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How environmentalist is Buddhism?
Religion (1991) 21, 101-l 14
HOW ENVIRONMENTAUST BUDDHISM?
IS
Ian Harris This article examines some of the presuppositions underlying contemporary Buddhist support for an environmentalist ethic. It shows that canonical texts do not always support such claims, and that the notion of nature itselfsits uncomfortably within a Buddhist framework. The paper concludes by suggesting that the process of Buddhist/Christian dialogue has contributed to a significant shift in the way that Buddhists must now see themselves as beings-within-the-world and wonders whether this innovation can be sustained by traditional Buddhist cosmology. The core of this article concerns the dialogue, between two missionary religions-Christianity and Buddhism, over the status of the natural world. In recent years a good deal of ink has been spilled on this topic. On a formal level the process was brought to an interim position in the declarations made at the Interfaith Ceremony which celebrated the 25th anniversary of the World Cl’ildlife Fund at Assisi on 29 September 1986. This event was attended by representatives of a wide variety of the world’s faiths. In his statement, made Ven. Lungrig Namgyal Rinpoche, ’ Abbot of Gyuto Tantric University a number of bold claims from the Buddhist perspective. Three are particularly noteworthy for our purposes. Firstly, we hear that Buddhism ‘attaches great importance to wildlife and the protection of the environment’.’ Secondly, Buddhists, now no longer ignorant of the destructive processes at work in the environment, should strive to protect habitats and ensure that endangered species do not become extinct.3 Finally, and as a background to the previous two positions, we are told that in the Buddhist past a harmony existed between man and nature. Statements of this kind are not confined to Buddhists from the Tibetan tradition. In Sri Lanka ideas with a similar provenance emerge from time to time. Thus at a conference organized by the FVorld Council of Churches in 1979 to examine the relations between contemporary faith and science, M. Palihawadana, the Buddhist representative, endorsed the view that, from its inception, Buddhism has been compatible with the scientific enterprise. He goes on to add the view that in classical India, scientific and technical advance took place ‘without any notion of conquest in relation to nature, animate or inanimate’.4 For him then, Buddhism provides a satisfactory and contemporary basis for the balancing of the competing demands of science and the environment. Buddhism is green! 0048-721X/91/020101
+ 14$02.00/O
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One shared feature of these uriters is an apparent romanticism with rrgard to the past. As far as I am aware there is no hard historical evidence which would either aflirm or nc,yate claims of this kind. Clearly both writers must be. at least unconsciousl>-. influenced 1)~ the golclcn agr motif so deeply rooted in the cultures of the Indian subcontinent. However, perhaps another influcncc is also present. In a seminal but overly simplistic rc\icw of the origins of’thc impending ecological disaster Lynn \Vhite Jnr.’ hlames the Christian idea of dominion for the rise of science and the conseclucnt 1ape of our planet. \Vhite continues by sug,gesting the most effective means I~)- which WY may rcvcrsc this trend. LVe should abandon our Christian roots and opt for a rrligious tradition more in tune with nature. In his view suitable candidates are to be found in the East, and on the Indian subcontinent in particular. \\‘hite‘s familiarity with both Christian thought and the Indian religious tradition, in my \iew, lacks sophistication but this can be passed over without further comment. Of more interest arc the romantic presuppositions at the root of much ofwhat he has to say. Certainly a rqjection ofbvcstcrn intellectuality in favour of-Eastern mysticism is a strong feature of German romanticism, so perhaps we can conclude that FVhite draws on sources closer to Schlegel, Goethe and Fichtc than either Sankara or Buddhaghosa in the de\-clopmcnt of this particular argument. It may bc worth noting at this point that E. F. Schumacher advances similarly idiosyncratic \+ws in his discussion on Buddhism and its relations with the natural world in his best-selling .Smai/ is Beautiful.” The provenance of thcsc notions may well have a related source. Of course we may be inclined to dismiss views like these as unrepresentati\,e. but the fact remains that they ha5.e tended to have an impact out of‘all relation to their inherent merits. Lynn LVhite Jnr. in particular is cited regularly with approval in a number of standard M-orks on emironmental ethics. ,John Passmore,’ Peter Singer” and Mar) Midgley,” one lvould ha\,e thought, should have known better. Before moving to a description of Buddhist canonical responses to the environment some further, though rcxlated, points must be made. It is clear that those writers who support a putative Buddhist environmentalism arc often, at least partially, motivated by strongly anti-Christian leanings. The Christian response to nature is condemned out of hand. This view is untenable because it is simply too one-sided. Though the essentially negative views of Augustine, Aquinas and Call-in may have come to dominate Christian responses to the animal and vegetable kingdoms, a parallel and far more positive tradition of stewardship has co-existed, and sometimes been in the ascendant, in Western culture. It seems to me that we may read this latter attitude into much ofthe evidence collected by Keith Thomas in his wonderful book Man and the Natural World.‘” It is explicit in the writings of Maximus the Confessor, Bonaventura and in the life of Francis of Assisi. In the twentieth
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century the mantle of the stewardship tradition appears, at least in part, to have fallen on the shoulders of process theologians and it is interesting in this connection to note that both Charles Hartshorne” and J. B. Cobb have worked hard to establish family relations between Buddhism and Christianity. Cobb” has gone so far as to suggest a certain congruence on environmental matters between these two traditions. Thejournal Philosopip East and West has regularly displayed a strong leaning towards the philosophy of Whitehead and his followers and it is therefore not surprising to find contributors occasionally linking Buddhism and environmentalism with approval. A collection of essays arising from this context has recently been collected together by J. B. Callicott and R. T. Ames.‘” On the Buddhist front both D. ,J. Kalupahana“’ and K. Inada’” lend support to the views expressed by our earlier Buddhist representatives, though some of the discussion is inclined to be shrouded in the dense terminology of deep ecology. Kalupahana’s contribution deserves greater attention. but before doing so it will be as well to set a benchmark from which it should be possible to determine the environmentalist credentials of Buddhist thought. The Christian stewardship tradition supplies an appropriate model for our purposes, though the list Mow is conflated from a variety of sources: 1. Creation by a supreme being e,x-nihilo. 2. All beings are created beings. 3. Nothing created is unnecessary-it is all part of a divinely appointed harmony. 4. Responsibility for the created world has been inherited by mankind. 5. Man’s responsibility lapsed at the Fall but is redeemed by Christ. 6. A purposeful symbiosis between man and nature fulfills God’s purpose. Now, even a superficial knowledge of basic Buddhist principles should be enough to convince us that they are not easily compatible with Christian ideas ofstewardship. Certainly many ofthe metaphysical grounds entailed in the six points do not, and cannot obtain in the Buddhist context. Not only is Buddhism opposed to theism in the Judaeo-Christian sense, it also refuses to accept that the world of becoming (sa@ra) possesses any inherent meaning or purpose. A Buddhist would find it difficult to endorse \Vhitehead’s view that ‘the process shows an upward trend, a teleological aspectbut not a simple one’.‘” If this is the case it is difficult to see how the relationship between mankind and the natural world can have an)- soteriological significance for the Buddhist. In order to continue with this line of enquiry let us turn to the technical appropriateness of the term ‘nature’ in a Buddhist context. Kalupahana tells us that dharmata is the Sanskrit equivalent and that this in turn is a synonym for prati~~asamutp~da-dependent origination. Ii Now emironmentalist literature
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generally assumes that nature is a term which refers to that part of the world which is neither human nor artificial. It is. to quote Karl Barth ‘. the strange life ofbeasts and plants which lies around us’.‘s In this way environmentalism. or shallow ecology, implies a ‘fight against pollution and resource depletion’.“’ It is an attempt to significantly limit man’s destruction of the non-human and the non-artificial. The Assisi declaration makes it clear that influential sections of the Buddhist world now regard this as part of their agenda. Kalupahana’s position is both more complex and more problematic. By linking nature with prati~asamutp~da he acknowledges that all conditioned things cooperate in dependent origination. This is good Buddhism but damaging to Kalupahana’s case for he must also accept that human life is itself part of the world process. Though this must clearly be so, it is still difficult to envisage how Buddhism could support the ‘fight against pollution and resource depletion’. If nature is the realm of complex and mutually conditioning interconnectedness represented by the term prati
