How institutions foster the informal side of the economy: Gold and platinum mining in Chocó, Colombia

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How institutions foster the informal side of the economy: Gold and �, Colombia platinum mining in Choco Juan Sebasti�an Lara-Rodríguez a, b, c, * a

Department of Science and Technology Policy, Institute of Geosciences, University of Campinas, S~ ao Paulo, Brazil Department of Administration and Accounting, National University of Colombia, Bogot� a D.C. Colombia c Development Studies, Lisbon School of Economics and Management, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal b

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Artisanal and small-scale mining Colombia Afro-descendants Choc� o Institutions Inefficiency Armed illegal groups

The mining formalization is a precondition for the sustainable development of the sector. This piece proposes a new qualitative method for mining and minerals policy assessment, based on novel institutional concepts and empirical gathering instruments, according to the stakeholders involving. To this end, we determine the selfreinforced rules that compose the formal and informal sides of the market economy and the explicit rules of the Colombian national mining formalization policy. Our evaluation, consulted officials of the centralized environmental and mining authorities through legal instruments, interviewed officials of the decentralized or­ ganizations, and interacted with who manage the land of the larger platinum extraction in Latin America, whose deposits are associated with gold, both alluvial. Our findings evidenced a rule of informality in the province of Choc� o, where armed illegal groups settle down underground-states toward illegal economic activities, and also where centralize and decentralize state organizations get rid of their responsibilities. Such picture allowed foreign illegal miners and provoked the widespread customs of informality. On the other hand, we found an exclusive mining formalization policy, with few strategies to push the formalization through capacity-building initiatives for the artisanal and small-scale miners, an embedded state inefficiency that originates explicit rules, which exclude the inhabitants with vulnerable livelihoods. We propose policy insights for the institutional change of the artisanal and small-scale mining in Choc� o, Colombia. Finally, future research should aim to study the environmental externalities of the informal economy in this biodiversity hotspot, and the effects of the possible pacification of the region.

1. Introduction The mining is an economic activity with notorious environmental, social and economic issues (Crowson, 2009). However, these extractive industries can boost economic growth and contribute to reducing poverty (Davis, 2009; Von Geyer, 2009). In Latin America (LA) the large-scale mining is key for such economies, for example, along with agriculture commodities, the minerals are the most exported products. However, the Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) is underestimated as a productive activity in the isolated and vulnerable regions, where is being performed in the informal economic side. According to

Rothenberg et al. (2016) this side, includes all economic activities conducted by firms that are not formally registered with the government and do not pay taxes. The size of the informal sector is inversely related to economic growth, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, tax revenues, and public goods provision. Particularly the mining industry of Colombia is the fifth world pro­ ducer of thermal coal and ninth of nickel (U.S. Geological Survey, 2015a; World Coal Association, 2014) the second and third more exported products, respectively, and the subsectors with higher foreign direct investment (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2013). From the subsoil, metals and non-metals are extracted contributing to 2.32% of

Abbreviations: LA, Latin America; ASM, Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining; MME, Ministry of Mines and Energy; UPM, Mining Production Unit; SGC, Colombia’s � Regional Autonomous Corporation Geological Survey; PGMs, Platinum Group Metals; MADS, Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development; CODECHOCO, for the Choc� o’s Sustainable Development; ANM, National Mining Agency; IIAP, Pacific Environmental Research Institute; SGR, Royalties General System; RUCOM, � The Afro Community Council of Condoto and Ir� Unique Record of Minerals Traders; COCOMACOIRO, o; UTCH, Choc� o Technological University; AREs, Special Reserves Areas; ELN, National Liberation Army; OPS, Service Order. * Rua do Quelhas 6, PO Box: 1200-781, Lisbon, Portugal. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2020.101582 Received 6 October 2017; Received in revised form 18 July 2019; Accepted 3 January 2020 0301-4207/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Juan Sebastián Lara-Rodríguez, Resources Policy, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2020.101582

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the GDP. Nevertheless, as Lara-Rodríguez et al. (2018) argue, within the main LA economies — Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chile — Colombia has the less developed mineral sector. According to the mining census made by the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2012a), Colombia has 14,357 Mining Production Units (UPM), of which 37 percent have a mining contract or could be considered as formal. Because of the rural underdevelopment, the ASM is the more promising, or sole livelihood for the poorest (Hilson, 2010, 2007; Hilson et al., 2017; Hilson and Maconachie, 2017; Verbrugge and Besmanos, 2016). Also, this mining has a high environmental cost, and the miners limited access to health and restricted safety (Hentschel et al., 2002). In Colombia, the MME aims to make, implement, lead and coordinate policies, plans and mining programmes for the nation, indeed, has implemented decisions to encourage the mineral sector, and trigger its formalization. For instance, the Resolucio�n1 180102 of 2012 (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2012b) based on a study of the Colombia’s Geological Survey (SGC) determined the following strategic minerals: gold, platinum group metals (PGMs), copper, iron, coltan (i.e., tantalum and niobium), potassium phosphate, magnesium, uranium, and metal­ lurgical coal. Nevertheless, these strategic minerals are embedded in particular economic, social and environmental backgrounds. On the one hand, for the thermal and metallurgical coal, copper and nickel mining, the presence of the state is noticeable. Enforcing the monopoly of the use of force and taxation, property rights, and offering public goods and services. Which create the thresholds for mineral feasibility, on the other hand, the state presence is weaker in the regions where the PGMs, col­ tan, tungsten, gold and light rare earth elements are extracted, like in the �. provinces2 of Guavire, Vaup�es, Vichada, Guainía and Choco The extraction of PGMs is remarkable because the main active re­ serves in Latin America and the Caribbean are located in the province of �, Colombia. The platinum production was around 40,000 ounces Choco or equivalent to 0.8% of the world’s primary metal output in 2014 (Agencia Nacional de Minería, 2014; World Platinum Investment � reached the level Council, 2015). Moreover, the gold extracted in Choco �n Minero Colombiano, of 11,318 kg that year (Sistema de Informacio 2019). In the province, the extraction of these two metals is essentially �, mining is the core economic alluvial (PNUMA, 2012). Indeed, in Choco activity. In fact, the Pt and Au production amounts US$ 562.186 million at market prices in 2014 according to the USGS (2015b, p. 66; 120), while the province GDP in 2015 was US$ 1.4 billion 3 (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, 2015, 2005) indicating that � income comes from mining. approximately 40 percent of the Choco Further, the mineral dependency, the spread of the informal economy is indisputable, only four out of 527 UPM had a contract and environ­ mental permit (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2012a). The Colombian government restructured the sector in 2012, forming the Vice-ministry of Mines from which stem the directorates of Entre­ preneurial Mining and Mining Formalization. The last aimed to push the formalization of the artisanal and small-scale miners, in a framework of social and environmental responsibility. The MME through the Reso­ lucio�n 90719 (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2014) adopted the national mining formalization policy. This policy defines, what are the requisites that should be accomplished to be a formal miner, to achieve technical and environmental mining requirements, and to meet, financial, taxa­ tion, social and labour exigencies. Scholars in diverse contexts and from different approaches have

