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Ideology and reality in Korean behavior
GREGORY F. T. WINN
Ideology and Reality in Korean Behavior
Professor B. C. Koh's article "Chuch'esong in Korean Politics" is an insightful summary of the meanings and interpretations of the concept of chuch'esong in North and South Korean politics. Koh's analysis, however, emphasizes certain meanings of the term clmctt'esong without suggesting that changes in Korean ideological terminology have had different impacts on North and South Korean economic, domestic, and international political behavior. In discussing the political/theoretical concept of chuch'eson,g as interpreted by the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Koh tends to emphasize elements of similarity between the two political states. In overall terms, one can agree that both Koreas have developed into what can be loosely categorized as totalitarian states, but it is at this juncture that similarities between the two Koreas tend to break down. Where the term chuch'eson,g connotes "nationalism," it is similarly used by all Koreans; but this use of a universally idealized term does not afford much of an insight into Korean political ideologies and governmental systems and objectives. Where the idea of chuch'esong expresses an ideal of national individualism, it may serve as a useful concept in the analysis of long-range Korean goals; but it must be shown to be in practice a guiding principle of Korean international interactions if it is
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to have any utility in the analysis of present-day Korean political behavior. There is a clear distinction between North and South Korean pledges to the ideals of clmch'esor~g, based on the relationship of these ideals for the North Koreans to Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. Koh successfully makes this distinction, but then proceeds essentially to minimize its impact. The Marxist concept of independence cuts across national lines, specifically referring to class oppression by capitalist overlords of the masses of the world's society. No specific extranational ideology pervades South Korean society. If a separate and distinct South Korean ideology can be determined, it might be conceived as based on a concept of economic prosperity and Korean national/ cultural independence. Thus, I would argue that the concept of chuch'eson'g as variously interpreted by the North and South Koreans comes closer to explaining the divergence than the possible convergence of the two Korean polities. When North Koreans refer to chuch'esong as "independence," they mean the "independence" of the masses of the world and not simply Korean independence from "great power intervention." Lest this be thought of as just an abstract concept, the observer need only go as far as the third and sixteenth articles of the North Korean Constitution of 1972,1 and read the newspapers concerning the North Korean participation in revolutionary activities in Mexico and Ceylon, and more recently in support of Egypt in the October War. Perhaps the greatest insight to be gathered from Koh's analysis is that the same word or phrase can have diametrically opposite meanings, based upon the perspective of those who use it. Kim II Sung's concept of the "Three Technical Revolutions" has perhaps no counterpart in modern South Korean society. There is an effort in South Korea to improve the village life of the people (Saemul Movement), but there is no significant attempt to "' equalize agricultural and industrial work." Nor does the chuch'e idea, in North Korea, of narrowing the gap between light and heavy labor have a counterpart 1. See John N. Hazard's article in this issue, above. Also see the lournal of Korean Affairs, Vol. II, No. 3 (January 1973), for the text of the new North Korean Constitution adopted December 27, 1972, in which Chap. 1, Art. 3 states: "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a revolutionary state power which has inherited the brilliant traditions formed during the glorious revolutionary struggle against the imperialist aggression . . . . " Chap. I, Art. 16, states in part that: "Thestate in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism unites with the socialist countries, unites with all the peoples of the world opposed to imperialism, and actively supports and encourages their struggles for national liberation and their revolutionary struggles."