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looks as though la L’allee Poussin’s Christian editor has sent him on a wild goose chase. Having surveyed some of the attempts to reconcile Buddhist thought with modern environmentalist notions, it is now necessary to take a step backwards to the canonical texts themselves. Taking into account the methodological complexities identified above, it should still be possible to identify a good deal of material relevant to the natural world, in its Barthian sense. By surveying some of this material, and assessing its ethical ramifications, it should be possible to determine how far Buddhism promotes ‘that whole vast range of duties”” towards the non-human realm. which, for Mary, Midgeley. constitute the hallmark of modern environmentalism. THE C4XO.VIC4 L A TTI TCTDE TO I;Z14RDS =1.2’IaK4 LS The animal kingdom is regarded as comprising one of the six destinies (gati) which make up the world of beings (satta loka). Since all beings, including humans, suffer to a greater or lesser extent by being bound to the circle of becoming, it is natural that we should feel some solidarity with animals.“’ However, the destiny of the animals is regarded as particularly unfortunate. They are more violent and less wise than humans’” and cannot grow in the dharma or cinqa. As such they may not be admitted to the Sangha.‘” In the literature of the Vinqa animals are regularly classified alongside matricides, patricides, thieves, hermaphrodites and slayers of a Buddha.” As such. monks may not imitate the habits of animals.‘* On the more positive side animals are said to possess emotions and may, on occasion, behave virtuously. Thus a mother cow may experience intense longing for its dead calf.‘” Again. in the story of the partridge, monkey and bull elephant who get on famously. the virtues of courtesy, politeness and deference are mentioned.30 This latter tale is supposed to provide a satisfactory model for relations between members of the Sangha, but it should be noted that none of the virtues listed has any specifically Buddhist sense. They are virtues equally admired in most secular societies. The way in which an individual Buddhist should respond to animals is largely dependent on his or her status. Early texts recognize that the laity cannot entirely avoid injury to animals.” However, the constant stress on mindfulness indicates that compassion should govern interactions between the lay and animal realms. Thus cowherds should exercise consideration. They should not milk their charges dry. They should dress their wounds.“” On the other hand, rules regulating the life of monks in this area are far more comprehensive and move closer to the Jaina ideal. To dig the ground and incur the possibility of in,juring a worm is an offcnce requiring expiation.“’ Similarly monks are encouraged to release animals caught in traps? It is not envisaged that such rules should apply to the lay population. However, it is
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interesting that in the V&y hierarchy of monastic offences the killing o1 animals is not regarded as particularly. hrinous. Thus homicide, theft and some sexual offences lead to permanent expulsion from the .Sangha. cvhile the killing of an animal requires simple expiation.‘” It is often said that non-injury (a[zG]hiTsa) is enjoined on all Buddhists, yet the texts concerned tend to stress the instrumentality ofthis observance rather than the inherent value of animals themse1ves.j” Thus the practice of noninjury is said to lead to a more favourable future birth. The role ofvegetarianism in early Buddhism has been much debated. It looks likely that this was only worked out as a coherent ethical doctrine at a fairly late stage in the histor) of Buddhist thought. D. S. Rucgg”’ maintains that it first becomes a major article offaith in the Mahayanist Tathcigatugarbha literature. Certainl). the Pali canon describes the Buddha as a meat eater.“’ Again, meat is allowed for monks provided that it is properl>- cooked”’ and pure in three respects.“” The Kna_~a prohibits only ten kinds ofmeat,‘” but when one looks at the list closel) it is clear that the choice has not been made on the basis of any generalized moral unease connected with the consumption of animal flesh. The choice is far more pragmatic. Thus snakes arc avoided because of their association with autochthonous cults. To eat them would give offencc to non-Buddhists and may be fraught with metaphysical dangers. Abstention from elephant flesh presumably arises from the emblematic association of these animals with kingship. Lion and tiger meat, on the other hand, taints those who eat it. This leaves them open to attack b>. other members of the same species.” This leads us to another important theme-the danger represented by the animal realm. In general animal life is described as participating in the processes which bring about the decay of all things. Thus insects and small creatures continually invade and damage a monk’s bedding and simple habitation.‘” However, this fact can be utilized to the monk’s ad\.antage for here is a concrete example of the impermanence associated with all conditioned things. Meditation on the animal kingdom is conduci\,c in another wa).. B> focusing one’s attention on wild animals fear is aroused. This fear can itself be contemplated, with the result that one becomes more closel)- identified with the dharma. Tambiah“’ notes that this is a practice commonI>, observed b) forest monks in N.E. Thailand and one also finds reference to its therapeutic value in the Pali Manual of a :%
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to the being to whom it is extended.48 The first point may well follow from the previously stated reticence about overly identifying with animals. The second underlines the essentially instrumental ethic at the root of the early Buddhist attitude towards animals. This fact is well supported by reference to the Buddha himself. On the occasions when he extends rnftta to animals it is to dcfusc a potentially dangerous situation, as when he calms the rampaging bull-elephant Nalagiri.~‘a There is little evidence in the canon, or its associated commentaries, to suggest that melt2 may be extended to other beings simply. as an expression of fellow-feeling. In general then the early Buddhist attitude towards animals lags some way behind the position outlined in the Buddhist Xssisi declaration at the beginning of this paper. Far from being concerned to preserve endangered species, the texts regard animals in a somewhat different light. They are an embodiment of the processes of decay at work in the world and as such are themselves lacking in permanence. Our relations with them may provide contexts in which we may act virtuously, but beyond the fact that they appear to be beings destined for final enlightenment, they have no intrinsic value in their present form. The texts leave one with the impression that the animal kingdom was viewed. certainly in the early Buddhist period, with a mixture of fear and bewilderment. Ifone accepts the notion that Buddhism has its origins amongst a predominantly urban middle class then perhaps this is not particularly surprising. Let us now turn our attention to the status of the plant kingdom. THE VEGETABLE KINGDOM IN EARLY BliDDHISM In the Vincp monks are discouraged from damaging plants. Thus the eleventh expiatory (P~cittjya) offence concerns the destruction of vegetable growth (bhz&zg~ma).‘O However. the extended discussion of this offence offers a large list of plants which fall under the general category- of bhzitugama. Analysis of the list reveals that the overwhelming majority, e.g. turmeric, ginger, etc.! are cultivated crops. Interpretation of this rule is therefore problematic. Another rule prohibits monks from wearing shoes made of palm leaves.” Since these clearly have a minimal cash value one is left to suppose that there did exist a general prohibition on damage to all plants. Perhaps this followed from the fact that the Buddha himself refrained from harming seed and plant life.” Certainly trees were regarded as single facultied life forms (ekindri_yumjiz~am). and as such were protected from harm.“’ It appears that the earliest strata of tradition did contain an element of nature mysticism. How else are we to interpret Sappaka’s delight in the scenic beauty of the river and its associated flora and fauna?“’ As the institutional nature of the religion begins to develop, responses like these get squeezed out. but perhaps are never lost altogether. Thus the extracanonical Milindupufihu regards the destruction of vegetable growth as ‘acceptable for the world but
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not in tune with the Buddhascisana’.“’ While noting this attitude, it is important to stress the fact that it must, of necessity, be a minority position within the tradition. The reason for this is that delight in something can easily lead to attachment and its consequent dangers. This being so, caution is a more prominent theme whenever the plant world is discussed, and this is nowhere more obvious than in the canonical treatment of the forest. In the previous section we saw that the forest is the abode of wild animals. These may threaten the practice of the dharma. However, other dangers may be present in the forest. It is an uncultivated and alien environment, and as such the antithesis ofthe settled agricultural land. ” This fact is well illustrated in the VessantaraJZtaka where the king regards the forest as antithetical to his cultured surroundings.” In the end his worries about unseen dangers lurking there prove to be groundless, for the forest is tamed by the practice of the dharma. A curious though connected passage occurs in Majhima NikZya.” Four great forests are cleared but revert to their former uncultivated state through the wickedness and ill-will of certain sages. Wilderness and evil are somehow interconnected here. This presumably explains the ban placed on nuns who wish to dwell in the forest.jg Unwholesome influences at work in this tainted environment will open them up to the possibility ofseduction. It is interesting to note that no complementary rule applies to monks! Views such as these are most likely, as we noted above, to arise in a sitp-imleben in which alienation from the natural world is the dominating feature. Such could easily have been the case in the large urban centres of northern India in the centuries following the Buddha’s life. Canonical responses to the fear of untamed nature appear to be twofold. It can be physically improved or cultivated. Alternatively it can be confronted in a therapeutic encounter. Sixth century B.C.E. India seems to have been in an age of improvement. Much is made in the canon of the delights of pleasure parks, groves and gardens. Planting such places is held to be meritorious.“’ In a remarkably utopian section, the Cakkavatisihamidasutta 61 describes an idealized future in which the degradation of human nature has been reversed and humans live to 80 000 years of age. This time is said to be ripe for the return of a new wheel-turning king (cakkavati). In Jambudvipa cities and towns are so close to one another that a cock can comfortably fly from one to the next. In this perfect world only urban and suburban environments are left. The jungle has been fully conquered. Civilization and artifice then are consistent with the total destruction of the wilderness. Only domesticated animals and cultivated crops survive. Such a conception comes close to the meaning of the term loka which, Gonda6* suggests, signifies a clearing in the forest. The therapeutic significance of the forest resembles that of dangerous creatures. Meditation on the forest as a metaphor for all that is impermanent and subject to decay is a theme to be found in many canonical texts. Outside
