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Humans are the selection criterion in psychological science, not “reality”: A reply to Herbert and Padovani
Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 4 (2015) 210–211
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jcbs
Correspondence Humans are the selection criterion in psychological science, not “reality”: A reply to Herbert and Padovani
art ic l e i nf o Keywords: a-ontology functional contextualism pragmatism realism selectionism
a b s t r a c t We provide a reply to Herbert & Padovani's (in press) critique of the a-ontological stance embraced by functional contextualism. We propose that the selection of scientific models that "work well" relies on the goals scientists choose to pursue. The selection criterion for scientific models is set by scientists and does not prove the existence of a putative reality, or its organization. Although somewhat arbitrary, scientific goals only require being stable and shared by a large community of scientists, not reflecting an external reality. Finally, we argue that a philosophical position should not be abandoned based on its lack of popularity, and we call instead for improvement in the way we explain the a-ontological stance of functional contextualism. & 2015 Association for Contextual Behavioral Science. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
In their article entitled “Contextualism, psychological science, and the question of ontology” (in press, JCBS), Herbert and Padovani criticize the a-ontological position of functional contextualism on the basis of two arguments. On theoretical grounds, they state that one cannot hypothesize the absence of any substratum independent of the scientists' analyses because such substratum is at least essential to evaluate the usefulness of any theoretical model. From a practical standpoint, they state that an a-ontological stance would alienate a large number of scientists who would otherwise be attracted to functional contextualism. Despite the well-formulated and thought provoking arguments offered in Herbert and Padovani's paper, we found some flaw in the logic presented by these two arguments. First, we think that Herbert and Padovani's theoretical argument against a-ontology is a priori grounded in realism and thus entails some level of tautology. For Herbert and Padovani, “The fact that some analyses work better than others necessarily requires the assumption that there be some independent substratum”, because such a substratum would “‘direct(s) and select(s)’, so to say, more useful from less useful analyses” (p. 11). What must be questioned here is the assertion that the selective agent for scientific analysis is “reality”. Hypothesizing that reality and its organization constitute the selection criterion for scientific hypotheses supposes a priori that such reality, and its precise organization, exists. Indeed, in order to prove that an a-ontological stance is not tenable, Herbert and Padovani necessarily affirm the existence of the very matter that a-ontology proposes to ignore. One would need to convoke arguments outside the putative existence of reality to prove that reality stands out there, and that the ultimate goal of science is to describe it accurately. Reality cannot be taken as a proof for its existence, otherwise the argument is tautological. The selection criterion in science is set by scientists themselves. This criterion is formulated first in the problems they choose to
address. “Problems”, as defined by humans, do not exist in the wild. They are delineated by scientists. For instance, what does it mean to find a solution to the “problem” of viruses? At the ecosystem scale, are viruses a problem to be solved? The selection criterion is also reflected by the representation of the world scientists choose to “work well” (i.e. it allows scientists to solve problems). And who decides which criterion is best to evaluate what “works well”, if not humans themselves? From a functional contextualist point of view, the “problems” and the solutions that “work well” only represent ways to organize scientific activity. Different problems and diverse approaches on how to solve them could equally exist, none of them being closer to “reality”. In psychology for example, scientists set prediction and influence as the ultimate goals of theoretical models, and thus, as the criteria to evaluate their effectiveness. Ultimately, it is the verbal community that determines whether a theory is better at predicting and influencing behaviors compared to another, not the putative organization of “reality” standing out there. However, we acknowledge that functional contexualists, no different than other scientists, need a relatively stable criterion to evaluate the utility of their theories. If the criterion is too relative, it becomes as useless as a compass that indicates North as a different direction each time it is used. This means that functional contextualists need to agree on common goals, while acknowledging that these goals are not a reflection of some independent reality. In that case, one can wonder what is the selection criterion for selecting the selection criterion. This issue is similar to what often comes up when working on clients’ values in therapy based on functional contextualism (e.g. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; ACT). In ACT, values are defined as “freely chosen, verbally constructed consequences of ongoing, dynamic, evolving patterns of activity, which establish predominant reinforcers for that activity that are intrinsic in engagement in the valued behavioral pattern itself” (Wilson &
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcbs.2015.06.003 2212-1447/& 2015 Association for Contextual Behavioral Science. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Correspondence / Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 4 (2015) 210–211
