Improving the prospects for plan acceptance in public organizations

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00244301/87 $3.00 + .OO Pcrgamon Journals Ltd.

Long Range Planning, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 52 to 66, 1987 Printed in Great Britain

Improving the Prospects for Plan Acceptance in Public Organizations Miron Mushkat

Public planning activities have acquired an increasingly systematic character in recent years, but plan formulation in the public sector is generally undertaken without due consideration of contextual factors that impinge on organizational validity. The work of management scientists contains several ideas which may prove useful in helping public planners to achieve a better fit between their recommendations and complex institutionalrealities. This work is reviewed here in the light of experience gained in a large public corporation.

Start

T Define the Problem

Contemporary public planning theory and practice have their roots in the systems approach. As a corollary, planners in public organizations-particularly those inclined towards academic concepts-tend to be preoccupied with the mechanics of problem identification, generating alternatives and evaluation of alternatives (Figure 1). One may also discern a growing interest on the part of members of the profession in the more technical facets of the activities which follow the adoption of the preferred alternative, namely, implementation and monitoring of performance (Figure 2). Irrespective, however, of the particular configuration of phases of the planning process serving as the focus of their attention, systems-oriented public planners are primarily concerned with problemsolving methodology. There are obviously exceptions to this generalization, but it is fair to say that relatively few of those who belong to the above category pause to consider seriously the interrelationships between method and the ubiquitous organizational factors which either lend it substance or (more often) act to undermine its viability. In this Although this study was conducted when the author was Task Force on Management Planning of the Broadcasting of New Zealand, he assumes sole responsibility for what Miron Mushkat is a senior lecturer in the Department Science at the University of Hong Kong.

heading the Corporation appears. of Politrcal

4

Evaluate Alternatives

Figure

1. Systems

approach

to public

planning

respect the systems approach to public planning can perhaps be described as not entirely syrtemicalthough, of course, it is highly systenzatic. A more satisfactory

state of affairs prevails

in other

Improving

in Public

Organizations

53

macroscopic in nature and, while sprinkled with general insights, it offers no concrete guidance to public planners in actual problem-solving situations.

9

Start

Another social science discipline in which research has been undertaken into contextual factors in problem-solving is psychology. Psychologistsparticularly those specializing in cognitive and social psychology-have produced an impressive amount of information on decision-making in individual, small group and organizational settings. Psychological studies in this field combine sophisticated conceptualization with rigorous design and have generated findings which have proved useful to students of management (most notably those interested in behavioural aspects of accounting and management information systems). By and large, however, the psychology of decision-making holds few answers to the specific problems encountered by planners in public organizations (although it may be of considerable heuristic value to them).

Select Preferred Alternative

-1

’ Implement Preferred Alternative

-

r Monitor Performance

Figure 2. Extended planning

Plan Acceptance

systems

model

of public

academic/professional domains. Political scientists, for instance, have long been engaged in fruitful exploration of the organizational context of public policy-making and have produced a number of illuminating models of the policy process. More recently they have turned their attention to the implementation of public policy and here too we now have a better understanding of the interplay between analysis and the organizational framework in which it is embedded. Unfortunately, however, the work of political scientists tends to be rather

The third area in which scholars have attempted to place problem-solving in its organizational context is management science. The concerns of management scientists have generally been more practical than those of political scientists and psychologists. For while they have not shunned theoretical generalization (indeed their work is becoming increasingly oriented towards theory-building) they have addressed themselves primarily to the immediate problem of successfully integrating management science models with ongoing organizational activities. This focus is most apparent in the writings of Schultz and his associates.’ The Schultz group argues that management scientists should not confine their analytical efforts to the development of workable (i.e. technically valid) models, but ought also to aim at delivering a product which is organizationuIly valid. The latter objective is attained when decision-makers actually use the model and when model-utilization contributes in some tangible way to organizational effectiveness (Figure 3). Schultz and his collaborators thus differentiate between the traditional management science activity of model construction (intervention), the adoption of the model by the decision-makers (implementation) and the impact of the model-in-use on organizational performance (strccessftrl implementation or improvement) (Figure 4). Public planners also have to grapple with the problem of organizational validity. Indeed, achieving a degree of balance between planning output and other components of a public organization is probably a more formidable task than satisfying the criteria of organizational validity in conventional management science work. The reason lies in the fact that public planners tend to provide support to what may be described as non-progrummed/unstructured decision-making, whereas management scien-

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/ ““-d$; used

> DecisionAakers

1Yes Write Model has

lt /

Cont

Figure 3. Model validation in management

science

tists are usually engaged in programmed/structured problem-solving. The corollary of this is that the former can seldom rely on established algorithms in generating solutions and are more likely to commit errors of the third type (ErrI; which may be defined as providing the wrong substantive or formal representation of a problem when one should have provided the right one). In such circumstances the notion of technical validity has a rather limited meaning and one is compelled to seek alternatives which are acceptable/useful in the organizational sense of the word.

The public planning literature, though, provides no clues whatever as to tactics that could possibly be employed with a view to attaining the elusive goal of organizational validity. As matters stand now, perhaps the only option available to a planner who wishes to synchronize his analytical input with the efforts of other members of a public organization is to turn to the writings of management scientists on the subject. This was the course of action resorted to by the author when, as the head of the ‘think tank’ of a large publicly-owned corporation, he sought to overcome institutional barriers which hampered the

Improving

Plan Acceptance in Public Organizations

55

Table 1. Patterns of relationships between the management consultant and operating managers

?I? intervention

Implementation

-r

II

Figure 4. Idealized model of management activities

science

work of his planning team. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the contributions of management scientists (at least those thought to be the most relevant) and evaluate them in the light of that particular experience.

