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Human space exploration beyond the international space station: Role of relations of human, machine and the “Earth”
Acta Astronautica 67 (2010) 925–933
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Acta Astronautica journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/actaastro
Human space exploration beyond the international space station: Role of relations of human, machine and the ‘‘Earth’’$ Alexander Yu. Kalery, Igor V. Sorokin n, Mikhail V. Tyurin S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia (RSC Energia), 4A, Lenin Street, Korolev City, Moscow region 141070, Russia
a r t i c l e in fo
abstract
Article history: Received 26 January 2010 Received in revised form 25 April 2010 Accepted 5 June 2010 Available online 29 June 2010
This paper discusses the role of human being in space, his/her functions and responsibility during space flights beyond the Earth orbit. The relationship of the ‘‘Human’’, ‘‘Machine’’ and the ‘‘Earth’’ as basic elements of the control and decisionmaking loop is analyzed to provide maximum efficiency of such complex system. & 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Spacecraft Exploration ISS Man–machine interaction Flight control Decision-making Process
1. Introduction Over the last ten years all human space flights have been related primarily to the International Space Station (ISS). Rare Space Shuttle utilization missions can be treated rather as exceptions than the rule. Station deployment and utilization definitely became as routine, like going every day to work or working at a production line. All participants of this process became used to standard processes and procedures for research development, crew training, safety data package reviews and cargo manifesting. Continuous growth of ground support personnel as well as further subdivision of their functions is accompanied with an increase in bureaucracy at all levels of control and generation of huge amounts of documentation for different purposes. (Basically
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This paper was presented during the 60th IAC in Daejeon. Corresponding author. Tel.: + 7 495 513 6188; fax: +7 495 513 6138. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A.Y. Kalery), [email protected], [email protected] (I.V. Sorokin), [email protected] (M.V. Tyurin). n
0094-5765/$ - see front matter & 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.actaastro.2010.06.009
bureaucratization in this case is a natural sequence of the objective control law where any complex system in absence of impetus to development tends to stabilize itself by increasing inertia and introducing the integrated delay links into the control loop). Increased focus of the existing bureaucratic system on secondary issues related to crew and station safety leads to a gradual loss of initial basic objectives of human missions targeted at crew ability to act autonomously, display initiative, sustain logical and technical adequacy during a spaceflight. All these factors are critical for implementation of journeys beyond the low Earth orbit. At some point young and trained ‘‘space muscles’’ of humans start aging in spite of high level of modern technology (compared to use of automobiles replacing walking, running and cycling). As a consequence, the global public attention to space exploration naturally subsides, or even disappears, and crews actually turn into ‘‘taxi drivers’’ or ‘‘lab workers’’. At the same time, the governments of the ISS member-nations drastically require reports from their agencies accounting for spending significant amounts of money, whereas specialists
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responsible for ISS utilization are constantly and feverishly looking for more and more convincing reasons justifying the existence of the Space Station; otherwise there would be no need of any space station once if a different perception of ‘‘space reality’’ is formed. Did we need to have such justification in 1960s? Now we observe clearly a tendency where human space exploration is becoming self-serving. In reality, space industry ‘‘working as space station assembly line’’, with the station performing repetitive flight operations and utilization programs, overlooks its primary objective of being on the front edge of science and technology in the exploration of the unknown. It appears that there is a substitution of notions at the quality level for the sake of rationality. As a rule, no satisfactory and sensible answer to a layman’s question about explaining as to, ‘‘what you are doing there’’ can be providedy’’ As the result, the public tends to be not interested, the young generation tends to be not involved, the government tends not to provide funding. Space exploration at the same time is not only ISS but rather much more than the ISS. It is important that the adopted guidelines and approaches that are currently governing the ISS Program are not ‘‘stuck’’. From the point of technology, the idea of development and utilization of long-term modular orbital stations was implemented through the Soviet Salyut 7 station, Mir and ISS stations made a step forward without any doubt from the engineering standpoint; however without any principal novelty for experts. Stagnation in the process of replication of already tested engineering solutions means only regress, a degradation of human inspiration for space, a degradation of human explorative and pioneering abilities that are associated with risk and necessity to make vital real-time decisions. Space exploration has an important social objective related to implementation of a natural need of humanity to strive for the unknown. Conviction of many that human spaceflight to the Moon will appreciably change the situation is disputable. How can we prevent regress? The answer to this question lies in the definition of the goal of space exploration. Such goal must be of large scale going into the domain of apparent fantasy. If the goal is to conquer the Solar system, then neither machine, no matter how perfect it might be, nor ‘‘collective mind’’ of the ‘‘Earth’’ or a mission control center would be able to replace a human being in space. The achievement of this objective is only possible (and necessary) by combining human, machine and the ‘‘Earth’’ as a basic element of the control loop and decision-making process. Similar to any complex system, it is necessary to look for optimal combinations of relative ‘‘weights’’ of these elements within the system to ensure its maximal efficiency. Only an effective system has a potential for evolution. The article attempts to identify such optimal combinations for human spaceflight beyond the ISS, with ISS assistance. 2. The basis and new conditions For almost fifty years after the historic flight of Yury Gagarin people have been flying to space, mainly to the
low Earth orbit. The results of these flights are wellknown. The most important result is that practically permanent human presence in space (with some minor exceptions) has been established since 1989, first on Soviet/Russian Mir orbital station and now on the ISS. On the average, every expedition crew stays on-board for six months. Some missions lasted a year and more (up to 437 days). Twenty cosmonauts and astronauts stayed in space in total for more than one year, two of them spent in space more than two years. Work of different complexities is done in orbit: assembly and operation of modular crew stations, multiple docking and undocking of spacecraft; spacewalks became routine proceduresy Obviously the next step in space exploration should be interplanetary flights. People, as it was predicted by the great space theoretician K. Tsiolkovsky, cannot stay on Earth forever, but having looked beyond Earth atmosphere, they will strive to explore the whole near-Sun space [1]. Now we have the tasks of Moon exploration and reaching Mars on the agenda [2]. The conditions of human space flight along interplanetary trajectory and space flight along the near-Earth orbit are very similar, but there are some principal differences [3]. There are four of them, namely:
the impact of space radiation on crew and on-board systems;
communication between the crew and the Earth; crew rescue in contingencies; lack of resupply (complete resource autonomy). These differences apply to a mission to Mars and likewise to asteroids. Some of them are not that essential during a mission to Moon. Further, we describe these conditions in more detail. Radiation: protection from radiation is a very serious problem for space flights in general and first of all for interplanetary flights [3,4]. Although the discussion of this issue in not the topic of the given paper, we would like to mention that we need to do our absolute best to minimize negative radiation impact on human body to the level acceptable in everyday life. We believe it is an axiom that availability of such solution is basically feasible; otherwise everything presented in this paper is meaningless. Communication: two aspects play a major role: distance and subsequently communication signal transit time from a spacecraft to Earth and back, and vehicle shadowing by solar system bodies and primarily by the Sun itself when communication with Earth is basically not possible (use of a transponder located in a heliocentric orbit is not considered here). Communication between a spacecraft and the ground during a mission to the Moon is not a problem as confirmed during American human missions of the Apollo program in 1968–1972 [5]. In case of a mission to Mars, the situation changes radically [4,6]. In this case signal transit time from the vehicle to Earth is approximately 4–14 min and the shadowing of the vehicle by the Sun may last several days. It is evident that such communication conditions between the crew and the
