Identifying barriers to implementation of local transport policy – Lessons learned from case studies on bus policy implementation in Great Britain

Transport Policy 91 (2020) 16–25

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Identifying barriers to implementation of local transport policy – Lessons learned from case studies on bus policy implementation in Great Britain Clare McTigue a, *, Tom Rye b, Jason Monios c a

Transport Research Institute, Edinburgh Napier University, UK Molde University College, Norway & Urban Planning Institute of Slovenia, Ljubljana, Slovenia c Kedge Business School, Marseille, France b

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Transport policy Implementation Bus Case study Great britain UK

Previous work by the authors has addressed the issue of local bus policy implementation in Britain outside London by studies of local transport documents, survey and interviews of local transport officers working in local authorities. The findings from these studies highlight that some of the key elements to successful implementation could be understood in more depth by taking a case study approach. This paper analyses four case studies of the implementation of specific bus policy measures in four different cities in Great Britain: the Quality Contract Scheme (QCS) in Tyne and Wear, the Fastlink Scheme in Glasgow, a Bus Priority Scheme in Solihull and a Smart Ticketing Scheme in Dundee. The findings in this paper show that policy champions, collaboration and inter­ action help to build a relationship between the parties involved, ensure limited changes due to bureaucratic power and changes to the policy, and help to overcome opposition, conflict and ambiguities. It is important that those involved in the policy process are provided with relevant training, supervision and support to help overcome the staffing difficulties and to deal with barriers external to the implementing organisation such as economic, social and political conditions.

1. Introduction Bus policy is essential to realising broader transport policy objec­ tives, since buses play a vital role in delivering a sustainable transport system, being the most frequently used and most accessible mode of public transport. However, the literature demonstrates that the appli­ cation of such policies in real-world situations remains inconsistent (Hull, 2009). This is evident across Great Britain where the latest sta­ tistics show a continuous decline in bus journeys outside London, along with a decrease in bus patronage and bus mileage. Fig. 1 represents local bus passenger journeys in England outside London and London, from 2004/05 to 2017/18 (Department for Transport, 2019). In 2017/18, in England outside London, passenger journeys decreased by 3.2% when compared with the previous year. This has been on a downward trend since the recent peak of 2.41 billion passenger journeys in 2008/09. Similarly, in London, passenger jour­ neys decreased by 0.7% when compared with the previous year (2016/7). This is also the fourth consecutive year in which passenger journeys in London have fallen, whereas, prior to 2012/13, bus use in London increased every year since 1998/99. Fig. 2 also shows similar

trends when examining vehicle miles on local bus services (Department for Transport, 2019). In 2017/18, in England outside London, bus mileage decreased by 4.2% when compared with 2016/17. However, in London, bus mileage remained at levels seen since 2011/12 at over 300 million vehicle miles. Previous work by the authors has addressed the issue of local bus policy implementation in Britain outside London by studies of local transport documents (McTigue et al., 2018b) and survey and interviews of local transport officers working in local authorities (McTigue et al., 2018a). The two studies analysed why some policies were not imple­ mented successfully based on the application of a new hybrid theory of policy implementation. The papers highlight that the reporting process of bus policy implementation is often lacking key information which limits the ability of local authorities to monitor their policy imple­ mentation. Even in cases of good reporting, some important elements needed to evaluate the implementation of transport policy are lacking. The studies also identified the greatest challenges faced by local au­ thorities when implementing bus policy which include the availability of financial and staff resources, the existence (or rather lack) of a clear policy document, inter-organisational communication and

* Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (C. McTigue). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2020.03.002 Received 28 February 2019; Received in revised form 21 February 2020; Accepted 4 March 2020 Available online 10 March 2020 0967-070X/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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characteristics of organisations involved. However, the findings from the previous studies highlight that some of the key elements in the 10-point framework could be understood in more depth by taking a case study approach. According to Yin (1994, p.13), case study research is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and it relies on multiple sources of evidence”. To obtain a deeper understanding of transport policy, it is necessary to examine how issues such as collaboration, policy champions and economic, social and po­ litical environments influence real projects on the ground. This paper analyses four case studies of the implementation of specific bus policy measures in four different cities in Great Britain: the Quality Contract Scheme (QCS) in Tyne and Wear, the Fastlink Scheme in Glasgow, a Bus Priority Scheme in Solihull and a Smart Ticketing Scheme in Dundee. Similar to the previous studies, the analysis is based on the application of the ten-point framework (hybrid theory) of McTigue et al. (2018a), which synthesises top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation and facilitates the drawing of policy recommendations for local authorities. This paper now goes on to examine previous studies on bus policy in Great Britain and the impact bus deregulation and privatisation has on the implementation of bus policy as we see it today. Next this paper will present a narrative of the four case studies and the results are presented under three themes (Issues with scheme design; existing bus policy document, policy targets and monitoring of bus policies; and policy Implementation and barriers to implementation). This is followed by the application of the ten-point analytical framework, which in turn helps to identify the barriers and enablers required for successful implementa­ tion. Finally, the paper will present some concluding remarks and rec­ ommendations for policy makers and local authority staff.

