- Email: [email protected]
Ingredients in sustainably managing water in semi-arid environments
environmental science & policy 12 (2009) 737–740
available at www.sciencedirect.com
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci
Ingredients in sustainably managing water in semi-arid environments Samuel N. Luoma * John Muir Institute of the Environment, 122C The Barn, One Shields Avenue, University of California, Davis, CA 95616, USA
article info Published on line 5 August 2009 Keywords: CALFED Water issues California Lead Scientist
1.
abstract The lessons learned from CALFED indicate that ingredients important in the long-term resolution of water management issues may not result in short-term ‘‘solutions’’. The value of this special issue lies in its identification of ingredients that stimulate re-framing of issues, adapting to new knowledge and innovative decisions. But sustainable water management also requires the political patience to sustain those processes as a means of perpetuating the long-term decision-making necessary to anticipate and/or respond to an ever-changing environment.
Introduction
Analysts increasingly recognize that, across the globe, sustainable management of water resources is a critical issue. This special series presents insights into water management in an over-subscribed environment using the experiences of California’s CALFED process. Taken together, the different papers discuss some important ingredients in any sustainable water management strategy. They note the need for breaking down barriers between institutions, managing conflict, and improving understanding through integrated assessments. They discuss the value of constantly re-framing issues, discursive process, and adapting to new knowledge. They also note that CALFED did not ‘‘fix’’ California’s water problems, despite the presence of many of these ingredients. The decline of native fish species was not reversed, despite the successful implementation of the innovative Environmental Water Account (Lejano and Ingram, 2009) and a decade of fruitful scientific effort (Taylor and Short, 2009). The reliability of water deliveries declined, not improved, partly as a result of court rulings to protect the collapsing fish populations (Owen, 2009; Fuller, 2009; Hanneman and Dyckman, 2009). Nor did the process reverse the
# 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
brinksmanship approach to managing this complex and ever fluctuating water resource (Owen, 2009). What then was the overall lesson of the CALFED experiment? Are we to conclude that the political, cultural, legal and institutional barriers to sustainably managing water are impenetrable to known solutions? Or, for the sake of argument, did CALFED teach us a simpler lesson: a decade is not enough time to create a ‘‘solution’’ to a wicked, longstanding water management problem. Is it possible that ‘‘a solution’’ can also be defined as progressively implementing incremental improvements in water management over a long period of time? That would require identifying the most desirable traits of the CALFED process and sustaining those while evaluating and continuously adjusting those things that impeded innovation and sustainability. Summary judgments under such a strategy would require decades of experience. From that perspective, perhaps CALFED is best viewed as a first step in a long process of reforming water management in California. We might view the Delta Vision developed by the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission in 2008 as a refinement of that process in that it presented an overall goal that grew out of CALFED: ecosystem restoration and water supply reliability are ‘‘co-equal’’. We might view the more recent assessment of
* Tel.: +1 650 329 4481. E-mail address: [email protected]. 1462-9011/$ – see front matter # 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2009.07.003
738
environmental science & policy 12 (2009) 737–740
infrastructure options by Lund et al. (2007, 2008) as an outcome demonstrating the value of the increased investments in science under CALFED. Californians have many major decisions about water infrastructure and water policy ahead of them if reform is to keep up with the inevitable changes that will come to the Delta in the decades ahead (Lund et al., 2008). But if we are looking at a long-term process it is also critical to identify the ingredients that are necessary to sustain perpetual decision-making. The identification of some of those ingredients is a major contribution of this series of articles.
2.