studied the ASM formalization dilemmas. Hilson (2007) pointed out how the international support programmes for the ASM in Africa have meagre results, from the notion of the absence of knowledge about the livelihoods of the miners by the donors. Then ASM in the sub-Sahara Africa has been examined in depth (see Hilson, 2009). For example, in the case of Ghana, Hilson (2010) studied the Akwatia’s diamonds, or Teschner (2012) analysed the gold mining in the surrounding area of the town of Tarkwa. These works elucidate concerns toward the market of these resources and the informal economy. From another view, Ver­ brugge (2015a) using the historical institutionalism, explains ambigu­ ities around the centralization or decentralization of the ASM, and gold mining governance in Mindanao Philippines. In the south of the same nation, Verbrugge (2015b) states that the legalistic focus on regulatory barriers and political impediments prevent or discourage the formal­ ization of poverty-driven ASM. In Colombia, Lara-Rodríguez et al. (2017) developed a demonstrative programme proposing the economic formalization as pre-requisite for the sustainable development of the sector, however, this study does not take into account Colombia’s Pacific region. Returning to Choc� o, Tubb (2015) describes the main reasons that stimulate the traditional miners to invite outsiders who use heavy ma­ chinery and mercury, to work their mines. Additionally, this biodiversity hotspot is threatened due to the massive use of mercury in mining, the inefficiency of the state organizations and stakeholders engaged (Lar­ a-Rodríguez, 2018), and multidimentional issues as Lara-Rodríguez et al. (2020) posit. Moreover, the ASM sector continues been analysed by research carried out in a repetitive manner with therefore a limited utility (Hilson, 2006). In this body of literature, has not been identified research towards the ASM formalization policy assessment. Or how the public agents enforce the explicit rules in this region. The aim of this article is to examine in a qualitative approach the institutions involved �, Colombia. The in the national mining formalization policy in Choco structure of this piece is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of SD, introduces the concept of institutions and depicts the traits of the formal and informal sides of the economy and its links with the ASM, also de­ scribes the explicit rules of the national mining formalization policy. Section 3 portrays the qualitative assessment method, its three phases, fieldwork and data gathering instruments applied in the stakeholders. Section 4 begins to put forward the results across the actor’s voices, �, particularly related to defining the rule of law in the province of Choco non-renewable resources and behaviour of the mining and minerals institutions. Section 5, explains the national mining formalization policy �, the empirical assessments recreate the min­ implementation in Choco eral and mining policy gaps, and the agent’s behaviour into the social system. We end concluding our argument and emphasizing policy in­ sights for the institutional change in section 6. 2. The role of institutions in sustainable mining 2.1. Toward a suitable concept of institutions “Institutions are social rule-systems, not simply rules” (Hodgson, 2006, p. 13). North (1990) defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society, or, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence, they structure incentives in human ex­ change, whether political, social, or economic. As a result, the behaviour and think of the individuals to live in society is strongly influenced by the explicit rules or written, and the tacit rules known as being trans­ mitted by human contact. Indeed, we consider the market economy an institution, developed to the social allocation of resources, goods and services. However, the market fails to allocate natural and environ­ mental resources. Morey (2016) identified six categories of market �, (1) the common failures, but we stressing in two for the case of Choco property: the market or its lack put the price zero for these resources; (2) externalities: the actions of one economic agent directly affects one or more other economic agents without passing through market. The negative externalities explain the social and environmental cost of the

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It is a directive from the government of Colombia. We shall refer province as Departamento, which is a Colombian adminis­ trative region equivalent to a state. 3 The figure is obtained from Choc� o’s demographic projection (500,093 in­ habitants in 2015) multiplied by the provinces’ GDP per capita (US$ 2799). The exchange rate used is 2102 COP (Peso Colombiano) ¼ one US$ according to the historical series 2012–2015 of the Colombian Central Bank Banco de la República (2016). 2

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mineral economic activity that is not internalized by fine, tax or mandate. For Coase (1960), the economic problem in all the cases of externalities or prejudicial effects is how to maximize the value of pro­ duction, particularly to the factor of production, stated: “the land-owner, in fact, possesses the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions” (p. 49) that is to say the property rights. Externalities arise when the property rights are not well defined, in other words, if the property rights are well-defined and well-enforced, perhaps the market will allocate efficiently resources. Then, market failures as common property resources have a link with negative externalities. The role of the state is to define and enforce the property rights searching an effi­ cient resources allocation and intends to reduce the social and envi­ ronmental negative externalities. Furthermore, the mining environmental and social cost can be mitigated through regulation or internalized by taxes (Waye et al., 2009). The nature of the rules and its enforcement has a confusing dichotomy. According to North (1990) it is represented by (1) Informal constraints: norms of behaviour in our daily interaction with others, within the family, in external social relations, or in business activities, codes of conduct, and conventions, and (2) Formal constraints: political (judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts. Firstly, peers or whether who will impose a cost enforces these behav­ iours. Secondly, the courts and state’s organizations enforce these rules. In such institutional concepts, Hodgson and North (Hodgson, 2006, pp. 19–21) created the distinction between legal and nonlegal, or distinction between explicit and tacit rules/constraints, the ‘formal’ institutions (in any of the above sense) always depend on nonlegal rules and inexplicit norms in order to operate. Therefore, if ‘formal’ means ‘legal’, then this is unclear when ‘informal’ means illegal or nonlegal — not expressed in explicit rules. In our view, the market economy is an institution with two sides. The informal side — also referred as shadow economy — as Baksi and Bose (2016, p. 167) straightforward, has a central trait that it is not regulated, or is in violation of legal requirements that society imposes on the formal side of the economy. These scholars find whether the informal sector acts as a source of leakage or not, depend jointly in the stringency of the regulation and the effectiveness of its enforcement. In this light, we propose to make the distinction between formal/informal, one of explicit rules and other or tacit rules, respectively. That is to say, the formal rules are equivalent to explicit written rules, and the informal rules are equivalent to tacit or non-written rules. Fig. 1 portrays the traits of rules that mainly constrain human behaviour in the two sides of the market economy.

Fig. 1. The market economy, its sides, and rules.

2.3. The explicit rules against informal mining in Colombia In our understanding, the institutions are social systems of explicit and tacit rules. Therefore, the empirical assessment proposed firstly requires to identify the explicit rules of the national mining formaliza­ tion policy, and thereby, its actors. Law 685 of 2001 (Congreso de Colombia, 2001) — Mining Act — regulates the mining sector. In Colombia, the state is the non-renewable natural resources owner, and the private sector is in charge of studies, works, and constructions for the minerals exploration. The contractual arrangement has two stages: (1) the contract award varying since eight up to 14 procedures; (2) the audit with seven procedures, executed by mining and environmental author­ ities through mandates and fines. �, three extractive techniques For the Au and Pt exploitation in Choco are usually used: (1) The artisanal called Barequeo consists in traditional handy tools, sieving the sediment in a wooden tray; this technique is legal according to the Articles 155 and 158 of Law 685. (2) The semimechanized, based on the material detachment with motor pumps, or little dredgers called Dragones that absorb and classify the material from the riverbed. (3) The mechanized, use heavy machinery like backhoes, �n Minero trucks, hoppers, gutters, and have a camp (Unidad de Planeacio Energ�etica, 2005, p. 151). Therefore, the second and the third require a mining contract and environmental permit to be formal. Explicitly the environmental and mining authorities enforce the mining contract and implement the mining formalization policy. The Ministry of Environ­ ment and Sustainable Development (MADS) was restructured via decree 3570 (Decreto 3570 del 27 de septiembre de 2011) (see Departamento �n Pública, 2011) with the aim to be the Administrativo de la Funcio national guiding organization for the environmental and non-renewable resources management. Simultaneously, the Regional Autonomous � is �’s Sustainable Development (CODECHOCO) Corporation for the Choco the decentralized environmental authority in the province. Fig. 2a shows the MADS and the de- and centralized organizations implicated in the implementation. Also, the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) via the executive action decree 0381 (Decreto 0381 de 2012) (see Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2012c) was reorganized, and the National Mining Agency (ANM) was created as the attached organization of the MME, which aim is the integral management of the mineral resources in cooperation with the SD authorities. In fact, the ANM Par-Quibd� o is the � region depicted decentralized mining authority operating in the Choco in Fig. 2b. The Pacific Environmental Research Institute (IIAP), is the main science and technology organization related environmental concerns in the province, and Colombia’s Pacific region — four provinces or 83,000 �Km2. The IIAP develops information and knowledge regarding Choco