and privatisation has on the implementation of bus policy as we see it today. Over the last two decades, White (1995, 1997, 2010) has provided extensive research on the impact of bus deregulation. Looking at the short-term impact of bus deregulation, White (1995, 1997) found that while the cost per kilometre operated had fallen, patronage had also fallen and profitability only remained marginal. White (2010) also explored issues such as the removal of previous restrictions on routes, service levels and fares and a reversal of the previous emphasis on co­ ordination of services. In comparison to the short-term impact of bus deregulation by White (1995, 1997, 2010), other scholars have explored the long-term impact of bus deregulation. Preston and Almutairi (2013) examined bus deregulation and the long-term impact it had on the sector, using de­ mand, cost and fares models. The study found that the regulated bus market in London experienced a positive pattern of welfare gains; however, passengers received fewer benefits when the subsidy was reduced. By comparison, there is a negative pattern with welfare im­ pacts outside London and therefore a regulated bus service like that in London would be more appropriate. However, Preston and Almutairi (2014) re-evaluated this position and found a considerable welfare loss. Preston (2016) also examined the impact of bus deregulation in Wales in the mid-1980s and found a decrease in bus trips and vehicle mileage, a rise in fares and operating costs and a decrease in subsidy. To overcome the barriers associated with bus deregulation, they suggest a Rapid Transit scheme would complement the existing rail network in urban areas of Wales. In rural areas, they suggest the implementation of Quality Contracts, Quality Partnerships and Community Partnerships would help overcome barriers to implementation such as a lack of funding which has prevented the development of more flexible public transport services. Cowie (2014) also examined the English deregulated market and carried out an overall assessment of performance in terms of fare levels, technical efficiencies, profitability and user satisfaction. The study found that local English bus markets contain producer centric operators that remain protected by significant barriers to entry and this has resulted in the market being unable to regulate its own behaviour to produce economically efficient bus services. The study concluded that, in the long term, the market cannot sustain competition or be influenced by potential competition unless an external body such as a transport authority provides that function. More recently, Cowie (2018) explored the long-term impact of bus deregulation by examining the development

2. Literature review 2.1. Bus policy in Great Britain While there has been limited research directly linked to the imple­ mentation of bus policy at a local level, some scholars have examined bus deregulation since the Transport Act 1985 radically changed the bus industry by privatising the companies and deregulating services outside London. Studies by these scholars help us to understand the current situation of bus policy in Great Britain and the impact bus deregulation

Fig. 1. Local bus passenger journeys in England outside London and London, 2004/05 to 2017/18. Source: Department for Transport (2019). 17

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of the bus industry in Scotland since privatisation and how it compares with the markets in England and London. The study suggests that in order to reverse the continued long-term decline in bus patronage, policy needs to focus on areas outside of the sector such as proactive public transport initiatives and car use limiting measures. More pre­ cisely, a package of measures is required where the wider public interest has a key role to play in the provision of bus services, along with some form of economic regulation. Similar views are shared by Van de Velde and Wallis (2013) and their study also examined the long-term impact of bus deregulation in Great Britain and New Zealand and partial deregulation in Sweden. They suggest that successful implementation is dependent on the co-existence of a favourable public transport policy that places limits on automobile use by means of parking charges, pedestrian-only zones, and extensive park-and-ride facilities. Another study by Van de Velde and Augustin (2014) suggest that where deregulation is sustained as a regime, success is driven by external factors. In the case of bus deregulation in Britain, the most successful cases are dependent upon the local authority’s anti-car or pro public transport policy, however, success is ultimately also dependent upon the management style adopted by the bus operator. There have been several amendments to the 1985 Transport Act and the 2000 Transport Act, with the latest being made by the Local Transport Act 2008 in England. The amended Acts saw the introduction of the possibility of different forms of partnerships and levels of part­ nership between bus companies and local authorities. These include Voluntary Quality Partnership, Voluntary Partnership Agreements, Statutory Quality Partnership, and Quality Contract. Godfrey and Taylor (2018) examined the role of these partnerships to identify the benefits of and obstacles to partnership, the mechanisms and components of suc­ cessful partnerships, and the lessons from less successful implementa­ tions. The study found that the key obstacles reported by local transport authorities included political issues such as a lack of support and interest within the authority; objections from traders and residents; and timing issues as a result of contract delays, design problems, achieving funding, and utility provider requirements or adverse weather. These findings correlate with the findings by McTigue et al. (2018a,b) where the study found key barriers to the implementation of bus policy included a lack of political support and political will; public opposition and opposition from bus operators when implementing certain bus measures; delays due to shortage of staff or over-worked staff; and availability of re­ sources such as funding which was preventing councils from achieving targets. Furthermore, Godfrey and Taylor (2018) found the key

obstacles reported by bus operators included a lack of consistency or credibility in terms of what local transport authorities offer; lack of new buses; and changes to market conditions, revenue or the competitive situation. They suggest that these obstacles can be minimised by effec­ tive communication and consultation within or between the organisa­ tions involved, which also mirrors the findings by McTigue et al. (2018a, b) which states that intra-organisational support and communication are essential for successful implementation of bus policy. In light of these barriers associated with the different partnerships in place, the Bus Services Act 2017 in Britain came into place which aims to shift from the previous focus on competition to one which encourages partnerships between operators and local transport authorities. White (2018) carried out an overview of this Act and suggested that the Act has the potential to encourage greater bus use, but the extent of this is highly uncertain. The studies show that there are still some major concerns for how bus policy is currently being implemented in Great Britain; however, it ap­ pears that much of the focus is on the partnerships in place and the longterm or short-term impact of bus deregulation since it was introduced in the Transport Act 1985. The aim of this paper is therefore to build on these studies and the previous studies by the authors to examine bus policy implementation in a much more focused context by exploring different cases which can help identify the greatest barriers to policy implementation and in turn mitigate the concerns associated with the year-on-year decline in passenger journey and vehicle kilometres on local bus services in Great Britain. 2.2. Theoretical approaches to policy implementation For more detailed discussion on the various theoretical approaches to policy implementation that have developed over time, readers are referred to the authors’ previous work (McTigue et al., 2018a,b), which discussed the models and frameworks used to determine what makes a policy and its subsequent implementation successful. This included work carried out by scholars since the late 1960s, which can be divided into three distinct theoretical approaches. Top-down theorists suggests that centralised policymakers should be as clear as possible with their goals, minimise the number of bureaucrats a policy depends on, and limit necessary change (e.g. Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1981). Work by bottom-up theorists emphasises target groups and service deliverers, arguing that policy is made at the local level (e.g. Lipsky, 1971). Finally, hybrid (synthesis) theories try to overcome the divide between both the top-down and bottom-up approaches by incorporating elements of both.

