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Institutional logics of ungating communities in China
Habitat International 94 (2019) 102065
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Institutional logics of ungating communities in China Cui Liu College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Zhejiang University, No. 866 Yuhangtang Road, Hangzhou, 310058, China
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Gated community Ungating Institutional logics Professional logics Institutional entrepreneurship China
Setting against the global trend of gated communities, this paper uncovers the phenomenon of ungating com munities in China and discusses its rationale from the institutional logics perspective. With focuses on work unit compounds and commodity housing estates, the paper provides an understanding of gated communities as the interplay of state, market, and community logics. It attributes the rationale of ungating to 1) institutional entrepreneurship in the urban profession for intensive land use; 2) structural overlap between the professional logics of sustainable urbanization, the state logics of governance legitimacy, the market logics of continuous economic growth, and the community logics of distributive justice; 3) event sequencing through a series of policies to shift the societal focus-of-attention from scale and speed of urbanization to sustainability and justice. Challenges of ungating communities exist in the scale of spatial subdivision, the legitimacy of club goods, and the managerial and democratic turn of urban governance. In contrast to the neoliberal assertion of the weakening professions and the spreading market logics, this paper reveals the power of professional logics in promoting ungating communities and its potential of triggering more profound societal changes.
1. Introduction While gated communities have been proliferating across the world since 1990s, the phenomenon is strong in some countries but absent in others (CS Falvay & Webster, 2012), with most communities trans forming from ungated to gated but some vice versa (Zhang & Chai, 2014). The variation of gated communities in different countries, together with their positive or negative impacts, has been interpreted by many scholars from context-sensitive and time-specific perspectives, ranging from suburban new towns in North America (Blakely & Snyder, 1997) to prestigious self-segregation in East Central Europe (Kov CS & } s, 2014), from small-scale infill development in England Hegedu (Blandy, 2006) to large-scale exclusive gated ‘cities’ in Latin America (Borsdorf & Hidalgo, 2008), from transitional housing market in China (Wu, 2005) to transnational houses in West Africa (Grant, 2005). Among all the countries, none is more progressive than China which officially and institutionally encouraged the gating of communities in the late 1990s and early 2000s but urged their ungating in the mid 2010s. It was reported in 1998 that the central government of China had taken gating as a critical credit to evaluate the performance of local governments. The municipal government of Beijing even directly required all residential communities to be gated in 2001 (Miao, 2003). However, more than a decade later, in the Central Meeting on Urban Affairs in December 2015 (hereafter the 2015 Meeting), the Chinese
central government declared to forbid the construction of any new gated communities and to open the existing ones gradually. This is a turning point in the Chinese urban history to change the neighborhood forms and to break with gated communities. In fact, gated communities in China have been discussed widely in the scholarly literature. It has been commonly acknowledged that walls and gates have been essential elements of Chinese cities over thousands of years and they are now represented in overlapping multiple forms. Five types of residential enclaves have been distinguished in contem porary China: courtyard housing, work unit compounds, commodity housing estates, urban villages and factory compound (for various types see Breitung, 2012, He, 2013; Li, Zhu, & Li, 2012). Among these types, work unit compounds and commodity housing estates share greater similarities with gated communities in the global scenario and are the targets for reform according to the 2015 Meeting. Chinese gated communities are evolving around various social, economic, cultural, institutional, and political forces, within which the persisting power of the state to serve its political and economic purposes plays the most predominant and compelling role (He, 2013). The form of gating in post-reform China is a logical response to the changing social conditions which deconstructed the space of state-organized collective consumption and reconstructed the post-reform consumer spaces (Wu, 2005). A number of institutions with respect to land use rights, revenue redistribution, policymaking procedures and hukou-related social
E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2019.102065 Received 12 February 2017; Received in revised form 3 July 2019; Accepted 11 October 2019 Available online 17 October 2019 0197-3975/© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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welfare system are manipulated by the state for socio-spatial organiza tion (Zhao, 2017). Existing studies all contend that the state plays a significant role for the rising of gated communities. But no studies have yet discussed the rationales of the state, as shown in the 2015 Meeting, to explicitly dissolve them. Therefore this paper tries to understand why the Chinese state aimed to ungate communities. To this end, it employs the institu tional logics perspective (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012) to un cover the mechanism of community transformation. The institutional logics perspective provides an analytical tool by conceptualizing the society as an inter-institutional system constituted by institutional or ders (Friedland & Alford, 1991) and focusing on the interconnection of different institutional logics within and across institutional orders for societal changes (Holm, 1995). In the following, the paper first elucidates the production of gated communities from the institutional logics perspective. Then it examines the interplay of state, market and community logics in the development of gated communities in the context of China. After that it discusses the institutional mechanism driving the ungating of gated communities and finally proposes the challenges and possible countermeasures.
2.2. The state logics Neoliberalism is characterized by the retreat of the state and the shrinking of the public sector, or in other words, a trend of privatization, which involves both transferring the ownership of properties and ser vices from the public sector to the private sector and establishing a deregulated institutional framework with limited government inter vention for market activities (Jessop, 2002). Privatization happens in nearly all the functional areas but most dramatically in residential communities compared with working and recreational areas. The pri vatization of public housing takes various forms, such as selling rented public housing through right-to-buy policies to sitting tenants and transferring properties to not-for-profit or profit-maximizing actors (Rolnik, 2013). Privatization brings about social, legal, and physical boundaries that demarcate different residential communities as enclaves (Breitung, 2011). These enclaves are often walled, fenced or guarded, contain economically or ethnically classified groups, and are subject to different governance regimes (Atkinson & Blandy, 2005). The neoliberal shift does not imply a passive and diminishing role of the state. In contrast, the state usually plays a rather active and promi nent role in creating and promoting an enabling environment to support economic activities (Bremmer, 2009; Woo-Cumings, 1999). It can be considered that even more state intervention is needed in order to liberalize the market (Yeung, 2000). In this sense, gated communities represent the rescaling of state governance (Brenner, 2001) that is adjusted by itself to meet the growing demand for club-like management of residential environments and to reconcile with the principles of jus tice reigning in the economic sphere (Charmes, 2009). Moreover, the state undertakes different strategies in the development of different types of gated communities, such as privatized preference in commodity housing, public-private partnership in affordable housing, and strong state intervention in resettlement housing (Lu, Zhang, & Wu, 2019). In some cases, the state has returned to strengthen administration in community governance after its previous retreat following housing privatization when the attempt to transfer responsibility to commercial property management failed (Wu, 2018).
2. Understanding the production of gated communities from the institutional logics perspective 2.1. Institutional logics perspective Institutional logics are defined as a set of historically rooted (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) and culturally constructed (Dimaggio, 1997) material practices and symbolic constructions which influence the cognition and behavior of individuals and organizations. The concept of institutional logics was initially proposed by Friedland and Alford (1991) to account for institutional changes. Friedland and Alford (1991) suggested that the society consists of a set of institutional orders, including the family, religion, market, state, and democracy, and that each institutional order has a central logic as its organizing principles. Thornton et al. (2012) further elaborated the relationship of institu tional logics and configured the society as an inter-institutional system, extending the institutional orders as family, religion, state, market, profession, corporation, and community. The multiple logics of institutional orders may be conflicting or compatible, therefore institutional changes may occur through replacing one dominant logic with another or through the overlapping and coex istence of different logics (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Zheng, Cai, & MA, 2017). Specifically, institutional changes can take place through insti tutional entrepreneurship, structural overlap, event sequencing and so on (Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 2005). Institutional entrepreneurship refer to the activities of individuals or organizations who exploit the oppor tunities of cultural discontinuity for institutional change (Dimaggio, 1988; Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009), playing similar roles as entrepreneurs in the economic fields. Structural overlap is the associa tion and collaboration of distinct actors with divergent cultures (Thornton, 2004). Event sequencing is theorized as the occurrence of structural transformation such as the changes of cultural schemas, the shifts of resources and the emergence of new power (Sewell, 1996). Examining the production of gated communities from the institu tional logics perspective, it can be understood as the joint influence of state, market and community logics. The interplay of state and market logics in gated communities has been discussed by many researchers as associated with neo-liberal change (e.g. Rosen & Razin, 2009; GüZey, 2014; Kov CS & Heged} us, 2014; Xu & Yang, 2008), while the community logics (Webster, 2002, CS Falvay, 2011) provides genuine account from a third perspective of civil society (Minnery, 2007). The following text examines the logics of state, market, and community respectively, while inevitably mentioning the intertwining of each logic with the other two.