DuFrene, 2009, p. 66). “Freely chosen” means that clients determine the selection criterion for their behaviors. But if values are freely chosen and verbally constructed, they can be seen as somewhat arbitrary. Many clients suffer precisely from not knowing, or doubting, what they care about in life. How can we hold on to stable values while being aware that they are not bound to any external reality? Along the same lines, how can scientists have a stable selection criterion for their theories without assuming that an independent reality is guiding their choices? For clients, one way of grounding values is to link them to basic needs independent of language (e.g. exploration, social connection, safety) (Villatte, Villatte, & Hayes, in press). For example, the value “learning psychology” might be linked to the need for exploration and the value of “teaching psychology” might be linked to the need for social connection. The advantage of connecting values to variables that are independent of language is to give them a more stable, almost essential quality. However, independence from language does not mean independence from human perception. Basic needs are less arbitrary than values, but we do not have to assume that they reflect a reality outside of our experience. Similarly, when scientists from a functional contextualistic perspective define their selection criterion, they do not need to assume that this criterion relies on an external truth or reality. Rather, they need only find a common agreement on what is worth pursuing. This stability and commonality can be found in the universality of basic needs and formulated in various ways through values. For example, the main goal of contextual behavioral science is to “alleviate human suffering and advance human well being”, which brings about a community of scientists working together in a coherent and pragmatic fashion. Another point drew our attention, as Herbert and Padovani refer to selectionism to justify their view. They state in a footnote that “The history of science clearly reveals some idea of progress over time with respect to the goals of prediction and influence” (p.10). Indeed, progress over time seems at the core of science. However, when Herbert and Padovani refer to selectionism, they cannot disregard the consensus in evolutionary sciences regarding the untenability of any teleological position (Gould, 1996). Evolution has no goal and no direction, and if scientists think of any, it is because verbal organisms have the capacity to forge goals and to have intentions – a capacity that itself appeared without any purpose (Monestès, in press). Progress in science is not “real” and does not reveal that scientists are approaching closer to “reality”. If any progress is made, it corresponds to scientists approaching the goals they themselves set (prediction and influence in this case). In the words of Thagard (1988), “(…) scientific innovations are designed by their creators to solve recognized problems; they therefore are correlated with solutions to problems” (p. 103). Science is a human activity, evaluated by humans. If there is progress in science, it cannot be anything but the product of human evaluation. Interestingly, Herbert and Padovani seem to acknowledge that the selection criterion in science is set by scientists themselves. While turning to their practical argument against a-ontology, they state that such a position should be abandoned because it leads “to ridicule, derision, and at times even wholesale rejection of the CBS program” (p. 13). If lack of adhesion to a conceptual position
211
should drive it to its abandon, it must be because human goals drive the selection process of scientific ideas, and not some sort of reality. The argument that scientists would reject the CBS program because of the a-ontological stance held by functional contextualists is itself misleading. Indeed, science is a collaborative activity, and scientific models built and developed by only a handful of scientists are rarely sustainable. It is of pragmatic value that a scientific model be able to draw the interest and participation of scientists. Any model needs forces, in other words, scientists, to produce data that further tests and refines it. However, a scientific stance cannot be chosen based on its attractiveness to other scientists or its capacity to draw consensus. Scientific hypotheses are sometimes challenging, and choosing to abandon a position because it would alienate other scientists turns the whole process of science upside down (i.e. a theoretical orientation should attract scientists because it proposes fresh and useful ways to define and explore problems, not because it confirms what they already think). Regarding the present question of ontology, functional contextualists' position represents a choice guided by philosophical reasoning. The choice between some sort of nominalism, pragmatism or realism relies on a fundamental decision that should hold coherently in the relevant field. One can hardly rely on the popularity of a philosophical position, or the risk isolating of its supporters, as a criterion to keep or discard it. If anything, it is our way of explaining this philosophical position that needs to improve if we want it to be better understood, and we commend Herbert and Padovani for their contribution to this endeavor.
References Gould, S. J. (1996). Full house: The spread of excellence from Plato to Darwin. New York: Harmony Books. Herbert, James D., Padovani, Flavia. (2015). Contextualism, psychological science, and the question of ontology, Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science. (in press) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcbs.2014.11.005. Monestès, J. L. (2015). A functional place for language in evolution: Contextual behavior science contribution to the study of human evolution. In S. Hayes, D. Barnes-Holmes, R. Zettle, & T. Biglan (Eds.), Handbook of contextual behavioral science. New York: Wiley-Blackwell (in press). Thagard, P. (1988). Computational philosophy of science. Cambridge: MIT Press. Villatte, M., Villatte, J. L, & Hayes, S. C. (2015). Mastering the clinical conversation: Language as intervention. New York: Guilford Press (in press). Wilson, K. G., & DuFrene, T. (2009). Mindfulness for two: An acceptance and commitment therapy approach to mindfulness in psychotherapy. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger.
