- Email: [email protected]
If enforcement is not working, what are the alternatives?
International Journal of Drug Policy 17 (2006) 104–106
Response
If enforcement is not working, what are the alternatives? Kash Heed ∗ Vancouver Police Department, 312 Main Street, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6A 2T2 Received 11 August 2005; received in revised form 28 September 2005; accepted 5 October 2005
“Drug policies must be pragmatic. They must be assessed on their actual consequences, not whether they symbolically send the right, the wrong, or mixed messages.” Des Jarlais (1995, pp. 10–12). If only it were legitimate, there would be much to admire about the illicit drug industry. To start, it is highly profitable. It produces goods for a small fraction of the price its customers are willing to pay. It cleverly takes advantage of the globalization of the economy, and skilfully responds to changing markets and distribution routes. It is global but dispersed, built on a high level of trust, marketing its wares to the young without spending anything on conventional advertising. It brings rewards to some poorer countries, and employs many of the worlds disadvantaged and unskilled. Unfortunately, I am not talking about NIKE; I am describing the world drug industry. In this issue of the International Journal of Drug Policy, you have heard from individuals with expertise on the social and health impacts of illicit drug use in Vancouver. I will, however, give you a perspective that may or may not be supported by these people or others who study the drug problem. I am aware that analyzing a topic that is the subject of heated social debate may have its hazards. Many law enforcement professionals are reluctant to openly discuss the issues, and several police leaders are concerned about the prospect of losing the power to arrest people for drug offences. Police everywhere find it hard to liberalise their approach to drugs, and not just because of the UN conventions: any police leader who advocates more liberal drug laws or approaches, risks being pictured as favouring drug use. This same dilemma once held for loosening restrictions on abortion and homosexuality, on all of which law and public opinion has shifted. Fortunately, public opinion is clearly shifting ∗
Tel.: +1 604 717 2840 E-mail address: [email protected].
0955-3959/$ – see front matter © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2005.10.005
on drugs, too. Nevertheless, it is clear that law enforcement officials view the illegal drug trade and subsequent health consequences as a serious challenge, and frequently point out the threatening nature of the drug trade and its impact on society. Developing strategies to deal with the use and sale of drugs is a central theme of all plans to revitalise areas suffering from the accompanying urban decay. Many argue that the criminal justice system does not respond adequately to people who sell drugs or commit crimes to sustain a drug habit. They contend that the failure can be attributed to the inability of the various actors in the criminal justice process to see what they must do to solve the drug problem. Others suggest that substance abuse is primarily a health issue and should be dealt with by increasing services to those who are addicted to drugs, and that the criminal justice system is, at root, irrelevant to crime, that it deals with only the symptoms of underlying social problems, and that the solution to the drug problem must be found in broad-scale social change. Fortunately, most critics agree that these issues require either a national, provincial, regional, or community approach, or a combination of these approaches. This essay will concentrate largely, but not exclusively on a retrospective view – what happened and what difference did it make; on a prospective view – what will happen and what should be done; and, on an integrated approach – combining the operating styles of practitioners concerned with the drug problem in Vancouver. For the moment, though, even having an honest discussion concerning drug policy remains extremely difficult in Vancouver. The drug strategy is often characterized in the media by heated debate, disagreement, and bitterness. Points of principle have become counterproductive on pragmatic grounds. Stakeholders, subject to their different worldviews, ideologies, and frames of reference, challenge other stakeholders, while academics, policy makers, and practitioners who operate largely within their own communities, reinforce
K. Heed / International Journal of Drug Policy 17 (2006) 104–106
this condition. In addition, pure reason competes with politics in shaping the response of the government. For spectators, the process of moving from strategy to action appears to be a stalemate in most cities throughout the western world, and the participating stakeholders resemble a standoff. The drug industry is simple and profitable. Its simplicity makes it relatively easy to organize; its profitability makes it hard to stop. At every level, the risk of enforcement shapes its pricing and its structure. Getting drugs from the poor world to a rich market requires a distribution network. This is where large sums of money start to be made. The price paid to a Pakistani farmer for opium is approximately $90 a kilo. The wholesale price in Pakistan is almost $3000. The North American wholesale price is $80,000. On the street at 40% purity, the retail price is $290,000 (World Drug Report, 1997). The enormous gap between the cost of producing the drugs and the price paid by the final consumer goes a long way in explaining why some drug policies fail. Cutting off the supply at times is hopeless. The drug business is simply too profitable. People making vast