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How democracy was achieved
European Journal of Political Economy 28 (2012) 651–658
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How democracy was achieved A review of Roger Congleton, Perfecting Parliament: Constitutional Reform and the Origins of Western Democracy, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011, pp. 658 George Tridimas ⁎ University of Ulster, School of Economics, Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim, BT37 0QB, UK
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Article history: Received 12 October 2011 Received in revised form 25 October 2011 Accepted 2 November 2011 Available online 3 February 2012 JEL classification: D7 N4
a b s t r a c t In ‘Perfecting Parliament’ Roger Congleton applies the rational choice framework to explain two attributes of the democratization of the West from the medieval times to the early twentieth century, first the shift of policy making authority from the king to the parliament and second the extension of voting rights to previously disenfranchised groups of the population. This review essay sets out the themes of the book, and relates the book to the democratization of classical Athens and democratization from the last quarter of the 20 th century. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Democracy Democratization Ancient Athens Constitutional exchange Franchise extension Democracy and development
You can never have a revolution to establish a democracy. You must have a democracy in order to have a revolution. (G.K.Chesterton, Tremendous Trifles, 1909)
1. Introduction In modern free societies, democracy is the basis of policymaking and law enforcement. In the current political climate, politicians always profess to act democratically. Even in autocratic regimes, rulers often feel obliged to make claims that citizens of their countries are not denied democratic freedoms. However, if we take a long view of history and judge the political lives of our ancestors by modern standards, autocracy, that is, absence of rule by the people, was the norm. It has only been in the last two hundred years that people in Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan, collectively known as “the West”, have come to live under regimes where those who govern do so after winning competitive elections. Also political liberalization during the 19th and early 20th centuries coincided with unprecedented economic growth that vastly improved the well⁎ Tel.: +44 28 90368273; fax: +44 28 0366847. E-mail address: [email protected]. 0176-2680/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.11.001
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being of the same people who experienced democratic politics. However, the advance of democracy has not been smooth; the 20th century inter-war period witnessed a reverse to authoritarianism, and, despite the progress to democracy after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, great swathes of humanity remain ruled by autocrats. Roger Congleton offers illuminating answers to the question of how liberal democracy arose. In scholarship that combines economic theory, political science and history, he builds a theory of constitutional negotiation, which he uses to explain the transformation of king-dominated medieval government to modern liberal parliamentary democracy as it prevailed in the early 20th century. He divides the democratization of the West into two fundamental elements: first, the shift of policymaking authority from the king to the parliament; second, the extension of voting rights to previously disenfranchised groups of the population, so that the parliament came to represent the citizenry rather than the aristocratic elites. He shows that the two moves were generated by mechanisms that operated independently of one other and constructs a systematic account of how the shift to democracy was accomplished. Such arguments and related hypotheses will surely be discussed at length and will be tested empirically for a long time to come. In the present essay, after reviewing Congleton's theory of how the West democratized (Section 2), I shall also investigate how, if at all, the theory fits the introduction of democracy in ancient Athens (Section 3) and is consistent with (Section 4) the recent democratic transition, that is, democratization before and after the time period covered by his book. In Section 5 I offer some concluding comments. 2. Congleton's theory of the democratic transformation The book is in three parts, namely, formal economic theory, Chapters 2–8; a constitutional, political and economic history account, Chapters 9–18; and a statistical evidence part with a social science overview, Chapters 19–20. The first part weaves together previously published work of Congleton to present a political–economy explanation of the existence and architecture of territorial governments. Chapters 2–4 show that such governments are based on the “king and council” template, remain relative stable over time, and display institutional conservatism. In the king-and-council scheme, responsibilities for deciding policies are divided between a single person, the king (or chief executive) and a committee or council that is the progenitor of the modern parliament and makes important decisions by voting, and tends to be governed by rules rather than making arbitrary decisions. Chapter 5 observes that the authority to make policy is multi-dimensional, because decisions on different policy issues are separable, and control of policy can be divided between the king and the originally aristocratic parliament. The initial assignments of policymaking authority are regarded as “political property rights”. When authority is shifted among policymakers, a “market for power” is created through which policymaking and procedures for selecting policymakers can be peacefully and lawfully reformed. Just as trade in ordinary markets results in mutual benefits for the trading parties, so do constitutional bargains that divide power over policymaking. When technology changes, ideology shifts, external threats beckon, or genetic shocks occur (a new sovereign with talents and tastes different from those of his predecessor ascends to the throne), mutually beneficial trades in policymaking authority between the king and the parliament take place. Using a spatial decision framework, Chapter 6 develops a model of constitutional bargains where the king may trade parliament's approval for higher revenue for the royal household in exchange for more parliamentary authority (veto power to agenda setting) in other policy areas. Chapters 7 and 8 examine the extension of the franchise, the second component of democratization. Suffrage laws for selecting political representatives are remarkably stable for a simple reason: at any point in time, other things being equal, the median–decisive voter is satisfied with the existing law defining voting rights, for it allows him to be pivotal in determining policy. Similarly, those elected to office are reluctant to change the parameters of a system that has brought them the benefits of office. When the ideological norms held by the median voter shift in favor of extending the right to vote, widespread expansion of suffrage follows. Such changes in norms occurred as a result of personal experiences, inspiration from new ideas, and convictions of those who were already enfranchised. Furthermore, in practice, the cost of organizing interest groups fell with industrialization and the increase in urbanization. Campaigns for change were then orchestrated by interest groups pursuing franchise reform, by political groups expecting to gain the support of newly enfranchised voters, and industrialists and workers who were under-represented in the medieval parliaments. In particular, following the industrial revolution, workers could bargain for voting rights in exchange for industrial peace and a broader tax base. Chapter 9–12 of Part II describe how from the 18th century onwards western European societies became more secular (even though the population continued to be deeply religious) and more liberal as a result of discoveries of new lands, technological changes that increased the efficient scale of production, trade expansion, greater scientific knowledge, and wider consumer choice. These chapters also document the ascent of liberal ideas about limited government, tolerance, natural rights, equality before the law, and gradual rejection of the importance of birth privileges. Taking full advantage of technological progress was possible after reforming medieval laws and regulations controlling economic and political life. Economic and political reforms did not occur spontaneously or through revolution but through formal changes in the law that reflected changes in political and legal theories and the economic interests of those with the authority to reform long-standing laws. Restrictions on farmland ownership were liberalized, as were internal and external trade, slavery was abolished, publicly funded education was introduced, and suffrage was extended. To some extent, the latter came as a result of economic growth that allowed more citizens to satisfy wealth and tax payments qualifications; but more importantly it came as the result of ideological shifts and pragmatic considerations by liberal politicians who expected a larger number of supporters from newly qualified middle-class voters. Over the course of the 19th century, policymaking authority gradually shifted away from the aristocratic chamber of parliament toward the elected chamber, as the cumulative result of a series of minor liberal reforms that reduced the control of the sovereign. At the same time, new debates emerged regarding qualifications for voting, size of voting districts, voting rules, partisan interests, weighted voting, and women's suffrage. Chapters 12–18 of the historical narrative chart the constitutional histories of three contemporary constitutional monarchies, the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands, and three republics Germany, Japan and USA. Despite obvious and significant differences, the
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constitutional developments of the six countries share several common trends that fit well the hypotheses advanced in the first part of the book. In all countries, the fabric of the king-and-council template was retained, parliaments gradually acquired more control over policy making (as a result of opportunistic bargaining between the parliaments and the sovereigns), and the right to vote was slowly extended from a very small percentage of the population to what is now known as universal suffrage. In England, starting with the Magna Charta of 1215, the parliament became the dominant institution well before universal suffrage was obtained. In Germany, on the contrary, suffrage expanded more rapidly than power shifted to parliament, while with the World War I defeat hereditary monarchy was abolished and a republic was established, which was subsequently overthrown by the chancellorship of Adolph Hitler in 1933. Constitutional reform in the Netherlands took the form of moving from the republic of the provinces (1581) to kingdom (1815) and then gradually to parliamentary democracy. Japanese political liberalization started in earnest toward the end of the 19th century but parliamentary democracy ended in the 1930s after a resurgence of conservatism and domestic political violence. Industrialization was a catalyst for the transition to liberal reform in the European countries but not for the USA, where liberalization of colonial governments preceded the 1776 war of independence from Britain. As a corollary, the case studies show that constitutional reform toward parliamentary democracy was neither an entirely European phenomenon nor irreversible once started. Chapter 19 of Part III presents statistical evidence supporting the validity of the theoretical model of constitutional reform developed in Part I. Although the regression equations are not structural equations of the models studied, they are motivated and informed by the analytical framework developed. The chapter first discusses the problems of measuring economic, institutional, and political variables during the 19th century; it then plots several diagrams correlating the time profile of real per capita GDP and political variables; finally, it reports Granger-type causality tests. It is found that causality between economic growth and democratic liberalization is bidirectional as predicted by the theoretical analysis. Congleton concludes that the political and economic ‘revolutions’ of the 19th century were not revolutions (in the sense of a single abrupt break from the past), but the consequence of a series of reforms, and that constitutional and economic liberalization