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Institutional framework for managing groundwater: A case study of community organisations in Gujarat, India
Water Policy 2 (2000) 423–432
Institutional framework for managing groundwater: A case study of community organisations in Gujarat, India M. Dinesh Kumar* Institute of Rural Management, P.O. Box 60, Anand, Gujarat 388 001, India Received 26 April 2000; received in revised form 15 July 2000; accepted 21 July 2000
Abstract Groundwater resources are showing increasing signs of over-development in many arid and semi-arid sections of India. The author suggests a general framework for design of local groundwater management institutions based on participatory institutional format and determines the ‘externalities’ in local groundwater management. The author presents a case study of community based groundwater management initiative in Western India and discusses the real life externalities. The author suggests establishment of tradable private property rights in groundwater as a major institutional reform for communities to establish rights over the water they manage and to address the issues of efficiency, equity and sustainability. # 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction Groundwater in India is characterized by physical heterogeneity in geology, topography and climate. In hard rocks, which underlie two-third of the country, groundwater availability varies widely depending upon the depth and degree of weathering and fracturing. In alluvial areas, aquifers are regionally extensive and are capable of giving sustained yields through high-capacity tube wells. Rainfall, the primary source of groundwater recharge, and topography vary significantly across the country resulting in significant changes in the magnitude of recharge. The average replenishable groundwater in India has been estimated to be 43.18 Mha m (Kittu, 1995). Groundwater has been viewed as a sustainable source of irrigation over the past few decades. During 1951–1990, there was a steady increase in the groundwater irrigation potential from a mere 6.5 million hectare (m ha) to 34.8 m ha (Kittu, 1995). Groundwater irrigation now accounts for more than 50% of the net irrigated area in India (GOI, 1992). According to some reports: *Corresponding author. Fax: +91-26-92-60-188. E-mail address: [email protected] (M.D. Kumar). 1366-7017/00/$ - see front matter # 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 1 3 6 6 - 7 0 1 7 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 2 0 - 9
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‘groundwater irrigation already accounts for 75–80% of the irrigated production’ (Daines & Pawar, 1987). Today, groundwater also supplies 80% of domestic water supply in rural areas and perhaps 50% of urban and industrial uses (World Bank/GOI, 1997). Over-development of groundwater is causing threats to groundwater supplies in terms of depletion and groundwater quality deterioration (Moench, 1993; Kumar, 1995). Alarming drops in water table and increasing levels of fluoride and TDS are reported from the deep alluvial areas of North Gujarat (Bhatia, 1991; Kumar, 1995). Dropping groundwater levels are observed in many parts of Rajasthan, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. Saline intrusion is occurring in the coastal aquifers of Gujarat and in Chennai coast of Tamil Nadu (Kumar, 1995). Widespread incidences of high arsenic content in deep aquifers have affected 34 districts and 50 million people in West Bengal and neighbouring Bangladesh. However, major institutional innovations to manage groundwater are absent. The focus of this paper is on the institutional framework for community-based groundwater management. The paper discusses the institutional structure for local groundwater management consisting of village institutions, watershed committees and aquifer management committees and identifies and determines the externalities. It also provides a case study of community-based local groundwater management initiative in Gujarat State of India. It recognizes and demonstrates the role of these institutions in the overall institutional arrangements for groundwater management at the basin level.
2. Legal and regulatory approaches to manage groundwater De Jure rights to groundwater are not clearly defined. But de facto, groundwater belongs to all those who have land overlaying it (Singh, 1995). Any one who has a piece of land has access to the resource underlying. A landowner can legally abstract any amount of water unless the geohydrology limits. The lack of well-defined property rights, the invisibility, indivisibility and the complex flow characteristics of groundwater makes it difficult to monitor the use (Singh, 1995). On the other hand, the landless do not enjoy ownership rights in groundwater. In a socialistic society, such a legal framework is inappropriate as it does not suit the interests of all sections of the society (Sharma, 1995). The most dominant institutional approach to check over development of groundwater and to mitigate the environmental consequences has been regulatory in nature. The oldest is the Gujarat groundwater legislation of 1976, which was an amendment to the Bombay Irrigation Act. The legislation could never be enacted due to lack of popular support. Nevertheless, the legislation passed by the Government of Maharashtra for protection of public drinking water sources is found to be effective. The reason being that the number of drinking water sources is very small. Regulatory approaches also include control of institutional financing for well development by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development in ‘dark’ and ‘grey’ talukas1 (blocks). However, this was not very effective due to a large amount of private financing in the sector. The State Electricity Departments use power connections as a leverage to control groundwater 1
Dark talukas are those where average annual extraction exceeds 85% of the annual recharge and grey talukas are those where average annual extraction is between 65 and 85% of the annual recharge.
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extraction in overexploited and critically developed areas. However, this is also not effective due to large number of illegal connections and electricity theft predominant in the rural areas (Kumar, 1995). Top-down legal and regulatory approaches to check over development are most likely to be less effective in the Indian context due to many reasons. First, legislation is generally applied to large regions within which significant variations in the characteristics of groundwater exist. It is very unlikely that legislation reflects the local specific problems and the interests of the communities at large and hence could face strong opposition in enforcement. Second, there are millions of wells located in the rural areas, which suffer from poor road networks and are inaccessible. It will be extremely difficult to get a monitoring mechanism established to ensure that a particular regulation is enforced. Third, the farming lobby, which is strong enough to get political patronage can mobilize rural masses against legislation. The farmers’ movement against the proposed hike in electricity tariffs in the farm sector in Gujarat is an example. Such moves are sufficient to cause political instability. Governments require great political will to strictly enforce legislation.