2.3. The market logics Another hallmarks of neoliberal restructuring is the increasing role of financial markets, often referred to as financialization, in the econ omy and everyday life (Stockhammer, 2010). Financialization refers to structural changes in the operation of capitalism in which profit accu mulation is increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade or commodity production (Krippner, 2005). It is marked by the penetration of financial actors, tools and logics into non-financial realms such as real estate and housing (August & Walks, 2018; Fields, 2015; Klink & Denaldi, 2014). Financial changes in economic regulations and industrial structures have embedded urban development more deeply in the worldwide financial markets and compelled it to perform according to a common standard of shareholder value-creation (Rutland, 2010). It is manifested at a number of scales, ranging from the economic insta bility of nation-state, through the capital pressures of firms or corpora tions, to the equity issues of households and individuals (French, Leyshon, & Wainwright, 2011). The integration of housing into financial market implies that the value of housing depends on the possibilities of creating more value, i.e. the speed and number of transactions capable of generating value appreciation (Rolnik, 2013). It intensifies the tensions between the use value of housing as a unique home and its exchange value as a saleable commodity (August & Walks, 2018). Housing is increasingly considered as an investment asset and as a means to wealth, assessed exclusively in terms of its potential yield. Services and amenities of the residential environment are all capitalized into real estate prices (Zheng & Kahn, 2008). Consequently, gated communities are rendered as a club of consumers who pay membership fees for using club goods and services 2
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relations, the Chinese state monopolized the investment, production, circulation and distribution of resources by nationalizing the economic units. It made comprehensive plans for an average of five years and designated input quotas and output targets to each state-owned work unit for achieving the economic development goals. Labors and capital goods were hierarchically distributed and internally circulated only between the state departments. In consistency with the socialist ideology and the central planning system, the state nationalized the ownership of land and housing. In such a system, two stages were involved in housing provision: the state allocated public rental housing to work units, then the work units distributed housing as an in-kind welfare to their employees (Yang & Chen, 2014). A central idea of the work unit system was to increase efficiency because it tied infrastructure investment to production in vestment and thus ensured the minimum standard of social reproduction so as to concentrate more on production (Wu, 2005). Moreover, the colocation of housing and workplace could reduce traffic burdens and save on commuting time, thus contributing to the working efficiency. In this context, work unit was not simply a place to work, but rather a self-contained complex providing all daily necessities such as housing, canteens, and hospitals for its employees. The integration of various functions in work units drove the residents to depend increasingly on organized collective consumption (Walder, 1986). The management of work unit compounds and the provision of community services were carried out by the estate department which performed as a subsidiary and an extension of the work unit. The resi dents in the work unit compounds were not only neighbors at home but also colleagues at work, which contributed to close interaction and made neighborhood watch possible to facilitate state governance. The work unit functioned actually as a fundamental unit of the society and as the buffer zone linking individuals with the state.
collectively to avoid of the potential downgrading of housing values due to free riders and public intervention (Webster, 2002). In response to the differentiated affordability and diversified consumption needs, gated commodities are seen as an efficient way of organizing the new con sumption space (Wu, 2005). 2.4. The community logics Setting in the interconnections of state and market, the prevalence of gated communities is finally attributed to public choice (CS Falvay, 2011). It has been suggested two ways of people’s response to disaf fection: exit and voice (Hirschman, 1970). The exit option indicates the spatial mobility of people to move between different residential com munities by paying taxes or fees in return for their desired goods and services. Its underlying principle is fiscal equivalence, i.e. ‘match be tween those who receive the benefits of a collective good and those who pay for it’ (Olson, 1969). The voice option involves negotiation between residents and other stakeholders to attain expected outcomes without migrating or paying additional costs, which is profoundly rooted in the decentralized and democratic political contexts (CS Falvay, 2011). Compared with other residential forms, gated communities match the territory of governance most precisely to the territory of provision of goods and services and match the beneficiaries to the payers. Therefore they have been accepted as a feasible exit option and proliferating rapidly in countries that are incapable of providing sufficient non-profitable public goods as voice options for residents (CS Falvay, 2011). Based on the principles of fiscal federalism (CS Falvay & Webster, 2012) and driven by other factors such as fear of crime and flight from blight, many studies highlight the fact that gated communities are favored particularly by higher income class. The affluent groups can not only segregate themselves from the rest of society through physical barriers of gated communities, but also privatize public spaces and engage public authorities to improve their comfort in gated commu } s, 2014) through political mechanisms such as nities (Kov CS & Hegedu voting in elections and attending public hearings. However, gated communities that are inhabited by lower-income and working-class people (Sanchez, Lang, & Dhavale, 2005) or middle-income and well-educated migrants (Zhao & Zhang, 2018) are also emerging. Gated communities appear to be a common attempt of various social groups to insulate themselves against unwanted encounters and perceived risks, which extends from social networks elsewhere such as places of work and leisure and constitutes a time-space trajectories of segregation (Atkinson & Flint, 2004).
3.2. Developmental state, prospering real estate market, and stratified communities Along with the transition of China from a planned to a market economy after 1978, state-market relations began to change. Economic development is seen as the combination instead of the dichotomy of state and market actions. The state deploys the economic, institutional and legal resources for imperative coordination and plays an indis pensable role in promoting all spheres of market activities. The market includes product market and resource market while the resource market can be further divided into capital, land and labor market (Mceachern, 2009). The Chinese state loosened the central control of commodities and products first, making them distributed and priced largely by the market rather than according to the designated quotas. But for the resource market, the reform was gradual and partial. Land reform proved to be a powerful force to drive China’s housing reform and urban development into a new stage (Lin & Yi, 2011). In 1988, the Land Administration Law was amended to allow the paid transfer of land use rights. It was further specified in 1990 by the State Council that land use rights could be assigned, transferred, leased and mortgaged. The transfer of land use rights enabled urban governments to effectively raise funds through the sales of land use rights and the collection of land use taxes. It was reported that the revenue of local governments generated from urban land across the country had increased from 35 million RMB in 1987 to 29,048 million RMB in 1996, accounting for 20% to 25% of the revenue of local governments on average (State Land Administration Bureau, 1997). The land revenues were then used to improve infrastructures so as to increase land values and attract investment, leading to a positive cycle of land development. Following the land reform, the Chinese state launched marketoriented housing reform. It officially identified the nature of housing as commodity-based and announced to completely replace the previous welfare housing distribution with monetary distribution. To promote housing privatization and commodification, the state further increased
3. The interplay of state, market and community logics in the development of gated communities in China Setting in the global scenario, gated communities in China have shown some local variations. This section examines the interplay of state, market, and community logics in the development of gated com munities in China, focusing particularly on work unit compounds and commodity housing estates which have been urged for ungating ac cording to the 2015 Meeting. 3.1. State monopolization, internalized housing distribution, and collective consumption When the Chinese Communist Party came into power in 1949, it adopted a centrally planned economy based on Marxist ideology. Ac cording to the Marxist viewpoint, market and private property would inherently lead to social inequality. Therefore the actions of the socialist Chinese state to eliminate unacceptable injustice and achieve socialist commitment were basically against the market, controlling the market, and internalizing the market (Yeh, Yang, & Wang, 2015). Unlike the free market in which economic activities are subject to supply-demand 3
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rents to make public rental housing less attractive. Moreover, it set up the financial system of housing provident fund to help households with mortgages. Following these policies, the residents were encouraged either to buy housing from the market or to buy their sitting public housing from the work unit. The work units were forbidden to build any more welfare housing for their employees, and all newly built housing had to be sold on the open market. Housing commodification has dramatically stimulated housing consumption and led to the prospering of real estate market. Taking Beijing as an example, the total sale of commodity housing increased from 4.09 million square meters in 1998 to 14.59 million square meters in 2014, at an annual growth rate of 24%. Matching the remarkable growth of commodity housing is the growth in commodity housing in vestments, which grew from 37.7 billion RMB in 1998 to 391.1 billion RMB in 2014, at an annual growth of 48% (Beijing Statistics Bureau, 2015). These estates were developed by real estate developers and managed by property management companies, most of which were initially converted from the subsidiaries of housing bureau in the process of marketization. The land of commodity housing estates was obtained through land leasing system at different prices according to different development requirements offered by local governments. By assigning land use rights to the developers, local governments could transfer the cost of infrastructure development in the land to the developers (Wu, Xu, & Yeh, 2007). The larger the scale of the commodity housing estates, the more benefits local governments could gain from land speculation. The flourishing real estate market increased residential stratification. For example, affluent people with similar social status and interests concentrate in prestigious estates and pay for high-quality goods and services for their common use with exclusive access, whereas the working-class and low-income people, especially migrants, gather in overcrowded and poorly equipped urban enclaves (He, 2013). Resi dential stratification is an accumulative process. First, public housing in the work unit system was not distributed in an equal way but hierar chically varied between workers and leaders and between different types of work units. Second, housing privatization transferred public housing assets to the private, thus those better-off families got housing with higher values while some poor households even didn’t receive housing in the old distribution system. Third, in the booming housing financial market, the higher class could realize more capital gains through housing transactions while those poor were even worse off. Socio-spatial stratification between residents in different gated com munities exist not only in their residential areas, but also in their values, social relations, and daily lives, manifested in the extensity, intensity, and exclusivity of their activity spaces (Wang, Fei, & Chai, 2012).