Ingredients
The signs of unsustainable management were clearly defined in these papers: deadlock; conflict; unreliable delivery of high quality water to critical institutions; losses of natural capital as populations of native species begin to disappear; levee collapses; and an increasing risk of significant disruptions in drinking water provisions. Add to that the challenge of adapting to the growing implications of global warming and unpredictable natural events. In California, this means more floods, less snowpack, perhaps less water overall and the high probability of earthquakes severe enough to seriously damage the antiquated infrastructure of the Delta. In this environment, agreement on the general ingredients of a workable strategy forward may be a next step as important as suggestions for specific policy and infrastructure changes. Several of those ingredients are discussed in the CALFED context below. Strong, focused, independent science leadership is an essential ingredient in any water management program, as recognized by both Norgaard et al. (2009) and Taylor and Short (2009). They both agree that an independent, carefully managed and robust program of scientific effort is necessary to effectively grow the critical new knowledge from which innovative solutions spring, even if they do not agree on exactly how that should be accomplished. But the CALFED experience also suggests that new knowledge is not enough to ask from a science program. Science needs to contribute to other processes that allow innovation: repeatedly re-framing issues, breaking down barriers between institutions (debalkanizing) and managing conflict. This view colored my experience as CALFED’s first Lead Scientist, from 2000 through 2003. The Lead Scientist was defined in the 2000 CALFED Record of Decision (ROD), the core negotiated policy document on which CALFED’s last stages were officially based, as a position independent from external influences and parallel to the executive director (Jacobs et al., 2003). Compared to other water management programs, the CALFED Lead Scientist and the science program were, and continue to be, unique in their goals, the degree of investment, and the extent of their influence. The responsibilities included engaging academic, agency and stakeholder scientists in water issues, leading growth of scientific understanding relevant to the CALFED issues and leading communication of the state of science to the public, the scientific community and the policy/political community (Taylor and Short, 2009 go into more detail). But for perspective, it is important to understand that more
complex responsibilities were (and continue to be) also involved: namely establishing trust in the scientific enterprise and avoiding breakdown of the collaborative effort over conflicts about the relevant science (which I define as ‘‘managing conflict’’). Bettsy Reicke, who led the development of the 1990’s water accord in California argued that innovative solutions to California’s water problems were not possible at that time because knowledge of the Delta was minimal and understanding was fractured among institutions (Jacobs et al., 2003). Improvements in that understanding resulted from CALFED’s investments in science between 1997 and 2006. Continuing to grow that knowledge provides the necessary foundation for the independent, integrated assessments described by Norgaard et al. (2009) and implemented by Lund et al. (2007, 2008). The CALFED science program also showed that it is possible to develop a shared understanding of the scientifically complex issues surrounding resource problems, even among a diverse array of interested parties (Jacobs et al., 2003; Taylor and Short, 2009). The main benefit of shared understanding (even if it does not involve complete agreement about issues) is its usefulness in re-framing problems in ways that areas of agreement can be found. The result is not necessarily true adaptive management experiments, but re-framing can provide opportunities for institutions to respond to constantly changing issues. But the structure of the science dialogue must be designed with these goals in mind (see Jacobs et al., 2003). A strong science program can also contribute to breaking down barriers between institutions and thereby reducing the potential for conflict (Lejano and Ingram, 2009). Thus, CALFED taught us that a science program with the goals described by Taylor and Short (2009) can be a boundary organization wherein science can play a role in all these processes. A science program that sustains such goals is also likely to sustain its own support. Secretary of Resources Mary Nichols cited the science dialogue in 2002 as ‘‘calming the waters’’ of conflict within CALFED. In 2004, when 40 stakeholders of BDPAC were asked to vote on what CALFED programs should be subject to budgetary cuts, none voted to cut the science program. It was the only program so designated. Finally, the science program and the science dialogue remain an active entity in CALFED today, despite greatly reduced funding and the turmoil surrounding CALFED as a whole. Sustainable water management, of course, requires more than a strong program of science (Taylor and Short, 2009). But in a complex environment, it is not conceivable how an ongoing sequence of constructive actions could proceed without such a program. Another lesson I took away from CALFED is that even well planned or managed programs require sufficient resources applied persistently to the right problems. In contrast to many circumstances, there was ample funding when CALFED formally began its implementation in 2000. But three other crucial resources were in short supply: time, knowledge and water. My personal observation was that the time deadlines set politically (e.g. in the Record of Decision) inadequately accounted for both the deliberate nature of the collaborative process (Fuller, 2009) and the complexity of implementing reform on the desired scale (Hanneman and Dyckman, 2009). The collapse of political support in only the fourth year after
environmental science & policy 12 (2009) 737–740