2.2. Sustainable development and resources Population wealth in non-renewable natural resources based econ­ omies and its Sustainable Development (SD) is widely studied. Concepts as: The paradox of plenty (Karl, 1997); the resources course hypotheses (Auty, 2007, 2003) and its opposed the resources blessing (Ploeg, 2011); even the Hartwick Rule (Hartwick, 1977), in sum demonstrate how the decision-making processes translated into rules are key to transform the natural wealth in inter/intra-generational welfare. Which underpins human-behaviours so as to “ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 19). Albeit, scholars examine and propose frameworks for the SD in the mining and mineral industry (Azapagic, 2004; Clifford et al., 2018; Hilson, 2000; Hilson and Murck, 2000) and for specifically the SD of the ASM (see Baah-Ennumh and Ato Forson, 2017; Dreschler, 2001; Zvarivadza, 2018; Zvarivadza and Nhleko, 2018). In this sense, “the SD recommends a holistic framework, in which society aims for economic, social, and environmental goals” (Sachs, 2015, p. 3). In accordance with Gallopín (2003), perhaps it is better than each region builds sustainable development regarding its own interests and particular situations. Therefore, this piece argues that the institutions determine the SD for the �, Colombia. ASM sector in Choco 3

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Fig. 2. Main state organizations involved in the formalization of the ASM in Choc� o. Source: Based on Departamento Administrativo de la Funci� on Pública (2011) & Ministerio de Minas y Energía (2012b).

Dari� en biodiversity hotspot, cementing the decision-making for envi­ ronmental policies at national, regional and local levels. Besides, the SGC aims to make basic and applied sciences of subsoil resources and other functions according to decree 4137 (Decreto 4137 of 2013) (Min­ isterio de Minas y Energía, 2011). Moreover, these organizations have as principal financial source the Royalties General System (SGR). This system was restructured via legislative act 05 July of 2011 (Congreso de Colombia, 2011), which determined that 2% of the mineral royalties would be designated for audit, explore and exploitation of mineral de­ posits, also, the subsoil’s knowledge and cartography. Furthermore, decree 2637 (Decreto 2637 of 2012) (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2012d) controls Colombia’s mineral market through the Unique Record of Minerals Traders (RUCOM). The holder of the mining contract with all the environmental permits and the mineral traders have the duty to be registered on it. � is the population. In the A prominent agent of the ASM in Choco province, mainly African and Indigenous descendants compose the so­ ciety, and the organizations of these ethnic groups are linked with the distribution of land. Indeed, the province has 119 Indigenous Reserves (Resguardos Indigenas4) and 57 titles of Black Grassroots Lands (Tierras de Comunidades Negras5) which constitute predominantly Colombia’s Pa­ cific (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, 2010, pp. 32–33). The Rivers San Juan and Atrato are those with larger gold de­ posits, the municipality of Condoto and its river represent the larger presence of PGMs associated with Au. In Condoto, the Afro Community � manage the land. The � (COCOMACOIRO) Council of Condoto and Iro state is the subsoil-owner, furthermore, the indigenous councils and the afro community councils govern the collective property of land; the legal framework of the “Law 70 of 1993” (Congreso de Colombia, 1993a) ensures that rights for the territories of Colombia’s Pacific Basin.

Simultaneously, the political constitution in its Article 58 (see República de Colombia, 1991) guarantee the private property and the other rights acquired in accordance to civil rules; in addition, the state will protect and promote the different shapes of associative and united property. The national mining formalization policy has as a strategy to encourage the miners’ knowledge to increase their productivity. In fact, higher education organizations and the Directorate of mining formal­ ization are the actors who carry out means and actions. In the province, the Choc� o Technological University (UTCH) is the only organization of tertiary education that offers the two sole courses related with mining: (1) Technologist6 in mining and environmental management; and (2) Technician in sustainable mining. Moreover, the courses are recent, and there is an absence of undergraduate and graduate courses related to mining engineering, geological engineering, or geoscience in the region. 3. Method The data-gathering instruments were various and applied in three phases. Firstly, according to the explicit rules identified, we consulted officials of the centralized and semi-centralized state organizations (i.e., ministers, heads, and agency directors) by constitutional instruments. The main participative instrument was the petition right (derecho de petici� on), which according to the Article 23 of Colombia’s political constitution (see República de Colombia, 1991) is the right that every person have for submit questions to the authorities by purposes of public or particular interests, and obtain prompt answers. In fact, we submitted four petition rights. Two for the centralized authorities MADS and MME (see Lara-Rodríguez, 2017, pp. 177–180; pp. 187–190) and for the semi-decentralized ANM and SGC (see Lara-Rodríguez, 2017, pp. 184–186; pp. 191–193). All these state organizations are located in the city of Bogot� a, D.C., the capital of Colombia. The second phase consisted in the direct consultation with officials of � and ANM Par-Quibdo �, the decentralized organizations CODECHOCO simultaneously to the semi-centralized organization IIAP. Through indepth-interviews the authorities of these organizations were consulted

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Public lands occupied by one or multiple indigenous communities legally delimited. Such land, is communally used for the ethnic group, manage by traditional indigenous authorities, and governed by the Indigenous Councils [Cabildos Indigenas] (Presidencia de la República de Colombia, 1995). 5 Following “Law 70 of 1993” (Congreso de Colombia, 1993a) is the land or public lands award to the afrodescendant communities, which are used for traditional productive practices, administered by the Afro Community Council [Consejo Comunitario de Comunidades Negras].

6 The programmes ‘Technologist and Technician’ are a sort of vocational courses.

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4.1. A mineral euphoria

about the explicit rules enforcement, actions, intern cooperation, with centralized organizations, and others state actors (e.g., mayors, control agencies, security forces, universities, firms, etc.). Besides that, at the UTCH we interviewed a professor by each one of the two vocational education courses previously mentioned, to know his experiences regarding the formalization programmes, law enforcement, and how is the academia’s role in the ASM dilemma in the province. Finally, we � consulted a leader of the Afro Community Council of Condoto and Iro � as a final agent of the mining and mineral policy. To (COCOMACOIRO) achieve the two phases, the fieldwork was undertaken for three months in Colombia. In Bogot� a D.C., during December 2015 and January 2016 we delivered the Petition Rights (PR) in the offices of the centralized organizations, likewise, we identified by the suggestion of practitioners and phone calls the contact with the officials, professors, and activist �. Subsequently, during February disposed of, in the province of Choco � the capital of the Choco � (Western-Colombia some 20 h 2016 in Quibdo � or 1 h by flight), we carried out the in-depthoverland from Bogota � ANM Par-Quibdo �, IIAP interviews with the officials of CODECHOCO, and two professors at the UTCH (see Lara-Rodríguez, 2017, pp. 216–220; pp. 198–205; pp. 221–236; pp. 237–246; pp. 247–257). Thereby, in the municipality of Condoto (6 h by land south of Quibd� o) over the same month, we had the interview with the general secretary of � (see Lara-Rodríguez, 2017, pp. 206–215). the COCOMACOIRO The third phase was the information analysis, comparing the answers of the centralized, semi-centralized and decentralized organizations, about the enforcement of the rules. Including the participative obser­ vation of the social, environmental and economic dynamics. We address the empirical assessment findings in a narrative form because in this case, quantitative indicators do not necessarily represent the agents’ behaviour in the social systems of explicit and tacit rules.

