Indoctrinability as an evolutionary precondition for democracy

Indoctrinability as an Evolutionary Precondition for Democracy Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson I.

The Problems to be Addressed

This article seeks to account for two “sets” of long-established (and apparently inconsistent, if not contradictory) political phenomena: A.

Throughout human history, the overwhelming majority of political societies have been authoritarian (i.e., characterized by the rule of the few over the many, by command and obedience, and by dominance and submission). This has been true in the past; as we will see, a realistic assessment of the contemporary world compels the conclusion that, although we purportedly live in an “Age of Democracy,” it still remains essentially true today. Why, then, have authoritarian societies been so pervasive and enduring, and democracies so infrequent and fragile?

B.

Nonetheless, from time to time democracies do appear and, fortunately, some of them do manage to survive, a few even to flourish. There were, after all, perhaps fifty glorious years in Athens and, after a lengthy interval, a century or so of democratic grandeur in Rome. After that, a long, long hiatus-and, finally, beginning with England, democracies appear once again. Given the overwhelming preponderance of authoritarian polities over the centuries, then and now, how do we explain these occasional emergences and survivals of democratic governments?

These are the two rather substantial questions which we address. Before doing so, however, it is probably desirable to document our contention that, notwithstanding the much heralded “Age of Democracy,” and triumph (or just-about-to-be-accomplished world-wide triumph) of democratic theory,’ democratic states still remain very much a minority in the family of nations.

Albert Somit, Southern Illinois University, NY 14802.

Carbondale,

Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 19(1):4/-54

MN:

1061-7361

IL 62901; Steven A. Peterson, Alfred University,

Alfred,

Copyright 0 1996 by JAI F’ress, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 41

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SOMIT AND STEVEN A. PETERSON II.

Will the Real Democracies Please Stand Up? A.

Essential Characteristics of a Democracy

Obviously, before we can attempt any credible census of current democracies, there will have to be some agreement on the criteria to be applied. Toward this end we propose a “soft” definition which few persons, we are confident, will regard as overly demanding. To be classified as a democracy, we suggest, a state should have at least the following characteristics: 1. Wide-spread, if not universal, suffrage and a respectable track record of free and openly contested elections (with at least one electorally achieved change of ruling party-or parties-in recent decades);2 and 2. A reasonably effective legal system for protecting individual rights (freedom of speech, of the press, etc.) against arbitrary governmental action (i.e., what is usually meant by the term “the rule of law.“)3 Admittedly, neither of these two criteria lends itself to precise quantification and, in a given instance, opinions may legitimately differ. But when we compare the various listings and evaluations cited below, there is far more agreement than disagreement. To paraphrase a famous judicial comment about pornography, we may not be able precisely to define a democracy-but we usually know one when we see one. . . . B.

Democracies-Still

a Minority

Since the paucity of democracies prior to, say, the 18th century is hardly contestable,4 we will focus our attention on the contemporary scene. Given our basic thesis about the relative scarcity of democratic polities today as well as in the past, any census which we ourselves undertook might understandably be viewed with some skepticism. Fortunately, we are spared this task, for there exists an abundance of such counts conducted by other social scientists whose bias, if any, plainly runs in quite the opposite direction. Among the most recent of these tabulations are Vanhanen (1984, 1990), Dahl (1971), McColm (1991), Sullivan (1992), Sorenson (1993), and (as of this writing) the latest, conducted by The Economist (August, 1994). To be sure, there are some differences in terminology which tend to complicate exact comparisons.’ Nonetheless, individually and collectively these several studies warrant the following conclusions: 1. Most are plainly “pro-democratic” in sympathy (as are we) and use basically the same evaluative criteria. 2. Most, if not all, are extremely charitable in their classification. For example, in one of the lists we find Mexico and the Dominican Republic (to mention only a couple of the most egregious cases) placed fairly high on the ranking of “free” nations. 3. This generosity notwithstanding, all of the studies concur that democracies still constitute a minority of present day govemments.6

Indoctrinability as an Evolutionary Preconditionfor Democracy -43 4.

Despite two World Wars fought, one explicitly and the other implicitly, to “make the world safe for democracy,” the ratio of democracies to non-democracies has remained about the same for the past 75 years (Dahl, 1991, p. 77).