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the confines of the canon, Buddhaghosa recommends attention to the falling of leaves as an aid to mindfulness of impermanence63 and Candrakirti regularly refers to sa~Zru itself as a forest. 64 In the mediators’ tradition the wilderness loses the natural grandeur associated with it in some of the early texts. It becomes empty and insubstantial.“” Nothing relevant can be found here from the soteriological perspective. The vegetable world is not even part of the world of beings (satta loka). One must turn away from its attractions. On the other hand the metaphor of cultivation may be internalized. Steven Collins6” has pointed to the fact that the Buddhist meditational tradition tends to employ nature imagery to describe the path. Yet it is not without significance that this imagery is almost always connected with cultivated existence rather than the wilderness. Thus in Dcgha Nik@z we hear: Keep to your own pastures (gocura) brethren, walk in the haunts where your fathers roamed. If you walk in them the Evil One will find no hiding place, no basis ofifattack. It is precisely by the cultivation of good qualities that this merit gro\+3. By continuing the uncultivated
the metaphor one concludes part of the world.
that Mara
attacks
in the forest-
CONCLUDING REMARKS Most forms of Buddhism make a distinction between beings capable ofachieving release on the one hand, and the physical worlds in which they are located on the other. The Surv&tivadu, for instance, distinguishes between the realm of beings (suttvuloku) and the physical receptacle world (bh@znuloku) .68 This distinction is reproduced in Asanga’s .21uh~_y~nusutralaIlzkara.6g The term bhcjunuloku is not found in Pali, but an equivalent, sunkh&loku (= world of formations) is contrasted with suttuloku in Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimuggu.70 There can be little doubt that the strongly soteriological character of the early phases ofBuddhism places all the emphasis on the nature and fate ofsuttvuloku and has little to say about the physical composition of the stage on which the drama of salvation is played out. However, this situation cannot persist for ever. In time Buddhists are obliged to enter into debate with members ofother sects, and must have something sensible to say on the subject of bhr7junuloku. Given the fact that a convenient, proto-Puranic store of cosmological lore is already available in the Hindu cultural area, the easiest course of action is to borrow relevant ideas and bring them into line with basic Buddhist dogma. and the odd snippet of related thought which can be traced back to the word of the Buddha. Thus, by about the fifth century C.E., particularly in the writing ofBuddhaghosa and Vasubandhu, Buddhism emerges with a reasonably coherent cosmological scheme. As la Vallee Poussin sardonically notes.
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Buddhism comes to ‘align itselfwith the fanciful theories of‘the knlpaJ’.” There are two interesting features of these Buddhist cosmologics. In the first place they are strongly deterministic. One kalpa follows the next in a more or less identical fashion. Progressive moral and physical degeneration in the realm of beings is reflected by analogous changes in the physical world. The bhnjanaloka provides the context in which the prolonged struggle for liberation takes place, and as such it is very difficult to ever conceive of it being devoid of beings. Two possibilities are open for bhujanaloka in the unlikely rl.ent that all beings were to achieve Buddhahood. Either its constitution would change rapidly to support the radical changes in sattvaloka, or it would be emptied of its sentient contents. In the second case it is difficult to see how it could continue to exist. In fact both positions arc problematic from an environmentalist pcrspectivc for, as John Passmore forcibly argues ‘any successful en\-ironmental philosophy must acknowledge that natural processes go on in their own vyay. in a tnannet indifferent to human interests, and by no means incompatible with man’s total This seems reasonable, so ho% disappearance from the face of the earth’.” can a Buddhist environmentalism fulfil such criteria? It seems that it cannot without a substantial reworking of its cosmological base, though perhaps this is not as serious as it appears on first acquaintance. After all most of the ideas associated with this area ofBuddhist thought are relatively late and not always easily reconciled with the central teachings ofthe Buddha, but perhaps a tnore important observation concerns thr sense of the term ‘Buddhist cnvironmentalism’. Are we really describing a phenomenon which naturally arises from the heart of the Buddhist tradition or simply- a series of compatible secular concerns which can be happily assented to by contrmporar) Buddhists? I am of the view that the latter position is nearer to the truth, and this has some support from the tradition itself. Thus. Xsanga holds cosmological thought to form part of that class of knowledge which does not contribute to release.‘” It is unconnected to soteriological practice and as such has an importance mainly in the field of apologetics. It is all good stuff but indubitably secular. If this is so, we are back to our initial question. FVhy have some contemporary Buddhists felt the need to argue that environmentalist concerns naturally arise as an essential feature of the dharma? The reasons are doubtlessly complex, but the desire to empty Buddhism of some of its central soteriological content. linked to the replacement of this content by a range of secular, this-worldly issues, is an important feature of the phenomenon identified by Profs Bechert. Gombrich,‘” and others as secular or protestant Buddhism. Now one of the claims made by this form ofBuddhism is that it is in harmony with the findings of science and reason. As such the tradition, once it has been stripped of its phantasticat elements, can be re-presented in a more consistently empirical light. K. N. Jayatilleke is a writer who falls within this category. His demytholo-
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gizing of the tradition enables him to argue that the multiple cosmologies of Buddhafields, more numerous than the grains of sand on the banks of the river Ganges, are congruent with the findings of modern science.‘” In effect the Buddha becomes a remarkably prescient astronomer. M’hile reductionism of this kind has its attractions it also suffers from a serious pitfall. It is based on the assumption that the Buddha consciousl!supported the modern scientific world picture over two thousand years before the present era. The cultural and historical gulf between now and then makes such an assumption seem incredible, despite the fact that some superficial similarities in outlook may be observed. NOM. it is not inconceivable that historical scholarship may, in the future, reveal that early Buddhists did live in harmony with their surroundings. Their doctrinal position may well have contributed to this harmony, but will we be justified in concluding that the). were environmentalists? If we accept that environmentalism is the conscious attempt to critically appraise and counteract the adverse by-products of thr scientific enterprise, then it seems that we will not. The early Buddhist mode of dealing with the natural world is simply traditional and essentially nonreflective. Protestant Buddhist romanticization of the past conveniently ignores this fact and in the process contributes to a significant doctrinal shift. The traditional attitude of good natured benevolence and decorum directed towards a radically unstable natural environment is transformed into an ethic based on the ultimate value of nature. From a broader perspective this looks very much like the beginning of the erosion of the Buddhist understanding of reality and its replacement by some of the metaphysical roots of the Christian stewardship tradition. Perhaps we are witnessing the transformation ofa significant traditional system of thought and its re-emergence as liberal Christianity. Certainly this outcome could never have been consciously intended by those Christians who have sought to enter into dialogue with members of other faiths, but there is a kind of inevitability woven into the process. By asking questions which naturally arise from a Christianity already saturated with, and acculturated to, the dominant ideology of science, other traditions, already unsure of their traditional conceptual resources. can do little more than acquiesce.