profits from the drug market distance themselves from the activities on the street. They do not commit the crimes themselves, they manage criminal enterprises. I have seen first hand the large amounts of cash involved in wholesale transactions, and the subsequent wealth that these traffickers accumulate. Our aim in Vancouver is to arrest the dealers, but there are an enormous number of people who want to buy from them. So whenever we take a dealer out, the gap is filled. Enforcement is at best able to displace the market, and to keep a lid on it. Our priority is to stop the threats to public order and safety that drug dealing can bring. Enforcement everywhere ought to have effects on the supply of drugs: it should drive up the price, reduce the competition, and restrict the supply. However, the increased efforts that we have made to stem the flow do not appear to have raised the price, lowered the purity, or discouraged the purchase or use of drugs. We recognise that many of the people who are addicted to drugs must be dealt with outside of the legal system. There is an increasing consensus by our officers that drug dependency is primarily a health issue rather than a legal issue. Our officers are afforded a wide margin of discretion on arresting people with addiction problems who are found in possession of small quantities of drugs for personal use. However, these same officers are frustrated with the limited treatment resources and addiction services available despite all the attention that has been given to the Four Pillar Approach. Continually, beat officers get requests for help from distressed addicts on the street. They are discouraged by the inability to at least initiate arrangements for detoxification and treatment for those who desire it, and obviously need it. I believe the same frustration exists for other front line workers who regularly encounter these same people. The inability of “the system” to respond to immediate needs creates a huge credibility problem for any drug strategy. Addicts face social, economical, physical, and legal environments unique to their situation. Asking an addict to be patient
105
and wait for an available slot for detoxification and treatment is frankly a waste of time. The crisis will pass, and the addict will simply pick up their usual habits. The opportunity to intervene will be lost, and the addict will view “the system” as useless and ineffective. Repeated experiences of this sort simply re-enforce to the addict that he or she cannot initiate change. Police officers and other front line workers must have the ability to arrange for initial drug detoxification and steps toward treatment for those who appear to sincerely request and require it. A drug strategy that includes immediate responsive resources is more likely to be respected and utilized by addicts and professionals alike. Health apart, drugs cause other kinds of harm, not just to the individual but to society at large. Chaotic drug users are disproportionately likely to commit crimes. Given the expense of a heavy habit, crime is an obvious income source. One research project has shown that 1000 addicts committed 70,000 criminal acts during a 90-day period before their intake for treatment (Shaw, 1999). I would guess that a mere 5000 of the city’s hard drug addicts are responsible for about half of the crimes committed in the Central Business District and the Downtown Eastside. Where drug use directly harms society, the police are right to intervene. However, the best way to protect society is not necessarily to increase enforcement. If that were the right course of action, the police would begin by pursuing alcohol users who cause far more aggression and misbehaviour than any other substance, licit or illicit. During my tenure as the Head of Vice and Drugs in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, almost every week, I would unveil an eye catching, drug busting measure in front of the cameras. Nevertheless, despite some victories, we continued to struggle to get on top of the problem. I am frustrated by fighting what I see as an un-winnable battle. Continually dealing with addicted users is not the best way for police to spend limited and valuable police resources. The focus of police resources, and serious criminal penalties, should remain for producers, suppliers, and traffickers. If enforcement is unlikely to secure the fight against drug use, what other avenues are there? Through the Four Pillar Strategy, there is a willingness among all levels of government to rally together to develop and implement a coordinated, comprehensive framework for action that will help address the drug problem in Vancouver. Critical to its success will be the balance between public health and social order. The approach highlights what is required from all relevant stakeholders, which includes the very people who have the problem. It creates a framework for action to appropriately and effectively deal with substance misuse and associated crime. It clarifies that one must deal with people who have an addiction and need treatment, while clearly stating that social order and health problems related to “open air” drug use must be stopped. Building on the established implementation of pragmatic responses and effective strategies throughout the world, then
106
K. Heed / International Journal of Drug Policy 17 (2006) 104–106
applying them to the local context, a vision of the ideal model for future drug responses in Vancouver is framed by the City’s Four Pillar drug strategy. If we continue with this metaphor, and if we apply some basic rules of construction, then all the pillars will relate to one another so that their strength in unity is greater than the strength of each of them individually.