3. General framework for design of groundwater management institutions The institutional structure for community-based local groundwater management suggested here have three levels in the hierarchy that are vertically integrated. 3.1. Village level institutions (VLIs) The role of groundwater management institution created/formed at the village level will be as follows: (1) evolving groundwater management solutions appropriate for the locality } identification of possible physical management interventions like building of recharge systems and plantation/afforestation, suggesting locations for the same, and identifying potential users of enduse conservation schemes; (2) identification of water use priorities of the communities in the locality; (3) framing rules and regulations necessary for regulation and management and monitoring of the ‘use’ to ensure that individual users adhere to them; and, [4] implementation of management activities. 3.2. Watershed institutions (WI) As some of the physical activities necessary to augment groundwater supplies are to be carried out at the watershed level, the activities being taken up in different villages within the same watershed need to be coordinated so that they become effective. An organisation is to be formed at the watershed level called a ‘watershed committee’. Such an organisation will have representation of village level institutions from all the villages falling in the watershed. The specific roles envisaged here for such an institution are (1) setting up of village level institutions in all the villages falling in the watershed; (2) coordination of various village level physical activities; and (3) resolving the conflicts between villages. If one of the villages in the watershed is not cooperative in implementing the management plans for the watershed due to conflicting interests, the watershed committee can intervene, and help
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them resolve the conflict. It is important to note that in the case of a small micro watershed falling completely within the administrative boundaries of a village, there will not be any need for a separate watershed committee. 3.3. Management institutions at aquifer level The need for aquifer level management of groundwater had earlier been mooted (Mohanty & Ebrahim, 1993; Kumar, 1997; Narain, 1998). The mandate of the aquifer management committee should be to facilitate ‘scaling up’ and evolve aquifer management plans. Some of the management decisions are (1) amount of water that needs be captured from within and outside the aquifer for augmenting groundwater; (2) the future hydrologic stress for the aquifer and the total allowable abstraction; (3) identification and demarcation of watersheds for implementation of local management solutions; (4) suggestion of suitable cropping patterns for the region with a view to increase the water use efficiency; and (5) suggesting efficient irrigation water management practices for the region. Evolving management strategies for large groundwater basins will call for reliable information on the physical characteristics of the resource, the current level of groundwater exploitation, the social, economic and institutional factors affecting the resource use, the socio-economic and ecological impacts of resource exploitation. Therefore, aquifer management committee shall have representation from the state groundwater agencies, NGOs, water management specialists, ecologists and social scientists apart from the representatives of the watershed committees working in the basin.
4. Local management of groundwater by user groups The nature of groundwater problems varies from region to region and location to location and as a result the management solutions for one locality cannot be adopted for another. Also, there is a range of physical, social, economic, and institutional factors, which affect the effectiveness of any groundwater management solution for a locality. These factors also vary from locality to locality. As a result, groundwater management solutions are to be ‘locale specific’ and should incorporate the range of physical, social, economic, and institutional characteristics of the locality (Moench, 1995). Regarding regulations, as earlier indicated, top-down, centralized approaches to regulate the use of groundwater are most likely to be less effective. Involvement of groundwater users in evolving regulations could help increase the effectiveness of the regulations as they are more aware of the resource management issues and the management needs than the official agencies concerned. The local institutions } village and watershed institutions } can influence the behaviour of all individual users within the community with regard to the use of groundwater, through framing and enforcing appropriate rules and regulations. It is, however, important to note that so long as the benefits to individuals from collective action is not distinct and direct, and lack of participation in the collective action doesn’t involve any ‘opportunity cost’ to the individuals, there could be resistance from individual users to join the group initiatives. This might hinder the process of community organisation. Therefore, there is a need to find ways by
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which the individuals also get direct benefits from the community action along with the larger social benefits. 4.1. The negative externalities in local groundwater management The local community organisations generally operate at the village level. In case of many villages tapping the same aquifer, the actions of a single village to protect and manage their groundwater resource may not find success unless the neighbouring communities cooperate. Understanding the scale at which interventions should occur is an important aspect of institutional analysis (Kumar, Shashikant, Srinivas & Prakash, 1999). In this section, an attempt is made to determine the externalities in local groundwater management. The first and the most important aspect of designing any resource management institution is identification of the resource boundaries (Ostrom, 1992). Inconsistency between hydrological boundaries and jurisdiction of the management institution may lead to obstacles in broad planning, data collection and regulatory activities (Frederiksen, 1998). In the case of groundwater, the resource boundaries could be demarcated on the basis of the physical system affecting groundwater recharge and the social systems affecting its use. The physical systems affecting groundwater use are integrated at the level of watershed. The social systems affecting their use are integrated at the level of aquifer. For any supply side approaches to augment the available groundwater supplies to be effective, the approach has to be watershed based. This is one of the factors, which induces a negative externality for local groundwater management efforts. For the demand side approaches for groundwater management to be effective from physical sustainability considerations, the total pumping across the aquifer should balance with the average annual replenishment. Hence, this is one of the externalities for local groundwater management initiatives. Again, in order to ensure sustainable use of the available groundwater, it is essential to maintain the quality. There are two sources of pollution of aquifers: (1) internal sources, and (2) external sources. The external sources of pollution can further be classified into point pollution and non-point pollution. The potential sources of external pollution are fertilizers, and industrial effluent. The internal pollution is due to the geo-hydrochemical processes taking place within the formation bearing groundwater. The physical and social parameters within a watershed that determine the degree of these externalities for local groundwater management regime are (1) watershed characteristics, and (2) groundwater basin characteristics. The major watershed characteristics that influence the externality function in a village-level groundwater management action are: (a) physical characteristics of the watershed: size of the portion of the watershed falling outside the boundaries of the village, and the extent to which that portion of the watershed has been treated; and (b) social characteristics: number of socio-economic groups within the watershed and the different water use priorities existing. The groundwater basin characteristics that influence the externality function are: (a) aquifer characteristics such as areal extent and yield characteristics of the aquifer, and the vulnerability of the aquifer to pollution; and (b) socio-economic factors affecting groundwater use such as presence or absence of urban centres and industrial areas, and water markets. The degree of success in implementing a management decision by a village level institution will be much more for an aquifer of limited areal extent than an aquifer of large areal extent. The ‘degree of stress’
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imposed by the same amount of pumping on the groundwater regime will be far less for an aquifer with high yields than that with poor yield characteristics.