is often minimized to reduce the cost of guards and to ensure effective security management (Miao, 2003). This led to a lack of connectivity in Chinese cities, which usually causes long detours and induces traffic jams (Su & Xu, 2006). In response to the above problems, measures were taken in the professional field of urban planning to promote economical and inten sive land use. 56 relevant policies had been promulgated at the national level from 1999 to 2014, covering the fields of scale control, structure optimization, regulation standard, market allocation, supervision and examination, legal responsibility and so on (Xiao et al., 2015). However, most of these policies are notices and opinions whose effectiveness levels are quite low and disciplining functions are quite weak. But they artic ulate new sets of values such as environmental sustainability, civil rights and distributive justice which have indeed altered the institutional logics to some extent. 4.2. Structural overlap between the professional logics and the state, market and community logics The professional logics of intensive land use are structurally over lapped with the state, market and community logics for sustainable urbanization. Urbanization can be assessed from multiple aspects such as land, economy, population, and comprehensiveness (Chen, Liu, Lu, Hao, & Chao, 2018). Land urbanization rate in China grew much faster than population urbanization rate. The newly constructed urban areas in China had grown by 76.4% from 2000 to 2011 while the urban residents increased only 50.5% (Wang, Hui, Choguill, & Jia, 2015). It showed excessive urban sprawl with extensive land use, which is unsustainable in a long run. If just taking into consideration those residents with urban household registration, the urbanization rate was even lower. For example, the urban population had grown from 170 million to 730 million from 1978 to 2013 and the urbanization rate reached 53.7% in 2013, but the urbanization rate of those population with urban house hold registration was just 36% (Wang et al., 2015). That means nearly 240 million rural migrants live in the cities but with no urban rights such as equal access to medical care, education, employment, insurance, housing and so on. Moreover, China’s urbanization process has progressed faster than economic growth since 2004 (Chen, Liu, & Tao, 2013) and the economic growth rate marked the historically lowest level in 2014 (Kim, 2015). Therefore the logics of ‘performance legitimacy’ in the pragmatic Chi nese urban governance were questioned (Kim, 2015). Problems such as environmental pollution and social stratification underneath the pros perous urbanization were uncovered and received more and more attention from the public. Many ‘occupy’ movements that symbolized the reappropriation of public spaces, though in smaller scale in China, have reaffirmed the existence of the ‘public’ in terms of urban gover nance, social justice and policy making (Pickerill & Krinsky, 2012). To solve the many problems accumulated in the process of urbanization, it was necessary to find a new way jointly promoted by the multiple institutional logics.
4. Institutional mechanism driving the ungating of gated communities in China As discussed above, gated communities in China were forged by the interplay of state, market, and community logics. While it is difficult to break the balanced interaction of the three, the transformation of communities from gated to ungated is triggered by institutional entre preneurship in the urban profession which then influenced the other institutional logics through structural overlap and finally shift the so cietal focus-of-attention through event sequencing.
4.3. Event sequencing to shift the societal focus-of-attention Driven by the overlapped multiple institutional logics, the 18th Na tional Congress of the Communist Party of China officially introduced the term of new urbanization in November 2012. In November 2013, it was designated as one of the main tasks of the central government to pursue the sound development of urbanization. In March 2014, China’s National Development and Reform Commission released National Newtype Urbanization Plan 2014–2020, setting people-centred urbanization at the core. The so-called new urbanization was aimed to refine the existing mode of urbanization, promote social integration and realize sustainable development (Chen, Liu, Lu, Hao, & Chao, 2018; Lang, Chen, & LI, 2016; Wang et al., 2015). It sowed the seeds of urban trans formation in the institutional logics of many fields.
4.1. Institutional entrepreneurship in the urban profession Gated communities in China have been criticized for causing many urban ills. Most distinctively, they are often blamed for occupying too much land. A comparison between Chinese and American gated com munities has shown that the American gated communities usually cover less than 13 ha each whereas the Chinese ones can occupy as much as 25 ha of land each (Miao, 2003). Due to the large size of gated com munities, the distance between publicly accessible streets could be as much as 1 km or span the entire side of the estates. The number of gates 4
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As an effort to realize sustainable urbanization, the Central Meeting on Urban Affairs was held in December 2015, declaring that ‘It should promote block system in newly built residential areas and should not build any more gated communities. The existing commodity housing estates and work unit compounds should be gradually open.’ The aim of ungating communities, as declared by the officials, was ‘to encourage the public use of internal roads, to optimize the layout of road network, and to realize land saving and intensive utilization.’ Following the 2015 Meeting, 1) Regulation of Urban Design Management and 2) General Rules of Urban Design Technical Management were issued by Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China to establish the urban design system institutionally (Wei, Zhu, & Chen, 2017). Most recently, Planning and Design Standards for Urban Residential Areas (GB50180-2018) was issued in 2018 and provides detailed regulations in terms of the scale of public space and facilities in the 15-min, 10-min, 5-min pedestrian areas and neighborhood blocks. All these policies provide institutional guarantee for the technical feasibility of getting the right to the city at the physical level. With regard to social integration, the Chinese government relaxed the restrictions of household registration in mid- and small-sized cities according to the Plan 2014–2020. It stressed coordinated development of urban and rural areas from the regional perspective and aimed to reduce regional disparity so as to ease the conflicts due to unbalanced regional development. Later, in the 19th National Congress of Chinese Communist Party in October 2017, President Xi Jinping declared that the main social conflicts in China has been changed from those between people’s growing material and cultural needs and the backward social production that had lasted for over three decades since the reform and opening up, to those between people’s growing need for a better life and the unbalanced and insufficient development. It finally changed the societal focus-of-attention in an officially institutional way.