Fig. 2. Vehicle miles on local bus services in England outside London and London, 1982 to 2017/18. Source: Department for Transport (2019). 18

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The hybrid theory developed by the authors is presented in Table 1.

authority, Nexus. Three other more successful schemes were selected, to reflect the range of scheme types that are found in bus policy and therefore to be able to explore how far the type of scheme (e.g. size, bus priority or vehicle-based scheme) influences the success of imple­ mentation or otherwise. The Fastlink Scheme in Glasgow was the second scheme selected as it is a large-scale BRT and bus priority scheme including specified facilities such as extensive bus priority measures along the routes, improved bus stop and access measures, improved bus shelters and enhanced bus route monitoring. Another scheme selected due to successful implementation was the Lode Lane Route Enhance­ ment (LLRE) in Solihull. This scheme included new bus lanes along three sections of the road on Lode Lane, along with infrastructure improve­ ment measures. Finally, it was also decided to choose a case study which was successful, but which did not include physical on-road measures. Therefore, the ABC (All Bus Companies) Multi-Operator Smart Ticketing Scheme in Dundee was selected, which introduced smart ticketing valid on all bus company routes across Dundee and surrounding areas.

3. Methodology 3.1. Case study research Case study research (CSR) is one of the most frequently-used but also challenging methods in qualitative research (Reddy, 2015). The work of Yin (1984) has had a major impact on CSR in terms of developing its application, design and procedure, theory testing and theory develop­ ment. According to Yin (1984, p26) “CSR is remarkably hard, even though case studies have traditionally been considered to be ‘soft’ research”. CSR has been selected here to investigate in further detail implementation barriers and enablers in local bus policy that were identified in previous research based on document analysis, survey and interviews with local authorities. A multiple case study methodology was chosen in this study to enable a much deeper examination of bus policy implementation.

3.3. Case design and analysis

3.2. Case selection

Unlike the survey and interview approaches in the authors’ previous work where only public transport officers were contacted, a variety of actors were contacted for the case studies because they have different perspectives on the implementation process for the particular scheme under investigation. Participants were selected for each case study because they are especially knowledgeable or experienced with regards to the specific bus scheme, including actors from the bus industry, local and national government, NGOs and consultants. In total, 31 semistructured interviews were conducted with 35 industry representatives (some interviews involved more than one participant). The interviews included 23 open-ended questions under four common themes: overall description of the scheme design, identification of relevant issues, the role of bus policy documents, targets and monitoring in the scheme development, and finally a discussion on the implementation process and particularly barriers to scheme implementation. This structure enabled first an overview of the practical challenges in the scheme design, before moving on to a deeper analysis of the roles of policy ac­ tions. Thus the case narratives are presented in this paper according to this four-part structure, which then allows the application of the analytical framework to compare the key elements identified in the case narratives. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded. The first step was to use the interview and documentary data to write case study narratives under comparable structures (presented in Section 4 and summarised in Table 2). This enabled a more structured understanding of the development process of each case. To take the findings deeper, the data was also coded against the 10 factors in the analytical framework, in order to perform a theoretical analysis which is presented in Section 5 and Table 3.

Several prerequisites were required to be fulfilled for schemes to merit inclusion as case studies. Firstly, they had to be schemes that had been implemented, not those that were in still in planning. Secondly, they were also selected due to their comparability; they include the same phenomenon under investigation (implementation of bus policy) and follow similar transport policy frameworks (Scotland and England). As it was important to include both successful and unsuccessful schemes, a desktop review was carried out first. A scheme which was found to be less successful included a proposal for a Quality Contract Scheme (QCS) in Tyne and Wear in northeast England which was rejected in November 2015. The QCS was intended to move the region from a bus network provided primarily on a deregulated basis by private bus companies operating in an open market to one where private op­ erators would run services under contract to a passenger transport Table 1 McTigue et al. (2018a,b) hybrid theory. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9 10

Policy document: A written bus policy document should be in place, showing a clear link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring of targets. Availability of resources: Resources such as financial support are important; however, where resources are limited, it is necessary to maximise the use of available resources. Intra-organisation support and communication: Policy staff need relevant training, supervision and support within their organisation when dealing with complex policy issues. Characteristics of organisations: Both formal structural features of organisations and informal attributes of their personnel (including size, competency and workload of staff). Economic, social and political environments: Current and future economic, social and political environments play an important role on the outcome of the policy process. Policy champions: Policy implementation should not be restricted to one policy champion and instead needs several policy champions who are responsible, competent and motivated to see the policy through from beginning to end. Bureaucratic power: Hierarchical control in an organisation is important; however, hierarchical power must not be used to overrule policy decisions by other members within the organisation. Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process: Collaboration and interaction is necessary between key actors involved in the policy process, including policy makers, local authority staff, local and national governing bodies, regional transport partnerships, bus operators and transport practitioners working within the transport field. Policy remodelling: Limited changes to the policy should occur from the design stage right through to the implementation stage. Opposition, conflict and ambiguities: Opposition, conflict and ambiguities are inevitable including public opposition, political power, local and national elections, conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars and open-access to data by bus operating companies.

