Individual differences in the game motives of Own, Relative, and Joint gain

JOURNAL

OF

RESEARCH

IN

PERSONALITY

Individual Differences of Own, Relative,

9, 240-251 (1975)

in the Game Motives and Joint Gain

D. MICHAEL KUHLMANAND ALFRED MARSHELLO University

of Delaware

Two hundred and eighteen undergraduates (94 males and 124 females) made decisions in same-sex dyads across four types of 3-choice decomposed games. An analysis of each subject’s choices was performed to see if he or she consistently pursued one of the three motives of Own (Individualism), Relative (Competition) or Joint (Cooperation) gain across all four decomposed games. Sixty-six percent of the subjects manifested such consistency, and sex of subject was unrelated to which goal was pursued. Of the remaining 32%, a sizable subgroup (%) was shown to be making its choices in an Altruistic fashion, attempting to maximize the outcomes of the other subject. An analysis of variance of the F scale scores of subjects in these motivational categories yielded an effect (p < .025), with the Competitive group having the highest, and the Altruistic group having the lowest mean authoritarianism score. Correlational analyses indicated negative r’s between degree of Competition and F score, positive r’s between degree of Altruism and F, but no apparent relation between F and either Individualistic or Joint gain choice.

Studies of decision making in situations of social interdependence have by no means ignored the role of individual differences. However, Terhune’s (1970) review of the relevant literature indicates “ . . . personality effects have been sufficiently elusive to render overall results equivocal” (p. 199). The typical approach in such studies has been to differentiate people on the basis of a given paper and pencil inventory and then observe the game behavior of the differentiated groups. Failure or equivocal outcomes of such attempts may result from either: (1) a lack of relationship between the personality dimension and decisions in games, or (2) an absence of individual differences in game contexts. The current paper addresses itself to this second possibility by attempting a direct demonstration of individual differences in game behavior. Individual differences in game behavior may exist with respect to: (1) the motives of each participant and/or, (2) the strategy employed by each person to achieve his motives. This study will focus on the former Requests for reprints should be sent to D. Michael Kuhlman, Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 197 1 1. The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments made by Dr. Samuel Gaertner on an earlier version of this paper. 240 Copyright All rights

@ 1975 by Academic Press, Inc. of reproduction in any form resewed.

INDIVIDUAL

DIFFERENCES

IN

GAME

MOTIVES

241

aspect, specifically attempting to show individual differences in the social motives of Individualism (a concern with maximizing one’s own gain, the losses or gains of the other being irrelevant), Competition (a concern with maximizing the algebraic difference between one’s own and the other’s outcome), and Cooperation (a concern with maximizing the algebraic sum of one’s own and the other’s outcome). Recent studies (Messick & McClintock, 1968; McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman & Campos, 1973) show that a great deal of choice behavior in experimental games is directed toward maximizing these goals. In addition, Messick and McClintock have developed a probabilistic choice model which takes the strengths of each of these motives as its parameters. Specifically, this model assumes that at any given time the subject is in one of four mutually exclusive motivational states (Individualistic, Competitive, Cooperative or Indifferent) with some probability (M*, x, y, 2. respectively). It is further assumed that the subject’s choice on each trial is determined by the state in which he currently finds himself. Messick and McClintock evaluated this model for group data, assuming an absence of individual differences with respect to the values of M’, X, y and z. While this evaluation met with success, these same authors provide additional results suggesting that these four parameters may vary from one person to the next. This latter suggestion provides the major impetus for the current paper, which poses two interrelated questions: (1) Do individuals display a consistent preference for a single social goal across a variety of experimental games? (2) Are there individual differences with respect to which goal is most desired? It should be pointed out that question (2) is meaningful only if question ( 1) is answered affirmatively; however, question one’s affirmation does not by itself imply the existence of individual differences in this context. For example, if all people were strongly competitive question (I) would be affirmed but question (2) would not. These questions were evaluated by having pairs of same-sex subjects make choices across four types of decomposed games. The decomposed games used in this study are given in Table 1. The decomposed game. developed independently by Pruitt (1967) and Messick and McClintock presents the subject with a choice between n alternatives; in the present study, II = 3. Associated with each alternative are two numbers: ( 1) $f is the number of points that go to one’s self, and (2) Ut equals the points that go to the other. On a given trial, each subject’s total outcome is the sum of the Sf resulting from his own choice plus the Ot resulting from the other subject’s choice. The present study presented subjects with a decomposed game setting designed to minimize situational determinants of choice by withholding information as to: (1) the choices of the other subject, and (2) the cumulative score of both subjects. Hence, the assumption is made that intrapersonal factors determine choice: specifi-

