their plans on the assump- Arab-Israeli war of 1948 seriously tion that the Allies would win compromised the U.S.'s standing World War I, the Zionists in En- with the Arabs. President Truman's gland set about winning British immediate recognition of Israel in support for Zionism. This the En- May 1948 and the subsequent U.S. glish Zionists successfully accom- technical, military, and economic plished in 1916 in the form of a assistance to the new state added secret gentleman's agreement. to the Arabs' bitterness. Several months later, the agreement was publicly confirmed in ~he Invasion of Egypt the famous Balfour Declaration of n November 1956, Great 1917. Britain, France, and Israel The proclamation of the Baljointly engineered a coorfour Declaration was designed "to. win world-wide Jewish backing for dinated attack on Egypt. The
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2. Charles Cremeans, The Arabs and the World (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1963): 124.
3. Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963): 107.
How Arabs See the West
"The Arab who travels to the West for the first time becomes dismayed at the perverted images Westerners have of Arabs."
13 avowed purpose of the invasion was to regain control of the Suez Canal, nationalized a few months earlier by Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser. After coming to power in 1952, Nasser sought to assert Egypt's sovereignty by pursuing a policy of what he termed "positive neutralism" and by building a strong national army. To achieve the latter objective, Nasser turned to the West, principally the U.S., for help. After failing repeatedly to obtain arms from the U.S., Nasser began, in 1954-1955, to negotiate an arms agreement with the Communist bloc. Russia, eagerly awaiting an opportunity to press its cause in the Arab world, welcomed the Egyptian initiative. Soon, extensive military and economic assistance began to flow into Egypt from several Communist countries. The Egyptian-Soviet ties grew closer and were accelerated by the political and psychological advantages the Communists had over the West. For one thing, the Communists were free of any record of Middle Eastern colonialism. For another, they were avowed opponents of Western imperialism, with no stake in the status quo of the conservative Arab regimes existing at the time. While the Communist influence in Egypt was on the rise, Nasser was nearing agreement with the
U.S. to finance the building of the Aswan Dam, urgently needed to augment Egypt's arable land. Embittered at the friendly ties between Egypt and the Communist block, J o h n Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, informed Nasser that the U.S. had reconsidered the matter and could not provide credits formerly agreed to. In a retaliatory move, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, owned mostly by the British and the French. Reluctant to give up their control over the strategic waterway, and growing impatient with Nasser's revolutionary agitation in the Middle East, England and France drew up plans to invade Egypt and t o p p l e Nasser in the process. Israel, becoming increasingly apprehensive about the rapid growth of the Egyptian military strength, welcomed the opportunity to join in the invasion. The tripartite attack on Egypt, which took place in August 1956, failed to achieve its objectives. Coming under heavy pressure from the United Nations, the Soviet Union (which threatened to use rockets and send volunteers to fight the invaders), and the U.S., the invading countries were forced to withdraw their troops. The Suez Canal remained in Egyptian hands, and Nasser not only survived the attack but emerged as a hero throughout the Arab world.
The invasion of Egypt rekindled Arab resentment and served to convert dark suspicions of the West into hard realities. The Arabs viewed the attack as being directed not against Egypt alone but against all Arabs, with an eye toward reestablishing Western dominance in the area. To the Arabs, the invasion revealed another aspect of the Machiavellian characteristic of the West: the ruthless preoccupation with military force. The West's Negative
Image
he Arab's perception of the West is, to a considerable degree, a reaction to the West's perception of him. The Arab who travels to the West for the first time becomes dismayed at the perverted images Westerners have of the Arabs. In the face of what he regards as gross misrepresentations of his people and culture, the Arab reacts angrily, and his anger often translates into bitterness and hostility toward the West. To be sure, some Westerners harbor a number of positive images of the Arabs. There is the image of the noble desert Bedouin, devoted to his thoroughbred mare. And there is the image of the Arabian knights and the tales of Scheherazade. On the whole, though, the Westerners' image of
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the Arabs tends to be highly negative. There are at least three factors which may account for the West's negative picture of the Arabs: (1) the West's distorted portrayal of Islam, (2) the rejection of Western ideologies by most Arabs, and (3) the role which Western communications media have played in inventing, perpetuating, and dramatizing the Arab stereotypes. The Religion Factor Islam, born in the seventh century, has m a n y elements in c o m m o n with Christianity. Both religions agree that one God created the universe, that Christ was miraculously born of a virgin, that he rose into heaven, and that God will grant m e n eternal life if they obey His divine will. Many of the parables in the Quran, the Muslim's holy book, are similar to those in the Old and the New Testaments. There are stories of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Joseph, Solomon, Zachariyah, J o h n the Baptist, and Jesus. The Muslims, however, reject the idea of God as Father; and although they accept the prophethood of Christ, they deny His divinity. Following the Muslims' advance into Europe (Spain and southern France) early in the eighth century, the Christian West not only exaggerated the doctrinal incompatibility between Christianity and Islam but also concocted fantastic misrepresentations of the Islamic religion. For example, in an effort to provide the Europeans with an idea of the nature of Islam, a Spanish poet, employing the Christian doctrine of the trinity as a frame of reference, claimed that the Muslims worshiped a trinity consisting of three persons: Muhammad, founder of the religion; and two others, Appolin and Tervagant, both of them devils. 4 4. Bernard Lewis, "Return of Islam," Commentary, January 1976: 39.