are jointly determined rather than causally related. Chapter 20 compares and contrasts the theory of constitutional bargains developed in the book with other theories of the rise of western democracy, and in particular, “big-bang” approaches, in which democratic governance emerges as a result of a violent revolution or alternatively a peaceful constitutional convention (or some combination of the two), and evolutionary or reform theories, in which political developments are one of many areas of change through time. Contrary to popular myths and romantic views of historical episodes, it was not revolutions that established contemporary democracy and representative government. Revolutions, which more often than not are accompanied by widespread violence, do not lead to democratic reforms, since successful revolutionary leaders are more likely to keep control and continue the revolutionary organization's hierarchical decision making, secrecy, and discipline, rather than grant voting rights. Congleton's analysis differs from other economic accounts by emphasizing the role of both economic interests and liberal ideologies, with interest groups organized around narrow liberal ideas in education, trade and voting rights instrumental in a long series of reforms that produced liberal democracies and open economic systems. Congleton's book is a huge intellectual enterprise covering vast territories of research carried out with rigor and gusto. Drawing on the familiar spatial decision making framework, he offers an innovative model of the market for power over budgets and public policies to explain how constitutional reforms are adopted. His modeling of franchise extension stresses the importance of ideological objectives and the reduction of the cost of organizing political interest groups that are able to push for the realization of their objectives. His case studies of comparative constitutional histories along with his empirical results shed light on the debate surrounding the link between development and democracy. Some further discussion of Congleton's hypotheses is warranted. Empirical work has confirmed the casual observation that democracy and development are positively correlated. Research has investigated how factors such as size of real per capita income, education, ethnic fractionalization, hierarchical state religions, trade openness, income inequality, legacy of institutions established by colonial powers, legal origins (whether dominated by common law or civil law systems), geography (which includes non-human factors such as climate, soil fertility, disease and mineral wealth), trust, and democracy are related. There is, however, controversy about causality. Two opposing views have been expressed. The modernization, or democratic transition, theory 1 claims that political development in the long run is a consequence of overall development. Economic development is driven by higher production volumes, which also generate more complex transactions, and, as income increases, so does demand for democracy, urbanization, education and other attributes of modernity such as administrative efficiency, transparency and so on. Neither the economy nor the society can any longer be run by the edicts of autocratic rulers and democracy is established. On the other hand, the primacy of institutions view 2 argues that both income and democracy are determined by political institutions that structure power relations. Countries that choose different institutions at different “critical junctures” travel along different long-run paths of economic and political development. 3 Like the primacy of institutions view, Congleton treats institutions that divide authority about policymaking as endogenous, that is, they are chosen by rational actors. In his statistical work he does not undertake a detailed multiple regression analysis of the kind 1 This is typically associated with Lipset (1959); for recent discussion and empirical results see among others Barro (1999), Borooah and Paldam (2007), Paldam and Gundlach (2008) and (2009), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). 2 The origins of this view can be found in North (1981); for a full formal account and econometric investigation see Acemoglu et al. (2001), Rodrik et al. (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2005), who also offer a comparative review, and Acemoglu et al. (2008). 3 Przeworski and Limongi (1997) find that the level of economic development does not affect the probability of transitions to democracy but high income makes democratic regimes more stable. However, the validity of that conclusion was challenged by Boix and Stokes (2003) who found that economic development increases the probability that a country will undergo a transition to democracy. More generally, Przeworski and Limongi (2005) doubt whether existing theoretical models can identify the mechanisms that give rise to democracy — instead they are concerned with the question of whether democracies can survive once they are established. See also Cheibub et al. (2010) for an insightful discussion in favor of a minimalist classification of democracy–dictatorship and critique of measures of democracy used in empirical studies.
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carried out by the empirical research. Instead, he runs temporal causality tests for five of the countries investigated (Japan is left out because of lack of data) with mid-19th to early 20th century data, and concludes that democracy and income are jointly determined. This finding indicates that economic and political liberalization are the outcome of other underlying variables and is consistent with his fundamental hypothesis that “both are induced by trends in technology and ideological developments that produce new constitutional gains from exchange and compromise” (p.587), an argument further supported by the narrative of each country studied. Congleton's argument that political change and liberalization came about as the outcome of constitutional negotiations, and was gradual and peaceful, goes against that of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) that the elites extended suffrage rights to the disenfranchised poor majority because that was the only credible way to redistribute wealth and hold back the threat of revolution. 4 On this account and despite several differences, Congleton's focus on negotiation is closer to the spirit of explanations of franchise extension that call attention to peaceful political exchanges. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) emphasize trading voting rights for more public goods and intra-elite divisions. Specifically, an external economic shock causes divergent interests within the elite and drives part of the enfranchised elite to extend the franchise voluntarily to previously disenfranchised groups in order to increase the provision of public goods that will directly increase its welfare. 5 Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) propose yet another explanation for the extension of the franchise in the Americas based on factor endowments that does not involve revolutionary threats. Territories facing labor scarcity, typically USA “frontier” states, could attract immigrants by offering them, among other inducements, full political rights including the suffrage. On the other hand, in countries with soil suitable for production in large plantations or abundant mineral wealth, as in Latin America, small settler elites could more easily exploit the resources and deny political rights to the large native populations. 3. Democratization in ancient Athens I turn now to the democracy of ancient Athens, which has had an enduring impact on ideas of liberty and political equality as well as on ensuing perennial dilemmas involving the latter and order and social stability. Etymologically, the word democracy comes from the Greek words ‘demos’, that is, people, and ‘kratos’, that is, rule. The political ideals of equality among the citizens, liberty, respect for the law, and justice of modern democracy originate from ancient Greece. However, the modern notion that human beings are individuals with inviolable rights is not part of the ancient Greek thought. A citizen's rights and obligations followed from his capacity of being a member of the citizenry; they were public rights and duties. 6 In this context, the notion of protecting the individual against the might of the state did not exist in ancient Greece. Democracy was born in ancient Athens at the end of the sixth century BCE. 7 Until then Athens was ruled by the nine archons, drawn from the aristocratic families that often fought against each other for supremacy, and the Council of Areopagus consisting of former archons, that had veto powers, oversaw laws and magistrates, and conducted trials. In 594 BCE a large scale social and economic crisis was resolved by appointing Solon, an aristocrat, as lawgiver. Solon introduced wide ranging political and economic reforms that included making access to public office conditional on wealth rather than birth, formal accountability of magistrates, and granting legal standing rights to all male Athenian citizens. Solon's dispensation was broken in 546 BCE when Peisistratus established himself as tyrant (extra-constitutional, one-man authority). The tyranny was overthrown in 510. A struggle for power that followed was won by Cleisthenes, an aristocrat, who allied himself to the common people – demos – by proposing constitutional reforms that would provide for wider political rights. He then introduced a series of fundamental constitutional reforms, determining citizenship rights and the powers of the assembly of citizens, which led to the foundation of democracy. The assembly of citizens, requiring a quorum of six thousand participants, became the sovereign political body deciding on all important issues of public interest. All Athenian men from the age of twenty years could participate, while those aged thirty and above could be appointed to executive or judicial office. After listening to the speakers, voting in the assembly took place by show of hands and decisions were taken by simple majority. From 501 BCE, the assembly elected annually by show of hands the ten generals, the commanders of the army and the navy, who along with a few treasury and religious commissionaires were the only elected officials. From 487 BCE the nine archons were selected by lot, while in 462 BCE the Areopagus lost its checking powers. A fully democratic constitution was then functioning. 8 In addition to its direct nature, it had several other prominent characteristics. There were no political parties in the sense of organizations to represent economic and social cleavages and espouse distinct ideological positions. The courts played a significant political role in the sense of controlling the other organs of the state. Perhaps more strikingly, a large number of public offices were filled by lot including five hundred councilors responsible for the day-today administration and the preparation of the assembly business, six thousand judges and another six hundred magistrates. 4 That enfranchisement of the poor diminishes the risk of insurrection is an argument also pursued by Justman and Gradstein (1999) and Conley and Temini (2001). Bourgignon and Verdier (2000) study the complex dynamics of growth, inequality, franchise extension and investment in human capital financed by taxation. In the vein of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Ellis and Fender (2009) explore a growth model where the capital owning elite introduce democracy to ensure the credibility of labor market reforms that aim to redistribute to the workers by paying them the marginal product of labor. 5 For further elaboration of intra-elite division as a cause of franchise extension see Llavador and Oxoby (2005) and Jack and Lagunoff (2006). Munshi (2011) explains franchise extension without revolutionary threats or redistribution motives but through the presence of elite-pressure, large rents from office and evenly-balanced partisan competition. Like Congleton, Horpedahl (2011) too emphasizes political exchanges and voluntary suffrage expansion. 6 See Held (2006). 7 Historians have pieced together the fragmentary written and archeological evidence to provide a coherent and detailed account of the emergence of the Athenian democracy and its structures. For a recent account, see among others Ober (2008) and Cartledge (2009); see also the volume edited by Raaflaub et al. (2007) for a debate about the start and completion of the Athenian democratic transformation. 8 By the mid-5th century, pay for those serving in public office had been introduced. In comparison, the British equivalent evolution was considerably slower as property qualifications for the British MPs were scrapped in 1858 and pay was introduced in 1912.