The Quest for Mutual Understanding In the first substantial book on the methodology of operational research, Morse and Kimball* stressed the importance of forging a satisfactory working relationship between the management scientist and the operating manager. The same theme resurfaced, however briefly, in other early OR texts. Gradually, though, the focus of operational researchers had shifted almost exclusively to questions of method and the concern with reaching a modus vivendi in the relationships with their clients had more or less disappeared from the literature. The interest in issues of organizational validity has been rekindled with the publication of a seminal article co-authored by Churchman and Schainblatt and entitled ‘The Researcher and the Manager’.3 These two writers have been the first to address themselves systematically to the interface between the management scientist and the operating manager. In their article, which is based on extensive observation, they have identified four patterns of relationships that may evolve between the above role occupants in the context of a management science assignment: separate function, persuasion, communication and mutual understanding (Table 1). The separate function category represents a situation in which the management scientist produces a

Mutual understanding

Communication

Persuasion

Separate function

solution to a problem with detailed instruction as to its implementation. The instructions must be clear enough to allow the operating manager to apply the new method without further communication and interpretation. The responsibility of the management scientist is thus confined to systems design/ systems improvement and the operating manager, on the other hand, does not extend the scope of his activities beyond systems implementation. Or, put another way, the functions of the parties are entirely separate: the responsibility of one begins where the other’s ends. The persuasion category reflects an attitude which rests on the assumption that organizational validity largely hinges on the ability of the management scientist to convince the operating manager of the desirability of adopting his proposals. According to the logic of this situation, the former needs to ‘sell’ his ideas to the latter, or overcome any personal ‘resistance’ which may impede implementation. The tactics that can assist the management scientist in persuading the operating manager consist predominantly of behavioural techniques of attitude (encompassing the cognitive, affective and behavioural components) change and group dynamics. The communication category represents an approach which seeks to attain organizational validity through education rather than sociopsychological manipulation. Here the underlying assumption is that implementation difficulties stem from the simple fact that the operating manager does not quite understand the specialized language of the management scientist. The recommendations of the latter are thus not accepted because the former is in no position to grasp fully either their essence or implications. The answer to the problem, according to those who favour this particular explanation, lies in bridging the gap by training operating managers to better understand the general nature of management science work and the specific solutions which it generates. The mutual understanding category differs from its communication counterpart in that it injects an element of reciprocity into the relationship between the management scientist and the operating manager. Specifically, it corresponds to a situation in which both parties understand each other. In such circumstances the management scientist strives to acquire a basic understanding of the position of those to whom he provides service. This means that he no longer places the onus exclusively on the operating manager with regard to adjustment. The

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mutual understanding configuration, Churchman and Schainblatt suggest, is the most conducive to achieving organizational validity. Our experience generally dcmonstratcs that the conceptual framework constructed by these two writers may also be useful in putting into perspectivc the interactions between public planners and their counterparts on the management side. WC too started by manoeuvring ourselves into the separate function position; for several weeks we worked in almost total isolation, researching problems and producing preliminary reports. Then, in the face of rather strong opposition from operating managers to some of our proposals, we shifted to persuasion. When this approach proved only partly effective, our response was to turn to communication. Finally, after the attempt to sensitize management to the logic of the planning task did not really yield the cxpectcd results, WC opted for mutual understanding. It is interesting to note, however, that our efforts to reach a mutual understanding with operating managers did not preclude altogether the need for persuasion. Ch urc h man and Schainblatt seem to argue that mutual understanding leaves the managcment scientist free to pursue his activities without resorting to measures designed to change the attitudes of those who have a stake (‘stakeholders’) in the outcome of the project(s) in which he is involved. WC attained a reasonable level of mutual understanding with operating managers about 5 months after embarking on our assignment. Nonethcless, during the 7 months that followed there were several occasions on which some recourse to persuasion proved essential (Figure 5). The sole difference between the two periods insofar as persuasion is concerned was that, when coupled with mutual understanding, it tended to be nonmanipulative in nature. In addition to this slight discrepancy between the Churchman-Schainblatt model and our experience, we found their contribution somewhat problematic in at least two other respects. To begin with, they devote a great part of their article to pointing out the limitations of the first three categories identified by them and say relatively little about the specific attributes of mutual understanding and concrete ways to achieve this quasi-ideal state. The particular feature of their work which WC thought to bc possibly the least helpful in that regard was the lack of any substantial discussion of factors which might assist the management scientist/public planner in understanding the operating manager. We also cncountercd considerable difficulties in endcavouring to translate Churchman’s and Schainblatt’s rather general ideas concerning persuasion into a series of steps that could render managcmcnt more rcccptive to planning rccommcndations. Secondly,

it is arguable

that the strong

emphasis

Mutual Understanding and Persuasion I

Figure 5. The Churchman-Schainblatt an organizational context

1

dialectic

in

placed by Churchman and Schainblatt on mutual understanding may prove occasionally counterproductive. There appears to be a basic incompatibility between analysts and those in positions of management which no amount of mutual understanding is likely to eliminate. This incompatibility stems presumably from differences in institutional/ professional socialization, role expectations and task environment. Rather than attempting to reduce it to an absolute minimum, it is sometimes desirable to try to turn the residue of ‘misunderstanding’ to organizational advantage by giving it formal cxpression. We reached this conclusion about half way through our assignment. Paradoxically enough, we relied largely on the work of Churchman4 to provide the conceptual underpinning for institutionalizing the ‘adversary relationship’ bctwecn our planning group and the coalition of management representatives with which it had to interface. For Churchman was the first to suggest that organizational decision-making, particularly of the non-programmed/unstructured variety, should assume the form of an organized

Improving debate bctwcen the ‘expert’ and the ‘manager’. His followers have developed a method of problemsolving (strategic assumption surfacing and testing; SAST) which involves the formulation of a plan (thesis), counterplan (antithesis) and their synthesis through the reconciliation of conflicting arguments. Churchman’s writings on decision-making procedures which revolve around a structured dialogue between competing positions (dialectical inquiry) have also stimulated considerable interest among students of problem-solving in the time-honoured technique of devil’s advocate. This technique ensures, by rigid separation of the functions of promoter and dissenter, that both sides of the question are presented and carefully scrutinized. Now the relevance of the above developments lies in the fact that in the last phase of our assignment we employed a decision-making mechanism which may be described as a compromise between SAST and the devil’s advocate technique in order to bring into focus and resolve major planner-operating manager conflicts. Our purpose at that stage was not to maximize mutual understanding as such, but to formalize dissent by forcing management into countcrplanning/dcvil’s advocate roles. This approach proved acceptable, perhaps even attractivc, to both planners and operating managers. Given the positive response of all the parties concerned, as well as the fact that we embraced dialectical inquiry after a fairly long period of experimentation with alternative modes of collecit may be legitimate to tive problem-solving, conclude that the key to organizational validity in public planning does not lie exclusively in mutual understanding and that skilful conflict management can play an equally important part in the process.