Even the name that Europeans gave the Muslims was void of any religious meaning. Thus, the Muslims were either called Saracens, Moors, or Turks, all of which are words with ethnic but not religious connotations. After Europe began to recognize the fact that Islam was a religion and not an ethnic community, it expressed this realization in a false analogy with Christianity. Thus, Islam was called Muhammadanism and the Muslims Muhammadans. The Muslims take offense at such an appellation, since it implies the divinity of Muhammad whom the Muslims consider to be only human. For hundreds of years, medieval divines, building on conceptions created by their predecessors living under Muslim rule, repeated and invented incidents to prove that the Prophet Muhammad was an imposter, a sexually indulgent schemer who fabricated revel a t i o n s to meet his political ambitions. The Quran was denounced as false and Islam as a sinister invitation to immorality, s Early in this century, an American missionary graciously conceded that "the Prophet was not an imposter; rather, he was a 'pathological case,' a 'trance-medium' who yielded to temptation and forged the awful machinery of divine inspiration to serve his own ignoble and selfish purposes. ''6 Many of today's Western thinkers are no less biased in their judgment of Islam than the medieval divines. With little or no knowledge of Islamic doctrines, they follow one another in deprecating Islam, branding it as the religion of war and backwardness. In typifying this position, R.E. Tyrell, Jr., writes: "Arabs are religious fanatics devoted to a non-Western warrior religion . . . . On this earth only the Chinese and the Russians indulge in more wanton slaughter of one 5. Lewis: 39. 6. Morroe Berger, "Arabs' Attitude to the West," Yale Review, December 1971: 219.
another. The Russians and the Chinese do it to make their societies more efficient and sequacious; the Arabs do it out of religious fervor . . . the Arab draws his blade with gusto, and when he is finished butchering he is always that much closer to Allah. The more addicted he is to the Koran, the less apt he is to conform to the idealistic notions of American statesmen."7 Faced with such misconceptions and falsehoods about Islam, the Arab cannot help reacting indignantly; he perceives the Westerners' distortion of his religion as a manifestation of their prejudice against Islam. Reflecting the views of most Arabs, Edward W. Said, an American literary critic of Arab descent, maintains that one of the factors contributing to the West's stereotyped images of Islam has been "the history of popular anti-Arah and anti-Islamic prejudice in the West . . . . - 8 The same point has been expressed recently and more bluntly by Sheik A h m e d Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabia's Minister of Oil, who said: " . . . quite simply, it is America's hatred for Moslems that makes it help Israel seize their land and expel the Palestinian nation. ''9 The Ideology Factor It was pointed out earlier that after the collapse of the O t t o m a n Empire in World War I, Great Britain and France came to be in direct control of the Middle East. Consequently, the Arabs began to turn their ire from the Turks to the British and the French. After nearly four decades of struggle, the Arabs were finally able to extricate themselves from the throes of European colonial domination. As a new superpower, the U.S. 7. R.E. Tyrell, Jr., "Chimera in the Middle East," Harper's, November 1976: 38. 8. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976): 26. 9. The New York Times, April 24, 1981: 1, 5.
How Arabs See the West
"Perhaps no single force has conditioned the average Westerner's attitude toward the Arabs as much as the communications media have."
15 grew increasingly apprehensive about the diminished Western influence in the Middle East. Fearing that the Soviet Union might capitalize on the resultant "power vacuum," the U.S. felt obliged to step in and assume many of the European c o m m i t m e n t s in the region. However, unlike the British and the French who often resorted to direct military occupation to solidify their power, the U.S. generally adopted a more subtle approach. By playing up the threats of Communism and by promising generous economic, military, and technical assistance, the U.S. sought to lure the Arabs into joining the West in a series of mutual defense treaties, a notable example of which was the Baghdad Pact. Although it met with some initial success, the new approach proved to be a failure. Some key Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria, viewed the proposed treaties as merely another device to introduce the new "American Imperialism" into the Middle East. It was at this time that the idea of neutralism began to gain wide popularity among the Arabs. Many Arab leaders became convinced that an alliance with any of the feuding superpowers could seriously undermine their national sovereignty. More importantly, perhaps, was the Arabs' conviction that their interests were actually at
cross-purposes with those of the West, which has always aligned itself with Israel, the Arabs' enemy. Russia, against which the proposed defense systems were directed, seemed too distant, with no historical memories to embitter its relations with the Arabs. Furthermore, the Arabs felt no immediate urgency to antagonize the Russians by joining Western-inspired military alliances. The West's frustration with the Arabs was compounded when a growing number of Arab governments began to cast aside Western political and economic institutions. By the late 1950s, the multi-party system had collapsed in m a n y Arab countries, to be replaced by military or one-party regimes. Maintaining that the multi-party system had been too hastily and clumsily grafted on the Middle East, the new rulers felt that a strong government was needed to ensure political stability so vital for their countries' development. Economically, several key Arab leaders turned their backs on the freeenterprise system, terming it exploitative and unjust. In its place there emerged socialism, which the new leaders came to view as being more in line with their avowed objectives of improving the conditions of the peasantry and the working class. With its effort to draw the Arabs back into the fold of the
Western sphere of influence thwarted and its political and economic institutions downgraded, the West reacted with hostility. Taking the position that "he who is not for us is against u s , ' ' 1 ° Western leaders began to brand neutralism as a pro-Communist manifestation and sought to discredit Arab leaders, such as Nasser, by labeling them Communists. The West's hostility toward the Arabs was perhaps no more evident than in the almost euphoric reaction with which the Israeli military victories over the Arabs were received in the West. Such a reaction is due, at least in part, to the notion that the Israeli triumphs signified the superiority of Western institutions, present in Israel and absent in most of the Arab world. The Arabs counteracted the West's hostility, particularly as it was reflected in its moral and material support for Israel in the 1973 war with the Arabs, with a heightened level of bitterness and resentment. Translating their feelings into a dramatic politicaleconomic move, the Arabs imposed an embargo on their oil exports to the West. The 1973 embargo marked a turning point in modern Arab-West relations. A growing number of European nations set out to befriend the 10. William Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958): 461.
