- Email: [email protected]
Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy
Book reviews / The Social Science Journal 41 (2004) 147–161
157
history, however, the book offers a highly readable and efficient corrective to long-held public views on the subject. The endnotes indicate that Udall has, in fact, relied on much recent scholarship to present his case. While the book’s main audience appears to be casual readers unacquainted with current historical issues, it is recommended for anyone interested in the West. Wallace G. Lewis Department of Behavorial and Social Sciences Western State College, Gunnison, CO 81231, USA Tel.: +1-970-943-7011 E-mail address: [email protected] doi: 10.1016/j.soscij.2003.10.018 Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy Susan Mendus, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England, 2002, 168 pages In Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy, Susan Mendus tackles one of the central problems in western liberal political philosophy—namely, reconciling our seemingly inconsistent intuitions that impartiality has, and should have, a central place in our moral lives and that our close personal relationships often seem to preclude considerations of impartiality. Like most theorists who advocate impartiality, Mendus thinks that these things can, in fact, be reconciled. Her aim in the book is to show that partial concerns (those generated by close personal relationships) are morally important to us, yet need not conflict with impartiality. Further, and more strongly, she argues it is these very partial concerns that are able to generate the sense of justice required for impartiality. And in that, her approach is interestingly different. The book is divided into four progressive chapters, each successive one relying heavily on those that precede it. Mendus begins her discussion with an analysis of the role impartiality plays in political philosophy. In political philosophy, impartiality, she argues, is taken to reflect a commitment to equality and to justice. This is well reflected in the works she cites of John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, and Brian Barry. Mendus’ understanding of political impartiality is indicative of her contractarian leanings. So, it is not surprising that she considers the motivational force of the account of impartiality as important as the justification it offers. Following Rawls and contra Barry, she sees that one of the problems that she must address is the priority of justice in the face of pluralism, where some may not take impartiality as part of their overall conception of the good life. The recognition of this problem and the need to solve it for the success of her overall project lead Mendus to suggest that moving to a discussion of moral impartiality, rather than political impartiality, is warranted. Arguing that the priority of impartial morality will give grounds for asserting the priority of justice even in the face of reasonable pluralism, Mendus provides a framework for her discussion. The normative question of why we should be impartial has two distinct answers prevalent in the literature. Both of these Mendus takes as offering some important insights, but she argues both are ultimately flawed, before offering her own solution. The reductivist response takes the priority of impartial morality problem to be more apparent than real. This
158
Book reviews / The Social Science Journal 41 (2004) 147–161
response asserts that the reasons to act generated by friendship turn out to be grounded in the reasons to act generated by morality; thus, there is no real conflict. Further, it argues that impartial morality is necessary for genuine friendship. The identity response takes the priority problem to be real and intractable. It is real, the position states, because the reasons of morality are generated from a distinct source from the reasons generated by friendship. It is intractable because both sources of reasons involve our practical identities, and there is no principled reason to accord priority to one source of our practical identity over another. Mendus’ own response to the normative question is to begin with our partial concerns rather than to begin with a commitment to equality. She argues that this approach has three advantages: (1) it provides a defense of impartiality that is not dependent on any conception of the good (so it does not conflict with reasonable pluralism); (2) it generates a more plausible motivational story in cases in which we are tempted to disregard impartial morality; and (3) it does not understand our particular commitments as at odds with impartial morality. So, again, Mendus takes another step back. The step back in Chapter 2 is to look at impartial morality rather than political impartiality. The step back in Chapter 3 is to look at the generation of impartial morality, rather than the current state of it. Mendus argues that impartiality at the moral level (as well as the political level) arises from our partial concerns. This approach is unique in many respects. She takes this approach for two distinct reasons. First, grounding impartiality in partial concerns has some purchase on those who do not already think impartiality is part of the conception of the good. It seems most (if