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in South Korea, unless it can also be interpreted as a narrowing of the gap between light and heavy industry. The third "technical revolut i o n " to " f r e e women from the excessive burdens of household c h o r e s " is a clear derivative of Mao Tse-tung's concept of the " F i v e News." 2 Perhaps it can be argued that South Korean women are by some traditional standards liberated (e.g., they maintain their maiden names after marriage), but it can hardly be said, under any rubric, that a significant change is occurring in the role of women in South Korea. Thus, the societal structures of North and South Korean society differ with respect to economic development, the role of labor, and the relative position of women. Furthermore, the absence of an omnipresent party system in South Korea, and the relative freedom of the South Koreans in non-political matters, is a strong point of difference with the present North Korean system. In both North and South Korea, the term chuch'esong is the focal point of a reformation in the educational system of the country. Once again, however, the same term is used to represent different concepts. The transformation within the South Korean system was made, as the Minister of Education expressed it, to teach " K o r e a n i c Democracy." a But, as Koh points out, the educational goal of the North Koreans is to p r o p a g a t e " socialist p a t r i o t i s m " and the "revolutionary world view." Despite almost identical terminology--compare Park Chung Hee's " K o r e a n i c Democracy," Ne Win's " B a s i c Democracy," Nasser's "Presidential Democracy," and Sukarno's " G u i d e d Democracy " - - n a t i o n a l governmental systems may be quite different. There are perhaps several reasons why Koh chose to emphasize, in analyzing the use of the term chuch'esong by both North and South Koreans, the element of convergence as an indicator of potential integration of the two systems. One important factor of his analysis is that it approaches the Korean political systems ,from an ideological rather than a structural perspective. Koh does, however, refer to the 2. See "The Revolutionary Women's Will Is Strong," Hung ch'i, No. 2 (February 1, 1971). Among the "Five News" of Maoist thought are the concepts that "women are a great revolutionary force" and that "women are one-half of the sky and can assume half the responsibility." Recurring themes in Maoist thought on the role of women are that "times have changed and today men and women are equal " and that "whatever men comrades can accomplish, women comrades can too." See "East China Women Workers Play Important Role in Socialist Construction," New China News Agency (NCNA) (March 10, 1971). These ideas are partially based on Lenin's statement that "the proletariat cannot achieve complete liberty until it has won complete liberty for women." See NCNA, March 8, 1971, in Survey o/China Mainland Press. 3. Korea Herald (Seoul), December 23, 1972.
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element of mutual totalitarianism, which may do more to deter than to enhance a joining of the two Koreas. Thus, it may be useful to study Korean polities from the perspective of their totalitarian structures. As Koh has suggested, both the South and the North Koreans use such terms as chuch'esong to "legitimize, consolidate, and perpetuate their respective political controls." The use of ideolgical terminology for totalitarian ends may lead more certainly toward conflict than toward peaceful consolidation of the Koreas. Dr. Lee Jae Hyon, formerly of the South Korean foreign service, has suggested that " a s long as there was democratic government in South Korea, there was no potentiality of conflict with anybody," and " i f suppressed dissidence in a dictatorial government erupts, then conflict erupts." 4 Regardless of whether Lee's assessment that internal struggles can often lead to externalized war can be empirically and theoretically substantiated, analysis of the relative totalitarian structures of the two Koreas suggests the potential of conflict, as well as of peaceful integration, between the two countries. Koh's analysis may have been influenced by the situation in Korea at the time he wrote an earlier draft of his paper (March 1973), and quite possibly by a perspective that preferred to conclude that mutual acceptance by both North and South Koreans of the term chuch'esong was yet another indicator that the first steps had been taken toward the ultimate goal of Korean unification. In 1973 and 1974, the dialog between North and South Korea has deteriorated, and the Korean debate in the United Nations has not provided a ready solution to the Korean question. Thus, it is difficult to agree with Koh's statement that " a remarkable convergence has occurred in the political systems of the two Koreas both in structure and ideology." Perhaps if the two Koreas were not geographically related, this conclusion would have less credence. Thus, if we were to compare a Communist totalitarian government, such as that of East Germany, with a dictatorship ruled by a military junta, in this case Brazil, both states might be viewed as totalitarian governments with common habits of using such terms as "independence," " d e m o c r a c y , " and "nationalism." It is doubtful, however, that our analysis of these states would conclude that there is a considerable convergence between their political systems. The reality is often the opposite of the stated principle. Chuch'esong 4. Lee Jae H y o n was formerly chief cultural and information attach6 in the South Korean Embassy to the United States. He sought political asylum in the United States on June 5, 1973, and is at present director of the Center for East Asian Studies in Washington, D.C. This statement was made by Lee in a personal interview on September 6, 1973.