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Arabs, b y assuming either a neutral or pro-Arab stand on the international political scene. Today, the U.S. remains the only significant Western nation which most Arabs continue to view with deep resentment, chiefly because of its unwavering support for Israel. But there are signs indicating that even the U.S. is attempting to ameliorate its standing among the Arabs. Playing a mediator role in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been only one dimension of such an effort. The Media Factor Perhaps no single force has conditioned the average Westerner's attitude toward the Arabs as much as the communications media have. Not only have the media served as a popular forum for perpetuating a host of misleading images about the Arabs, they also have invented some stereotypes of their own. The worst culprit in maligning the Arabs has been T.V. Today, high doses of distorted pictures of the Arabs are offered to T.V. viewers on a continuing basis. The Arab is invariably d e p i c t e d as a white slaver, a dope dealer, a pleasure seeker "with multiple wives, bizarre religious practices, execrable taste, and evil designs, m l He is also protrayed as a terrorist or participant in political intrigue. Although he might be concerned about political issues, his concern is expressed largely through murder and terrorism. 12 The Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel let loose in the West a flood of disparaging jokes that astonished many pro-Western Arabs. T.V. comedians made a daily practice of denigrating the Arabs, their culture, and their heritage. Similar Arab stereotypes can be seen in the movies. From the silent movies of the 1920s to today's 11. "The Other Anti-Semitism," The New Republic, March 1980: 6. 12. Jack G. Sheehan, "The Arab: TV's Most Popular Villain," Christian Century, December 3, 1978: 1214-1218.
wide-screen spectaculars, the Arabs are generally shown as greedy fools, sex-crazed, or blood-thirsty desert killers. The press has been equally guilty in its erroneous depiction of the Arabs. Aside from the frequent anti-Arab editorials, political cartoons routinely use hideouslooking sheiks pointing gas pumps like pistols to symbolize OPEC, or waving around piles of dollars to suggest that the Arabs are buying up the U.S., even though the Arabs account for just three percent of foreign investment in the U.S. 1 a Studies made of the American press' treatment of the Arab-Israeli conflict have revealed a consistent anti-Arab bias. This has led one researcher to conclude that much of the anti-Arab treatment in the press is purely racist in tone. 14 Books have made their own contributions in maligning the Arabs. In a study of the Arabs' portrayal in American textbooks, it was found that numerous texts blame the Arabs for the hostilities in the Middle East and for the plight of the Palestinians. One b o o k states that the only force unifying the Arabs is their hatred for the Jews, and that most Arabs do not know that there is a better way to live. 1 s Literary works are replete with such distortions. An Egyptian journalist could not help noticing them while visiting the U.S. With obvious bewilderment, he writes: "When I first visited the United States . . . I was interested in the literature of the Beat Generation and read On the Road by J a c k Kerouac. I was struck b y the sentence saying 'We were like a band of Arabs coming to blow up New York' and another saying 'Dean 13. "The Other Anti-Semitism": 6. 14.Janice Terry, "A Content Analysis of American Newspapers," in Abdeen Jabbara and Janice Terry, eds., The Arab World: From Nationalism to Revolution (Wilmette, IL.: The Medina University Press International, 1971): 100. 15. Ayad al-Qazzaz et al., The Arabs in American Textbooks (California State Board of Education,June 1975): 5-10.
drove into a filling station . . . noticed that the attendant was fast asleep . . . quitely filled the gas tank and rolled off like an Arab.'m 6 The pervasive Arab stereotypes in the media prompted one American writer to remark: "I do not think this is wholly owing to the absence of a big enough ArabAmerican political constituency to raise hell. The caricature dehumanizes. But it is inspired and made acceptable b y an earlier dehumanizing influence, namely, the absence of feeling for who the Arabs are and where they have been.,,1 These stereotypes injure the Arabs in the deepest sense. The Arabs who visit Europe and the U.S. experience a feeling of bewilderment at the disparaging manner in which their culture is portrayed. Here are people who grow up in a society that instills in them the notion that they belong to a great culture with remarkable traditions and accomplishments. Yet as soon as the Arab steps out of his cultural setting into the Western world, he is confronted with a painful reality. His selfesteem is challenged, his timehonored values are misrepresented, and his religion is denigrated. In the face of such challenges, the Arab reacts defensively; he begins to develop negative images of his own about the West which he comes to perceive as a hostile world and about Westerners as bigoted people. These reactive perceptions of the West exert a strong influence on the Arab's behavior long after he returns home. Westerners are often puzzled as to w h y some Arab leaders, who had received their education in the West, speak and act with so much belligerence toward the West. Such Westerners 16. Ahmed Baha El-Din, "World Media and the Arabs: An Arab Perspective," in The Arab World: From Nationalism to Revolution, op. cit.: 85. 17. Meg Greenfield, "Our Ugly Arab Comp l e x , " N e w s w e e k , December 5, 1977: 1110.