Abbreviations
r\ D ERE M Miln
Ar@ttaranik@a Dighanikiya Encyclopedia Majhimanikcya Milindattatiha
ofReligion
and Ethics.
J. Hastings
(rd.),
Edinburgh,
1908
I I IL
MSA Pras s Sn Thag Vin \‘ism 1
2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9
10 11
12
13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24
I. Harris
MahLya‘nasutralamkara, S. Levi (ed), Paris, 1907 Prasannapadci, L. de la Vallee Poussin (ed.), Osnabriick, Sanlyuttanikaya Suttanipcita Theragcitha Vinaya Visuddhimagga, Bhikkhu Nyanamoli (trans.), Berkeley
1970
& London,
1976
The Assisi Declarations: Messages on Man and N’atature from Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism, cf. The Buddhist Declaration on Nature, pp. 3-7, Basilica di S. Francesco. Assisi, Italy, London, CVWF, 1986. Ibid., p. 5. Ibid., pp. 6-7. M. Palihawadana, ‘Buddhism and the scientific enterprise’, in R. L. Shinn (ed.), Faith andScience in an Unjust World, Vol. 1, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1980, p. 138. Lynn M’hite Jnr., ‘The historical roots of our ecological crisis’. Scienre 155: 3767 (Mar 1967), p. 1204. E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered, London, Abacus, 1974, cf. p, 49 where the author talks of the Buddhist attitude of reverence towards trees. J. Passmore, Man’s ResponsibilityforNature, 2nd edition, London, Duckworth, 1980. P. Singer, Practical Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979. M. Midgeley, ‘Duties Concerning Islands’, in R. Elliot and A. Gane (eds). Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of Readings, Milton Keynes. Open University Press, 1983, p. 175. K. Thomas, Man and the hTatural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1.50~1800. London, A. Lane, 1983. cf. C. Hartshorne, ‘Toward a Buddhistico-Christian religion’, in K. K. Inada and N. P. Jacobson (eds), Buddhism and American Thinkers, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1984, pp. 2-13. J. B. Cobb, Is it Too Late? A Theology of Ecolog, Beverley Hills, California. Bruce, 1972 and Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christian+ and Buddhism, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1982. J. Baird Callicott and R. T. iimes (eds), Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Eassays in Environmental Philosophy, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989. D. J. Kalupahana, ‘Toward a middle path of survival’, ibid., pp. 247-256. K. K. Inada, ‘Environmental problematics’, ibid., pp. 231-245. Quoted by I. G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, London, SCM. 1966. p. 441. Op. cit., p. 252. Quoted in Passmore, op. cit., p. 207. A. Naess, ‘The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement’, InquiT 16, p. 95. Ibid. L. de Silva, ‘Man and nature in a mutual causal relationship’, in S. J. Samartha and L. de Silva (eds), Man in N’ature: Guest or Engineer, Colombo, The Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue, 1979, p. 7. ERE, Vol. 9, Nature (Buddhist), pp. 209-210. Op. cit., p. 178. S.ii. 189-190. Also cf. the example ofAnandasiri in M. Carrithers, The Forest Monks ofSri Lanka, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 291,
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Miln. 32. e.g. The snake that is prevented from obtaining ordination, Vin.i.87. Vin.i. 134-5 + Vin.i.320. The Buddha condemns the ruminating monk (Vin.ii. 132) and the canine ascetic (M.i.387-389). Vin.i. 193. V’in.ii.161. Sn.219. A.v.347-8 = M.i.220f. \‘in.iv.32-33 (Pacittiva X). Vin.iii.62-3. A fact noted by S. J. Tambiah, Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in N.E. Thailand, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 86-87. Also cf. Vin.iv.124 (PZcittiya LXI). e.g. M.i.60. Non-Buddhist texts (e.g. Baudhayana Dharmastitra 3.1.23) also treat ahimsa directed towards animals as a form of internal purification (anta@auca). D. S. Ruegg, ‘Ahimsa and vegetarianism in the history of Buddhism’, in S. Balasooriya et al. (eds), Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula, London, Gordon Fraser, 1980, pp. 234-241. A.iii.491. A.ii.208-9. M.i.368-371 sutta 55. A monk must neither see, hear. nor suspect that the animal was slaughtered for him. Vin.i.218ff. A similar, though not identical list is given in Asokan Pillar Edict V. Vin.i.219. \‘in.ii. 148-9. S. J, Tambiah, The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 90. F. L. Woodward (trans.), Manual of a Mystic, Being a Translation from the Pali and Sinhalese Work Entitled the Yogavachara’s Manual. London. Pali Text Society. 1916. Vism.ix. Vism.ix.S-4. Vism.ix.59f. \,.in.ii. 194f. Vin.iv.34. l’in.i.157. D.i.5. Vin.iii.156. Thag.307-310. Miln.266. This point is noted by L. Schmithausen, ‘Buddhismus und Natur’, in R. Panikkar and \v. Strolz (eds). Die Verantwortung des Menschen fu’r eine bewohnbare Welt in Christenturn, Hinduismus und Buddhismus, Freiburg, Base1 und Wien, Herder, 1985, cf. pp. 105f in particular. cf. M. Cone and R. Gombrich (trans.), The Perfect Generosity of Prince Vessantara. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 28. hI.i.378. Yin.ii.278. S.i.33. D.i.75.
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62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
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J. Gonda, Loka: World and Heawn in the Ida, Amsterdam, Noord-Hollandschr Uitgevers, 1966, p. 150. Vism.ii.58, also cf. Thag.1133. Pras.246,13; 299,9f. M.iii.104-109, sutta 121 Lesser Discourse on Emptiness (Culasunnatasutta). S. Collins, Seljless Persons: Image?? and Thought in Theral’ada Buddhism, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1982. p. 218. D.iii.58. L. de la Vallte Poussin, ERE Vol. 4. Gsmogony and Cosmolou (Buddhist), 11. 130. MSA.iv. 15-20. Vism.vii.37. L. de la Vallie Poussin, ERE Vol. 1, Ages ofthe World (Buddhist), p. 188. Passmore, op. cit., p. 213. For Asanga it is secular knowledge (lokzyatika), though it must be said that he recognizes the need for the bodhisattua to possess such knowledge in order that the dharma may be propagated, cf. Bodhisattvabhimi ch. 8 & la Vallee Poussin. op. cit. R. Gombrich, Theravada Buddhism, London, Routledge. Kegan and Paul, 1988, pp. 174ff. K. N. Jayatilleke, ‘The Buddhist conception of the universe‘, in N. Smart ted.). The Message of the Buddha, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1975, pp. 90-103.
IAN HARRIS is a Senior Lecturer in Religious Studies at S. Martin’s College, Lancaster with teaching responsibilities in the field of Hindu and Buddhist thought. He was a student at the universities of Lancaster and Cambridge, holding a PhD from the former. Currently working on the relationship between Indian medicine and Buddhist thought, his first book The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara in Ear& Indian Buddhism is to be published shortly. Department
of Religious Studies, S. Martin’s
College, Lancaster LA I 3JD.
HOW ENVIRONMENTAUST BUDDHISM?