activities, is essential for further development. 5.2. The legitimacy of club goods Socially, explorations are needed to clarify the legitimacy of club goods so as to keep balance between the public and private interest. Different from the situation in some countries such as South Africa where the roads within gated communities are still public property (Landman, 2006), the internal roads and open space of gated commu nities in China were mostly developed by private commercial developers and their costs have already been transferred to the residents through housing prices. The residents are also responsible for the maintenance of club goods by paying property management fees. The land use rights of the roads and open space in gated communities are owned jointly by the residents who may be largely unwilling to share their paid services and goods with non-payers. In this regard, it is very critical to clarify the legitimacy of club goods and the relationship between club goods and public goods before simply opening enclaves. 5.3. The managerial and democratic turn of urban governance Politically, the development of ungated communities calls for necessary changes in the mode of urban governance. As analyzed above, the emergence of gated communities in the contemporary era were largely due to the privatization of public service provision, tailoring to the needs of various social groups. This market-driven phenomenon could be greatly eased if public facilities are greatly improved to attract people to enjoy the amenities together and increase their social inter action. The goal of urban governance is therefore to enhance the effi ciency of public service production and delivery. Such governance places local authorities in a dependency on professional management resources inside and outside their organizations (Pierre, 1999) and re quires them to response quickly enough to the needs of the governing areas. Moreover, the turn towards new urbanization is aimed for systemic sustainability and long-term effects which promotes a balanced agenda in marketization, industrial transformation, social inclusion and mac roeconomic stability. It reflects the increasing diversity and heteroge neity of policy communities and relies on the existence of a multi-scalar democratic governance regime that favors public deliberation and social economy initiatives (Gerometta, Haussermann, & Longo, 2005). Considering that such governance arrangements may be selective by integrating the core and excluding the marginal (Collier & Etchemendy, 2007), local governments should perform to engage various social groups and organized interests into the urban political process on the one hand and to ensure that the participants’ membership exerts influ ence on urban policies on the other hand.
5. Challenges of ungating communities Many cities have already experimented to open the gated commu nities until now. For example, Beijing has opened some work unit compounds in Sanlihe area where concentrate many central ministries and has witnessed the first ungated public rental housing project named Guogongzhuan Jiayuan. Their practices have shown that solving the problems associate with gated communities goes far beyond the mea sures of simply opening them up. It is closely related with the spatial, social and political matters. 5.1. The scale of subdivision Spatially, it has to decide the scale of subdivision, i.e. the size of the plots, which is related to the issues of where to open and the extent of openness (Sun, Webster, & Chiaradia, 2017). In European cities, the typical urban blocks are approximately 150 m by 150 m and have several plots (World Bank, 2014). But in China, urban blocks are much larger and usually consist of only one plot. The scale of subdivision exerts an influence not only on the environmental quality of the neighborhoods but also on the street networks between the plots. Smaller blocks greatly increase the permeability and accessibility of the neighborhoods, promote smooth movement and reduce traffic jams (Xu & Yang, 2008). They also provide opportunities for smaller developers to take part in the land market, which avoids the monopoly of large enterprises in manipulating housing prices, thus cater to infill develop ment and contribute to higher agglomeration economies (World Bank, 2014). In so doing, smaller blocks help to create a more heterogeneous urban district with diverse housing types, prices and aesthetic styles to meet the demands of different consumer groups. However, too small plots will decrease the economies of scale in land development and interrupt the peaceful living environment due to traffic noise. Therefore, the careful subdivision of land to decide the scale of gated communities, together with corresponding policies to regulate land development
6. Conclusion While many studies highlight that gated communities have been prevailing across both developed and developing countries, this paper uncovers the phenomenon of ungating communities in China and dis cusses the rationale from the institutional logics perspective. Work unit compounds and commodity housing estates are two different types of gated communities in China and attributed to the interplay of state, market, and community logics in different socioeconomic contexts. Work unit compounds came into being in the so cialist era when the state nationalized the economic units and distrib uted housing as a social welfare to the unit workers. Work unit compounds performed as a self-contained complex providing all daily necessities and as the buffer zone linking individuals with the state. Commodity housing estates emerged along with land reform and housing commodification. They generated huge financial benefit for local governments through land speculation and met the collective re quirements of residents by providing exclusive club goods. However, 5
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they sorted people into different socio-economic classes and finally led to residential stratification. The policies and practices of ungating work unit compounds and commodity housing estates were triggered by institutional entrepre neurship in the urban profession in response to the many urban ills generated by gated communities such as traffic congestion and extensive land use. The professional logics of intensive land use were structurally overlapped with the state logics of governance legitimacy, the market logics of continuous economic growth, and the community logics of distributive justice in the process of urbanization. Therefore it became a consensus in the multiple institutional orders to transform the current mode of development and find a new way of sustainable urbanization. To achieve the goal, ungating communities was proposed as a technical measure to guarantee the right to the city at the physical level while household registration reforms were carried out to provide equal civil rights for various groups of people at the social level, which ultimately shifted the development focus from scale and speed of urbanization to sustainability and justice. In contrast to the assertion of the weakening professions and the spreading market logics in many substantive do mains (Thornton et al., 2012), this paper reveals the power of profes sional logics in promoting ungated communities and their potential of triggering more profound societal changes. However, there are many challenges for ungating communities. Spatially, the scale of subdivision must be ascertained because a too large or too small area of the plot is detrimental to the viability of communities. Socially, the legitimacy of club goods must be clarified to keep balance between the public and private interest. Politically, the mode of urban governance must be reformed to enhance the efficiency of public service production and delivery and towards more diversified, inclusive, and democratic.
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Acknowledgement This project was supported by the Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province (Grant No. LY19E080027), China Institute for New Urbanization Studies at Zhejiang University, and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 51508497). References Atkinson, R., & Blandy, S. (2005). Introduction: International perspectives on the new enclavism and the rise of gated communities. Housing Studies, 20, 177–186. Atkinson, R., & Flint, J. (2004). Fortress UK? Gated communities, the spatial revolt of the elites and time–space trajectories of segregation. Housing Studies, 19, 875–892. August, M., & Walks, A. (2018). Gentrification, suburban decline, and the financialization of multi-family rental housing: The case of Toronto. Geoforum, 89, 124–136. Battilana, J., Leca, B., & Boxenbaum, E. (2009). How actors change institutions: Towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship. The Academy of Management Annals, 3, 65–107. Beijing Statistics Bureau. (2015). Beijing statistical yearbook 2014. Beijing: China Statistics Press. Blakely, E. J., & Snyder, M. G. (1997). Fortress America: Gated communities in the United States. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Blandy, S. (2006). Gated communities in England: Historical perspectives and current developments. Geojournal, 66, 15–26. Borsdorf, A., & Hidalgo, R. (2008). New dimensions of social exclusion in Latin America: From gated communities to gated cities, the case of Santiago de Chile. Land Use Policy, 25, 153–160. Breitung, W. (2011). Borders and the city: Intra-urban boundaries in Guangzhou (China). Quaestiones Geographicae, 30, 55–61. Breitung, W. (2012). Enclave urbanism in China: Attitudes towards gated communities in Guangzhou. Urban Geography, 33, 278–294. Bremmer, I. (2009). State capitalism comes of age (p. 88). Foreign Affairs. Brenner, N. (2001). The limits to scale? Methodological reflections on scalar structuration. Progress in Human Geography, 25, 591–614. Charmes, E. (2009). On the residential ’clubbisation’ of French Periurban municipalities. Urban Studies, 46, 189–212. Chen, M., Liu, W., Lu, D., Hao, C., & Chao, Y. (2018). Progress of China’s new-type urbanization construction since 2014: A preliminary assessment. Cities, 78, 180–193. Chen, M., Liu, W., & Tao, X. (2013). Evolution and assessment on China’s urbanization 1960–2010: Under-urbanization or over-urbanization? Habitat International, 38, 25–33.