� with the In 2006 the MME declared an AREs for the COCOMACOIRO, firm Aluviones de Colombia S.A. as responsible of the Au and PGMs exploration and extraction. Nevertheless, in 2009 the firm ceased op­ erations for breach explicit environmental rules. The general secretary � interviewee argues: “at the moment we have had no of COCOMACOIRO success in the exploration, the public order in the areas is ‘complicated’.” When the activist says public order, this means the presence of armed illegal groups in the region. Therefore, the property rights whether state or communitarians are delegitimized. This weak property rights enforcement, allow illegal mining and multidimensional externalities. � due to the proliferation of Indeed, based on stories of COCOMACOIRO, mechanized and semi-mechanized technologies, transferred from Bajo Cauca’s region northern Antioquia, during 2008–2014 Condoto lived a gold and platinum ‘mineral euphoria’ totally illegal. With the prolifer­ ation of backhoes used in 170 excavations and the mineral plenty, the traditional or tacit rules of property land were forgotten. The mineral euphoria spurred negative social externalities, as the presence of armed illegal groups, sexual exploitation, and teenage pregnancy of immi­ grants stemming from the Caribbean and Antioquia. The chaos persisted up to the alluvial reserves begin their exhaustion. This episode origi­ nated with the state organizations inefficiency that did not enforce explicit rules. Regarding illegal mining implicated with criminal and predatory mining, the official of the ANM Par-Quibd� o interviewee mentions: “the aim of the agency is to control, audit, and manage the state’s mineral resources. We do not control the illegal mining, as such, � or the we are not responsible to close an illegal mine. CODECHOCO mayor of the municipality are the main authorities.” The response of the official of the decentralized organization do not match with the centralized, who explains: “the duty of the agency is to provide infor­ mation for the qualified authorities about mining operations without contract, identified during the audit of the formal contracts” (Agencia � Nacional de Minería, 2016, p. 3). The response of the ANM Par-Quibdo agree with the environmental authority, and the official of � explains: “about the mining of insurgency or criminal CODECHOCO gangs, I do not have, no I don’t know! I know that exists formal and informal mining, illegal and legal, but criminal mining carried out by insurgents, I don’t have a report about it.” When this decentralized environmental authority finds an illegal mine — something that sporadically occurs — he states: “we make the visit, in the case the equipment is confiscated or destroyed, and we impose a sanction for the Afro Community Council or the person who is in there.” Indeed, in this process emerge the weak cooperation and coordination between the state organizations than enforce the explicit rules, also a limited communication among these centralized and decentralized organiza­ tions appears.

� 4. The rule of informality in Choco The mining in the province of Choc� o remains informal, due to the meagre enforcement of the Mining Act. In front of this, the ANM (2016, p. 2) answered the execution of a strategy to enforce the mining law in � through the use of the Special Reserves Areas (AREs) form, Choco established in the Article 31 of the Mining Act processing seven AREs applications for the province. The aim is to carry out geological and mining studies, and develop strategic mining projects. According to the explicit rule these studies cannot take more than two years. However, as �, no specific the SGC mentioned, “currently in the province of Choco recognition, prospection, and exploration programmes for the PGMs are �gico Colombiano, 2016, p. 2). For being implemented” (Servicio Geolo instance, in 2015 this attached organization of the MME scheduled a multipurpose geochemical sampling and responded that they are inca­ pable to perform it, due to the denied access in this area by the com­ munities. Another exploration task is the magnetometry and gamma-spectrometry data acquisition programme, which is covering a tiny area of the province. This happened because the aircraft that was executing the information gathering, received shots by a firearm, orig­ inating the programme suspension. Additionally, the SGC does not � and has suspended the pro­ execute subsoil cartography in Choco gramme, which was invested around US$ 1.15 million from the SGR. In front of this, the SGC is indifferent. While explaining the criminal fact that stopped the information-gathering programme, they do not make any mention of cooperation between the state organizations devoted to maintaining the state monopoly on violence, i.e., the armed forces or the national defence ministry. After the criminal fact against the public goods and the crew, the SGC does not mention whether someone was processed, or if an investigation initiated. The contract suspension does not alarm the contractors, concomitant to the disbelief in the justice and armed forces in charge to provide security in the province, and, the uncertain accomplishment of the public contracts. Then, the tacit rules are more enforced than the explicit ones, by the state organizations.

4.2. A semblance of the armed illegal groups The law enforcement processes, cannot be appropriate considering a � claim extracted from a conversation between the ANM Par-Quibdo official and a miner, the last said: “But Sir, I am working and the armed forces arrive and burn my machine [backhoe], I have a family, we have to move to the monte7! We must move onto the monte! Because what more we can do?” Therefore, the authorities’ coercive behaviour can reproduce violence and illegality. In turn, the state attempts to organize the miners are unnoticeable, rejecting the enforcement of the explicit rules through incentives towards the artisanal and small scale-miners’ productivity. Because such strategies are not well included in the explicit rules, and as we shall see, the state organizations do not have the 7 When the miner indicates monte (hinterland in Spanish) that is mean, join armed illegal groups that settle down in the highlands or deep tropical forests with difficult access.

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capabilities to assimilate and spread such information. Mining and environmental authorities engage few actions for pre­ cluding the illegal mining. This concealment could have several reasons. The short time of the mining authority in the region, which was set through the miners’ strike of 2013 — ending the mineral euphoria — �’s miners federation, the Indigenous Councils, which grouped the Choco and the Afro Communities Councils; the intense protest of nine days results in agreements with the government. For instance, the MME � creation. Indeed, the learning processes for defined the ANM par-Quibdo this organization can be considerate as premature. On the other side, the intimidation or fear experienced by the organization provoked from the power of the armed illegal groups. Similarly, the limited interaction with the actors that should provide security and the small number of officials or staff are restraining factors. The official interviewee in the semicentralized IIAP exposes another viewpoint that fortifies the rule of informality: “No, no, the rule of law? It is weak! So weak! The few law enforcement actions are emblematic and unstable, one action up to the half of the year. But, the national media reports in favour of the order forces: we captured! We confiscated! and we developed such operative! … Being so easy to detect illegal operations! In the case of the guerrilla groups, I understand that they have some rules, demanding some envi­ ronmental mining items. This happens, here in the middle Atrato, Negu� a, Ribar� a and Bebar� an, the inhabitants said, that the guerrilla re­ quires the miners’ compromise with measures, the guerrilla requires the mineral rents investments in social affairs, sure!” That is mean, the armed illegal groups settle down ‘undergroundstates’ where the monopoly of the use of force and taxes belongs to them organizing the informal side, seemingly to build some public services and goods, e.g., security, education and infrastructure. Such areas privilege behaviours do not self-reinforce8 the explicit rules of the state. In other words, in these populations, the tacit rules push the interaction and constraints the inhabitant’s behaviour. � improve the notion of tacit rules self-reinforcing. As COCOMACOIRO the organization, that manage the main Pt deposits in Colombia through its secretary explained: “The state and the government till now say that this is criminal mining? The, I don’t know mining? Sure, when the government perceives that the armed illegal groups (whatever it is leftists or rightists) are using the mining, as the coca bush cultivation or the vacuna.9 The problem is with the money! However, is easy to pur­ chase a mine and hire a figurehead to manage. And the government knows!” The absence of state organizations for the enforcement of the explicit rule, foster the reproduction of non-legal organizations or armed illegal groups, which are capable to develop irregular forms to money laundering10, that is to say, enter money of the other underground economic activities11 in the formal side. Herein the dilemma is whether