How Arabs See the West
fail to realize that a great deal of the Arabs' bitterness is b u t a reflection of the anger the Arabs feel over the manner in which they are perceived in the West. The Westerners' Superior Attitude ndoubtedly, the four factors discussed above (Western colonialism, the creation of Israel, the invasion of Egypt, and the West's negative image of the Arabs) account for most of the resentment the Arabs feel toward the West. There is yet another factor which has served to foster such a feeling. This can be found in the air of superiority which many Westerners, operating in the Middle East, have often displayed in their interpersonal communication with the Arabs. The Arabs' resentment here is also a reactive behavior; it is a type of defense mechanism which the Arabs resorted to as a means of dealing with the West's sense of superiority. Many British and French officials who served in the Arab world during the colonial period, were neither able nor well-balanced individuals. They were largely secondraters who t o o k minor posts in the Arab countries. Foreign service "afforded these officials an opportunity to appease their own sense of inferiority b y lording it over the Arabs.,,1 s The contemptuous attitude of Western officials is evident in the books some of them wrote detailing their impressions of the Arabs. in one such b o o k titled Egypt and the English, the author states:
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18. Cremeans: 49.
"To hear the Egyptian talk, y o u would imagine that his one desire was to improve his mind, to raise his level to the equal of a highly-educated European. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian has no mind . . . . He is a liar, a rogue, an assassin as needs be and opportunities arise. As the b o y cheats over his work, so the man cheats over his business. Taking a mean advantage is, to him, a commendable strategy.'19 Egyptians and other Arabs have not failed to notice that many Westerners who visited the Middle East had in their bags books similar to Egypt and the English. Most of these books contained outlandish stories of the experiences of Westerners who made their long years in the Arab countries tolerable by seeing the amusing side of the antics of the natives. In the personal experiences of many Arabs are recollections of c o n t e m p t u o u s and uncivil treatment b y Westerners who regarded themselves as superior to the Arabs by virtue of their Westerness. Even members of the Arab educated class who became deeply attached to Western culture were denied membership in Western communities based in the Arab world. After giving their best efforts to penetrate the secrets of Western culture, these Arab imitators of the West suffered a sense of betrayal when Westerners rejected them. Edward Attiyah, a Lebanese, is one of those educated Arabs who became disillusioned with the West. Later, he wrote an auto19. Douglas Sladen, Egypt and the English (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1908): 73.
biography detailing the sense of rejection and resentment the educated Arabs felt. The Westernized Arab had revolted, Attiyah says, " n o t against oppression, injustice or economic exploitation . . . b u t against spiritual arrogance, racial haughtiness, social aloofness, and paternal authoritarianism."2 o
Implications n their relationship with the West, the Arabs exhibit an injured superiority complex. A highly proud people, the Arabs feel that the West has not only wronged them but also humiliated them. But, despite their embittered feelings, most Arabs have a deep reservoir of goodwill toward the West. The slightest sign of understanding displayed by Westerners often produces a remarkable change in their attitude. If the businessman is to bring out the Arabs' goodwill, he should begin b y engaging in self-examination to identify any ethnocentric tendencies and prevent them from injuring the Arabs' sensitivities. Next, he will do well to equip himself with accurate information about the Arabs' history, religion, politics, value systems, and the like. Finally, the businessman will be prudent to adopt an empathic approach in dealing with the Arabs. That is, he should not only perceive the Arabs as they like to be perceived; he should also endeavor to perceive the Arabs' outer world as they perceive it. [23
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20. Edward Attiyah, An Arab Tells His Story: A Study in Loyalties (London: J o h n Murray, 1946): 165.
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11 A.J. A l m a n e y is Professor o f Managem e n t at DePaul University in Chicago a n d t h e a u t h o r o f n u m e r o u s articles.
Those planning to do business with the Arab world should know how the Arabs came to perceive the West in the way they do. usinesses which deal in international markets need as much information as they can find about those they b u y from and sell to. The ambitious economic development programs in the oil-producing Arab countries have transformed the area into one of the fastest growing markets in the world. The area is being coveted b y American, European, and Asian firms, with each vying to capture a bigger slice of this lucrative market. Clearly, the American businessman's ability to compete successfully in such a highly sought-after market depends on more than the provision of quality products and services. It is also contingent on h o w the businessman deals with the Arabs, which, in turn, depends on the type of knowledge he has about the Arabs' value systems, customs, expectations, sensitivities, and perceptions of themselves and of the world around them. I intend here to explore one crucial aspect of the Arabs' behavior, namely, their perception of the West, or, more accurately, the
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factors which have conditioned the manner in which the Arabs have come to perceive the West. The businessman's knowledge as to how he is perceived b y the Arabs, and why, can serve to protect him from being caught off guard b y anything the Arabs might say or do. More importantly, he will be more able to understand the rationale behind the behavior, to anticipate the behavior, and to deal with it appropriately. It is necessary to state at this point that the Arabs generally exhibit mixed feelings toward the West. These feelings are at once an admiration and resentment or "love and hate. ''1 Most Arabs show a great admiration for Western ways. They admire the West's affluence, technology, consumer goods, educational system, music, and the like. The Arabs' admiration is, however, frequently overshadowed b y the stronger and deeper sentiments of resentment and suspicion. 1. Charles Adams, "How to Talk Business with Arabs," Forbes, September 15, 1974: 106-109. Business Horizons ] September-October 1982
A number of forces have combined to produce the Arabs' negative perception of the West. Here, we will focus on five such forces, namely: (1) Western colonialism, (2) the creation of the State of Israel, (3) the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956, (4) the West's negative image of the Arabs, and (5) the superior attitude Westerners operating in the Middle East have generally exhibited toward the Arabs on the interpersonal level. Western Colonialism