Grappling with the Cognitive Constraint

Style

As stated in the prcccding section, Churchman and Schainblatt have stopped short of identifying factors which might assist the management scientist in understanding the operating manager. The task of filling this gap was left to future writers, several of whom have adopted the Churchman-Schainblatt model as their point of departure. The focus of those who have addressed themselves to the subject in the past decade or so has been primarily on the cognitive style of persons cngagcd in managerial work. The impression is that management scientists subscribe to the view that a good grasp of the working of this factor is crucial to understanding the operating manager. The first systematic attempt to shed light on the role of cognitive style in managerial decision-making was that of Huysmans.’ Hc postulated that individuals can normally bc placed on a continuum ranging from analytical to heuristic veasoniq and proceeded thereupon to establish the validity of this

Plan Acceptance

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57

distinction through an cxpcrimcnt in a simulated administrative setting. According to Huysmans the former type reduces problem situations to a core set of underlying causal relationships. All effort is directed towards detecting these relationships and manipulating the decision variables (behaviour), in such a manner that some ‘optimal’ equilibrium is reached with respect to the objectives. A more or less explicit model, often stated in quantitative terms, forms the basis for each decision. Factors not comprised in the model. e.g. because they could not be quantified, are considered only insofar as they may require a significantly different course of action from the one suggested by the model solution. Available alternative courses of action arc also weighed primarily by the signiflcancc of their deviation from the model-proposed course of action.“

Heuristic

reasoning,

on the other hand,

emphasizes workable solutions to total problem situations. The search is for analogies with familiar solved problems rather than for a cystcm of underlying causal relationships, which is often thought illusory. Common sense. intuition, and unquantified feelings about future developments play an important role to the extent they are applied to the totality of the situation as an organic whole, rather than as built up from clearly idcntifiablc separate parts. It is extremely diff<, if not impossible, to uncover the mechanisms that lcad to a decision under heuristic rcasoning. The resulting dcclsion, however, can be characterized by its emphasis on consistency with its internal and external environment, in contrast with the decision of an analytic reasoner which emphasizes optimality.’

Huysmans’ cxpcrimcntal work has generated some intcrcsting findings. On the basis of these findings, hc has been able to conclude that cognitive style may operate as an effective constraint on the implementation of management science recommendations. The difficulty, it appears, lies in the fact that the heuristic reasoning of the operating manager does not correspond to the analytical approach which underlies managcmcnt science work (or rather the other way round). To overcome this constraint, the analyst must obviously take into account the different cognitive style of his clientsboth in seeking a solution to their problem and in communicating with them. The writings of a number of prominent students of managerial decision-making lend general support to Huysmans’ conclusions. Barnard,’ for instance, has differentiated between ‘logical’ and ‘non-logical’ mental processes in organizational problem-solving and has advocated grcatcr reliance on the latter. In a similar vein, Leavitt” has criticized the tendency to over-emphasize the analytical aspects of decisionmaking in management education and has called for with intuition. Finally, integrating logic Mintzberg”’ has argued, on the basis of psychological and clinical evidence, that analysts gcncrally exhibit strengths of the left (i.c. logical) hcmisphcrc of the human brain whereas operating managers tend to exhibit strengths ofits right (i.e. non-logical)

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counterpart, and that problem-solving in organizations has been biased towards the former since the advent of scientific management.” Implicit in these observations is the belief that the analyst should take concrete steps to accommodate the heuristic reasoning propensities of the operating manager. Further support for the inferences drawn by Huysmans from his data may be found in the empirical work of Doktor and Hamilton.‘* They too have distinguished between more and less analytical cognitive styles13 and have hypothesized that the acceptance of management science recommendations hinges largely on whether the analyst and his client are compatible in this particular respect. While Doktor and Hamilton are somewhat guarded in their conclusions, the experimental data which they have produced appear to substantiate the view that the management scientist ought, at least in presenting his proposals, to take into consideration the heuristic reasoning mode of the operating manager. Other researchers who have conducted experiments in the same area have opted for a conceptual framework slightly different from that of Huysmans and Doktor and Hamilton. In a highly influential article, for instance, McKenney and Keeni have reported the results of studies in which they tested a two-dimensional model of cognitive behaviour. Their model differentiates between information gatheritig (which ‘relates to the essentially perceptual processes by which the mind organizes the diffuse verbal and visual stimuli it encounters’15) and information evaluation (which ‘refers to processes commonly classified under problem solving’16). The two writers maintain that it is generally possible to characterize individual decision-makers as preceptive or receptive information gatherers (the former ‘bring to bear concepts to filter data”’ whereas the latter ‘are more sensitive to the stimulus itself ‘*) and systematic or intuitive information evaluators (the former ‘tend to approach a problem by structuring it in terms of some method which, if followed through, leads to a likely solution”’ whereas the latter ‘usually avoid committing themselves in this way. Their strategy is more one of solution testing and trial-and-error’20). The classificatory scheme proposed by McKenney and Keen results in four categories of cognitive style: precepfive-systematic, precepfive-intuitive, receptive-systematic and receptive-intuitive (Figure 6). As one would expect, management scientists tend to be preceptive-systematic in their approach. Operating managers, on the other hand, are prone to develop a more receptive-intuitive style-although the actual manner in which they process information may vary according to circumstances. McKenney’s and Keen’s prescription is similar to that of the writers referred to earlier in this section: the analyst should show sensitivity to the different cognitive pattern

Information

Gathering

Figure 6. The McKenney-Keen cognitive style underlying client.