242

KUHLMAN

AND MARSHELLO TABLE

THE

DECOMPOSED

GAMES

USED

1 IN THE PRESENT

STUDY

Game type OR . J

OJ R

ORJ

Alternative 0 R J

Alternative OR J N

Alternative OJ R N

Alternative ORJ N, N,

50 20 60 30 70 40 80 30 100 50

50 10 70 30 80 40

50 40 70 60 80 70

0.R.J Game number 1 2 3 4 5

sp ot Sf ot v Or Sf Ot Sf ot

40 0 50 10 60 20 60 0 80 10

40 40 50 50 60 60 70 50 90 70

40 30 60 50 70 60

20 0 40 20 50 30

40 20 60 40 70 50

20 10 40 30 50 40

60 0 70 20 90 10

40 10 50 10 70 20

20 20 40 30 60 20

Note. Each of these games was played three times with the following exceptions: 0 . R . J number 2 was played six times and ORJ number 2 was played twice. ’ Sf indicates the units that go to one’s self; Ot indicates units that go to the other.

tally, it is assumed that the subject’s choice on each trial is determined by the type of social goal he is currently motivated to maximize. Each goal specifies unique criteria for choosing between the three alternatives: (1) Own gain motivation (Individualism) leads to the alternative with the largest Sf (2) Relative gain (Competition) leads to a choice of the largest Sf-Ot and, (3) Joint gain (Cooperation) produces a choice of the largest Sf+Ot. As may be seen in Table 1, the four types of games used here differ with respect to the amount and pattern of conflict between these criteria. In the ORJ game no conflict exists, in that all criteria lead to the same choice. For the 0R.J and 0J.R games there is only partial agreement among the criteria and in the 0.R.J game they all conflict. In the present study, a subject was categorized as either Individualistic, Cooperative or Competitive if, across all four classes of games, he showed a clear preference for the choices maximizing Own, Joint, or Relative gain, respectively. Any other form of responding produced a categorization of inconsistent. The criteria for showing a clear preference are given in the results section of this paper. A second concern of this paper deals with the relation of the above mentioned categories to the personality dimension of authoritarianism. Kelly and Stahelski ( 1970) have developed a cogent argument suggesting that high authoritariams manifest a more competitive game orientation or motivation, than low authoritarians, although these authors do not specifically test this assertion. There is empirical support (e.g., Deutsch,

INDIVIDUAL

DIFFERENCES

IN

GAME

MOTIVES

243

1960; Kuhlman, Marshello & Lake, 1973) which shows that high authoritarians make more defecting responses than lows in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG). However, these two studies do not provide unambiguous support for Kelley and Stahelski’s suggestion concerning the motives of these groups. It could be that high and low authoritarians possess the same underlying motives, or orientations. but employ different strategies in their pursuit. Another problem of interpretation results from the motivational structure of the PDG itself. As McClintack et al. have pointed out, the motivational structure of a PDG is that of an 0R.J game. Hence a high number of defecting choices in the PDG is motivationally ambiguous in that either a competitive or individualistic motive could lead to such behavior. In the current case, the Deutsch and the Kuhlman et al. results can only imply that high authoritarians are either more Competitive OY more Individualistic than lows. The present study will examine the mean authoritarianism of subjects in each of the motivational categories in an attempt to directly evaluate Kelley and Stahelski’s assertion. METHOD

Subjects Ninety-four males (47 male-male dyads) and 124 females (62 female-female dyads) served as subjects. They were students enrolled in introductory general psychology or personality courses and were fulfilling a participation requirement.