This latter statistic is particularly troublesome for those who believe in democracy. As Huntington (1991-1992) has demonstrated, there have been several democratic “waves” over the past century, with the number of such polities increasing-and then diminishing. Of the many newly-created post-World War I democracies, for instance, rather few survived as such into even the mid- 1930s. More recently, the collapse of the USSR gave rise to numerous now-independent states which were immediately hailed as “democracies” or, just a bit more cautiously, as “proto democracies” (Nelson & Bentley, 1994). But both Huntington’s historical perspective and, perhaps even more saddening, political developments in many of these nations, justify the fear that few of these nations are likely to warrant classification under either of these headings by the end of this decade. In short, the names change and the roster of “sovereign” nations expands-at least for the moment. But the long-standing historical pattern has altered very slightly, if at all: authoritarian states still constitute a majority, and democracies a minority, of political societies. JiII. Darwhism and Democracy: The Problem of the Missing Polity Why are democracies so rare and fragile-and authoritarian forms of government so common and enduring? To this question, many responses have been offered. In this article, we address the same issue. We advance, however, a quite different answer. Bluntly stated, it is that evolution has given our species an inherent preference for hierarchically structured social and political systems. A.

Authoritarianism:

A neo-Darwinian

Perspective

Humans are social primates, closely akin genetically to the chimpanzees and only slightly less so to the gorillas. Working over at least 10 million years, natural selection’ has endowed the social primates with a “predisposition” (to understate the matter) for hierarchical social structures. That is, they almost invariably form groups, troops, tribes, and societies characterized by marked differences of individual status in terms of dominance and submission-and by unequal access to many of the good things of life. These hierarchically organized modes of existence evolved among all the social primates, varying primarily in detail from one species to another. They evolved for the same reason that all other behaviors evolve (i.e., because they contributed significantly, on balance, to the “inclusive fitness” of the individual social primate, whether male or female, dominant or subordinate). Dominance and submission became integral aspects of primates’ behavioral repertoire because they served an important, perhaps even an indispensable, evolutionary function. But in nature as elsewhere there is no free lunch. This genetic legacy has endowed Homo sapiens with an innate bias or inclination toward authoritarian, that is, hierarchically structured, political and social systems.

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Rousseau (1762), then, was wrong, terribly wrong.’ We are not born free. On the contrary, we come into the world bearing the burdens and shackles of our evolutionary past. In short, the single most important reason (though not necessarily the only reason) for the relative rarity of democratic government is to be found not in our stars but in our social primate nature. B.

Counter-Arguments

to an Evolutionary

Explanation

At this juncture, two major objections’ are almost certain to arise. One is the “level of analysis” argument; the other springs from the long-standing notion of the “natural” or “uncorrupted” human. 1. Level ofAnalysis. As graduate students are repeatedly warned (and their elders regularly forget), an explanation for behavior observed at one level of analysis is not necessarily a valid explanation for apparently similar behavior manifested at either a “higher” or “lower” level. Thus, for example, the tendency of males, and especially small groups of young males, to resort to violence in situations of interpersonal and intergroup rivalry and competition has sometimes been offered as an explanation for the frequency and persistence of war between nations. Alternatively, but less commonly, the frequency with which nations engage in war has been seen as a major contributing factor in the manifestations of inter-individual and inter-group violence within a given society. In both instances, a theory which seeks to account for behavior at one social level is extrapolated to apply to behavior at a quite different level of social organization. Even if the explanation for the behavior at the original level is valid, or reasonably so, that explanation may be quite inadequate-or conceivably even irrelevant-to behavior at a different level. lo Applying the level of analysis argument, one might quite reasonably question whether an evolutionary explanation for the pervasiveness of hierarchical structure (and of command and obedience) among relatively small groups of social primates can help us better understand the predominance of authoritarian political regimes throughout human history. After all, is it not the case that these behaviors are taking place at strikingly different levels? This is a very reasonable objection, especially since we are not yet able to identify the combination of genes which actually underlay dominance behaviors among social primates at the small group, let alone any higher, social level. Nonetheless, we think there is a reasonably persuasive response: hierarchical social structures, and dominance and submission behavior, are to be found among Homo sapiens not simply at the small group level but at every level from the family to the state. As Shepher (1987) has observed: Modern human life is basically a study in dominance hierarchies; we spend most of our hours in hierarchies that range from corporate industry to government administration, from supermarkets to department stores, from the elementary school to the university. Even our clubs, associations, churches and hospitals are hierarchically organized, all displaying a wide variety of dominance systems [in McGuiness, 1987, p. 1741.