the problem-solving

model of

behaviour

of his

Another researcher who has investigated by experimental means the role of cognitive style in managerial decision-making is LarrCcht.*’ The particular concept around which he has organized his work is that of integrative complexity. This concept looms large in studies designed to highlight human information processing in accounting contexts and it was first introduced into the social sciences by Schroder, Driver and Streufert.** The three posit that an individual, at least in a given domain of thought, will tend to process information at a given level of integration. Specifically, they have developed a series of general information structures representing various levels of integration from low to high. The low integration structure (or simple structure) corresponds to an individual who integrates the dimensions that he perceives in a fixed or hierarchical fashion. This fixed or hierarchical structure is absolute, i.e. the individual will not try to consider alternate organizations for integrating the dimensions. Higher levels of integration correspond to individuals who contemplate alternate combinations of the dimensions (moderately low level of integration), general rules for comparing these alternate combinations (moderately high level of integration), or possess a structure that generates complex relationships (high level of integration).‘3

Larrecht contends that the implementation of management science recommendations may be constrained by the ability of the operating manager to integrate information in a complex fashion. Model-building in organizations normally presupposes a high level of integration on the part of the user. Yet, this underlying assumption often turns out to be unrealistic. The implication obviously is that the model-builder (Larrtche focuses exclusively on the attributes of the model as distinct from the

Improving manner of its presentation to management) ought to gear his developmental effort to the limitations imposed by the lower levels of integration which tend to characterize managerial decision-making. The last conceptual framework that may be of interest here has featured in the work of several writers.24 This framework derives from Jung’s25 theory of personality and it differentiates between two cognitive activities: perception (gathering information) and judgment (processing information). Perception is attained by either sensation (S) or intuition (N). (‘Sensation perceives things as they are and not otherwise. Intuition also “perceives” but less through the conscious apparatus of the senses than through its capacity for an unconscious “inner” perception of the inherent potentiality of things.‘26) Judgment is made by either thinking (T) or feeling (F). (‘Thinking is the function which seeks to apprehend the world and adjust to it by way of thought or cognition (logical inferences). The function of feeling, on the other hand, apprehends the world through evaluations along the lines of liking or disliking, good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant, or value judgments.‘27) Pairing a mode of perception with a mode of judgment yields four categories of cognitive style: sensation/thinking (ST), intuition/thinking (NT), sensation/feeling (SF) and intuitionlfeeling (NF). These categories according to Myers,28 may be distinguished in terms of: (1) personal focus of (2) method of handling things, (3) attention, tendency to become and (4) expression of abilities. Thus, ST types rely on sensing of the environment for perception and rational thinking for judgment. They attend to facts and handle them with impersonal analysis. Such individuals are inclined to be practical and matter of fact and their abilities are more easily expressed in technical work with facts and objects. At the other extreme, NF types rely on intuitive perceptions and non-rational feeling for judgment. They attend to possibilities and handle them with personal warmth. Those who belong to

Plan Acceptance in Public Organizations

this category are inclined to be enthusiastic and insightful, and their abilities are more easily expressed in understanding and communicating. NT and SF types fall between the two extreme profiles. The former attend to possibilities, as do NFs, but they handle them with impersonal analysis, like STs. NT types are inclined to be logical and ingenious, and their abilities are more easily expressed in theoretical and technical developments. By contrast, SF persons attend to facts, as do STs, but they handle them with personal warmth, like NFs. Such individuals are inclined to be sympathetic and friendly, and their abilities are more easily expressed in practical help and services for people (Table 2). The above conceptual framework bears a general similarity to the one employed by McKenney and Keen. Furthermore, there is some overlap between this framework and the dualistic models of Huysmans and Doktor and Hamilton.29 The most significant dividing line here appears to be that which sets apart the NT and SF profiles. To its left lie cognitive styles typical of those charged with analytical tasks in organizations. The cognitive behaviour of operating managers, on the other hand, corresponds more closely to the pattern located on the right side, or constitutes a blend of left and right hemisphere propensities. The writers who resort to Jung’s theory of personality in order to illuminate pivotal factors in the implementation of management science insist, as do the. other researchers whose work has been surveyed in this section, that the design of decision aids should be oriented towards complementing the sui generis cognitive style of the operating manager. According to them, herein lines the key to attaining mutual understanding in the relationship between the model-builder and its user. The fact that the writings on the role of cognitive style in managerial decision-making tend to converge in both their descriptive and normative aspects renders the ideas contained in them more

Table 2. Range of cognitive styles in managerial decision-making, Personality ST Sensation/thinking

59

based on Jung’s Theory of

Cognitive style NT SF Intuition/thinking Sensation/feeling

NF Intuition feeling

Focus of attention

Facts

Possibilities

Facts

Possibilities

Method of handling things

Impersonal analysis

Impersonal analysis

Personal warmth

Personal warmth

Tendency to become

Practical and matter of fact

Logical and ingenious

Sympathetic and friendly

Enthusiastic and insightful

Expression of abilities

Technical skills with facts and objects

Theoretical and technical developments

Practical help and services for people

Understanding and communicating with people

I Left Hemisphere

, Right hemisphere

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applicable in planning contexts. must be at the however, that conceptual frameworks above may applied in contexts only a very form. The for this two-fold. In first place, in public differ from scientists in significant respect: usually interface a wide of operating whereas the often provide to operations fall under purview of single executive marketing manager). a corollary, would not practical on part to to ascertain exact cognitive of every with whom come into contact. Rather, have to on the simplistic assumption the informaprocessing behaviour operating managers a certain pattern and the exceptions it are unimportant.

1987 promising and the manner of their presentation management reflected sufficiently the tendency the operating manager to rely on intuition problem-solving (Figure 7). It is not possible to gauge precisely

the effect that this approach had on the quality of our work, but in a detailed review conducted about 6 weeks following its adoption the consensus of the group was that on

7

Start

The point is the measurement cognitive style the context an ongoing planning assignment beset with difficulties. So three kinds instruments have relied upon measuring information mode: (1) state indicators encephalograms and skin resistance), psychological tests imply cognitive through observable and (3) tion inventories.“” instruments have useful in settings and is also that individual executives would willing to themselves to of the which are in the and third The bchavioural inherent in such instruments a large of public arc, however, formidable that attempt at measurement might from, rather contribute to, understanding. perhaps the way to this problem by assuming priori that the information processing behaviour of operating managers cxhibits under most circumstances certain common characteristics. Because of the large technical background of members of our planning team (except for the author the group consisted of professional fmancc offlccrs and system analysts) we were constrained in the team was yet another respect. Specifically, sccptical of any claboratc bchavioural constructs and willing to embrace only a very simple set of assumptions. For this reason, as well as the more intractable constraints outlined above, WC resolved to adopt the elementary distinction which McKenncy and Keen 3’ draw bctwcen ‘systematic’ managcment scientists and ‘intuitive’ managers (without any reference, however, to prcceptive or rcceptivc information gathering) and postulated that it would bc legitimate to assume that the users of our output were likely to have an intuitive cognitive style. In practical terms this meant asking ourselves whether the planning alternatives which we considered

to of in

Compatible with the Intuitive Cognitive Style of

No

1

v

Manager?