An integrated approach vision In this vision, the enforcement pillar has an acknowledged role. Police agencies have a leadership structure that is responsive to emerging concerns. They abandon politics, limit philosophical agendas, and focus on immediate problems where solutions are available. The police are involved in reducing the supply of drugs, suppressing or disrupting the drug scene, and maintaining order on the street. At the same time, the police accept addiction as a health issue, instead of strictly a law enforcement problem. They address different levels of the drug continuum. At the lower end, they refer addicts to health and social services. These services primarily deal with addicts and substance abusers who are poverty stricken, dual disordered, and in need of a multitude of different services. At the opposite end of the continuum are high-level, profitoriented traffickers who are initially and largely the concern of the police. The police actively pursue these people and expect the courts and corrections to play a role in dealing with these subjects. The addicted trafficker lies between these two groups. This individual is the “open air” dealer who is the common connection between the profit motivated wholesaler and the user. They traffic at the street-level in order to maintain their drug habit. Typically, persons in this category are chronic offenders, with long histories of trafficking related behaviour. Addiction and trafficking have become a lifestyle for these subjects. The police refer an addicted trafficker, who resists
detoxification and treatment, and continues to deal, to the legal system. An integrated approach will depend on a high degree of cooperation between the services and agencies that deal with the drug problem. All agencies (social workers, health services, police judiciary, corrections, etc.) have meaningful roles that contribute to the overall solution. Polarized debate and conflicting ideas must be left behind. Stakeholders must concentrate collectively on the issues where agreement exists, as opposed to those that breed discord. We cannot arrest our way out of the drug problem. The best way is to address the drug problem is to stop people before they start. We must proactively prevent drug use from occurring in the first place. If people are using drugs, we must try to make them stop, and if we cannot make them stop, we must try to reduce the harm that it is going to bring them, and consequently to society. This means accepting and respecting the fact that addicts are people too. They are not a lost group. They have an identity, they have stories, and they can still lead useful lives. Drug use is one of the nation’s most difficult and complex problems, and society must refuse to accept the notion that somehow it is beyond their reach to solve. Equally important is the need to refrain from the notion that unless we win unconditionally, we have failed. This is not a problem that developed overnight, and it will not be solved overnight. To begin to put into place the Four Pillar Strategy is a step forward, which is the only way to go.
References Des Jarlais, D. C. (1995). Harm reduction: A framework for incorporating science into drug policy. American Journal of Public Health, 85, 10–12. Shaw, B. (1999). Cleveland report. U.K. Drug Policy: Cleveland Police. United Nations International Drug Control Programme (1997). World Drug Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Response
If enforcement is not working, what are the alternatives? Kash Heed ∗ Vancouver Police Department, 312 Main Street, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6A 2T2 Received 11 August 2005; received in revised form 28 September 2005; accepted 5 October 2005
“Drug policies must be pragmatic. They must be assessed on their actual consequences, not whether they symbolically send the right, the wrong, or mixed messages.” Des Jarlais (1995, pp. 10–12). If only it were legitimate, there would be much to admire about the illicit drug industry. To start, it is highly profitable. It produces goods for a small fraction of the price its customers are willing to pay. It cleverly takes advantage of the globalization of the economy, and skilfully responds to changing markets and distribution routes. It is global but dispersed, built on a high level of trust, marketing its wares to the young without spending anything on conventional advertising. It brings rewards to some poorer countries, and employs many of the worlds disadvantaged and unskilled. Unfortunately, I am not talking about NIKE; I am describing the world drug industry. In this issue of the International Journal of Drug Policy, you have heard from individuals with expertise on the social and health impacts of illicit drug use in Vancouver. I will, however, give you a perspective that may or may not be supported by these people or others who study the drug problem. I am aware that analyzing a topic that is the subject of heated social debate may have its hazards. Many law enforcement professionals are reluctant to openly discuss the issues, and several police leaders are concerned about the prospect of losing the power to arrest people for drug offences. Police everywhere find it hard to liberalise their approach to drugs, and not just because of the UN conventions: any police leader who advocates more liberal drug laws or approaches, risks being pictured as favouring drug use. This same dilemma once held for loosening restrictions on abortion and homosexuality, on all of which law and public opinion has shifted. Fortunately, public opinion is clearly shifting ∗
Tel.: +1 604 717 2840 E-mail address: [email protected].