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ground require basically different (compared to existing) approaches to the design of interplanetary expedition complex control loop. Rescue in case of contingency: in near-Earth orbit the spacecraft that delivered the crew to the station is constantly ready to return the crew back to Earth in case of contingency and it has the required life-support resources. Rescue from high orbits and in interplanetary missions is much more complicated. However cosmonautics already addressed this problem and successfully dealt with this issue during the US Lunar Program in 1960s. In April 1971, crew rescue was successfully performed during the Apollo 13 mission [5,6]. A contingency rescue task is much more complex during a mission to Mars. The solution of this task a Mars mission will most likely become the basis for crew rescue ideology in far space. In general, if mission duration is about two years, a Martian Expedition Complex (MEC) will not be able to address this task without sophisticated back-up and highly reliable on-board systems, safe crew haven, ergonomics and maintainability of all hardwares, compartmentalization of life-support resources and spares for vitally important hardware and assemblies. It is especially important that in case of contingency highly skilled and often completely autonomous actions of the crew will be required. Lack of resupply: the existence of the near-Earth orbital station is not feasible without regular cargo resupply from ‘‘Earth-to-orbit’’ and ‘‘orbit-to-Earth’’. Transport vehicles everything required for station operation and crew life support. They also remove waste, unnecessary hardware and materials and return results of the experiments to Earth. In a future lunar program organization of similar ‘‘the Earth-to-Moon-to-Earth’’ traffic will be required to support orbital station operations in selenocentric orbit and on the Moon surface. The farther away the final point of an expedition is the more expensive and difficult the cargo delivery from the Earth becomes. That is why starting from Moon exploration, it becomes very important to use local raw materials for a human space infrastructure deployed far away from Earth [4,6]. Moon may be a good test ground for verification of methods used to solve this challenge. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the next and more difficult task would be mining and processing of first Moon mineral resources and later resources of other bodies of the Solar system for Earth needs [7]. But this is still a remote prospective. Now we can state that MEC crew cannot rely on resupply of its life and other resources from Earth. In this case it should be completely autonomous and self-sufficient during the entire mission. The above-mentioned conditions of deep space and long-term missions and related scientific, technical and organizational challenges (resolution of which becomes the basis for further human space exploration) become a starting point for the development of methods addressing this major complex problem for future space exploration [8]. The approach is evident. It provides for creation of integrated support (engineering, organizational, psychological, etc.) for successful implementation of an interplanetary human mission.
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The above-mentioned challenges are primarily of technological nature and their solution is within the domain of engineering and technology. This is a so-called ‘‘machine component’’ of the process. At the same time, another obvious question arises as to what other experience and knowledge gained during the operation of near-Earth orbital stations including the ISS may be learned to enhance the development of an optimal MEC utilization strategy and most efficient crew operation. The answer appears to be obvious: (1) training of a highly skilled, psychologically compatible, functionally reliable crew in different professional disciplines and (2) development of an ‘‘Earth–vehicle–Earth’’ control loop meeting all requirements of an interplanetary mission. In other words, the engineering (‘‘machine’’) component for the system must be reinforced by ‘‘human’’ and ‘‘control’’ components. The system may be treated as complete only if it includes all the three above-mentioned components. Their most effective identified combinations (at first approximation—logical and qualitative) will bring us closer to the solution of the above-mentioned complex task. Let us address these two identified components of the ‘‘human-machine-control’’ system in more detail. The crew: based on the heritage of space exploration, the following tasks should be addressed to implement at future space missions:
comprehensive training of cosmonauts/astronauts cap-
able of acting under extreme conditions and, in the worst case, absolutely on their own. It is evident that favorable conditions for their work (link to the ‘‘machine’’ component) should be provided on MEC board; comprehensive training and incorporation in the crew, of cosmonauts/astronauts with specialized knowledge and skills that sometimes cannot be acquired via training programs of commanders and pilots. In specific areas of servicing MEC on-board systems and operation on a planet.
The requirements for the MEC crew were described by us earlier in the categories of creativity and determinism ratio in operator’s actions [9]. Such requirements include: [1] Crew should learn to treat contingencies as routine operations. This approach should be viewed as an important skill of an operator. Test pilot should easily switch from one task to another. He flies different aircrafts and that is why he has to possess universal skills. The same is true for a cosmonaut/astronaut. [2] We need to reduce nomenclature and volume of documentation including the on-board documentation used for spacecraft operation. The exception may be made only for the test documentation of vehicle spacecraft. [3] We should strive to optimize crew member operation in space flight. As a rule, this is a creative process, sometimes of intuitive nature, quite individual and related to the freedom of choice. On the other hand,
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selection of an optimal solution may be considered as a process of approaching a deterministic decision. [4] Crew proficiency with respect to a specific utilization task is a necessary but not sufficient requirement. Such proficiency is complemented by intuition based on experience, specialized knowledge, general engineering training as well as mental stability under stress. Crew proficiency may be considered as knowledge and ‘‘feeling’’ of the system based on this knowledge. Cosmonaut’s creativity is his ability to adequately analyze actions in case of a contingency and to find optimal recovery means. Control: two control loops – ground and on-board – are currently used for control of any spacecraft, with the ground loop in the Mission Control Center (MCC) having a leading role [5]. The main functions of the MCC are: planning of operations for the on-board systems and the crew as part of the mission plan implementation, uplink of commands and monitoring of their execution. It is evident that in view of the above-mentioned requirements of the interplanetary flight this approach becomes inefficient. In this case it is necessary to handover the main control function from the ground to MEC that is to hand-over MCC functions on-board [9]. Currently, several dozen specialists work in the MCC control shift to support a space flight, whereas it is expected that 4–6 cosmonauts will man an MEC at least in the first 5–10 interplanetary missions, and in this case the crew will bear additional (almost a tenfold) control load. Under present condition, this task is beyond crew’s abilities and certain steps are required to improve the situation. To this end, on-board control system enhancement is required. The areas of improvement appear to be obvious. In other words, the computing and intellectual potential of the MCC control specialists should be moved to the MEC board. For this purpose, we need to design an on-board Data Control System that will have the following functions: automated planning, implementation of the mission plan, telemetry data processing, analysis of the on-board systems status and functionality and execution of the control tasks. Besides, the Data Control System should have a capability to automatically address planned contingencies and to make recovery recommendations for the crew. Additional function of the system is to provide the crew data required for housekeeping and utilization activities on-board an MEC. To compare the Data Control System with existing control process an MEC commander should perform the functions of the current Flight Director but unlike Flight Director he or she will not be getting reports from dozens of specialists in different disciplines, but rather be relying on the information provided by the computer programs that substitute these specialists. Functions of numerous MCC specialists in charge of different systems should be distributed across other MEC crewmembers; each of them will be monitoring systems based on the data input from the Data Control System, which he or she is responsible for and will be making decisions within his or her authority, while commander (‘‘flight director’’) will be involved only in case of a contingency where a recovery decision should be required.