not all) of us have these kinds of partial concerns. Second, grounding impartiality in partial concerns provides the motivational force Mendus’ overall project requires. According to Mendus, partial concerns can provide for impartial morality because, in deciding what we care about, we are implicitly making some value judgments that are themselves morally evaluable. Further, they provide the requisite grounding because caring about things in an other-directed (i.e., not because it is for our own good) way, is a matter of being motivated by the interests of another; according to Mendus, this is fundamental to impartiality, and does not seem intuitively implausible. In the last chapter, Mendus returns to the question of political impartiality. She argues that an impartiality grounded in partial concerns can be commended to those whose conceptions of the good do not include impartiality. This is so because those people already have the kinds of concerns that can generate impartiality. Further, such a form of impartiality, even if not part of the agent’s conception of the good, is at least congruent with his or her good because the reasons of impartiality are reasons he or she already has from partial concerns. Congruence is further important, as Mendus argues it contributes to the stability of justice in the face of pluralism, which is so central to western liberal political philosophy. Yet, she states that this can do so without implying any particular comprehensive conception of the good. Mendus’ book adds to the growing literature on impartiality in an interesting way since she incorporates discussions of both moral and political impartiality and offers a different approach for generating impartiality in the first place. The book is targeted at those who already have a working knowledge of much of the literature in the area and in surrounding areas. Knowledge of the literature of John Rawls, Brian Barry, and of explanatory and justificatory reasons are particularly important. Therefore, the book is best suited to faculty and graduate students and would be inappropriate for use by all but the most advanced undergraduates. A word of caution must be made, however. Even though Mendus claims to be talking a great deal about moral
Book reviews / The Social Science Journal 41 (2004) 147–161
159
impartiality, there is much more written on the subject than she chooses to address. I believe that this is because she is employing the moral concept for a distinct political philosophical purpose. At base then, this is a work in political theory and not a work in philosophy, which may not be entirely clear from the title. Finally, the book is an interesting one, mostly due to Mendus’ unique approach of generating impartiality out of partial concerns, and her excellent use of examples, scattered throughout. And she seems to be successful in reconciling impartiality and partial concerns, if one accepts her premises. This book should prove to be usefully employed in discussions of political theory, especially those about the demands of justice and why they should have some grip on us. Ellen M. Maccarone Department of Philosophy University of Florida Gainesville, FL 32611, USA Tel.: +1-352-392-2084; fax: +1-352-392-5577 E-mail address: [email protected] doi: 10.1016/j.soscij.2003.10.019 Dereliction of Duty Robert Patterson, Washington, DC, Regenery, 2003, 216 pp. The state of national security in the United States and the war on terrorism has been the focus of much debate and scrutiny. The prevalence and scope of coverage given to such topics has increased the scholarly discussion dedicated to the security of America and her goals in foreign policy and international affairs. In particular, many choose to analyze the past and especially the actions of former presidential administrations in order to uncover any lapses in judgment that may have contributed to the current state of affairs in national security. In Dereliction of Duty, former Lieutenant Colonel Robert Patterson (USAF, Ret.) focuses attention on the Clinton administration and its management of national security. In addition, Patterson divulges specific circumstances gathered from first hand knowledge that focuses on President Clinton and his administration’s apparent disregard for the military establishment, poor judgment about terrorist attacks that occurred during his presidency, and the failure that existed in regards to the highly sensitive national security concerns trusted to him for safeguarding the United States and her citizens. It is imperative to note that on several occasions Patterson clearly states that his decision to write the book was not meant as a personal attack on the former president but rather to illustrate Clinton’s failure to lead the United States with “responsibility and honor”. It must also be noted that Patterson professes that he was never treated badly by President Clinton. Dereliction of Duty is an eyewitness report of the degradation in national security under President Clinton. Patterson organizes the book starting with an introduction of his military career and the events that led up to his acceptance of military aide to the president. In this case, Patterson’s chief responsibilities were to carry the “football” or the briefcase that held the information required to launch a nuclear attack. Due to his position and the sensitive