ne of the principal factors Ishaping the Arabs' perception of the West is their history of subjugation to Western colonialism. Following the disintegration of the Islamic Empire in the fifteenth century, the Arabs came under the rule of the Ottoman Turks. When T u r k e y entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers, the Arabs realized that the defeat of Turkey and her allies would result in the partition of the O t t o m a n Empire. So that their lands would not be divided as spoils of war, and in order to realize their aspirations for independence, the Arabs reached an understanding with Great Britain, the world's superpower at the time. Accordingly, Great Britain promised to grant the Arabs their independence in return for the Arabs' military support for the Allies in the Middle East. While Great Britain was negotiating with Sherif Husein, keeper of the holy places in Mecca and Medina and the Arabs' leader at the time, a secret political arrangement known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement had been reached among the Allies to carve up the Ottoman Empire. When the war ended with the defeat of Turkey, all Arab provinces were placed under British and French control. The Sykes-Picot Agreement became known to the Arabs when its contents were revealed by the
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Bolshevik government of Russia. A the war effort at a time when pall of disillusionment fell over the Great Britain urgently needed Arabs when they discovered that every possible source of support. ''3 promises of freedom made during The British thought that if an the war were now to be sacrificed alliance could be contracted with to European political claims in the worldwide Zionist interests, it region. World War I revealed to the might strengthen the pro-Allied Arabs the Machiavellian char- sentiments of m a n y influential acteristic of Western power Jews in Europe and in the U.S. politics, namely, readiness to With the tremors of the Sykespromise anything to further a Picot Agreement still being felt Western cause. The Arabs felt throughout the Arab world, the double-crossed. That the war Arabs received another jolt when ended with Arab lands being they learned of the West's scheme divided into British and French to establish a Jewish state in their spheres of influence "seemed to midst. When Sherif Husein sought most Arabs to provide clear and clarification from the British reincontrovertible proof of British, garding the Balfour Declaration, he indeed of Western, perfidy. ''2 was assured that Great Britain's Although the Arabs have finally promise to the Zionists would be managed to rid themselves of Euro- implemented only insofar as it did pean :domination, they continue to not impinge on the right and freeview the West's "broken promises" dom of the inhabitants of Palas manifestations of its untrust- estine. worthiness and unreliability. The ultimate establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 hurt the Arabs deeply. To the Arabs, Israel The Creation of Israel symbolized the last trace of the " ~ A T hile Arab nationalists hated Western influence and the V V were striving to extricate chief base of Western imperialist them selves from the interests in the Middle East. With Turkish hold, Zionist Jewish their suspicion of the West now leaders were diligently working to reinforced, the Arabs became conobtain the right to establish a vinced of the West's "treacherous" true self. Jewish state in Palestine. The U.S. was not spared the The Zionists realized that to achieve their end, they had to Arabs' wrath. The strong support secure the official backing of one the Zionists received from the or more of the great powers. American government in the first Basing their plans on the assump- Arab-Israeli war of 1948 seriously tion that the Allies would win compromised the U.S.'s standing World War I, the Zionists in En- with the Arabs. President Truman's gland set about winning British immediate recognition of Israel in support for Zionism. This the En- May 1948 and the subsequent U.S. glish Zionists successfully accom- technical, military, and economic plished in 1916 in the form of a assistance to the new state added secret gentleman's agreement. to the Arabs' bitterness. Several months later, the agreement was publicly confirmed in ~he Invasion of Egypt the famous Balfour Declaration of n November 1956, Great 1917. Britain, France, and Israel The proclamation of the Baljointly engineered a coorfour Declaration was designed "to. win world-wide Jewish backing for dinated attack on Egypt. The
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2. Charles Cremeans, The Arabs and the World (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1963): 124.
3. Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963): 107.
How Arabs See the West
"The Arab who travels to the West for the first time becomes dismayed at the perverted images Westerners have of Arabs."
13 avowed purpose of the invasion was to regain control of the Suez Canal, nationalized a few months earlier by Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser. After coming to power in 1952, Nasser sought to assert Egypt's sovereignty by pursuing a policy of what he termed "positive neutralism" and by building a strong national army. To achieve the latter objective, Nasser turned to the West, principally the U.S., for help. After failing repeatedly to obtain arms from the U.S., Nasser began, in 1954-1955, to negotiate an arms agreement with the Communist bloc. Russia, eagerly awaiting an opportunity to press its cause in the Arab world, welcomed the Egyptian initiative. Soon, extensive military and economic assistance began to flow into Egypt from several Communist countries. The Egyptian-Soviet ties grew closer and were accelerated by the political and psychological advantages the Communists had over the West. For one thing, the Communists were free of any record of Middle Eastern colonialism. For another, they were avowed opponents of Western imperialism, with no stake in the status quo of the conservative Arab regimes existing at the time. While the Communist influence in Egypt was on the rise, Nasser was nearing agreement with the
U.S. to finance the building of the Aswan Dam, urgently needed to augment Egypt's arable land. Embittered at the friendly ties between Egypt and the Communist block, J o h n Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, informed Nasser that the U.S. had reconsidered the matter and could not provide credits formerly agreed to. In a retaliatory move, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, owned mostly by the British and the French. Reluctant to give up their control over the strategic waterway, and growing impatient with Nasser's revolutionary agitation in the Middle East, England and France drew up plans to invade Egypt and t o p p l e Nasser in the process. Israel, becoming increasingly apprehensive about the rapid growth of the Egyptian military strength, welcomed the opportunity to join in the invasion. The tripartite attack on Egypt, which took place in August 1956, failed to achieve its objectives. Coming under heavy pressure from the United Nations, the Soviet Union (which threatened to use rockets and send volunteers to fight the invaders), and the U.S., the invading countries were forced to withdraw their troops. The Suez Canal remained in Egyptian hands, and Nasser not only survived the attack but emerged as a hero throughout the Arab world.