implementation was based upon the conclusion that CALFED was both expensive and unproductive. But that conclusion was based upon deadlines that were artificial. Time turned out to be a resource more difficult to extract from the political process than money. One of the innovative cornerstones of CALFED, the Environmental Water Account (EWA) described by Lejano and Ingram (2009), provides another example of resource limitation. The EWA was restricted to the margins of the ecological issues by the relatively small quantity of water devoted to managing protection of species of concern. It was also limited to issues associated with water diversion in the Delta. Management of water releases from the upstream reservoirs was off limits, despite the observations of experts that management of river discharges offered important opportunities for coordinated management of endangered and threatened species. As noted above, knowledge was also in short supply when the water accord was initiated and EWA was designed. For example, the needs of important native species like Delta smelt (Taylor and Short, 2009) were essentially unknown when EWA was implemented, partly to manage this species. Decisions about when and how to use environmental water were based upon professional judgment and a scattering of ‘‘real time’’ data, with little immediate feedback as to successes and failures. Knowledge of Delta smelt has grown rapidly since 1997, but a decade appeared to be insufficient to both accumulate such knowledge then turn it into knowledge-based management practices. Finally, Lejano and Ingram (2009) describe why breaking down institutional barriers and managing conflict are necessary for implementation of innovative water policy reform. In CALFED the long-standing ‘‘opposition of interests’’ and the zero sum game involved in dividing up water were sufficient to impede an immediate overall solution to water issues (Hanneman and Dyckman, 2009). But smaller scale ‘‘cores’’ were developing within the process. The EWA helped institutions work together outside their historic boundaries (Lejano and Ingram, 2009). Fuller (2009) described a second instance where parties with very different interests were able to find consensus on how to approach agricultural water use efficiency. Neither of these examples resulted from simply convening different parties with intention to build consensus (Fuller, 2009). Consistent with our experience in the Science Program, these ‘‘cores’’ for consensus building were strategically designed and nurtured to breakdown institutional barriers but avoid breakdown of the collaborative process. Another constructive element in both successes was the inclusion of independent technical experts as advisors and/or reviewers. The addition of the academic community to the mix of parties further stimulated innovation, transparency and cooperation. The experts helped identify common ground where all parties could find areas of agreement and helped reframe the old arguments about who is right, exploring areas of mis-understanding, finding places of agreement within those areas and then designing strategies for next steps (Fuller, 2009). Indeed, these were small victories. Neither provided the ‘‘big fix’’ for questions about the potential for agricultural water conservation or about protecting native species. But the ingredients of success detailed by Lejano and Ingram (2009)
739
and Fuller (2009) should not be ignored. They are building blocks for a larger and longer scale evolution of solutions. Another important lesson from CALFED is that sustaining boundary objects and boundary organizations is a challenge. Lejano and Ingram (2009) and Fuller (2009) described how failure to break down boundaries on smaller scales resulted in less successful attempts at developing innovative policy, in the water quality program and in addressing agricultural water use efficiency. What none of the articles seemed to recognize is that the implementation of the CALFED process, overall, started as a model resembling the success stories in Fuller et al. and Lejano/Ingram in the first 3 years. But, in the fourth year of the program the agencies began to take over control of the CALFED programs most related to their expertise (e.g. ecosystem restoration was moved under Cal Fish and Game; water conveyance and storage were moved to Dept. Water Resources, etc.). This change was stipulated in the ROD. In retrospect, re-balkanization was designed into the process before de-balkanization could be evaluated. After a short 3-year experiment with an institutional arrangement that was designed to break down institutional boundaries, it could be argued that CALFED retreated behind the old boundaries and ‘‘hierarchical governance’’ (Norgaard et al., 2009). The timing was consistent with slower progress, a decline in innovation and a reduced ability of the process to manage conflict.
3.
Conclusion
In short, the articles in this series are important to understand what worked and what did not in CALFED, both as a contribution to social science theory and to we practitioners, seeking the ingredients of a sustainable water management strategy. The tests that await Californians are similar to the tests that water management projects around the world are facing. As Lund et al. (2008) emphasize, the Delta will be a very different place than it is today when today’s young scientists reach their 60’s. Some aspects of that change will reflect the decisions of humans and some will be outcomes of processes we cannot, or can no longer, control. The time scale for real change is probably decades, however. There exists a consensus that the status quo is unacceptable. But Californians need to think carefully about the benefits, risks and challenges in demanding an immediate fix as compared to accepting the importance of systematically incorporating softer changes, large and small. Each choice should be at least partly judged by how well it allows flexible responses and/or adaptations to surprises. Large or small, constructive steps take time to evolve and it takes time for their influence to be felt. It can be argued that time is short in the San Francisco Delta. On the other hand the ultimate failure might be the time, money, trust and water lost by poorly considered stranded investments. There is political risk, but perhaps more ultimate value in acting systematically, prioritizing flexibility, building on successes and assuming California’s water issues will always require attention, investment and adjustment. The latter relies upon incorporating some of the lessons detailed in the papers in this series and a continuation of analyses of this sort as the process proceeds.