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Habitat International 94 (2019) 102065 Wu, F., Xu, J., & Yeh, A. G. O. (2007). Urban development in post-reform China: State, market, and space. Oxon and New York, Routledge. Xiao, L. V., Niu, S. D., Huang, X. J., Zhao, Y. T., Zhao, X. F., & Zhong, T. Y. (2015). Policy evolution of economical and intensive use of land in China based on content analysis method. China Land Sciences. Xu, M., & Yang, Z. (2008). Theoretical debate on gated communities: Genesis, controversies, and the way forward. Urban Design International, 13(14), 213–226. Yang, Z., & Chen, J. (2014). Housing reform and the housing market in urban China. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. Yeh, A. G. O., Yang, F. F., & Wang, J. (2015). Economic transition and urban transformation of China: The interplay of the state and the market. Urban Studies, 52, 2822–2848. Yeung, H. W.-C. (2000). State intervention and neoliberalism in the globalizing world economy: Lessons from Singapore’s regionalization programme. The Pacific Review, 13, 133–162. Zey, G. (2014). Neoliberal urbanism restructuring the city of Ankara: Gated communities as a new life style in a suburban settlement. Cities, 36, 93–106. Zhang, C., & Chai, Y. (2014). Un-gated and integrated work unit communities in postsocialist urban China: A case study from Beijing. Habitat International, 43, 79–89. Zhao, P. (2017). An ‘unceasing war’ on land development on the urban fringe of Beijing: A case study of gated informal housing communities. Cities, 60, 139–146. Zhao, P., & Zhang, M. (2018). Informal suburbanization in Beijing: An investigation of informal gated communities on the urban fringe. Habitat International, 77. S0197397517312286. Zheng, G., Cai, Y., & MA, S. (2017). Towards an analytical framework for understanding the development of a quality assurance system in an international joint programme. European Journal of Higher Education, 1–18. Zheng, S., & Kahn, M. E. (2008). Land and residential property markets in a booming economy: New evidence from Beijing. Journal of Urban Economics, 63, 743–757.
Thornton, P. H. (2004). Markets from culture: Institutional logics and organizational decisions. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Higher Education Publishing. Thornton, P. H., Jones, C., & Kury, K. (2005). Institutional logics and institutional change in organizations: Transformation in accounting, architecture, and publishing. Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 23, 125–170. Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the historical contingency of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958-1990. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 801–843. Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. (2012). The institutional logics perspective : A new approach to culture, structure and process. Oxford University Press. Walder, A. G. (1986). Communist neo-traditionalism:work and authority in Chinese industry. Berkeley: University of California Press. Wang, D., Fei, L., & Chai, Y. (2012). Activity spaces and sociospatial segregation in Beijing. Urban Geography, 33, 256–277. Wang, X. R., Hui, C. M., Choguill, C., & Jia, S. H. (2015). The new urbanization policy in China: Which way forward? Habitat International, 47, 279–284. Webster, C. (2002). Property rights and the public realm: Gates, green belts, and gemeinschaft. Environment and Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science, 29, 397–412. Wei, G., Zhu, Z., & Chen, Z. (2017). Reflections on the mechanism of urban design in China: understandings of the compilation of urban design management regulation and urban design technical regulations. Urbanism & Architecture. Woo-Cumings, M. (Ed.). (1999). The developmental state. Cornell University Press. World Bank. (2014). Urban China: Toward efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urbanization. Wu, F. (2005). Rediscovering the ‘gate’ under market transition: From work-unit compounds to commodity housing enclaves. Housing Studies, 20, 235–254. Wu, F. (2018). Housing privatization and the return of the state: Changing governance in China. Urban Geography, 1–18.
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Institutional logics of ungating communities in China Cui Liu College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Zhejiang University, No. 866 Yuhangtang Road, Hangzhou, 310058, China
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Gated community Ungating Institutional logics Professional logics Institutional entrepreneurship China
Setting against the global trend of gated communities, this paper uncovers the phenomenon of ungating com munities in China and discusses its rationale from the institutional logics perspective. With focuses on work unit compounds and commodity housing estates, the paper provides an understanding of gated communities as the interplay of state, market, and community logics. It attributes the rationale of ungating to 1) institutional entrepreneurship in the urban profession for intensive land use; 2) structural overlap between the professional logics of sustainable urbanization, the state logics of governance legitimacy, the market logics of continuous economic growth, and the community logics of distributive justice; 3) event sequencing through a series of policies to shift the societal focus-of-attention from scale and speed of urbanization to sustainability and justice. Challenges of ungating communities exist in the scale of spatial subdivision, the legitimacy of club goods, and the managerial and democratic turn of urban governance. In contrast to the neoliberal assertion of the weakening professions and the spreading market logics, this paper reveals the power of professional logics in promoting ungating communities and its potential of triggering more profound societal changes.
1. Introduction While gated communities have been proliferating across the world since 1990s, the phenomenon is strong in some countries but absent in others (CS Falvay & Webster, 2012), with most communities trans forming from ungated to gated but some vice versa (Zhang & Chai, 2014). The variation of gated communities in different countries, together with their positive or negative impacts, has been interpreted by many scholars from context-sensitive and time-specific perspectives, ranging from suburban new towns in North America (Blakely & Snyder, 1997) to prestigious self-segregation in East Central Europe (Kov CS & } s, 2014), from small-scale infill development in England Hegedu (Blandy, 2006) to large-scale exclusive gated ‘cities’ in Latin America (Borsdorf & Hidalgo, 2008), from transitional housing market in China (Wu, 2005) to transnational houses in West Africa (Grant, 2005). Among all the countries, none is more progressive than China which officially and institutionally encouraged the gating of communities in the late 1990s and early 2000s but urged their ungating in the mid 2010s. It was reported in 1998 that the central government of China had taken gating as a critical credit to evaluate the performance of local governments. The municipal government of Beijing even directly required all residential communities to be gated in 2001 (Miao, 2003). However, more than a decade later, in the Central Meeting on Urban Affairs in December 2015 (hereafter the 2015 Meeting), the Chinese
central government declared to forbid the construction of any new gated communities and to open the existing ones gradually. This is a turning point in the Chinese urban history to change the neighborhood forms and to break with gated communities. In fact, gated communities in China have been discussed widely in the scholarly literature. It has been commonly acknowledged that walls and gates have been essential elements of Chinese cities over thousands of years and they are now represented in overlapping multiple forms. Five types of residential enclaves have been distinguished in contem porary China: courtyard housing, work unit compounds, commodity housing estates, urban villages and factory compound (for various types see Breitung, 2012, He, 2013; Li, Zhu, & Li, 2012). Among these types, work unit compounds and commodity housing estates share greater similarities with gated communities in the global scenario and are the targets for reform according to the 2015 Meeting. Chinese gated communities are evolving around various social, economic, cultural, institutional, and political forces, within which the persisting power of the state to serve its political and economic purposes plays the most predominant and compelling role (He, 2013). The form of gating in post-reform China is a logical response to the changing social conditions which deconstructed the space of state-organized collective consumption and reconstructed the post-reform consumer spaces (Wu, 2005). A number of institutions with respect to land use rights, revenue redistribution, policymaking procedures and hukou-related social
E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2019.102065 Received 12 February 2017; Received in revised form 3 July 2019; Accepted 11 October 2019 Available online 17 October 2019 0197-3975/© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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welfare system are manipulated by the state for socio-spatial organiza tion (Zhao, 2017). Existing studies all contend that the state plays a significant role for the rising of gated communities. But no studies have yet discussed the rationales of the state, as shown in the 2015 Meeting, to explicitly dissolve them. Therefore this paper tries to understand why the Chinese state aimed to ungate communities. To this end, it employs the institu tional logics perspective (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012) to un cover the mechanism of community transformation. The institutional logics perspective provides an analytical tool by conceptualizing the society as an inter-institutional system constituted by institutional or ders (Friedland & Alford, 1991) and focusing on the interconnection of different institutional logics within and across institutional orders for societal changes (Holm, 1995). In the following, the paper first elucidates the production of gated communities from the institutional logics perspective. Then it examines the interplay of state, market and community logics in the development of gated communities in the context of China. After that it discusses the institutional mechanism driving the ungating of gated communities and finally proposes the challenges and possible countermeasures.