The invasion of Egypt rekindled Arab resentment and served to convert dark suspicions of the West into hard realities. The Arabs viewed the attack as being directed not against Egypt alone but against all Arabs, with an eye toward reestablishing Western dominance in the area. To the Arabs, the invasion revealed another aspect of the Machiavellian characteristic of the West: the ruthless preoccupation with military force. The West's Negative
Image
he Arab's perception of the West is, to a considerable degree, a reaction to the West's perception of him. The Arab who travels to the West for the first time becomes dismayed at the perverted images Westerners have of the Arabs. In the face of what he regards as gross misrepresentations of his people and culture, the Arab reacts angrily, and his anger often translates into bitterness and hostility toward the West. To be sure, some Westerners harbor a number of positive images of the Arabs. There is the image of the noble desert Bedouin, devoted to his thoroughbred mare. And there is the image of the Arabian knights and the tales of Scheherazade. On the whole, though, the Westerners' image of
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the Arabs tends to be highly negative. There are at least three factors which may account for the West's negative picture of the Arabs: (1) the West's distorted portrayal of Islam, (2) the rejection of Western ideologies by most Arabs, and (3) the role which Western communications media have played in inventing, perpetuating, and dramatizing the Arab stereotypes. The Religion Factor Islam, born in the seventh century, has m a n y elements in c o m m o n with Christianity. Both religions agree that one God created the universe, that Christ was miraculously born of a virgin, that he rose into heaven, and that God will grant m e n eternal life if they obey His divine will. Many of the parables in the Quran, the Muslim's holy book, are similar to those in the Old and the New Testaments. There are stories of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Joseph, Solomon, Zachariyah, J o h n the Baptist, and Jesus. The Muslims, however, reject the idea of God as Father; and although they accept the prophethood of Christ, they deny His divinity. Following the Muslims' advance into Europe (Spain and southern France) early in the eighth century, the Christian West not only exaggerated the doctrinal incompatibility between Christianity and Islam but also concocted fantastic misrepresentations of the Islamic religion. For example, in an effort to provide the Europeans with an idea of the nature of Islam, a Spanish poet, employing the Christian doctrine of the trinity as a frame of reference, claimed that the Muslims worshiped a trinity consisting of three persons: Muhammad, founder of the religion; and two others, Appolin and Tervagant, both of them devils. 4 4. Bernard Lewis, "Return of Islam," Commentary, January 1976: 39.
Even the name that Europeans gave the Muslims was void of any religious meaning. Thus, the Muslims were either called Saracens, Moors, or Turks, all of which are words with ethnic but not religious connotations. After Europe began to recognize the fact that Islam was a religion and not an ethnic community, it expressed this realization in a false analogy with Christianity. Thus, Islam was called Muhammadanism and the Muslims Muhammadans. The Muslims take offense at such an appellation, since it implies the divinity of Muhammad whom the Muslims consider to be only human. For hundreds of years, medieval divines, building on conceptions created by their predecessors living under Muslim rule, repeated and invented incidents to prove that the Prophet Muhammad was an imposter, a sexually indulgent schemer who fabricated revel a t i o n s to meet his political ambitions. The Quran was denounced as false and Islam as a sinister invitation to immorality, s Early in this century, an American missionary graciously conceded that "the Prophet was not an imposter; rather, he was a 'pathological case,' a 'trance-medium' who yielded to temptation and forged the awful machinery of divine inspiration to serve his own ignoble and selfish purposes. ''6 Many of today's Western thinkers are no less biased in their judgment of Islam than the medieval divines. With little or no knowledge of Islamic doctrines, they follow one another in deprecating Islam, branding it as the religion of war and backwardness. In typifying this position, R.E. Tyrell, Jr., writes: "Arabs are religious fanatics devoted to a non-Western warrior religion . . . . On this earth only the Chinese and the Russians indulge in more wanton slaughter of one 5. Lewis: 39. 6. Morroe Berger, "Arabs' Attitude to the West," Yale Review, December 1971: 219.
another. The Russians and the Chinese do it to make their societies more efficient and sequacious; the Arabs do it out of religious fervor . . . the Arab draws his blade with gusto, and when he is finished butchering he is always that much closer to Allah. The more addicted he is to the Koran, the less apt he is to conform to the idealistic notions of American statesmen."7 Faced with such misconceptions and falsehoods about Islam, the Arab cannot help reacting indignantly; he perceives the Westerners' distortion of his religion as a manifestation of their prejudice against Islam. Reflecting the views of most Arabs, Edward W. Said, an American literary critic of Arab descent, maintains that one of the factors contributing to the West's stereotyped images of Islam has been "the history of popular anti-Arah and anti-Islamic prejudice in the West . . . . - 8 The same point has been expressed recently and more bluntly by Sheik A h m e d Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabia's Minister of Oil, who said: " . . . quite simply, it is America's hatred for Moslems that makes it help Israel seize their land and expel the Palestinian nation. ''9 The Ideology Factor It was pointed out earlier that after the collapse of the O t t o m a n Empire in World War I, Great Britain and France came to be in direct control of the Middle East. Consequently, the Arabs began to turn their ire from the Turks to the British and the French. After nearly four decades of struggle, the Arabs were finally able to extricate themselves from the throes of European colonial domination. As a new superpower, the U.S. 7. R.E. Tyrell, Jr., "Chimera in the Middle East," Harper's, November 1976: 38. 8. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976): 26. 9. The New York Times, April 24, 1981: 1, 5.
How Arabs See the West
"Perhaps no single force has conditioned the average Westerner's attitude toward the Arabs as much as the communications media have."
