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Intelligence requirements for the 1980s: Clandestine collection
Books 321
Away from robots, back to labour? Chapman
Pincher
Intelligence Requirements for 1980s: Clandestine Collection edited by Roy Godson
the
232 pages, $8.50 (published by National Strategy Information Center Inc, 111 East 58th Street, New York, NY 10022; dis-
tributed by Transaction Books, New Brunswick and London, 1982) It is widely believed that the gathering of military intelligence is now achieved so I. mgeniously by robots-reconnaissance interception devices satellites and coupled with computer decipheringthat the spy on the ground is virtually out of business. This most informative report on clandestine collection in the 1980s shows, as does the recent spate of Soviet agents expelled from several European countries, that this is far from being the case. Human collectors essential for various remain and, reasons, would seem to be destined for a new lease of life with new functions as well as continuation of the old. While photographic and radar satellites can provide detailed information about an adversary’s capabilities, it is the human collector, the spy with the right access, who is most likely to glean that most important aspect of all intelligence-the adversary’s intentions. With ever-increasing sophistication, robot collection is becoming so expensive that more reliance on the cheaper human collector may become necessary on sheer cost alone. The codes of the major powers are becoming so difficult to decipher, and can be changed so frequently with computer-creation, that the spy who can secure the code-key may become the sole means by which they can be cracked. It is only through human sources that the West is likely to learn details of the Soviet Spetznas, the Chapman UK.
Pincher
is a defence
FUTURES August 1983
journalist
in the
commando groups trained to land in advance of a surprise attack in order to sabotage airfields and other installations. The need to ascertain an adversary’s weaknesses as well as his strengths is also more likely to be fulfilled by the human collector. Moreover, the agent on the ground is essential to the processes of deception and ‘disinformation’ now considered vital by all major intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies. Events have shown that Western intelligence has been successfully duped over a number of years concerning the real strength of the Soviet Union in offensive nuclear missiles. The telemetry signals emitted by the missiles under test and picked up by Western interception stations were deliberately falsified. For this deception to succeed over a long period, it has to be monitored by an agent on the ground at the Western end. This was part of the function of Geoffrey Prime, the recently convicted Soviet agent in the Government Communications HQat Cheltenham, UK. For the West, of course,,the difficulty of penetrating Soviet security is enormous compared with the problems faced by the Soviets in the open society of places like Britain and America. Frank Barnett, President of the National Strategy Information Centre in Washington, which published this volume, states, “The secret is no longer wrapped only in an enigma. It is rolled up in iron curtains, electronic curtains and computer shields. It is smothered under security blankets of almost totally allpervasive intelligence services. ’ ’ In the past, penetration of these formidable defences has depended to a large extent on defectors from the Soviet intelligence services and it is the view of the American specialists who took part in the colloquium (on which the volume is based) that the reliance on defectors
3 22
Books/Publicattons received
will be greater still in the years ahead. The West must find incentives to induce defection of Soviet intelligence officers with good access, keeping them ‘in place’ as long as possible, and then ensuring that they move physically to the West bringing their store of secret information with them. Many more Russians defect than is generally realized and the number should increase as more and more Soviet citizens are posted abroad, especially into the Third World where they can be approached. But the greatest care will be necessary to ensure that they are genuine. The Soviets now make regular use of false defectors to sow disinformation and, in some notorious cases, have been astonishingly successful. One such, code-named Fedora in the US, sold himself so successfully to the FBI that he misled them for ten years. These 232 pages (there are five other titles in this series on intelligence requirements for the 1980s) bring together the ideas and experience of such specialists as Dr. Roy Godson; David Kahn, the code expert; Lt. Gen. Graham, a former Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency; Raymond Rocca, previously Deputy Chief of the Counter-Intelligence staff of the CIA; Cord Meyer, one-time head of the CIA mission in London; John Maury, former Chief of the Soviet Division of the CIA; plus officials of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, and many others. No such gathering of professionals would be permitted in Britain under the Official Secrets Act, former
Publications
members of MI5 and MI6 being forbidden to expound their views in public. All seem agreed that a major problem for the future is the reduction of the costs of gathering intelligence. One suggestion is that the agencies which use it (such as the Defence Ministry, Foreign Office and Cabinet Office in Britain), should pay for it on a fee basis. Under the present system in all countries, the intelligence gathering agencies have regarding of reference wide terms requirements and tend to collect as much as possible, being encouraged to do so by the users. Members of the colloquium felt that the users would be more sensibly selective if they realized that they had to pay for what they receive out of their departmental funds. The total costs of intelligence gathering in Britain are secret, the real figures being hidden in various sections of various financial votes. Fortunately for the British taxpayer, they are very much less than those of the US or the Soviet Union. This is not simply a matter of scale. Britain saves enormous sums by virtue of having no capability to place reconnaissance satellites in orbit. Under joint intelligence-sharing agreements, the information which the American agencies secure from their immense robot intelligence-gathering efforts is provided free to Britain, which would be almost blind without it. Those who would oust the Americans from their bases in Britain, some of which are concerned with the gathering of intelligence, appear to be ignorant of this situation.