5. A case study of community-based groundwater management The Mehsana district in Gujarat is underlain by a rich multi-layered alluvial aquifer which underlies most parts of the district. But, with the average annual extraction (900 MCM) far exceeding annual recharge (510 MCM) (GOG, 1992), overdraft of groundwater for irrigation has resulted in many depletion problems in the district. Water levels are falling at alarming rates resulting in drying up of many thousands of shallow open wells, large reduction in deep tube well yields, and increasing fluoride levels in groundwater. This results in scarcity of water for irrigation and drinking. Kheralu taluka, mostly underlain by shallow and phreatic alluvial aquifers, constitutes the major recharge area of Mehsana aquifer system. Groundwater pumping in the area is through open wells. The groundwater table was very high in the past. Due to overdraft, the estimated net annual draft in the taluka is 191.58 MCM against a utilizable recharge of 90.63 MCM (GOG, 1992) } and reduction in natural recharge due to deforestation, well water levels in the area have been falling. During droughts many wells go dry. The Vikram Sarabhai Centre for Development Interaction (VIKSAT) } a Gujarat-based NGO } initiated a field project in the area to help the farmers to address the problem of groundwater depletion. The area was chosen for the following reasons. First, the area being the recharge area of Mehsana aquifer system, any supply-based intervention can create a significant impact on the aquifer. Second, the structures required to recharge groundwater would be simple and inexpensive and a small increase in groundwater recharge will cause a perceptible difference in the groundwater levels. Third, due to the above-said reasons, replicability is high, so are the chances of convincing the farmers about the impact of the structures and involving them in the management activities. 5.1. Community organizations for managing groundwater The project initiated by VIKSAT tries to address some of the issues intrinsic in involving the users in the management of groundwater. The objectives of the project were to create community organisations, facilitate their increased access to technical, legal and financial support from various agencies for implementing groundwater management projects, and assist them in project implementation. The approach used in the field was land and water management. The activities tried to address the depletion problems are structural and vegetative measures to augment recharge groundwater; and, end use conservation measures like irrigation water management and cropping pattern changes to reduce the end use of water. In order to promote strong community organisations } Tree Growers’ Cooperative Societies (TGCS) that are registered under the Cooperative Act } VIKSAT has been conducting: (1) awareness programmes on groundwater depletion problems and their impact; (2) training and educational programmes on technical aspects of water management for the members of the cooperatives; and (3) exposure trips to areas where water management projects are being
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implemented by NGOs through local community participation. The TGCSs are engaged in protecting and re-vegetating the village commons and various soil and water conservation practices, and construction of water harvesting and recharge structures such as check dams. 5.2. Action research on local recharge and end-use conservation In order to understand the impact of local water harvesting and recharge systems, wells are monitored periodically by the farmer with support from the field staff of VIKSAT using simple water level recorders. The data generated from this was used to motivate more farmer organisations to take up activities to augment the groundwater supplies. To ensure long-term sustainability of resource, emphasis was also given to demand management. As lion’s share of the water goes for irrigation, thrust was on irrigation management. In order to analyse its scope, a field-based research study was carried out. The study showed significant overuse of water in the conventional flood irrigation using long borders in sandy and sandy loam. The Kubada Tree Growers Cooperative Society had the most successful experience with wasteland re-vegetation, and local recharge structures. It took up plantation in the revenue wasteland in 1988. Around 100 ha of forest area, 11 ha of revenue wasteland and 10 ha of grazing land are being protected. During the period from 1994–1997, they also took up construction of 6 check dams across the streams in order to recharge groundwater and check soil erosion. For this, the cooperative has invested a total of only US$ 16,000 with funds made available from the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA), Mehsana. The most significant impacts of the recharge structures and afforestation were on the local hydrological regime: increase in the natural recharge to groundwater, rise in groundwater levels, increase in grass cover and soil moisture, increased base flow in the streams and control of soil erosion. Since 1994, 15 land-less families are growing vegetables on the streambed. These families earn approximately US$ 250 by selling the vegetables every year. Some farmers also started lifting water from the stream for irrigation. The above strategy helps the landless to put the resource made available to them to a high-valued use. Having seen the experience of Kubada, many new surrounding villages are coming up with plans to take up recharge activities. In one village named Nana Kotasana, the TGCS proposed 3 check dams in the micro-watershed in the village to DRDA Mehsana in the year 1997 and the activity has already started with DRDA sanctioning the grant this year. In another village named Samrapur, the TGCS proposed a large check dam in the village with an estimated cost of US$ 6000. The practice adopted for efficient use of irrigation water was optimizing the size of the ‘level borders’ on the basis of the soil type, well discharge and field slope. This increased the efficiency of water application, distribution and storage, which in turn resulted in reduction in duration of watering. This improved method of irrigation benefited the farmers using diesel wells as diesel use for irrigation came down. By 1998, around 100 farmers spread across seven villages in the area started adopting this practice. 5.3. Institutional innovation for scaling up local community action Gadwada is a region comprising of 32 villages in the northern part of Kheralu taluka that has similar physiographical conditions and faces problems of soil erosion, land degradation and
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groundwater depletion. The project villages of VIKSAT fall in this region. The cluster of the 32 villages is also in conformation with the drainage patterns in the area and can be considered as a large watershed. In early 1996, VIKSAT initiated a federation of the Tree Growers Cooperative Societies named Gadwada Jal Jameen Sarakshan Sangh. The objective of the federation was to expand the local management activities to cover the entire Gadwada region. At the same time, VIKSAT wanted to assist the Sangh in evolving long-term strategies for management of land and water resources in the area. The Sangh, with financial and logistic support from VIKSAT, was able to organize several meetings, awareness and training programmes and exposure trips for the representatives of the villages in its constituency. VIKSAT is strengthening the Sangh for them to evolve water management strategies for the region and implement them. Over the years, the community- based programme on ground water management has expanded in terms of quality and scale of operation. First of all, there are 12 village level community organisations involved in land and water management activities in the area. Four TGCSs in the area are implementing wasteland afforestation programme and protection of village grazing land and forestland. In a village named Umri, the cooperative protects around 160 ha of forestland. In Nana Kotasana, 150 ha of degraded forestland and 20 ha of grazing land are being protected by the TGCS. The Mehsana aquifer has very large areal extent. The management effort is now only limited to a part of the recharge area, comprising of physical options for supply and conservation management. But groundwater in being pumped from across this large aquifer basin. The management emphasis in this area should be on regulations and other institutions for managing the demand. Local institutions have to be promoted in these areas to enforce regulations and other institutional mechanisms, while an institution has to be created to evolve and implement broader groundwater management strategies for Mehsana aquifer. Long-term efforts are needed to get the communities around the resource to manage it. The communities need to be educated and trained to facilitate its organizing and working out of institutional arrangements for resource utilization and management. Short-term strategies to mobilize social action are needed to sustain the community’s interest in the project such as management of common property land.
