Improving international space cooperation: Considerations for the USA

Space Policy 26 (2010) 143e151

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Improving international space cooperation: Considerations for the USA James D. Rendleman a, J. Walter Faulconer b, * a b

Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA Strategic Space Solutions, LLC, P.O. Box 223, Glenelg, MD 21737-0223, United States

a b s t r a c t In 2000 there were 40 different countries that had registered space agencies. By 2009 that number had continued to grow to 55. This article discusses how cooperation allows a nation to leverage resource and reduce risk; improve global engagement; and enhance diplomatic prestige of engaged states, political sustainability and workforce stability. The obstacles and impediments to cooperation are substantial, and are manifested through various anticollaborative behaviors. To achieve success, these obstacles and impediments must be understood and confronted. The article examines the substantial challenges posed by technology transfer constraints, international and domestic politics, and exceptionalism perspectives. Given the imperative to cooperate, four frameworks (cooperation, augmentation, interdependence, and integration) can be employed to overcome these challenges and achieve success. Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Over the past 50 years, humans have made significant strides in space exploration. What rises above the specific details of these accomplishments, however, is the worldwide effort and cooperation that made them possible. Spoken by Dr. Scott Horowitz, then NASA Associate Administrator for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, in 2006,1 these words speak to the best of the human spirit. And it was in a similar spirit of collaboration that US President Barack Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed on 24 November 2009 to expand cooperation to civil space, less than a week after Obama had returned from Beijing, where he and Chinese President Hu Jintao pledged to expand dialogue between the US and Chinese space agencies. However, one must contrast these developments to the statement from then candidate Obama, on 22 October 2008, following India’s launch of its first lunar mission, Chandrayaan-1. With India’s launch of its first unmanned lunar spacecraft following closely on the heels of China’s first spacewalk, we are reminded just how urgently the United States must revitalize its space program if we are to remain the undisputed leader in space, science, and technology.2

* Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (J.W. Faulconer). 1 Scott J. Horowitz, “Nations in Space,” cited in “Future of Space Exploration Depends on International Cooperation, America.gov, October 11, 2006, http://www. america.gov/st/scitech-english/2006/October/20061011113830lcnirellep0.9637567. html, accessed November 29, 2009. 2 Barack Obama 2008, Press Release, October 22, 2008. 0265-9646/$ e see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2010.06.008

A turnabout? Maybe, but the reality is that the USA is the absolute leader in terms of human, science and commercial spaceflight. So what are the USA’s real interests in international space cooperation? Does it need to cooperate as a fundamental part of its space strategy? The US National Space Policy accurately proclaims that for five decades the nation “has led the world in space exploration and use and has developed a solid civil, commercial, and national security space foundation. Space activities have improved life in the United States and around the world, enhancing security, protecting lives and the environment, speeding information flow, serving as an engine for economic growth, and revolutionizing the way people view their place in the world and the cosmos.”3 International interest in space continues to grow. In 2000 there were 40 different countries that had registered space agencies. By 2009 that number had continued to grow to 55. The National Space Policy’s assertions of US space leadership are easily supported by studies including the Futron Corporation annual 2009 Space Competitive Index. This assessment contends that the USA still makes the largest investment in its space community in terms of its human capital 4: “The [US] remains the current leader in space competitiveness, but its relative position has declined marginally based on increased activity by other spacefaring nations. The US still leads in each of the major categories: government, human capital, and industry, however, its comparative advantage is narrowing.”5

3 4 5

Fact Sheet on the U.S. National Space Policy, August 31, 2006, p. 1. Futron’s 2009 Space Competitiveness Index, Executive Summary, p. 3. Ibid.

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The National Space Policy also declares that the conduct of U.S. space programs is guided by the following principle: The United States will seek to cooperate with other nations in the peaceful use of outer space to extend the benefits of space, enhance space exploration, and to protect and promote freedom around the world.6 This sentiment is growing. As we will discuss, there is considerable justification for this. Indeed, the new NASA Administrator, Charles Bolden, has announced that greater international cooperation is coming, affirming his belief that the two organizations who do more for US diplomacy than anyone else are its armed forces and NASA. Changes in future international cooperation, he added, would include “non-traditional partners”, such as China. At a luncheon in 2009 jokingly commented: “I0 d rather work with them than fight them.”7 We believe there is a strong and powerful case to be made for the USA to increase its international space cooperation activities. Cooperation allows a nation to leverage resources and reduce risk; improve global engagement; and enhance diplomatic prestige of engaged states, political sustainability and workforce stability. Yet, although the case for international space cooperation is powerful, from a US perspective, its success is often achieved only after great expense, as demonstrated by problems that arose within the International Space Station (ISS) and James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) programs. The obstacles and impediments to cooperation are substantial, and are manifested through various anti-collaborative behaviors. To achieve success, these obstacles and impediments must be understood and confronted. To that end, we will examine the substantial challenges posed by technology transfer constraints, international and domestic politics, and exceptionalism perspectives. We then discuss four frameworks (cooperation, augmentation, interdependence, and integration) to overcome these challenges and achieve success.