I

I

-

Yes 1 .

Present Alternative to Management

1 I

Figure 7. Informal decision rule for developing and presenting planning alternatives in a public organization

Improving the whole it proved helpful in designing a more useable product. At the same time, we reached the conclusion that the benefits which had resulted from reorganization of the planning process to take account of the information processing mode of the operating manager were not as substantial as originally expected. This, in turn, prompted the suggestion that the management profession cannot be understood in terms of cognitive style alone and that the public planner ought to take additional factors/constraints into consideration. Indeed, after exploring several possibilities in the ensuing period, we were able to identify three other factors which may be relevant here. The first of these refers to the characteristics of managerial work. The work-activity school in organizational studies has establishcd3* that the operating manager generally follows a rather unique work pattern. Thus, inter alia, he carries a very heavy workload and works at an unrelenting pace. The activities which he performs are also characterized by their brief duration, great variety and considerable fragmentation. Finally, he tends to show a strong preference for live action; that is, he gravitates towards the more active elements of his workactivities that are current, specific, well-defined and non-routine. We found it useful to take this set of characteristics into account in developing planning alternatives. Another factor which may loom large in the relationship between the public planner and the operating manager is managerial politics. As our assignment entered its most critical phase, we were genuinely taken aback by the extent to which management responses to any idea emanating from our team became imbued with political overtones. The attention of operating managers appeared to shift then almost exclusively to changes in managerial power and status likely to be engendered by our proposals. In consequence, at that stage we were less concerned with the cognitive style underlying management decision-making, or even the characteristics of managerial work, than with the ‘utility maximizing’ behaviour of operating managers. Our solution to the ‘problem’ was to conceptualize the planning process as a ‘metagame’ and employ the analysis of options technique popularized by Radford”” in order to determine whether the alternatives which passed the initial screening test would result in politically stable outcomes. The solution itself, however, is less important in the present context than the fact that throughout the period in question we purported to understand our counterparts on the management side primarily as ‘political men’. The third factor which may assist the public planner in gaining a better insight into managerial behaviour in planning settings pertains not to the formulation of alternatives but to their prtsentation to operating managers. For it appears that the latter

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show a distinct preference for information which is packaged in accordance with certain specifications. Thus, they tend to value information that is embodied in personal verbal reports, rather than formal written documents and expressed in language which reflects operational problems rather than the more abstract concerns of the social science attach greater disciplines. 3J They also normally value to information that is perceived as objective, i.e. that is accurate, precise and generalizable to of these preferences” similar settings. Awareness contributed to our ability to engage in effective communication with organizational actors whose co-operation was essential to the success of our work. The three factors highlighted above do not neccssarily constitute an exhaustive inventory. The options available to the public planner in any given problem-solving situation may be limited because of the existence of additional constraints on the management side. Since our experience was of a relatively short duration and confined to a single institutional setting, we are in no position to venture any further in this respect. It is evident from what has been said so far, however, that planning in public organizations should preferably be grounded in a multidimensional conception of the operating manager. The cognitive style perspective furnishes a useful starting point here, but there are other factors which to all appearances need to bc taken into consideration.

Change Process Research and Participative Model-building As indicated earlier, our expcriencc did not conform exactly to the Churchman-Schainblatt model in that we found it necessary to combine mutual understanding with persuasion. Other applied social scientists3” have also stressed the need to appeal in various ways to the operating manager with a view to enhancing the receptivity of the products of analysis. Yet, public planners, and analysts in general, are often reluctant to engage in persuasion, even when it consists largely of appeals to reason (as distinct from emotion). Their allegiance presumably ‘is to “truth” and truth is supposed to be its own advocate’. Or as Leavitt has stated (in relation to emotional persuasion) : Our training tends not only to teach analysis but simultaneously to ‘unteach’ emotionality. Yet implementation is a heavily emotional process. To worry about selling, persuading, and urging almost a violation to denigrate and than to use one’s

others to do what is obviously right is of the analyst’s implicit ethics. It is easier attack impulsiveness and emotionalism own cmotionality as a tool.”

Perhaps for this very reason, management scientists have not addressed themselves to the problem of persuasion with the thorough application which has

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characterized their approach to the subject surveyed in the preceding section. Still, they have written rather extensively on questions that appear to have a close bearing on the matter. This is particularly true of those who have studied the implementation of management science as a process of organizational change. Useful insights have also been generated by exponents of participative model-building, although it can be said that their work does not concern persuasion as such. The first group, change process researchers, have relied largely38 on the theories of Lewin39 and Schein40 in seeking to identify mechanisms which might enable the management scientist to persuade the operating manager. According to these two behavioural scientists, socio-psychological entities such as formal organizations have a built-in tendency to resist change. Individuals grow accustomed in organizational settings to a stable pattern of role behaviour and over a period of time performance of many tasks becomes routine and repetitive. Members of organizations depend heavily on the stability inherent in organizational environments to satisfy their various needs. Change introduces an element of uncertainty into this stable situation and is consequently deemed threatening. Resistance to change stems from the desire to neutralize the threat and restore the organization to its original equilibrium. Tactics employed to obstruct change may thus be seen as a stabilizing factor insofar as organizational functioning is concerned. When change is necessary, however, resistance to it must be minimized. This, suggest Lewin and Schein, can be achieved by means of a subtle manipulation of the change target. The prescribed course of action consists of applying in quick succession the following three processes: unfreezing, changing and refreezing (Figure 8). Unfreezing is, perhaps, the most critical step in the sequence. The objective here is to overcome resistance to change by encouraging dissatisfaction with current behaviour in order to unlearn this behaviour and create a desire to learn new behaviour (Lewin referred to this process as unfreezing because he saw it as akin to converting something solid into a fluid state). Changing, the next step, aims at systematically exposing the change target to new information which might lead to new behaviour patterns. Finally, refreezing purports to reinforce the new behaviour and integrate it into the total response set of the change target. (As Schein has put it: ‘Just as unfreezing is necessary for change to begin, refreezing is necessary for change to endure.‘4’) The specific techniques employed in the process of unfreezing are lack of confirmation, disconfirmation, induction of guilt-anxiety and creation of psychological safety by reduction of threat or removal of barriers. In lack of confirmation, the change target no longer receives positive communi-