6. Alternative institutional and legal framework for groundwater management In the absence of well-defined property rights structure, the increase in groundwater supplies due to management interventions will lead to increased use by a few, undermining local management efforts. Therefore, unless the communities establish rights over the resource and regulate the demand, groundwater cannot be sustainably managed. Many researchers suggest the establishment of tradable private rights as a solution to the growing issues of access equity and efficiency in water (Frederick, 1993; Chaudhari, 1996; Saleth, 1996; Kumar, 1997). What is being suggested is a system of tradable property rights for groundwater. Such rights could be vested either with the State or with the Aquifer Management Committees. These Committees can sell the rights to the legally registered WCs and VLIs. The members, the landowners and landless, can buy the rights to use groundwater from the VLIs or WCs. Every member of the cooperative will have a fixed entitlement on the basis of the family size
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and can be made free of cost or nominally charged. The users who need extra water can buy the rights from the local institution. As the price at which water is traded reflects the opportunity cost of using water, it will create incentives for the users to invest in efficient use practices or transfer the water to more economically efficient uses (Frederick, 1993). Such markets can act as effective tools for inter-sectoral water allocation. For instance, agriculture accounts for a lion’s share of the total water use in most regions. The economic efficiency of agricultural use is much lower as compared to industries or less than what Municipal water users are willing to pay for the water they use. The industries or the Municipalities might be willing to provide financial assistance to farmers to invest in efficient irrigation technologies and could, in turn, get the additional water saved. Bringing about reforms in water rights is, however, a complex process, in the light of the fact that rights are not always mutually exclusive (Saleth, 1996). As a matter of fact, they are ‘correlative’ meaning a user while exercising his rights can reduce the ability of his neighbouring user to access his entitlement. Also, bringing about water rights reforms would also mean making suitable changes in the existing legal framework related to water to enable protection of individual users. The Central Groundwater Authority being constituted in India will have a wide range of legal regulatory powers such as issuing ownership rights, controlling manner of use of groundwater by users, determining the volumetric water extraction, and imposing penalties, apart from notifying ‘problem areas’.
7. Conclusion The legal and regulatory measures to be used by the Central Groundwater Authority are likely to be ineffective, as they deny ownership rights to individual users and do not involve them in management. The Central Groundwater Authority being set up in India should evolve strategies and guidelines for Joint Management of groundwater for ‘problem areas’ and provide legal, financial and technical support for speeding up the process of institutional development from aquifer to watershed to village level. The local institutions can evolve norms and regulations with regard to the use of groundwater apart from implementing a wide range of physical activities related to managing the resource, while higher level institution can evolve broader groundwater management solutions for the aquifer and support local institutional development. There are several countries across the world where development and use of groundwater has taken place almost entirely in the private sector and ownership rights over the resource are not defined like in India. Overdevelopment problems similar to that of India are existing in these countries also. Promoting local user group organizations will be critical in achieving sustainable management of the resource in these countries. Experience shows that local user group organizations can emerge in problem areas with support from external agencies such as NGOs if appropriate legal, institutional and policy regimes exist. Some of them are (1) recognition of rights of individuals and communities over groundwater, and (2) establishment of tradable private property rights. Institutional processes can be initiated to demarcate aquifer basins, evaluate the resource availability and integrate the local institutions with new basin level organisations that are to be created.