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Being a direct democracy, it also defied modern classifications on the parliamentary–presidential scale. Recent research has revealed that the Athenian democratization was associated with growing economic prosperity, urbanization was high, and wealth was distributed relatively equitably. 9 In sum, the ancient Athenian democracy differs from the modern western variant in that it was direct and not representative, made decisions by simple majority, had no political parties, and delegated responsibilities to officials appointed by sortition. In Tridimas (2011a), I explain how the above institutions worked in tandem, forming an internally consistent framework such that it may not have been possible for any one of them to have functioned without the existence of the rest. Contrasting the parliamentarian and the Athenian democracy, Manin (1997) points out that the former is predicated on citizens having an equal right to consent to government, while the Athenian democracy not only recognized the latter but also promoted equality of the right to occupy office. Coercive government is legitimized when citizens agree to be bound by the rules imposed by those in office. Equal voting rights (irrespective of one's birth, income, education, or gender) in elections to choose government manifests equality of citizens to give their consent and therefore confer legitimacy to those elected to office. 10 The 19th and 20th century conflicts for suffrage extension analyzed by Congleton and the literature he surveys describe fights for achieving such political equality. A similar fight took place in ancient Athens. Franchise extension took place gradually throughout the sixth century when aristocratic rule by birthright was replaced with rule by the wealthy (Solon's reforms), and eventually with rule by the people irrespective of wealth (Cleisthenes' democracy). 11 However, the Athenians restricted voting rights to men only; but they went one step further than equality of voting rights for men by instituting equality of opportunity to occupy office for all citizens, as manifested in the practice of sortition, 12 which lacks a modern equivalent. The above description shows that despite the ideological and practical differences, there is a remarkable similarity between the emergence of the Athenian democracy and the parliamentary democracies described by Congleton. A form of king-andcouncil architecture was present in ancient Athens and Congleton's thesis on the gradual extension of the franchise is applicable too. The democratic transformation of Athens, the political emancipation of the demos and its eventual control over policymaking was accomplished in a number of steps over a long period of time (594–462 BCE), with each reform building on previous ones and with support by substantial parts of the earlier aristocracy, and despite the occasional violence, was peaceful. Nor was calling the assembly a revolutionary institutional innovation: assemblies of warriors were held from the Archaic times (700–500 BCE) as described in the Homeric poems. The new element was the transfer of decision making power to the assembly (and the courts); that too took a while to be completed and was the product of negotiations between the ruling aristocrats and the emerging demos, who provided the hoplites for land defense, and the rowers for powering the navy, classes excluded from decision making in earlier political dispensations. Equally, even though absence of quantitative information does not permit an empirical investigation, historians affirm a link between political liberalization and economic growth which is also manifested through the famed architectural and cultural achievements of the Athenians. On this account, democracy led to a revolution in living standards and attitudes. However, the analogies stop here. The direct-democracy nature of ancient Athens implies that there is no strict analog between the gradual transfer of power from the king to the parliament analyzed by Congleton and ancient Athens. Direct democracy meant that enfranchisement simultaneously shifted policymaking authority from the aristocracy to the demos. We may then infer that Congleton's theory of constitutional bargaining and enfranchisement produces multiple institutional equilibria, the Athenian democracy being one and the Western democracy being a different one. How the Athenian democracy fell is a question still awaiting a satisfactory political economy explanation. The rise of Alexander's Macedon in the fourth quarter of the 3rd century and the military defeat of Athens in 322 BCE ended the democratic constitution, while it also gave rise to theoretical writings favoring monarchy. (The reverse of) Congleton's intuition may be of use here: the Athenian democracy was not concurrent with major technological breakthroughs or large scale industrialization. After Athens and before the imperial period, the ancient Roman republic operated a number of democratic arrangements but never adopted the notion of oneman one-vote, while it also had in place a variety of restrictions on political participation based on wealth. Ideas in favor of democracy and against absolute rule reappear with the Enlightenment and it is with scholars from that era that Congleton's inquiry starts. 4. Democratization after World War II The constitutional evolution analyzed in ‘Perfecting Parliament’ ends in the 1930s. Further democratization took place after the end of WWII when Germany, Italy and modern Greece resumed democratic politics (but Central and East Europe turned communist) and in the aftermath of decolonization from European powers. However, democratization stalled and was even in reverse by the early 1960s. Indeed, consistent with Congleton's injunction, and despite the rhetoric, nationalist revolutionary leaders were more likely to fashion and preside over despotic regimes rather than democracies. Democratic order took root only in India (1947) and Israel (1948). A “third” wave of democratization swept Europe in the mid-seventies with, Portugal (1974), Greece (1974) and Spain (1976) shaking off military dictatorships and adopting the parliamentary democracies analyzed by
9
See Morris (2004) and Ober (2010). However, in practice the interplay of the usual electoral laws based on plurality or proportional representation formulas applied to constituencies of different size, may invalidate the principle of vote equality. 11 Fleck and Hanssen (2006) offer a formal model of the extension of voting rights in ancient Athens. Bitros and Karayiannis (2010) show how institutions and the moral norms of Athens were instrumental in her economic success, while Pitsoulis (2011) discusses of the origin and adoption of the majority rule. 12 For a review of the literature on sortition and the question of why a self-interested citizen may appoint government officials by lot rather than elections, see Tridimas (2012). 10
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Congleton. Interestingly, Portugal and Greece opted for a republican form of state, 13 while Spain established a constitutional monarchy. Political liberalization in Argentina (1983), Brazil (1985), South Korea (1987) and Chile (1988) preceded the surge of democratization that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of Communism. As a broad generalization, Central and Eastern European countries made the transition to parliamentary democracy rather rapidly and smoothly (Yugoslavia being an obvious exception). In the nineties democracy seemed to be on an unstoppable advance in Latin America, Africa and several parts of Asia. In the first decade of the 21st century, with the exceptions of autocracies in the Middle East, communists in East Asia, and some African states, countries hold elections and many countries ruled by illiberal governments only twenty years before are now classified as democracies. Several countries previously torn by strife and civil war have power-sharing arrangements based on proportional representation and respect for minorities. 14 The ‘Arab spring’ of 2011 that sees countries of the Maghreb getting rid of long dictatorships raises expectations that democracy will prevail there too. However, the ongoing wave of democratization differs from the democratization of the West analyzed by Congleton. I discuss three key issues, namely, winning the argument against an autocratic alternative, achieving democracy out of dictatorship rather than 18th century hereditary monarchy, and finally establishing a functioning democracy. The first obstacle to democratic convergence relates to the appeal of current nondemocratic alternatives. Western liberal democracy as a system of governance is not unchallenged. The Chinese model of economic growth, including among other components one-party rule, emphasis of the paramount interests of the nation over the individual, selective use of markets, a significant role for state enterprises and the importance of government in guiding the economy, may be considered as an alluring option. From the mid-nineties, that system delivered fast growing prosperity to the rising middle class of city-dwellers, and increased China's status as a global power. Further, the banking crisis, output contraction and sovereign debt crisis that have befallen on the West since 2008 have sparked talk about the failure of capitalism and boosted support for an expansive role of the state. The argument about the superiority of non-democratic regimes in delivering high economic growth, drawn from the conflictual and often fractious nature of democratic politics, is related to the debate on the modernization vs institutions controversy mentioned above. However, the emphasis here is on the comparative advantages of democracy and dictatorship for economic growth, that is, how political institutions affect the rate of change of income rather than its level. 15 It is first important to recognize that there are several contemporary counterexamples of autocracies from Africa, Asia and Latin America with meager and indeed declining economic performance. Arguably then, it may be more accurate to talk about “Chinese exceptionalism”. Democrats would of course remain undeterred by such arguments not least because of the value placed on democracy, that is, democracy and the associated freedoms are desirable per se over and above their economic implications. 