Procedure The subjects reported to the lab in like-sex pairs. They were separated visually from one another and sat facing a common screen upon which the games were to be projected. Instructions began by stating that this was a decision making experiment in which each subject would receive a number of units on each trial, the total number being determined by the subject’s own choice rind the choice of the other, and that for every I.000 units each subject accumulated he or she would receive 10 cents. A sample 0J.R game was projected and used to explain how total outcomes were determined for each subject on each trial. Following these instructions, each subject was given a nine item questionnaire asking for the total outcome that each subject would receive as a result of each of the nine possible combinations of the three alternatives. If a subject missed any of these 18 questions, the experimenter explained the error(s) and then asked the subject to give and explain the correct answers to the missed item(s). Once each subject demonstrated his or her comprehension of the situation, the instructions continued, the subjects being informed that they would receive no information concerning the other subject’s choices or the cumulative score of either subject until a “ . number of trials have been completed.” The purpose of withholding feedback was to prevent subjects’ choices affecting one another in an attempt to measure each subject’s personal motives. The final phrase of the instructions was: “Your task in this experiment is to make that choice which you consider to be the best on each trial.‘: . Each trial began with a new slide being projected: a few seconds later the experimenter turned on each subject’s signal light, which served to tell the subject to indicate his or her choice once a decision has been reached. Each subject was supplied with three silent switches which were used to signal their decisions to the experimenter. Throughout the en-

244

KUHLMAN

AND MARSHELLO

tire session, no subject knew the responses of the other nor was any score feedback given. Each trial presented one of the four types of games. The series of slides contained five different 0.R.J games (see the first column of Table I), three different OR.J’s, three Different OJ.R’s, and three different ORJ’s (columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 1, respectively). Three copies of each game were prepared to control for position preference by associating each column of payoffs once with A, once with B, and once with C. This produced 18 O.R.J’s (one game was repeated), and nine each of the remaining three types. One ORJ slide was eliminated, and approximately half the number of slides of each type of game were randomly presented in the first 22 trials, and the other half were randomly presented in the second 22 trials. After the last trial, subjects completed a postexperimental questionnaire and were then shown their final outcomes and paid; each subject was asked not to talk about the study until the term ended. All subjects were contacted at another date and requested to attend a group testing session in which they completed the reversed item F scale (Christie, Have1 & Seidenberg, 1958) as a measure of their authoritarianism.

RESULTS

On the postexperimental questionnaire, six males and seven females indicated they had been exposed to or had read about experiments resembling the current one, and were eliminated from the analysis, leaving 88 males and 117 females whose data is reported here. In all, each subject made 44 decisions: 18 0.R.J, 9 OR-J, 9 OJ-R and 8 ORJ. Table 2 shows the mean proportion of each choice across these four games for males and females separately and for the sexes combined. As may be seen in Table 2, the choice proportions in the 0-R-J game are approximately equal, indicating either that each motive was active or that subjects were choosing indifferently. Choice proportions in the TABLE MEAN

CHOICE MALE

Game type 0.R.J OR . J OJ . R ORJ

PROPORTIONS

AND

FEMALE

ACROSS SUBJECTS

2 THE

AND

FOUR FOR

DECOMPOSED

THE

COMBINED

GAMES

BY

SEXES

Choice

Males (N = 88)

Females (N= 117)

Males & females (N = 205)

0 R J OR J N” OJ R N ORJ Nb

.311 .413 .276 .689 .272 .039 .533 .424 .043 .874 .126

.382 ,286 ,332 .656 .322 .022 .618 .355 ,027

.351 ,341 ,308 .670 ,301 .029 .581 .386 .033 835 .165

a This is a choice which maximizes none of the three motives. b In the ORJ game, the two choices which maximize none of the three motives were combined to produce a single N category.