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as expressed by Park Chung Hee refers to Korean self-reliance and independence in the areas of economics, internal reunification negotiations, political behavior, national defense, and ideology. The meaning of this "independence" is paradoxically reversed when South Korea's high level of international interdependence is examined. South Korea, for example, is hardly charting out an independent economic course. Its most recent five-year plan (1972-1976) has been greatly expanded in terms of projected goals. The ROK continues to set an annual GNP growth rate of 9 percent, despite the energy crisis, inflation, and the more conservative growth-rate estimates of other developing and developed nations. South Korea continues to concentrate its economic expansion plans in the area of increased exports. The goal for exports in 1974 was fixed at $4.5 billion, or an increase of 38-3 percent over 1973's export total---only slightly below South Korea's previous tenyear export increment average of 41.4 percent. The 1973 export total of $3.254 billion included over $1 billion worth each of various Korean commodities to the United States and Japan. By 1980 the goal of South Korean exporters is $10 billion, readjusted from an earlier goal estimate of $5-3 billion. This projection necessitates an annual trade growth rate of at least 25 percent, and the amount of $10 billion exceeds the total GNP statistic for the Republic of Korea in 1972.s Economic growth of this kind is highly dependent on continued positive and intensive economic relations with the United States, Japan, and countries of Western Europe. The North Koreans also show signs of becoming more economically involved with the nations of the world, with their plans to import several dozen complete factories from Russia, and their interest in importing the technology of the Japanese chemical fiber textile industry. In the international political area as well, North Korea's independent line has not meant an "isolationist" behavior pattern. We have mentioned the North Korean concepts of world revolution, but not its relatively recent "Peace Offensive." Since the Joint C0mmuniqu6 of July 4, 1972, between North and South Korea, twelve states which had recognized South Korea have also recognized North Korea. 6 Furthermore, the North Koreans achieved observer status in the United Nations through their acceptance as members in the World Health 5. See Korean Report (Seoul), Spring 1973; Korea Herald (Seoul), April 21 and 23, 1974; and DRP (Seoul), Vol. 9, Nos. 1, 2, 3, lanuary, February, and March 1974. 6. Among those countries newly recognizing the DPRK are several nations of Western Europe. South Korea, in contrast, has not been recognized since the Joint Communiqu6 by any nations that previously recognized North Korea.
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Organization and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. North Korea's active role in furthering its status has been interpreted as either a major peace-oriented change in diplomatic behavior or as a means for gaining further support in efforts to remove U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. The South Koreans, by continuing to support the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, have not initiated a foreign policy independent of foreign interventionJ Not only do the South Koreans fear the potentially unsettling effect of U.S. troop withdrawal on their national-defense and internal domestic security, but also Japanese government officials do not generally favor a U.S. withdrawal,8 and the United States feels that it must continue to demonstrate support for the South Koreans. Finally, use of the terms chuch'esong and chuch'e and similar concepts can be seen as the direct result of great-power pressures upon the Korean nations. Koh has suggested that one of President Park Chung Hee's primary motivations and justifications for the "October Revitalizing Reforms" was his reaction to the dramatic international changes resulting from President Nixon's visit to China. The impact upon North Korea of the Nixon visit and the initial Kissinger visits to China is also evident. During the first Kissinger visit (July 9-11, 1971), the Communist Chinese sent a representative to the Military Armistice Commission and United Nations Command talks at Panmunjom for the first time in five years. The Shanghai Communiqu6 of February 28, 1972, made special reference to a Chinese promise to offer their support of a negotiated settlement on the Korean peninsula. Koh's analysis of chuch'esong in Korean politics suggests many areas where the use of similar ideological expressions may indicate a new direction in the ideological path of North and South Korea toward an eventual philosophical convergence. His analysis might well be expanded to include not only the ramifications of this ideological convergence, but also an investigation of the systemic factors that might have been the basis ,for a change in ideological expression, if not in actual political behavior. This note has suggested that two important elements in an ideological analysis are (1) the motivations 7. A large majority of the U.S. troops in South Korea, with the exception of those members of the United Nations Military Armistice Commission and the United Nations Honor Guard, are not stationed in Korea under the auspices of the United Nations; they are there as a result of the bilateral security agreement signed between the Republic of Korea and the United States in 1954. 8. This view, according to Dr. Young C. Kim, who had recently returned from North Korea and Japan, was representative of the official Japanese position on the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea. Statement made by Kim in a personal interview on September 8, 1973, Washington, D.C.