That is certainly the pattern even in “democratic” societies today; it is even more strikingly the pattern in contemporary authoritarian polities; and, as we gaze back in time, it has assuredly been the organizational pattern observed in every society of which we have an historical record. Indeed, so ubiquitous is hierarchy that, as one observer remarked, “modem

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man is virtually incapable of fully recognizing it. For a start, he simply fails to notice it. If it does force itself on his attention he tends to eliminate it as an epiphenomenon” (Dumont, 1966, p. xvii). The response to the “level of analysis” objection, then, is quite simple. Hierarchical structures have predominated and continue to predominate at all social levels of human existence-the family, multi-family small groups, and then moving “upwards” to the so-called sovereign state.” If, as we have argued, hierarchy, dominance, and submission at the small group level can satisfactorily be accounted for by neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, then the consistency with which the same behavioral tendencies manifest themselves at every “higher” level strongly suggests that the same genetic tendencies are operative.12 This formulation, it is critical to emphasize, does not deny the very real possibility that cultural factors (see below) may strengthen or attenuate this tendency as we move from one level of social behavior to another-or from one society to another. 2. The Argumentfrom “Natural Man”. One of the most attractive and cherished notions in social philosophy maintains that, “in the state of nature” (i.e., before the appearance of organized government) our remote ancestors lived in a truly egalitarian, peaceful, and harmonious fashion. According to this theory, differences of social and political status, the vast disparities in wealth, the resort to violence and to war, in brief, the shortcomings of society as we know it, are afflictions resulting from the insidiously corrupting influence of private property and of the state.13 From such a perspective, “natural man” is seen, almost by definition, as inherently egalitarian and democratic. This theory both predicts and requires, then, that peoples still living in a state of nature display these appealing characteristics. Plainly, there are serious difficulties here. First, that of actually finding such a people. As the world rapidly grows more crowded, the likelihood that there still exist such societies becomes increasingly minuscule. Second, no matter how skilled and careful the observer, there is the problem of accurately describing, through 20th century eyes, a world so vastly different from our own. Third, even should they be found, the initial contact with such a people often sets profound change into motion, almost automatically marking the end of the geographic and cultural isolation which has left the group so quintessentially “primitive.” Small won&r that anthropologists often differ so sharply among themselves in what they see, even though their respective visits may occur within relatively brief successive intervals of time. Allowing for all of this, studies of contemporary “hunter-gatherer” peoples may cast some light on the matter, for theirs is the way our forerunners presumably lived during the greater part of our species’ evolution. Admittedly, the hunter-gatherer societies surviving in the “ethnographic present” are not necessarily identical to those of our ancestors; still, they may yield suggestive evidence. Not surprisingly, many of the earlier anthropologist visitors, possibly reflecting the influence of Locke and Rousseau, often described a halcyon mode of peaceful, egalitarian life. Over the last several decades, however, quite another picture has emerged. With very few exceptions, “field studies” report the existence of unmistakable patterns of dominance and submission (see, for instance, Lee and DeVore, 1968). As a result, anthropologists have become increasingly receptive to the idea, as one specialist put it, that “all [human] groups have their dominance-deference hierarchies . . . . [and that] such hierarchical organizations appear to be rooted in the biological nature of our species” (Ginsburg, 1988).

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~~o~logists and human ethologists have come to dis~~sh, moreover, between “‘immediate return” and “delayed return” primitive societies. The former, exceedingly rare and quite small (say, 30-50 members), are characterized by very simple tools and, as the term suggests, by the immediate consumption of food. Even here, there are modest status differencesi4 When, for whatever reasons, these become oppressive, the group simply fissions into two or more entities. On the other hand, the much more common “delayed return” primitive societies are usually considerably larger, have more advanced tools, recognize property rights, and display the social stratification and inequalities with which we are so familiar (Woodbum, in Gellner, 1980; 1982). To summarize: immediate return primitive societies are often little more than “extended” families; their delayed return counterparts were likely initially created by the aggregation of families which frequently still constitute their constituent components. In both cases, however, we find the same pyramidal structure: modest but unmistakable patterns of dominance and submission in the former; greater and considerably sharper differences of status in the latter. Given these persistent similarities between both types of so-called primitive societies and our own, it is truly difficult to escape the conclusion that these cross-cultural consistencies of social structure reflect a genetically ~smi~ed behavioral tendency. IV.