INDIVIDUAL

DIFFERENCES

IN

GAME

MOTIVES

245

remaining three games allow a rejection of the possibility of indifference. Specifically, when the number of motives maximized by a single choice increases, that choice is made more frequently. This can be seen in the OR, OJ and ORJ rows of Table 2. Also, choices which maximize none of the three motives (the N rows of Table 2) are made very infrequently. Table 2 clearly indicates that each motive was determining choice behavior and that on the group level no single motive was most salient. To assess the reliability of sex differences apparent in the 11 rows of Table 2, a series of 10 t tests was performed, with each test taking the transformed (arcsine) proportions of the 88 males and 117 females as raw data. (Only 10 tests were necessary in that the two choice proportions computed in the ORJ game are complementary, and therefore perfectly correlated.) Of these 10 comparisons, only one reached significance at the .05 level of confidence. Specifically, males appear to be making more R choices than females in the 0.R.J game (t(203) = 2.19). However, a similar effect for R responding does not occur in the 0J.R game (t = 1.2 I). Hence it is difficult to argue for systematic sex effects in these measures of motivation. It is appropriate to question the validity of this multiple t analysis due to the fact that a subject’s choice proportions within each game class are necessarily correlated; hence, the r’s computed in each game class are not independent. Therefore, an additional sex-effect analysis was performed which does not suffer from such interdependence of measures. Specifically, a 2 x 4 (sex x game class; game class being a repeated measures factor) analysis of variance was performed using an unweighted means solution. Each level of the repeated measures factor (game class) represented a choice maximizing a single motive in one of the four game classes: level 1 was proportion of 0 choices in the 0.R.J game, level 2 was proportion of J choices in the 0R.J game, level 3 was proportion of R choices in the 0J.R game and level 4 was proportion of N choices in the ORJ game. Choice proportions were converted via the arcsine transformation and the resulting analysis shows no main effect for sex (p < 1) and no interaction (F(3,610) = 1.84). There was a nonsurprising main effect for game class (F(3,610) = 15.04, p < .Ol) reflecting the very low proportion of choices which maximize none of the three social goals relative to those that do. This failure to detect sex differences in the strengths of Own, Relative and Joint gain has been reported in two recent studies (McClintock, et al.; Messick, Nielsen, Lytle & Woodward, 1967). This section now turns to the analysis of each motive’s strength within the single subject. Although sex differences do not occur in terms of overall choice proportions, a question still remains as to the proportion of males and females manifesting consistently Individualistic, Competitive and Cooperative motivation. For this reason, results of within-subject analyses will be reported for each sex separately.

246 Classi$cation

KUHLMAN

AND

MARSHELLO

Criteria

As mentioned in the introduction a subject must show a clear preference for a single goal within and across each of the four game classes before he or she is classified as Individualistic, Competitive or Cooperative. The criterion for a clear preference within a given game depended on the number of times that game was presented. Specifically, in the 0.R.J (18 presentations), 10 or more choices were required; in the OR-J and 0J.R (nine presentations each) and in the ORJ (eight presentations), five or more choices were required. These minimum frequencies of 10 and 5 prevent ties with any other choice within a given game type, and also prevent any subject from satisfying more than one set of criteria. An appropriate question at this point is: Given no individual differences, what is the probability that a subject would satisfy criteria for classification on the basis of chance? This probability was computed for each of the three motivational categories as follows. First the probability of choosing an alternative equal to or greater than the minimum criterion frequency was determined for each choice in each game with the following binominal summation: P (making

M or more choices of type X in Game Type G) = N! M!(N-M)!

where N is the number of games of that type, M is the minimum number of choices for preference and P is the probability of the choice in question. The value of P for each case was estimated with the mean choice proportions given in Table 2. For example, P for an OR choice in the 0R.J game was taken as .670. Once the value of each of the 12 summations was determined, the probability that a subject would satisfy criteria for all four game classes was computed by taking the product of the four probabilities corresponding to those classes. These products were then used to produce expected frequencies of categorization due to chance. Table 3 presents expected and observed categorization frequencies for males and females, and for the sexes combined. A chi-square computed on frequency of categorization between the sexes proved nonsignificant (X”(3) = 5.94) which is consistent with the lack of sex differences in overall choice proportions reported above. Combining the sexes then, Row 3 (as well as the two above it) of Table 3 shows two things: (1) In each motivational category, many more subjects are included than are expected by chance and, (2) the number of subjects categorized as inconsistent is far fewer than chance expectation. Regarding the two questions posed in the introduction, the data in Table 3 provide a strong affirmative response to each. Sixty-six percent of the subjects in this