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underlying a significant change in rhetoric, and (2) the relationship between changes in verbal statements and subsequent changes in actual behavior. According to a spokesman in the U.S. State Department, " W e do not see a parallel movement in the two Koreas toward mutually acceptable ideologies." o The reality of chuch'esong in Korean politics is that, though North and South Korea are using the same lyrics, they are singing different songs.
B. C. KOH
Rejoinder There is, in fact, little disagreement between Mr. Winn and myself. For much of his comment is based on what I view as a misunderstanding of my views as expressed in my paper. He appears to be 6isturbed by my use of the term "convergence," arguing that there is more divergence than convergence between the two Koreas. Since neither of us has relied on quantitative indicators to measure the distance between the political systems of North and South Korea, both of our views remain largely impressionistic and untestable. By indicating that the differences between Seoul and Pyongyang in terms of political structure and ideology have been "blurred," however, I have not suggested that there no longer remain significant differences between the two. But what is remarkable is that one of the most crucial differences between the two--the toleration of a modicum of political opposition, coupled with the availability of some restraining influences in the South Korean domestic political arena--has all but evaporated in the wake of the traumatic events of O c ~ b e r 1972. Manifestly, one can, and even should, write a paper accentuating the differences between the two Koreas. And I invite Winn to take up the challenge. Nevertheless, given what I view as the epochal sigtfificance of the new development, I have myself chosen to stress the aspects in which the two Koreas have become similar. In so doing, 9. Opinion expressed by an official of the U.S. State Department in September 1973 and in June 1974.
Ideology and Reality in Korean Behavior
Professor B. C. Koh's article "Chuch'esong in Korean Politics" is an insightful summary of the meanings and interpretations of the concept of chuch'esong in North and South Korean politics. Koh's analysis, however, emphasizes certain meanings of the term clmctt'esong without suggesting that changes in Korean ideological terminology have had different impacts on North and South Korean economic, domestic, and international political behavior. In discussing the political/theoretical concept of chuch'eson,g as interpreted by the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Koh tends to emphasize elements of similarity between the two political states. In overall terms, one can agree that both Koreas have developed into what can be loosely categorized as totalitarian states, but it is at this juncture that similarities between the two Koreas tend to break down. Where the term chuch'eson,g connotes "nationalism," it is similarly used by all Koreans; but this use of a universally idealized term does not afford much of an insight into Korean political ideologies and governmental systems and objectives. Where the idea of chuch'esong expresses an ideal of national individualism, it may serve as a useful concept in the analysis of long-range Korean goals; but it must be shown to be in practice a guiding principle of Korean international interactions if it is
IDEOLOGY AND REALITY IN KOREAN BEHAVIOR
99
to have any utility in the analysis of present-day Korean political behavior. There is a clear distinction between North and South Korean pledges to the ideals of clmch'esor~g, based on the relationship of these ideals for the North Koreans to Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. Koh successfully makes this distinction, but then proceeds essentially to minimize its impact. The Marxist concept of independence cuts across national lines, specifically referring to class oppression by capitalist overlords of the masses of the world's society. No specific extranational ideology pervades South Korean society. If a separate and distinct South Korean ideology can be determined, it might be conceived as based on a concept of economic prosperity and Korean national/ cultural independence. Thus, I would argue that the concept of chuch'eson'g as variously interpreted by the North and South Koreans comes closer to explaining the divergence than the possible convergence of the two Korean polities. When North Koreans refer to chuch'esong as "independence," they mean the "independence" of the masses of the world and not simply Korean independence from "great power intervention." Lest this be thought of as