However, an MCC on the ground is still required. It will remain an indispensable component of the mission control loop with a very important function of the brain center by serving as a consulting center that will prepare long-term recommendations for crew activities and operational development of optimal decisions to recover from contingencies. MCC will continue monitoring and controlling MEC resources and providing recommendations for their optimal use. MCC will provide MEC crew with all required navigational and ballistic information, which along with the data from the on-board navigation system is used for correction of MEC trajectory and implementation of maneuvering operations that are vitally important for the spacecraft. This mission control profile could be implemented only when the entire community of mission controllers realizes and accepts the necessity to execute such transition [9]. We will try to define the combination in the abovementioned triad that will provide crew safety, optimal MEC utilization and, lastly, addressing the issue of a successful interplanetary crew mission. 3. Combination of the components We view an optimal combination of the triad components for each possible option of future interplanetary missions as a combination of ‘‘weights’’ (evaluated in the fractions of the unit) of the components that would support unconditionally a successful mission implementation (execution of all mission tasks). In the case under consideration the notion ‘‘optimum’’ is not used in a strictly mathematical meaning. This is rather a logical optimum that allows us to justify adequacy of the proposed predicted assessments. Using this understanding of an optimum as a basis and relying on the experience in flown space missions, including their ground support, we will try to identify such combination of the triad components for future space missions. Let us consider the most obvious and widely discussed options of crew missions to the Moon, Mars and asteroids based on the available quite comprehensive status of their technical study. Further remote missions will be analyzed separately. Let us exploit as a reference point the ISS, currently existing and operational space station with required ground and space infrastructure (a complex system with known characteristics). In all cases, weight ratios of the triad components are defined by a method of expert assessments taking into account the above-mentioned considerations. 3.1. Combinations for the ISS In the case of the ISS operation (Fig. 1) all station systems and crew operations (short- and long-term planning; continuous crew feedback w/r to operations defined in the mission plan; continuous monitoring of onboard systems status based on telemetry (TM) data received by MCC are under full control of the mission
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true for decisions in case of contingencies. During Moon landing, communication between the crew and the Earth must be provided (though with delay), but the crew has more freedom in its operations. In this case the weight ratios of the triad may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.3. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.2. For ‘‘the ‘‘Earth’’ component: 0.5.
Fig. 1. International Space Station, September 2009: &NASA.
control centers. There is continuous real-time radio communication with the ISS. The level of freedom allotted to crew operations (with the exception of their personal time) is minimal. There is some freedom only in case of unplanned contingencies that are not specified in the onboard documentation and require actions in real time. With the exception of unplanned contingencies, the crew (‘‘humans’’) is actually an ISS element (an element of the ‘‘machine’’) providing support of operations and utilization. Control of the ‘‘machine’’ where a ‘‘human’’ on-board is an extremely important but subordinate component of the system is completely provided by the ‘‘Earth’’. In this case the weight ratios of the triad may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.2. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.2. For the ‘‘Earth’’ component: 0.6.
3.2.2. Phase 2—long-term exploration missions with Moon landing and return to Earth All characteristics of Phase 1 apply. These missions may feature increased crew autonomy, especially when the crew operates on the Moon (Fig. 3) and communication is often lost due to the shadowing caused by landscape elements. When the cosmonauts/astronauts operate on the opposite side of the Moon, communication is lost completely; that is why positioning of a relay satellite on the selenocentric orbit is critical. In this case the weight ratios of the triad may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.4. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.2. For ‘‘the ’’ Earth’’ component: 0.4.
3.2. Combinations for the Moon mission In this case it is desirable to assess the combinations for different phases of Moon exploration—from first reconnaissance missions to creation and sustaining of Moon outposts and probably to the phase of Moon industrialization. 3.2.1. Phase 1—short-term reconnaissance or exploratory missions with Moon landing and return to Earth This is, to a great extent, a duplication of the Apollo Program [5,10] based on a Moon Expedition Complex control profile used at that time (obviously significantly modified due to new technology and algorithms) (Fig. 2). The MCC role in taking control decisions remains dominant: from mission planning to getting feedback about crew operations and TM monitoring of the on-board systems. But in this case MCC role is of smaller prominence compared to the ISS. Real-time communication, especially when the Moon Expedition Complex is in the vicinity of the Moon, is not provided. The mission follows a selenocentric orbit and the crew is on its own when the vehicle loses ground coverage. In this case the crew role in decision making regarding control of all Moon Expedition Complex systems increases. This is also
Fig. 2. NASA Moon Expedition Complex developed within the framework of the Constellation Program: &Lockheed Martin Corp.
Fig. 3. Crew of the Moon Expedition Complex operates on Moon surface: & Lockheed Martin Corp.
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3.2.3. Phase 3—construction of the Moon Outpost, transportation and engineering infrastructure on the selenocentric orbit and on the Moon surface, permanent human presence on the Moon In this case Moon Operations Control Center should undoubtedly move from the Earth to the Moon (Fig. 4). The role of the ‘‘Human’’ operating on the Moon becomes dominant over the role of ‘‘Earth’’. Earth-based Mission Control Center in this case functions as a consulting center, providing psychological support to crew operating and living on the Moon over a long period of time. The role of ‘‘Machine’’ also seems to increase since the inhabitants of the Moon Outpost [11] will depend greatly on the reliability of the ‘‘machine component’’ when the role of ‘‘Earth’’ is reduced. In this case the weight ratios of the triad may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.6. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.3. For ‘‘the Earth’’ component: 0.1. 3.2.4. Phase 4—industrial development of the Moon All the characteristics of the previous phase most likely apply in this phase in an amplified way. Basically, the Mission Control Center should be combined with ‘‘the crew’’ operations on a Moon Outpost or several Moon Outposts that remind of colonists with all the necessary (and absolutely autonomous) operational controls and the operation of the expedition personnel on the whole. The role of ‘‘Earth’’ is reduced to a minimum. ‘‘Human’’ and ‘‘Machine’’ (undoubtedly more ‘‘intelligent’’ than today) establish a strong bond while relying on on-site resources.
Fig. 4. Possible components of the Moon Outpost: (a) cargo transport vehicles: &Lockheed Martin Corp; (b) facilities on and under the Moon surface: &RSC Energia.
In this case the weight ratios of the triad may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 4 0.5. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.4. For ‘‘ the ’’Earth’’ component: o0.1. 3.3. Combinations for the Mars mission All the issues discussed in the previous sections become more important for Mars missions. MEC crew should become in many respects a single social, cultural, psychological and control body with strict centralized and clear distribution of functions across the participants. After MEC reaches interplanetary trajectory any rescue operations (in traditional understanding) using non-MEC means becomes impossible for almost two years. From the point of view of their reliability, the crew as well as all complex systems bear huge load. At least during the initial phases of Mars exploration Earth should mitigate this huge load by all possible means. 3.3.1. Phase 1—remote exploration of Mars and its satellites from areocentric orbit by robotic means without landing It is evident that the first mission to Mars will be literally traveling into the unknown. And this is primarily a key difference compared to Moon missions. Presently, we have a large number of different MEC designs that have been performed in the USSR/Russia and the USA starting from 1960s [5,12]. Their principal distinctions are in the use of different types of propulsion systems. Most recent studies consider use of solar dynamics based on either solar energy or nuclear reactors as part of MEC (Fig. 5). No matter what the design of the complex is, the crew will have to rely more on their skills and knowledge compared to Moon missions and/or ISS missions. It is reasonable to assume that for the first MEC mission to Mars no landing will be planned. It is desirable that an MEC crew perform extensive program of remote research of the planet and perhaps of its satellites with the help of robotics and automatic test landing and takeoff of an automatic landing module. Control of these operations will be provided by the MEC crew, as well as by Earth (as is normally done during missions of automatic spacecraft to Mars). Most likely the roles of the ‘‘Human’’, ‘‘Machine’’ and ‘‘ Earth’’ during first missions to Mars will be approximately equal though ‘‘man’’ and ‘‘machine’’ will be greater represented compared to Moon missions. Based on these assumptions the weight ratio for the triad during first Mars missions will be the following: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.35. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.35. For ‘‘the ‘‘Earth’’ component: 0.3. 3.3.2. Phase 2—exploration of Mars and its satellites with crew landing and intensive use of robotics Transition to the second phase of Mars exploration by human expeditions with crew landing and operating on its surface (Fig. 6) may be called a dream of modern cosmonautics without any exaggeration.