INDIVIDUAL

DIFFERENCES TABLE

OBSERVED

AND FEMALES

IN GAME

247

MOTIVES

3

EXPECTED CATEGORY FREQUENCIES AND FOR MALES AND FEMALES

FOR MALES COMBINED

AND

Category Subject

Individualist

Competitive

Cooperative

Male Female Both

17 (3.08) 30 (4.10) 47 (7.18)

32 ( .87) 27 (1.16) 59 (2.03)

13 ( .44) 15 ( S9) 28 (1.03)

Inconsistent 26 ( 83.6) 45 (111.2) 71 (194.8)

’ Expected frequencies are in parentheses.

experiment were predominantly pursuing one of the three social goals across the four decomposed games and different subjects pursued different goals. A within-category examination was performed on the 7 1 remaining subjects classified as inconsistent. Thirteen members of this category made a majority of their choices in each game consistent with a single motive (seven subjects chose Own gain, four Relative and two of them chose Joint), but at least one of these majorities failed to reach the current criteria. Another 38 subjects defied classification given the current approach. Of this group, 28 pursued different goals in different games and the remaining 10 produced ties in choice frequencies in at least one game category. This leaves 20 subjects (5 males and 15 females) who, as a group, present a very homogeneous yet unsuspected pattern of choice. Specifically they are highly cooperative in the O*R.J, 0R.J and 0J.R games; the mean number of cooperative responses in each equals 16.25, 8.25, and 8.35, respectively. Everyone of these subjects more than satisfies current choice criteria in each of these three games. However, in the ORJ game, the mean frequency of ORJ choices is only 1.5, out of a possible 8. Such a low level of ORJ choice is unique to this group. Of the 38 subjects described above who defied classification, only 8 made less than five ORJ choices in this game; the mean number of ORJ choices made by these 38 subjects is 5.8, whereas for the current group it is less than 2. It is certainly possible that these 20 subjects were systematically pursuing a motive other than the three considered thus far. Whatever this additional motive might be, it is necessary that it lead to the joint gain choice in the O-R-J, 0R.J and 0J.R games used in this study. McClintock rt al. describe recent work suggesting the presence of an equalitarian or equity motive, which (unlike cooperation as currently defined) seeks to minimize the difference between Sf and Ot. An examination of the 0-R-J and 0R.J games used in this study (see Table 1) shows that equity or joint gain would lead to the same choice. Assuming