�, in fact, exists as the MME said, or if are the minerals extracted in Choco only accounting records of the figureheads of the armed illegal groups. Moreover, perhaps the mining is the sector with more washed capitals, due to the provinces’ mineral economic dependency, and the easy trade of precious metals. 4.3. The Brazilian dragones The informality boosts the presence of foreign illegal miners. The � warned: “I know that there are Brazilians official of CODECHOCO working with dredgers [Dragones], yes I know, I know them, but they do not have a permit here! They do not have a mining license … most of them are in Quito River.” A professor of mines at the UTCH pointed about the Brazilians illegal miners: “these dragones at Quito River are monsters, I come from there two or three mounts ago and I was terrified what they are doing, is disrespect for the nature. These dragones are for some Brazilians!” Some conjectures of law enforcement are identified. For instance, in June 2016 the National Police made an action widely broadcasted by a national circulation newspaper. El Tiempo (2016), address in the news report that the Brazilian citizen Jos� e Antonio Cav­ alcante is the creator of the called Brazilian dragones, he had been captured in 2014 but was acquitted. In light of the new arrest, the report mentioned that he should be processed for the crimes: criminal con­ spiracy, environmental pollution, natural resources damage, and bor­ ders violation. This head of the illegal mining organization maintained associations with armed illegal groups as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and Emergent Criminal Bands12 (BACRIM) through the vacunas payments. In fact, during this operation, the police fought with rebels of the Frente Cimarr� on of the ELN, who protected the dragones. Following the news report of this isolated and selective explicit rules enforcement, is the Cavalcante’s capture “along with other seven persons and Jos�e Aroundo Sousa, who was in charge to move the mercury used in the illegal mining and ends poisoning rivers and forests” (El Tiempo, 2016). This newspaper informs a tendentious perspective accusing Jos�e Aroundo of the mercury usage in mining. At the same time, the report does not make mention if other state organizations participated in law enforcement. Thus, for this media the enforcement of the explicit rules is a police action, resulting in the punishment of irremediable damages. Inasmuch as the environmental damages shall be, remediate by the time and the nature, and not by the state organizations. 4.4. National governments’ disdain for the formalization Other notion for the rule of informality, are explicit rules engendered by national governments that do not foster the inclusion of the artisanal and small-scale miners. Then the framework does not make a differen­ tiation of the miners with impoverished livelihoods. As the interviewee defends, this perception is a deep-rooted custom for the � “the ministry [MME] has put the mining in a general COCOMACOIRO: frame, and leave all the people, the small, medium and large-scale as one single miner, saying, who has more economic power! Thus, we are not able to make responsible and legal mining.” This deficit of adequate explicit or inclusive rules fosters the illegality, the fences imposed does not promote a market that compensates the entrepreneurship, because the competition with the illegal miners will be unbalanced in costs. Contingently, the Afro Community Council have the habit of ignoring the state capacity in Condoto. For example, “the mining in Colombia has been the support of the people that the state has ignored, thus, the people have been educated by mining.” In this sense, the � discussed with the Colombian president in office COCOMACOIRO [2002–2010] Alvaro Uribe-V� elez the mineral euphoria issues.

8 If agents have compatible preferences and strategies in this sense, then coordination rules can often emerge spontaneously and be self-reinforcing (Hodgson, 2006, p. 14). 9 Vacuna (vaccine in Spanish). This term is used as analogy, of the possible mortal effects for the economic agents that perhaps not pay extortions to these illegal armed groups, or street crime in these underground-states. 10 See Tubb (2014, Chapters 8 & 9) Small-Scale Gold Mining and Money Laundering & Large-Scale Gold Mining and Money Laundering. 11 Underground economic activities include illegal logging, trafficking in weapons and wildlife, cannabis cultivation, and extortion. The dominant ac­ tivity, however, is cocaine production which reaches astonishing levels and generates other negative externalities. During 2014, seizures in Choc� o included 6315 kg of coca leaf, 2606 kg of coca base, and 3125 kg of cocaine hydro­ chloride (UNDOC, 2015, p. 92, 94). In the same year, deforestation caused by illegal coca bush cultivation in Choc� o was approximately 1741 ha (UNDOC, 2015, p. 31). The Colombian government responds by aerial spraying with the herbicide glyphosate: during 2014, 7460 ha were sprayed in Choc� o (UNODC, 2016a, p. 81). Another — environmental — externality is the loss of vegetation cover by the exploitation of alluvial gold. In the province of Choc� o, this reached 36,185 ha in 2014 (UNODC, 2016b, p. 13).

12 Drug traffickers and criminal bands: Disturbing agents of the public order, which appeared after the demobilization of 31,000 members of paramilitaries groups, between 2003 and 2006 (Prieto, 2012, p. 181).

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Nevertheless, that government did not take any action. A background of this community that reinforces the habit to ignore the state capacity is the citation of a speech made by the former �pez Nichelsen [1974–1978] “But rebúsquense,13 Colombian President Lo rebúsquense, because the state and the government cannot fix every­ thing, but rebúsquense!” Based on the behaviour of the rulers, the informal side became the only area where this population can set its production systems. In other words, the illegality is a habit or tacit rule of thought and action. This holds the argument to one state with in­ stitutions that foster the illegality in the poor regions. The self-reinforcement of tacit rules by the state organizations, make it them inefficient. The General Contracting Statute of Public Adminis­ tration “Ley 80 de 1993” (Congreso de Colombia, 1993b) encourage in the Article 32 the contract of officials to perform public administrative tasks, without establishing an employment relationship or health and social care payments. This scheme known as Service Order (OPS) has spread in all public organizations and intensified in the decentralized without exception for the environmental and mining authorities in Choc� o. Most of the officials of the ANM par-Quibd� o are contracted in OPS, with only one mining engineer; the other officials are qualified in administrative and law topics. Moreover, during the fieldwork, the head of this agency was not hired, waiting for his designation from Bogot� a. Concerning the environmental supervision, the official interviewed pointed out: “There are two environmental engineers, one chemistry, and contractors for audit we have six.” Then, the inspectors are equal to the number of mining permits in the province, albeit insufficient, � manage the natural renewable resources of the because, CODECHOCO biodiversity hotspot, and aims to enforce the explicit environmental rules into a market dominated by the informal side. The OPS itself, self-reinforced tacit rules within the state organiza­ tions. The absence of tailored full-time officials generates high staff turnover, therefore, volatile learning processes and low cooperation. The contractors are recruited by ‘external social relations’ with the few full-time officials, who maintain political nexus — business — with politicians, linked with patronage circles in the retribution of electoral favours. In this sense, the tacit rules are self-reinforced. In addition, the OPS contract boosts identity theft. That is to say, a third person executes the contract, and the contractor charges a sort of commission, for have lent his name — this is a custom. The staff contracted by the OPS ac­ cording to Law 80, can execute simultaneously other ones, indeed, the work or organization involvement is precarious. At the same time, as we shall see, the third party that enforces public contracts have the same inefficiency.