T Start

Unfreeze

7

Figure 8. The Lewin-Schein

model of change

cation concerning current behaviour so that gradual unlearning occurs. Disconfirmation is a more extreme measure for it entails providing negative cues about current behaviour with a view to reversing the disposition of the change target towards the status quo and thus bringing about rapid unlearning. Induction of guilt-anxiety has similarly negative undertones. The idea here is to induce a feeling of inadequacy or failure in the change target (e.g. by comparing current performance to better performance that is theoretically attainable) on the assumption that such a feeling would render him more inclined to experiment with new behaviour patterns. Creation of psychological safety by reduction of threat or removal of barriers has a different quality altogether in that it emphasizes positive action. In this instance, the change agent (1) reassures the change target, (2) shows him that the outcome is more palatable than he may have assumed and (3) helps the change target to bear the anxiety attendent upon change. The process of changing does not involve the use of such elaborate behavioural mechanisms. Throughout this phase, the change agent acts in various ways to facilitate the assimilation of new information by the change target. The input of information emanating from the former is designed to effect a cognitive redefinition of the situation on the part of the latter. This, in turn, furnishes the basis for the crystallization of new attitudes and behaviour. The

Improving new responses acquired by the change target in the course of changing need, as indicated, to be reinforced. The refreezing process is set in motion to this end and the particular technique which gives it substance is reconfirmation, or the provision of positive feedback as regards the new behaviour. The unfreeze-change-refreeze paradigm presupposes an active strategy of persuasion on the part of the change agent/management scientist. The analyst here formulates a detailed plan of action and embarks on a series of steps intended to propel the change target/operating manager towards behaviour patterns compatible with his design. Participative model-building is completely different in this respect. In its extreme form4* the method eliminates the need for direct persuasion almost altogether because it ‘reduces’ the role of the management scientist to that of an ‘intellectual facilitator’ for organizational stakeholders: rather than providing them with ready solutions to their problems he endeavours to make it possible for them to solve these problems themselves. Participative model-building has its roots in a school of thought which urges far-reaching democratization of the management science function. Ackoff,43 the chief advocate of this point of view, contends that MS practitioners have been unduly preoccupied with the ends of organizational action, According to him, ‘[elvery end is a means to a further end and every means is an end-in-itself; hence means as well as ends have value to US’.~~The value which he ascribes to means has two dimensions: extrinsic (or instrumental) and intrirzsic (or stylistic). The former refers to the efficiency of a means relative to an end, and the latter to the satisfaction which it produces independently of its outcome. This distinction plays a crucial part in Ackoff’s argument. For he maintains that participation in organizational decision-making enhances substantially the satisfaction with work of those involved regardless of the benefits which might accrue from bringing expert knowledge to bear on the problem(s) confronting the organization. The implication is that participative model-building is an end in itself, or possesses an intrinsic value, and that the ultimate objective of management scientists ‘should notbe.. . to improve the quality of life of others but . . . to enable them to improve their own quality of life’.45 Stakeholder participation in organizational decision-making is said, however, to have an extrinsic value as well. The assumption here is that organizations can learn to diagnose and solve a wide range of problems. A technical expert, on the other hand, is constrained by the fact that his understanding of the organizational decision-environment is rather limited. Therefore, by retreating into a background position, or confining himself largely to the provision of relevant information to other interested

Plan Acceptance in Public Organizations

63

parties, he may contribute to the development of a collective problem-solving mode which is likely to produce better outcomes. At the same time, he would presumably not have to resort to persuasion in the context of his relationship with stakeholders-something that mutual understanding perhaps cannot achieve in itself. We considered both the unfreeze-change-refreeze paradigm and participative model-building as possible vehicles for facilitating persuasion or minimizing the need for it, although at different stages of our assignment. The former was the first framework to which we turned our attention because of the impression that it could be put into practice without any major organizational restructuring. We soon realized, however, that members of our team simply did not possess the requisite OD skills for engaging in unfreezing-changing-refreezing and decided therefore not to pursue this approach to its logical end. Now since public planning groups generally lack behavioural expertise, this factor may be thought of as an almost universal constraint. Nor is it just a matter of OD skills. One can discern a tendency in the social science literature to ascribe to public planners power that they do not in fact enjoy. As Baurn& has recently pointed out, planners in public organizations exercise limited authority and have little autonomy. Their mandate rarely extends to the manipulation of stakeholder attitudes and behaviour. We certainly did not feel free to’ apply the unfreeze-change-refreeze paradigm except in a most superficial way-which was another reason for our reluctance to explore fully its usefulness as a construct designed to guide public planners in their attempts to persuade operating-managers. The question also arises as to whether unfreezingchanging-refreezing tactics are compatible with the spirit of mutual understanding. The latter obviously hinges on fostering an open relationship which is based on reciprocal learning. Any major recourse to the unfreeze-change-refreeze paradigm, on the other hand, is bound to entail far-reaching manipulation of one party by another. Such manipulation doubtless runs counter to the principles of openness and reciprocity. Thus, although it may be desirable to sensitize planners in public organizations to their role as change agents, one is inclined to conclude that unfreezing-changing-refreezing techniques are not likely to advance the cause of mutual understanding. Participative model-building should not, of course, present any problems in this respect. The reason is that this mode of decision-making presupposes a reflective orientation4’ on the part of the public planner-an orientation deemed to be highly conducive under most circumstances to the development of mutual understanding. Still, if our experience is typical, it is questionable whether public organizations, with the possible exception of