IS
Ian Harris This article examines some of the presuppositions underlying contemporary Buddhist support for an environmentalist ethic. It shows that canonical texts do not always support such claims, and that the notion of nature itselfsits uncomfortably within a Buddhist framework. The paper concludes by suggesting that the process of Buddhist/Christian dialogue has contributed to a significant shift in the way that Buddhists must now see themselves as beings-within-the-world and wonders whether this innovation can be sustained by traditional Buddhist cosmology. The core of this article concerns the dialogue, between two missionary religions-Christianity and Buddhism, over the status of the natural world. In recent years a good deal of ink has been spilled on this topic. On a formal level the process was brought to an interim position in the declarations made at the Interfaith Ceremony which celebrated the 25th anniversary of the World Cl’ildlife Fund at Assisi on 29 September 1986. This event was attended by representatives of a wide variety of the world’s faiths. In his statement, made Ven. Lungrig Namgyal Rinpoche, ’ Abbot of Gyuto Tantric University a number of bold claims from the Buddhist perspective. Three are particularly noteworthy for our purposes. Firstly, we hear that Buddhism ‘attaches great importance to wildlife and the protection of the environment’.’ Secondly, Buddhists, now no longer ignorant of the destructive processes at work in the environment, should strive to protect habitats and ensure that endangered species do not become extinct.3 Finally, and as a background to the previous two positions, we are told that in the Buddhist past a harmony existed between man and nature. Statements of this kind are not confined to Buddhists from the Tibetan tradition. In Sri Lanka ideas with a similar provenance emerge from time to time. Thus at a conference organized by the FVorld Council of Churches in 1979 to examine the relations between contemporary faith and science, M. Palihawadana, the Buddhist representative, endorsed the view that, from its inception, Buddhism has been compatible with the scientific enterprise. He goes on to add the view that in classical India, scientific and technical advance took place ‘without any notion of conquest in relation to nature, animate or inanimate’.4 For him then, Buddhism provides a satisfactory and contemporary basis for the balancing of the competing demands of science and the environment. Buddhism is green! 0048-721X/91/020101
+ 14$02.00/O
0
199 I Academic
Press Limited
One shared feature of these uriters is an apparent romanticism with rrgard to the past. As far as I am aware there is no hard historical evidence which would either aflirm or nc,yate claims of this kind. Clearly both writers must be. at least unconsciousl>-. influenced 1)~ the golclcn agr motif so deeply rooted in the cultures of the Indian subcontinent. However, perhaps another influcncc is also present. In a seminal but overly simplistic rc\icw of the origins of’thc impending ecological disaster Lynn \Vhite Jnr.’ hlames the Christian idea of dominion for the rise of science and the conseclucnt 1ape of our planet. \Vhite continues by sug,gesting the most effective means I~)- which WY may rcvcrsc this trend. LVe should abandon our Christian roots and opt for a rrligious tradition more in tune with nature. In his view suitable candidates are to be found in the East, and on the Indian subcontinent in particular. \\‘hite‘s familiarity with both Christian thought and the Indian religious tradition, in my \iew, lacks sophistication but this can be passed over without further comment. Of more interest arc the romantic presuppositions at the root of much ofwhat he has to say. Certainly a rqjection ofbvcstcrn intellectuality in favour of-Eastern mysticism is a strong feature of German romanticism, so perhaps we can conclude that FVhite draws on sources closer to Schlegel, Goethe and Fichtc than either Sankara or Buddhaghosa in the de\-clopmcnt of this particular argument. It may bc worth noting at this point that E. F. Schumacher advances similarly idiosyncratic \+ws in his discussion on Buddhism and its relations with the natural world in his best-selling .Smai/ is Beautiful.” The provenance of thcsc notions may well have a related source. Of course we may be inclined to dismiss views like these as unrepresentati\,e. but the fact remains that they ha5.e tended to have an impact out of‘all relation to their inherent merits. Lynn LVhite Jnr. in particular is cited regularly with approval in a number of standard M-orks on emironmental ethics. ,John Passmore,’ Peter Singer” and Mar) Midgley,” one lvould ha\,e thought, should have known better. Before moving to a description of Buddhist canonical responses to the environment some further, though rcxlated, points must be made. It is clear that those writers who support a putative Buddhist environmentalism arc often, at least partially, motivated by strongly anti-Christian leanings. The Christian response to nature is condemned out of hand. This view is untenable because it is simply too one-sided. Though the essentially negative views of Augustine, Aquinas and Call-in may have come to dominate Christian responses to the animal and vegetable kingdoms, a parallel and far more positive tradition of stewardship has co-existed, and sometimes been in the ascendant, in Western culture. It seems to me that we may read this latter attitude into much ofthe evidence collected by Keith Thomas in his wonderful book Man and the Natural World.‘” It is explicit in the writings of Maximus the Confessor, Bonaventura and in the life of Francis of Assisi. In the twentieth
HOE
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century the mantle of the stewardship tradition appears, at least in part, to have fallen on the shoulders of process theologians and it is interesting in this connection to note that both Charles Hartshorne” and J. B. Cobb have worked hard to establish family relations between Buddhism and Christianity. Cobb” has gone so far as to suggest a certain congruence on environmental matters between these two traditions. Thejournal Philosopip East and West has regularly displayed a strong leaning towards the philosophy of Whitehead and his followers and it is therefore not surprising to find contributors occasionally linking Buddhism and environmentalism with approval. A collection of essays arising from this context has recently been collected together by J. B. Callicott and R. T. Ames.‘” On the Buddhist front both D. ,J. Kalupahana“’ and K. Inada’” lend support to the views expressed by our earlier Buddhist representatives, though some of the discussion is inclined to be shrouded in the dense terminology of deep ecology. Kalupahana’s contribution deserves greater attention. but before doing so it will be as well to set a benchmark from which it should be possible to determine the environmentalist credentials of Buddhist thought. The Christian stewardship tradition supplies an appropriate model for our purposes, though the list Mow is conflated from a variety of sources: 1. Creation by a supreme being e,x-nihilo. 2. All beings are created beings. 3. Nothing created is unnecessary-it is all part of a divinely appointed harmony. 4. Responsibility for the created world has been inherited by mankind. 5. Man’s responsibility lapsed at the Fall but is redeemed by Christ. 6. A purposeful symbiosis between man and nature fulfills God’s purpose. Now, even a superficial knowledge of basic Buddhist principles should be enough to convince us that they are not easily compatible with Christian ideas ofstewardship. Certainly many ofthe metaphysical grounds entailed in the six points do not, and cannot obtain in the Buddhist context. Not only is Buddhism opposed to theism in the Judaeo-Christian sense, it also refuses to accept that the world of becoming (sa@ra) possesses any inherent meaning or purpose. A Buddhist would find it difficult to endorse \Vhitehead’s view that ‘the process shows an upward trend, a teleological aspectbut not a simple one’.‘” If this is the case it is difficult to see how the relationship between mankind and the natural world can have an)- soteriological significance for the Buddhist. In order to continue with this line of enquiry let us turn to the technical appropriateness of the term ‘nature’ in a Buddhist context. Kalupahana tells us that dharmata is the Sanskrit equivalent and that this in turn is a synonym for prati~~asamutp~da-dependent origination. Ii Now emironmentalist literature
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generally assumes that nature is a term which refers to that part of the world which is neither human nor artificial. It is. to quote Karl Barth ‘. the strange life ofbeasts and plants which lies around us’.‘s In this way environmentalism. or shallow ecology, implies a ‘fight against pollution and resource depletion’.“’ It is an attempt to significantly limit man’s destruction of the non-human and the non-artificial. The Assisi declaration makes it clear that influential sections of the Buddhist world now regard this as part of their agenda. Kalupahana’s position is both more complex and more problematic. By linking nature with prati~asamutp~da he acknowledges that all conditioned things cooperate in dependent origination. This is good Buddhism but damaging to Kalupahana’s case for he must also accept that human life is itself part of the world process. Though this must clearly be so, it is still difficult to envisage how Buddhism could support the ‘fight against pollution and resource depletion’. If nature is the realm of complex and mutually conditioning interconnectedness represented by the term prati
Hou’ enr’ironmentalist is Buddhism?