16 However, if the authoritarian exceptionalism secures long-lasting economic gains, it is legitimate to ask whether there is a trade-off between democracy and economic growth. Congleton's reply is reassuring for democracy. He points out that during the 19th century there was no trade-off between liberal politics and economic growth. Rather, the two complemented one another. 17 Establishing democracy from 20th century dictatorship differs from achieving democracy out of 18th century hereditary monarchy. Traditional European monarchical rule was based on government by birth right and deference to the ruling aristocratic class. Military dictatorship relies on the backing of the armed forces while civilian dictatorship relies on the support of a mass party, and both types operate repressive security apparatus. Succession in monarchies is based on familial ties, a simple rule whose operation avoids costly contests for power. On the contrary, dictatorships lack clear rules of succession. Rival claims may then be settled after violent and otherwise damaging conflicts. To avoid such problems the dictator may appoint a successor. However, in doing so he faces the “successor's dilemma” 18: the sitting dictator may be threatened by a designated successor who builds enough independent support to ensure his succession against his rivals. However, if the designated successor fails to build a power base, his rule will be at risk and so will the legacy of the sitting dictator. A further complicating issue relates to the types of compromises struck to unseat a dictator. Inducements like immunity from prosecution and safe passage away from the country may hasten his exit but may violate notions of justice particularly for the victims of repression. Congleton's book attests that establishing democracy out of medieval aristocratic parliaments was a long and slow process unfolding over several generations. On the other hand, transition to democracy at the end of the 20th century was faster. In the first instance, unlike the 19th century norm, the overthrow of a post 1974 dictatorship was followed by immediately granting of universal suffrage rather than extending it gradually. Second, in comparison to the gradual ascent of the power of the parliament at the expense of the king, the shift of policy making authority from the dictator to the elected representatives took place in rapid steps (although not necessarily on a single date). As with any catching-up, new comers to the democratization process have the advantage that they can learn from the constitutional experience of “early starters”, observe what political arrangements have worked in the past, and adapt them to their own circumstances. Another significant difference is that the current wave of democratization includes attempts to 13
See Tridimas (2010) for a political economy examination of the 1974 Greek referendum that abolished the monarchy. Examples of varying success are among others Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon and Northern Ireland. Tridimas (2011b) offers a public choice analysis of power-sharing arrangements based on election outcomes under proportional representation. 15 A large volume of work has developed debating the issue and often reporting conflicting estimates; see Olson (1993), Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Perotti (1996), Wintrobe (1998), Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) and Collier and Hoeffler (2009). 16 Furthermore, Bjørnskov et al. (2010) report that both economic and democratic political institutions have a positive effect on happiness, where the latter effect is more pronounced in richer countries. 17 Hillman (2007) argues that autocrats do not have an “encompassing interest” in economic growth because their priority is the survival of their rule and security of office rents. The emergence of a middle class associated with economic development will lead to demand for accountability and honesty in government and political competition that would end autocratic rule. For the same reason autocrats do not have the incentive to provide quality education or health care. On the contrary, they encourage corruption because it redistributes income to public officials that are then expected to support the regime. 18 See Zhang (2011) for a detailed discussion with an application to communist China. 14
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establish democracy by an external power, as in the cases of the USA-led efforts to impose democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, their ambiguous outcomes are in accordance with Congleton's implicit corollary that democracy is the negotiated outcome of the actions of domestic players. 19 The third challenge relates to adopting the rituals and trappings of democracy rather than asserting its essence. 20 That is, holding elections does not provide a guarantee of a functioning democracy. Elections that are neither free nor fair, vote buying, refusal of defeated incumbents to leave office, ethnic tensions, civil wars, and revolving plundering governments make a mockery of the electoral process. Liberal democracy is concerned not only with the representatives of the majority winning office, but with limiting abuses of power by those in office. The latter requires the operation of checks and balances so that no single state organ monopolizes power, and freedoms and rights are protected. Prominent among those arrangements are separation of powers, bicameral legislatures, federal structures, and independent judiciaries with the power to review the acts of other government bodies. A number of empirical studies have shown that income and education correlate significantly with democratization, while democratization is less likely to emerge in Muslim countries as well as in oil producing countries. 21 Such findings go a long way to explaining why Central and Eastern European countries as well as Latin American countries were more successful in their transition to democracy. In addition, having set full membership of the European Union as the final destination of their transition, Central and Eastern European countries had a clear objective of the political and economic transformation required and the standards to be achieved. On the other hand, countries lacking such objectives may be less fervent supporters of democratic reform. It is then advisable to be cautious about the speed and depth of the current transitions of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The democratic transformation may take some time to complete as the various actors learn to negotiate and compromise. 5. Conclusions In answering the question of how the western democracy arose out of aristocratic oligarchy, Roger Congleton has served an intellectual feast. He augments the standard spatial decision framework to present an innovative model of constitutional bargaining between the king and the parliament that is then used to explain how political authority shifts. He highlights the role of ideological objectives and the decreasing costs of organizing interest groups to explain franchise extension. He subsequently embarks on a commanding historical narrative of comparative constitutional developments. He finally contributes to the empirical literature on the nexus between economic development and democratization. To recap, his propositions are that democratic governance in the West came about gradually through a series of parliamentary and electoral reforms that were the result of negotiations, and that the economic and constitutional liberalization of the 19th century were interdependent, determined by the same variables, although through different processes. The shift to liberal democracy consisted of a long series of small, largely peaceful, steps that unfolded together with important economic and ideological changes, and took a long time to complete. The book challenges conventionally held views of the emergence of western democracy: “Sudden radical breaks with the past are not necessary for democracy to emerge from medieval parliamentary regimes, nor are class consciousness or civil wars necessary preconditions for liberal reform. Institutional flexibility, bargaining, and liberal interests are sufficient. The models suggest that peaceful lawful constitutional reforms are possible, and parliamentary democracy can emerge gradually as a series of constitutional reforms are adopted.” (p. 182) Among other issues, one expects that several more studies will be published in the years to come to analyze some of the traditional Western democracies left out of the book, with France being an obvious candidate. In the meantime, taking stock from Congleton's analysis, I have gone back to the birth of democracy to relate Congleton's analysis and intuition to aspects of the emergence of the Athenian democracy, the predecessor and intellectual ancestor of modern democracy, and highlighted some stark differences from the period and institutions that motivated Congleton's ideas. Congleton's framework also offers insightful pointers for reflection on the expansion of democracy beyond the West. Acknowledgments I wish to thank Arye Hillman for conversations that helped shape my thoughts on the issues discussed in this paper. References Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A., 2000. Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 1167–1199. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A., 2001. The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91, 1369–1401. 19 The post WWII democratization of Japan was also imposed by the USA, but it differs from current attempts in that Japan is a homogeneous nation, had prewar democratic experience and built on pre-existing structures. 20 See also Lipset (1994) for a detailed survey of this and related points. 21 See among others Borooah and Paldam (2007), Persson and Tabellini (2007), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) and Gundlach and Paldam (2009). The opposing effects of natural resource abundance on regime stability are studied by Bjorvatn and Naghavi (2011): a dictator in a country rich in natural resources may be challenged by rival rent-seekers destabilizing the regime, but may also have enough revenue to buy out opposition groups increasing stability.