157
history, however, the book offers a highly readable and efficient corrective to long-held public views on the subject. The endnotes indicate that Udall has, in fact, relied on much recent scholarship to present his case. While the book’s main audience appears to be casual readers unacquainted with current historical issues, it is recommended for anyone interested in the West. Wallace G. Lewis Department of Behavorial and Social Sciences Western State College, Gunnison, CO 81231, USA Tel.: +1-970-943-7011 E-mail address: [email protected] doi: 10.1016/j.soscij.2003.10.018 Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy Susan Mendus, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England, 2002, 168 pages In Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy, Susan Mendus tackles one of the central problems in western liberal political philosophy—namely, reconciling our seemingly inconsistent intuitions that impartiality has, and should have, a central place in our moral lives and that our close personal relationships often seem to preclude considerations of impartiality. Like most theorists who advocate impartiality, Mendus thinks that these things can, in fact, be reconciled. Her aim in the book is to show that partial concerns (those generated by close personal relationships) are morally important to us, yet need not conflict with impartiality. Further, and more strongly, she argues it is these very partial concerns that are able to generate the sense of justice required for impartiality. And in that, her approach is interestingly different. The book is divided into four progressive chapters, each successive one relying heavily on those that precede it. Mendus begins her discussion with an analysis of the role impartiality plays in political philosophy. In political philosophy, impartiality, she argues, is taken to reflect a commitment to equality and to justice. This is well reflected in the works she cites of John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, and Brian Barry. Mendus’ understanding of political impartiality is indicative of her contractarian leanings. So, it is not surprising that she considers the motivational force of the account of impartiality as important as the justification it offers. Following Rawls and contra Barry, she sees that one of the problems that she must address is the priority of justice in the face of pluralism, where some may not take impartiality as part of their overall conception of the good life. The recognition of this problem and the need to solve it for the success of her overall project lead Mendus to suggest that moving to a discussion of moral impartiality, rather than political impartiality, is warranted. Arguing that the priority of impartial morality will give grounds for asserting the priority of justice even in the face of reasonable pluralism, Mendus provides a framework for her discussion. The normative question of why we should be impartial has two distinct answers prevalent in the literature. Both of these Mendus takes as offering some important insights, but she argues both are ultimately flawed, before offering her own solution. The reductivist response takes the priority of impartial morality problem to be more apparent than real. This
158
Book reviews / The Social Science Journal 41 (2004) 147–161
response asserts that the reasons to act generated by friendship turn out to be grounded in the reasons to act generated by morality; thus, there is no real conflict. Further, it argues that impartial morality is necessary for genuine friendship. The identity response takes the priority problem to be real and intractable. It is real, the position states, because the reasons of morality are generated from a distinct source from the reasons generated by friendship. It is intractable because both sources of reasons involve our practical identities, and there is no principled reason to accord priority to one source of our practical identity over another. Mendus’ own response to the normative question is to begin with our partial concerns rather than to begin with a commitment to equality. She argues that this approach has three advantages: (1) it provides a defense of impartiality that is not dependent on any conception of the good (so it does not conflict with reasonable pluralism); (2) it generates a more plausible motivational story in cases in which we are tempted to disregard impartial morality; and (3) it does not understand our particular commitments as at odds with impartial morality. So, again, Mendus takes another step back. The step back in Chapter 2 is to look at impartial morality rather than political impartiality. The step back in Chapter 3 is to look at the generation of impartial morality, rather than the current state of it. Mendus argues that impartiality at the moral level (as well as the political level) arises from our partial concerns. This approach is unique in many respects. She takes this approach for two distinct reasons. First, grounding impartiality in partial concerns has some purchase on those who do not already think impartiality is part of the conception of the good. It seems most (if not all) of us have these kinds of partial concerns. Second, grounding