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looks as though la L’allee Poussin’s Christian editor has sent him on a wild goose chase. Having surveyed some of the attempts to reconcile Buddhist thought with modern environmentalist notions, it is now necessary to take a step backwards to the canonical texts themselves. Taking into account the methodological complexities identified above, it should still be possible to identify a good deal of material relevant to the natural world, in its Barthian sense. By surveying some of this material, and assessing its ethical ramifications, it should be possible to determine how far Buddhism promotes ‘that whole vast range of duties”” towards the non-human realm. which, for Mary, Midgeley. constitute the hallmark of modern environmentalism. THE C4XO.VIC4 L A TTI TCTDE TO I;Z14RDS =1.2’IaK4 LS The animal kingdom is regarded as comprising one of the six destinies (gati) which make up the world of beings (satta loka). Since all beings, including humans, suffer to a greater or lesser extent by being bound to the circle of becoming, it is natural that we should feel some solidarity with animals.“’ However, the destiny of the animals is regarded as particularly unfortunate. They are more violent and less wise than humans’” and cannot grow in the dharma or cinqa. As such they may not be admitted to the Sangha.‘” In the literature of the Vinqa animals are regularly classified alongside matricides, patricides, thieves, hermaphrodites and slayers of a Buddha.” As such. monks may not imitate the habits of animals.‘* On the more positive side animals are said to possess emotions and may, on occasion, behave virtuously. Thus a mother cow may experience intense longing for its dead calf.‘” Again. in the story of the partridge, monkey and bull elephant who get on famously. the virtues of courtesy, politeness and deference are mentioned.30 This latter tale is supposed to provide a satisfactory model for relations between members of the Sangha, but it should be noted that none of the virtues listed has any specifically Buddhist sense. They are virtues equally admired in most secular societies. The way in which an individual Buddhist should respond to animals is largely dependent on his or her status. Early texts recognize that the laity cannot entirely avoid injury to animals.” However, the constant stress on mindfulness indicates that compassion should govern interactions between the lay and animal realms. Thus cowherds should exercise consideration. They should not milk their charges dry. They should dress their wounds.“” On the other hand, rules regulating the life of monks in this area are far more comprehensive and move closer to the Jaina ideal. To dig the ground and incur the possibility of in,juring a worm is an offcnce requiring expiation.“’ Similarly monks are encouraged to release animals caught in traps? It is not envisaged that such rules should apply to the lay population. However, it is
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interesting that in the V&y hierarchy of monastic offences the killing o1 animals is not regarded as particularly. hrinous. Thus homicide, theft and some sexual offences lead to permanent expulsion from the .Sangha. cvhile the killing of an animal requires simple expiation.‘” It is often said that non-injury (a[zG]hiTsa) is enjoined on all Buddhists, yet the texts concerned tend to stress the instrumentality ofthis observance rather than the inherent value of animals themse1ves.j” Thus the practice of noninjury is said to lead to a more favourable future birth. The role ofvegetarianism in early Buddhism has been much debated. It looks likely that this was only worked out as a coherent ethical doctrine at a fairly late stage in the histor) of Buddhist thought. D. S. Rucgg”’ maintains that it first becomes a major article offaith in the Mahayanist Tathcigatugarbha literature. Certainl). the Pali canon describes the Buddha as a meat eater.“’ Again, meat is allowed for monks provided that it is properl>- cooked”’ and pure in three respects.“” The Kna_~a prohibits only ten kinds ofmeat,‘” but when one looks at the list closel) it is clear that the choice has not been made on the basis of any generalized moral unease connected with the consumption of animal flesh. The choice is far more pragmatic. Thus snakes arc avoided because of their association with autochthonous cults. To eat them would give offencc to non-Buddhists and may be fraught with metaphysical dangers. Abstention from elephant flesh presumably arises from the emblematic association of these animals with kingship. Lion and tiger meat, on the other hand, taints those who eat it. This leaves them open to attack b>. other members of the same species.” This leads us to another important theme-the danger represented by the animal realm. In general animal life is described as participating in the processes which bring about the decay of all things. Thus insects and small creatures continually invade and damage a monk’s bedding and simple habitation.‘” However, this fact can be utilized to the monk’s ad\.antage for here is a concrete example of the impermanence associated with all conditioned things. Meditation on the animal kingdom is conduci\,c in another wa).. B> focusing one’s attention on wild animals fear is aroused. This fear can itself be contemplated, with the result that one becomes more closel)- identified with the dharma. Tambiah“’ notes that this is a practice commonI>, observed b) forest monks in N.E. Thailand and one also finds reference to its therapeutic value in the Pali Manual of a :%
Ifox, rmironmentalist is Buddhism?
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to the being to whom it is extended.48 The first point may well follow from the previously stated reticence about overly identifying with animals. The second underlines the essentially instrumental ethic at the root of the early Buddhist attitude towards animals. This fact is well supported by reference to the Buddha himself. On the occasions when he extends rnftta to animals it is to dcfusc a potentially dangerous situation, as when he calms the rampaging bull-elephant Nalagiri.~‘a There is little evidence in the canon, or its associated commentaries, to suggest that melt2 may be extended to other beings simply. as an expression of fellow-feeling. In general then the early Buddhist attitude towards animals lags some way behind the position outlined in the Buddhist Xssisi declaration at the beginning of this paper. Far from being concerned to preserve endangered species, the texts regard animals in a somewhat different light. They are an embodiment of the processes of decay at work in the world and as such are themselves lacking in permanence. Our relations with them may provide contexts in which we may act virtuously, but beyond the fact that they appear to be beings destined for final enlightenment, they have no intrinsic value in their present form. The texts leave one with the impression that the animal kingdom was viewed. certainly in the early Buddhist period, with a mixture of fear and bewilderment. Ifone accepts the notion that Buddhism has its origins amongst a predominantly urban middle class then perhaps this is not particularly surprising. Let us now turn our attention to the status of the plant kingdom. THE VEGETABLE KINGDOM IN EARLY BliDDHISM In the Vincp monks are discouraged from damaging plants. Thus the eleventh expiatory (P~cittjya) offence concerns the destruction of vegetable growth (bhz&zg~ma).‘O However. the extended discussion of this offence offers a large list of plants which fall under the general category- of bhzitugama. Analysis of the list reveals that the overwhelming majority, e.g. turmeric, ginger, etc.! are cultivated crops. Interpretation of this rule is therefore problematic. Another rule prohibits monks from wearing shoes made of palm leaves.” Since these clearly have a minimal cash value one is left to suppose that there did exist a general prohibition on damage to all plants. Perhaps this followed from the fact that the Buddha himself refrained from harming seed and plant life.” Certainly trees were regarded as single facultied life forms (ekindri_yumjiz~am). and as such were protected from harm.“’ It appears that the earliest strata of tradition did contain an element of nature mysticism. How else are we to interpret Sappaka’s delight in the scenic beauty of the river and its associated flora and fauna?“’ As the institutional nature of the religion begins to develop, responses like these get squeezed out. but perhaps are never lost altogether. Thus the extracanonical Milindupufihu regards the destruction of vegetable growth as ‘acceptable for the world but