15 grew increasingly apprehensive about the diminished Western influence in the Middle East. Fearing that the Soviet Union might capitalize on the resultant "power vacuum," the U.S. felt obliged to step in and assume many of the European c o m m i t m e n t s in the region. However, unlike the British and the French who often resorted to direct military occupation to solidify their power, the U.S. generally adopted a more subtle approach. By playing up the threats of Communism and by promising generous economic, military, and technical assistance, the U.S. sought to lure the Arabs into joining the West in a series of mutual defense treaties, a notable example of which was the Baghdad Pact. Although it met with some initial success, the new approach proved to be a failure. Some key Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria, viewed the proposed treaties as merely another device to introduce the new "American Imperialism" into the Middle East. It was at this time that the idea of neutralism began to gain wide popularity among the Arabs. Many Arab leaders became convinced that an alliance with any of the feuding superpowers could seriously undermine their national sovereignty. More importantly, perhaps, was the Arabs' conviction that their interests were actually at
cross-purposes with those of the West, which has always aligned itself with Israel, the Arabs' enemy. Russia, against which the proposed defense systems were directed, seemed too distant, with no historical memories to embitter its relations with the Arabs. Furthermore, the Arabs felt no immediate urgency to antagonize the Russians by joining Western-inspired military alliances. The West's frustration with the Arabs was compounded when a growing number of Arab governments began to cast aside Western political and economic institutions. By the late 1950s, the multi-party system had collapsed in m a n y Arab countries, to be replaced by military or one-party regimes. Maintaining that the multi-party system had been too hastily and clumsily grafted on the Middle East, the new rulers felt that a strong government was needed to ensure political stability so vital for their countries' development. Economically, several key Arab leaders turned their backs on the freeenterprise system, terming it exploitative and unjust. In its place there emerged socialism, which the new leaders came to view as being more in line with their avowed objectives of improving the conditions of the peasantry and the working class. With its effort to draw the Arabs back into the fold of the
Western sphere of influence thwarted and its political and economic institutions downgraded, the West reacted with hostility. Taking the position that "he who is not for us is against u s , ' ' 1 ° Western leaders began to brand neutralism as a pro-Communist manifestation and sought to discredit Arab leaders, such as Nasser, by labeling them Communists. The West's hostility toward the Arabs was perhaps no more evident than in the almost euphoric reaction with which the Israeli military victories over the Arabs were received in the West. Such a reaction is due, at least in part, to the notion that the Israeli triumphs signified the superiority of Western institutions, present in Israel and absent in most of the Arab world. The Arabs counteracted the West's hostility, particularly as it was reflected in its moral and material support for Israel in the 1973 war with the Arabs, with a heightened level of bitterness and resentment. Translating their feelings into a dramatic politicaleconomic move, the Arabs imposed an embargo on their oil exports to the West. The 1973 embargo marked a turning point in modern Arab-West relations. A growing number of European nations set out to befriend the 10. William Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958): 461.
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Arabs, b y assuming either a neutral or pro-Arab stand on the international political scene. Today, the U.S. remains the only significant Western nation which most Arabs continue to view with deep resentment, chiefly because of its unwavering support for Israel. But there are signs indicating that even the U.S. is attempting to ameliorate its standing among the Arabs. Playing a mediator role in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been only one dimension of such an effort. The Media Factor Perhaps no single force has conditioned the average Westerner's attitude toward the Arabs as much as the communications media have. Not only have the media served as a popular forum for perpetuating a host of misleading images about the Arabs, they also have invented some stereotypes of their own. The worst culprit in maligning the Arabs has been T.V. Today, high doses of distorted pictures of the Arabs are offered to T.V. viewers on a continuing basis. The Arab is invariably d e p i c t e d as a white slaver, a dope dealer, a pleasure seeker "with multiple wives, bizarre religious practices, execrable taste, and evil designs, m l He is also protrayed as a terrorist or participant in political intrigue. Although he might be concerned about political issues, his concern is expressed largely through murder and terrorism. 12 The Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel let loose in the West a flood of disparaging jokes that astonished many pro-Western Arabs. T.V. comedians made a daily practice of denigrating the Arabs, their culture, and their heritage. Similar Arab stereotypes can be seen in the movies. From the silent movies of the 1920s to today's 11. "The Other Anti-Semitism," The New Republic, March 1980: 6. 12. Jack G. Sheehan, "The Arab: TV's Most Popular Villain," Christian Century, December 3, 1978: 1214-1218.
wide-screen spectaculars, the Arabs are generally shown as greedy fools, sex-crazed, or blood-thirsty desert killers. The press has been equally guilty in its erroneous depiction of the Arabs. Aside from the frequent anti-Arab editorials, political cartoons routinely use hideouslooking sheiks pointing gas pumps like pistols to symbolize OPEC, or waving around piles of dollars to suggest that the Arabs are buying up the U.S., even though the Arabs account for just three percent of foreign investment in the U.S. 1 a Studies made of the American press' treatment of the Arab-Israeli conflict have revealed a consistent anti-Arab bias. This has led one researcher to conclude that much of the anti-Arab treatment in the press is purely racist in tone. 14 Books have made their own contributions in maligning the Arabs. In a study of the Arabs' portrayal in American textbooks, it was found that numerous texts blame the Arabs for the hostilities in the Middle East and for the plight of the Palestinians. One b o o k states that the only force unifying the Arabs is their hatred for the Jews, and that most Arabs do not know that there is a better way to live. 1 s Literary works are replete with such distortions. An Egyptian journalist could not help noticing them while visiting the U.S. With obvious bewilderment, he writes: "When I first visited the United States . . . I was interested in the literature of the Beat Generation and read On the Road by J a c k Kerouac. I was struck b y the sentence saying 'We were like a band of Arabs coming to blow up New York' and another saying 'Dean 13. "The Other Anti-Semitism": 6. 14.Janice Terry, "A Content Analysis of American Newspapers," in Abdeen Jabbara and Janice Terry, eds., The Arab World: From Nationalism to Revolution (Wilmette, IL.: The Medina University Press International, 1971): 100. 15. Ayad al-Qazzaz et al., The Arabs in American Textbooks (California State Board of Education,June 1975): 5-10.