2. The case for collaboration The hope in international projects is that one plus one will equal threedthat the diverse resources, skills, and technologies of the partners will achieve synergy, adding up to more than the sum of their parts.8 NASA certainly believes in the promise of cooperation. Of its 42 ongoing space and Earth science missions, over half have international participation. Of missions it has under development, nearly two-thirds involve international contribution and participation. Much of the astronomy and astrophysics community is gratified to see that NASA is leveraging and expanding international investments in its great science enterprise.9 International cooperation on space missions is not new. Successful elements of collaboration, shown in Table 1, have been around since the beginning of the Space Age. Intelsat’s success provides a good example. Intelsat began in 1964 with 11 participating countries; it launched the first commercial international geosynchronous communication satellite the following year. By 1973, there were 80 signatories, and it was providing service to over 600 Earth stations in more than 149 countries, territories, and dependencies.10 Intelsat’s early substantial funding came from

Table 1 Factors supporting international cooperation/collaboration. Cost sharing e not enough money to go alone Foreign policy goals e space cooperation is part of a larger package Building political support Insight into partner capabilities, approaches & plans Expand scientific/instrument spaceflight opportunities e open the door to more launch opportunities for “ride-sharing”

participating national governments. It developed none of its own hardware; instead, Intelsat purchased system capabilities from global aerospace commercial companies.11 By the end of the 20th century, its resource sharing and administrative scheme had helped shepherd in a global communications market era. Commercial entities involved in entertainment, news, internet, government services, and telecommunications now spend more on space than all the world’s governments combined. Intelsat became a purely commercial entity in 2000, and continues to expand.12 ESA is another oft-cited example of international collaboration. ESA currently has 18 member states.13 And since 1975 has focused on supporting commercial companies in Europe, doing this by investing in and developing technologies to enable it to compete in the global space market. With most individual nations in Europe generally too small to develop a sound and comprehensive space program on their own, the ESA confederation has proven valuable in leveraging member resources. Jean-Jacques Dordain, Director General of ESA, has stated: “We know now that it is always easier not to cooperate, but that it is always more difficult to succeed alone.”14 ESA’s governance structure works. It has helped rationalize European space efforts, usually allocating expenditures among members based on their relative technical strengths. It has also helped achieve standardization and interoperability among Europe’s space systems. Nevertheless, member nations have to reconcile their industrial space priorities with those emphasized by ESA’s leadership. These may differ. Internecine squabbles have generated much rhetoric. ESA’s spending priorities have been criticized; some argue that the framework unfairly favors French, German, and Italian interests in spending, but the same nations are also its largest contributors. And while France’s space agency receives a budget which is double the amount it contributes to ESA, without the ESA funding framework, France would arguably never have been able to put together resources to fund the immense Ariane rocket system and the spacecraft buses used by Europe’s EADS Astrium and Alcatel Alenia Space. Thus, cooperation has been a tremendous boon to France’s national space aspirations, and to other European consortiums and industrial concerns that are now able to participate in space activities. 3. Resource and risk sharing Cost motivations are the most important rationale given for cooperation. Space endeavors are very expensive and are thus highly debated, especially the returns on investment. International cooperation offers the potential to reduce the burden of gaining access to space by even the poorest of nations. It does this by

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Ibid. Recently it consolidated its global dominance in satellite communications by acquiring rival PanAm Sat. 13 ESA is not an agency or part of the European Union (EU) and has non-EU nations as members, though some think that ESA is the de facto space agency of the EU. There are ties between the two and the member states, and moves are afoot to better define the status of the ESA with respect to the EU. As security dimensions to European space activities grow, some believe ESA will become more fully integrated into the EU governing structures. 14 Jean-Jacques Dordain, “International Cooperation in Space,” remarks at 40th Anniversary of the Universities Space Research Association (USRA), March 26, 2009. 12

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Fact Sheet on the U.S. National Space Policy, supra., p. 1. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics/Women-in-Aerospace joint luncheon with speaker, NASA administrator Charles Bolden, 2009. 8 “International Cooperation: When 1 þ 1 ¼ 3”, Toshifumi Mukai, ASK Magazine, NASA, Summer 2008, pg. 8. 9 Remarks by Shana Dale at AAS/AIAA Seminar on the Importance of International Collaboration in Space Exploration, Nov 1, 2006. 10 Ryan Zelnio, “A model for the international development of the Moon,” The Space Review, December 5, 2005. 7

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spreading the resource investments and expenditures among cooperating nations. Observers have concluded that as per-partner costs decrease, the per-partner utility of international cooperation increases.15 Cooperation reduces exposure by spreading the risk of failure and allows a spacefaring state to draw in outside resources. This is especially compelling for nations whose resources are insufficient to attain any substantial space operational and technical goals. Even the well-endowed ESA has engaged the USA and Japan to join what were previously traditional European science missions as a way to rescue its mission portfolio from increased cost-growth.16 Similarly, Chandraayan, India’s first satellite to the Moon, was launched in 2008 carrying two primary instruments to help locate water and other resources. The USA contributed these to the mission. They cost more than the amount India spent building and integrating the balance of the spacecraft and the launch vehicle. International cooperation offers the opportunity to improve the efficacy of the expenditures. Resources can be rationalized, standardized, and made interoperable to bring about the best and most efficient use of research, development, procurement, support, and production resources. This fosters effective operations. So if a hypothetical space partnership involves two nations, one with sophisticated remote sensing engineering capabilities, and the other, spacelift, a rational approach would allocate program activities in accord with these strengths. International cooperation can provide a strong and essential benefit by providing programmatic redundancy, as happened when Russian Soyuz craft were able to provide transportation to the ISS following the loss of the Shuttle Challenger. Standardization of hardware, software, procedures, and the like helps to achieve a closer practical cooperation among partners. It does this through an efficient use of resources and reduction of operational, logistic, communications, technical, and procedural obstacles. It is telling that international partnerships usually begin their efforts by standardizing administrative, logistic, and operational procedures. Originators of standardizing systems and procedures often become the de facto leaders of collaborative efforts. Finally and closely related to standardization, interoperability is essential. “Designing for programmatic redundancy provides a strong argument for interoperability between nations’ space exploration assets, as this would allow nations to substitute each other’s critical capabilities with relative ease.”17 Nations whose space systems are interoperable can operate together more effectively. Designing for interoperability enables them to substitute each other’s critical capabilities with relative ease,18 and provides much needed redundancy in the event one nation cannot supply a key service or component for any number of reasons. Space programs can use the important capabilities provided by rationalization, standardization and interoperability to: communicate; efficiently integrate and synchronize operations; enable data and information exchanges; share consumables and resources; enhance effectiveness by optimizing individual and combined capabilities of equipment; increase efficiency through common or compatible support and systems; and assure technical compatibility by developing standards for equipment design, employment, maintenance, and updating them. With rationalization,

15 D. A. Broniatowski, G. Ryan Faith, and Vincent G. Sabathier, “The Case for Managed International Cooperation in Space Exploration,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2006. 16 “Fighting Inflation, ESA Science Candidates Pushing the Cost Curve Could be Saved by U.S. and Japanese Roles,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 7, 2009, Pg. 46. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.