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References Bhatia, B. (1991). Lush fields and parched throats: Political economy of groundwater in Gujarat. Working Paper, World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland. Chaudhari, S. (1996). To sell a resource. Down to Earth, New Delhi, February 15. Daines, S. R. & Pawar, J. R. (1987). Economic returns to irrigation in India. SDR Research Groups Inc. and Development Group Inc. Report Prepared for the US Agency for International Development Mission to India, New Delhi (p. 95). Frederick, K. D. (1993). Balancing water demands with supplies: The role of management in a world of increasing scarcity. World Bank Technical Paper No. 189. Frederiksen, H. D. (1998). Institutional principles for sound management of water and related environmental resources. In A. K. Biswas, Water resources: Environmental planning, management and development. New Delhi: Tata McGrawHill Publishing. Government of Gujarat. (1992). Report of the Committee on Estimation of Groundwater Resources and Irrigation Potential in Gujarat State. Gandhinagar. Government of India. (1992). Indian agriculture in brief (24th ed.). Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. Kittu, N. (1995). Status of groundwater development and its impact on groundwater quality. In M. Moench, Groundwater availability and pollution, the growing debate over resource condition in India. Ahmedabad: VIKSATNatural Heritage Institute Collaborative Groundwater Project, VIKSAT. Kumar, M. D. (1995). Approaches to groundwater management: An overview of groundwater situation in Gujarat, Western India. Paper Presented at the Sixth Annual South Asian NGO Summit, organized by Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Kathmandu, Nepal, 21–23 February 1995. Kumar, M. D. (1997). Managing Common Pool Groundwater Resources: Identifying Management Regimes. Ahmedabad: VIKSAT Monograph. Kumar M. D., Shashikant, C., Srinivas, M. & Prakash, A. (1999). Addressing water scarcity and pollution problems in Sabarmati Basin: Local strategies for water supply and conservation management. In M. Moench, E. Caspari & A. Dixit, Rethinking the mosaic: Investigations into local water management. Kathmandu: Nepal Water Conservation Foundation, Kathmandu and Institute for Social and Environmental Transition, BO. Moench, M. (1995). Approaches to groundwater management in India: To control or enable? In M. Moench, Groundwater law: The growing debate. Ahmedabad: VIKSAT } Natural Heritage Institute Monograph, VIKSAT. Mohanty, S. & Ebrahim, A. (1993). Perspectives on groundwater management in Junagadh district. Paper Presented at the Workshop on Water Management: India’s Groundwater Challenge, VIKSAT, Ahmedabad, 14–16 December. Narain, V. (1998). Towards groundwater management institutions for India. Water Policy, 1, 357–365. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Ostrom, E. (1992). Crafting institutions for self governing irrigation systems. San Francisco: Institute of Contemporary Studies. Saleth, R. M. (1996). Water institutions in India: Economics, law and policy (299 pp.). New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers. Sharma, S. C. (1995). Regulation of groundwater development in India: Existing provisions and future options. In M. Moench, Groundwater law: The growing debate. Ahmedabad: Vikram Sarabhai Centre for Development Interaction (VIKSAT) } Natural Heritage Institute Monograph, VIKSAT. Singh, K. (1995). Cooperative property rights as an instrument of managing groundwater. In M. Moench, Groundwater law: The growing debate. Ahmedabad: Vikram Sarabhai Centre for Development Interaction (VIKSAT) } Natural Heritage Institute Monograph, VIKSAT. World Bank/GOI (1997). Groundwater regulation and management. Draft Report, Prepared by J. V. D. Gun, K. Palanisami, M. Moench & T. Shah, India } Water Resource Management Sector Work.
Institutional framework for managing groundwater: A case study of community organisations in Gujarat, India M. Dinesh Kumar* Institute of Rural Management, P.O. Box 60, Anand, Gujarat 388 001, India Received 26 April 2000; received in revised form 15 July 2000; accepted 21 July 2000
Abstract Groundwater resources are showing increasing signs of over-development in many arid and semi-arid sections of India. The author suggests a general framework for design of local groundwater management institutions based on participatory institutional format and determines the ‘externalities’ in local groundwater management. The author presents a case study of community based groundwater management initiative in Western India and discusses the real life externalities. The author suggests establishment of tradable private property rights in groundwater as a major institutional reform for communities to establish rights over the water they manage and to address the issues of efficiency, equity and sustainability. # 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction Groundwater in India is characterized by physical heterogeneity in geology, topography and climate. In hard rocks, which underlie two-third of the country, groundwater availability varies widely depending upon the depth and degree of weathering and fracturing. In alluvial areas, aquifers are regionally extensive and are capable of giving sustained yields through high-capacity tube wells. Rainfall, the primary source of groundwater recharge, and topography vary significantly across the country resulting in significant changes in the magnitude of recharge. The average replenishable groundwater in India has been estimated to be 43.18 Mha m (Kittu, 1995). Groundwater has been viewed as a sustainable source of irrigation over the past few decades. During 1951–1990, there was a steady increase in the groundwater irrigation potential from a mere 6.5 million hectare (m ha) to 34.8 m ha (Kittu, 1995). Groundwater irrigation now accounts for more than 50% of the net irrigated area in India (GOI, 1992). According to some reports: *Corresponding author. Fax: +91-26-92-60-188. E-mail address: [email protected] (M.D. Kumar). 1366-7017/00/$ - see front matter # 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 1 3 6 6 - 7 0 1 7 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 2 0 - 9
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‘groundwater irrigation already accounts for 75–80% of the irrigated production’ (Daines & Pawar, 1987). Today, groundwater also supplies 80% of domestic water supply in rural areas and perhaps 50% of urban and industrial uses (World Bank/GOI, 1997). Over-development of groundwater is causing threats to groundwater supplies in terms of depletion and groundwater quality deterioration (Moench, 1993; Kumar, 1995). Alarming drops in water table and increasing levels of fluoride and TDS are reported from the deep alluvial areas of North Gujarat (Bhatia, 1991; Kumar, 1995). Dropping groundwater levels are observed in many parts of Rajasthan, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. Saline intrusion is occurring in the coastal aquifers of Gujarat and in Chennai coast of Tamil Nadu (Kumar, 1995). Widespread incidences of high arsenic content in deep aquifers have affected 34 districts and 50 million people in West Bengal and neighbouring Bangladesh. However, major institutional innovations to manage groundwater are absent. The focus of this paper is on the institutional framework for community-based groundwater management. The paper discusses the institutional structure for local groundwater management consisting of village institutions, watershed committees and aquifer management committees and identifies and determines the externalities. It also provides a case study of community-based local groundwater management initiative in Gujarat State of India. It recognizes and demonstrates the role of these institutions in the overall institutional arrangements for groundwater management at the basin level.
2. Legal and regulatory approaches to manage groundwater De Jure rights to groundwater are not clearly defined. But de facto, groundwater belongs to all those who have land overlaying it (Singh, 1995). Any one who has a piece of land has access to the resource underlying. A landowner can legally abstract any amount of water unless the geohydrology limits. The lack of well-defined property rights, the invisibility, indivisibility and the complex flow characteristics of groundwater makes it difficult to monitor the use (Singh, 1995). On the other hand, the landless do not enjoy ownership rights in groundwater. In a socialistic society, such a legal framework is inappropriate as it does not suit the interests of all sections of the society (Sharma, 1995). The most dominant institutional approach to check over development of groundwater and to mitigate the environmental consequences has been regulatory in nature. The oldest is the Gujarat groundwater legislation of 1976, which was an amendment to the Bombay Irrigation Act. The legislation could never be enacted due to lack of popular support. Nevertheless, the legislation passed by the Government of Maharashtra for protection of public drinking water sources is found to be effective. The reason being that the number of drinking water sources is very small. Regulatory approaches also include control of institutional financing for well development by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development in ‘dark’ and ‘grey’ talukas1 (blocks). However, this was not very effective due to a large amount of private financing in the sector. The State Electricity Departments use power connections as a leverage to control groundwater 1
Dark talukas are those where average annual extraction exceeds 85% of the annual recharge and grey talukas are those where average annual extraction is between 65 and 85% of the annual recharge.
