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How do we provide proof that our processes are operated according to the state of the art?
European Perspectives
How do we provide proof that our processes are operated according to the state of the art?
Jo¨rg Steinbach holds the Chair of Process Safety and Plant Technology at the Technical University of Berlin.
t has more or less become a world-wide requirement that industry must operate its plants and processes according to state of the art safety. Authorities must affirm compliance when issuing permits as well as inspect processes periodically during operation. The theory is straight-forward, but how is it actually achieved in practice? German legislation and regulations distinguish between three levels of “state of the art:” the acknowledged state of the art, the state of the art, and finally the scientific state of the art. The first refers to everything that has been defined in terms of technical regulations in the broadest sense, ranging from laws and acts to standards such as NFPA, API, ASME in the United States. The second level is higher in quality, based on the first level and amended by any technical improvement compared to what is stated in the technical regulations and —(and this is a significant additional requirement)— has proven its suitability in practice. Finally, the third level is equal the second and it includes every new development and scientific research result independent of the proof of suitability in practice. Consequently, the state of the art is a dynamically changing property. In order to maintain compliance, constant observation of new developments in safety engineering must be made. This is not an easy task. Unfortunately it is not the only hurdle to overcome. A higher one is set up by the innumerable number of documents that, in total, make up the above mentioned technical regulations. Hardly anyone has the total picture. In other, and slightly more ironic words, everything mentioned so far may be summarized as follows: Anyone involved in either assuring by design or assessing the compliance with the safety state of the art performs this job although the existence of certain technical regulations may have been neglected, because either they were not known or a better and praxis-proven technology has not come to the person’s attention. How can this situation be overcome? In co-operation with Michael Nitsche, of the Federal Institute For The Environment, (the
I
38
© Division of Chemical Health and Safety of the American Chemical Society Published by Elsevier Science Inc.
German equivalent to the EPA), we have developed a database with the purpose to provide assistance in documenting the safety state of the art for chemical and petrochemical processes including loading and unloading and storage facilities. In order to keep the database useful, it must be updated to reflect the dynamics of the changes to the “state of the art.” The basic concept of the system is shown in Figure 1. Each process is characterized by its main attributes, such as purpose, a simple process diagram, the substances involved, and their handling. The process itself is analyzed in terms of units that form the process, the func-
Each process is characterized by its main attributes, such as purpose, a simple process diagram, the substances involved, and their handling. tional groups of each unit, and finally the components forming the different functional groups. Let us look at a simple example: a process consisting of a reactor, a centrifuge, and a dryer (3 units). The reactor is equipped with a solid handling device, a stirrer and a condenser (functional groups) as well as a temperature probe, devices for measuring filling height and pressure and rupture disk (component level). The condenser is equipped with a relief vent on the coolant side and perhaps a different measuring device to monitor the filling height of the condensate (more components). On each level of detail, the substances that contact with a unit, functional group or component and their handling mechanism (e.g. pressurized, liquefied systems), are attributed. Finally all technical regulations
1074-9098/00/$20.00 PII S1074-9098(00)00150-7
Figure 1. Database for documenting safety state of the art.
concerning hazardous materials or operation modes are linked to the individual entities. So-called open fields allow for the inclusion of “new technical devices” and also for comments and explanations. The rational character of the database avoids multiple redundant inputs while providing adequate flexibility to dynamically change the process if necessary. Additionally, it allows the documentation of equivalent technical alternatives with identi-
cal purpose and state of the art quality. If this database is filled individually by each company for all processes then it will mature in the quality of its descriptions. For example, more than one centrifuge may be used on any given site, while being engineered at different times by different people. That may have led to differing design with respect to the safety relevant components. A systematic review process will help to identify either that all
Chemical Health & Safety, November/December 2000
units should have been identically equipped, which leaves only one entity stored in the database linked to different processes, or, that all of them represent equivalent solutions, which are in compliance with the demands of the safety state of the art. The database is Microsoft Access based and currently tested in practice. If anyone is interested in this system or the approach, please contact me. You can reach me as always at [email protected].