inter-administrative contract between the MME and IIAP implement the programme under OPSs. However, the uncertainty of the state’s financing discourage these actions, emerging symptoms of ‘instability’. As the official of the IIAP explained: “we will see if the ANM and the MME provide the resources to take the process with the required seriousness.” About the contract GGC 072, the latest official mentioned “on it, we collected information, gathered a lot of information to conclude that the region of San Juan and here in the Atrato, are susceptible of mining formalization”, which cemented the AREs processes. Therefore, the process has been focussed to induce some miners to self-reinforce the explicit rules framework, which can be an advance to enter in the called by the MME formalization programme. “The programme is targeted to those miners in the category of regularized, that means, those miners that develop their activities in a mining contract … and have the envi­ ronmental permit or it is in procedure” (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2016, p. 4). Nevertheless, this approach is exclusive, because not pro­ vide organizational infrastructure for the informal miners, encouraging their productivity with capacity-building. Another factor is the pro­ grammes’ inappropriateness in front of the land property features and miners’ livelihoods. Then, the success of these programmes depends on their approval by the inefficient state organizations. The bottleneck is narrow, because of � official argued: the lack of cooperation in the audit. As the CODECHOCO “No, we make the audit ourselves, alone! We do not search for the mining contract. Ok? We are interested in environmental procedures!” �, the official said: Inquiring about the relation with the ANM Par-Quibdo “If they invite us we will work together, but we do not, not!” The cooperation is degraded between the two authorities, based on the getting rid of responsibilities; for instance, with regard to the mining formalization requirements, the environmental organization explains: “for the platinum and gold mining? The mining contract award! The mining contract award! The ANM takes long-time to resolve the � around the contracts audit request.” On his behalf, the ANM Par-Quibdo argued: “legally we are making three or four visits per year at the con­ � The tract if we see inconsistencies the file is sent to the CODECHOCO.” mining authority attempts some cooperation in the audit, nonetheless, dismissing the environmental organization. For example, the agency’s official commented: “we ask for the presence of the police, the mayor, third party organizations, and we notify the miners about our visit in advance.” Around the request, the process of mining contract award can � re­ be tricky due to centralized procedures, once the ANM Par-Quibdo ceives the request to begin the formalization, this documents should be � D.C. for its approval. Because of the state organiza­ analysed in Bogota tions inefficiency, in many times the documents have to be filled again. Furthermore, the policy does not make any regional differentiation or definition of critical formalization provinces.

5. An exclusive mining formalization policy Colombia’s mining formalization policy ‘resolucio�n 90719’ (Minis­ terio de Minas y Energía, 2014) attempts to be transversal, and engage � has had a meagre the stakeholders. That policy in the province of Choco implementation. As the MME explained: “Up to now the agreements that have been made in this province are with the IIAP, implementing characterization programmes” (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2016, p. 3). These actions are executed in the inter-administrative contract [GGC 072], in the called ‘formalization actions to identify UPM’: in 2013 were identified 93, in 2014 20, and in 2015 27. The amount is limited if considering that 527 UPM worked without a license in 2012, during the mineral euphoria. Additionally, the staff that executes the

5.1. An overlooked capacity-building The capacity-building programmes for the ASM are imperceptible. The MME denotes that in the Itsmina Mining District14 qualification programmes for Barequeros were made, without describing their con­ tents. Also, indicated technical support for construction minerals (i.e., sands, gravels, clays, etc.) (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2016, p. 5). 14 The Ministerio de Minas y Energía (2005) characterized some mining dis­ tricts by three criteria: (1) The mineral and its production. (2) The mining concentration. (3) The mining tradition. According the MME (see Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2008) in these mining districts actors as: miners, private en­ trepreneurs, institutions, social organizations, science and technology organi­ zations, and state organizations find each other. In the province of Choc� o was created the 20 mining district Itsmina, where the mining activities of the mu­ nicipalities of Bagad� o, Condoto, Itsmina, Sipí and Tad� o are concentrated (Unidad de Planeaci� on Minero Energ�etica, 2004).

13 In Colombia, the term ‘rebusque’ refers to the execution of informal or illegal economic activities of easy entrance, performed by persons with low or even high qualification, that cannot access to the formal side. Therefore, these per­ sons dedicate themselves to casual or stationary jobs, which guarantee liveli­ hoods avoiding health and social care payments. Simultaneously, the state execute weak actions to induce this population for the formal side. This is more intense in the countryside.

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Materials that are not the aim of the mining district creation, or suitable as to, strategic minerals policy. In contrast, the Mining District pushed the informality and confrontation between armed illegal groups. � did Thereby, such mining district policy in the case of Itsmina and Choco not prevent the mineral euphoria and contingent externalities. Besides that, the state does not pursue the economic contributions of the ASM in � and its capacity-building via technical support. For instance, a Choco UTCH professor pointed out: “nowadays the miners’ technical support is unnoticed. Before with the famous ‘Regional Miners’ the support �, Bucaramanga, happened, these existed upon a time, here in Quibdo Medellín and Cali, but, the government took it off, and mounted this called ANM.” The IIAP official pronounced a similar opinion: “why a control structure does not exist? Mining encouragement, integral assis­ tance for the ASM, at the national or local level. The Mining and Energy Planning Unit (UPME) and the ANM, have the national mining outlook. Why this is not regional?” The centralized state organizations are not interested in the ASM �. The MME manifests that the promotion of capacity-building at Choco the mining industry, in particular, the Pt extracted in Choc� o, is concentrated in the national mining formalization policy. However, the Directorate of Entrepreneurial Mining, — who is in charge to elaborate and propose the guidelines and policies for the mining development — was consulted by the petition 2016008027 05th February 2016 (Minis­ terio de Minas y Energía, 2016, p. 5), did not pronounce an answer. Also, the main organization that manages the nations’ minerals, regarding its performance delivered confusing information: “the first point is that the platinum mining has not policies or specific sectoral plans” (Agencia Nacional de Minería, 2016, p. 1). That is to say, the inefficiency in the centralized state organizations is more intense — perhaps the origin of that found in the system. The PGMs or platinum metal is a strategic mineral as the UPME and SGC determined, and the sectoral planning is a function of the ANM at the national level. Therefore, the explicit rules (i. e., executive directives or mandates) inside the centralized state orga­ nizations are not self-reinforcing. Some capacity-building attempts come from the UTCH professors, however outside the policy’s explicit rules. Particularly the waste minerals removal processes and in exploitation systems diversification, trying to improve the traditional methods as holladero and guache, which are little fronts of open sky mining at the riversides, and low deep underground mining in the basins, respectively. �n Panamer­ Such attempts are performed in the municipality of Unio icana. Herein, we perceive that the professors do not have good infor­ mation regarding the regulation, because perhaps, they could perform these attempts with the support of the state organizations, albeit being a remote possibility. Thereby, we argued the weak miner’s inclusion, as a consequence of insufficient boost. Or its productivity promotion, allowing the self-reinforcement of inclusive explicit rules.