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mission scientific and technical success depend on entire crew proficiency. The hardware must function flawlessly that it its turn depends on the MEC design maturity and comprehensive testing of all components. Crew will be responsible for control of dedicated robotics; real-time control executed by the crew will enable an increase in exploration and research efficacy by orders of magnitude, while hardware maintainability will greatly improve the robustness of the system on the whole. The weight ratio of the components in question may be very similar to Phase 3 of Moon exploration (construction of a Moon Outpost and its transport and engineering infrastructure) where ‘‘Machine’’ serves as ‘‘Human’s’’ assistant or appendix and ‘‘Earth’’ role is reduced to only required minimal consulting. In this case the weight ratios of the triad may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.55. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.3. For the ‘‘Earth’’ component: 0.15.
Fig. 5. Modern MEC concepts: (a) with solar dynamics using solar energy; (b) with nuclear reactors: &RSC Energia.
3.3.3. Phase 3—construction of a Martian Outpost to be periodically visited and its transport and engineering infrastructure to provide its continuous operation (including a robotic mode when the crew is not there) Most likely that the trends developed during the previous phase will increase more enhanced in this third phase where: the center of decision-making should be definitely shifted to Mars to ensure system efficiency. Taking into account the above-mentioned assumptions, the weight ratios for this case may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 40.6. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.3. For the ‘‘Earth’’ component: o0.1. 3.4. Combinations for crew missions to asteroids
Fig. 6. One of the possible concepts of MEC and a landing-take-off vehicle: &RSC Energia.
In this case similar to the previous case, mission success is a function of increased role both of the ‘‘Human’’ and ‘‘Machine’’ components of the triad. Crew becomes practically autonomous, where well-being of a crew member and
Lately crew missions to asteroids have been discussed both as an alternative to Moon missions and as a separate task for space exploration to develop a concept minimizing the danger of asteroids to Earth. The development of the new Orion crew vehicle (Fig. 7) in the framework of the Constellation program [13,14] became an engineering and technology basis for these discussions. The analysis shows that from the point of view of the weight ratio in the triad under discussion this type of expedition holds an interim position between missions to Moon and Mars. To some extent, this is a combination of phase 2 in Section 3.2.2 (long-term reconnaissance flights with Moon landing and return to Earth) and phase 1 in Section 3.3.1 (first expeditions to Mars). Both in the first and second cases we see increased crew role and its autonomy in taking control decisions; the role of the ground MCC that performs coordination and guidance functions in the expedition is still prominent. In this case the weight ratios may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.4. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.3. For the ‘‘Earth’’ component: 0.2.
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Summary data of the results of assessment is presented in Fig. 8. Even cursory analysis of this data makes it possible to draw the following conclusions and predictions: Today, from the standpoint of making control decisions, human space exploration is dependent on the ground. The crew on-board a space station is a necessary, but still a complementary element of the system controlled from the Earth. Its activity is strictly regulated and it has a minimum level of freedom. During missions beyond near-Earth orbit the role of the ‘‘Human’’ in decision-making process should gradually increase to become almost autonomous in order to operate planetary bases. At the same time, the control role of the ground infrastructure should be reduced. Finally, the Earth should have consulting and recommendation functions in regards to the crew of an interplanetary expedition complex. First missions to Moon, Mars and asteroids (‘‘missions to the unknown’’), where the Earth should monitor accurate execution (for the first time!) of all flight operations by crew and on-board systems may be considered as an exception.
Fig. 7. The concept of a crew mission to an asteroid using two Orion vehicles [14]: &Lockheed Martin Corp.
The role of the machine component of the triad in all analyzed combinations is approximately constant though it increases in ‘‘missions to the unknown’’ and during operation of planetary bases using local resources. When exploration of the Moon, Mars and other celestial bodies becomes more mature, the center of control decision-making is moved from the Earth to this celestial body where the humans are already accommodated and use local resources.
4. Conclusions Human missions to Moon, Mars, asteroids and other technically complex missions in the near-Earth orbit are related to a high level of crew autonomy. That is why the crew should be thoroughly trained in different areas (at the level of skills) to perform given tasks. With an increase in complexity of tasks performed in space participation of a human in this process becomes more prominent. Where spacecraft control may be formalized, it should be performed robotically. But the ‘‘Human’’-operator should always reserve the right to define when he or she can rely on the ‘‘Machine’’ and when he or she has to take control over critical operations [9]. The tendency of increased determinism in mission operations reduces both control efficiency and spacecraft utilization slowing down progress of human space exploration of the Moon, Mars and beyond. Evidently, one of the vectors in its development should be the change from the paradigm ‘‘human in space is a component of the machine under the ground control’’ to the paradigm ‘‘human in space making autonomous decisions with the help of the vehicle controlled by him/her and recommendations of ground infrastructures’’. And if the humanity intends to explore the Solar system this transition process from the first paradigm to the second one should be started right away, on the ISS.
0.7 0.6
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Human
Machine
the Earth
Fig. 8. Summary data of the results of expert assessments.
3.4 Asteroids
3.3.3 Mars
3.3.2 Mars
3.3.1 Mars
3.2.4 Moon
3.2.3 Moon
3.2.2 Moon
3.2.1 Moon
0 3.1 - ISS
Weight Ratio
0.5
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Acknowledgments We acknowledge the Head of the Yu. Gagarin Research and Test Cosmonaut Training Center, Star City, Moscow Region, Russia, cosmonaut Sergey Krikalev for fruitful discussions during paper preparation. Special thanks to an aerospace consulting expert Vladimir Fishel for substantial editing of the paper to improve the text.
[6] [7] [8]
[9] [10] [11]
References [12] [1] I.V. Sorokin, A.V. Markov, Utilization of space stations: 1971–2006, Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 45 (3) (2008) 600–607. [2] G.H. Kitmacher, W.H. Gerstenmaier, The international space station: stepping-stone to exploration, IAC Paper IAC-05-B4.1.02, 2005. [3] V.L. Pisacane, The space environment and its effects on space systems, AIAA Education Series, AIAA, , 2008 Chapters 1–3, p. 9. [4] W. Ley, K. Wittmann, W. Hallmann, in: Handbook of Space Technology A, John Wiley and Sons, 2008 Chapters 2, 5–7. [5] I.B. Afanasyev, Yu.M. Baturin, A.G. Belozerskiy, I.A. Ivanov, A.I. Lazutkin, K.A. Lantratov, I.A. Lisov, V.P. Lukashevich, I.A. Marinin, A.E. Markov, T.V. Prygichev, S.H. Shamsutdinov, World’s Cosmonautics: History.