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Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., 2005. Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth. In: Aghion, P., Durlauf, S. (Eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 385–472. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A., Yared, P., 2008. Income and democracy. American Economic Review 98, 808–842. Barro, R.J., 1999. Determinants of democracy. Journal of Political Economy 107, S158–S183. Bitros, G.C., Karayiannis, A.D., 2010. Morality, institutions and the wealth of nations: some lessons from ancient Greece. European Journal of Political Economy 26, 68–81. Bjørnskov, C., Dreher, A., Fischer, J.A.V., 2010. Formal institutions and subjective well-being: revisiting the cross-country evidence. European Journal of Political Economy 26, 419–430. Bjorvatn, K., Naghavi, A., 2011. Rent seeking and regime stability in rentier states. European Journal of Political Economy 27, 740–748. Boix, C., Stokes, S.C., 2003. Endogenous democratization. World Politics 55, 517–549. Borooah, V.K., Paldam, M., 2007. Why is the world Short of democracy: a cross-country analysis of barriers to representative government. European Journal of Political Economy 23, 582–604. Bourgignon, F., Verdier, T., 2000. Oligarchy, democracy, inequality, and growth. Journal of Development Economics 62, 285–313. Cartledge, P., 2009. Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K. Cheibub, J.A., Gandhi, J., Vreeland, J.R., 2010. Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice 143, 67–101. Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., 2009. Testing the neocon agenda: democracy in resource-rich societies. European Economic Review 53, 293–308. Ellis, C.J., Fender, J., 2009. The economic evolution of democracy. Economics of Governance 10, 119–145. Engerman, S.L., Sokoloff, K.L., 2005. The evolution of suffrage institutions in the New World. The Journal of Economic History 65, 891–921. Fleck, R., Hanssen, A., 2006. The origins of democracy: a model with applications to Ancient Greece. Journal of Law and Economics 49, 115–146. Gundlach, E., Paldam, M., 2009. A farewell to critical junctures: sorting out long-run causality of income and democracy. European Journal of Political Economy 25, 340–354. Held, D., 2006. Models of Democracy. Polity Press, Cambridge U.K. Hillman, A.L., 2007. Democracy and low-income countries. In: Casas Pardo, J., Schwartz, P. (Eds.), Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 277–294. Horpedahl, J., 2011. Political exchange and the voting franchise: universal democracy as an emergent process. Constitutional Political Economy 22, 203–220. Justman, M., Gradstein, M., 1999. The industrial revolution, political transition, and the subsequent decline in inequality in 19th-century Britain. Explorations in Economic History 36, 109–127. Lizzeri, A., Persico, N., 2004. Why did the elites extend the suffrage? Democracy and the scope of government, with an application to Britain's ‘Age of Reform’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 707–765. Lipset, S.M., 1959. Social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review 53, 69–105. Lipset, M.S., 1994. The social requisites of democracy revisited. American Sociological Review 59, 1–22. Llavador, H., Oxoby, R.J., 2005. Partisan competition, growth, and the franchise. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1155–1188. Manin, B., 1997. The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K. Morris, I., 2004. Economic growth in ancient Greece. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160, 709–742. Munshi, S., 2011. Enfranchisement from a political perspective. Constitutional Political Economy. doi:10.1007/s10602-010-9091-7. North, D.C., 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. W.W. Norton & Co., New York. Ober, J., 2010. Wealthy Hellas. Transactions of the American Philological Association 140, 241–286. Ober, J., 2008. Democracy and Knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. Olson, M., 1993. Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political Science Review 87, 567–576. Paldam, M., Gundlach, E., 2008. Two views on institutions and development: the grand transition vs. the primacy of institutions. Kyklos 61, 65–100. Paldam, M., Gundlach, E., 2009. A farewell to critical junctures: Sorting out long-run causality of income and democracy. European Journal of Political Economy 25, 340–354. Papaioannou, E., Siourounis, G., 2008. Economic and social factors driving the third wave of democratization. Journal of Comparative Economics 36, 365–387. Perotti, R., 1996. Growth, income distribution and democracy. What the data say. Journal of Economic Growth 1, 149–187. Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 2007. The growth effect of democracy: is it heterogeneous and how can it be estimated? In: Helpman, E. (Ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 544–586. Pitsoulis, A., 2011. The egalitarian battlefield: reflections on the origins of majority rule in Archaic Greece. European Journal of Political Economy 27, 87–103. Przeworski, A., Limongi, F., 1997. Modernization: theory and facts. World Politics 49, 155–183. Przeworski, A., Limongi, F., 2005. Democracy as an equilibrium. Public Choice 123, 253–273. Przeworski, A., Limongi, F., 1993. Political regimes and economic growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, 51–69. Raaflaub, K.A., Ober, J., Wallace, R.W. (Eds.), 2007. Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece. University of California Press, Berkeley CA. Rodrik, D., Wacziarg, R., 2005. Do democratic transitions produce bad economic outcomes? American Economic Review 95, 50–55. Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., Trebbi, F., 2004. Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development. 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How democracy was achieved A review of Roger Congleton, Perfecting Parliament: Constitutional Reform and the Origins of Western Democracy, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011, pp. 658 George Tridimas ⁎ University of Ulster, School of Economics, Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim, BT37 0QB, UK
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Article history: Received 12 October 2011 Received in revised form 25 October 2011 Accepted 2 November 2011 Available online 3 February 2012 JEL classification: D7 N4
a b s t r a c t In ‘Perfecting Parliament’ Roger Congleton applies the rational choice framework to explain two attributes of the democratization of the West from the medieval times to the early twentieth century, first the shift of policy making authority from the king to the parliament and second the extension of voting rights to previously disenfranchised groups of the population. This review essay sets out the themes of the book, and relates the book to the democratization of classical Athens and democratization from the last quarter of the 20 th century. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Democracy Democratization Ancient Athens Constitutional exchange Franchise extension Democracy and development
You can never have a revolution to establish a democracy. You must have a democracy in order to have a revolution. (G.K.Chesterton, Tremendous Trifles, 1909)
1. Introduction In modern free societies, democracy is the basis of policymaking and law enforcement. In the current political climate, politicians always profess to act democratically. Even in autocratic regimes, rulers often feel obliged to make claims that citizens of their countries are not denied democratic freedoms. However, if we take a long view of history and judge the political lives of our ancestors by modern standards, autocracy, that is, absence of rule by the people, was the norm. It has only been in the last two hundred years that people in Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan, collectively known as “the West”, have come to live under regimes where those who govern do so after winning competitive elections. Also political liberalization during the 19th and early 20th centuries coincided with unprecedented economic growth that vastly improved the well⁎ Tel.: +44 28 90368273; fax: +44 28 0366847. E-mail address: [email protected]. 0176-2680/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.11.001
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being of the same people who experienced democratic politics. However, the advance of democracy has not been smooth; the 20th century inter-war period witnessed a reverse to authoritarianism, and, despite the progress to democracy after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, great swathes of humanity remain ruled by autocrats. Roger Congleton offers illuminating answers to the question of how liberal democracy arose. In scholarship that combines economic theory, political science and history, he builds a theory of constitutional negotiation, which he uses to explain the transformation of king-dominated medieval government to modern liberal parliamentary democracy as it prevailed in the early 20th century. He divides the democratization of the West into two fundamental elements: first, the shift of policymaking authority from the king to the parliament; second, the extension of voting rights to previously disenfranchised groups of the population, so that the parliament came to represent the citizenry rather than the aristocratic elites. He shows that the two moves were generated by mechanisms that operated independently of one other and constructs a systematic account of how the shift to democracy was accomplished. Such arguments and related hypotheses will surely be discussed at length and will be tested empirically for a long time to come. In the present essay, after reviewing Congleton's theory of how the West democratized (Section 2), I shall also investigate how, if at all, the theory fits the introduction of democracy in ancient Athens (Section 3) and is consistent with (Section 4) the recent democratic transition, that is, democratization before and after the time period covered by his book. In Section 5 I offer some concluding comments. 2. Congleton's theory of the democratic transformation The book is in three parts, namely, formal economic theory, Chapters 2–8; a constitutional, political and economic history account, Chapters 9–18; and a statistical evidence part with a social science overview, Chapters 19–20. The first part weaves together previously published work of Congleton to present a political–economy explanation of the existence and architecture of territorial governments. Chapters 2–4 show that such governments are based on the “king and council” template, remain relative stable over time, and display institutional conservatism. In the king-and-council scheme, responsibilities for deciding policies are divided between a single person, the king (or chief executive) and a committee or council that is the progenitor of the modern parliament and makes important decisions by voting, and tends to be governed by rules rather than making arbitrary decisions. Chapter 5 observes that the authority to make policy is multi-dimensional, because decisions on different policy issues are separable, and control of policy can be divided between the king and the originally aristocratic parliament. The initial assignments of policymaking authority are regarded as “political property rights”. When authority is shifted among policymakers, a “market for power” is created through which policymaking and procedures for selecting policymakers can be peacefully and lawfully reformed. Just as trade in ordinary markets results in mutual benefits for the trading parties, so do constitutional bargains that divide power over policymaking. When technology changes, ideology shifts, external threats beckon, or genetic shocks occur (a new sovereign with talents and tastes different from those of his predecessor ascends to the throne), mutually beneficial trades in policymaking authority between the king and the parliament take place. Using a spatial decision framework, Chapter 6 develops a model of constitutional bargains where the king may trade parliament's approval for higher revenue for the royal household in exchange for more parliamentary authority (veto power to agenda setting) in other policy areas. Chapters 7 and 8 examine the extension of the franchise, the second component of democratization. Suffrage laws for selecting political representatives are remarkably stable for a simple reason: at any point in time, other things being equal, the median–decisive voter is satisfied with the existing law defining voting rights, for it allows him to be pivotal in determining policy. Similarly, those elected to office are reluctant to change the parameters of a system that has brought them the benefits of office. When the ideological norms held by the median voter shift in favor of extending the right to vote, widespread expansion of suffrage follows. Such changes in norms occurred as a result of personal