2.2. The state logics Neoliberalism is characterized by the retreat of the state and the shrinking of the public sector, or in other words, a trend of privatization, which involves both transferring the ownership of properties and ser vices from the public sector to the private sector and establishing a deregulated institutional framework with limited government inter vention for market activities (Jessop, 2002). Privatization happens in nearly all the functional areas but most dramatically in residential communities compared with working and recreational areas. The pri vatization of public housing takes various forms, such as selling rented public housing through right-to-buy policies to sitting tenants and transferring properties to not-for-profit or profit-maximizing actors (Rolnik, 2013). Privatization brings about social, legal, and physical boundaries that demarcate different residential communities as enclaves (Breitung, 2011). These enclaves are often walled, fenced or guarded, contain economically or ethnically classified groups, and are subject to different governance regimes (Atkinson & Blandy, 2005). The neoliberal shift does not imply a passive and diminishing role of the state. In contrast, the state usually plays a rather active and promi nent role in creating and promoting an enabling environment to support economic activities (Bremmer, 2009; Woo-Cumings, 1999). It can be considered that even more state intervention is needed in order to liberalize the market (Yeung, 2000). In this sense, gated communities represent the rescaling of state governance (Brenner, 2001) that is adjusted by itself to meet the growing demand for club-like management of residential environments and to reconcile with the principles of jus tice reigning in the economic sphere (Charmes, 2009). Moreover, the state undertakes different strategies in the development of different types of gated communities, such as privatized preference in commodity housing, public-private partnership in affordable housing, and strong state intervention in resettlement housing (Lu, Zhang, & Wu, 2019). In some cases, the state has returned to strengthen administration in community governance after its previous retreat following housing privatization when the attempt to transfer responsibility to commercial property management failed (Wu, 2018).
2. Understanding the production of gated communities from the institutional logics perspective 2.1. Institutional logics perspective Institutional logics are defined as a set of historically rooted (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) and culturally constructed (Dimaggio, 1997) material practices and symbolic constructions which influence the cognition and behavior of individuals and organizations. The concept of institutional logics was initially proposed by Friedland and Alford (1991) to account for institutional changes. Friedland and Alford (1991) suggested that the society consists of a set of institutional orders, including the family, religion, market, state, and democracy, and that each institutional order has a central logic as its organizing principles. Thornton et al. (2012) further elaborated the relationship of institu tional logics and configured the society as an inter-institutional system, extending the institutional orders as family, religion, state, market, profession, corporation, and community. The multiple logics of institutional orders may be conflicting or compatible, therefore institutional changes may occur through replacing one dominant logic with another or through the overlapping and coex istence of different logics (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Zheng, Cai, & MA, 2017). Specifically, institutional changes can take place through insti tutional entrepreneurship, structural overlap, event sequencing and so on (Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 2005). Institutional entrepreneurship refer to the activities of individuals or organizations who exploit the oppor tunities of cultural discontinuity for institutional change (Dimaggio, 1988; Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009), playing similar roles as entrepreneurs in the economic fields. Structural overlap is the associa tion and collaboration of distinct actors with divergent cultures (Thornton, 2004). Event sequencing is theorized as the occurrence of structural transformation such as the changes of cultural schemas, the shifts of resources and the emergence of new power (Sewell, 1996). Examining the production of gated communities from the institu tional logics perspective, it can be understood as the joint influence of state, market and community logics. The interplay of state and market logics in gated communities has been discussed by many researchers as associated with neo-liberal change (e.g. Rosen & Razin, 2009; GüZey, 2014; Kov CS & Heged} us, 2014; Xu & Yang, 2008), while the community logics (Webster, 2002, CS Falvay, 2011) provides genuine account from a third perspective of civil society (Minnery, 2007). The following text examines the logics of state, market, and community respectively, while inevitably mentioning the intertwining of each logic with the other two.
2.3. The market logics Another hallmarks of neoliberal restructuring is the increasing role of financial markets, often referred to as financialization, in the econ omy and everyday life (Stockhammer, 2010). Financialization refers to structural changes in the operation of capitalism in which profit accu mulation is increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade or commodity production (Krippner, 2005). It is marked by the penetration of financial actors, tools and logics into non-financial realms such as real estate and housing (August & Walks, 2018; Fields, 2015; Klink & Denaldi, 2014). Financial changes in economic regulations and industrial structures have embedded urban development more deeply in the worldwide financial markets and compelled it to perform according to a common standard of shareholder value-creation (Rutland, 2010). It is manifested at a number of scales, ranging from the economic insta bility of nation-state, through the capital pressures of firms or corpora tions, to the equity issues of households and individuals (French, Leyshon, & Wainwright, 2011). The integration of housing into financial market implies that the value of housing depends on the possibilities of creating more value, i.e. the speed and number of transactions capable of generating value appreciation (Rolnik, 2013). It intensifies the tensions between the use value of housing as a unique home and its exchange value as a saleable commodity (August & Walks, 2018). Housing is increasingly considered as an investment asset and as a means to wealth, assessed exclusively in terms of its potential yield. Services and amenities of the residential environment are all capitalized into real estate prices (Zheng & Kahn, 2008). Consequently, gated communities are rendered as a club of consumers who pay membership fees for using club goods and services 2
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relations, the Chinese state monopolized the investment, production, circulation and distribution of resources by nationalizing the economic units. It made comprehensive plans for an average of five years and designated input quotas and output targets to each state-owned work unit for achieving the economic development goals. Labors and capital goods were hierarchically distributed and internally circulated only between the state departments. In consistency with the socialist ideology and the central planning system, the state nationalized the ownership of land and housing. In such a system, two stages were involved in housing provision: the state allocated public rental housing to work units, then the work units distributed housing as an in-kind welfare to their employees (Yang & Chen, 2014). A central idea of the work unit system was to increase efficiency because it tied infrastructure investment to production in vestment and thus ensured the minimum standard of social reproduction so as to concentrate more on production (Wu, 2005). Moreover, the colocation of housing and workplace could reduce traffic burdens and save on commuting time, thus contributing to the working efficiency. In this context, work unit was not simply a place to work, but rather a self-contained complex providing all daily necessities such as housing, canteens, and hospitals for its employees. The integration of various functions in work units drove the residents to depend increasingly on organized collective consumption (Walder, 1986). The management of work unit compounds and the provision of community services were carried out by the estate department which performed as a subsidiary and an extension of the work unit. The resi dents in the work unit compounds were not only neighbors at home but also colleagues at work, which contributed to close interaction and made neighborhood watch possible to facilitate state governance. The work unit functioned actually as a fundamental unit of the society and as the buffer zone linking individuals with the state.
collectively to avoid of the potential downgrading of housing values due to free riders and public intervention (Webster, 2002). In response to the differentiated affordability and diversified consumption needs, gated commodities are seen as an efficient way of organizing the new con sumption space (Wu, 2005). 2.4. The community logics Setting in the interconnections of state and market, the prevalence of gated communities is finally attributed to public choice (CS Falvay, 2011). It has been suggested two ways of people’s response to disaf fection: exit and voice (Hirschman, 1970). The exit option indicates the spatial mobility of people to move between different residential com munities by paying taxes or fees in return for their desired goods and services. Its underlying principle is fiscal equivalence, i.e. ‘match be tween those who receive the benefits of a collective good and those who pay for it’ (Olson, 1969). The voice option involves negotiation between residents and other stakeholders to attain expected outcomes without migrating or paying additional costs, which is profoundly rooted in the decentralized and democratic political contexts (CS Falvay, 2011). Compared with other residential forms, gated communities match the territory of governance most precisely to the territory of provision of goods and services and match the beneficiaries to the payers. Therefore they have been accepted as a feasible exit option and proliferating rapidly in countries that are incapable of providing sufficient non-profitable public goods as voice options for residents (CS Falvay, 2011). Based on the principles of fiscal federalism (CS Falvay & Webster, 2012) and driven by other factors such as fear of crime and flight from blight, many studies highlight the fact that gated communities are favored particularly by higher income class. The affluent groups can not only segregate themselves from the rest of society through physical barriers of gated communities, but also privatize public spaces and engage public authorities to improve their comfort in gated commu } s, 2014) through political mechanisms such as nities (Kov CS & Hegedu voting in elections and attending public hearings. However, gated communities that are inhabited by lower-income and working-class people (Sanchez, Lang, & Dhavale, 2005) or middle-income and well-educated migrants (Zhao & Zhang, 2018) are also emerging. Gated communities appear to be a common attempt of various social groups to insulate themselves against unwanted encounters and perceived risks, which extends from social networks elsewhere such as places of work and leisure and constitutes a time-space trajectories of segregation (Atkinson & Flint, 2004).