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extraction in overexploited and critically developed areas. However, this is also not effective due to large number of illegal connections and electricity theft predominant in the rural areas (Kumar, 1995). Top-down legal and regulatory approaches to check over development are most likely to be less effective in the Indian context due to many reasons. First, legislation is generally applied to large regions within which significant variations in the characteristics of groundwater exist. It is very unlikely that legislation reflects the local specific problems and the interests of the communities at large and hence could face strong opposition in enforcement. Second, there are millions of wells located in the rural areas, which suffer from poor road networks and are inaccessible. It will be extremely difficult to get a monitoring mechanism established to ensure that a particular regulation is enforced. Third, the farming lobby, which is strong enough to get political patronage can mobilize rural masses against legislation. The farmers’ movement against the proposed hike in electricity tariffs in the farm sector in Gujarat is an example. Such moves are sufficient to cause political instability. Governments require great political will to strictly enforce legislation.
3. General framework for design of groundwater management institutions The institutional structure for community-based local groundwater management suggested here have three levels in the hierarchy that are vertically integrated. 3.1. Village level institutions (VLIs) The role of groundwater management institution created/formed at the village level will be as follows: (1) evolving groundwater management solutions appropriate for the locality } identification of possible physical management interventions like building of recharge systems and plantation/afforestation, suggesting locations for the same, and identifying potential users of enduse conservation schemes; (2) identification of water use priorities of the communities in the locality; (3) framing rules and regulations necessary for regulation and management and monitoring of the ‘use’ to ensure that individual users adhere to them; and, [4] implementation of management activities. 3.2. Watershed institutions (WI) As some of the physical activities necessary to augment groundwater supplies are to be carried out at the watershed level, the activities being taken up in different villages within the same watershed need to be coordinated so that they become effective. An organisation is to be formed at the watershed level called a ‘watershed committee’. Such an organisation will have representation of village level institutions from all the villages falling in the watershed. The specific roles envisaged here for such an institution are (1) setting up of village level institutions in all the villages falling in the watershed; (2) coordination of various village level physical activities; and (3) resolving the conflicts between villages. If one of the villages in the watershed is not cooperative in implementing the management plans for the watershed due to conflicting interests, the watershed committee can intervene, and help
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them resolve the conflict. It is important to note that in the case of a small micro watershed falling completely within the administrative boundaries of a village, there will not be any need for a separate watershed committee. 3.3. Management institutions at aquifer level The need for aquifer level management of groundwater had earlier been mooted (Mohanty & Ebrahim, 1993; Kumar, 1997; Narain, 1998). The mandate of the aquifer management committee should be to facilitate ‘scaling up’ and evolve aquifer management plans. Some of the management decisions are (1) amount of water that needs be captured from within and outside the aquifer for augmenting groundwater; (2) the future hydrologic stress for the aquifer and the total allowable abstraction; (3) identification and demarcation of watersheds for implementation of local management solutions; (4) suggestion of suitable cropping patterns for the region with a view to increase the water use efficiency; and (5) suggesting efficient irrigation water management practices for the region. Evolving management strategies for large groundwater basins will call for reliable information on the physical characteristics of the resource, the current level of groundwater exploitation, the social, economic and institutional factors affecting the resource use, the socio-economic and ecological impacts of resource exploitation. Therefore, aquifer management committee shall have representation from the state groundwater agencies, NGOs, water management specialists, ecologists and social scientists apart from the representatives of the watershed committees working in the basin.
4. Local management of groundwater by user groups The nature of groundwater problems varies from region to region and location to location and as a result the management solutions for one locality cannot be adopted for another. Also, there is a range of physical, social, economic, and institutional factors, which affect the effectiveness of any groundwater management solution for a locality. These factors also vary from locality to locality. As a result, groundwater management solutions are to be ‘locale specific’ and should incorporate the range of physical, social, economic, and institutional characteristics of the locality (Moench, 1995). Regarding regulations, as earlier indicated, top-down, centralized approaches to regulate the use of groundwater are most likely to be less effective. Involvement of groundwater users in evolving regulations could help increase the effectiveness of the regulations as they are more aware of the resource management issues and the management needs than the official agencies concerned. The local institutions } village and watershed institutions } can influence the behaviour of all individual users within the community with regard to the use of groundwater, through framing and enforcing appropriate rules and regulations. It is, however, important to note that so long as the benefits to individuals from collective action is not distinct and direct, and lack of participation in the collective action doesn’t involve any ‘opportunity cost’ to the individuals, there could be resistance from individual users to join the group initiatives. This might hinder the process of community organisation. Therefore, there is a need to find ways by
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which the individuals also get direct benefits from the community action along with the larger social benefits. 4.1. The negative externalities in local groundwater management The local community organisations generally operate at the village level. In case of many villages tapping the same aquifer, the actions of a single village to protect and manage their groundwater resource may not find success unless the neighbouring communities cooperate. Understanding the scale at which interventions should occur is an important aspect of institutional analysis (Kumar, Shashikant, Srinivas & Prakash, 1999). In this section, an attempt is made to determine the externalities in local groundwater management. The first and the most important aspect of designing any resource management institution is identification of the resource boundaries (Ostrom, 1992). Inconsistency between hydrological boundaries and jurisdiction of the management institution may lead to obstacles in broad planning, data collection and regulatory activities (Frederiksen, 1998). In the case of groundwater, the resource boundaries could be demarcated on the basis of the physical system affecting groundwater recharge and the social systems affecting its use. The physical systems affecting groundwater use are integrated at the level of watershed. The social systems affecting their use are integrated at the level of aquifer. For any supply side approaches to augment the available groundwater supplies to be effective, the approach has to be watershed based. This is one of the factors, which induces a negative externality for local groundwater management efforts. For the demand side approaches for groundwater management to be effective from physical sustainability considerations, the total pumping across the aquifer should balance with the average annual replenishment. Hence, this is one of the externalities for local groundwater management initiatives. Again, in order to ensure sustainable use of the available groundwater, it is essential to maintain the quality. There are two sources of pollution of aquifers: (1) internal sources, and (2) external sources. The external sources of pollution can further be classified into point pollution and non-point pollution. The potential sources of external pollution are fertilizers, and industrial effluent. The internal pollution is due to the geo-hydrochemical processes taking place within the formation bearing groundwater. The physical and social parameters within a watershed that determine the degree of these externalities for local groundwater management regime are (1) watershed characteristics, and (2) groundwater basin characteristics. The major watershed characteristics that influence the externality function in a village-level groundwater management action are: (a) physical characteristics of the watershed: size of the portion of the watershed falling outside the boundaries of the village, and the extent to which that portion of the watershed has been treated; and (b) social characteristics: number of socio-economic groups within the watershed and the different water use priorities existing. The groundwater basin characteristics that influence the externality function are: (a) aquifer characteristics such as areal extent and yield characteristics of the aquifer, and the vulnerability of the aquifer to pollution; and (b) socio-economic factors affecting groundwater use such as presence or absence of urban centres and industrial areas, and water markets. The degree of success in implementing a management decision by a village level institution will be much more for an aquifer of limited areal extent than an aquifer of large areal extent. The ‘degree of stress’
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imposed by the same amount of pumping on the groundwater regime will be far less for an aquifer with high yields than that with poor yield characteristics.