experiences, inspiration from new ideas, and convictions of those who were already enfranchised. Furthermore, in practice, the cost of organizing interest groups fell with industrialization and the increase in urbanization. Campaigns for change were then orchestrated by interest groups pursuing franchise reform, by political groups expecting to gain the support of newly enfranchised voters, and industrialists and workers who were under-represented in the medieval parliaments. In particular, following the industrial revolution, workers could bargain for voting rights in exchange for industrial peace and a broader tax base. Chapter 9–12 of Part II describe how from the 18th century onwards western European societies became more secular (even though the population continued to be deeply religious) and more liberal as a result of discoveries of new lands, technological changes that increased the efficient scale of production, trade expansion, greater scientific knowledge, and wider consumer choice. These chapters also document the ascent of liberal ideas about limited government, tolerance, natural rights, equality before the law, and gradual rejection of the importance of birth privileges. Taking full advantage of technological progress was possible after reforming medieval laws and regulations controlling economic and political life. Economic and political reforms did not occur spontaneously or through revolution but through formal changes in the law that reflected changes in political and legal theories and the economic interests of those with the authority to reform long-standing laws. Restrictions on farmland ownership were liberalized, as were internal and external trade, slavery was abolished, publicly funded education was introduced, and suffrage was extended. To some extent, the latter came as a result of economic growth that allowed more citizens to satisfy wealth and tax payments qualifications; but more importantly it came as the result of ideological shifts and pragmatic considerations by liberal politicians who expected a larger number of supporters from newly qualified middle-class voters. Over the course of the 19th century, policymaking authority gradually shifted away from the aristocratic chamber of parliament toward the elected chamber, as the cumulative result of a series of minor liberal reforms that reduced the control of the sovereign. At the same time, new debates emerged regarding qualifications for voting, size of voting districts, voting rules, partisan interests, weighted voting, and women's suffrage. Chapters 12–18 of the historical narrative chart the constitutional histories of three contemporary constitutional monarchies, the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands, and three republics Germany, Japan and USA. Despite obvious and significant differences, the
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constitutional developments of the six countries share several common trends that fit well the hypotheses advanced in the first part of the book. In all countries, the fabric of the king-and-council template was retained, parliaments gradually acquired more control over policy making (as a result of opportunistic bargaining between the parliaments and the sovereigns), and the right to vote was slowly extended from a very small percentage of the population to what is now known as universal suffrage. In England, starting with the Magna Charta of 1215, the parliament became the dominant institution well before universal suffrage was obtained. In Germany, on the contrary, suffrage expanded more rapidly than power shifted to parliament, while with the World War I defeat hereditary monarchy was abolished and a republic was established, which was subsequently overthrown by the chancellorship of Adolph Hitler in 1933. Constitutional reform in the Netherlands took the form of moving from the republic of the provinces (1581) to kingdom (1815) and then gradually to parliamentary democracy. Japanese political liberalization started in earnest toward the end of the 19th century but parliamentary democracy ended in the 1930s after a resurgence of conservatism and domestic political violence. Industrialization was a catalyst for the transition to liberal reform in the European countries but not for the USA, where liberalization of colonial governments preceded the 1776 war of independence from Britain. As a corollary, the case studies show that constitutional reform toward parliamentary democracy was neither an entirely European phenomenon nor irreversible once started. Chapter 19 of Part III presents statistical evidence supporting the validity of the theoretical model of constitutional reform developed in Part I. Although the regression equations are not structural equations of the models studied, they are motivated and informed by the analytical framework developed. The chapter first discusses the problems of measuring economic, institutional, and political variables during the 19th century; it then plots several diagrams correlating the time profile of real per capita GDP and political variables; finally, it reports Granger-type causality tests. It is found that causality between economic growth and democratic liberalization is bidirectional as predicted by the theoretical analysis. Congleton concludes that the political and economic ‘revolutions’ of the 19th century were not revolutions (in the sense of a single abrupt break from the past), but the consequence of a series of reforms, and that constitutional and economic liberalization are jointly determined rather than causally related. Chapter 20 compares and contrasts the theory of constitutional bargains developed in the book with other theories of the rise of western democracy, and in particular, “big-bang” approaches, in which democratic governance emerges as a result of a violent revolution or alternatively a peaceful constitutional convention (or some combination of the two), and evolutionary or reform theories, in which political developments are one of many areas of change through time. Contrary to popular myths and romantic views of historical episodes, it was not revolutions that established contemporary democracy and representative government. Revolutions, which more often than not are accompanied by widespread violence, do not lead to democratic reforms, since successful revolutionary leaders are more likely to keep control and continue the revolutionary organization's hierarchical decision making, secrecy, and discipline, rather than grant voting rights. Congleton's analysis differs from other economic accounts by emphasizing the role of both economic interests and liberal ideologies, with interest groups organized around narrow liberal ideas in education, trade and voting rights instrumental in a long series of reforms that produced liberal democracies and open economic systems. Congleton's book is a huge intellectual enterprise covering vast territories of research carried out with rigor and gusto. Drawing on the familiar spatial decision making framework, he offers an innovative model of the market for power over budgets and public policies to explain how constitutional reforms are adopted. His modeling of franchise extension stresses the importance of ideological objectives and the reduction of the cost of organizing political interest groups that are able to push for the realization of their objectives. His case studies of comparative constitutional histories along with his empirical results shed light on the debate surrounding the link between development and democracy. Some further discussion of Congleton's hypotheses is warranted. Empirical work has confirmed the casual observation that democracy and development are positively correlated. Research has investigated how factors such as size of real per capita income, education, ethnic fractionalization, hierarchical state religions, trade openness, income inequality, legacy of institutions established by colonial powers, legal origins (whether dominated by common law or civil law systems), geography (which includes non-human factors such as climate, soil fertility, disease and mineral wealth), trust, and democracy are related. There is, however, controversy about causality. Two opposing views have been expressed. The modernization, or democratic transition, theory 1 claims that political development in the long run is a consequence of overall development. Economic development is driven by higher production volumes, which also generate more complex transactions, and, as income increases, so does demand for democracy, urbanization, education and other attributes of modernity such as administrative efficiency, transparency and so on. Neither the economy nor the society can any longer be run by the edicts of autocratic rulers and democracy is established. On the other hand, the primacy of institutions view 2 argues that both income and democracy are determined by political institutions that structure power relations. Countries that choose different institutions at different “critical junctures” travel along different long-run paths of economic and political development. 3 Like the primacy of institutions view, Congleton treats institutions that divide authority about policymaking as endogenous, that is, they are chosen by rational actors. In his statistical work he does not undertake a detailed multiple regression analysis of the kind 1 This is typically associated with Lipset (1959); for recent discussion and empirical results see among others Barro (1999), Borooah and Paldam (2007), Paldam and Gundlach (2008) and (2009), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). 2 The origins of this view can be found in North (1981); for a full formal account and econometric investigation see Acemoglu et al. (2001), Rodrik et al. (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2005), who also offer a comparative review, and Acemoglu et al. (2008). 3 Przeworski and Limongi (1997) find that the level of economic development does not affect the probability of transitions to democracy but high income makes democratic regimes more stable. However, the validity of that conclusion was challenged by Boix and Stokes (2003) who found that economic development increases the probability that a country will undergo a transition to democracy. More generally, Przeworski and Limongi (2005) doubt whether existing theoretical models can identify the mechanisms that give rise to democracy — instead they are concerned with the question of whether democracies can survive once they are established. See also Cheibub et al. (2010) for an insightful discussion in favor of a minimalist classification of democracy–dictatorship and critique of measures of democracy used in empirical studies.
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carried out by the empirical research. Instead, he runs temporal causality tests for five of the countries investigated (Japan is left out because of lack of data) with mid-19th to early 20th century data, and concludes that democracy and income are jointly determined. This finding indicates that economic and political liberalization are the outcome of other underlying variables and is consistent with his fundamental hypothesis that “both are induced by trends in technology and ideological developments that produce new constitutional gains from exchange and compromise” (p.587), an argument further supported by the narrative of each country studied. Congleton's argument that political change and liberalization came about as the outcome of constitutional negotiations, and was gradual and peaceful, goes against that of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) that the elites extended suffrage rights to the disenfranchised poor majority because that was the only credible way to redistribute wealth and hold back the threat of revolution. 4 On this account and despite several differences, Congleton's focus on negotiation is closer to the spirit of explanations of franchise extension that call attention to peaceful political exchanges. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) emphasize trading voting rights for more public goods and intra-elite divisions. Specifically, an external economic shock causes divergent interests within the elite and drives part of the enfranchised elite to extend the franchise voluntarily to previously disenfranchised groups in order to increase the provision of public goods that will directly increase its welfare. 5 Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) propose yet another explanation for the extension of the franchise in the Americas based on factor endowments that does not involve revolutionary threats. Territories facing labor scarcity, typically USA “frontier” states, could attract immigrants by offering them, among other inducements, full political rights including the suffrage. On the other hand, in countries with soil suitable for production in large plantations or abundant mineral wealth, as in Latin America, small settler elites could more easily exploit the resources and deny political rights to the large native populations. 