impartiality in partial concerns provides the motivational force Mendus’ overall project requires. According to Mendus, partial concerns can provide for impartial morality because, in deciding what we care about, we are implicitly making some value judgments that are themselves morally evaluable. Further, they provide the requisite grounding because caring about things in an other-directed (i.e., not because it is for our own good) way, is a matter of being motivated by the interests of another; according to Mendus, this is fundamental to impartiality, and does not seem intuitively implausible. In the last chapter, Mendus returns to the question of political impartiality. She argues that an impartiality grounded in partial concerns can be commended to those whose conceptions of the good do not include impartiality. This is so because those people already have the kinds of concerns that can generate impartiality. Further, such a form of impartiality, even if not part of the agent’s conception of the good, is at least congruent with his or her good because the reasons of impartiality are reasons he or she already has from partial concerns. Congruence is further important, as Mendus argues it contributes to the stability of justice in the face of pluralism, which is so central to western liberal political philosophy. Yet, she states that this can do so without implying any particular comprehensive conception of the good. Mendus’ book adds to the growing literature on impartiality in an interesting way since she incorporates discussions of both moral and political impartiality and offers a different approach for generating impartiality in the first place. The book is targeted at those who already have a working knowledge of much of the literature in the area and in surrounding areas. Knowledge of the literature of John Rawls, Brian Barry, and of explanatory and justificatory reasons are particularly important. Therefore, the book is best suited to faculty and graduate students and would be inappropriate for use by all but the most advanced undergraduates. A word of caution must be made, however. Even though Mendus claims to be talking a great deal about moral
Book reviews / The Social Science Journal 41 (2004) 147–161
159
impartiality, there is much more written on the subject than she chooses to address. I believe that this is because she is employing the moral concept for a distinct political philosophical purpose. At base then, this is a work in political theory and not a work in philosophy, which may not be entirely clear from the title. Finally, the book is an interesting one, mostly due to Mendus’ unique approach of generating impartiality out of partial concerns, and her excellent use of examples, scattered throughout. And she seems to be successful in reconciling impartiality and partial concerns, if one accepts her premises. This book should prove to be usefully employed in discussions of political theory, especially those about the demands of justice and why they should have some grip on us. Ellen M. Maccarone Department of Philosophy University of Florida Gainesville, FL 32611, USA Tel.: +1-352-392-2084; fax: +1-352-392-5577 E-mail address: [email protected] doi: 10.1016/j.soscij.2003.10.019 Dereliction of Duty Robert Patterson, Washington, DC, Regenery, 2003, 216 pp. The state of national security in the United States and the war on terrorism has been the focus of much debate and scrutiny. The prevalence and scope of coverage given to such topics has increased the scholarly discussion dedicated to the security of America and her goals in foreign policy and international affairs. In particular, many choose to analyze the past and especially the actions of former presidential administrations in order to uncover any lapses in judgment that may have contributed to the current state of affairs in national security. In Dereliction of Duty, former Lieutenant Colonel Robert Patterson (USAF, Ret.) focuses attention on the Clinton administration and its management of national security. In addition, Patterson divulges specific circumstances gathered from first hand knowledge that focuses on President Clinton and his administration’s apparent disregard for the military establishment, poor judgment about terrorist attacks that occurred during his presidency, and the failure that existed in regards to the highly sensitive national security concerns trusted to him for safeguarding the United States and her citizens. It is imperative to note that on several occasions Patterson clearly states that his decision to write the book was not meant as a personal attack on the former president but rather to illustrate Clinton’s failure to lead the United States with “responsibility and honor”. It must also be noted that Patterson professes that he was never treated badly by President Clinton. Dereliction of Duty is an eyewitness report of the degradation in national security under President Clinton. Patterson organizes the book starting with an introduction of his military career and the events that led up to his acceptance of military aide to the president. In this case, Patterson’s chief responsibilities were to carry the “football” or the briefcase that held the information required to launch a nuclear attack. Due to his position and the sensitive