drove into a filling station . . . noticed that the attendant was fast asleep . . . quitely filled the gas tank and rolled off like an Arab.'m 6 The pervasive Arab stereotypes in the media prompted one American writer to remark: "I do not think this is wholly owing to the absence of a big enough ArabAmerican political constituency to raise hell. The caricature dehumanizes. But it is inspired and made acceptable b y an earlier dehumanizing influence, namely, the absence of feeling for who the Arabs are and where they have been.,,1 These stereotypes injure the Arabs in the deepest sense. The Arabs who visit Europe and the U.S. experience a feeling of bewilderment at the disparaging manner in which their culture is portrayed. Here are people who grow up in a society that instills in them the notion that they belong to a great culture with remarkable traditions and accomplishments. Yet as soon as the Arab steps out of his cultural setting into the Western world, he is confronted with a painful reality. His selfesteem is challenged, his timehonored values are misrepresented, and his religion is denigrated. In the face of such challenges, the Arab reacts defensively; he begins to develop negative images of his own about the West which he comes to perceive as a hostile world and about Westerners as bigoted people. These reactive perceptions of the West exert a strong influence on the Arab's behavior long after he returns home. Westerners are often puzzled as to w h y some Arab leaders, who had received their education in the West, speak and act with so much belligerence toward the West. Such Westerners 16. Ahmed Baha El-Din, "World Media and the Arabs: An Arab Perspective," in The Arab World: From Nationalism to Revolution, op. cit.: 85. 17. Meg Greenfield, "Our Ugly Arab Comp l e x , " N e w s w e e k , December 5, 1977: 1110.
How Arabs See the West
fail to realize that a great deal of the Arabs' bitterness is b u t a reflection of the anger the Arabs feel over the manner in which they are perceived in the West. The Westerners' Superior Attitude ndoubtedly, the four factors discussed above (Western colonialism, the creation of Israel, the invasion of Egypt, and the West's negative image of the Arabs) account for most of the resentment the Arabs feel toward the West. There is yet another factor which has served to foster such a feeling. This can be found in the air of superiority which many Westerners, operating in the Middle East, have often displayed in their interpersonal communication with the Arabs. The Arabs' resentment here is also a reactive behavior; it is a type of defense mechanism which the Arabs resorted to as a means of dealing with the West's sense of superiority. Many British and French officials who served in the Arab world during the colonial period, were neither able nor well-balanced individuals. They were largely secondraters who t o o k minor posts in the Arab countries. Foreign service "afforded these officials an opportunity to appease their own sense of inferiority b y lording it over the Arabs.,,1 s The contemptuous attitude of Western officials is evident in the books some of them wrote detailing their impressions of the Arabs. in one such b o o k titled Egypt and the English, the author states:
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18. Cremeans: 49.
"To hear the Egyptian talk, y o u would imagine that his one desire was to improve his mind, to raise his level to the equal of a highly-educated European. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian has no mind . . . . He is a liar, a rogue, an assassin as needs be and opportunities arise. As the b o y cheats over his work, so the man cheats over his business. Taking a mean advantage is, to him, a commendable strategy.'19 Egyptians and other Arabs have not failed to notice that many Westerners who visited the Middle East had in their bags books similar to Egypt and the English. Most of these books contained outlandish stories of the experiences of Westerners who made their long years in the Arab countries tolerable by seeing the amusing side of the antics of the natives. In the personal experiences of many Arabs are recollections of c o n t e m p t u o u s and uncivil treatment b y Westerners who regarded themselves as superior to the Arabs by virtue of their Westerness. Even members of the Arab educated class who became deeply attached to Western culture were denied membership in Western communities based in the Arab world. After giving their best efforts to penetrate the secrets of Western culture, these Arab imitators of the West suffered a sense of betrayal when Westerners rejected them. Edward Attiyah, a Lebanese, is one of those educated Arabs who became disillusioned with the West. Later, he wrote an auto19. Douglas Sladen, Egypt and the English (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1908): 73.
biography detailing the sense of rejection and resentment the educated Arabs felt. The Westernized Arab had revolted, Attiyah says, " n o t against oppression, injustice or economic exploitation . . . b u t against spiritual arrogance, racial haughtiness, social aloofness, and paternal authoritarianism."2 o
Implications n their relationship with the West, the Arabs exhibit an injured superiority complex. A highly proud people, the Arabs feel that the West has not only wronged them but also humiliated them. But, despite their embittered feelings, most Arabs have a deep reservoir of goodwill toward the West. The slightest sign of understanding displayed by Westerners often produces a remarkable change in their attitude. If the businessman is to bring out the Arabs' goodwill, he should begin b y engaging in self-examination to identify any ethnocentric tendencies and prevent them from injuring the Arabs' sensitivities. Next, he will do well to equip himself with accurate information about the Arabs' history, religion, politics, value systems, and the like. Finally, the businessman will be prudent to adopt an empathic approach in dealing with the Arabs. That is, he should not only perceive the Arabs as they like to be perceived; he should also endeavor to perceive the Arabs' outer world as they perceive it. [23
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20. Edward Attiyah, An Arab Tells His Story: A Study in Loyalties (London: J o h n Murray, 1946): 165.
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