4. Results 4.1. Case study profile and scheme description 4.1.1. Quality contract scheme In 2011, Nexus (Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive) were one of the first areas to put forward proposals for a QCS in Tyne and Wear. This would mean the local authority in place would take control of the entire bus networks in the region. On the 3rd November 2015, the QCS Board (consisting of the Traffic Commissioner and independent consultants) rejected these proposals and concluded that Nexus failed to comply with 3 out of the 5 statutory requirements for a QCS in accor­ dance with the Transport Act 2000. In addition, they felt the scheme could not demonstrate that it would increase use of bus services, would not have provided value for money, and it would have imposed disproportionately adverse effects on operators. Therefore, on the basis 19

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Table 2 Key findings from the case studies. Scheme

Quality contract scheme

Fastlink scheme

Lode Lane route enhancement scheme

ABC smart ticketing scheme

Location

Tyne and Wear

Glasgow

Solihull

Dundee

Issues with scheme design

� Nexus were first area in the UK (outside London) to try implement QCS. � Difficulties encountered due to legislation in place. � Lack of access to data and changes made during methodology. � Bus operators could demonstrate that Nexus had underestimated costs of scheme. � Nexus were unable to predict outcome of scheme. � Potential to damage bus operators’ business.

� No plans for walking or cycling infrastructure included. � Opposition from cycling activists and public. � Several delays were encountered. � 1 km of construction works remained when new hospital opened. � Delays resulted in added bus journey times. � The scheme would have been “designed better” with bigger budget.

� Time limit in order to avail of local growth funding. � Modifications were required to address local concerns. � Needed to purchase land for scheme. � Design team were required to “fudge the road space”.

Existing bus policy document, policy targets and monitoring of bus policies

� 2012 bus strategy which led the QCA has not been updated since. � Targets are less important now that QCS was not implemented. � Legislation a barrier suggesting Local Transport Act (and subsequent legislation) has flaws.

� Lack of targets in place. � Monitoring difficult due to commercial confidentiality and access to data from bus operator.

Policy implementation and identified barriers

� Opposition from bus operators. � Opposition from public and user groups. � Mistakes made by Nexus’ consultants. � Nexus short of skilled staff and expertise. � Concerns with modelling predictions.

� Opposition from public. � Delays due to money being delivered in phases. � Lack of local government interest. � SPT were short staffed. � Difficulties understanding business case. � Image problem with buses.

� Solihull has no bus strategy. � Lack of targets in place. � Policy documents considered with less importance. � Decisions are driven by local politicians. � Opposition from public. � Time limitations to prepare scheme. � Several changes occurred to scheme. � Lack of political support. � Priorities of staff an issue.

� First in urban network and Scotland to build a ST scheme. � Delays due to lack of stakeholder buy-in and relying on bus operators’ resources. � Issue with information about scheme provided online. � Issues with vending machines required for smart cards. � Took time to upload all cards for ABC product. � Bad experience could have long term impact on how smart ticketing perceived. � Dundee City has no bus strategy. � Concerns over language used to explain bus policy. � Smart ticketing can be overcomplicated. � Limited monitoring in place. � Lack of targets in place. � Loss of revenue for council parking. � Lack of coherence with road maintenance policy. � Local elections caused delays. � Conflict between bus operators and council. � Lack of data from bus operators. � Priorities of staff a barrier. � Difficulties encountered with smart cards. � Concerns for air quality with current use of Xplore Dundee bus fleet. � Lack of interaction between actors involved.

of the business case provided by Nexus (which was based on its con­ sultants’ estimates of the economics of the local bus operation, not on any financial data provided by bus operators) the QCS Board decided the scheme was unaffordable and the councils would eventually have run out of money to keep the buses running. To this day, no QCS has been successfully implemented in the UK since the possibility was introduced in the 2008 Local Transport Act, which indicates possible concerns about the legislation currently in place. However, it could also be a case that the QCS may simply not be deemed an appropriate solution in some instances.

accordance with the Fastlink Statutory Quality Partnership (SQP). This included a statutory agreement and a partnership arrangement whereby SPT provides specified facilities and sets quality standards to be observed by bus operators for using those facilities. 4.1.3. LLRE scheme In 2015, the Greater Birmingham and Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership announced the expansion of its Local Growth Fund with an extra £21.4m to be invested in the area between 2016 and 2021. The LLRE Scheme was put forward and a funding award of £1,790,000 was confirmed for delivery in 2015/16. The scheme consisted of bus priority improvements along three sections of the B425 Lode Lane corridor, but with a particular objective of enhancing connectivity between North Solihull and the UK Central Hub area to Solihull Town Centre. This scheme was of particular interest because is the busiest bus corridor in Solihull, however it was heavily congested and the bus services expe­ rienced significant delays. In November 2016, the final stage of the LLRE Scheme was completed which resulted in approximately 60% reduction in journey time, reduced congestion, and improved connectivity, reli­ ability and bus speed on the B425 Lode Lane corridor.

4.1.2. Fastlink Scheme, Glasgow The origins of the Fastlink proposal date back to the mid-1990s when Strathclyde partnership for Transport (SPT) published a set of plans for the reintroduction of trams in Glasgow. However, there were many objections to the proposed tram and the parliamentary Commissioners ruled against the scheme. It was not until 2011 when SPT achieved the support of the Scottish Government and funding to deliver the Fastlink Scheme, an enhanced bus priority corridor (with some elements of bus rapid transit, BRT) between the city centre and the new hospital. Two major contributing elements of the scheme included public transport provision for the 2014 Commonwealth Games and the new Queen Elizabeth University Hospital (QEUH) to be opened in 2015. In 2015, the Fastlink was opened and a number of local bus services registered with the Traffic Commissioner for Scotland to operate on the Fastlink in

4.1.4. ABC scheme In 2011, a study was commissioned by Transport Scotland to help improve policy towards smart and integrated ticketing. The ABC scheme was one of several pilot schemes to meet Transport Scotland’s vision to 20

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Table 3 Theoretical analysis of case studies. Theory