3. Democratization in ancient Athens I turn now to the democracy of ancient Athens, which has had an enduring impact on ideas of liberty and political equality as well as on ensuing perennial dilemmas involving the latter and order and social stability. Etymologically, the word democracy comes from the Greek words ‘demos’, that is, people, and ‘kratos’, that is, rule. The political ideals of equality among the citizens, liberty, respect for the law, and justice of modern democracy originate from ancient Greece. However, the modern notion that human beings are individuals with inviolable rights is not part of the ancient Greek thought. A citizen's rights and obligations followed from his capacity of being a member of the citizenry; they were public rights and duties. 6 In this context, the notion of protecting the individual against the might of the state did not exist in ancient Greece. Democracy was born in ancient Athens at the end of the sixth century BCE. 7 Until then Athens was ruled by the nine archons, drawn from the aristocratic families that often fought against each other for supremacy, and the Council of Areopagus consisting of former archons, that had veto powers, oversaw laws and magistrates, and conducted trials. In 594 BCE a large scale social and economic crisis was resolved by appointing Solon, an aristocrat, as lawgiver. Solon introduced wide ranging political and economic reforms that included making access to public office conditional on wealth rather than birth, formal accountability of magistrates, and granting legal standing rights to all male Athenian citizens. Solon's dispensation was broken in 546 BCE when Peisistratus established himself as tyrant (extra-constitutional, one-man authority). The tyranny was overthrown in 510. A struggle for power that followed was won by Cleisthenes, an aristocrat, who allied himself to the common people – demos – by proposing constitutional reforms that would provide for wider political rights. He then introduced a series of fundamental constitutional reforms, determining citizenship rights and the powers of the assembly of citizens, which led to the foundation of democracy. The assembly of citizens, requiring a quorum of six thousand participants, became the sovereign political body deciding on all important issues of public interest. All Athenian men from the age of twenty years could participate, while those aged thirty and above could be appointed to executive or judicial office. After listening to the speakers, voting in the assembly took place by show of hands and decisions were taken by simple majority. From 501 BCE, the assembly elected annually by show of hands the ten generals, the commanders of the army and the navy, who along with a few treasury and religious commissionaires were the only elected officials. From 487 BCE the nine archons were selected by lot, while in 462 BCE the Areopagus lost its checking powers. A fully democratic constitution was then functioning. 8 In addition to its direct nature, it had several other prominent characteristics. There were no political parties in the sense of organizations to represent economic and social cleavages and espouse distinct ideological positions. The courts played a significant political role in the sense of controlling the other organs of the state. Perhaps more strikingly, a large number of public offices were filled by lot including five hundred councilors responsible for the day-today administration and the preparation of the assembly business, six thousand judges and another six hundred magistrates. 4 That enfranchisement of the poor diminishes the risk of insurrection is an argument also pursued by Justman and Gradstein (1999) and Conley and Temini (2001). Bourgignon and Verdier (2000) study the complex dynamics of growth, inequality, franchise extension and investment in human capital financed by taxation. In the vein of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Ellis and Fender (2009) explore a growth model where the capital owning elite introduce democracy to ensure the credibility of labor market reforms that aim to redistribute to the workers by paying them the marginal product of labor. 5 For further elaboration of intra-elite division as a cause of franchise extension see Llavador and Oxoby (2005) and Jack and Lagunoff (2006). Munshi (2011) explains franchise extension without revolutionary threats or redistribution motives but through the presence of elite-pressure, large rents from office and evenly-balanced partisan competition. Like Congleton, Horpedahl (2011) too emphasizes political exchanges and voluntary suffrage expansion. 6 See Held (2006). 7 Historians have pieced together the fragmentary written and archeological evidence to provide a coherent and detailed account of the emergence of the Athenian democracy and its structures. For a recent account, see among others Ober (2008) and Cartledge (2009); see also the volume edited by Raaflaub et al. (2007) for a debate about the start and completion of the Athenian democratic transformation. 8 By the mid-5th century, pay for those serving in public office had been introduced. In comparison, the British equivalent evolution was considerably slower as property qualifications for the British MPs were scrapped in 1858 and pay was introduced in 1912.
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Being a direct democracy, it also defied modern classifications on the parliamentary–presidential scale. Recent research has revealed that the Athenian democratization was associated with growing economic prosperity, urbanization was high, and wealth was distributed relatively equitably. 9 In sum, the ancient Athenian democracy differs from the modern western variant in that it was direct and not representative, made decisions by simple majority, had no political parties, and delegated responsibilities to officials appointed by sortition. In Tridimas (2011a), I explain how the above institutions worked in tandem, forming an internally consistent framework such that it may not have been possible for any one of them to have functioned without the existence of the rest. Contrasting the parliamentarian and the Athenian democracy, Manin (1997) points out that the former is predicated on citizens having an equal right to consent to government, while the Athenian democracy not only recognized the latter but also promoted equality of the right to occupy office. Coercive government is legitimized when citizens agree to be bound by the rules imposed by those in office. Equal voting rights (irrespective of one's birth, income, education, or gender) in elections to choose government manifests equality of citizens to give their consent and therefore confer legitimacy to those elected to office. 10 The 19th and 20th century conflicts for suffrage extension analyzed by Congleton and the literature he surveys describe fights for achieving such political equality. A similar fight took place in ancient Athens. Franchise extension took place gradually throughout the sixth century when aristocratic rule by birthright was replaced with rule by the wealthy (Solon's reforms), and eventually with rule by the people irrespective of wealth (Cleisthenes' democracy). 11 However, the Athenians restricted voting rights to men only; but they went one step further than equality of voting rights for men by instituting equality of opportunity to occupy office for all citizens, as manifested in the practice of sortition, 12 which lacks a modern equivalent. The above description shows that despite the ideological and practical differences, there is a remarkable similarity between the emergence of the Athenian democracy and the parliamentary democracies described by Congleton. A form of king-andcouncil architecture was present in ancient Athens and Congleton's thesis on the gradual extension of the franchise is applicable too. The democratic transformation of Athens, the political emancipation of the demos and its eventual control over policymaking was accomplished in a number of steps over a long period of time (594–462 BCE), with each reform building on previous ones and with support by substantial parts of the earlier aristocracy, and despite the occasional violence, was peaceful. Nor was calling the assembly a revolutionary institutional innovation: assemblies of warriors were held from the Archaic times (700–500 BCE) as described in the Homeric poems. The new element was the transfer of decision making power to the assembly (and the courts); that too took a while to be completed and was the product of negotiations between the ruling aristocrats and the emerging demos, who provided the hoplites for land defense, and the rowers for powering the navy, classes excluded from decision making in earlier political dispensations. Equally, even though absence of quantitative information does not permit an empirical investigation, historians affirm a link between political liberalization and economic growth which is also manifested through the famed architectural and cultural achievements of the Athenians. On this account, democracy led to a revolution in living standards and attitudes. However, the analogies stop here. The direct-democracy nature of ancient Athens implies that there is no strict analog between the gradual transfer of power from the king to the parliament analyzed by Congleton and ancient Athens. Direct democracy meant that enfranchisement simultaneously shifted policymaking authority from the aristocracy to the demos. We may then infer that Congleton's theory of constitutional bargaining and enfranchisement produces multiple institutional equilibria, the Athenian democracy being one and the Western democracy being a different one. How the Athenian democracy fell is a question still awaiting a satisfactory political economy explanation. The rise of Alexander's Macedon in the fourth quarter of the 3rd century and the military defeat of Athens in 322 BCE ended the democratic constitution, while it also gave rise to theoretical writings favoring monarchy. (The reverse of) Congleton's intuition may be of use here: the Athenian democracy was not concurrent with major technological breakthroughs or large scale industrialization. After Athens and before the imperial period, the ancient Roman republic operated a number of democratic arrangements but never adopted the notion of oneman one-vote, while it also had in place a variety of restrictions on political participation based on wealth. Ideas in favor of democracy and against absolute rule reappear with the Enlightenment and it is with scholars from that era that Congleton's inquiry starts. 4. Democratization after World War II The constitutional evolution analyzed in ‘Perfecting Parliament’ ends in the 1930s. Further democratization took place after the end of WWII when Germany, Italy and modern Greece resumed democratic politics (but Central and East Europe turned communist) and in the aftermath of decolonization from European powers. However, democratization stalled and was even in reverse by the early 1960s. Indeed, consistent with Congleton's injunction, and despite the rhetoric, nationalist revolutionary leaders were more likely to fashion and preside over despotic regimes rather than democracies. Democratic order took root only in India (1947) and Israel (1948). A “third” wave of democratization swept Europe in the mid-seventies with, Portugal (1974), Greece (1974) and Spain (1976) shaking off military dictatorships and adopting the parliamentary democracies analyzed by
9
See Morris (2004) and Ober (2010). However, in practice the interplay of the usual electoral laws based on plurality or proportional representation formulas applied to constituencies of different size, may invalidate the principle of vote equality. 11 Fleck and Hanssen (2006) offer a formal model of the extension of voting rights in ancient Athens. Bitros and Karayiannis (2010) show how institutions and the moral norms of Athens were instrumental in her economic success, while Pitsoulis (2011) discusses of the origin and adoption of the majority rule. 12 For a review of the literature on sortition and the question of why a self-interested citizen may appoint government officials by lot rather than elections, see Tridimas (2012). 10