received
Oul ofprint books: Out Of Print Book Service, 17 Fairwater Grove East, Cardiff CP5 2JS, Wales, will attempt to locate out of print books for you; there is no charge. For information, send stamped, further L. Foulkes envelope to addressed (Proprietor). James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace (London,
Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982), 465 pages, s9.95. David S. Brown, Managing The Large Organization (USA, Lomond Publications Incorporated, 1982), 307 pages. Guy Caire (ed), The European Labour Market: Recent Studies on Employment Issues in the European Community (Luxembourg, Office
FUTURES August 1983
Away from robots, back to labour? Chapman
Pincher
Intelligence Requirements for 1980s: Clandestine Collection edited by Roy Godson
the
232 pages, $8.50 (published by National Strategy Information Center Inc, 111 East 58th Street, New York, NY 10022; dis-
tributed by Transaction Books, New Brunswick and London, 1982) It is widely believed that the gathering of military intelligence is now achieved so I. mgeniously by robots-reconnaissance interception devices satellites and coupled with computer decipheringthat the spy on the ground is virtually out of business. This most informative report on clandestine collection in the 1980s shows, as does the recent spate of Soviet agents expelled from several European countries, that this is far from being the case. Human collectors essential for various remain and, reasons, would seem to be destined for a new lease of life with new functions as well as continuation of the old. While photographic and radar satellites can provide detailed information about an adversary’s capabilities, it is the human collector, the spy with the right access, who is most likely to glean that most important aspect of all intelligence-the adversary’s intentions. With ever-increasing sophistication, robot collection is becoming so expensive that more reliance on the cheaper human collector may become necessary on sheer cost alone. The codes of the major powers are becoming so difficult to decipher, and can be changed so frequently with computer-creation, that the spy who can secure the code-key may become the sole means by which they can be cracked. It is only through human sources that the West is likely to learn details of the Soviet Spetznas, the Chapman UK.
Pincher
is a defence
FUTURES August 1983
journalist
in the
commando groups trained to land in advance of a surprise attack in order to sabotage airfields and other installations. The need to ascertain an adversary’s weaknesses as well as his strengths is also more likely to be fulfilled by the human collector. Moreover, the agent on the ground is essential to the processes of deception and ‘disinformation’ now considered vital by all major intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies. Events have shown that Western intelligence has been successfully duped over a number of years concerning the real strength of the Soviet Union in offensive nuclear missiles. The telemetry signals emitted by the missiles under test and picked up by Western interception stations were deliberately falsified. For this deception to succeed over a long period, it has to be monitored by an agent on the ground at the Western end. This was part of the function of Geoffrey Prime, the recently convicted Soviet agent in the Government Communications HQat Cheltenham, UK. For the West, of course,,the difficulty of penetrating Soviet security is enormous compared with the problems faced by the Soviets in the open society of places like Britain and America. Frank Barnett, President of the National Strategy Information Centre in Washington, which published this volume, states, “The secret is no longer wrapped only in an enigma. It is rolled up in iron curtains, electronic curtains and computer shields. It is smothered under security blankets of almost totally allpervasive intelligence services. ’ ’ In the past, penetration of these formidable defences has depended to a large extent on defectors from the Soviet intelligence services and it is the view of the American specialists who took part in the colloquium (on which the volume is based) that the reliance on defectors
3 22
Books/Publicattons received
will be greater still in the years ahead. The West must find incentives to induce defection of Soviet intelligence officers with good access, keeping them ‘in place’ as long as possible, and then ensuring that they move physically to the West bringing their store of secret information with them. Many more Russians defect than is generally realized and the number should increase as more and more Soviet citizens are posted abroad, especially into the Third World where they can be approached. But the greatest care will be necessary to ensure that they are genuine. The Soviets now make regular use of false defectors to sow disinformation and, in some notorious cases, have been astonishingly successful. One such, code-named Fedora in the US, sold himself so successfully to the FBI that he misled them for ten years. These 232 pages (there are five other titles in this series on intelligence requirements for the 1980s) bring together the ideas and experience of such specialists as Dr. Roy Godson; David Kahn, the code expert; Lt. Gen. Graham, a former Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency; Raymond Rocca, previously Deputy Chief of the Counter-Intelligence staff of the CIA; Cord Meyer, one-time head of the CIA mission in London; John Maury, former Chief of the Soviet Division of the CIA; plus officials of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, and many others. No such gathering of professionals would be permitted in Britain under the Official Secrets Act, former
Publications
members of MI5 and MI6 being forbidden to expound their views in public. All seem agreed that a major problem for the future is the reduction of the costs of gathering intelligence. One suggestion is that the agencies which use it (such as the Defence Ministry, Foreign Office and Cabinet Office in Britain), should pay for it on a fee basis. Under the present system in all countries, the intelligence gathering agencies have regarding of reference wide terms requirements and tend to collect as much as possible, being encouraged to do so by the users. Members of the colloquium felt that the users would be more sensibly selective if they realized that they had to pay for what they receive out of their departmental funds. The total costs of intelligence gathering in Britain are secret, the real figures being hidden in various sections of various financial votes. Fortunately for the British taxpayer, they are very much less than those of the US or the Soviet Union. This is not simply a matter of scale. Britain saves enormous sums by virtue of having no capability to place reconnaissance satellites in orbit. Under joint intelligence-sharing agreements, the information which the American agencies secure from their immense robot intelligence-gathering efforts is provided free to Britain, which would be almost blind without it. Those who would oust the Americans from their bases in Britain, some of which are concerned with the gathering of intelligence, appear to be ignorant of this situation.
received
Oul ofprint books: Out Of Print Book Service, 17 Fairwater Grove East, Cardiff CP5 2JS, Wales, will attempt to locate out of print books for you; there is no charge. For information, send stamped, further L. Foulkes envelope to addressed (Proprietor). James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace (London,
Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982), 465 pages, s9.95. David S. Brown, Managing The Large Organization (USA, Lomond Publications Incorporated, 1982), 307 pages. Guy Caire (ed), The European Labour Market: Recent Studies on Employment Issues in the European Community (Luxembourg, Office
FUTURES August 1983