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Technology. People, RTSoft, Moscow, 2005, Chapters 9–12, 15, 16, 19, and 21 (in Russian). L.-A. McFadden, P.R. Weissman, T.V. Johnson (Eds.), Encyclopedia of the Solar System, 2nd ed., Elsevier, 2007 Chapter 46. B. Feuerbacher, H. Stoewer (Eds.), Progress in Astronautics and Aeronautics, 211, AIAA-Springer, 2006 Chapters 1, 8, 9. J.I. Rhatigan, J.A. Robinson, C.F. Sawin, Exploration-Related Research on ISS: Connecting Science Results to Future Missions, AIAA Paper 2006-344, Jan. 2006. S.K. Krikalev, A.Yu. Kalery, I.V. Sorokin, Crew on the ISS: creativity or determinism?, Acta Astronautica 66 (1–2) (2010) 70–73. A. Chaikin, in: A Man on the Moon. The Voyages of the Apollo Astronauts, Penguin Books, 1995. C. Walz, J. Uri, D. Baumann, Far from Home—Human Presence on the ISS as a Preparation for a Lunar Base and Beyond, AIAA Paper 2005-2549, Jan.–Feb. 2005. Y.P. Semenov, Y.A. Ashmarin, O.I. Babkov, V.N. Bobkov, V.E. Galperin, L.A. Gorshkov, G.N. Degtyarenko, N.I. Zelenschikov, S.A. Zemlyakov, V.M. Karashtin, V.G. Kravets, V.P. Legostaev, B.A. Sokolov, V.A. Timchenko, V.M. Filin, N.I. Chekin, B.E. Chertok, Rocket and Space Corporation ‘‘Energia,’’ S.P. Korolev (Ed.), Energia, Moscow, 1996, Chapter 4 (in Russian). Constellation. NASA’s New Spacecraft: Ares and Orion. /http:// www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/constellation/main/index.htmlS (Retrieved 30 Dec. 2009). G. Norris, Orion Options: Caution Urged for Commercial HumanRated Space Operations as New Orion Roles Studied, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2009, August 17, 31.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Acta Astronautica journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/actaastro
Human space exploration beyond the international space station: Role of relations of human, machine and the ‘‘Earth’’$ Alexander Yu. Kalery, Igor V. Sorokin n, Mikhail V. Tyurin S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia (RSC Energia), 4A, Lenin Street, Korolev City, Moscow region 141070, Russia
a r t i c l e in fo
abstract
Article history: Received 26 January 2010 Received in revised form 25 April 2010 Accepted 5 June 2010 Available online 29 June 2010
This paper discusses the role of human being in space, his/her functions and responsibility during space flights beyond the Earth orbit. The relationship of the ‘‘Human’’, ‘‘Machine’’ and the ‘‘Earth’’ as basic elements of the control and decisionmaking loop is analyzed to provide maximum efficiency of such complex system. & 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Spacecraft Exploration ISS Man–machine interaction Flight control Decision-making Process
1. Introduction Over the last ten years all human space flights have been related primarily to the International Space Station (ISS). Rare Space Shuttle utilization missions can be treated rather as exceptions than the rule. Station deployment and utilization definitely became as routine, like going every day to work or working at a production line. All participants of this process became used to standard processes and procedures for research development, crew training, safety data package reviews and cargo manifesting. Continuous growth of ground support personnel as well as further subdivision of their functions is accompanied with an increase in bureaucracy at all levels of control and generation of huge amounts of documentation for different purposes. (Basically
$
This paper was presented during the 60th IAC in Daejeon. Corresponding author. Tel.: + 7 495 513 6188; fax: +7 495 513 6138. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A.Y. Kalery), [email protected], [email protected] (I.V. Sorokin), [email protected] (M.V. Tyurin). n
0094-5765/$ - see front matter & 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.actaastro.2010.06.009
bureaucratization in this case is a natural sequence of the objective control law where any complex system in absence of impetus to development tends to stabilize itself by increasing inertia and introducing the integrated delay links into the control loop). Increased focus of the existing bureaucratic system on secondary issues related to crew and station safety leads to a gradual loss of initial basic objectives of human missions targeted at crew ability to act autonomously, display initiative, sustain logical and technical adequacy during a spaceflight. All these factors are critical for implementation of journeys beyond the low Earth orbit. At some point young and trained ‘‘space muscles’’ of humans start aging in spite of high level of modern technology (compared to use of automobiles replacing walking, running and cycling). As a consequence, the global public attention to space exploration naturally subsides, or even disappears, and crews actually turn into ‘‘taxi drivers’’ or ‘‘lab workers’’. At the same time, the governments of the ISS member-nations drastically require reports from their agencies accounting for spending significant amounts of money, whereas specialists
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responsible for ISS utilization are constantly and feverishly looking for more and more convincing reasons justifying the existence of the Space Station; otherwise there would be no need of any space station once if a different perception of ‘‘space reality’’ is formed. Did we need to have such justification in 1960s? Now we observe clearly a tendency where human space exploration is becoming self-serving. In reality, space industry ‘‘working as space station assembly line’’, with the station performing repetitive flight operations and utilization programs, overlooks its primary objective of being on the front edge of science and technology in the exploration of the unknown. It appears that there is a substitution of notions at the quality level for the sake of rationality. As a rule, no satisfactory and sensible answer to a layman’s question about explaining as to, ‘‘what you are doing there’’ can be providedy’’ As the result, the public tends to be not interested, the young generation tends to be not involved, the government tends not to provide funding. Space exploration at the same time is not only ISS but rather much more than the ISS. It is important that the adopted guidelines and approaches that are currently governing the ISS Program are not ‘‘stuck’’. From the point of technology, the idea of development and utilization of long-term modular orbital stations was implemented through the Soviet Salyut 7 station, Mir and ISS stations made a step forward without any doubt from the engineering standpoint; however without any principal novelty for experts. Stagnation in the process of replication of already tested engineering solutions means only regress, a degradation of human inspiration for space, a degradation of human explorative and pioneering abilities that are associated with risk and necessity to make vital real-time decisions. Space exploration has an important social objective related to implementation of a natural need of humanity to strive for the unknown. Conviction of many that human spaceflight to the Moon will appreciably change the situation is disputable. How can we prevent regress? The answer to this question lies in the definition of the goal of space exploration. Such goal must be of large scale going into the domain of apparent fantasy. If the goal is to conquer the Solar system, then neither machine, no matter how perfect it might be, nor ‘‘collective mind’’ of the ‘‘Earth’’ or a mission control center would be able to replace a human being in space. The achievement of this objective is only possible (and necessary) by combining human, machine and the ‘‘Earth’’ as a basic element of the control loop and decision-making process. Similar to any complex system, it is necessary to look for optimal combinations of relative ‘‘weights’’ of these elements within the system to ensure its maximal efficiency. Only an effective system has a potential for evolution. The article attempts to identify such optimal combinations for human spaceflight beyond the ISS, with ISS assistance. 2. The basis and new conditions For almost fifty years after the historic flight of Yury Gagarin people have been flying to space, mainly to the
low Earth orbit. The results of these flights are wellknown. The most important result is that practically permanent human presence in space (with some minor exceptions) has been established since 1989, first on Soviet/Russian Mir orbital station and now on the ISS. On the average, every expedition crew stays on-board for six months. Some missions lasted a year and more (up to 437 days). Twenty cosmonauts and astronauts stayed in space in total for more than one year, two of them spent in space more than two years. Work of different complexities is done in orbit: assembly and operation of modular crew stations, multiple docking and undocking of spacecraft; spacewalks became routine proceduresy Obviously the next step in space exploration should be interplanetary flights. People, as it was predicted by the great space theoretician K. Tsiolkovsky, cannot stay on Earth forever, but having looked beyond Earth atmosphere, they will strive to explore the whole near-Sun space [1]. Now we have the tasks of Moon exploration and reaching Mars on the agenda [2]. The conditions of human space flight along interplanetary trajectory and space flight along the near-Earth orbit are very similar, but there are some principal differences [3]. There are four of them, namely:
the impact of space radiation on crew and on-board systems;