740
environmental science & policy 12 (2009) 737–740
references
Fuller, 2009. Surprising cooperation despite apparently irreconcilable differences: agricultural water use efficiency and CALFED. Environmental Science and Policy 12 (6), 663–673. Hanneman, M., Dyckman, C., 2009. The San Francisco BayDelta: a failure of decision-making capacity. Environmental Science and Policy 12 (6), 710–725. Jacobs, K.L., Luoma, S.N., Taylor, K.A., 2003. CalFed, an experiment in science and decision making. Environment 45 (1), 30–41. Lejano, R.P., Ingram, H., 2009. Collaborative networks and new ways of knowing. Environmental Science and Policy 12 (6), 653–662. Lund, J., Hannak, E., Fleenor, W., Howitt, R., Mount, J., Moyle, P., 2007. Envisioning Futures for the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. Public Policy Institute of California Publication, San Francisco, 205 pp. Lund, J., Hannak, E., Fleenor, W., Howitt, R., Mount, J., Moyle, P., 2008. Comparing Futures for the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta. Public Policy Institute of California, ISBN: 978-158213-130-6, 196 pp. Norgaard, R.B., Kallis, G., Kiparsky, M., 2009. Collectively engaging complex socio-ecological systems: re-envisioning science, governance and the California Delta. Environmental Science and Policy 12 (6), 644–652. Owen, D., 2009. Legal constraints, environmental variability and the limits of innovative environmental governance. Environmental Science and Policy 12 (6), 684–693. Taylor, K.A., Short, A., 2009. Integrating scientific knowledge into large-scale restoration programs: the CALFED Bay-Delta Program experience. Environmental Science and Policy 12 (6), 674–683.
Samuel N. Luoma is a researcher in the John Muir Institute of the Environment, University of California, Davis, Emeritus Senior Scientist with the US Geological Survey, and a Scientific Associate with The Natural History Museum in London, UK. From 2000 to 2003 he was the first Lead Scientist for the CALFED Bay-Delta program. His research interests are in chemical contamination in aquatic environments and coordination of water policy with science.
available at www.sciencedirect.com
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci
Ingredients in sustainably managing water in semi-arid environments Samuel N. Luoma * John Muir Institute of the Environment, 122C The Barn, One Shields Avenue, University of California, Davis, CA 95616, USA
article info Published on line 5 August 2009 Keywords: CALFED Water issues California Lead Scientist
1.
abstract The lessons learned from CALFED indicate that ingredients important in the long-term resolution of water management issues may not result in short-term ‘‘solutions’’. The value of this special issue lies in its identification of ingredients that stimulate re-framing of issues, adapting to new knowledge and innovative decisions. But sustainable water management also requires the political patience to sustain those processes as a means of perpetuating the long-term decision-making necessary to anticipate and/or respond to an ever-changing environment.
Introduction
Analysts increasingly recognize that, across the globe, sustainable management of water resources is a critical issue. This special series presents insights into water management in an over-subscribed environment using the experiences of California’s CALFED process. Taken together, the different papers discuss some important ingredients in any sustainable water management strategy. They note the need for breaking down barriers between institutions, managing conflict, and improving understanding through integrated assessments. They discuss the value of constantly re-framing issues, discursive process, and adapting to new knowledge. They also note that CALFED did not ‘‘fix’’ California’s water problems, despite the presence of many of these ingredients. The decline of native fish species was not reversed, despite the successful implementation of the innovative Environmental Water Account (Lejano and Ingram, 2009) and a decade of fruitful scientific effort (Taylor and Short, 2009). The reliability of water deliveries declined, not improved, partly as a result of court rulings to protect the collapsing fish populations (Owen, 2009; Fuller, 2009; Hanneman and Dyckman, 2009). Nor did the process reverse the
# 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
brinksmanship approach to managing this complex and ever fluctuating water resource (Owen, 2009). What then was the overall lesson of the CALFED experiment? Are we to conclude that the political, cultural, legal and institutional barriers to sustainably managing water are impenetrable to known solutions? Or, for the sake of argument, did CALFED teach us a simpler lesson: a decade is not enough time to create a ‘‘solution’’ to a wicked, longstanding water management problem. Is it possible that ‘‘a solution’’ can also be defined as progressively implementing incremental improvements in water management over a long period of time? That would require identifying the most desirable traits of the CALFED process and sustaining those while evaluating and continuously adjusting those things that impeded innovation and sustainability. Summary judgments under such a strategy would require decades of experience. From that perspective, perhaps CALFED is best viewed as a first step in a long process of reforming water management in California. We might view the Delta Vision developed by the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission in 2008 as a refinement of that process in that it presented an overall goal that grew out of CALFED: ecosystem restoration and water supply reliability are ‘‘co-equal’’. We might view the more recent assessment of
* Tel.: +1 650 329 4481. E-mail address: [email protected]. 1462-9011/$ – see front matter # 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2009.07.003
738
environmental science & policy 12 (2009) 737–740
infrastructure options by Lund et al. (2007, 2008) as an outcome demonstrating the value of the increased investments in science under CALFED. Californians have many major decisions about water infrastructure and water policy ahead of them if reform is to keep up with the inevitable changes that will come to the Delta in the decades ahead (Lund et al., 2008). But if we are looking at a long-term process it is also critical to identify the ingredients that are necessary to sustain perpetual decision-making. The identification of some of those ingredients is a major contribution of this series of articles.