Other Supporting Evidence, Very, Very Briefly Noted

The thesis that our evolutionary history has left us genetically inclined toward hierarchical, au~o~~~ social structures can be supported by evidence drawn from a sizable nmber of additional fields and disciplines. Given the constraints of space, we can here mention briefly only the most relevant of these.

Space permitting, we would provide at this juncture a review of the primatological literature, with the focus on the social primates, especially on our closest relatives, the great apes, and with most attention to the chimpanzees-of whom, Jared Diamond (1992) insists, we consti~~ simply a third variety. Space manifestly not permitting, we note only that all the social primates have evolved hierarchically structured dominance systems, although the details of the structures vary from species to species and (as in the case, for example, of the baboons) also according to the ecological setting. B.

Child Ethology

Once again, we can only summarize rather than discuss a large body of work. Almost without exception, these studies point to the spon~eous emergence of dominance structures among even very young children fi.e, from 3 112to 6 112years old, and as early as the first grade in school (see, for example, Strayer & Strayer, 1976; Banter-Barry, 1977,198l; Hold, 1977, 198O)J. These hierarchical distinctions, furthermore, tend to be fairly stable (Bdelman & Omark, 1973).

lndoctrinabilityas an EvolutionaryPrecondition fir Democracy-47 C.

Experimental Small Group Psychology

Two general findings emerge from the reports describing these experimental efforts. First, that where there is social pressure to “conform,” a large proportion of the subjects yield, consciously or otherwise, to that pressure (see, for instance, the classic studies of Asch, 1965; Sherif, 1965; Janis, 1972; Noelle-Neumann, 1986).15 Second, and much more disturbing, was Milgram’s (1974) exploration of the extent to which “normal” people will obey even when they are instructed to commit actions that violate their basic values and beliefs. In this case, as is well known, they were ordered to inflict physical pain upon subjects who answered questions incorrectly. Many of them did so. Milgram’s results forced him to the unwilling conclusion that, when commanded by those in apparent positions of authority, humans have an “instinct to obey.” B. F. Skinner put it in slightly different terms when he remarked that “One of the most striking things about the struggle for freedom from intentional control is how often it has been lacking. Many people have submitted to the most odious religious, governmental and economic controls for centuries” (cited by Barash, 1986, pp. 323-324). D.

The Fate of Utopian Societies

The nature of utopian undertakings, we know, has varied greatly. Some of these communities were based, from their very inception, on an inequality of status; others, though, sought to establish an economically egalitarian and politically democratic society. But few of these attempts, of whatever type, to build a better world survived more than a decade or two. Of those utopias that endured for any substantial length of time, almost all were either authoritarian in design-or, if not so originally, soon developed marked disparities of authority and influence. Whatever the hopes for a brave new world, as historian Henry Selby conceded, “Sadly for social utopias, genes will out. . .” (in Wilkinson, 1969, p. 21). E.

Democratic Theory-The

Philosophers’ Pariah

“Democracy” (in the sense of “one man, one vote”) has now become so popular a catchphrase that few realize that, until modem times, it was an unwanted and an unloved orphan in the family of political theories. Whatever their other differences, all of our ‘great” political philosophers-even Rousseau l6 and John Stuart Milll’have been united in their distaste for and/or skepticism about the idea of rule by the majority. Philosophers reflect as well as shape the beliefs of their times, and there is ample evidence that their lack of enthusiasm for democracy was shared by the citizenry at large. In fact, historians of democracy agree that, until the end of the 18th century, “. . . democracy was not thought of well by most people, and certainly not by most of the educated or ruling classes” (Mayo, 1960, p. 25). ’* The popular appeal of “democracy’* today springs in substantial part from the strikingly diverse and often contradictory uses, as Alexis de Tocqueville (1835/1946) presciently warned, to which the term has been put.” There can be no better example of this than the insistence of the (now defunct) USSR and (at this writing) still functioning North Korean and Chinese (mainland) governments that they are a “‘people’s democracy.” Or, to take an almost equally strained usage, there is the American government’s announced determination, in

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SOMIT AND STEVEN A. PETERSON

1994, to “restore democracy in Haiti.” When, we may wonder, have the unfo~unate Haitians ever had a government which even remotely resembled a democracy? V.

What Makes Democracy (Sometimes) Possible? A.