Jean-Louis Monestèsn Univ. Grenoble Alpes, LIP/PC2S, Grenoble, Lab Epsylon, Montpellier, France E-mail address: [email protected] Matthieu Villatte Evidence Based Practice Institute, Seattle, USA Received 12 May 2015; accepted 9 June 2015
n Correspondence to: LIP/PC2S Lab, Univ. Grenoble Alpes, UFR SHS, 1251 avenue Centrale, 38040 Grenoble Cedex 9, France.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jcbs
Correspondence Humans are the selection criterion in psychological science, not “reality”: A reply to Herbert and Padovani
art ic l e i nf o Keywords: a-ontology functional contextualism pragmatism realism selectionism
a b s t r a c t We provide a reply to Herbert & Padovani's (in press) critique of the a-ontological stance embraced by functional contextualism. We propose that the selection of scientific models that "work well" relies on the goals scientists choose to pursue. The selection criterion for scientific models is set by scientists and does not prove the existence of a putative reality, or its organization. Although somewhat arbitrary, scientific goals only require being stable and shared by a large community of scientists, not reflecting an external reality. Finally, we argue that a philosophical position should not be abandoned based on its lack of popularity, and we call instead for improvement in the way we explain the a-ontological stance of functional contextualism. & 2015 Association for Contextual Behavioral Science. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
In their article entitled “Contextualism, psychological science, and the question of ontology” (in press, JCBS), Herbert and Padovani criticize the a-ontological position of functional contextualism on the basis of two arguments. On theoretical grounds, they state that one cannot hypothesize the absence of any substratum independent of the scientists' analyses because such substratum is at least essential to evaluate the usefulness of any theoretical model. From a practical standpoint, they state that an a-ontological stance would alienate a large number of scientists who would otherwise be attracted to functional contextualism. Despite the well-formulated and thought provoking arguments offered in Herbert and Padovani's paper, we found some flaw in the logic presented by these two arguments. First, we think that Herbert and Padovani's theoretical argument against a-ontology is a priori grounded in realism and thus entails some level of tautology. For Herbert and Padovani, “The fact that some analyses work better than others necessarily requires the assumption that there be some independent substratum”, because such a substratum would “‘direct(s) and select(s)’, so to say, more useful from less useful analyses” (p. 11). What must be questioned here is the assertion that the selective agent for scientific analysis is “reality”. Hypothesizing that reality and its organization constitute the selection criterion for scientific hypotheses supposes a priori that such reality, and its precise organization, exists. Indeed, in order to prove that an a-ontological stance is not tenable, Herbert and Padovani necessarily affirm the existence of the very matter that a-ontology proposes to ignore. One would need to convoke arguments outside the putative existence of reality to prove that reality stands out there, and that the ultimate goal of science is to describe it accurately. Reality cannot be taken as a proof for its existence, otherwise the argument is tautological. The selection criterion in science is set by scientists themselves. This criterion is formulated first in the problems they choose to
address. “Problems”, as defined by humans, do not exist in the wild. They are delineated by scientists. For instance, what does it mean to find a solution to the “problem” of viruses? At the ecosystem scale, are viruses a problem to be solved? The selection criterion is also reflected by the representation of the world scientists choose to “work well” (i.e. it allows scientists to solve problems). And who decides which criterion is best to evaluate what “works well”, if not humans themselves? From a functional contextualist point of view, the “problems” and the solutions that “work well” only represent ways to organize scientific activity. Different problems and diverse approaches on how to solve them could equally exist, none of them being closer to “reality”. In psychology for example, scientists set prediction and influence as the ultimate goals of theoretical models, and thus, as the criteria to evaluate their effectiveness. Ultimately, it is the verbal community that determines whether a theory is better at predicting and influencing behaviors compared to another, not the putative organization of “reality” standing out there. However, we acknowledge that functional contexualists, no different than other scientists, need a relatively stable criterion to evaluate the utility of their theories. If the criterion is too relative, it becomes as useless as a compass that indicates North as a different direction each time it is used. This means that functional contextualists need to agree on common goals, while acknowledging that these goals are not a reflection of some independent reality. In that case, one can wonder what is the selection criterion for selecting the selection criterion. This issue is similar to what often comes up when working on clients’ values in therapy based on functional contextualism (e.g. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; ACT). In ACT, values are defined as “freely chosen, verbally constructed consequences of ongoing, dynamic, evolving patterns of activity, which establish predominant reinforcers for that activity that are intrinsic in engagement in the valued behavioral pattern itself” (Wilson &
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcbs.2015.06.003 2212-1447/& 2015 Association for Contextual Behavioral Science. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Correspondence / Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 4 (2015) 210–211