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standardization, and interoperability, nations that are likely to join a partnership can properly prepare to perform their responsibilities.

4. Global engagement For thousands of years, tribes, then cities, states, and nations, have formed cooperative agreements, partnerships and relationships with others to promote matters of mutual interest, such as security and self defense, commerce, and humanitarian assistance. Cooperation presents an opportunity to develop dependencies among nations that may obviate conflict. Such sharing also gives a nation an opportunity to gain what may be a rare insight into what a competitor or adversary knows about space technologies and how they can be employed. This understanding can help reduce the need to prepare for doomsday scenarios where one imagines or projects the technologies that an adversary could develop, regardless of the technical merit or reality. Today, international cooperation extends to a whole host of scientific endeavors, reflecting the best spirit and intentions of the Outer Space Treaty, whose preamble calls for space to be used for “peaceful purposes.”19 This has been the hope since the beginnings of the space era. In 1955, before the very first successful space launches, cooperation was declared a centerpiece of US foreign policy strategy when the White House announced: The President has approved plans by this country for going ahead with launching of small unmanned earth-circling satellites as part of the United States participation in the International Geophysical .This program will for the first time in history enable scientists throughout the world to make sustained observations in the regions beyond the earth’s atmosphere.20 The full realization of cooperation’s promise occurred nearly four decades later with the end of the Cold War. Space and Earth science research and space exploration were no longer constrained by an overarching competition between two superpowers. Capitalizing on opportunities and leveraging the expertise of other nations, those seeking to jumpstart or advance their scientific initiatives rushed into the new multi-polar world creating a surplus of international space alliances and partnerships.21 The USA is continuing this trend by reaching out more constructively to large nuclear global powers like India and China, in the hope that such engagement shapes their future space and engineering activities in positive directions. Of course, a nation’s decision to engage in space cooperation is very much a political decision. Nations pick and choose if, when, where, and how they expend their national treasure. They choose the manner and extent of their foreign investments for reasons both known and unknown to other nations. The only constant is that a decision to “join in” cooperation is, in every case, a calculated political decision by each potential member of a commercial partnership or alliance, or inter- or quasi-governmental structure. Private commercial investments are

19 See generally, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, other known as the Outer Space Treaty (1967). Article III of the Treaty declares that states parties must conduct their space activities “in the interest of maintaining international peace and security.” The treaty’s preamble also recognizes “the common interest of all mankind in the progress of exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes”. 20 Statement by James C. Hagerty, White House, July 29, 1955. 21 Approaches to Future Space Cooperation and Competition in a Globalizing World, National Research Council, 2009, pg. 1.

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nearly always controlled at a national level, usually by the force of domestic (municipal) law, regulation, or licensing.22 National decision-making influences commercial and government entity governing structures. Accordingly, some space capabilities will be funded, developed, and offered if and only if they are strictly operated and controlled under specific national direction and within strategic national guidelines. Thus, military space cooperation tends to occur only when overarching national security military and intelligence community interests are satisfied. In contrast, international civil cooperation generally wins internal national political support for a different set of reasons: that is, if the cooperation generates national diplomatic prestige, provides for political sustainability, or enables workforce stability.23 4.1. Diplomatic prestige Cooperation provides opportunities for a nation to demonstrate its international leadership and technical prowess. For example, India has used its recent launches to host payloads from a number of international partners. South Korea is leveraging Russian launch technology to attempt space launches of satellites in support of its dream to become a “top ten” space fairing nation. Russia and China launch satellites for much of the global spacefaring community. Ultimately, support for cooperation and collaboration increases when the perceived utility and diplomatic prestige derived from cooperation increases. A demonstration of the utility of diplomatic prestige gained from space cooperative endeavors can be seen in the ApolloeSoyuz space link-up (1975) and Space ShuttleeMir docking (1995) missions, though not for reasons contained in the public pronouncements by the participants Their true and complex diplomatic utility was not made apparent for many years. As described by James Oberg: Only with the Soviet program at a standstill did Moscow agree to fly a joint orbital mission. Its fallback position was that if it couldn’t be Number One in space, it could at least pose as the equal partner of the new Number One, the United States. It was better than letting on how far behind its space program had fallen.24

the program even when the perceived justification has collapsed. Now the new internationalist US president doesn’t care much for the NASA manned mission, and has even less understanding of its science mission. But critics concede that the president sees value in the votes its engineering and contractor community represents, key especially in vote rich states such as Florida which serve as a nexus for manned US launches. Similarly, some reason the political and diplomatic integration of Russia into the ISS program may well have saved it and Space Shuttle programs from cancellation.25 Once cooperation has commenced, canceling a program becomes inconsistent with political sustainability as long as the utility cost associated with the loss of diplomatic benefits and the negative effects on reputation of terminating an international agreement is larger in magnitude than the utility cost that must be paid to maintain the system. In general, any unilateral action sends a signal that the actor is an unpredictable and therefore an unreliable and possibly disrespectful partner. This tends to sabotage the possibility of future cooperation.26 If significant cooperation has never previously occurred, its commencement is thought to be a defining event, delivering specific political rewards and diplomatic utility. This is why the recent pronouncements on space cooperation made by President Obama and Chinese officials during his November 2009 visits are being watched with special interest. The same attention is being paid to the discussions held with the Indian government and its space community. During the height of the Cold War the USA and the USSR were able to find common ground to press on with the ApolloeSoyuz mission despite longstanding security concerns. Perhaps similar common ground can be found with the Chinese. Lamentably, space cooperation between the two countries has thus far been only marginal given the strict security controls that needed to be imposed. The Chinese, like many others, are exploiting space technologies to improve missile systems that can deliver weapons of mass destruction and they are stealing every technology they can get their hands on. China has now tested a kinetic-kill anti-satellite weapon system.