The “Material Conditions” Approach

Many social scientists have sought to identify the conditions which make it possible for a democracy to emerge and to survive. A few maintain that this is basically a random phenomenon, similar perhaps to a meteor somehow surviving its journey through the atmosphere and eventually managing to strike the Earth. Most of those who have addressed this question, though, find the answer in some special concatenation of social, economic, historical and political factors.20 Among the requirements most often identi~ed are wealth and the mode of dist~bution thereof, widespread participation in societal institutions, a substantial middle class, communication networks, industrialization, urbanization, level of “popular” education, cultural values, the prevailing international norms and, of course, the specific historical context (i.e., a colonial power which encourages a movement toward democracy by a former colony). In any given instance, some, many, or even all of these factors may well play a role. Nonetheless, we must again turn to evolutionary theory for an understanding of a necessary if not a sufficient precondition for successful democratic governance. B.

~~doctrinabi~i~

A neo-Darwinian approach suggests, to repeat, that Homo sapiens shares the genetically transmitted proclivity for dominance and hierarchy of the other social primates. At the same time this approach emphasizes as well as recognizes that humankind has also evolved some behavioral attributes and capacities which are, in effect, unique in the animal kingdom. There has been, needless to say, a running debate over whether other social primates are capable of language or, to take another controversy, of self-consciousness. But there is near unanimity that our species alone has evolved the type of brain needed to create that vast complex of Ianguage, laws, customs and mores, art forms, material objects, technology, science, ideas, and value which are subsumed by the term “culture.” Some of the ideas and values which constitute so large a component of any people’s culture are often attributed to a divine source, sometimes acting through a human agent, sometimes not. Other ideas and values, especially those of a more secular nature, are recognized as having unmist~able human origins. Nonetheless, once brought into existence, these ideas and values, whatever their putative inspiration, have the same power of profoundly altering the behaviors of those who believe in them.21 When this happens, humankind literally becomes the servant of its own creations; in some instances, culture may even triumph, at least temporarily, over nature. True believers often willingly undertake actions and pursue goals which may be strikingly different from those-sex, aggression, violence and dominance, to mention only the more obvious-for which evolution has otherwise predisposed our species. In fact, cognizant of the enthusiastic readiness with which Homo sapiens becomes involved in these behaviors, both religiously derived and secularly based moral codes strive earnestly to prohibit, or at least discourage,

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their followers from engaging in them. Thus, adherents of almost all faiths, religious and secular alike, are urged-or commanded-to be chaste; not to be overly enamored of worldly possessions; to give charity to the poor; to forgive those who offend them; even to love their neighbors as they love themselves.22 But moral and religious beliefs are not the only source of actions which run against the biological grain. Secular doctrines no less than theological teachings have the same remarkable power. As repeatedly demonstrated over the centuries, social and political ideologies can also inspire their adherents to engage in behaviors, and to pursue objectives, which are at great variance from those to which their primate origins and genetic legacy may have predisposed them. Just as they have been willing to sacrifice, suffer and die for their God or Gods, so men and women have been ready to give of themselves for their culture and language, for flag and country, for one political “ism” or another. This, of course, is what is meant by indoctrinability (i.e., the extraordinary capacity of ideas to impel human behavior or, to put it more precisely, for human behavior to be shaped and driven by ideas, even when those ideas may dictate actions counter to our innate predispositions, or actions which even jeopardize life itself). It is indoctrinability which makes democracy sometimes viable. But if indoctrinability is a necessary condition, it is manifestly not a sufficient one. For a democracy to be born and to survive demands both the capacity for indoctrination (which our species possesses) and other enabling conditions (which may or may not be present). what, then, are these additional requirements? Second, how do they combine with indoctrinability to overcome our innate social primate inclination for authoritarian social and political structures? These are the problems to which we next turn. C.

Zndoctrinabilty and Democracy

Selection for indoctrinability in a language-capable species of social primates makes sound evolutionary sense. When individuals living in the same group accept the same values, conflict and violence will be diminished, resulting in a more stable society. This relative order and tranquility, in turn, is likely to result in greater reproductive success and inclusive fitness. Neo-Darwinian theory thus explains the benefits of indoctrinability to both the individual and the group and suggests the reasons why it has evolved in conjunction with the capacity to speak (and eventually to write and to read). But indoctrinability, though the product of evolution and “designed” to enhance inclusive fitness, may take on a life of its own. Once evolved, it can be so powerful a motivating factor that it is capable of working against reproductive success. A few examples make this abundantly clear: 1. The institution of celibacy of Roman Catholic priests demonstrates that religious doctrine can overrule the most imperative drive of all living beings-sex and reproduction. 2. From Thermopylae to the present, endless millions of men (and women) have willingly died in behalf of cherished ethnic, religious and “nationalistic” beliefs as indoctrinability has triumphed over the individual desire for replication. 3. From Masada to Jonestown, humankind has engaged in collective suicide in behalf of some cause and/or value. This is perhaps indoctrinability carried to its ultimate extreme.