DuFrene, 2009, p. 66). “Freely chosen” means that clients determine the selection criterion for their behaviors. But if values are freely chosen and verbally constructed, they can be seen as somewhat arbitrary. Many clients suffer precisely from not knowing, or doubting, what they care about in life. How can we hold on to stable values while being aware that they are not bound to any external reality? Along the same lines, how can scientists have a stable selection criterion for their theories without assuming that an independent reality is guiding their choices? For clients, one way of grounding values is to link them to basic needs independent of language (e.g. exploration, social connection, safety) (Villatte, Villatte, & Hayes, in press). For example, the value “learning psychology” might be linked to the need for exploration and the value of “teaching psychology” might be linked to the need for social connection. The advantage of connecting values to variables that are independent of language is to give them a more stable, almost essential quality. However, independence from language does not mean independence from human perception. Basic needs are less arbitrary than values, but we do not have to assume that they reflect a reality outside of our experience. Similarly, when scientists from a functional contextualistic perspective define their selection criterion, they do not need to assume that this criterion relies on an external truth or reality. Rather, they need only find a common agreement on what is worth pursuing. This stability and commonality can be found in the universality of basic needs and formulated in various ways through values. For example, the main goal of contextual behavioral science is to “alleviate human suffering and advance human well being”, which brings about a community of scientists working together in a coherent and pragmatic fashion. Another point drew our attention, as Herbert and Padovani refer to selectionism to justify their view. They state in a footnote that “The history of science clearly reveals some idea of progress over time with respect to the goals of prediction and influence” (p.10). Indeed, progress over time seems at the core of science. However, when Herbert and Padovani refer to selectionism, they cannot disregard the consensus in evolutionary sciences regarding the untenability of any teleological position (Gould, 1996). Evolution has no goal and no direction, and if scientists think of any, it is because verbal organisms have the capacity to forge goals and to have intentions – a capacity that itself appeared without any purpose (Monestès, in press). Progress in science is not “real” and does not reveal that scientists are approaching closer to “reality”. If any progress is made, it corresponds to scientists approaching the goals they themselves set (prediction and influence in this case). In the words of Thagard (1988), “(…) scientific innovations are designed by their creators to solve recognized problems; they therefore are correlated with solutions to problems” (p. 103). Science is a human activity, evaluated by humans. If there is progress in science, it cannot be anything but the product of human evaluation. Interestingly, Herbert and Padovani seem to acknowledge that the selection criterion in science is set by scientists themselves. While turning to their practical argument against a-ontology, they state that such a position should be abandoned because it leads “to ridicule, derision, and at times even wholesale rejection of the CBS program” (p. 13). If lack of adhesion to a conceptual position
211
should drive it to its abandon, it must be because human goals drive the selection process of scientific ideas, and not some sort of reality. The argument that scientists would reject the CBS program because of the a-ontological stance held by functional contextualists is itself misleading. Indeed, science is a collaborative activity, and scientific models built and developed by only a handful of scientists are rarely sustainable. It is of pragmatic value that a scientific model be able to draw the interest and participation of scientists. Any model needs forces, in other words, scientists, to produce data that further tests and refines it. However, a scientific stance cannot be chosen based on its attractiveness to other scientists or its capacity to draw consensus. Scientific hypotheses are sometimes challenging, and choosing to abandon a position because it would alienate other scientists turns the whole process of science upside down (i.e. a theoretical orientation should attract scientists because it proposes fresh and useful ways to define and explore problems, not because it confirms what they already think). Regarding the present question of ontology, functional contextualists' position represents a choice guided by philosophical reasoning. The choice between some sort of nominalism, pragmatism or realism relies on a fundamental decision that should hold coherently in the relevant field. One can hardly rely on the popularity of a philosophical position, or the risk isolating of its supporters, as a criterion to keep or discard it. If anything, it is our way of explaining this philosophical position that needs to improve if we want it to be better understood, and we commend Herbert and Padovani for their contribution to this endeavor.
References Gould, S. J. (1996). Full house: The spread of excellence from Plato to Darwin. New York: Harmony Books. Herbert, James D., Padovani, Flavia. (2015). Contextualism, psychological science, and the question of ontology, Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science. (in press) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcbs.2014.11.005. Monestès, J. L. (2015). A functional place for language in evolution: Contextual behavior science contribution to the study of human evolution. In S. Hayes, D. Barnes-Holmes, R. Zettle, & T. Biglan (Eds.), Handbook of contextual behavioral science. New York: Wiley-Blackwell (in press). Thagard, P. (1988). Computational philosophy of science. Cambridge: MIT Press. Villatte, M., Villatte, J. L, & Hayes, S. C. (2015). Mastering the clinical conversation: Language as intervention. New York: Guilford Press (in press). Wilson, K. G., & DuFrene, T. (2009). Mindfulness for two: An acceptance and commitment therapy approach to mindfulness in psychotherapy. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger.
Jean-Louis Monestèsn Univ. Grenoble Alpes, LIP/PC2S, Grenoble, Lab Epsylon, Montpellier, France E-mail address: [email protected] Matthieu Villatte Evidence Based Practice Institute, Seattle, USA Received 12 May 2015; accepted 9 June 2015
n Correspondence to: LIP/PC2S Lab, Univ. Grenoble Alpes, UFR SHS, 1251 avenue Centrale, 38040 Grenoble Cedex 9, France.