Case study evidence

Impact

1

Policy document

Medium

2

Availability of resources

3

Intra-organisation support and communication

4

Characteristics of organisations

5

Economic, social and political environments

6

Policy champions

7

Bureaucratic power

8

Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process

9

Policy remodelling

10

Opposition, conflict, and ambiguities

All four case studies revealed an unclear link between designing the policy, setting targets and suitable measures to achieve those targets, and monitoring those targets for successful implementation. No clear evidence that a written bus policy document is essential for implementation. CS1: QCS was financially unsustainable and rejected by Traffic Commissioner. CS2: Delays in obtaining funding and delays with delivery of scheme. CS4: Bus operators struggled to prioritise resources and deal with requests from various bodies. Also made most financial investments. Lack of knowledge, advertisement and marketing around scheme. CS3: Solihull MBC maximised the use of available funding but still ensuring that it was in place was challenging. CS1: Nexus made “changes along the way” and “some mistakes” were made by their consultants. CS2: SPT don’t have internal expertise or full powers for regulation in comparison to bus operators. Bus operators don’t have enough staff to look at radical plans to put in integrated transport systems. CS4: Lack of support within bus companies on complex issues with ABC product. Bus drivers have difficulty using product. CS3: Organisations worked together for a number of years and carried out a series of bus network reviews across region. CS1: Took a year to educate 3 people on work done in 5 years. Small firm with small legal team and economic advisers (Nexus). Bus operators commercially minded to work against QCS case. CS2: Extra workload created stress for the staff. Size of scheme and level of public engagement an issue. CS3: Workload, competency and priorities of staff a barrier. Scheme worked simultaneously instead of sequentially. CS4: Internal efforts and time by the bus operators to deliver the scheme an issue. Bus operators had an incomplete understanding of smart ticketing. Reluctant to be involved meant the scheme started later than anticipated. CS1: Nexus could not prove QCS0 affordability and value for money. QCS proposal indicated that it would not extend to Durham and Northumberland. NECA area was unable to decide on election of new mayor. CS2: Image problem associated with using bus. Competition between buses and rail. Less press coverage to encourage bus usage. CS3: Negative perception from drivers. Lack of political support around understanding bus policy. Uncertainty about what the council is trying to achieve, and reviewing bus lanes. CS4: Bus operators don’t portray benefits of using scheme. Negative perception of how some bus drivers communicate with customers. Danger that ABC product would threaten existing revenue stream of bus operators. Transport Scotland imposed scheme on bus operators. CS1: Go North East and Stagecoach were championing opposition to the policy set out by Nexus and successful in ensuring its rejection. CS2: SPT were policy champions and were committed and willing to work with other stakeholders involved. CS3: One key policy champion from Solihull 7MBC who was responsible, competent, motivated and wanted to drive change. CS4: Two key policy champions from National Express who had willingness and drive to implement scheme. CS1: Bus operators didn’t want to share data with Nexus CS4: Bus operators were reluctant to be involved in the Scheme but Transport Scotland had the power to enforce the scheme upon them. CS2: Limited evidence of bureaucratic power. CS3: Limited evidence of bureaucratic power. CS1: Relationship between Nexus and bus operators was “damaged”. Bus companies were unwilling to share data. CS2: Enabler included collaboration with locals who supported development, political buy-in, public transport agencies and operators. CS3: TfWM provided Solihull MBC with data. Atkins worked with TfWM on initial feasibility and preliminary design. Solihull MBC engaged with JLR about site. National Express shared data with Centro to carry out monitoring and evaluation. Solihull MBC collaborated with TfWM to deal with customers and general queries. CS4: Consultation and engagement took place with the stakeholders. CS1: Nexus made changes during scheme proposal. CS2: Changes required due to feedback from public. CS3: Changes include removal of cycle lanes, repairs to the canal bridge on Lode Lane and adjustments to the traffic regulation order at Ratcliffe House. CS4: Decided from the beginning how scheme would be implemented and completed without significant changes. CS1: Tyne and Wear Public Transport User Group (TWPTUG) supported the scheme but strongly opposed the opinions of the bus operators. Opposition from general public. Breakdown in the relationship between Nexus and bus operators. CS2: Delays to scheme resulted in opposition. General public concerned over appropriateness of cost of scheme. Lack of local government interest and support. CS3: Public opposition and lack of government interest and support. CS4: Bus operators had different expectations to DCC. Local and national elections delayed scheme.

introduce smarter travel across Scotland. This involved a voluntary partnership between local bus operators and local authorities, with support from Transport Scotland, as a means of introducing smarter travel. In 2016, the ABC Scheme was launched and it offers unlimited travel every day and is valid on all bus company routes across Dundee and the surrounding areas. Given the success of the ABC Scheme, it is proposed that the ABC Scheme will be extended into Angus, Perth, Kinross and Fife. It is also proposed that the scheme will extend the use of ABC smart ticketing to students, and specialist products such as EMV contactless technology will be introduced.

Mediumhigh

Mediumhigh

High

Mediumhigh

High

Mediumlow Mediumhigh

Mediumlow Mediumhigh

QCS and therefore had to interpret the legislation and regulations in a way that no other organisation had previously done, and this was a great challenge for them, which may have contributed ultimately to the scheme failing three out of the five tests of necessity for the QCS as set out in legislation. Nexus also encountered problems with scheme design because they found it difficult to prove that its benefits outweighed its costs, and ultimately a key reason for the rejection of the scheme was that the Board that judged the need for it believed that the costings provided by Nexus were unrealistic. Nexus could have potentially made better predictions if they had access to financial data from the bus op­ erators, but the operators were not legally required to provide them with this data. The Fastlink scheme also experienced some issues with scheme design. For example, no proposals for walking or cycling infrastructure were included in initial plans. This resulted in public opposition, espe­ cially from cycling activists, because of the potential danger posed to

4.2. Issues with scheme design In the case of the Quality Contract scheme (QCS), there were many such issues. Nexus, on behalf of the North East Combined Authority (NECA), were one of the first areas to put forward proposals to make a 21

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authorities are not specialists in relation to smart ticketing and therefore require simplified terminology. Similarly, Transport Scotland pointed out that there is a risk with smart ticketing as it can be over-complicated. Meanwhile, it appears that there are few targets set and limited moni­ toring in place for the ABC Scheme.