0955-3959/$ – see front matter © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2005.10.005
on drugs, too. Nevertheless, it is clear that law enforcement officials view the illegal drug trade and subsequent health consequences as a serious challenge, and frequently point out the threatening nature of the drug trade and its impact on society. Developing strategies to deal with the use and sale of drugs is a central theme of all plans to revitalise areas suffering from the accompanying urban decay. Many argue that the criminal justice system does not respond adequately to people who sell drugs or commit crimes to sustain a drug habit. They contend that the failure can be attributed to the inability of the various actors in the criminal justice process to see what they must do to solve the drug problem. Others suggest that substance abuse is primarily a health issue and should be dealt with by increasing services to those who are addicted to drugs, and that the criminal justice system is, at root, irrelevant to crime, that it deals with only the symptoms of underlying social problems, and that the solution to the drug problem must be found in broad-scale social change. Fortunately, most critics agree that these issues require either a national, provincial, regional, or community approach, or a combination of these approaches. This essay will concentrate largely, but not exclusively on a retrospective view – what happened and what difference did it make; on a prospective view – what will happen and what should be done; and, on an integrated approach – combining the operating styles of practitioners concerned with the drug problem in Vancouver. For the moment, though, even having an honest discussion concerning drug policy remains extremely difficult in Vancouver. The drug strategy is often characterized in the media by heated debate, disagreement, and bitterness. Points of principle have become counterproductive on pragmatic grounds. Stakeholders, subject to their different worldviews, ideologies, and frames of reference, challenge other stakeholders, while academics, policy makers, and practitioners who operate largely within their own communities, reinforce
K. Heed / International Journal of Drug Policy 17 (2006) 104–106
this condition. In addition, pure reason competes with politics in shaping the response of the government. For spectators, the process of moving from strategy to action appears to be a stalemate in most cities throughout the western world, and the participating stakeholders resemble a standoff. The drug industry is simple and profitable. Its simplicity makes it relatively easy to organize; its profitability makes it hard to stop. At every level, the risk of enforcement shapes its pricing and its structure. Getting drugs from the poor world to a rich market requires a distribution network. This is where large sums of money start to be made. The price paid to a Pakistani farmer for opium is approximately $90 a kilo. The wholesale price in Pakistan is almost $3000. The North American wholesale price is $80,000. On the street at 40% purity, the retail price is $290,000 (World Drug Report, 1997). The enormous gap between the cost of producing the drugs and the price paid by the final consumer goes a long way in explaining why some drug policies fail. Cutting off the supply at times is hopeless. The drug business is simply too profitable. People making vast profits from the drug market distance themselves from the activities on the street. They do not commit the crimes themselves, they manage criminal enterprises. I have seen first hand the large amounts of cash involved in wholesale transactions, and the subsequent wealth that these traffickers accumulate. Our aim in Vancouver is to arrest the dealers, but there are an enormous number of people who want to buy from them. So whenever we take a dealer out, the gap is filled. Enforcement is at best able to displace the market, and to keep a lid on it. Our priority is to stop the threats to public order and safety that drug dealing can bring. Enforcement everywhere ought to have effects on the supply of drugs: it should drive up the price, reduce the competition, and restrict the supply. However, the increased efforts that we have made to stem the flow do not appear to have raised the price, lowered the purity, or discouraged the purchase or use of drugs. We recognise that many of the people who are addicted to drugs must be dealt with outside of the legal system. There is an increasing consensus by our officers that drug dependency is primarily a health issue rather than a legal issue. Our officers are afforded a wide margin of discretion on arresting people with addiction problems who are found in possession of small quantities of drugs for personal use. However, these same officers are frustrated with the limited treatment resources and addiction services available despite all the attention that has been given to the Four Pillar Approach. Continually, beat officers get requests for help from distressed addicts on the street. They are discouraged by the inability to at least initiate arrangements for detoxification and treatment for those who desire it, and obviously need it. I believe the same frustration exists for other front line workers who regularly encounter these same people. The inability of “the system” to respond to immediate needs creates a huge credibility problem for any drug strategy. Addicts face social, economical, physical, and legal environments unique to their situation. Asking an addict to be patient
105