3.2. Developmental state, prospering real estate market, and stratified communities Along with the transition of China from a planned to a market economy after 1978, state-market relations began to change. Economic development is seen as the combination instead of the dichotomy of state and market actions. The state deploys the economic, institutional and legal resources for imperative coordination and plays an indis pensable role in promoting all spheres of market activities. The market includes product market and resource market while the resource market can be further divided into capital, land and labor market (Mceachern, 2009). The Chinese state loosened the central control of commodities and products first, making them distributed and priced largely by the market rather than according to the designated quotas. But for the resource market, the reform was gradual and partial. Land reform proved to be a powerful force to drive China’s housing reform and urban development into a new stage (Lin & Yi, 2011). In 1988, the Land Administration Law was amended to allow the paid transfer of land use rights. It was further specified in 1990 by the State Council that land use rights could be assigned, transferred, leased and mortgaged. The transfer of land use rights enabled urban governments to effectively raise funds through the sales of land use rights and the collection of land use taxes. It was reported that the revenue of local governments generated from urban land across the country had increased from 35 million RMB in 1987 to 29,048 million RMB in 1996, accounting for 20% to 25% of the revenue of local governments on average (State Land Administration Bureau, 1997). The land revenues were then used to improve infrastructures so as to increase land values and attract investment, leading to a positive cycle of land development. Following the land reform, the Chinese state launched marketoriented housing reform. It officially identified the nature of housing as commodity-based and announced to completely replace the previous welfare housing distribution with monetary distribution. To promote housing privatization and commodification, the state further increased
3. The interplay of state, market and community logics in the development of gated communities in China Setting in the global scenario, gated communities in China have shown some local variations. This section examines the interplay of state, market, and community logics in the development of gated com munities in China, focusing particularly on work unit compounds and commodity housing estates which have been urged for ungating ac cording to the 2015 Meeting. 3.1. State monopolization, internalized housing distribution, and collective consumption When the Chinese Communist Party came into power in 1949, it adopted a centrally planned economy based on Marxist ideology. Ac cording to the Marxist viewpoint, market and private property would inherently lead to social inequality. Therefore the actions of the socialist Chinese state to eliminate unacceptable injustice and achieve socialist commitment were basically against the market, controlling the market, and internalizing the market (Yeh, Yang, & Wang, 2015). Unlike the free market in which economic activities are subject to supply-demand 3
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rents to make public rental housing less attractive. Moreover, it set up the financial system of housing provident fund to help households with mortgages. Following these policies, the residents were encouraged either to buy housing from the market or to buy their sitting public housing from the work unit. The work units were forbidden to build any more welfare housing for their employees, and all newly built housing had to be sold on the open market. Housing commodification has dramatically stimulated housing consumption and led to the prospering of real estate market. Taking Beijing as an example, the total sale of commodity housing increased from 4.09 million square meters in 1998 to 14.59 million square meters in 2014, at an annual growth rate of 24%. Matching the remarkable growth of commodity housing is the growth in commodity housing in vestments, which grew from 37.7 billion RMB in 1998 to 391.1 billion RMB in 2014, at an annual growth of 48% (Beijing Statistics Bureau, 2015). These estates were developed by real estate developers and managed by property management companies, most of which were initially converted from the subsidiaries of housing bureau in the process of marketization. The land of commodity housing estates was obtained through land leasing system at different prices according to different development requirements offered by local governments. By assigning land use rights to the developers, local governments could transfer the cost of infrastructure development in the land to the developers (Wu, Xu, & Yeh, 2007). The larger the scale of the commodity housing estates, the more benefits local governments could gain from land speculation. The flourishing real estate market increased residential stratification. For example, affluent people with similar social status and interests concentrate in prestigious estates and pay for high-quality goods and services for their common use with exclusive access, whereas the working-class and low-income people, especially migrants, gather in overcrowded and poorly equipped urban enclaves (He, 2013). Resi dential stratification is an accumulative process. First, public housing in the work unit system was not distributed in an equal way but hierar chically varied between workers and leaders and between different types of work units. Second, housing privatization transferred public housing assets to the private, thus those better-off families got housing with higher values while some poor households even didn’t receive housing in the old distribution system. Third, in the booming housing financial market, the higher class could realize more capital gains through housing transactions while those poor were even worse off. Socio-spatial stratification between residents in different gated com munities exist not only in their residential areas, but also in their values, social relations, and daily lives, manifested in the extensity, intensity, and exclusivity of their activity spaces (Wang, Fei, & Chai, 2012).
is often minimized to reduce the cost of guards and to ensure effective security management (Miao, 2003). This led to a lack of connectivity in Chinese cities, which usually causes long detours and induces traffic jams (Su & Xu, 2006). In response to the above problems, measures were taken in the professional field of urban planning to promote economical and inten sive land use. 56 relevant policies had been promulgated at the national level from 1999 to 2014, covering the fields of scale control, structure optimization, regulation standard, market allocation, supervision and examination, legal responsibility and so on (Xiao et al., 2015). However, most of these policies are notices and opinions whose effectiveness levels are quite low and disciplining functions are quite weak. But they artic ulate new sets of values such as environmental sustainability, civil rights and distributive justice which have indeed altered the institutional logics to some extent. 4.2. Structural overlap between the professional logics and the state, market and community logics The professional logics of intensive land use are structurally over lapped with the state, market and community logics for sustainable urbanization. Urbanization can be assessed from multiple aspects such as land, economy, population, and comprehensiveness (Chen, Liu, Lu, Hao, & Chao, 2018). Land urbanization rate in China grew much faster than population urbanization rate. The newly constructed urban areas in China had grown by 76.4% from 2000 to 2011 while the urban residents increased only 50.5% (Wang, Hui, Choguill, & Jia, 2015). It showed excessive urban sprawl with extensive land use, which is unsustainable in a long run. If just taking into consideration those residents with urban household registration, the urbanization rate was even lower. For example, the urban population had grown from 170 million to 730 million from 1978 to 2013 and the urbanization rate reached 53.7% in 2013, but the urbanization rate of those population with urban house hold registration was just 36% (Wang et al., 2015). That means nearly 240 million rural migrants live in the cities but with no urban rights such as equal access to medical care, education, employment, insurance, housing and so on. Moreover, China’s urbanization process has progressed faster than economic growth since 2004 (Chen, Liu, & Tao, 2013) and the economic growth rate marked the historically lowest level in 2014 (Kim, 2015). Therefore the logics of ‘performance legitimacy’ in the pragmatic Chi nese urban governance were questioned (Kim, 2015). Problems such as environmental pollution and social stratification underneath the pros perous urbanization were uncovered and received more and more attention from the public. Many ‘occupy’ movements that symbolized the reappropriation of public spaces, though in smaller scale in China, have reaffirmed the existence of the ‘public’ in terms of urban gover nance, social justice and policy making (Pickerill & Krinsky, 2012). To solve the many problems accumulated in the process of urbanization, it was necessary to find a new way jointly promoted by the multiple institutional logics.
4. Institutional mechanism driving the ungating of gated communities in China As discussed above, gated communities in China were forged by the interplay of state, market, and community logics. While it is difficult to break the balanced interaction of the three, the transformation of communities from gated to ungated is triggered by institutional entre preneurship in the urban profession which then influenced the other institutional logics through structural overlap and finally shift the so cietal focus-of-attention through event sequencing.