5. A case study of community-based groundwater management The Mehsana district in Gujarat is underlain by a rich multi-layered alluvial aquifer which underlies most parts of the district. But, with the average annual extraction (900 MCM) far exceeding annual recharge (510 MCM) (GOG, 1992), overdraft of groundwater for irrigation has resulted in many depletion problems in the district. Water levels are falling at alarming rates resulting in drying up of many thousands of shallow open wells, large reduction in deep tube well yields, and increasing fluoride levels in groundwater. This results in scarcity of water for irrigation and drinking. Kheralu taluka, mostly underlain by shallow and phreatic alluvial aquifers, constitutes the major recharge area of Mehsana aquifer system. Groundwater pumping in the area is through open wells. The groundwater table was very high in the past. Due to overdraft, the estimated net annual draft in the taluka is 191.58 MCM against a utilizable recharge of 90.63 MCM (GOG, 1992) } and reduction in natural recharge due to deforestation, well water levels in the area have been falling. During droughts many wells go dry. The Vikram Sarabhai Centre for Development Interaction (VIKSAT) } a Gujarat-based NGO } initiated a field project in the area to help the farmers to address the problem of groundwater depletion. The area was chosen for the following reasons. First, the area being the recharge area of Mehsana aquifer system, any supply-based intervention can create a significant impact on the aquifer. Second, the structures required to recharge groundwater would be simple and inexpensive and a small increase in groundwater recharge will cause a perceptible difference in the groundwater levels. Third, due to the above-said reasons, replicability is high, so are the chances of convincing the farmers about the impact of the structures and involving them in the management activities. 5.1. Community organizations for managing groundwater The project initiated by VIKSAT tries to address some of the issues intrinsic in involving the users in the management of groundwater. The objectives of the project were to create community organisations, facilitate their increased access to technical, legal and financial support from various agencies for implementing groundwater management projects, and assist them in project implementation. The approach used in the field was land and water management. The activities tried to address the depletion problems are structural and vegetative measures to augment recharge groundwater; and, end use conservation measures like irrigation water management and cropping pattern changes to reduce the end use of water. In order to promote strong community organisations } Tree Growers’ Cooperative Societies (TGCS) that are registered under the Cooperative Act } VIKSAT has been conducting: (1) awareness programmes on groundwater depletion problems and their impact; (2) training and educational programmes on technical aspects of water management for the members of the cooperatives; and (3) exposure trips to areas where water management projects are being
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implemented by NGOs through local community participation. The TGCSs are engaged in protecting and re-vegetating the village commons and various soil and water conservation practices, and construction of water harvesting and recharge structures such as check dams. 5.2. Action research on local recharge and end-use conservation In order to understand the impact of local water harvesting and recharge systems, wells are monitored periodically by the farmer with support from the field staff of VIKSAT using simple water level recorders. The data generated from this was used to motivate more farmer organisations to take up activities to augment the groundwater supplies. To ensure long-term sustainability of resource, emphasis was also given to demand management. As lion’s share of the water goes for irrigation, thrust was on irrigation management. In order to analyse its scope, a field-based research study was carried out. The study showed significant overuse of water in the conventional flood irrigation using long borders in sandy and sandy loam. The Kubada Tree Growers Cooperative Society had the most successful experience with wasteland re-vegetation, and local recharge structures. It took up plantation in the revenue wasteland in 1988. Around 100 ha of forest area, 11 ha of revenue wasteland and 10 ha of grazing land are being protected. During the period from 1994–1997, they also took up construction of 6 check dams across the streams in order to recharge groundwater and check soil erosion. For this, the cooperative has invested a total of only US$ 16,000 with funds made available from the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA), Mehsana. The most significant impacts of the recharge structures and afforestation were on the local hydrological regime: increase in the natural recharge to groundwater, rise in groundwater levels, increase in grass cover and soil moisture, increased base flow in the streams and control of soil erosion. Since 1994, 15 land-less families are growing vegetables on the streambed. These families earn approximately US$ 250 by selling the vegetables every year. Some farmers also started lifting water from the stream for irrigation. The above strategy helps the landless to put the resource made available to them to a high-valued use. Having seen the experience of Kubada, many new surrounding villages are coming up with plans to take up recharge activities. In one village named Nana Kotasana, the TGCS proposed 3 check dams in the micro-watershed in the village to DRDA Mehsana in the year 1997 and the activity has already started with DRDA sanctioning the grant this year. In another village named Samrapur, the TGCS proposed a large check dam in the village with an estimated cost of US$ 6000. The practice adopted for efficient use of irrigation water was optimizing the size of the ‘level borders’ on the basis of the soil type, well discharge and field slope. This increased the efficiency of water application, distribution and storage, which in turn resulted in reduction in duration of watering. This improved method of irrigation benefited the farmers using diesel wells as diesel use for irrigation came down. By 1998, around 100 farmers spread across seven villages in the area started adopting this practice. 5.3. Institutional innovation for scaling up local community action Gadwada is a region comprising of 32 villages in the northern part of Kheralu taluka that has similar physiographical conditions and faces problems of soil erosion, land degradation and