commercial intermediaries, imposing purchase prices well under the formal market increasing their profits. Such market features decrease the livelihoods of the poorest. Something that aggravates the market’s exclusion was removed the Central Bank as the only buyer of precious metals. In front of it, the IIAP tried to create a bank of Au and Pt, as the official recreated: “we struc­ tured a bank, but this required the institutional encouragement of the MME to give the legal support in the policy framework, and it was not possible.” Consequently, a free mineral market pushes the trade chaos and foments the wealth concentration. The programme Green Gold (Oro Verde) — designed by the IIAP, practitioners and donors — had signs of inclusion and sustainability, but was gradually forgotten. Concerning the programme led mainly by the IIAP, the official mentions that between 1999 and 2005 the institute handled technical support and certifications. Later, in 2007 was constituted the Green Gold Corporation (Corporacio�n Oro Verde), which submitted the minerals to the Fairmined15 certification, where existed two orientations. (1) ecologic certification and (2) fair markets, how­ ever, the programme functioned up to 2010. Deepening in the impasses for the programme and corporation, some causes arise: (1) The mineral euphoria absorbed the artisanal miners (Barequeros) in the municipal­ � and Tado � that were part of Green Gold. (2) The difficult ities of Taguato access to international markets, where the overpriced Au and Pt be placed. (3) Low organizational capabilities of the afro community councils. (4) The financial sources from donors like GOMIAN,16 the environmental national fund, and the same IIAP decreased, and princi­ pally (5) the disinterest of state organizations. Around the Green Gold programme, the artisanal and small-scale � interviewed ex­ miners have nostalgia. The activist of COCOMACOIRO plains: “The Green Gold was the better experience, this is artisanal mining, 100 percent artisanal, I mean in the production processes and the improvement for the clean recovery.” When we mention the mar­ kets, the afro leader visibly excited emphasized: “the gold, of course! Because they bought it, and casually it was for the Nobel Prizes, the prizes made with gold, Green Gold certificated!” 5.3. A sustainable development in limbo In light of the institutional chaos and output of the 2013 miners’ strike, such agreements shaped the Provinces’ Mining Board. This “is a body of participation between diverse sectors related with mining in Choc� o, so as to develop the mining in the territory, achieving formal­ ization goals” (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2016, p. 4). In this sce­ nario, the MME has participated six times. Inasmuch as the actors participate in the board, are identified positions for the enforcement of the explicit rules on the following facets: The ANM’s official pointed out: “there have been several permanent boards about the miners, and there appeal for a differential approach. But not! Has not been possible to engage an initial approach, and move forward. Because the law is one � affirmed for the entire nation’s territory.” In this thread, CODECHOCO about the board’s dissent: “This occurs because the afro councils and the indigenous councils claim some things because they are different, while the ministry says that it cannot be that perhaps. Is wait for that the ministry of mines and the afro and indigenous communities reach an agreement.” Herein, the differential approach is not possible, from the interpretation of centralized explicit rules, which not make any social, environmental or economic distinction. Another facet is the uselessness findings of the inter-administrative contract between the MME and IIAP in the Mining Board. The official of the research organization explained: “these inputs could have real effects, for change and adjust the sectoral policy, but there remain only

5.2. Green gold The RUCOM is the main strategy to regulate the Au and Pt market in �, however, shows deficiency and exclusion. The ANM mentions Choco �, are 244 persons or firms and 227 minerals that in the province of Choco traders authorized (Agencia Nacional de Minería, 2016, p. 3). However, inquiring about the amount of Pt confiscated by the law enforcement no information is available. The mining authority states search the infor­ mation and send it later (Agencia Nacional de Minería, 2016, p. 4), but, no official response was received. These facts emphasize the lack of liaising between the state organizations, and the unconcern to register figures for the mineral resources management. Also, as one professor of the UTCH interviewee mentioned: “a miner who works with a wooden tray and a hoe, and someone says to him, register online! These things are made for the people who have the machinery to extract the gold.” That is to say, the RUCOM creates barriers for the artisanal and small-scale miners and benefits for the medium-scale miners and traders, who concentrate the right to commerce the gold and platinum. � are Therefore, the main agents of the strategic minerals in Choco

15

See http://www.fairmined.org/. http://www.nwo.nl/en/research-and-results/research-projects/i/45/6145. html. 16

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in the speech. If the communities propose the ministries do not react with a counter-proposal, they responded saying that it is not possible, � — that the law says one thing.” The opinion of the COCOMACOIRO actor with active participation in the Mining Board — is similar to the exposed: “the results are crude, that is mean, you cannot see the real interest of the government to make this a real fact. This is a palliative! The ministry says entangle these miners with prose and cited laws. We do not see a governmental decision, to make the formalization a fact.” Besides the state organizations inefficiency, another challenge is the deep incapacity of social and political learning, which results in exclu­ sive explicit rules. A behaviour that exacerbates the exclusiveness of the mining � is the indifference of the centralized formalization policy in Choco environmental authority. The Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MADS) responded with apathy to our questions, leading us to employ other legal instruments, right up to the national level. The process comprised several steps. (1) We submitted a petition right ac­ cording to Article 23 of the Colombian political constitution (see Lar­ a-Rodríguez, 2017, pp. 177–180). (2) We received a response from the MADS about petition rights originating in the MME (Lara-Rodríguez, 2017, p. 263) which argued that it needed time to collect information. (3) Given the lack of response from the MADS, we proceeded according to Article Five of the Administrative Act (c� odigo contensioso admin­ istrativo) and submitted another petition right addressed to the MADS (Lara-Rodríguez, 2017, p. 264). (4) Due to the indifference displayed by the MADS, we sought the intermediation of a third party to enforce the petition right (the general procurator — procuraduría general de la naci� on) (Lara-Rodríguez, 2017, p. 265). (5) The general procurator office requested that the MADS respond to the petition rights, as the Anexo E (Lara-Rodríguez, 2017, p. 266) shows. (6) Having exhausted all other procedures, we resorted to the “Human Right’s Ombudsman” (defensoría del pueblo), seeking its intermediation to interpose a tutelage action (accio�n de tutela) as per Article 86 of the political constitution. This was � (Lara-Rodríguez, 2017, p. 267), sent to the regional defender in Bogota who failed to process it according to the legal terms. From the experienced, we argued that the state organizations in­ efficiency is systematic throughout the mining formalization policy. More alarming, is the dysfunctionality of a third party, or the general procurator, aiming the enforcement of the public contracts. Also, pros­ ecute and punish the official’s corruption. Additionally, organizations as the Human Right’s Ombudsman that have the duty to the legal repre­ sentation of the low-wealth community, did not act in the case. On the other hand, the breach of the explicit rules by the MADS is critical, even more, if the restructured ministry was founded to fosters Colombia’s sustainable development.