just an abstract concept, the observer need only go as far as the third and sixteenth articles of the North Korean Constitution of 1972,1 and read the newspapers concerning the North Korean participation in revolutionary activities in Mexico and Ceylon, and more recently in support of Egypt in the October War. Perhaps the greatest insight to be gathered from Koh's analysis is that the same word or phrase can have diametrically opposite meanings, based upon the perspective of those who use it. Kim II Sung's concept of the "Three Technical Revolutions" has perhaps no counterpart in modern South Korean society. There is an effort in South Korea to improve the village life of the people (Saemul Movement), but there is no significant attempt to "' equalize agricultural and industrial work." Nor does the chuch'e idea, in North Korea, of narrowing the gap between light and heavy labor have a counterpart 1. See John N. Hazard's article in this issue, above. Also see the lournal of Korean Affairs, Vol. II, No. 3 (January 1973), for the text of the new North Korean Constitution adopted December 27, 1972, in which Chap. 1, Art. 3 states: "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a revolutionary state power which has inherited the brilliant traditions formed during the glorious revolutionary struggle against the imperialist aggression . . . . " Chap. I, Art. 16, states in part that: "Thestate in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism unites with the socialist countries, unites with all the peoples of the world opposed to imperialism, and actively supports and encourages their struggles for national liberation and their revolutionary struggles."
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in South Korea, unless it can also be interpreted as a narrowing of the gap between light and heavy industry. The third "technical revolut i o n " to " f r e e women from the excessive burdens of household c h o r e s " is a clear derivative of Mao Tse-tung's concept of the " F i v e News." 2 Perhaps it can be argued that South Korean women are by some traditional standards liberated (e.g., they maintain their maiden names after marriage), but it can hardly be said, under any rubric, that a significant change is occurring in the role of women in South Korea. Thus, the societal structures of North and South Korean society differ with respect to economic development, the role of labor, and the relative position of women. Furthermore, the absence of an omnipresent party system in South Korea, and the relative freedom of the South Koreans in non-political matters, is a strong point of difference with the present North Korean system. In both North and South Korea, the term chuch'esong is the focal point of a reformation in the educational system of the country. Once again, however, the same term is used to represent different concepts. The transformation within the South Korean system was made, as the Minister of Education expressed it, to teach " K o r e a n i c Democracy." a But, as Koh points out, the educational goal of the North Koreans is to p r o p a g a t e " socialist p a t r i o t i s m " and the "revolutionary world view." Despite almost identical terminology--compare Park Chung Hee's " K o r e a n i c Democracy," Ne Win's " B a s i c Democracy," Nasser's "Presidential Democracy," and Sukarno's " G u i d e d Democracy " - - n a t i o n a l governmental systems may be quite different. There are perhaps several reasons why Koh chose to emphasize, in analyzing the use of the term chuch'esong by both North and South Koreans, the element of convergence as an indicator of potential integration of the two systems. One important factor of his analysis is that it approaches the Korean political systems ,from an ideological rather than a structural perspective. Koh does, however, refer to the 2. See "The Revolutionary Women's Will Is Strong," Hung ch'i, No. 2 (February 1, 1971). Among the "Five News" of Maoist thought are the concepts that "women are a great revolutionary force" and that "women are one-half of the sky and can assume half the responsibility." Recurring themes in Maoist thought on the role of women are that "times have changed and today men and women are equal " and that "whatever men comrades can accomplish, women comrades can too." See "East China Women Workers Play Important Role in Socialist Construction," New China News Agency (NCNA) (March 10, 1971). These ideas are partially based on Lenin's statement that "the proletariat cannot achieve complete liberty until it has won complete liberty for women." See NCNA, March 8, 1971, in Survey o/China Mainland Press. 3. Korea Herald (Seoul), December 23, 1972.