cyclists by the new traffic layout. Other delays occurred as a result of a section of the Anderson Quay that collapsed into the River Clyde, the upgrade of the Govan bus-Subway interchange and further road works and traffic management requirements. This in turn meant the scheme was not delivered on time for the opening of the new hospital, access to which was the justification for the whole scheme. There were also problems where traffic signal priority for buses was not initially planned into the scheme, resulting in added extra time to bus journeys, such that buses stopped using the Fastlink bus lanes for a period of time because they were too slow. The LLRE bus priority scheme in Solihill also experienced issues with scheme design. According to Solihull MBC, there was a time limit that they had to work towards and the availability of local growth funding also had a time limit which meant they had to “pack a lot into the timescale”. There were also a number of modifications required to address local concerns. For example, a dedicated right turn lane was required where there were concerns for the safety at a particular crossing where there were several lanes of traffic. Another issue with the design was that they needed to purchase land for the scheme. Mean­ while, an interview with Solihull Ratepayers Association indicated that they had “mixed feelings about the scheme because the road doesn’t lend itself easily to put in bus lanes”. Therefore, they believed that the design team tried to “fudge the road space”. They also felt congestion is still a barrier in the area, contrary to the findings by Transport for West Midlands (TfWM) and Solihull MBC who indicated that the LLRE scheme alleviated congestion within the area. Many barriers were also associated with the design of the ABC Scheme and this was inevitable as Dundee City Council and bus opera­ tors were the first in Scotland to start from scratch and build a smart ticketing scheme. Transport Scotland argued that delays occurred due to a “lack of stakeholder buy-in” and that relying on bus operators and their resources caused delays. There were also problems with the vending machines, in particular with the secure access modules which sit inside machines, and also configuration issues with the machines themselves.

4.4. Policy implementation and identified barriers A key barrier for the implementation of the QCS was that Nexus were unable to gain access to data from the bus operators due to strained relationships between the two. Another barrier was that mistakes were also made by Nexus’ consultants in their development of the QCS business case (based on estimated operating costs and income for the scheme, not on bus operator data) which were then picked up by the QCS Board and this was one of the reasons why they rejected the scheme. It was also discovered during the interviews that Nexus strug­ gled to compete against the bus operators because they had a smaller organisation with fewer resources to employ staff with the skills and competences required to see through a complex proposal such as the Quality Contract Scheme. There were further social and political chal­ lenges that the QCS proposal would have faced if implemented – for example, whether it would extend to Durham and Northumberland, or its relationship to plans for placing Nexus under the control of an elected mayor, but whilst potentially significant, these were not the undoing of the scheme. It would appear the greatest barrier to the implementation of the Fastlink Scheme came from public opposition, which was a result of the general public not being convinced of the benefits of the scheme. Delays also occurred as the money was delivered in phases much later than planned. A lack of local government interest and support for the Fastlink also appeared to be another key barrier – for example, Scottish Associ­ ation for Public Transport (SAPT) (a public transport lobby group) believe politicians tend to be interested in schemes that give “publicity” such as road schemes for cars, but not buses. Meanwhile, they believe the SPT were short staffed while preparing the scheme. According to the Confederation of Passenger Transport (CPT), who are an advocacy group representing operators of the UK buses and coaches, another barrier for the scheme was that “people didn’t fully understand the business case”. They also suggested that there is an “image problem [with the scheme]” and this is related to the “reliability and quality of services, cleanliness, smart ticketing etc.”. Public opposition was a key barrier associated with the imple­ mentation of the LLRE Scheme. According to Solihull MBC, there were particularly negative perceptions around reallocation of road space, priority at junctions and impact on traffic. Time limitations to prepare the scheme were another key barrier and TfWM pointed out that they were under pressure to complete various stages of the business case. They also pointed out that several changes occurred when the scheme was passed onto other teams with different roles for implementing the scheme. Political support was another key barrier and TfWM indicated that “people in general don’t like bus lanes and bus users are a voice that is not heard by politicians”. A final barrier associated included priorities of staff and TfWM pointed out that at a local level, all local authorities have staff to deliver the scheme but “too many authorities are delivering road schemes that benefit car drivers”. National Express, who are the main bus operator within Dundee (trading as ‘Xplore Dundee’), pointed out that one of the biggest barriers to impact the ABC Scheme is the revenue for parking in Dundee City, as it is “quite profitable” for DCC. Council owned parking can be cheaper than purchasing an ABC ticket and therefore driving is more attractive for vehicle owners than taking the bus. There also appears to be an issue with the information about the scheme provided online. An interview with regional transport body Tactran revealed that the information provided on the Dundee City Council (DCC) website, Stagecoach website and the Travel Dundee website described the ABC differently and therefore appeared confusing for someone looking for information about

4.3. Existing bus policy document, policy targets and monitoring of bus policies In Tyne and Wear, the PTE Nexus developed its 2012 Bus Strategy to provide the policy context for the development of the QCS and therefore as a means for achieving the ITA’s objectives. However, the interviews found concerns as to the relevance of some of the targets listed in the strategy and uncertainty as to whether there is monitoring in place. There are no monitoring documents available to check the performance of the specific targets mentioned in the bus strategy, and the Bus Strategy itself has not been updated since 2012. The Fastlink Scheme also showed examples of issues associated with policy targets and monitoring of bus policies. Although there is a long comprehensive list of targets for monitoring the Fastlink scheme, the Chair of Strathclyde Bus Partnership pointed out they “continue to fail to meet targets and this make things worse. This reinforces the decline in patronage.” They also suggested that there are many concerns over the monitoring that is in place for the Fastlink Scheme, such as commercial confidentiality issues and access to data from the bus operator. A desktop review revealed that Solihull also does not have a bus strategy or local transport plan. Instead, the area is covered in the ‘West Midlands Local Transport Plan 2011–2026’ and bus policy for Solihull is captured at a broad level within this document. There were also no specific targets set for the scheme to meet. Meanwhile, the interviews revealed that although a council can have a policy, decisions are still driven by local politicians. Finally, it was also discovered that DCC does not have a bus strategy. The majority of interviews also revealed that there are concerns over the language used to explain bus policy and many people can get “lost in translation”. For example, the bus company Stagecoach, who are the main regional operator whose network also served the city, feel local 22