mining and environmental administrative sector structure obey interests that privilege the large-scale mining. Due to the weak Colombian mining companies, the government has tried to foster foreign direct investments for mineral exploration. However, it is evident that the Colombian state � has not acted in pursuing the miners’ capacityin the province of Choco building or pushing their productivity, as a formalization strategy. �, the state does not hold the monopoly of the In the province of Choco use of force. The armed illegal groups may have appeared as a contin­ gency of explicit rules that excludes the vulnerable population to join the formal social system, alongside the meagre explicit rules enforcement through capacity-building or productivity strategies by the inefficient state organizations. The armed illegal groups who usurp the use of the force or violence have created their own rules and settled underground economic structures. Then, in a province where the rule of law is un­ sustainable, the informal side will predominate. Another notion that foster the informal side is the weak property rights enforcement from the authorities or security state organizations. The state subsoil ownership and the afro and indigenous common property land seem to be administered by armed illegal groups, making uncertain the establishment of sedentary productive activities. This empirical evidence is key for the ASM reproduction as a livelihood because the persons are pushed to develop nomads or illegal economic activities, due to the ambiguous property rights enforcement. All of this contributes for the non-creation of reproducible capital goods (i.e., technology, machines, and knowledge) in Choc� o, precluding the Sus­ tainable Development, and motivating the mineral rents investment in other places, where such security is guaranteed. The exiguous development of minerals knowledge with geoscience � promotes habits and mining engineering by state organizations in Choco of informality. This absence of mineral research and education make that informal mining gains the upper hand. That is to say, a Colombia’s market economy that self-reinforce tacit rules does not create elements that offer or demand human capital in the scholar disciplines needed to make the mining a relevant sector for the economic growth and SD of �. In addition, the state organizations that enforce the explicit rules Choco suffer the same incapacity of qualified human capital absorption, in addition, to the labour instability and, little presence of indigenous and afro officials. Indeed, the social and political learning is getting more difficult. Furthermore, the environmental damage produced by inap­ propriate technological systems promoted by exclusive tacit rules, and inefficient state organizations, reproduce negative externalities. Indeed, these environmental and social damages will only be compensated by the nature and time, because the current state does not have the capacity to recover such harms. A gold and platinum market regulated by the RUCOM, promotes the enrichment of traders and the powerful. Actually, reducing the incomes and work value of the poorest, perpetuating their exclusion. The state incapacity it is equally represented in the pro­ gramme and corporation Green Gold — which showed signs of sus­ tainability and inclusion — vanished by the mineral euphoria, concomitant, to the unpromising District’s Mining Board, that does not �’s mining. As the main issue offer any institutional change for the Choco of this systematic inefficiency, arise the behaviour of the Environmental and Sustainable Development national authority. The MADS’s apathy shared with other centralized state organizations that enforce Colom­ bia’s tacit rules, indicates — unfortunately — a terrible foresight for the people of Choc� o, and their natural resources. Future research will strive into the demobilization of the armed illegal groups, the mega-diverse sustainability and the economic formalization. Whilst in Colombia exists an increasing hope for peace, because of the demobilized agreements between the armed illegal group ‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)’ guerrilla, and the government of the former President Santos-Calderon [2010–2018]. The ELN who control the province initiated a similar process that is now jeopardized. Thus, the institutional features identified should be

6. Conclusions In this paper, we tried to know how institutions foster the informal side of the economy. For this, we represent the case of the gold and �, Colombia. Our aim was the national mining platinum ASM in Choco formalization policy assessment, with the application of novel qualita­ tive empirical methods elucidating the agents’ behaviour. In sum, the social systems of explicit and tacit rules enforce the informal economic side, when such explicit rules are exclusive with the persons that want to be part of the formal social system, and when the state’s organizations at the charge, mostly self-reinforce tacit rules. This situation of the weak state social and political learning capacity arises as a contingency. Our argument is based on crucial insights for Colombia’s minerals and mining policy. The mining contract — as the main trait of economic and environmental formality — is an extensive bureaucratic process, which requires an important legal, technical, and scientific knowledge; also, considerable financing capabilities for establishing the contract’s tech­ nical items and the environmental insurance charges. In this manner, the

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changed if the governments do not want to repeat the past of violence and poverty in the countryside. To conclude, we believe that the poli­ ticians or the decision-makers are actors that have not been included in our research scope, this topic deserves special care in forthcoming studies of the ASM.

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Funding This work was supported by the National Research Council of Brazil (CNPq) [N� 131999/2015-0]. Acknowledgements I am grateful with my co-authors and advisors Professors: Andr�e Tosi Furtado and Aleix Altimiras-Martin, at the University of Campinas, in the research project ‘The sustainable development of platinum mining in �, Colombia’ (written in Spanish). The fieldwork in the province of Choco Colombia it would not be possible without the kindness of Helcias Jos�e Ayala Mosquera, Manuel Rosero Cuesta, Vianney Sarria Palacios in the �, and Jorge Enrique Perea Mosquera in Condoto. My city of Quibdo sincere gratitute with the Editors for the patience, and thank you very much to the Reviewers for its fantastic comments that did this paper more solid. The unique responsibility to all opinion and error is for the author. Appendix A. Supplementary data Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi. org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2020.101582. References Agencia Nacional de Minería, 2014. Producci� on de minas y canteras 2014. Bogot� a D.C. Agencia Nacional de Minería, 2016. Respuesta Comunicaci� on Radicado: � N 20164100069831. Auty, R.M., 2003. Natural resources, development models and sustainable development. In: International Institute for Environment and Development, Environmental Economics Programe. Earthprint Limited, Stevenage, UK, 0–25. Auty, R.M., 2007. The resources curse and sustainable development. In: Atkinson, G., Dietz, S., Neumayer, E. (Eds.), Handbook of Sustainable Development. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA, pp. 207–219. Azapagic, A., 2004. Developing a framework for sustainable development indicators for the mining and minerals industry. J. Clean. Prod. 12, 639–662. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/S0959-6526(03)00075-1. Baah-Ennumh, T., Ato Forson, J., 2017. The impact of artisanal small-scale mining on sustainable livelihoods. World J. Entrep. Manag. Sustain. Dev. 13, 204–222. https:// doi.org/10.1108/WJEMSD-09-2016-0042. Baksi, S., Bose, P., 2016. Informal sector, regulatory compliance, and leakage. J. Dev. Econ. 121, 166–176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.03.008. Clifford, M.J., Ali, S.H., Matsubae, K., 2018. Mining, land restoration and sustainable development in isolated islands: an industrial ecology perspective on extractive transitions on Nauru. Ambio. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-018-1075-2. Coase, R., 1960. The problem of social cost. J. Law Econ. III, 1–44. Congreso de Colombia, 1993a. Ley 70 de 1993, por la cual se desarrolla el artículo transitorio 55 de la Constituci� on Política. Congreso de Colombia, 1993b. Ley 80 de 1993 "Por la cual se expide el Estatuto General de Contrataci� on de la Administraci� on Pública. Congreso de Colombia, 2001. Ley 685 de agosto 15 de 2001. Congreso de Colombia, 2011. Acto legislativo No 05 del 18 julio 2011. Por el cual se constituye el sistema general de regalias, se modifican los artículos 360 y 361 de la constituci� on política y se dictan otras disposiciones sobre el r�egimen de regalías y compensaciones. Crowson, P., 2009. The resources curse: a modern myth?. In: Mining, Society, and a Sustainable World. Springer, Berlin, pp. 3–35. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-64201103-0. Davis, G.a., 2009. Extractive economies, growth, and the poor. In: Richards, J.P. (Ed.), Mining, Society and Sustainable World. Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht, Berlin, pp. 37–60. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01103-0_2. de la República, Banco, 2016. Tasa de cambio representativa del mercado (TRM) [WWW Document]. Ser. hist� orica 1991-2016. http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/trm (accessed 5.17.16). Departamento Administrativo de la Funci� on Pública, 2011. Decreto 3570 del 27 de septiembre de 2011 "Por el cual se modifican los objetivos y la estructura del Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible y se integra el Sector Administrativo de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenibles.

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