2.
Ingredients
The signs of unsustainable management were clearly defined in these papers: deadlock; conflict; unreliable delivery of high quality water to critical institutions; losses of natural capital as populations of native species begin to disappear; levee collapses; and an increasing risk of significant disruptions in drinking water provisions. Add to that the challenge of adapting to the growing implications of global warming and unpredictable natural events. In California, this means more floods, less snowpack, perhaps less water overall and the high probability of earthquakes severe enough to seriously damage the antiquated infrastructure of the Delta. In this environment, agreement on the general ingredients of a workable strategy forward may be a next step as important as suggestions for specific policy and infrastructure changes. Several of those ingredients are discussed in the CALFED context below. Strong, focused, independent science leadership is an essential ingredient in any water management program, as recognized by both Norgaard et al. (2009) and Taylor and Short (2009). They both agree that an independent, carefully managed and robust program of scientific effort is necessary to effectively grow the critical new knowledge from which innovative solutions spring, even if they do not agree on exactly how that should be accomplished. But the CALFED experience also suggests that new knowledge is not enough to ask from a science program. Science needs to contribute to other processes that allow innovation: repeatedly re-framing issues, breaking down barriers between institutions (debalkanizing) and managing conflict. This view colored my experience as CALFED’s first Lead Scientist, from 2000 through 2003. The Lead Scientist was defined in the 2000 CALFED Record of Decision (ROD), the core negotiated policy document on which CALFED’s last stages were officially based, as a position independent from external influences and parallel to the executive director (Jacobs et al., 2003). Compared to other water management programs, the CALFED Lead Scientist and the science program were, and continue to be, unique in their goals, the degree of investment, and the extent of their influence. The responsibilities included engaging academic, agency and stakeholder scientists in water issues, leading growth of scientific understanding relevant to the CALFED issues and leading communication of the state of science to the public, the scientific community and the policy/political community (Taylor and Short, 2009 go into more detail). But for perspective, it is important to understand that more
complex responsibilities were (and continue to be) also involved: namely establishing trust in the scientific enterprise and avoiding breakdown of the collaborative effort over conflicts about the relevant science (which I define as ‘‘managing conflict’’). Bettsy Reicke, who led the development of the 1990’s water accord in California argued that innovative solutions to California’s water problems were not possible at that time because knowledge of the Delta was minimal and understanding was fractured among institutions (Jacobs et al., 2003). Improvements in that understanding resulted from CALFED’s investments in science between 1997 and 2006. Continuing to grow that knowledge provides the necessary foundation for the independent, integrated assessments described by Norgaard et al. (2009) and implemented by Lund et al. (2007, 2008). The CALFED science program also showed that it is possible to develop a shared understanding of the scientifically complex issues surrounding resource problems, even among a diverse array of interested parties (Jacobs et al., 2003; Taylor and Short, 2009). The main benefit of shared understanding (even if it does not involve complete agreement about issues) is its usefulness in re-framing problems in ways that areas of agreement can be found. The result is not necessarily true adaptive management experiments, but re-framing can provide opportunities for institutions to respond to constantly changing issues. But the structure of the science dialogue must be designed with these goals in mind (see Jacobs et al., 2003). A strong science program can also contribute to breaking down barriers between institutions and thereby reducing the potential for conflict (Lejano and Ingram, 2009). Thus, CALFED taught us that a science program with the goals described by Taylor and Short (2009) can be a boundary organization wherein science can play a role in all these processes. A science program that sustains such goals is also likely to sustain its own support. Secretary of Resources Mary Nichols cited the science dialogue in 2002 as ‘‘calming the waters’’ of conflict within CALFED. In 2004, when 40 stakeholders of BDPAC were asked to vote on what CALFED programs should be subject to budgetary cuts, none voted to cut the science program. It was the only program so designated. Finally, the science program and the science dialogue remain an active entity in CALFED today, despite greatly reduced funding and the turmoil surrounding CALFED as a whole. Sustainable water management, of course, requires more than a strong program of science (Taylor and Short, 2009). But in a complex environment, it is not conceivable how an ongoing sequence of constructive actions could proceed without such a program. Another lesson I took away from CALFED is that even well planned or managed programs require sufficient resources applied persistently to the right problems. In contrast to many circumstances, there was ample funding when CALFED formally began its implementation in 2000. But three other crucial resources were in short supply: time, knowledge and water. My personal observation was that the time deadlines set politically (e.g. in the Record of Decision) inadequately accounted for both the deliberate nature of the collaborative process (Fuller, 2009) and the complexity of implementing reform on the desired scale (Hanneman and Dyckman, 2009). The collapse of political support in only the fourth year after