4.3. Workforce stability 4.2. Political sustainability International cooperation has the wonderful, if sometimes wasteful, capacity to increase the political will to sustain and fund space programs and associated budgets. As noted, cooperation provides a spacefaring state the basis to draw on additional resources. It also enables a program to weather attempts to rein it in even when faced with contentious and devastating cost-growth or budget realities (which most space programs invariably face). Thus, within the USA, a program often wins some sanctuary from cancellation threats or significant budget reductions to the extent that Congress and the administration feel compelled not to break, stretch, or withdraw from international agreements. Political good will is generated by funding these programs. As an example of the power of this good will, one only need look at the politics surrounding NASA’s manned program. Money has been allocated to

22 The Outer Space Treaty and associated Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects(1972) also known as the Liability Convention provide an underlying basis for this regulation, to address liability issues of launching states arising out of their activities. 23 D. A. Broniatowski et al., “The Case for Managed International Cooperation.,” supra. 24 James Oberg, “The real lessons of international cooperation in space,” The Space Review, July 18, 2005.

Scientific research, engineering, and innovation are at the heart of the success of the US economy and world leadership. Some argue that the Apollo Moon landing program laid the technical foundations and infrastructure underpinning advances by the USA for the next 40 years. It inspired hundreds of thousands to become engineers and live on the innovation frontlines. Its communications, weather, precision navigation and timing, surveillance and warning satellites systems became part of a revolution that connected the USA and the rest of the world. Even when interest in manned space programs waned, the engineers it generated drove a technological innovation engine that sparked many years of advances across many other arenas. These successes rightly led to the 20th century being called the American Century. Over the past 50 years, 50e85% of the growth in America’s gross national product (GNP) can be attributed to its science and engineering strengths. As noted in a recent report published by the National Academy of Sciences, “scientists and engineers tend, through innovation, to create new jobs not only for themselves but

25 In the year before Russia was introduced as a partner, the ISS was saved by a single vote in Congress. See D. A. Broniatowski et al, “The Case for Managed International Cooperation.,” supra. 26 D. A. Broniatowski et al, “The Case for Managed International Cooperation.,” supra.

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also for workers throughout the economy.”27 They generate economic growth for others unlike many other elements of society, and this success is highly leverageddonly 4% of the US workforce is involved in engineering and science.28 Many other nations are eager to duplicate this success. They are working diligently to grow indigenous capabilities to exploit orbital space for their own commercial or military gain, or for national pride. This has all had the effect of generating considerable interest from other nations and commercial entities to seek space cooperation with USA and other potential partners. Initially such space cooperation might be perceived as inimical to the US aerospace industrial base: cooperation could cause decreased domestic employment because foreign nations could then build space systems and components that might otherwise have been constructed in the USA. India and China are producing huge numbers of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) qualified manpower in their rush to become first-tier superpowers. This is problematic for the USA, as cooperation with such states could allow them eventually to better engineer and then undercut US markets. While international space programs often survive the US Congress’ budget knife for the prestige and political reasons described above, spending on cooperative programs also generates large numbers of jobs. In turn, these can serve as key sources of revenue in local communities or among leading edge and educated engineering constituencies. Those who are employed in such programs benefit from the government largess that arises out of the cooperative space effort’s prestige and political support. On the other hand, the prospective loss of aerospace community jobs and revenue can easily pose a serious political problem for both the administration and Congress. Given this, political appointee and elected official perceptions of ongoing international cooperation programs is a matter of great importance. 5. International cooperation can be too expensive International cooperation efforts are often secured only at a tremendous expense. The ISS can be considered a stunning melding of international politics, technology, and cooperation, whose research capabilities and benefits have been much trumpeted. However, the ISS has turned out to be a very expensive offering on the altar of international cooperation. Billions of dollars have been squandered in order to construct, supply, and operate it. Its success has been forged only to the detriment of other much more scientifically productive projects such as robotic spacecraft missions and little scientific research on it has been planned and executed.29 There are also technical deficiencies in the ISS design that limit its utility, including its need for high levels of maintenance to be carried out by the crew, accomplished via recurring and risky extra-vehicular activities. The high inclination of the station’s orbit also leads to a higher cost for US-based Space Shuttle launches to the station.30

27 Rising Above the Gathering Storm, National Academies of Engineering, Washington, DC (2007), p. 29. 28 Norm Augustine, Competing in the New World Economy, Testimony before Congress, January 2009. 29 “The world’s most expensive scientific laboratory installed additional solar panels yesterday, capable of producing 100 kW or so of additional power for experiments. The panels cost $372 million to build, and about three times that much to send up to the ISS. Stand by for important new results. The only unique feature of a space environment is micro-gravity. One of the things you could study in micro-gravity is cavitation in spherical drops of water. A paper just published in Phys. Rev. Lett. reports important new insights from such studies except the experiments weren’t done in space. They were done on a European Space Agency aircraft flying in parabolic arcs.” Robert Park, “Space: International Space Station Unfurls New Solar Panels,” What’s New, September 15, 2006. 30 The U.S. space shuttle launches were used to support heavy lift requirements, bringing up key elements to the station during its construction.