248

KUHLMAN

AND

MARSHELLO

the current group is equalitarian then, would account for their high proportion of J choices in these two games. In the 0J.R game however, there are two choices for which (,Sf-Ot) is the same, specifically the OJ and N alternatives. If these subjects were equalitarian, we would expect them to choose indifferently between them, the effect being to lower frequency of OJ choice in this game relative to J choice frequencies in the 0.R.J and OR-J games. However, as has been stated, the level of OJ responding here is just as high as J responding in the other games, which poses a problem for an equity explanation. Such a problem is not encountered if one assumes an Altruistic motive, or desire to maximize Ot. As is easily seen, this motive leads to a clear choice in the O*R*J, 0R.J and 0J.R games and in each game it is confounded with Joint gain. In the ORJ game, Altruism always leads to some alternative other than the ORJ choice. As shown in Table I, alternative N2 maximizes Ot in ORJ number 1 (played three times) and ORJ number 2 (played two times). For these five games then, subjects should demonstrate a preferenc for N2 over N 1. The data show that relative to N 1, N2 was chosen 86% of the time; also relative to the Nl and ORJ choices combined, N2 was chosen 66% of the time. These preferences support the notion of an Altruistic motive. This leaves ORJ number 3 (played three times) in which Nl and N2 maximize Ot to the same degree and so we should expect our current group of subjects to be indifferent between them. However, the data indicate a preference for N 1; relative to N2, Nl was chosen 75% of the time; relative to N2 and ORJ combined, Nl was chosen 65% of the time. At this point it can only be suggested that in situations such as this where two (or more) alternatives maximize Ot, the Altruistic subject chooses between them on the basis of his own gain. Of course, such a possibility must await future test. Including this group then, 75% of the subjects in this study show a consistent motivational orientation over four types of decomposed game. In addition, sex does not appear related to the occurrence of any given motive; a chi square was computed on sex crossed with the motive categories including Altruism which did not reach significance at the .05 level of confidence. The second general concern of this paper is the relation of authoritarianism to these motivational orientations. Of the 205 subjects F scores were obtained for 150. Table 4 presents the number of subjects in each category from whom F scores were obtained and also the mean authoritarianism for each group. Consistent with Kelley and Stahelski’s suggestion, subjects with Competitive orientations manifest the highest level of authoritarianism. It is interesting to note that Individualists and Cooperators do not differ in authoritarianism and that Altruists show the lowest level of authoritarianism. A one-way analysis of variance allows rejection of the hypothesis of no authoritarianism differences between these groups (F(4,145) = 2.895, p < .025).

INDIVIDUAL

DIFFERENCES

IN

TABLE

MEAN

AUTHORITARIANISM

Category

249

MOTIVES

4

OF EACH

MOTIVATIONAL

N

Individualism Competition Cooperation Inconsistent Altruistic Overall

GAME

CATEGORY

Mean F

SD

34 42 25 35

70.80 75.30 70.40 69.49

14.00 12.30 11.32 11.74

14

62.50 70.93

13.24 12.96

150

The next analysis was performed to examine the relation between the strength of each game motive within the individual subject, and his/her level of authoritarianism. The examination was performed by simply correlating F scores with each of 11 choice frequencies across the decomposed games. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 5. The last column of this table, labeled “Altruistic” represents the number of maximize-other responses made in ORJ games numbers 1 and 2. Considering only the first three game classes, the table shows: (I ) positive and significant T’S between F score and all choices which maximize Relative or Competitive gain: (2) negative and significant Y’S for all choices involving Joint gain. With regard to these negative correlations, the reader should keep in mind that in the first three decomposed games, Joint gain and Altruistic gain are completely confounded, making it difficult to know which motive contributed to these r’s. The results from the ORJ game strongly suggest that the relationship is based on Altruism rather than Joint gain: r between Altruistic choice in ORJ and F is negative and of the same magnitude as all the preceding r’s involving cooperative measures which confounded Joint and Altruistic gain. Finally, Table 5 indicates no relation between Individualism and the F scale. TABLE CORRELATION

5

OF AUTHORITARIANISM AND ACROSS THE DECOMPOSED

FREQUENCY GAMES

OF CHOICE

Game class 0.R.J Choice

0

R

+**

.Ol

.21*

OR . J J -.20*

*p < .Ol. **p

< .05.

*** n = 150 for all cases.

OR

J

.17** -.17**

OJ R

ORJ

N

OJ

R

N

ORJ

.03

-.19**

.22”