environmental science & policy 12 (2009) 737–740
implementation was based upon the conclusion that CALFED was both expensive and unproductive. But that conclusion was based upon deadlines that were artificial. Time turned out to be a resource more difficult to extract from the political process than money. One of the innovative cornerstones of CALFED, the Environmental Water Account (EWA) described by Lejano and Ingram (2009), provides another example of resource limitation. The EWA was restricted to the margins of the ecological issues by the relatively small quantity of water devoted to managing protection of species of concern. It was also limited to issues associated with water diversion in the Delta. Management of water releases from the upstream reservoirs was off limits, despite the observations of experts that management of river discharges offered important opportunities for coordinated management of endangered and threatened species. As noted above, knowledge was also in short supply when the water accord was initiated and EWA was designed. For example, the needs of important native species like Delta smelt (Taylor and Short, 2009) were essentially unknown when EWA was implemented, partly to manage this species. Decisions about when and how to use environmental water were based upon professional judgment and a scattering of ‘‘real time’’ data, with little immediate feedback as to successes and failures. Knowledge of Delta smelt has grown rapidly since 1997, but a decade appeared to be insufficient to both accumulate such knowledge then turn it into knowledge-based management practices. Finally, Lejano and Ingram (2009) describe why breaking down institutional barriers and managing conflict are necessary for implementation of innovative water policy reform. In CALFED the long-standing ‘‘opposition of interests’’ and the zero sum game involved in dividing up water were sufficient to impede an immediate overall solution to water issues (Hanneman and Dyckman, 2009). But smaller scale ‘‘cores’’ were developing within the process. The EWA helped institutions work together outside their historic boundaries (Lejano and Ingram, 2009). Fuller (2009) described a second instance where parties with very different interests were able to find consensus on how to approach agricultural water use efficiency. Neither of these examples resulted from simply convening different parties with intention to build consensus (Fuller, 2009). Consistent with our experience in the Science Program, these ‘‘cores’’ for consensus building were strategically designed and nurtured to breakdown institutional barriers but avoid breakdown of the collaborative process. Another constructive element in both successes was the inclusion of independent technical experts as advisors and/or reviewers. The addition of the academic community to the mix of parties further stimulated innovation, transparency and cooperation. The experts helped identify common ground where all parties could find areas of agreement and helped reframe the old arguments about who is right, exploring areas of mis-understanding, finding places of agreement within those areas and then designing strategies for next steps (Fuller, 2009). Indeed, these were small victories. Neither provided the ‘‘big fix’’ for questions about the potential for agricultural water conservation or about protecting native species. But the ingredients of success detailed by Lejano and Ingram (2009)
739
and Fuller (2009) should not be ignored. They are building blocks for a larger and longer scale evolution of solutions. Another important lesson from CALFED is that sustaining boundary objects and boundary organizations is a challenge. Lejano and Ingram (2009) and Fuller (2009) described how failure to break down boundaries on smaller scales resulted in less successful attempts at developing innovative policy, in the water quality program and in addressing agricultural water use efficiency. What none of the articles seemed to recognize is that the implementation of the CALFED process, overall, started as a model resembling the success stories in Fuller et al. and Lejano/Ingram in the first 3 years. But, in the fourth year of the program the agencies began to take over control of the CALFED programs most related to their expertise (e.g. ecosystem restoration was moved under Cal Fish and Game; water conveyance and storage were moved to Dept. Water Resources, etc.). This change was stipulated in the ROD. In retrospect, re-balkanization was designed into the process before de-balkanization could be evaluated. After a short 3-year experiment with an institutional arrangement that was designed to break down institutional boundaries, it could be argued that CALFED retreated behind the old boundaries and ‘‘hierarchical governance’’ (Norgaard et al., 2009). The timing was consistent with slower progress, a decline in innovation and a reduced ability of the process to manage conflict.