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The need to support the ISS has gobbled up moneys needed by other programs, and at the same time helped justify continuing NASA programs that provided only marginal value for the investment. For example, during the 1990s, to continue its success in obtaining funding for the Shuttle program and manned spaceflight, NASA switched gears from funding arguments that suggested and implied the reusable Shuttle spacecraft provided flexibility and cost savings to ones that emphasized that it was vitally needed to service and supply the ISS. This funding strategy has had the unfortunate effect of siphoning off staggering amounts of moneys that could have been used to fund cutting-edge astronautics and aeronautics science and technology programs. Had NASA abandoned the Shuttle program, declined to help form the ISS as it was conceived, and instead flown traditional government and commercially available expendable boosters, significant spending might have been avoided. This would have freed funds for other initiatives and perhaps spawned a more balanced, scientifically-based civil space program.31 Similarly, by using expendable rocket options, the US domestic commercial booster industry could have been stimulated, with more resources directed to lowering the cost of space access.32 As it turned out, Space Shuttle features that have been argued and described as vital to the ISS support have proved superfluous. Russia has demonstrated that its expendable launch vehicles and unmanned supply systems have sufficient flexibility and robustness to sustain much of the station’s needs. In response to these arguments, true-believers in manned space exploration argue that criticism of the ISS is short-sighted, insisting that achieving human spaceflight is a singular wonderful end in itself, or that manned space research and exploration, and the international cooperation efforts, have produced billions of dollars’ worth of tangible benefits for all of mankind. Indeed, NASA’s Innovations Partnership Program distributes an annual report that celebrates space technologies that, “through productive partnerships with industry, entrepreneurs, universities, and research institutions have resulted in products and services that elevate health and public safety; augment industrial productivity, computer technology, and transportation; and enhance daily work and leisure.”33 NASA argues that the many benefits and indirect economic return from spin-offs of human space exploration have been many times the initial public investment. These claims can be contested. Other US space programs with significant international content, such as the JWST, suffer from resource and expenditure problems. ESA will provide the Ariane 5 launcher to lift the JWST to orbit, instead of a domestically produced Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) nominally procured through the United Launch Alliance.34 Launching on the Ariane 5 was intended to help NASA

31 See generally, “Criticism of the Space Shuttle program,” Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_Space_Shuttle_ program, citing Roger Handberg, Reinventing NASA: Human Spaceflight, Bureaucracy, and Politics, Greenwood Publishing Group (2003). 32 Ibid. See also Launius and Howard E. McCurdy, Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership: and the myth of presidential leadership, University of Illinois Press. (1997), pp. 146e155. 33 Spinoff, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2009, p. 7. 34 The JWST is a partnership between ESA, NASA and the Canadian Space Agency. Formerly known as the Next Generation Space Telescope (NGST), the JWST is due to be launched in August 2013, and it is considered the successor of the NASA/ESA Hubble Space Telescope. The ESA financial contribution to JWST will be about 300 million Euros, including the launcher. Other European institutions will contribute an additional 70 million Euros overall, all in return for flying the Mid Infrared Camera Spectrograph (MIRI) payload. According to a formal agreement, ESA will manage and coordinate the whole development of the European part of MIRI and act as the sole interface with NASA, which is leading the JWST project. MIRI will be built in cooperation between Europe and the United States (NASA), both equally contributing to its funding. MIRI’s optics, core of the instrument, will be provided by a consortium of European institutes. In addition to the MIRI, Europe through ESA is also contributing the NIRSPEC (Near-Infrared multi-object Spectrograph) instrument (funded and managed by ESA).

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avoid costs. Unfortunately, the expected savings will not materialize. They have been lost because the JWST prime contractor did not contemplate use of the Ariane system. As a result, costs to integrate the JWST on that launch system have skyrocketed.35 And the admirable success enjoyed by ESA has not come cheap. Indeed, the Ariane 5 spacelift system, while proficient, is very expensive to build, sustain, and push through a launch campaign. Of course, getting the 18 member governments of ESA to set common objectives, pool resources and make their industry work together has been a never ending task. Wise space professionals know the realityd much of ESA’s successes are really about ensuring full employment in Europe, especially for France’s aerospace workforce. Finally, the costs associated with terminating cooperation can be huge. Such moves can also risk alienating a key ally.36 So this serves as a logical consequence to the rule that cooperation improves the political sustainability of a program. There is no easy way to back out of cooperative relationships once they have been initiated.37 The end result of this is that one may choose to endure the high price and continue even failed cooperative efforts.

6. If international collaboration makes sense, why is it so difficult to achieve? International civil space cooperation is admired as a lofty and worthy goal, but space program managers confront a far different reality from the diplomats as they direct such efforts as described in Table 2. Hopes for cooperation can soon be overwhelmed by competing interests and priorities, and also by reduced or constrained budgets. These anti-collaborative behaviors are demonstrated in the recent rash of lunar flights, which have seen five different spacecraft sent to the moon by the USA, ESA, China, Japan and India; each mission essentially performing the same basic science missions.38 Expenditures for these repetitive efforts totaled between $2 and 3 billion dollars. More astounding, scientific data from several of the missions have not been shared. Were these just expensive stuntsdor merely lost opportunities? Perhaps better science and exploration could have been achieved if these activities had been consolidated into a single mission, with the excess funds spent on other scientific objectives. Now it seems the South Koreans, Brazilians, Iranians, and others want to launch their own Moon missions; their rationale draped in the words of great tribal patriots and accompanied by the best expressions of national pride. Similarly the international launch market is well over capacity for launching the current and foreseeable demand for communications,