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element of mutual totalitarianism, which may do more to deter than to enhance a joining of the two Koreas. Thus, it may be useful to study Korean polities from the perspective of their totalitarian structures. As Koh has suggested, both the South and the North Koreans use such terms as chuch'esong to "legitimize, consolidate, and perpetuate their respective political controls." The use of ideolgical terminology for totalitarian ends may lead more certainly toward conflict than toward peaceful consolidation of the Koreas. Dr. Lee Jae Hyon, formerly of the South Korean foreign service, has suggested that " a s long as there was democratic government in South Korea, there was no potentiality of conflict with anybody," and " i f suppressed dissidence in a dictatorial government erupts, then conflict erupts." 4 Regardless of whether Lee's assessment that internal struggles can often lead to externalized war can be empirically and theoretically substantiated, analysis of the relative totalitarian structures of the two Koreas suggests the potential of conflict, as well as of peaceful integration, between the two countries. Koh's analysis may have been influenced by the situation in Korea at the time he wrote an earlier draft of his paper (March 1973), and quite possibly by a perspective that preferred to conclude that mutual acceptance by both North and South Koreans of the term chuch'esong was yet another indicator that the first steps had been taken toward the ultimate goal of Korean unification. In 1973 and 1974, the dialog between North and South Korea has deteriorated, and the Korean debate in the United Nations has not provided a ready solution to the Korean question. Thus, it is difficult to agree with Koh's statement that " a remarkable convergence has occurred in the political systems of the two Koreas both in structure and ideology." Perhaps if the two Koreas were not geographically related, this conclusion would have less credence. Thus, if we were to compare a Communist totalitarian government, such as that of East Germany, with a dictatorship ruled by a military junta, in this case Brazil, both states might be viewed as totalitarian governments with common habits of using such terms as "independence," " d e m o c r a c y , " and "nationalism." It is doubtful, however, that our analysis of these states would conclude that there is a considerable convergence between their political systems. The reality is often the opposite of the stated principle. Chuch'esong 4. Lee Jae H y o n was formerly chief cultural and information attach6 in the South Korean Embassy to the United States. He sought political asylum in the United States on June 5, 1973, and is at present director of the Center for East Asian Studies in Washington, D.C. This statement was made by Lee in a personal interview on September 6, 1973.
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STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM
as expressed by Park Chung Hee refers to Korean self-reliance and independence in the areas of economics, internal reunification negotiations, political behavior, national defense, and ideology. The meaning of this "independence" is paradoxically reversed when South Korea's high level of international interdependence is examined. South Korea, for example, is hardly charting out an independent economic course. Its most recent five-year plan (1972-1976) has been greatly expanded in terms of projected goals. The ROK continues to set an annual GNP growth rate of 9 percent, despite the energy crisis, inflation, and the more conservative growth-rate estimates of other developing and developed nations. South Korea continues to concentrate its economic expansion plans in the area of increased exports. The goal for exports in 1974 was fixed at $4.5 billion, or an increase of 38-3 percent over 1973's export total---only slightly below South Korea's previous tenyear export increment average of 41.4 percent. The 1973 export total of $3.254 billion included over $1 billion worth each of various Korean commodities to the United States and Japan. By 1980 the goal of South Korean exporters is $10 billion, readjusted from an earlier goal estimate of $5-3 billion. This projection necessitates an annual trade growth rate of at least 25 percent, and the amount of $10 billion exceeds the total GNP statistic for the Republic of Korea in 1972.s Economic growth of this kind is highly dependent on continued positive and intensive economic relations with the United States, Japan, and countries of Western Europe. The North Koreans also show signs of becoming more economically involved with the nations of the world, with their plans to import several dozen complete factories from Russia, and their interest in importing the technology of the Japanese chemical fiber textile industry. In the international political area as well, North Korea's independent line has not meant an "isolationist" behavior pattern. We have mentioned the North Korean concepts of world revolution, but not its relatively recent "Peace Offensive." Since the Joint C0mmuniqu6 of July 4, 1972, between North and South Korea, twelve states which had recognized South Korea have also recognized North Korea. 6 Furthermore, the North Koreans achieved observer status in the United Nations through their acceptance as members in the World Health 5. See Korean Report (Seoul), Spring 1973; Korea Herald (Seoul), April 21 and 23, 1974; and DRP (Seoul), Vol. 9, Nos. 1, 2, 3, lanuary, February, and March 1974. 6. Among those countries newly recognizing the DPRK are several nations of Western Europe. South Korea, in contrast, has not been recognized since the Joint Communiqu6 by any nations that previously recognized North Korea.