64

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February

those involved in grass roots community work, would be prepared to embrace participative modelbuilding as a formal mechanism of institutional The underlying logic of this problem-solving. approach and its operational features arc to all appearances not entirely consistent with prevailing norms and decision-making practices in the public sector. Indeed, this was the reason given to us by those members of our Board of directors to whom we were directly accountable for their reluctance to allow the implementation of participative modelbuilding even on an experimental basis. They argued that any reforms of such nature might have a destabilizing effect on the bureaucratic machine under their control and urged us to explore the possibilities inherent in a more conventional planning format-one that would guarantee an active role for the planner (‘planner leader’ rather than ‘planner follower’). As a result, WC had to opt for a mode of collective problem-solving which is referred to as ‘evolutionary model-building’.48 Under the latter, the planner seeks close feedback from the user throughout the analytical process, but he is in most respects the pivotal actor in these interactions. Because of the strong emphasis which it places on accommodating stakeholder interests, evolutionary model-building can be said to be conducive to the development of mutual understanding. User involvement in problem-solving is also likely to predispose participants towards implementing analytical solutions, irrespective of whether they and the public planner fully understand each other. Yet, evolutionary model-building does not render persuasion altogether unnecessary. The free flow of information between the public planner and the operating-manager, and the fact that the former works actively with a view to developing solutions designed to satisfy the concrete needs of the latter, may reduce substantially the probability of disagreement between the two parties. However, since the public planner provides a distinct input into evolutionary model-building, an occasional recourse to persuasion is common in this context. As pointed out earlier, we felt compelled to resort to attempts to persuade operating-managers in various matters long after reaching something akin to mutual understanding in our relationship with them. WC also noted that our behaviour became progressively less manipulative in this respect as both sides learned to better understand each other. At the same time, it is true to say that WC never really succeeded in establishing in our minds the exact parameters of non-manipulative persuasion as an act of influence compatible with the notion of mutual understanding. This problem calls for careful attention on the part of applied social scientists, yet so far it has been largely glossed over in the management science literature.

1987

Summary Public planners have recently been urged to ‘think organizationally ‘4’)in order to gain acceptance for themselves and their work. It is not entirely clear, however, what form such thinking should take. When confronted with this question in a complex institutional setting, the author turned to the writings of management scientists for an answer. The three preceding sections provide an account of his experience. Most of the management science work surveyed here can be traced back to the seminal contribution of Churchman and Schainblatt. Indeed, their model appears to furnish a useful basis for smoothing the relationship between the public planner and the operating-manager. It is arguable, however, that the view of mutual understanding which they have been instrumental in propagating is on the idealistic side for it omits all reference to the need to engage in persuasion throughout the problem-solving process. Those management scientists who have followed in Churchman’s and Schainblatt’s footsteps have sought to gain insight into managerial behaviour by studying the cognitive style of the operatingmanager. Their writings contain ideas which may prove helpful in formulating public plans and presenting recommendations to management. Still, our experience suggests that cognitive style is perhaps not the only factor determining managerial responses in public planning contexts. It is also evident from what has been said here that participative model-building is not a decisionmaking mechanism which is likely to be embraced in the foreseeable future by public organizations on anything like a large scale. The implication is that public planners will have to continue to resort to persuasion in their relationship with operatingmanagers. However, given the fundamental imof the assumptions portance underlying the Churchman-Schainblatt model, it seems desirable to invest greater intellectual effort in identifying forms of persuasion consistent with the concept of mutual understanding.

References (1)

See in particular: R. L. Schultz and D. P Slevin (Eds.), lmplementing Operations Research/Management Scier&e, Amerjcan Elsevier. New York (1975); R. Doktor, R. L. Schultz and D. P. Slevin (Eds.), The jmplementation of Management Science. North-Holland, Amsterdam (1979); R. L. Schultz and M. D. Henry, Implementing decision models. In Marketing Decision Mode/s, R. L. Schultz and A. A. Zoltners (Eds.), North-Holland, New York (1981). pp. 275-296.

(2)

P. M. Morseand G. E. Kimball, MethodsofOperations Wiley, New York (1951 ).

(3)

C. W. Churchman and A. H. Schainblatt, The researcher and the manager, Management Science, 11, 869-887, February (1965).

Research,

Improving (4)

C. W. Churchman, The Design Books, New York (1971).

(5)

J. H. B. M. Huysmans, The effectiveness of the cognitive-style constraint in implementing operatrons research proposals. Management Science. 17. 92-l 04, September (1970).

(6)

Ibrd.. pp. 94-95.

(7)

Ibid.. p. 95.

(8)

C. I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, Press, Cambridge, MA (1938).

(9)

of Inquiring

Systems,

Basic

Harvard University

H. J. Leavitt, Beyond the analytic manager, California Management Review, 17, 5-12, Spring (1975): H. J. Leavitt, Beyond the analytic manager, California Management Review, 17. 11-21, Summer (1975).

(16)

H. Mintzberg, Planning on the left side and managing on the right, Harvard Business Review, 54. 49-58, July-August (1976).

(11)

See also: W. Taggart and D. Robey, Minds and managers, Academy of Management Review, 6. 187-l 95, April (1981).

(12)

R. H. Doktor and W. F. Hamilton, Cognitive style and the science recommendations, acceptance of management Management Science, 19, 884-894, April (1973).

(13)

Which they refer to as logical-analytical respectively.

(14)

J. L. McKenney and P. G. W. Keen, How managers’ minds work, Harvard Business Review, 52, 79-80, May-June (1974).

(15)

Ibid., p. 81

(16)

Ibrd.

(17)

They thus ‘focus on relationships between items and look for deviations from or conformities with their expectations. Their precepts act as cues for both gathering they find.’ See: ibid., p. 80.

and intuitive-synthetic,

and cataloguing

They thus ‘focus on detail rather than relationships and try to derive the attributes of the information from direct examination of rt instead of from fitting it to their precepts’. See: ibid., p. 81.

(19)

Ibid.

(26)

They thus ‘are much more willing to jump from one method to another, to discard information, and to be sensitive to cues that they may not be able to identify verbally’. See: ibid.

(21)

J. C. Larreche. Integrative complexity and the use of marketing models. In The Implementation of Management Science, Doktor. Schultz and Slevin (Eds.), pp. 171-187.