35 The program’s funding crisis surfaced.during an exchange of correspondence between NASA and Northrop Grumman officials. The company advised NASA that it would need an additional $270 million to make a series of changes to the program requested by the agency. Those changes included adjustments to the telescope’s instrument module and ground test equipment, Mohan said. NASA also advised Northrop to plan to launch Webb on a European Ariane 5 rocket rather than a U.S. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle. In the case of Webb, “changing one thing tends to ripple more than it does on other programs,” Mohan said. Ben Iannotta, “Webb Telescope Cost-Control Effort Focuses on Schedule, Requirements,” Space.com, August 22, 2005, https://www.space.com/spacenews/archive05/Webb_082205. html. 36 Such happened when the United States nearly a decade back suspended an exception to the International Trafficking in Arms regulations (ITAR) that Canada enjoyed for many years. The exemption was only regained after considerable effort by the Canadian Government. 37 “If it were necessary to cease cooperation, a mutual choice to do so would likely mitigate many of the negative reputation effects, because there would be no unilateral actor to whom one could assign blame.” D. A. Broniatowski et al, “The Case for Managed International Cooperation.,” supra. 38 See for example, India e Chandrayaan; Europe e Smart-1; China e Cheng’e; United Kingdom e MoonLite; Russia; Japan e Selene.

Table 2 Barriers/factors detracting from International Cooperation. National pride, prestige National security Economic development Complexity e different languages/cultures make complex projects even more difficult Government vs. commercial interest

remote sensing and navigation satellites. Eight different countries continue to subsidize their own launch capability and other nations are developing their own launchers. The USA prohibits US civil and commercial spacecraft from launching on Chinese vehicles. ESA demands that European satellites be launched on Ariane. These directions are driven by important national or regional interests. However, there may be no easy way to foster improved international cooperation if such protectionist behaviors stand in the way. And there are further obstacles to cooperation. 7. Technology transfer constraints Designing and manufacturing increasingly interoperable platforms, performing cooperative planning, and executing satellite operations are complicated by U.S. law and policy that imposes controls on the release of sensitive technologies and operations. Indeed, important technologies and information relating thereto may be determined by the US government to be non-releasable, even to allies and close partners.39 This is not just a US phenomenon; other nations have their own laws and policies that clamp down on technology transfers and specific relations with other nations. Important portions of US releasability law and policy arise out of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).40 It governs the sale and export of defense articles and services and related technical data, and serves as part of a statutory scheme to ensure compliance with technology control regimes that seek to slow the proliferation of missile and other technologies used to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Designated controlled articles, technologies and services are found in the U. S. Munitions List (USML), which is contained within the ITAR. These rules are driving small suppliers out of the export marketplace as they lack the economies of scale to properly respond to export legal requirements. This is unfortunate and damaging to US economic security interests since small companies are usually the engine of innovation within the US economy and especially its space community. International partners are also wary and nearly all members of the space community, foreign and domestic, find the AECA rules quite burdensome and onerous. Their imposition is generally agreed to have cost US industry billions of dollars in sales in the international space marketplace. The US communications satellite industry is losing market share to international competitors who claim their systems, products and services are “ITAR-free.” Chinese representatives have even jokingly thanked the USA We would have liked to buy satellites from the United States, but as a result of the ITAR policy it forced us to develop our own capability and develop a great pool of young scientists and engineers. Now we can build launch vehicles and satellites that have 0% of any U.S. parts.41

39 Other nations also secure their technologies for comparable diplomatic, military and economic reasons. 40 See Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Section 38, as amended, P.L. 94-329. The AECA’s 22 U.S.C. x 2778 provides the authority to control the export of defense articles and services. 41 Ju Jin, “China’s Space Industry and International Space Collaboration”, 3rd Annual Space Exploration Conference, Denver, Colorado, February 26e28, 2008.

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Of course, other US laws, regulations, and policies apply to exports of space data, hardware, and services.42 The Obama administration and Congress are reviewing them along with the AECA releasability rules. Some believe the president will push approvals for some transfers back to the Commerce Department, where approvals were issued for communications satellite technology transfers until the Chinese scandals of the late 1990s.43 8. Volatility in international and domestic politics Some suggest the USA is an unreliable partner because its political processes and tradition of biennial and quadrennial elections bring uncertainty to international agreements. For example, in 2004 President George W. Bush unveiled his Vision for Space Exploration which put a near-term emphasis on returning humans to the Moon. International partners, especially in Europe did not immediately embrace this policy because they were more interested in performing Mars missions. However, after four years of international workshops, bilateral meetings, then intense hectoring and haggling, a collective “global vision” was forged with prospective partners, especially ESA. The new global vision outlined important roles for the partners to return to the Moon and reinvigorate lunar exploration. ESA worked to cajole its members to program funds to support the Vision. Then, just as ESA was announcing that its membership had synched its planning and programming roadmap to match the Vision’s, the USA, led by a newly elected internationalist president, announced interest in a radically different plan, that recently identified by the Augustine committee. The USA is now in the process of abandoning the Vision’s “lunar base” concept and moving to a “flexible path” to manned space exploration. The change has devastated the ESA partners. Similarly, about-turns and difficulties have been experienced in collaborative work on Russian rocket engines following the collapse of the USSR. The problem cuts both ways - not all partners work reliability with the USA. For example, NASA administrator Sean O’Keefe cancelled the Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) initiative in 2001 arguing it was cheaper in the long run to buy Russian Soyuz capsules to park as an escape pod at the ISS, instead of investing $1.5e3.0 billion to develop and build a US rescue capability.44 Once the Space Shuttle program comes to an end, the USA will be reliant on the Russians to transport astronauts to the ISS for at least seven years (according to the Augustine Committee’s Report).45 Now Russia has nearly