-.06

.25*

Altruistic - .24*

250

KUHLMAN

AND

MARSHELLO

DISCUSSION

Many researchers in the area of social interdependence have argued that a highly important determinant of behavior in such settings is the specific structure the interdependence takes. For this discussion, structure can be viewed as the distribution of rewards and costs over the outcomes in the interaction. Also, it is common to assume an isomorphism between physical structure (i.e., the game matrix specified by the experimenter) and psychological structure across subjects. The findings of the current study suggest this latter assumption may be unwarranted. This paper has shown that individuals differ with respect to the kind of goal they wish to maximize in social interaction. Hence, the same physical structure can have a variable psychological structure, depending on who plays it. For example, consider the structure of a Chicken game as social motivation varies. Table 6 presents the phsyical and then the row player’s psychological structure of Chicken as his Own, to Relative to Joint gain orientation varies. For the motive of Individualism, the game presents the column player with behavior control over the row player; in this instance, one could expect row player’s choices to be responsive to those of the column player. For the two remaining psychological structures no behavior control exists: rather, for each motive, one of row player’s choices clearly dominates the other: For Relative gain, row D dominates whereas for Joint gain, row C dominates. Such an analysis suggests the prediction that in the game of Chicken, individuals motivated by Own gain should be more responsive to variations in a “stooge’s” style of play (specifically, from unilaterally cooperative to unilaterally competitive) than any of the remaining motivational types being considered. Support for this prediction would underscore the assertion that one cannot ignore the individual subject’s motives as determinants of the structures of his interactions. Such research is currently underway in this laboratory. This study also shows no sex differences in these social motives, TABLE THE PHYSICAL VARIATIONS

Physical structure

878 10,2

Motivation of row player is Relative gain

Own gain 2,lO -3,-3

6

STRUCTURE OF CHICKEN AND PSYCHOLOGICAL AS A FUNCTION OF SOCIAL MOTIVATION

8 10

2 -3

0 8

-8 0

Joint gain 16 12

12 -6

Note. The psychological variations are from the perspective of the row player. Also, in the leftmost matrix, (Physical structure) the row player’s outcomes are to the left and the column player’s outcome’s are to the right of the comma in each cell.

INDIVIDUAL

DIFFERENCES

IN GAME

MOTIVES

251

which repeats the findings of two other studies in this area (McClintock et al., 1974; Messick et al., 1974). The major implication of this result is that sex differences in other studies of social interdependence (e.g., Rapaport & Chammah, 1965) will probably be best understood in terms of strategic (rather than motivational) differences between the sexes. Finally, a common approach to authoritarianism and game playing is to hypothesize two positively co-varying continua: (1) high to low authoritarianism, and (2) competition to cooperation, respectively. The relationship between F scores and motivational category demonstrated here is certainly consistent with this hypothesis. At the same time, these data raise a question as to the most adequate interpretation of the “cooperativeness” of low authoritarians. It appears that the game orientation of individuals who score very low on the F scale is something other than a desire to maximize joint gain. Rather, such individuals appear more concerned with maximizing the gains of the other (altruism?). REFERENCES Christie. R., Havel, J.. & Seidenberg, B. Is the F scale irreversible? Jollrnrrl of’Ah)zo~mtr/ and

Social

Psychology,

1958.

56,

143-159.

Deutsch, M. Trust, trustworthiness, and the F scale. Jolrr& ofAhnornzct/ rrnd Socicll Psychology, 1960, 61, 138-140. Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski. A. J. Social interaction basis of cooperators’ and competitors‘ beliefs about others. Journal of Per.sona/ity and Social Psychology. 1970, 16, 66-9 I. Kuhlman. D. M., Marshello. A.. & Lake, D. Competition towards men and computers in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Paper presented at the meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, Washington, D. C.. 1973. McClintock, C. G.. Messick. D. M.. Kuhlman, D. M.. & Campos, F. T. Motivational bases of choice in three-choice decomposed games. Jr)ts)zn/ t$’ Espcrimental Socinl Psychology.

1974.9,

572-590.

Messick. D. M., & McClintock, C. G. Motivational bases of choice in experimental games. Journtrl of Experimental Sock/ Psychology, 1968, 4, I-75. Messick. D. M.. Nielsen. E., Lytle, L., & Woodward. C. Choice independence in a triple dominance game. Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1967. Pruitt, D. C. Reward structure and cooperation: The decomposed Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Journal of Personality und Social P.sychology, 1967, 7, 2 l-27. Rapaport, A., & Chammah. A. Sex differences in factors contributing to the level of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Journcr/ ofPersonu/ity and Sociu/ psycho/ogy, 1975. 2, 83 l-838. Terhune. K. W. The effects of personality in cooperation and conflict. In P. Swingle (Ed.), “The Structure of Conflict.” New York: Academic Press. 1970.