(22)

H. M. Shroder, M. J. Driver and S. Streufert, Human lnformation Processing, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York (1967).

(23)

Larreche, Integrative complexity models, pp. 172-l 73.

(24)

See In partrcular. D. Hellnegel and J. W. Slocum, Managenal problem-solving styles, Business Horizons, 18, 29-37, December (1975); D. Hellriegel and J. W. Slocum, Organrzationa/Behavior, West, St. Paul (1978); I. B. Myers, introduction to Type, AMSA Foundation, Gainesville (1976); M. De Waele, Managerial style and the design of decision atds, Omega, 6, 5-13 (1, 1978); D. J. Loveridge, Decision, judgment and style, Long Range Planning, 12, 22-27. February (1979); M. De Waele, Style complernentarity as a design criterion for decision aids, Omega, 8, 631-637 (6, 1980).

the

use

of

(25)

(26)

‘The sensatron function, for example, will note all the details of a hrstorrcal event, but tend to disregard the general context in whrch it IS set; the rntumve function, on the other hand, will pay little attention to the details but WIII have no difficulty in discernrng the Inner meanrng of the event, its possible implicatrons and effects.’ See De Waele. Managerial style and destgn of decrsion aids, pp. 7-8

in Public

Organizations

65

See: ibid., p. 7.

(28)

Myers, Introduction

(29)

The same conceptual

(30)

See in this connection: D. Robey and W. Taggart, Measuring managers’ minds, Academy of Management Review, 6, 375-383, July (1981).

to Type.

is

true, although possibly to a lesser extent, of the framework adopted by McKenney and Keen.

(31)

McKenney

(32)

See in particular: H. Mtntzberg, The Nature of Managerial Harper & Row, New York (1980).

(33)

See in particular: K. J. Radford, Complex Decision Problems, Reston. Reston (1977); K. J. Radford, information Systems for Strategic Decisions, Reston, Reston (1978); K. J. Radford, Strategic Planning. Reston, Reston (1980); K. J. Radford. Modern Managerial Decision Making, Reston, Reston (1981 ).

(34)

See in this connection: W. N. Dunn, Public Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs (1981).

(35)

See in this connection:

(36)

See for example: A. J. Meltsner, Don’t slight communication, Policy Analysis, 5, 367-392, Summer (1979).

(37)

Leavitt.

(38)

See for example: R. E. Sorensen and D. E. Zand, Improving the implementation of OR/MS models by applying the LewinSchein theory of change. In Implementing Operations Research/ Management Science, Schultz and Slevin (Eds.), pp. 217-235; D. E. Zand and R. E. Sorensen, Theory of change and the effective use of management science, Administrative Science Quarter/y, 20, 532-545, December (1975); P. G. W. Keen and M. S. Scott-Morton, Decision Support Systems, AddisonWesley, Reading, MA (1978); M. J. Ginzberg, A study of the implementanon process. In The Implementation of Management Science, Doktor, Schultz and Slevin (Eds.), pp. 85-l 02.

(39)

K. Lewin, Frontiers in group dynamics, Human Relations, 1, 2-38, February (1947); K. Lewin, Group decision and social change. In ReadingsinSocialPsychology, G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley (Eds.). Holt. New York (1958), pp. 197-221.

(40)

E. H. Schein, Management development as a process of influence, Industrial Management Review, 2, 59-77, Autumn (1961); E. H. Schein, Personal change through interpersonal relationship. In Interpersonal Dynamics, W. G. Bennis et al. (Eds.), Dorsey, Homewood (1968). pp. 333-368.

(41)

Schein, p. 340.

(42)

See for example: S. Hildebrant, From manipulation to participatton, in OR 78, K. B. Haley (Ed.), North-Holland, Amsterdam (1979). pp. 163-l 83.

(43)

See In particular: R. L. Ackoff, Does quality of ltfe have to be quantified?. Operatronal Research Quarterly. 27, 289-303 (2, 1976).

(44)

Ibid.. p. 243

(45)

See. ibrd., p. 299.

(46)

H. S. Baum. Analysts and planners must think organizatronally, Policy Analysis, 6, 479494, Autumn (1980).

(47)

Reflective orrentation has been defined (in the context of the manager-employee relatronship) as follows: ‘When employing the reflective orientation, the manager does not seek to direct the conversation. It IS the manager’s job only to listen and reflect back to the other party the crucial elements of what he feels the presenter regards as the problem. The manager’s task is to help the employee think through his problems so that the decision he reaches on what to do shall be his own.’ See: C. J. Margerison, Managerial Problem Solving, McGraw-Hill, London (1974). pp. 17-l 8.

(48)

See In this connection: Schultz and Slevrn (Eds.), implementing Operations ResearchlManagement Science; Doktor, Schultz and Slevin (Eds.), The Implementation of Management Science; Schultz and Henry, Implementing dectsion-models; J. D. Little,

markettng

See in particular. C. G. Jung, Psychological Types, trans. Ft. F. C. Hall, Prtnceton University Press Prrncston (1971); J. Jacobt. The Psychology of C. G. Jung, trans. R. Manheim, Yale Unrversity Press, New Haven (1973); R. 0. Mason and I. I. Mitroff, A program of research on management information systems, Management Science, 19, 475487. January (1973).

Acceptance

(27)

the data

(18)

and

Plan

and Keen, How

Beyond

managers’

Policy

Work,

Analysis,

ibid

the analytic

Personal

minds work.

change

manager,

through

p. 9

interpersonal

relationships,

66

Long

Range

Planning

Vol. 20

February

A media planning calculus, Operations Research, 17, l-35, January-February (1969); G. L. Urban and Ft. Karash, Evolutionary model building, Journal of Marketing Research, VIII, 62-66, February (1971); G. L. Urban, Building models for decision makers, Interfaces, 4, l-l 1, May (1974); J. D. Little, Brandaid, Operations Research, 23, 628-673, July-August (1975); Ft. J. Boland, The process and product of system design,

1987 Management Science, 24,887-898, May (1978); M. Alavi and J. C. Henderson, An evolutionary strategy for implementing a decision support system, ManagementScience, 27,1308-l 322, November (1981. (49)

See: Baum, Analysts and planners must think organizationally.