3.
Conclusion
In short, the articles in this series are important to understand what worked and what did not in CALFED, both as a contribution to social science theory and to we practitioners, seeking the ingredients of a sustainable water management strategy. The tests that await Californians are similar to the tests that water management projects around the world are facing. As Lund et al. (2008) emphasize, the Delta will be a very different place than it is today when today’s young scientists reach their 60’s. Some aspects of that change will reflect the decisions of humans and some will be outcomes of processes we cannot, or can no longer, control. The time scale for real change is probably decades, however. There exists a consensus that the status quo is unacceptable. But Californians need to think carefully about the benefits, risks and challenges in demanding an immediate fix as compared to accepting the importance of systematically incorporating softer changes, large and small. Each choice should be at least partly judged by how well it allows flexible responses and/or adaptations to surprises. Large or small, constructive steps take time to evolve and it takes time for their influence to be felt. It can be argued that time is short in the San Francisco Delta. On the other hand the ultimate failure might be the time, money, trust and water lost by poorly considered stranded investments. There is political risk, but perhaps more ultimate value in acting systematically, prioritizing flexibility, building on successes and assuming California’s water issues will always require attention, investment and adjustment. The latter relies upon incorporating some of the lessons detailed in the papers in this series and a continuation of analyses of this sort as the process proceeds.
740
environmental science & policy 12 (2009) 737–740
references
Fuller, 2009. Surprising cooperation despite apparently irreconcilable differences: agricultural water use efficiency and CALFED. Environmental Science and Policy 12 (6), 663–673. Hanneman, M., Dyckman, C., 2009. The San Francisco BayDelta: a failure of decision-making capacity. Environmental Science and Policy 12 (6), 710–725. Jacobs, K.L., Luoma, S.N., Taylor, K.A., 2003. CalFed, an experiment in science and decision making. Environment 45 (1), 30–41. Lejano, R.P., Ingram, H., 2009. Collaborative networks and new ways of knowing. Environmental Science and Policy 12 (6), 653–662. Lund, J., Hannak, E., Fleenor, W., Howitt, R., Mount, J., Moyle, P., 2007. Envisioning Futures for the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. Public Policy Institute of California Publication, San Francisco, 205 pp. Lund, J., Hannak, E., Fleenor, W., Howitt, R., Mount, J., Moyle, P., 2008. Comparing Futures for the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta. Public Policy Institute of California, ISBN: 978-158213-130-6, 196 pp. Norgaard, R.B., Kallis, G., Kiparsky, M., 2009. Collectively engaging complex socio-ecological systems: re-envisioning science, governance and the California Delta. Environmental Science and Policy 12 (6), 644–652. Owen, D., 2009. Legal constraints, environmental variability and the limits of innovative environmental governance. Environmental Science and Policy 12 (6), 684–693. Taylor, K.A., Short, A., 2009. Integrating scientific knowledge into large-scale restoration programs: the CALFED Bay-Delta Program experience. Environmental Science and Policy 12 (6), 674–683.
Samuel N. Luoma is a researcher in the John Muir Institute of the Environment, University of California, Davis, Emeritus Senior Scientist with the US Geological Survey, and a Scientific Associate with The Natural History Museum in London, UK. From 2000 to 2003 he was the first Lead Scientist for the CALFED Bay-Delta program. His research interests are in chemical contamination in aquatic environments and coordination of water policy with science.