communication between the crew and the Earth; crew rescue in contingencies; lack of resupply (complete resource autonomy). These differences apply to a mission to Mars and likewise to asteroids. Some of them are not that essential during a mission to Moon. Further, we describe these conditions in more detail. Radiation: protection from radiation is a very serious problem for space flights in general and first of all for interplanetary flights [3,4]. Although the discussion of this issue in not the topic of the given paper, we would like to mention that we need to do our absolute best to minimize negative radiation impact on human body to the level acceptable in everyday life. We believe it is an axiom that availability of such solution is basically feasible; otherwise everything presented in this paper is meaningless. Communication: two aspects play a major role: distance and subsequently communication signal transit time from a spacecraft to Earth and back, and vehicle shadowing by solar system bodies and primarily by the Sun itself when communication with Earth is basically not possible (use of a transponder located in a heliocentric orbit is not considered here). Communication between a spacecraft and the ground during a mission to the Moon is not a problem as confirmed during American human missions of the Apollo program in 1968–1972 [5]. In case of a mission to Mars, the situation changes radically [4,6]. In this case signal transit time from the vehicle to Earth is approximately 4–14 min and the shadowing of the vehicle by the Sun may last several days. It is evident that such communication conditions between the crew and the
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ground require basically different (compared to existing) approaches to the design of interplanetary expedition complex control loop. Rescue in case of contingency: in near-Earth orbit the spacecraft that delivered the crew to the station is constantly ready to return the crew back to Earth in case of contingency and it has the required life-support resources. Rescue from high orbits and in interplanetary missions is much more complicated. However cosmonautics already addressed this problem and successfully dealt with this issue during the US Lunar Program in 1960s. In April 1971, crew rescue was successfully performed during the Apollo 13 mission [5,6]. A contingency rescue task is much more complex during a mission to Mars. The solution of this task a Mars mission will most likely become the basis for crew rescue ideology in far space. In general, if mission duration is about two years, a Martian Expedition Complex (MEC) will not be able to address this task without sophisticated back-up and highly reliable on-board systems, safe crew haven, ergonomics and maintainability of all hardwares, compartmentalization of life-support resources and spares for vitally important hardware and assemblies. It is especially important that in case of contingency highly skilled and often completely autonomous actions of the crew will be required. Lack of resupply: the existence of the near-Earth orbital station is not feasible without regular cargo resupply from ‘‘Earth-to-orbit’’ and ‘‘orbit-to-Earth’’. Transport vehicles everything required for station operation and crew life support. They also remove waste, unnecessary hardware and materials and return results of the experiments to Earth. In a future lunar program organization of similar ‘‘the Earth-to-Moon-to-Earth’’ traffic will be required to support orbital station operations in selenocentric orbit and on the Moon surface. The farther away the final point of an expedition is the more expensive and difficult the cargo delivery from the Earth becomes. That is why starting from Moon exploration, it becomes very important to use local raw materials for a human space infrastructure deployed far away from Earth [4,6]. Moon may be a good test ground for verification of methods used to solve this challenge. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the next and more difficult task would be mining and processing of first Moon mineral resources and later resources of other bodies of the Solar system for Earth needs [7]. But this is still a remote prospective. Now we can state that MEC crew cannot rely on resupply of its life and other resources from Earth. In this case it should be completely autonomous and self-sufficient during the entire mission. The above-mentioned conditions of deep space and long-term missions and related scientific, technical and organizational challenges (resolution of which becomes the basis for further human space exploration) become a starting point for the development of methods addressing this major complex problem for future space exploration [8]. The approach is evident. It provides for creation of integrated support (engineering, organizational, psychological, etc.) for successful implementation of an interplanetary human mission.
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The above-mentioned challenges are primarily of technological nature and their solution is within the domain of engineering and technology. This is a so-called ‘‘machine component’’ of the process. At the same time, another obvious question arises as to what other experience and knowledge gained during the operation of near-Earth orbital stations including the ISS may be learned to enhance the development of an optimal MEC utilization strategy and most efficient crew operation. The answer appears to be obvious: (1) training of a highly skilled, psychologically compatible, functionally reliable crew in different professional disciplines and (2) development of an ‘‘Earth–vehicle–Earth’’ control loop meeting all requirements of an interplanetary mission. In other words, the engineering (‘‘machine’’) component for the system must be reinforced by ‘‘human’’ and ‘‘control’’ components. The system may be treated as complete only if it includes all the three above-mentioned components. Their most effective identified combinations (at first approximation—logical and qualitative) will bring us closer to the solution of the above-mentioned complex task. Let us address these two identified components of the ‘‘human-machine-control’’ system in more detail. The crew: based on the heritage of space exploration, the following tasks should be addressed to implement at future space missions:
comprehensive training of cosmonauts/astronauts cap-
able of acting under extreme conditions and, in the worst case, absolutely on their own. It is evident that favorable conditions for their work (link to the ‘‘machine’’ component) should be provided on MEC board; comprehensive training and incorporation in the crew, of cosmonauts/astronauts with specialized knowledge and skills that sometimes cannot be acquired via training programs of commanders and pilots. In specific areas of servicing MEC on-board systems and operation on a planet.
The requirements for the MEC crew were described by us earlier in the categories of creativity and determinism ratio in operator’s actions [9]. Such requirements include: [1] Crew should learn to treat contingencies as routine operations. This approach should be viewed as an important skill of an operator. Test pilot should easily switch from one task to another. He flies different aircrafts and that is why he has to possess universal skills. The same is true for a cosmonaut/astronaut. [2] We need to reduce nomenclature and volume of documentation including the on-board documentation used for spacecraft operation. The exception may be made only for the test documentation of vehicle spacecraft. [3] We should strive to optimize crew member operation in space flight. As a rule, this is a creative process, sometimes of intuitive nature, quite individual and related to the freedom of choice. On the other hand,
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selection of an optimal solution may be considered as a process of approaching a deterministic decision. [4] Crew proficiency with respect to a specific utilization task is a necessary but not sufficient requirement. Such proficiency is complemented by intuition based on experience, specialized knowledge, general engineering training as well as mental stability under stress. Crew proficiency may be considered as knowledge and ‘‘feeling’’ of the system based on this knowledge. Cosmonaut’s creativity is his ability to adequately analyze actions in case of a contingency and to find optimal recovery means. Control: two control loops – ground and on-board – are currently used for control of any spacecraft, with the ground loop in the Mission Control Center (MCC) having a leading role [5]. The main functions of the MCC are: planning of operations for the on-board systems and the crew as part of the mission plan implementation, uplink of commands and monitoring of their execution. It is evident that in view of the above-mentioned requirements of the interplanetary flight this approach becomes inefficient. In this case it is necessary to handover the main control function from the ground to MEC that is to hand-over MCC functions on-board [9]. Currently, several dozen specialists work in the MCC control shift to support a space flight, whereas it is expected that 4–6 cosmonauts will man an MEC at least in the first 5–10 interplanetary missions, and in this case the crew will bear additional (almost a tenfold) control load. Under present condition, this task is beyond crew’s abilities and certain steps are required to improve the situation. To this end, on-board control system enhancement is required. The areas of improvement appear to be obvious. In other words, the computing and intellectual potential of the MCC control specialists should be moved to the MEC board. For this purpose, we need to design an on-board Data Control System that will have the following functions: automated planning, implementation of the mission plan, telemetry data processing, analysis of the on-board systems status and functionality and execution of the control tasks. Besides, the Data Control System should have a capability to automatically address planned contingencies and to make recovery recommendations for the crew. Additional function of the system is to provide the crew data required for housekeeping and utilization activities on-board an MEC. To compare the Data Control System with existing control process an MEC commander should perform the functions of the current Flight Director but unlike Flight Director he or she will not be getting reports from dozens of specialists in different disciplines, but rather be relying on the information provided by the computer programs that substitute these specialists. Functions of numerous MCC specialists in charge of different systems should be distributed across other MEC crewmembers; each of them will be monitoring systems based on the data input from the Data Control System, which he or she is responsible for and will be making decisions within his or her authority, while commander (‘‘flight director’’) will be involved only in case of a contingency where a recovery decision should be required.