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One element was rated as medium impact. This includes the exis­ tence of a policy document which was evident in CS1 where the 2012 bus strategy which led the QCS has not been updated since the scheme’s inception. CS3 also indicated documents were considered with less importance, while both CS3 and CS4 revealed that there were no bus strategies in place. Two elements were rated as medium-low impact. The first was bureaucratic power which was evident in CS1 where the bus operators did not want to share data with Nexus, however, there was limited evidence to suggest that this was a barrier in the other case studies. Meanwhile, the bus operators were reluctant to be involved in the ABC Scheme, but Transport Scotland had the power to enforce the scheme upon them. The final medium-low element included policy remodelling and was a barrier for CS1 where Nexus made changes during the scheme proposal and for CS2 where changes included removal of cycle lanes, repairs to the canal bridge on Lode Lane and adjustments to the traffic regulation. However, this was also identified as an enabler in CS4 where it was decided from the beginning how scheme would be implemented and completed without significant changes.

the scheme. Local elections also delayed the scheme. Conflict between the bus operators and the council was identified as another key barrier and Stagecoach pointed out that while the council have an obligation to provide transport for targeted groups of passengers, they don’t feel there are enough passengers availing of the ABC Scheme. Meanwhile, DCC felt bus operators were also reluctant to be involved in the ABC scheme but, ultimately, Transport Scotland had the power to enforce the scheme upon them. A lack of data provided by the bus operators was identified as another barrier and DCC pointed out that they do not receive data from the bus operators on bus patronage numbers. Priorities of staff and staff time were identified as further barriers and Stagecoach indicated that they had a lot of requests about routes and services from politicians, local government bodies, and more widely. There also appeared to be issues with the smart cards themselves. 5. Theoretical analysis and synthesis of results Table 3 presents a summary of the theoretical analysis of the four case studies. For ease of reference, CS1 refers to the QC Scheme, CS2 refers to the Fastlink Scheme, CS3 refers to the LLRE Scheme and CS4 refers to the ABC Scheme. Based on the results of the case studies, each element in the framework was ranked as high, medium-high, mediumlow, or low influence. However, as previously mentioned by McTigue et al. (2018a,b), this is a qualitative ranking by the authors not intended to provide a deeply rigorous analysis but more as a qualitative tool for the ease of presenting and discussing the results. The results show two elements of the framework were rated as high impact. The first element was the characteristics of organisations and all four case studies revealed that internal efforts such as workload, com­ petency and priorities of staff were key issues. Looking at the cases involved, this applies particularly to the public sector organisations and tends to focus on staff capacity and capability. The second was policy champions due to the importance of these identified in each case study, thus making it clear that champions can be a key enabler for bus policy implementation. Five elements were rated as medium-high impact. The first was availability of resources which was identified as an issue in all four case studies in terms of maximising funding (CS1 and CS3), delays in receiving funding (CS2) and prioritising resources (CS4). Intraorganisation support and communication was another medium-high influence, and this was particularly a barrier in CS1 and CS2 due to a lack of internal expertise when implementing the respective schemes. It was also a challenge for CS3 due to a lack of support from the bus companies involved. Another medium-high barrier was economic, social and political environments. Economic conditions were an enabler for implementing bus schemes (CS3 and CS4) while social barriers included image problem with buses (CS2), less press coverage about improve­ ments to bus services as opposed to other modes (CS2), and negative perception from bus drivers (CS2 and CS4). Political barriers were identified in CS1 where the scheme would not extend to Durham and Northumberland and they were unable to decide on the election of a new mayor. Political barriers were also identified in CS4 where the bus op­ erators feared that the ABC product would threaten existing revenue stream of bus operators and Transport Scotland imposed scheme on bus operators. Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process was also identified as a medium-high influence and this was evident in CS1 where the relationship between Nexus and the bus operators was considered “damaged”. The other three case studies revealed that collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process was an enabler for implementing bus schemes. This was due to the successful relationships between the different parties involved in implementing the schemes. The final medium-high impact element included opposition, conflict, and ambiguities and this was due to public opposition (CS1, CS2 and CS3), opposition from bus operators (CS1 and CS4), lack of local government support (CS2 and CS3) and local and national elections (CS4).

6. Conclusions The previous study by McTigue et al. (2018a,b) used a survey and interviews to investigate barriers to the implementation of bus policies by local authorities in Great Britain. The two sets of data identified the greatest challenges faced by local authorities as the availability of financial and staff resources, the existence of a clear policy document, inter-organisational communication and support, and characteristics of organisations. The relationship between setting policy objectives, selecting suitable measures to achieve those objectives, and setting and monitoring targets was identified as key to successful policy imple­ mentation. This paper complements those findings by analysing four case studies to explore the issues associated with bus policy imple­ mentation in greater depth. Table 3 presented the theoretical analysis of the case studies and it was found that the greatest influences on implementation included the characteristics of organisations and policy champions. Further elements that were considered as a medium-high impact included the availability of resources; intra-organisation support and communication; economic, social and political environments; collaboration and interaction be­ tween those involved in the policy process; and opposition, conflict, and ambiguities. One element was rated a medium impact which included the existence of a policy document. Meanwhile, two elements were rated as medium-low impact including bureaucratic power; and policy remodelling. While the three sets of data remained relatively consistent throughout the data collection process with no major changes when analysing the results, there were however some differences (as well as similarities) when comparing these results with those of the survey and interviews, which is likely to be due to the wider range of stakeholders interviewed in the case studies providing a wider range of views. In terms of similarities, the three sets of data identified the avail­ ability of resources as a key barrier to the implementation of bus policy. These findings highlight the difficultly that local authorities face in allocating resources to new transport policy initiatives. This is unsur­ prising, as lack of funding is the easiest and most natural barrier to nominate, but this does not mean that unlimited resources would ensure bus policy implementation. Nonetheless, undertaking a policy initiative without financial resources to follow it through, or at the very least knowing where those resources might come from, suggests poor plan­ ning. These findings are also consistent with Godfrey and Taylor (2018) and Preston (2016), where allocating resources to new transport policy initiatives has been a key obstacle for local authorities. The survey, interviews and case studies revealed the characteristics of organisations as a key barrier associated with the implementation of bus policy at a local level. It is therefore important that those involved in the policy process are provided with relevant training, supervision and 23