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not in tune with the Buddhascisana’.“’ While noting this attitude, it is important to stress the fact that it must, of necessity, be a minority position within the tradition. The reason for this is that delight in something can easily lead to attachment and its consequent dangers. This being so, caution is a more prominent theme whenever the plant world is discussed, and this is nowhere more obvious than in the canonical treatment of the forest. In the previous section we saw that the forest is the abode of wild animals. These may threaten the practice of the dharma. However, other dangers may be present in the forest. It is an uncultivated and alien environment, and as such the antithesis ofthe settled agricultural land. ” This fact is well illustrated in the VessantaraJZtaka where the king regards the forest as antithetical to his cultured surroundings.” In the end his worries about unseen dangers lurking there prove to be groundless, for the forest is tamed by the practice of the dharma. A curious though connected passage occurs in Majhima NikZya.” Four great forests are cleared but revert to their former uncultivated state through the wickedness and ill-will of certain sages. Wilderness and evil are somehow interconnected here. This presumably explains the ban placed on nuns who wish to dwell in the forest.jg Unwholesome influences at work in this tainted environment will open them up to the possibility ofseduction. It is interesting to note that no complementary rule applies to monks! Views such as these are most likely, as we noted above, to arise in a sitp-imleben in which alienation from the natural world is the dominating feature. Such could easily have been the case in the large urban centres of northern India in the centuries following the Buddha’s life. Canonical responses to the fear of untamed nature appear to be twofold. It can be physically improved or cultivated. Alternatively it can be confronted in a therapeutic encounter. Sixth century B.C.E. India seems to have been in an age of improvement. Much is made in the canon of the delights of pleasure parks, groves and gardens. Planting such places is held to be meritorious.“’ In a remarkably utopian section, the Cakkavatisihamidasutta 61 describes an idealized future in which the degradation of human nature has been reversed and humans live to 80 000 years of age. This time is said to be ripe for the return of a new wheel-turning king (cakkavati). In Jambudvipa cities and towns are so close to one another that a cock can comfortably fly from one to the next. In this perfect world only urban and suburban environments are left. The jungle has been fully conquered. Civilization and artifice then are consistent with the total destruction of the wilderness. Only domesticated animals and cultivated crops survive. Such a conception comes close to the meaning of the term loka which, Gonda6* suggests, signifies a clearing in the forest. The therapeutic significance of the forest resembles that of dangerous creatures. Meditation on the forest as a metaphor for all that is impermanent and subject to decay is a theme to be found in many canonical texts. Outside
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the confines of the canon, Buddhaghosa recommends attention to the falling of leaves as an aid to mindfulness of impermanence63 and Candrakirti regularly refers to sa~Zru itself as a forest. 64 In the mediators’ tradition the wilderness loses the natural grandeur associated with it in some of the early texts. It becomes empty and insubstantial.“” Nothing relevant can be found here from the soteriological perspective. The vegetable world is not even part of the world of beings (satta loka). One must turn away from its attractions. On the other hand the metaphor of cultivation may be internalized. Steven Collins6” has pointed to the fact that the Buddhist meditational tradition tends to employ nature imagery to describe the path. Yet it is not without significance that this imagery is almost always connected with cultivated existence rather than the wilderness. Thus in Dcgha Nik@z we hear: Keep to your own pastures (gocura) brethren, walk in the haunts where your fathers roamed. If you walk in them the Evil One will find no hiding place, no basis ofifattack. It is precisely by the cultivation of good qualities that this merit gro\+3. By continuing the uncultivated
the metaphor one concludes part of the world.
that Mara
attacks
in the forest-
CONCLUDING REMARKS Most forms of Buddhism make a distinction between beings capable ofachieving release on the one hand, and the physical worlds in which they are located on the other. The Surv&tivadu, for instance, distinguishes between the realm of beings (suttvuloku) and the physical receptacle world (bh@znuloku) .68 This distinction is reproduced in Asanga’s .21uh~_y~nusutralaIlzkara.6g The term bhcjunuloku is not found in Pali, but an equivalent, sunkh&loku (= world of formations) is contrasted with suttuloku in Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimuggu.70 There can be little doubt that the strongly soteriological character of the early phases ofBuddhism places all the emphasis on the nature and fate ofsuttvuloku and has little to say about the physical composition of the stage on which the drama of salvation is played out. However, this situation cannot persist for ever. In time Buddhists are obliged to enter into debate with members ofother sects, and must have something sensible to say on the subject of bhr7junuloku. Given the fact that a convenient, proto-Puranic store of cosmological lore is already available in the Hindu cultural area, the easiest course of action is to borrow relevant ideas and bring them into line with basic Buddhist dogma. and the odd snippet of related thought which can be traced back to the word of the Buddha. Thus, by about the fifth century C.E., particularly in the writing ofBuddhaghosa and Vasubandhu, Buddhism emerges with a reasonably coherent cosmological scheme. As la Vallee Poussin sardonically notes.
I 10
I. Harris
Buddhism comes to ‘align itselfwith the fanciful theories of‘the knlpaJ’.” There are two interesting features of these Buddhist cosmologics. In the first place they are strongly deterministic. One kalpa follows the next in a more or less identical fashion. Progressive moral and physical degeneration in the realm of beings is reflected by analogous changes in the physical world. The bhnjanaloka provides the context in which the prolonged struggle for liberation takes place, and as such it is very difficult to ever conceive of it being devoid of beings. Two possibilities are open for bhujanaloka in the unlikely rl.ent that all beings were to achieve Buddhahood. Either its constitution would change rapidly to support the radical changes in sattvaloka, or it would be emptied of its sentient contents. In the second case it is difficult to see how it could continue to exist. In fact both positions arc problematic from an environmentalist pcrspectivc for, as John Passmore forcibly argues ‘any successful en\-ironmental philosophy must acknowledge that natural processes go on in their own vyay. in a tnannet indifferent to human interests, and by no means incompatible with man’s total This seems reasonable, so ho% disappearance from the face of the earth’.” can a Buddhist environmentalism fulfil such criteria? It seems that it cannot without a substantial reworking of its cosmological base, though perhaps this is not as serious as it appears on first acquaintance. After all most of the ideas associated with this area ofBuddhist thought are relatively late and not always easily reconciled with the central teachings ofthe Buddha, but perhaps a tnore important observation concerns thr sense of the term ‘Buddhist cnvironmentalism’. Are we really describing a phenomenon which naturally arises from the heart of the Buddhist tradition or simply- a series of compatible secular concerns which can be happily assented to by contrmporar) Buddhists? I am of the view that the latter position is nearer to the truth, and this has some support from the tradition itself. Thus. Xsanga holds cosmological thought to form part of that class of knowledge which does not contribute to release.‘” It is unconnected to soteriological practice and as such has an importance mainly in the field of apologetics. It is all good stuff but indubitably secular. If this is so, we are back to our initial question. FVhy have some contemporary Buddhists felt the need to argue that environmentalist concerns naturally arise as an essential feature of the dharma? The reasons are doubtlessly complex, but the desire to empty Buddhism of some of its central soteriological content. linked to the replacement of this content by a range of secular, this-worldly issues, is an important feature of the phenomenon identified by Profs Bechert. Gombrich,‘” and others as secular or protestant Buddhism. Now one of the claims made by this form ofBuddhism is that it is in harmony with the findings of science and reason. As such the tradition, once it has been stripped of its phantasticat elements, can be re-presented in a more consistently empirical light. K. N. Jayatilleke is a writer who falls within this category. His demytholo-
Hou,
r~~~~irortrttrtt/alist
is l3uddhism.)
III
gizing of the tradition enables him to argue that the multiple cosmologies of Buddhafields, more numerous than the grains of sand on the banks of the river Ganges, are congruent with the findings of modern science.‘” In effect the Buddha becomes a remarkably prescient astronomer. M’hile reductionism of this kind has its attractions it also suffers from a serious pitfall. It is based on the assumption that the Buddha consciousl!supported the modern scientific world picture over two thousand years before the present era. The cultural and historical gulf between now and then makes such an assumption seem incredible, despite the fact that some superficial similarities in outlook may be observed. NOM. it is not inconceivable that historical scholarship may, in the future, reveal that early Buddhists did live in harmony with their surroundings. Their doctrinal position may well have contributed to this harmony, but will we be justified in concluding that the). were environmentalists? If we accept that environmentalism is the conscious attempt to critically appraise and counteract the adverse by-products of thr scientific enterprise, then it seems that we will not. The early Buddhist mode of dealing with the natural world is simply traditional and essentially nonreflective. Protestant Buddhist romanticization of the past conveniently ignores this fact and in the process contributes to a significant doctrinal shift. The traditional attitude of good natured benevolence and decorum directed towards a radically unstable natural environment is transformed into an ethic based on the ultimate value of nature. From a broader perspective this looks very much like the beginning of the erosion of the Buddhist understanding of reality and its replacement by some of the metaphysical roots of the Christian stewardship tradition. Perhaps we are witnessing the transformation ofa significant traditional system of thought and its re-emergence as liberal Christianity. Certainly this outcome could never have been consciously intended by those Christians who have sought to enter into dialogue with members of other faiths, but there is a kind of inevitability woven into the process. By asking questions which naturally arise from a Christianity already saturated with, and acculturated to, the dominant ideology of science, other traditions, already unsure of their traditional conceptual resources. can do little more than acquiesce.