However, an MCC on the ground is still required. It will remain an indispensable component of the mission control loop with a very important function of the brain center by serving as a consulting center that will prepare long-term recommendations for crew activities and operational development of optimal decisions to recover from contingencies. MCC will continue monitoring and controlling MEC resources and providing recommendations for their optimal use. MCC will provide MEC crew with all required navigational and ballistic information, which along with the data from the on-board navigation system is used for correction of MEC trajectory and implementation of maneuvering operations that are vitally important for the spacecraft. This mission control profile could be implemented only when the entire community of mission controllers realizes and accepts the necessity to execute such transition [9]. We will try to define the combination in the abovementioned triad that will provide crew safety, optimal MEC utilization and, lastly, addressing the issue of a successful interplanetary crew mission. 3. Combination of the components We view an optimal combination of the triad components for each possible option of future interplanetary missions as a combination of ‘‘weights’’ (evaluated in the fractions of the unit) of the components that would support unconditionally a successful mission implementation (execution of all mission tasks). In the case under consideration the notion ‘‘optimum’’ is not used in a strictly mathematical meaning. This is rather a logical optimum that allows us to justify adequacy of the proposed predicted assessments. Using this understanding of an optimum as a basis and relying on the experience in flown space missions, including their ground support, we will try to identify such combination of the triad components for future space missions. Let us consider the most obvious and widely discussed options of crew missions to the Moon, Mars and asteroids based on the available quite comprehensive status of their technical study. Further remote missions will be analyzed separately. Let us exploit as a reference point the ISS, currently existing and operational space station with required ground and space infrastructure (a complex system with known characteristics). In all cases, weight ratios of the triad components are defined by a method of expert assessments taking into account the above-mentioned considerations. 3.1. Combinations for the ISS In the case of the ISS operation (Fig. 1) all station systems and crew operations (short- and long-term planning; continuous crew feedback w/r to operations defined in the mission plan; continuous monitoring of onboard systems status based on telemetry (TM) data received by MCC are under full control of the mission
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true for decisions in case of contingencies. During Moon landing, communication between the crew and the Earth must be provided (though with delay), but the crew has more freedom in its operations. In this case the weight ratios of the triad may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.3. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.2. For ‘‘the ‘‘Earth’’ component: 0.5.
Fig. 1. International Space Station, September 2009: &NASA.
control centers. There is continuous real-time radio communication with the ISS. The level of freedom allotted to crew operations (with the exception of their personal time) is minimal. There is some freedom only in case of unplanned contingencies that are not specified in the onboard documentation and require actions in real time. With the exception of unplanned contingencies, the crew (‘‘humans’’) is actually an ISS element (an element of the ‘‘machine’’) providing support of operations and utilization. Control of the ‘‘machine’’ where a ‘‘human’’ on-board is an extremely important but subordinate component of the system is completely provided by the ‘‘Earth’’. In this case the weight ratios of the triad may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.2. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.2. For the ‘‘Earth’’ component: 0.6.
3.2.2. Phase 2—long-term exploration missions with Moon landing and return to Earth All characteristics of Phase 1 apply. These missions may feature increased crew autonomy, especially when the crew operates on the Moon (Fig. 3) and communication is often lost due to the shadowing caused by landscape elements. When the cosmonauts/astronauts operate on the opposite side of the Moon, communication is lost completely; that is why positioning of a relay satellite on the selenocentric orbit is critical. In this case the weight ratios of the triad may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.4. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.2. For ‘‘the ’’ Earth’’ component: 0.4.
3.2. Combinations for the Moon mission In this case it is desirable to assess the combinations for different phases of Moon exploration—from first reconnaissance missions to creation and sustaining of Moon outposts and probably to the phase of Moon industrialization. 3.2.1. Phase 1—short-term reconnaissance or exploratory missions with Moon landing and return to Earth This is, to a great extent, a duplication of the Apollo Program [5,10] based on a Moon Expedition Complex control profile used at that time (obviously significantly modified due to new technology and algorithms) (Fig. 2). The MCC role in taking control decisions remains dominant: from mission planning to getting feedback about crew operations and TM monitoring of the on-board systems. But in this case MCC role is of smaller prominence compared to the ISS. Real-time communication, especially when the Moon Expedition Complex is in the vicinity of the Moon, is not provided. The mission follows a selenocentric orbit and the crew is on its own when the vehicle loses ground coverage. In this case the crew role in decision making regarding control of all Moon Expedition Complex systems increases. This is also
Fig. 2. NASA Moon Expedition Complex developed within the framework of the Constellation Program: &Lockheed Martin Corp.
Fig. 3. Crew of the Moon Expedition Complex operates on Moon surface: & Lockheed Martin Corp.
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3.2.3. Phase 3—construction of the Moon Outpost, transportation and engineering infrastructure on the selenocentric orbit and on the Moon surface, permanent human presence on the Moon In this case Moon Operations Control Center should undoubtedly move from the Earth to the Moon (Fig. 4). The role of the ‘‘Human’’ operating on the Moon becomes dominant over the role of ‘‘Earth’’. Earth-based Mission Control Center in this case functions as a consulting center, providing psychological support to crew operating and living on the Moon over a long period of time. The role of ‘‘Machine’’ also seems to increase since the inhabitants of the Moon Outpost [11] will depend greatly on the reliability of the ‘‘machine component’’ when the role of ‘‘Earth’’ is reduced. In this case the weight ratios of the triad may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.6. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.3. For ‘‘the Earth’’ component: 0.1. 3.2.4. Phase 4—industrial development of the Moon All the characteristics of the previous phase most likely apply in this phase in an amplified way. Basically, the Mission Control Center should be combined with ‘‘the crew’’ operations on a Moon Outpost or several Moon Outposts that remind of colonists with all the necessary (and absolutely autonomous) operational controls and the operation of the expedition personnel on the whole. The role of ‘‘Earth’’ is reduced to a minimum. ‘‘Human’’ and ‘‘Machine’’ (undoubtedly more ‘‘intelligent’’ than today) establish a strong bond while relying on on-site resources.
Fig. 4. Possible components of the Moon Outpost: (a) cargo transport vehicles: &Lockheed Martin Corp; (b) facilities on and under the Moon surface: &RSC Energia.