42 See generally, National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 119, “Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations” and Executive Order (EO) 12958, “Classified National Security Information,” April 17, 1995, as amended by EO 13292, “Further Amendment to EO 12958, as Amended, Classified National Security Information,” March 25, 2003, and by other executive orders. See also, the Export Administration Act of 1979, P.L. 96-72. The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) governs the export of most dual-use unclassified articles and services (having both civilian and military uses) not covered by the AECA. The EAA controls exports on the basis of their impact on national security, foreign policy, or supply availability. With the expiration of EAA in 1994, the President declared a national emergency and exercised authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to continue the EAA export control regulations then in effect by issuing EO 12924 on August 19, 1994. 43 See Final Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/ Commercial Concerns with the Peoples’ Republic of China, May 25, 1999 (the Cox Report). Technology transfer abuses identified within the Cox Report caused the Congress to tighten space systems export rules in with the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1999, P.L. 105-261, October 17, 1998. 44 Hearing Addresses NASA Budget Request, Shuttle Investigation, American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Science Policy News, March 25, 2003. Bruce Moomaw, “The Science of Spending Billons,” Space Daily, Sept 21, 2002. Congressman Criticizes O’Keefe, Space Today.net, April 18, 2002. 45 Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation, Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, Final Report, October, 2009, p. 10.

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doubled the cost of an escape pod capsule to $65 million each.46 It’s easy to reason that the Soviets, rebranded as Russian capitalists, have learned the lessons of capitalism all too well.

9. Exceptionalism Exceptionalism involves the perspective that a country or society is unusual or extraordinary in some way.47 Many nations throughout history have made claims of exceptionality: the USA, China, India, Britain, Japan, Iran (Persia), Korea (both South and North), Israel, the USSR, France and Germany.48 The term “exceptionalism” can also be used to describe a nation’s desire to remain separate from others.49 There is often a strong and intense political and cultural pressure to go it alone, to demonstrate a nation’s prowess and strengthdto show that a nation has joined the leaders of the world. This may explain South Korean plans to launch a lunar probe in 2020 and make a Moon landing by 2025, using a rocket the country is developing at a cost of 3.6 trillion won ($3.9 billion).50 The South Koreans, aware that their rivals and historical enemies, China and Japan, are both ahead of them in this field, are working hard to achieve success with their space programs; indeed, their space community leaders have told the authors that they take great pride in the successes they have already gained, and hope to gain. Exceptionalism also explains a desire by China for a national manned spaceflight, space station, and Moon programs; the desire by a wide variety of nations to develop spacelift and on-orbit capabilities; and, of course, the desire by other overachievers to launch missions to the moon. Unfortunately, exceptionalism pressures can cause inefficiency, with tremendous duplication and overlap in global space science and other missions. They can also generate considerable mistrust. For example, there has been much discussion about inviting China to participate in the ISS. Unfortunately, in its single-minded zeal to forge a unique world-class military and space program China has generated considerable mistrust among the international community. This is underscored by the program’s secrecy and the recent, alarming ASAT test that contaminated low-Earth orbit with thousands of pieces of space debris that will pose a threat to space systems for well over 100 years.51

46 The cost of Soyuz was $50 M per launch (1999 dollars) - www.astronautix.com/ lvs/soyuz.htm. Russian is now charging NASA $51 M per seat per astronaut. Tudor Vieru, “Russia Wants $51 Million for Seat on Soyuz e NASA will have to pay to get to the ISS,” Softpedia.com, May 14, 2009. 47 “Exceptionalism,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exceptionalism, accessed December 5, 2009. See also, Michael Kammen, “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration,” American Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), pp. 1e43. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Jack Kim, “South Korea eyes moon orbiter in 2020, landing 2025,” Reuters, November 20, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/ idUSSEO24596320071120, accessed November 29, 2009. 51 Of course, China has long maintained that its rapid development of space capabilities is peaceful in nature. However, recent comments by the head of China’s air force, General Xu Qiliang, sparked widespread criticism that Beijing now has other ideas. Xu told the state press that China’s armed forces should prepare for the “inevitable” militarization of outer space. He said the country has plans to build weapons in space, saying that it is a “historical inevitability,” the South China Morning Post reported citing state media. Xu said it was “imperative” as the air force sees the country that controls space will have military dominance. Military analysts take Xu’s comments as a sign that China is changing its military strategy from one of “passive defense” to “active defense.” Historically, China was concerned with protecting its borders but Xu comments indicate that it is now willing to attack potential threats. Recognizing the diplomatic faux pas, other members of China’s government rushed shortly afterwards to disavowed Xu’s remarks. “Air force head: China to build weapons in space,” China Economic Review, November 3, 2009, http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/dailybriefing/2009_11_03/Air_force_ head:_China_to_build_weapons_in_space.html, accessed December 30, 2009.

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10. Improving international space cooperation When attempting to achieve success with cooperative efforts participants must find utility in their efforts. To maximize this utility it is important to consider the types of cooperation frameworks that exist. According to Zelnio, there are four types: coordination, augmentation, interdependence, and integration.52 10.1. Coordination Each country operates a separate program independent of others but coordinates on technical and scientific matters. According to Zelnio, “This model of cooperation is inviting in that it is easy for people to agree to, as it allows each country to maintain its total independence and manage its own contributions. The disadvantage of this is that often countries push programs that greatly overlap the efforts pursued by other countries, causing much duplication of efforts.”53 The recent duplicative, overlapping and expensive missions to the moon serve as imperfect contra-examples of this framework. Worthwhile cooperation has failed to occur on several of the missions and some participants have yet to share the data gleaned from their observations, even though the data appears to involve no real national or economic security matters. The problem in failing to share occurs many times as an outgrowth of the exceptionalism, xenophobia, and paranoia some countries exhibit about their technology programs. Coordinating groups exist, however, and they have achieved success in improving international dialogue on scientific efforts. For example, both the Committee of Earth Observing Satellites (CEOS) and Global Earth Observation (GEO) promote sharing of Earth observation data and coordination of such missions.