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and ABC Scheme. Moreover, it highlights how the current economic climate also affects the outcome of targets and monitoring of bus policy measures. To conclude, this paper has shed useful light on the problems asso­ ciated with bus policy within the deregulated bus sector in the UK and particularly England. Periodically, attempts have been made by gov­ ernment to improve bus services and tackle the on-going issue of declining passenger numbers and vehicle kilometres on local bus ser­ vices. These include powers in the 2000 Transport Act, and 2008 Local Transport Act, and most recently in the Bus Services Act 2017, which enables (but does not require) new types of partnerships between local authorities and bus operators; but which also provides strengthened powers for authorities to replace the deregulated system with a fran­ chised one. Importantly in the light of the Tyne & Wear case, the new Act also requires operators to disclose data for evaluation of a quality con­ tract scheme and to remove foregone profit as a criterion in an assess­ ment. Although through such measures the government is attempting to make improvements, the extent of this is contested and the outcomes uncertain, particularly in view of the economic problems that now beset the privately owned and operated bus industry in England (White, 2018). What is certain, however, is that there are areas which can be improved as identified by the case studies conducted. The findings in this paper show that policy champions and collaboration and interaction help to build a relationship between the parties involved, ensure limited changes due to bureaucratic power and changes to the policy, and help to overcome opposition, conflict and ambiguities. It is important that those involved in the policy process are provided with relevant training, supervision and support to help overcome the staffing difficulties and to deal with barriers external to the implementing organisation such as economic, social and political conditions. Authorities must also be certain from the planning stage that there are sufficient resources available to support the initiative once implemented. Finally, it is important to have clear strategies and tactics, rather than simply implementing policies that are “do-able”, which can improve policy development and collaboration, promote an environment of stakeholder engagement and help develop a sound evidence base to influence deci­ sion making and monitor performance.

support when dealing with complex policy issues. This in turn can help overcome the staffing difficulties such as shortage of staff or overworked staff and it could also help to deal with barriers external to the implementing organisation such as economic, social and political conditions. These findings are also consistent with Godfrey and Taylor (2018) who suggest that obstacles related to bus policy implementation can be minimised by effective communication and consultation within or between the organisations involved and previous work by the authors which state that intra-organisational support and communication are essential for successful implementation of bus policy. There were also several differences when comparing the results of the survey and interviews with the case studies. For example, the survey revealed that officers recognise the importance of having a stated bus policy as part of their overall transport objectives. However, the case studies enabled a deeper investigation into the importance of written bus policy and it was found that overall, there was no clear evidence that a written bus policy document is essential for implementation. The survey and interview results revealed that continued and regular monitoring of bus policy objectives is being carried out by councils. However, the case studies revealed concerns over the monitoring regime instituted specifically for the new schemes; for example, CS2 revealed that there was a lack of monitoring in place for the Fastlink Scheme. Although there are concerns about the level of monitoring, the results indicate that councils do in fact think it is important to have monitoring in place to improve their chances of future funding. This highlights the importance of having clear strategies and tactics, rather than simply implementing policies that are “do-able.” This, in turn, may improve policy development and collaboration, and promote an environment of stakeholder engagement because external stakeholders can understand the guiding logic and see evidence of progress. Moreover, robust monitoring regimes help to develop a sound evidence base to influence decision making and to monitor performance. The survey and interviews revealed limited information on bureau­ cratic power and whether it had an impact on the implementation of bus policy at a local level. However, the case studies revealed several ex­ amples of how bureaucratic power had a negative impact on councils. These examples indicate that there are issues associated with bureau­ cratic power between organisations, rather than within organisations. Moreover, bureaucratic power is particularly an issue between bus op­ erators and government bodies such as Transport Scotland and local councils. This is similar to the findings of Cowie (2014) where the study suggests the bus market cannot sustain competition or be influenced by potential competition unless an external body such as a transport au­ thority provides that function. The case studies enabled a deeper investigation into the importance of policy champions. All four case studies highlighted the importance of the role of policy champions and how they enabled the schemes to succeed, or not succeed as seen in CS1. The case studies also revealed that both policy champions and collaboration and interaction help to build a relationship between the parties involved, ensure limited changes due to bureaucratic power and changes to the policy, and help to overcome opposition, conflict and ambiguities. This confirms the findings by Van de Velde and Augustin (2014) which suggests the most successful cases for bus deregulation in Great Britain are dependent upon the management style adopted by local authorities and bus operators. The survey and interviews revealed limited information about eco­ nomic, social and political environments. However, the case studies suggest that economic conditions are a lesser barrier in comparison to social and political environments. CS3 revealed economic environments were helpful to deliver the LLRE Scheme as Solihull has the most pro­ ductive economy in the Midlands. Meanwhile, CS4 revealed that eco­ nomic environments were helpful to implement the ABC Scheme due to the small number of operators with a good operating situation. This highlights the importance of the current economic climate, which is essential for implementation of bus schemes such as the LLRE Scheme

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