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In short, though evolved to enhance inclusive fitness, indo~~nabili~ is demons~bly capable of inducing behaviors which run counter to our most basic genetic inclinations. Consequently, even though as social primates we are innately biased toward authoritarian structures (and probably “predisposed” to favor authoritarian beliefs and values), indoctrinability has also endowed us with the capacity to embrace, to struggle for, and in some instances even to die in behalf of “democracy” just as endless millions of our fellow humans have embraced and, on occasion, died in behalf of other often quite contrary but no less deeply cherished ideas. Given our inherent authoritarian biases, however, democratic values-and ultimately democratic political institutions-app~ntly require quite special and nosily unsatisfied As suggested earlier, social and economic circonditions if they are to take popular root.23 cumstances may prove critical. Vanhanen (1984, 1990) finds, for instance, that the chances for democracy increase dramatically when there is general economic well-being, when land is widely held (rather than monopolized by a few), when there is extensive urb~~tion, and when a sizable segment of the population is literate. Others claim that dense communication networks facilitate democratic governance (Lipset, 1963; Cutright, 1963). And, according to Banks (1972), an educated public is a key requirement. Given its rarity, there can be no doubt that special circumstances, in conjunction with ind~~nability, are needed if democratic ideas are to be widely accepted and democratic governments are to survive. There remains, nonetheless, considerable uncertainty on this point. We call all think of polities in which most, if not all, of the foregoing material conditions are met-and yet the government remains intractably undemocratic. Furthermore, it is conceivable that some of these “essential” material conditions are as much the effects of, as they are contributing causes to, democratic political institutions. To be sure, indoctrinability makes democracy possible. But what else is needed? That, in all candor, remains to be established. What is clear, however, is that the consequences of indoctrinability frequently threaten to outweigh its benefits. Indoc~nabili~ evolved, surely, to lessen discord (and ultimately violence) within relatively small groups of social primates.24 But as the size and complexity of the groups increased, and as rival interests and ideas began increasingly to compete with each other, indoctrinability has become a fecund source both of intra-societal conflict and, as we see in the world around us, of ethnic, religious, and inter-state hostility, bloodshed, and warfare. Acknowledgements Based on a paper first presented at the Symposium on Ideology, Warfare and Ind~~Mbi~ty, Ringburg Castle, 9-13 January, 1995. Notes 1. Perhaps the best known example is Fukuyama (1992). 2. This requirement, other problems aside, would raise considerable doubt about the status of such states, for instance, as Mexico. 3. These are the two requirements agreed upon by almost all of those who have recently dealt with this subject (see, for example, Dahl, 1989; Vanhanen, 1990; Bobbio, 1987; and Bollen, 1993). It is

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a much less demanding definition than that, say, of Polybius who also insisted on “. . . reverence to the gods, honour for parents, respect to others, [and] obedience to laws as traditional and habitual. . .” Herbert Werlin would also require “a mutual respect among competing leaders and followers . . .” (1994, p. 530). 4. As Giovanni Sartori has remarked, “. . . [fhom the time city democracy was first conceived and practiced in ancient Greece, it has taken humankind more than two thousand years to invent and establish a viable large-scale democracy” (1987, p. xii). 5. Some, for instance, use the terms “democratic” and “non-democratic,” others employ a tripartite classification, “free,” “partly free,” and “not free.” The context, though, generally makes it evident that “free” and “democratic” are being employed as if they were essentially synonymous. 6. Even The Economist, which somehow manages to find freedom in the most unexpected--one is tempted to say truly unbelievable-places (1994, p. 16), classified only 74 of 184 states as ‘Tree.” A more critical assessment, we think it fair to say, would cut this figure at least in half. 7. Some biologists, of course, have recently questioned whether “natural selection” alone provides an adequate explanation of evolutionary change. 8. We refer, of course, to the famous opening lines of his Social Contract where, with characteristic confidence in the correctness of his (then current) convictions, Rousseau proclaims that: Man is born free but is everywhere in chains. How did this come about? That I do not know. What can make

it legitimate? That I believe I can explain.