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Congleton. Interestingly, Portugal and Greece opted for a republican form of state, 13 while Spain established a constitutional monarchy. Political liberalization in Argentina (1983), Brazil (1985), South Korea (1987) and Chile (1988) preceded the surge of democratization that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of Communism. As a broad generalization, Central and Eastern European countries made the transition to parliamentary democracy rather rapidly and smoothly (Yugoslavia being an obvious exception). In the nineties democracy seemed to be on an unstoppable advance in Latin America, Africa and several parts of Asia. In the first decade of the 21st century, with the exceptions of autocracies in the Middle East, communists in East Asia, and some African states, countries hold elections and many countries ruled by illiberal governments only twenty years before are now classified as democracies. Several countries previously torn by strife and civil war have power-sharing arrangements based on proportional representation and respect for minorities. 14 The ‘Arab spring’ of 2011 that sees countries of the Maghreb getting rid of long dictatorships raises expectations that democracy will prevail there too. However, the ongoing wave of democratization differs from the democratization of the West analyzed by Congleton. I discuss three key issues, namely, winning the argument against an autocratic alternative, achieving democracy out of dictatorship rather than 18th century hereditary monarchy, and finally establishing a functioning democracy. The first obstacle to democratic convergence relates to the appeal of current nondemocratic alternatives. Western liberal democracy as a system of governance is not unchallenged. The Chinese model of economic growth, including among other components one-party rule, emphasis of the paramount interests of the nation over the individual, selective use of markets, a significant role for state enterprises and the importance of government in guiding the economy, may be considered as an alluring option. From the mid-nineties, that system delivered fast growing prosperity to the rising middle class of city-dwellers, and increased China's status as a global power. Further, the banking crisis, output contraction and sovereign debt crisis that have befallen on the West since 2008 have sparked talk about the failure of capitalism and boosted support for an expansive role of the state. The argument about the superiority of non-democratic regimes in delivering high economic growth, drawn from the conflictual and often fractious nature of democratic politics, is related to the debate on the modernization vs institutions controversy mentioned above. However, the emphasis here is on the comparative advantages of democracy and dictatorship for economic growth, that is, how political institutions affect the rate of change of income rather than its level. 15 It is first important to recognize that there are several contemporary counterexamples of autocracies from Africa, Asia and Latin America with meager and indeed declining economic performance. Arguably then, it may be more accurate to talk about “Chinese exceptionalism”. Democrats would of course remain undeterred by such arguments not least because of the value placed on democracy, that is, democracy and the associated freedoms are desirable per se over and above their economic implications. 16 However, if the authoritarian exceptionalism secures long-lasting economic gains, it is legitimate to ask whether there is a trade-off between democracy and economic growth. Congleton's reply is reassuring for democracy. He points out that during the 19th century there was no trade-off between liberal politics and economic growth. Rather, the two complemented one another. 17 Establishing democracy from 20th century dictatorship differs from achieving democracy out of 18th century hereditary monarchy. Traditional European monarchical rule was based on government by birth right and deference to the ruling aristocratic class. Military dictatorship relies on the backing of the armed forces while civilian dictatorship relies on the support of a mass party, and both types operate repressive security apparatus. Succession in monarchies is based on familial ties, a simple rule whose operation avoids costly contests for power. On the contrary, dictatorships lack clear rules of succession. Rival claims may then be settled after violent and otherwise damaging conflicts. To avoid such problems the dictator may appoint a successor. However, in doing so he faces the “successor's dilemma” 18: the sitting dictator may be threatened by a designated successor who builds enough independent support to ensure his succession against his rivals. However, if the designated successor fails to build a power base, his rule will be at risk and so will the legacy of the sitting dictator. A further complicating issue relates to the types of compromises struck to unseat a dictator. Inducements like immunity from prosecution and safe passage away from the country may hasten his exit but may violate notions of justice particularly for the victims of repression. Congleton's book attests that establishing democracy out of medieval aristocratic parliaments was a long and slow process unfolding over several generations. On the other hand, transition to democracy at the end of the 20th century was faster. In the first instance, unlike the 19th century norm, the overthrow of a post 1974 dictatorship was followed by immediately granting of universal suffrage rather than extending it gradually. Second, in comparison to the gradual ascent of the power of the parliament at the expense of the king, the shift of policy making authority from the dictator to the elected representatives took place in rapid steps (although not necessarily on a single date). As with any catching-up, new comers to the democratization process have the advantage that they can learn from the constitutional experience of “early starters”, observe what political arrangements have worked in the past, and adapt them to their own circumstances. Another significant difference is that the current wave of democratization includes attempts to 13
See Tridimas (2010) for a political economy examination of the 1974 Greek referendum that abolished the monarchy. Examples of varying success are among others Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon and Northern Ireland. Tridimas (2011b) offers a public choice analysis of power-sharing arrangements based on election outcomes under proportional representation. 15 A large volume of work has developed debating the issue and often reporting conflicting estimates; see Olson (1993), Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Perotti (1996), Wintrobe (1998), Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) and Collier and Hoeffler (2009). 16 Furthermore, Bjørnskov et al. (2010) report that both economic and democratic political institutions have a positive effect on happiness, where the latter effect is more pronounced in richer countries. 17 Hillman (2007) argues that autocrats do not have an “encompassing interest” in economic growth because their priority is the survival of their rule and security of office rents. The emergence of a middle class associated with economic development will lead to demand for accountability and honesty in government and political competition that would end autocratic rule. For the same reason autocrats do not have the incentive to provide quality education or health care. On the contrary, they encourage corruption because it redistributes income to public officials that are then expected to support the regime. 18 See Zhang (2011) for a detailed discussion with an application to communist China. 14
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establish democracy by an external power, as in the cases of the USA-led efforts to impose democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, their ambiguous outcomes are in accordance with Congleton's implicit corollary that democracy is the negotiated outcome of the actions of domestic players. 19 The third challenge relates to adopting the rituals and trappings of democracy rather than asserting its essence. 20 That is, holding elections does not provide a guarantee of a functioning democracy. Elections that are neither free nor fair, vote buying, refusal of defeated incumbents to leave office, ethnic tensions, civil wars, and revolving plundering governments make a mockery of the electoral process. Liberal democracy is concerned not only with the representatives of the majority winning office, but with limiting abuses of power by those in office. The latter requires the operation of checks and balances so that no single state organ monopolizes power, and freedoms and rights are protected. Prominent among those arrangements are separation of powers, bicameral legislatures, federal structures, and independent judiciaries with the power to review the acts of other government bodies. A number of empirical studies have shown that income and education correlate significantly with democratization, while democratization is less likely to emerge in Muslim countries as well as in oil producing countries. 21 Such findings go a long way to explaining why Central and Eastern European countries as well as Latin American countries were more successful in their transition to democracy. In addition, having set full membership of the European Union as the final destination of their transition, Central and Eastern European countries had a clear objective of the political and economic transformation required and the standards to be achieved. On the other hand, countries lacking such objectives may be less fervent supporters of democratic reform. It is then advisable to be cautious about the speed and depth of the current transitions of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The democratic transformation may take some time to complete as the various actors learn to negotiate and compromise. 5. Conclusions In answering the question of how the western democracy arose out of aristocratic oligarchy, Roger Congleton has served an intellectual feast. He augments the standard spatial decision framework to present an innovative model of constitutional bargaining between the king and the parliament that is then used to explain how political authority shifts. He highlights the role of ideological objectives and the decreasing costs of organizing interest groups to explain franchise extension. He subsequently embarks on a commanding historical narrative of comparative constitutional developments. He finally contributes to the empirical literature on the nexus between economic development and democratization. To recap, his propositions are that democratic governance in the West came about gradually through a series of parliamentary and electoral reforms that were the result of negotiations, and that the economic and constitutional liberalization of the 19th century were interdependent, determined by the same variables, although through different processes. The shift to liberal democracy consisted of a long series of small, largely peaceful, steps that unfolded together with important economic and ideological changes, and took a long time to complete. The book challenges conventionally held views of the emergence of western democracy: “Sudden radical breaks with the past are not necessary for democracy to emerge from medieval parliamentary regimes, nor are class consciousness or civil wars necessary preconditions for liberal reform. Institutional flexibility, bargaining, and liberal interests are sufficient. The models suggest that peaceful lawful constitutional reforms are possible, and parliamentary democracy can emerge gradually as a series of constitutional reforms are adopted.” (p. 182) Among other issues, one expects that several more studies will be published in the years to come to analyze some of the traditional Western democracies left out of the book, with France being an obvious candidate. In the meantime, taking stock from Congleton's analysis, I have gone back to the birth of democracy to relate Congleton's analysis and intuition to aspects of the emergence of the Athenian democracy, the predecessor and intellectual ancestor of modern democracy, and highlighted some stark differences from the period and institutions that motivated Congleton's ideas. Congleton's framework also offers insightful pointers for reflection on the expansion of democracy beyond the West. Acknowledgments I wish to thank Arye Hillman for conversations that helped shape my thoughts on the issues discussed in this paper. References Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A., 2000. Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 1167–1199. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A., 2001. The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91, 1369–1401. 19 The post WWII democratization of Japan was also imposed by the USA, but it differs from current attempts in that Japan is a homogeneous nation, had prewar democratic experience and built on pre-existing structures. 20 See also Lipset (1994) for a detailed survey of this and related points. 21 See among others Borooah and Paldam (2007), Persson and Tabellini (2007), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) and Gundlach and Paldam (2009). The opposing effects of natural resource abundance on regime stability are studied by Bjorvatn and Naghavi (2011): a dictator in a country rich in natural resources may be challenged by rival rent-seekers destabilizing the regime, but may also have enough revenue to buy out opposition groups increasing stability.
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