Some question whether the augmentation framework really provides for true cooperation. Broniatowski et al. contend: By restricting international partners to noncritical-path items, a nation is sending a signal indicating a lack of trust and confidence in the partner’s capabilities and unwillingness to rely on that partner. [T]he requirement that one nation possess all of the critical-path capabilities is an implicit statement that such a nation can complete the system under its own power and therefore does not need its partners.56

10.3. Interdependence Cooperation occurs on the critical path as well as on functional systems with each participant still controlling their component part of the project.57 The USA and Russia employ the interdependence framework to cooperate on the ISS program. Since they serve as its prime resource contributors, this has satisfied each nation’s desire to exercise leadership over the enterprise and protects equities. Unfortunately, the framework has proven to be extremely costly. With the ISS, neither is able to keep the other from slipping their contributions and causing significant delays and cost increases. Some of this may be happening for justifiable reasons. For example, the ISS partnership suffered a lengthy stand-down in Space Shuttle flights after the disintegration of Columbia and the partnership is facing renewed spacelift challenges since the Space Shuttle fleet’s end-of-life is planned for 2011 for safety, logistic and other sustainment reasons. The European Union’s Galileo navigation satellite program also suffers from using an interdependence framework - and for not so justifiable reasons. Its partner nations have, from time-to-time, unilaterally withheld contributions causing the overall program to slip, a case of too many cooks spoiling the broth.

10.2. Augmentation Cooperating countries provide important elements of the project of the prime country but are not on the prime’s program critical path.54 The USA often employs the augmentation framework. The US National Space Policy states that a fundamental goal of US space activity is to “[s]trengthen the nation’s space leadership.”55 With this policy in hand the USA has led the world in space exploration for five decades. Selecting an augmentation framework is believed to be consistent with this leadership imperative and, more importantly, reflects the country’s tremendous resource investments in space activities. The disadvantage of the augmentation framework is that the bulk of the costs fall upon the prime country. The USA has usually accepted these because it nearly always assumes the prime risks of each mission and wants to control them. Using the augmentation framework allows it to exercise centralized control over a mission’s critical resource, schedule, technology development, and operational paths. Marginal or minimal contributors to space efforts are not usually given veto power over the mission decisions. US programmes like the JWST and Cassini follow this model, with ESA contributing only the MIRI and Huygens payloads, respectively, not controlling the essential mission activities and decisions. The framework has also been followed with the Space Shuttle program, with only small payloads and invited international astronauts being flown on-orbit.

52 53 54 55

Ryan Zelnio, “A model for the international development.,” supra. Ibid. Ibid. Fact sheet on the U.S. National Space Policy, supra.

10.4. Integration Full cooperation with a pooling of resources on shared and joint research and development. This framework spreads the financial costs, and can utilize the industries of multiple nations while maintaining a single entity to control the critical path.”58 Both ESA and Intelsat successfully employ the integration framework, with the latter doing the better job of it. Although ESA has had some failings, its successes have nevertheless attracted partners in and outside of Europe, including NASA. According to JeanJacques Dordain there are now 29 European countries cooperating in space thanks to collaboration across and between the agency and the EU (whose memberships are slightly different), outside Europe, ESA cooperates with virtually every spacefaring nation in the world.59 The primary negative with the integration framework is that it requires acceptance of maximum levels of technology transfer. This is often difficult and complex to achieve as national policy makers may be reluctant to share technologies that offer a unique security or economic edge. The European Union has been able to mitigate some of these technology transfer concerns internally by applying its own unique free market laws and regulations.

56 D. A. Broniatowski et al., “The Case for Managed International Cooperation.,” supra. 57 Ryan Zelnio, “A model for the international development.,” supra. 58 Ryan Zelnio, “A model for the international development.,” supra. 59 Jean-Jacques Dordain, “International Cooperation in Space,” remarks at 40th Anniversary of the Universities Space Research Association (USRA), March 26, 2009.

J.D. Rendleman, J.W. Faulconer / Space Policy 26 (2010) 143e151 Table 3 Recommendations for Productive International Cooperation In Space. Address technology transfer and releasability concerns early in the process e develop architectures for international environment Diplomacy, knowledge of partners, and rapport is vital Employ respect, reciprocity and transparency Apply patience e build in time for the team to “build trust”, “earn trust”, “maintain trust” and deal with communications issues

11. Concluding thoughts The case for cooperation is strong and powerful, and recommendations for productive success are summarized in Table 3. Each nation engages in multinational activities because they are in their best national interests to do so. Cooperation enables states to leverage resources and reduce risk; improve global engagement; and enhance diplomatic prestige, political sustainability and workforce stability. Given these benefits, space leaders must organize their programs to allow for cooperation. Although powerful, cooperation’s success is often achieved only at great expense, as the obstacles and impediments to cooperation are substantial. Releasabiliity constraints, international and domestic political volatilities; and exceptionalism must be attacked early to reduce their risk and expense. Significant

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harm can occur if these obstacles and impediments are ignored, so a system architect would help by developing a program that attacks them up front. For example, releasability constraints will not always be easy to master, but, if not resolved early, one can be sure its issues will ultimately be raised, with vastly increased costs and risk for embarrassment. Differences among partners must be understood and respected. Space leaders can help by attempting to foster conditions that allow for reciprocity and transparency when they can occur. These conditions will vary. Rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience among the assembled team members will also be essential. Successful international partnerships tend to have unifying attributesdfundamental trust with aligned goals. Without trust and common goals, relationships become inefficient and often fail. In the end, there isn’t a single recipe for success. Depending on the relationships, mission needs, and relative strengths of the partners, coordination, augmentation, interdependence, and integration frameworks can each be employed to overcome problems and achieve success. Ultimately, each of these frameworks requires an early definition of common objectivesdthis enables participants to successfully develop mission architectures and reduce coordination costs. Partners must define these objectives together and emphasize the benefits of the relationship that is being built. By keeping the benefits of cooperation in mind, system architects will each achieve solid success.