In this case the weight ratios of the triad may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 4 0.5. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.4. For ‘‘ the ’’Earth’’ component: o0.1. 3.3. Combinations for the Mars mission All the issues discussed in the previous sections become more important for Mars missions. MEC crew should become in many respects a single social, cultural, psychological and control body with strict centralized and clear distribution of functions across the participants. After MEC reaches interplanetary trajectory any rescue operations (in traditional understanding) using non-MEC means becomes impossible for almost two years. From the point of view of their reliability, the crew as well as all complex systems bear huge load. At least during the initial phases of Mars exploration Earth should mitigate this huge load by all possible means. 3.3.1. Phase 1—remote exploration of Mars and its satellites from areocentric orbit by robotic means without landing It is evident that the first mission to Mars will be literally traveling into the unknown. And this is primarily a key difference compared to Moon missions. Presently, we have a large number of different MEC designs that have been performed in the USSR/Russia and the USA starting from 1960s [5,12]. Their principal distinctions are in the use of different types of propulsion systems. Most recent studies consider use of solar dynamics based on either solar energy or nuclear reactors as part of MEC (Fig. 5). No matter what the design of the complex is, the crew will have to rely more on their skills and knowledge compared to Moon missions and/or ISS missions. It is reasonable to assume that for the first MEC mission to Mars no landing will be planned. It is desirable that an MEC crew perform extensive program of remote research of the planet and perhaps of its satellites with the help of robotics and automatic test landing and takeoff of an automatic landing module. Control of these operations will be provided by the MEC crew, as well as by Earth (as is normally done during missions of automatic spacecraft to Mars). Most likely the roles of the ‘‘Human’’, ‘‘Machine’’ and ‘‘ Earth’’ during first missions to Mars will be approximately equal though ‘‘man’’ and ‘‘machine’’ will be greater represented compared to Moon missions. Based on these assumptions the weight ratio for the triad during first Mars missions will be the following: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.35. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.35. For ‘‘the ‘‘Earth’’ component: 0.3. 3.3.2. Phase 2—exploration of Mars and its satellites with crew landing and intensive use of robotics Transition to the second phase of Mars exploration by human expeditions with crew landing and operating on its surface (Fig. 6) may be called a dream of modern cosmonautics without any exaggeration.
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mission scientific and technical success depend on entire crew proficiency. The hardware must function flawlessly that it its turn depends on the MEC design maturity and comprehensive testing of all components. Crew will be responsible for control of dedicated robotics; real-time control executed by the crew will enable an increase in exploration and research efficacy by orders of magnitude, while hardware maintainability will greatly improve the robustness of the system on the whole. The weight ratio of the components in question may be very similar to Phase 3 of Moon exploration (construction of a Moon Outpost and its transport and engineering infrastructure) where ‘‘Machine’’ serves as ‘‘Human’s’’ assistant or appendix and ‘‘Earth’’ role is reduced to only required minimal consulting. In this case the weight ratios of the triad may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.55. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.3. For the ‘‘Earth’’ component: 0.15.
Fig. 5. Modern MEC concepts: (a) with solar dynamics using solar energy; (b) with nuclear reactors: &RSC Energia.
3.3.3. Phase 3—construction of a Martian Outpost to be periodically visited and its transport and engineering infrastructure to provide its continuous operation (including a robotic mode when the crew is not there) Most likely that the trends developed during the previous phase will increase more enhanced in this third phase where: the center of decision-making should be definitely shifted to Mars to ensure system efficiency. Taking into account the above-mentioned assumptions, the weight ratios for this case may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 40.6. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.3. For the ‘‘Earth’’ component: o0.1. 3.4. Combinations for crew missions to asteroids
Fig. 6. One of the possible concepts of MEC and a landing-take-off vehicle: &RSC Energia.
In this case similar to the previous case, mission success is a function of increased role both of the ‘‘Human’’ and ‘‘Machine’’ components of the triad. Crew becomes practically autonomous, where well-being of a crew member and
Lately crew missions to asteroids have been discussed both as an alternative to Moon missions and as a separate task for space exploration to develop a concept minimizing the danger of asteroids to Earth. The development of the new Orion crew vehicle (Fig. 7) in the framework of the Constellation program [13,14] became an engineering and technology basis for these discussions. The analysis shows that from the point of view of the weight ratio in the triad under discussion this type of expedition holds an interim position between missions to Moon and Mars. To some extent, this is a combination of phase 2 in Section 3.2.2 (long-term reconnaissance flights with Moon landing and return to Earth) and phase 1 in Section 3.3.1 (first expeditions to Mars). Both in the first and second cases we see increased crew role and its autonomy in taking control decisions; the role of the ground MCC that performs coordination and guidance functions in the expedition is still prominent. In this case the weight ratios may be allocated as follows: For the ‘‘Human’’ component: 0.4. For the ‘‘Machine’’ component: 0.3. For the ‘‘Earth’’ component: 0.2.
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Summary data of the results of assessment is presented in Fig. 8. Even cursory analysis of this data makes it possible to draw the following conclusions and predictions: Today, from the standpoint of making control decisions, human space exploration is dependent on the ground. The crew on-board a space station is a necessary, but still a complementary element of the system controlled from the Earth. Its activity is strictly regulated and it has a minimum level of freedom. During missions beyond near-Earth orbit the role of the ‘‘Human’’ in decision-making process should gradually increase to become almost autonomous in order to operate planetary bases. At the same time, the control role of the ground infrastructure should be reduced. Finally, the Earth should have consulting and recommendation functions in regards to the crew of an interplanetary expedition complex. First missions to Moon, Mars and asteroids (‘‘missions to the unknown’’), where the Earth should monitor accurate execution (for the first time!) of all flight operations by crew and on-board systems may be considered as an exception.
Fig. 7. The concept of a crew mission to an asteroid using two Orion vehicles [14]: &Lockheed Martin Corp.
The role of the machine component of the triad in all analyzed combinations is approximately constant though it increases in ‘‘missions to the unknown’’ and during operation of planetary bases using local resources. When exploration of the Moon, Mars and other celestial bodies becomes more mature, the center of control decision-making is moved from the Earth to this celestial body where the humans are already accommodated and use local resources.
4. Conclusions Human missions to Moon, Mars, asteroids and other technically complex missions in the near-Earth orbit are related to a high level of crew autonomy. That is why the crew should be thoroughly trained in different areas (at the level of skills) to perform given tasks. With an increase in complexity of tasks performed in space participation of a human in this process becomes more prominent. Where spacecraft control may be formalized, it should be performed robotically. But the ‘‘Human’’-operator should always reserve the right to define when he or she can rely on the ‘‘Machine’’ and when he or she has to take control over critical operations [9]. The tendency of increased determinism in mission operations reduces both control efficiency and spacecraft utilization slowing down progress of human space exploration of the Moon, Mars and beyond. Evidently, one of the vectors in its development should be the change from the paradigm ‘‘human in space is a component of the machine under the ground control’’ to the paradigm ‘‘human in space making autonomous decisions with the help of the vehicle controlled by him/her and recommendations of ground infrastructures’’. And if the humanity intends to explore the Solar system this transition process from the first paradigm to the second one should be started right away, on the ISS.
0.7 0.6
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Human
Machine
the Earth
Fig. 8. Summary data of the results of expert assessments.
3.4 Asteroids
3.3.3 Mars
3.3.2 Mars
3.3.1 Mars
3.2.4 Moon
3.2.3 Moon
3.2.2 Moon
3.2.1 Moon
0 3.1 - ISS
Weight Ratio
0.5
A.Yu. Kalery et al. / Acta Astronautica 67 (2010) 925–933
Acknowledgments We acknowledge the Head of the Yu. Gagarin Research and Test Cosmonaut Training Center, Star City, Moscow Region, Russia, cosmonaut Sergey Krikalev for fruitful discussions during paper preparation. Special thanks to an aerospace consulting expert Vladimir Fishel for substantial editing of the paper to improve the text.
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