39
How do we provide proof that our processes are operated according to the state of the art?
Jo¨rg Steinbach holds the Chair of Process Safety and Plant Technology at the Technical University of Berlin.
t has more or less become a world-wide requirement that industry must operate its plants and processes according to state of the art safety. Authorities must affirm compliance when issuing permits as well as inspect processes periodically during operation. The theory is straight-forward, but how is it actually achieved in practice? German legislation and regulations distinguish between three levels of “state of the art:” the acknowledged state of the art, the state of the art, and finally the scientific state of the art. The first refers to everything that has been defined in terms of technical regulations in the broadest sense, ranging from laws and acts to standards such as NFPA, API, ASME in the United States. The second level is higher in quality, based on the first level and amended by any technical improvement compared to what is stated in the technical regulations and —(and this is a significant additional requirement)— has proven its suitability in practice. Finally, the third level is equal the second and it includes every new development and scientific research result independent of the proof of suitability in practice. Consequently, the state of the art is a dynamically changing property. In order to maintain compliance, constant observation of new developments in safety engineering must be made. This is not an easy task. Unfortunately it is not the only hurdle to overcome. A higher one is set up by the innumerable number of documents that, in total, make up the above mentioned technical regulations. Hardly anyone has the total picture. In other, and slightly more ironic words, everything mentioned so far may be summarized as follows: Anyone involved in either assuring by design or assessing the compliance with the safety state of the art performs this job although the existence of certain technical regulations may have been neglected, because either they were not known or a better and praxis-proven technology has not come to the person’s attention. How can this situation be overcome? In co-operation with Michael Nitsche, of the Federal Institute For The Environment, (the
I
38
© Division of Chemical Health and Safety of the American Chemical Society Published by Elsevier Science Inc.
German equivalent to the EPA), we have developed a database with the purpose to provide assistance in documenting the safety state of the art for chemical and petrochemical processes including loading and unloading and storage facilities. In order to keep the database useful, it must be updated to reflect the dynamics of the changes to the “state of the art.” The basic concept of the system is shown in Figure 1. Each process is characterized by its main attributes, such as purpose, a simple process diagram, the substances involved, and their handling. The process itself is analyzed in terms of units that form the process, the func-
Each process is characterized by its main attributes, such as purpose, a simple process diagram, the substances involved, and their handling. tional groups of each unit, and finally the components forming the different functional groups. Let us look at a simple example: a process consisting of a reactor, a centrifuge, and a dryer (3 units). The reactor is equipped with a solid handling device, a stirrer and a condenser (functional groups) as well as a temperature probe, devices for measuring filling height and pressure and rupture disk (component level). The condenser is equipped with a relief vent on the coolant side and perhaps a different measuring device to monitor the filling height of the condensate (more components). On each level of detail, the substances that contact with a unit, functional group or component and their handling mechanism (e.g. pressurized, liquefied systems), are attributed. Finally all technical regulations
1074-9098/00/$20.00 PII S1074-9098(00)00150-7
Figure 1. Database for documenting safety state of the art.
concerning hazardous materials or operation modes are linked to the individual entities. So-called open fields allow for the inclusion of “new technical devices” and also for comments and explanations. The rational character of the database avoids multiple redundant inputs while providing adequate flexibility to dynamically change the process if necessary. Additionally, it allows the documentation of equivalent technical alternatives with identi-
cal purpose and state of the art quality. If this database is filled individually by each company for all processes then it will mature in the quality of its descriptions. For example, more than one centrifuge may be used on any given site, while being engineered at different times by different people. That may have led to differing design with respect to the safety relevant components. A systematic review process will help to identify either that all
Chemical Health & Safety, November/December 2000
units should have been identically equipped, which leaves only one entity stored in the database linked to different processes, or, that all of them represent equivalent solutions, which are in compliance with the demands of the safety state of the art. The database is Microsoft Access based and currently tested in practice. If anyone is interested in this system or the approach, please contact me. You can reach me as always at [email protected].
39