Abbreviations
r\ D ERE M Miln
Ar@ttaranik@a Dighanikiya Encyclopedia Majhimanikcya Milindattatiha
ofReligion
and Ethics.
J. Hastings
(rd.),
Edinburgh,
1908
I I IL
MSA Pras s Sn Thag Vin \‘ism 1
2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9
10 11
12
13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24
I. Harris
MahLya‘nasutralamkara, S. Levi (ed), Paris, 1907 Prasannapadci, L. de la Vallee Poussin (ed.), Osnabriick, Sanlyuttanikaya Suttanipcita Theragcitha Vinaya Visuddhimagga, Bhikkhu Nyanamoli (trans.), Berkeley
1970
& London,
1976
The Assisi Declarations: Messages on Man and N’atature from Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism, cf. The Buddhist Declaration on Nature, pp. 3-7, Basilica di S. Francesco. Assisi, Italy, London, CVWF, 1986. Ibid., p. 5. Ibid., pp. 6-7. M. Palihawadana, ‘Buddhism and the scientific enterprise’, in R. L. Shinn (ed.), Faith andScience in an Unjust World, Vol. 1, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1980, p. 138. Lynn M’hite Jnr., ‘The historical roots of our ecological crisis’. Scienre 155: 3767 (Mar 1967), p. 1204. E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered, London, Abacus, 1974, cf. p, 49 where the author talks of the Buddhist attitude of reverence towards trees. J. Passmore, Man’s ResponsibilityforNature, 2nd edition, London, Duckworth, 1980. P. Singer, Practical Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979. M. Midgeley, ‘Duties Concerning Islands’, in R. Elliot and A. Gane (eds). Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of Readings, Milton Keynes. Open University Press, 1983, p. 175. K. Thomas, Man and the hTatural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1.50~1800. London, A. Lane, 1983. cf. C. Hartshorne, ‘Toward a Buddhistico-Christian religion’, in K. K. Inada and N. P. Jacobson (eds), Buddhism and American Thinkers, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1984, pp. 2-13. J. B. Cobb, Is it Too Late? A Theology of Ecolog, Beverley Hills, California. Bruce, 1972 and Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christian+ and Buddhism, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1982. J. Baird Callicott and R. T. iimes (eds), Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Eassays in Environmental Philosophy, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989. D. J. Kalupahana, ‘Toward a middle path of survival’, ibid., pp. 247-256. K. K. Inada, ‘Environmental problematics’, ibid., pp. 231-245. Quoted by I. G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, London, SCM. 1966. p. 441. Op. cit., p. 252. Quoted in Passmore, op. cit., p. 207. A. Naess, ‘The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement’, InquiT 16, p. 95. Ibid. L. de Silva, ‘Man and nature in a mutual causal relationship’, in S. J. Samartha and L. de Silva (eds), Man in N’ature: Guest or Engineer, Colombo, The Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue, 1979, p. 7. ERE, Vol. 9, Nature (Buddhist), pp. 209-210. Op. cit., p. 178. S.ii. 189-190. Also cf. the example ofAnandasiri in M. Carrithers, The Forest Monks ofSri Lanka, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 291,
How
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30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56
57 58 59 60 61
environmentalist
is Buddhism?
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Miln. 32. e.g. The snake that is prevented from obtaining ordination, Vin.i.87. Vin.i. 134-5 + Vin.i.320. The Buddha condemns the ruminating monk (Vin.ii. 132) and the canine ascetic (M.i.387-389). Vin.i. 193. V’in.ii.161. Sn.219. A.v.347-8 = M.i.220f. \‘in.iv.32-33 (Pacittiva X). Vin.iii.62-3. A fact noted by S. J. Tambiah, Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in N.E. Thailand, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 86-87. Also cf. Vin.iv.124 (PZcittiya LXI). e.g. M.i.60. Non-Buddhist texts (e.g. Baudhayana Dharmastitra 3.1.23) also treat ahimsa directed towards animals as a form of internal purification (anta@auca). D. S. Ruegg, ‘Ahimsa and vegetarianism in the history of Buddhism’, in S. Balasooriya et al. (eds), Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula, London, Gordon Fraser, 1980, pp. 234-241. A.iii.491. A.ii.208-9. M.i.368-371 sutta 55. A monk must neither see, hear. nor suspect that the animal was slaughtered for him. Vin.i.218ff. A similar, though not identical list is given in Asokan Pillar Edict V. Vin.i.219. \‘in.ii. 148-9. S. J, Tambiah, The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 90. F. L. Woodward (trans.), Manual of a Mystic, Being a Translation from the Pali and Sinhalese Work Entitled the Yogavachara’s Manual. London. Pali Text Society. 1916. Vism.ix. Vism.ix.S-4. Vism.ix.59f. \,.in.ii. 194f. Vin.iv.34. l’in.i.157. D.i.5. Vin.iii.156. Thag.307-310. Miln.266. This point is noted by L. Schmithausen, ‘Buddhismus und Natur’, in R. Panikkar and \v. Strolz (eds). Die Verantwortung des Menschen fu’r eine bewohnbare Welt in Christenturn, Hinduismus und Buddhismus, Freiburg, Base1 und Wien, Herder, 1985, cf. pp. 105f in particular. cf. M. Cone and R. Gombrich (trans.), The Perfect Generosity of Prince Vessantara. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 28. hI.i.378. Yin.ii.278. S.i.33. D.i.75.
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62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
74 75
I. Harris
J. Gonda, Loka: World and Heawn in the Ida, Amsterdam, Noord-Hollandschr Uitgevers, 1966, p. 150. Vism.ii.58, also cf. Thag.1133. Pras.246,13; 299,9f. M.iii.104-109, sutta 121 Lesser Discourse on Emptiness (Culasunnatasutta). S. Collins, Seljless Persons: Image?? and Thought in Theral’ada Buddhism, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1982. p. 218. D.iii.58. L. de la Vallte Poussin, ERE Vol. 4. Gsmogony and Cosmolou (Buddhist), 11. 130. MSA.iv. 15-20. Vism.vii.37. L. de la Vallie Poussin, ERE Vol. 1, Ages ofthe World (Buddhist), p. 188. Passmore, op. cit., p. 213. For Asanga it is secular knowledge (lokzyatika), though it must be said that he recognizes the need for the bodhisattua to possess such knowledge in order that the dharma may be propagated, cf. Bodhisattvabhimi ch. 8 & la Vallee Poussin. op. cit. R. Gombrich, Theravada Buddhism, London, Routledge. Kegan and Paul, 1988, pp. 174ff. K. N. Jayatilleke, ‘The Buddhist conception of the universe‘, in N. Smart ted.). The Message of the Buddha, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1975, pp. 90-103.
IAN HARRIS is a Senior Lecturer in Religious Studies at S. Martin’s College, Lancaster with teaching responsibilities in the field of Hindu and Buddhist thought. He was a student at the universities of Lancaster and Cambridge, holding a PhD from the former. Currently working on the relationship between Indian medicine and Buddhist thought, his first book The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara in Ear& Indian Buddhism is to be published shortly. Department
of Religious Studies, S. Martin’s
College, Lancaster LA I 3JD.