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groundwater depletion. The project villages of VIKSAT fall in this region. The cluster of the 32 villages is also in conformation with the drainage patterns in the area and can be considered as a large watershed. In early 1996, VIKSAT initiated a federation of the Tree Growers Cooperative Societies named Gadwada Jal Jameen Sarakshan Sangh. The objective of the federation was to expand the local management activities to cover the entire Gadwada region. At the same time, VIKSAT wanted to assist the Sangh in evolving long-term strategies for management of land and water resources in the area. The Sangh, with financial and logistic support from VIKSAT, was able to organize several meetings, awareness and training programmes and exposure trips for the representatives of the villages in its constituency. VIKSAT is strengthening the Sangh for them to evolve water management strategies for the region and implement them. Over the years, the community- based programme on ground water management has expanded in terms of quality and scale of operation. First of all, there are 12 village level community organisations involved in land and water management activities in the area. Four TGCSs in the area are implementing wasteland afforestation programme and protection of village grazing land and forestland. In a village named Umri, the cooperative protects around 160 ha of forestland. In Nana Kotasana, 150 ha of degraded forestland and 20 ha of grazing land are being protected by the TGCS. The Mehsana aquifer has very large areal extent. The management effort is now only limited to a part of the recharge area, comprising of physical options for supply and conservation management. But groundwater in being pumped from across this large aquifer basin. The management emphasis in this area should be on regulations and other institutions for managing the demand. Local institutions have to be promoted in these areas to enforce regulations and other institutional mechanisms, while an institution has to be created to evolve and implement broader groundwater management strategies for Mehsana aquifer. Long-term efforts are needed to get the communities around the resource to manage it. The communities need to be educated and trained to facilitate its organizing and working out of institutional arrangements for resource utilization and management. Short-term strategies to mobilize social action are needed to sustain the community’s interest in the project such as management of common property land.
6. Alternative institutional and legal framework for groundwater management In the absence of well-defined property rights structure, the increase in groundwater supplies due to management interventions will lead to increased use by a few, undermining local management efforts. Therefore, unless the communities establish rights over the resource and regulate the demand, groundwater cannot be sustainably managed. Many researchers suggest the establishment of tradable private rights as a solution to the growing issues of access equity and efficiency in water (Frederick, 1993; Chaudhari, 1996; Saleth, 1996; Kumar, 1997). What is being suggested is a system of tradable property rights for groundwater. Such rights could be vested either with the State or with the Aquifer Management Committees. These Committees can sell the rights to the legally registered WCs and VLIs. The members, the landowners and landless, can buy the rights to use groundwater from the VLIs or WCs. Every member of the cooperative will have a fixed entitlement on the basis of the family size
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and can be made free of cost or nominally charged. The users who need extra water can buy the rights from the local institution. As the price at which water is traded reflects the opportunity cost of using water, it will create incentives for the users to invest in efficient use practices or transfer the water to more economically efficient uses (Frederick, 1993). Such markets can act as effective tools for inter-sectoral water allocation. For instance, agriculture accounts for a lion’s share of the total water use in most regions. The economic efficiency of agricultural use is much lower as compared to industries or less than what Municipal water users are willing to pay for the water they use. The industries or the Municipalities might be willing to provide financial assistance to farmers to invest in efficient irrigation technologies and could, in turn, get the additional water saved. Bringing about reforms in water rights is, however, a complex process, in the light of the fact that rights are not always mutually exclusive (Saleth, 1996). As a matter of fact, they are ‘correlative’ meaning a user while exercising his rights can reduce the ability of his neighbouring user to access his entitlement. Also, bringing about water rights reforms would also mean making suitable changes in the existing legal framework related to water to enable protection of individual users. The Central Groundwater Authority being constituted in India will have a wide range of legal regulatory powers such as issuing ownership rights, controlling manner of use of groundwater by users, determining the volumetric water extraction, and imposing penalties, apart from notifying ‘problem areas’.
7. Conclusion The legal and regulatory measures to be used by the Central Groundwater Authority are likely to be ineffective, as they deny ownership rights to individual users and do not involve them in management. The Central Groundwater Authority being set up in India should evolve strategies and guidelines for Joint Management of groundwater for ‘problem areas’ and provide legal, financial and technical support for speeding up the process of institutional development from aquifer to watershed to village level. The local institutions can evolve norms and regulations with regard to the use of groundwater apart from implementing a wide range of physical activities related to managing the resource, while higher level institution can evolve broader groundwater management solutions for the aquifer and support local institutional development. There are several countries across the world where development and use of groundwater has taken place almost entirely in the private sector and ownership rights over the resource are not defined like in India. Overdevelopment problems similar to that of India are existing in these countries also. Promoting local user group organizations will be critical in achieving sustainable management of the resource in these countries. Experience shows that local user group organizations can emerge in problem areas with support from external agencies such as NGOs if appropriate legal, institutional and policy regimes exist. Some of them are (1) recognition of rights of individuals and communities over groundwater, and (2) establishment of tradable private property rights. Institutional processes can be initiated to demarcate aquifer basins, evaluate the resource availability and integrate the local institutions with new basin level organisations that are to be created.
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