and wait for an available slot for detoxification and treatment is frankly a waste of time. The crisis will pass, and the addict will simply pick up their usual habits. The opportunity to intervene will be lost, and the addict will view “the system” as useless and ineffective. Repeated experiences of this sort simply re-enforce to the addict that he or she cannot initiate change. Police officers and other front line workers must have the ability to arrange for initial drug detoxification and steps toward treatment for those who appear to sincerely request and require it. A drug strategy that includes immediate responsive resources is more likely to be respected and utilized by addicts and professionals alike. Health apart, drugs cause other kinds of harm, not just to the individual but to society at large. Chaotic drug users are disproportionately likely to commit crimes. Given the expense of a heavy habit, crime is an obvious income source. One research project has shown that 1000 addicts committed 70,000 criminal acts during a 90-day period before their intake for treatment (Shaw, 1999). I would guess that a mere 5000 of the city’s hard drug addicts are responsible for about half of the crimes committed in the Central Business District and the Downtown Eastside. Where drug use directly harms society, the police are right to intervene. However, the best way to protect society is not necessarily to increase enforcement. If that were the right course of action, the police would begin by pursuing alcohol users who cause far more aggression and misbehaviour than any other substance, licit or illicit. During my tenure as the Head of Vice and Drugs in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, almost every week, I would unveil an eye catching, drug busting measure in front of the cameras. Nevertheless, despite some victories, we continued to struggle to get on top of the problem. I am frustrated by fighting what I see as an un-winnable battle. Continually dealing with addicted users is not the best way for police to spend limited and valuable police resources. The focus of police resources, and serious criminal penalties, should remain for producers, suppliers, and traffickers. If enforcement is unlikely to secure the fight against drug use, what other avenues are there? Through the Four Pillar Strategy, there is a willingness among all levels of government to rally together to develop and implement a coordinated, comprehensive framework for action that will help address the drug problem in Vancouver. Critical to its success will be the balance between public health and social order. The approach highlights what is required from all relevant stakeholders, which includes the very people who have the problem. It creates a framework for action to appropriately and effectively deal with substance misuse and associated crime. It clarifies that one must deal with people who have an addiction and need treatment, while clearly stating that social order and health problems related to “open air” drug use must be stopped. Building on the established implementation of pragmatic responses and effective strategies throughout the world, then
106
K. Heed / International Journal of Drug Policy 17 (2006) 104–106
applying them to the local context, a vision of the ideal model for future drug responses in Vancouver is framed by the City’s Four Pillar drug strategy. If we continue with this metaphor, and if we apply some basic rules of construction, then all the pillars will relate to one another so that their strength in unity is greater than the strength of each of them individually.
An integrated approach vision In this vision, the enforcement pillar has an acknowledged role. Police agencies have a leadership structure that is responsive to emerging concerns. They abandon politics, limit philosophical agendas, and focus on immediate problems where solutions are available. The police are involved in reducing the supply of drugs, suppressing or disrupting the drug scene, and maintaining order on the street. At the same time, the police accept addiction as a health issue, instead of strictly a law enforcement problem. They address different levels of the drug continuum. At the lower end, they refer addicts to health and social services. These services primarily deal with addicts and substance abusers who are poverty stricken, dual disordered, and in need of a multitude of different services. At the opposite end of the continuum are high-level, profitoriented traffickers who are initially and largely the concern of the police. The police actively pursue these people and expect the courts and corrections to play a role in dealing with these subjects. The addicted trafficker lies between these two groups. This individual is the “open air” dealer who is the common connection between the profit motivated wholesaler and the user. They traffic at the street-level in order to maintain their drug habit. Typically, persons in this category are chronic offenders, with long histories of trafficking related behaviour. Addiction and trafficking have become a lifestyle for these subjects. The police refer an addicted trafficker, who resists
detoxification and treatment, and continues to deal, to the legal system. An integrated approach will depend on a high degree of cooperation between the services and agencies that deal with the drug problem. All agencies (social workers, health services, police judiciary, corrections, etc.) have meaningful roles that contribute to the overall solution. Polarized debate and conflicting ideas must be left behind. Stakeholders must concentrate collectively on the issues where agreement exists, as opposed to those that breed discord. We cannot arrest our way out of the drug problem. The best way is to address the drug problem is to stop people before they start. We must proactively prevent drug use from occurring in the first place. If people are using drugs, we must try to make them stop, and if we cannot make them stop, we must try to reduce the harm that it is going to bring them, and consequently to society. This means accepting and respecting the fact that addicts are people too. They are not a lost group. They have an identity, they have stories, and they can still lead useful lives. Drug use is one of the nation’s most difficult and complex problems, and society must refuse to accept the notion that somehow it is beyond their reach to solve. Equally important is the need to refrain from the notion that unless we win unconditionally, we have failed. This is not a problem that developed overnight, and it will not be solved overnight. To begin to put into place the Four Pillar Strategy is a step forward, which is the only way to go.
References Des Jarlais, D. C. (1995). Harm reduction: A framework for incorporating science into drug policy. American Journal of Public Health, 85, 10–12. Shaw, B. (1999). Cleveland report. U.K. Drug Policy: Cleveland Police. United Nations International Drug Control Programme (1997). World Drug Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press.