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Organization and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. North Korea's active role in furthering its status has been interpreted as either a major peace-oriented change in diplomatic behavior or as a means for gaining further support in efforts to remove U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. The South Koreans, by continuing to support the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, have not initiated a foreign policy independent of foreign interventionJ Not only do the South Koreans fear the potentially unsettling effect of U.S. troop withdrawal on their national-defense and internal domestic security, but also Japanese government officials do not generally favor a U.S. withdrawal,8 and the United States feels that it must continue to demonstrate support for the South Koreans. Finally, use of the terms chuch'esong and chuch'e and similar concepts can be seen as the direct result of great-power pressures upon the Korean nations. Koh has suggested that one of President Park Chung Hee's primary motivations and justifications for the "October Revitalizing Reforms" was his reaction to the dramatic international changes resulting from President Nixon's visit to China. The impact upon North Korea of the Nixon visit and the initial Kissinger visits to China is also evident. During the first Kissinger visit (July 9-11, 1971), the Communist Chinese sent a representative to the Military Armistice Commission and United Nations Command talks at Panmunjom for the first time in five years. The Shanghai Communiqu6 of February 28, 1972, made special reference to a Chinese promise to offer their support of a negotiated settlement on the Korean peninsula. Koh's analysis of chuch'esong in Korean politics suggests many areas where the use of similar ideological expressions may indicate a new direction in the ideological path of North and South Korea toward an eventual philosophical convergence. His analysis might well be expanded to include not only the ramifications of this ideological convergence, but also an investigation of the systemic factors that might have been the basis ,for a change in ideological expression, if not in actual political behavior. This note has suggested that two important elements in an ideological analysis are (1) the motivations 7. A large majority of the U.S. troops in South Korea, with the exception of those members of the United Nations Military Armistice Commission and the United Nations Honor Guard, are not stationed in Korea under the auspices of the United Nations; they are there as a result of the bilateral security agreement signed between the Republic of Korea and the United States in 1954. 8. This view, according to Dr. Young C. Kim, who had recently returned from North Korea and Japan, was representative of the official Japanese position on the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea. Statement made by Kim in a personal interview on September 8, 1973, Washington, D.C.
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underlying a significant change in rhetoric, and (2) the relationship between changes in verbal statements and subsequent changes in actual behavior. According to a spokesman in the U.S. State Department, " W e do not see a parallel movement in the two Koreas toward mutually acceptable ideologies." o The reality of chuch'esong in Korean politics is that, though North and South Korea are using the same lyrics, they are singing different songs.
B. C. KOH
Rejoinder There is, in fact, little disagreement between Mr. Winn and myself. For much of his comment is based on what I view as a misunderstanding of my views as expressed in my paper. He appears to be 6isturbed by my use of the term "convergence," arguing that there is more divergence than convergence between the two Koreas. Since neither of us has relied on quantitative indicators to measure the distance between the political systems of North and South Korea, both of our views remain largely impressionistic and untestable. By indicating that the differences between Seoul and Pyongyang in terms of political structure and ideology have been "blurred," however, I have not suggested that there no longer remain significant differences between the two. But what is remarkable is that one of the most crucial differences between the two--the toleration of a modicum of political opposition, coupled with the availability of some restraining influences in the South Korean domestic political arena--has all but evaporated in the wake of the traumatic events of O c ~ b e r 1972. Manifestly, one can, and even should, write a paper accentuating the differences between the two Koreas. And I invite Winn to take up the challenge. Nevertheless, given what I view as the epochal sigtfificance of the new development, I have myself chosen to stress the aspects in which the two Koreas have become similar. In so doing, 9. Opinion expressed by an official of the U.S. State Department in September 1973 and in June 1974.