4.3. Event sequencing to shift the societal focus-of-attention Driven by the overlapped multiple institutional logics, the 18th Na tional Congress of the Communist Party of China officially introduced the term of new urbanization in November 2012. In November 2013, it was designated as one of the main tasks of the central government to pursue the sound development of urbanization. In March 2014, China’s National Development and Reform Commission released National Newtype Urbanization Plan 2014–2020, setting people-centred urbanization at the core. The so-called new urbanization was aimed to refine the existing mode of urbanization, promote social integration and realize sustainable development (Chen, Liu, Lu, Hao, & Chao, 2018; Lang, Chen, & LI, 2016; Wang et al., 2015). It sowed the seeds of urban trans formation in the institutional logics of many fields.
4.1. Institutional entrepreneurship in the urban profession Gated communities in China have been criticized for causing many urban ills. Most distinctively, they are often blamed for occupying too much land. A comparison between Chinese and American gated com munities has shown that the American gated communities usually cover less than 13 ha each whereas the Chinese ones can occupy as much as 25 ha of land each (Miao, 2003). Due to the large size of gated com munities, the distance between publicly accessible streets could be as much as 1 km or span the entire side of the estates. The number of gates 4
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As an effort to realize sustainable urbanization, the Central Meeting on Urban Affairs was held in December 2015, declaring that ‘It should promote block system in newly built residential areas and should not build any more gated communities. The existing commodity housing estates and work unit compounds should be gradually open.’ The aim of ungating communities, as declared by the officials, was ‘to encourage the public use of internal roads, to optimize the layout of road network, and to realize land saving and intensive utilization.’ Following the 2015 Meeting, 1) Regulation of Urban Design Management and 2) General Rules of Urban Design Technical Management were issued by Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China to establish the urban design system institutionally (Wei, Zhu, & Chen, 2017). Most recently, Planning and Design Standards for Urban Residential Areas (GB50180-2018) was issued in 2018 and provides detailed regulations in terms of the scale of public space and facilities in the 15-min, 10-min, 5-min pedestrian areas and neighborhood blocks. All these policies provide institutional guarantee for the technical feasibility of getting the right to the city at the physical level. With regard to social integration, the Chinese government relaxed the restrictions of household registration in mid- and small-sized cities according to the Plan 2014–2020. It stressed coordinated development of urban and rural areas from the regional perspective and aimed to reduce regional disparity so as to ease the conflicts due to unbalanced regional development. Later, in the 19th National Congress of Chinese Communist Party in October 2017, President Xi Jinping declared that the main social conflicts in China has been changed from those between people’s growing material and cultural needs and the backward social production that had lasted for over three decades since the reform and opening up, to those between people’s growing need for a better life and the unbalanced and insufficient development. It finally changed the societal focus-of-attention in an officially institutional way.
activities, is essential for further development. 5.2. The legitimacy of club goods Socially, explorations are needed to clarify the legitimacy of club goods so as to keep balance between the public and private interest. Different from the situation in some countries such as South Africa where the roads within gated communities are still public property (Landman, 2006), the internal roads and open space of gated commu nities in China were mostly developed by private commercial developers and their costs have already been transferred to the residents through housing prices. The residents are also responsible for the maintenance of club goods by paying property management fees. The land use rights of the roads and open space in gated communities are owned jointly by the residents who may be largely unwilling to share their paid services and goods with non-payers. In this regard, it is very critical to clarify the legitimacy of club goods and the relationship between club goods and public goods before simply opening enclaves. 5.3. The managerial and democratic turn of urban governance Politically, the development of ungated communities calls for necessary changes in the mode of urban governance. As analyzed above, the emergence of gated communities in the contemporary era were largely due to the privatization of public service provision, tailoring to the needs of various social groups. This market-driven phenomenon could be greatly eased if public facilities are greatly improved to attract people to enjoy the amenities together and increase their social inter action. The goal of urban governance is therefore to enhance the effi ciency of public service production and delivery. Such governance places local authorities in a dependency on professional management resources inside and outside their organizations (Pierre, 1999) and re quires them to response quickly enough to the needs of the governing areas. Moreover, the turn towards new urbanization is aimed for systemic sustainability and long-term effects which promotes a balanced agenda in marketization, industrial transformation, social inclusion and mac roeconomic stability. It reflects the increasing diversity and heteroge neity of policy communities and relies on the existence of a multi-scalar democratic governance regime that favors public deliberation and social economy initiatives (Gerometta, Haussermann, & Longo, 2005). Considering that such governance arrangements may be selective by integrating the core and excluding the marginal (Collier & Etchemendy, 2007), local governments should perform to engage various social groups and organized interests into the urban political process on the one hand and to ensure that the participants’ membership exerts influ ence on urban policies on the other hand.
5. Challenges of ungating communities Many cities have already experimented to open the gated commu nities until now. For example, Beijing has opened some work unit compounds in Sanlihe area where concentrate many central ministries and has witnessed the first ungated public rental housing project named Guogongzhuan Jiayuan. Their practices have shown that solving the problems associate with gated communities goes far beyond the mea sures of simply opening them up. It is closely related with the spatial, social and political matters. 5.1. The scale of subdivision Spatially, it has to decide the scale of subdivision, i.e. the size of the plots, which is related to the issues of where to open and the extent of openness (Sun, Webster, & Chiaradia, 2017). In European cities, the typical urban blocks are approximately 150 m by 150 m and have several plots (World Bank, 2014). But in China, urban blocks are much larger and usually consist of only one plot. The scale of subdivision exerts an influence not only on the environmental quality of the neighborhoods but also on the street networks between the plots. Smaller blocks greatly increase the permeability and accessibility of the neighborhoods, promote smooth movement and reduce traffic jams (Xu & Yang, 2008). They also provide opportunities for smaller developers to take part in the land market, which avoids the monopoly of large enterprises in manipulating housing prices, thus cater to infill develop ment and contribute to higher agglomeration economies (World Bank, 2014). In so doing, smaller blocks help to create a more heterogeneous urban district with diverse housing types, prices and aesthetic styles to meet the demands of different consumer groups. However, too small plots will decrease the economies of scale in land development and interrupt the peaceful living environment due to traffic noise. Therefore, the careful subdivision of land to decide the scale of gated communities, together with corresponding policies to regulate land development
6. Conclusion While many studies highlight that gated communities have been prevailing across both developed and developing countries, this paper uncovers the phenomenon of ungating communities in China and dis cusses the rationale from the institutional logics perspective. Work unit compounds and commodity housing estates are two different types of gated communities in China and attributed to the interplay of state, market, and community logics in different socioeconomic contexts. Work unit compounds came into being in the so cialist era when the state nationalized the economic units and distrib uted housing as a social welfare to the unit workers. Work unit compounds performed as a self-contained complex providing all daily necessities and as the buffer zone linking individuals with the state. Commodity housing estates emerged along with land reform and housing commodification. They generated huge financial benefit for local governments through land speculation and met the collective re quirements of residents by providing exclusive club goods. However, 5
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they sorted people into different socio-economic classes and finally led to residential stratification. The policies and practices of ungating work unit compounds and commodity housing estates were triggered by institutional entrepre neurship in the urban profession in response to the many urban ills generated by gated communities such as traffic congestion and extensive land use. The professional logics of intensive land use were structurally overlapped with the state logics of governance legitimacy, the market logics of continuous economic growth, and the community logics of distributive justice in the process of urbanization. Therefore it became a consensus in the multiple institutional orders to transform the current mode of development and find a new way of sustainable urbanization. To achieve the goal, ungating communities was proposed as a technical measure to guarantee the right to the city at the physical level while household registration reforms were carried out to provide equal civil rights for various groups of people at the social level, which ultimately shifted the development focus from scale and speed of urbanization to sustainability and justice. In contrast to the assertion of the weakening professions and the spreading market logics in many substantive do mains (Thornton et al., 2012), this paper reveals the power of profes sional logics in promoting ungated communities and their potential of triggering more profound societal changes. However, there are many challenges for ungating communities. Spatially, the scale of subdivision must be ascertained because a too large or too small area of the plot is detrimental to the viability of communities. Socially, the legitimacy of club goods must be clarified to keep balance between the public and private interest. Politically, the mode of urban governance must be reformed to enhance the efficiency of public service production and delivery and towards more diversified, inclusive, and democratic.
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