How, then, did “this come about”? That we believe we can explain. What can make it legitimate? That, alas, we do not know. 9. This assumes, to be sure, that the reader accepts the concept of evolution, whether Lamarckian, neo-Darwinian, or other. Those readers who do not are not likely to proceed beyond this point. In fact, we suspect, they have already taken their leave. 10. For instance, see Kenneth Waltz (1959). 11. As Lionel Tiger puts it, ‘The work or social function of a particular group largely doesn’t matter; the status distinctions emerge anyway. They exist in groups of whatever kind, from garden clubs, to street gangs, to orchestras with soloists and dramatic conductors, to seminaries where some are holier than others and holier than thou, to the military and other official hierarchies with highly refined power schemes” (1992, p. 266). 12. “All [human] groups have their dominance-deference hierarchies. Seen collectively and historically, such hierarchical organizations appear to be rooted in the biological nature of our species and must, therefore, be, in part, understood in evolutionary terms” (Ginsburg, 1988, p. 1). 13. This formulation, of course, still leaves unanswered the question of just why these social and cultural forces should be so universally and so powerfully operative among our species. 14. According to P. L. van den Berghe, “no society or family system anywhere in the world has ever been egalitarian or genuinely democratic” (in Lockard, 1980, p. 72). 15. Summarizing this literature, Robert Frank concluded that “Even for ostensibly mature adults, peer behaviors remain an important source of standards. Failure to follow them has the capacity to stir unpleasant feelings even when the activity is one that all prior training and conditioning have opposed” (1988, p. 155). 16. “Taking the word democracy in its strictest sense, perhaps there never did, and never will exist such a government. It is against the natural order that the greater number should govern, and the smaller number be governed” (The Social Contract, Book 3, chap. iv). 17. Rightly regarded as the major spokesman for representative government, Mill had serious reservations about the wisdom of the majority and the desirability of universal suffrage. Nor were the spokesmen for the “far left” necessarily any more enchanted with democracy. Thus, from Proudhon, “Enough! Let us be frank. Universal suffrage, the popular mandate, the whole elective system is but

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child’s play. I will not trust them with my labor, my peace of mind, my fortnne. I will not risk a hair of my head to defend them” (cited by Macdonald, 1974, p. 69). 18. This was true even in the United States where “democracy” and “democrat” were “. . . generally used and understood by eighteenth century Americans as terms of political derogation” (Hanson, 1985, p. 25). 19. “Unless these words r’democracy“ and “democratic government“] are clearly defined and their definition agreed upon, people will live in an inextricable confusion of ideas, much to the advantage of demagogues and despots” (1946, p. 557). This caveat has not deterred some of our colleagues from referring to the present melange of Eastern European states as “proto-democracies” (Nelson & Bentley, 1994). 20. For example, see Banks (1972), Burkhart & Lewis-Beck (1994), Cutright (1963), Lipset (1963). 2 1. As the Gnostic “Gospel of Philip” puts it, “That is the way it is in the world-human beings make gods, and worship their creation” (Pagels, 1979, p. 122). 22. As Robert H. Frank reminds us, “Virtually every human culture we know has invested great effort in both the teaching and enfo~ement of moral codes of behavior. Most of these codes oppose the ‘animal in our nature,’ calling on people to forego personal advantage out of consideration for others” (1988, p. 39). 23. We speak here, we should emphasize, ofthe conditions that make possible the transformation of an authoritarian polity into a democracy. This may well be quite a different task from that of establishing a viable democracy in what was formerly a colonial possession of a democratic colonial power. Even here, though, there are vast differences as, for example, the respective histories of Nigeria, India, and Canada testify. As we emphasize later in this discussion, the requisite conditions almost surely vary from one situation to another. 24. See, for example, Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1982).

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About the Authors Albert Somlt is Professor at Southern Illinois University, Book Review Editor for the Journal, and author of numerous works about political theory. Steven A. Peterson is Professor at Alfred University, Book Review Editor for the Journal, and author of numerous works about political and evolutionary theory. His last article for the Journal, “Reification and Schizophrenia,” appeared in vol. 18 no. 1, and was written with Jessica Sicherman.