Interest and attitude — an attempt at a new orientation

INTEREST

A.N ATTEMPT

AND

ATTITZJDE

AT A NEW

WILHELM

UtGversicyof

-

ORIENTATION

SJOSTRAND Uppsala,

Sweden

1. The historical background The two concepts interest and attitude are commonly used both in pro-

fessional literature on education and in the ;rrocabulary of the practiciu teacher. It is, however, d.ift%ult to grasp what the words are actually regarded as covering. This vagueness in terminology is, of course, ~~o~~nat~; not least since it concerns central distinctions Which are used, e. g., in different educational connections for descriptive as well as explanatory poses. It should, therefore, be to our advantage to break such a dca as soon as possible. Interest is the older of the t\ TOconcepts. During the latter p Middle Ages the word was used more or less in a legal sense, by little it penetrated the ever, !ay :auGuage as a designation for th tional engagement of the indlvidu:tl. With Herbart and his fo raised to a professional term in psychology and edtcation. In synonymous with spontaneous Attention, and the latter, in closely bound up with the strecgth or ability of ideas to remain a threshold of consciousness, or to force their way into consciousn In this way interest became linked with attention. But when one a to explain the meaning of this phenomenon more fully, one oftc to interest, so that attention was defined as a consequence of int Thus an obviously vic:ious circle was established which has neve wholly overcome. The term attitude belongs preferably to the twe.ntieth century. Its o is connected especially with the discovery made by tthe experimental logists that there are “sets” or “determining tendencies” which are deci~ve for S’s response in a given situation (I, 5). The word position in social-psychological and sociological re new concept has not escaped great variations in meanin it is characteristic for the conceptuai confusion that one h tify interest with attitude. According to Stagner (2 I) they different”, and Vernon states that “interests are very much the attitudes” (25). Greene (11) points out that no clear line of de exists between interests aud attitudes and this view is reflected many modem text-books (see e.g. 4). Any progress in the matter

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said to have been brought about in this way. Instead of one diffuse concept, there arc hvt, which at times are separated (30) and at other times are more or less allowed to coincide. It is typical that I ;torndike in his well-known work (24) uses interest and attitude “most of the time in the same breath 3vithout any explicit differentiation” (3). Certain fundamental points of view emerge howzver, in the otherwise less culighteuing d&ussion of the concepts interest and attitude. It is here that the tivia.!, bu& nonetheless important statement comes in that both are closely related to the process of motivation which after the first World War began to attract more and more attention in the field of research. In a Glerman text-book published in 1930 e. g., interest is delimited as “die innere, durch den gerade im Subjekte tit&en Antrieb bedingte Notwendigkeit, jene Klasse der Dinge miiglichst klar zu erkennen, die diesen Antrieb xu stilleu vermiigen” (23). The same author (Sxymanski) says further, that interest stands in a causal relationship to the need. Regarding the concept attitude one can, among others, refer to Shaffer & Shoben (18). They define motive as a socially learned and complex pattern of behavior according to the model “need-drive-activity-recovery of the equilibrium of the organism”. They mean that attitude is ~1 organization of such motives around a certain person or an object. Another point about which there is substantial agreement lies in the statement that interests and attitudes are learned. This is clear from what has already been said. It is pointed out by Sxymanski that a phenomenon engages our interest first when it becomes necessary for satisfying a need (cf. e. g. 15). According to 18 the motives which center around a certain object and in which they include attitude are phenomena of learning. Different reviews on the subject emphasize that attitudes are based on experience (1,7. 19). Thus the question of interests and attitudes becomes part of the whole intricate problem-complex of the psychology of learning. 2. The actual situation Therewith the paradox in the existing situation in the field of research is Jearly revealed. Nevertheless it is not necessary to infer opposition betwoen these two tendencies, viz, that on the one hand, interests and attitudes are part of the process of motivatian, and on the other that they are learned. In this connection one can remind one’s self, e. g., that human motivation at least, is largely anchored in acquired, secondary needs. But for a long time the development of the psychology of learning has to a great extent gone in such a direction that no light has been cast on the question of interests and attitudes as learned phenomena. The Skinner box has be-

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come a kind of symbol for *he research h this field which would la to scientific exactness. The psychology of learning has been anima such a degree that e. g., the expectancy theory as an explanation of partial reinforcement is me,t with the objection that it implies an antropomorphism (6). Animalization has led to the fact. that very little attention in the psycbology of learning has been devoted to questions concerning interest and attitude, since it has not occurred to anyone to use these concepts in connection with the experiments for which the Skinner box is a requisite ex mental condition. Consequently we find ourselves in a position wkere interests and attitudes are said to be learned phenomena, while we have very little empirical material to explain e.g., the factors which have afraid during the learning process. Therefore when one attempts to app opposing points of view which exist between the followers of the cant and effect theories within the investigation of Ieating (13) to the qucs of learning of interests and attitudes, one soon finds one’s self confronte with the iask of building a bridge between two almost separate w A similar paradox to the one just pointed out - that interests turies are characterized as learning phenomena, while they are not rn~dg objects of nctu.al research in the psychology of learning - is recent attempts to delimit attitudes. Green states in 19 characteristic of these attempts that attitude is looked upon as variable which give:: rise to consistency and logical sequence among responses to a certain kiud of object ar social phenomena. Without da that is a correct rendering of the situation. All of the scien Allport (1,2), who designate attitude as a disposition to way in a definite situation, belong here (cf. e. g. 20). Espec is, however, the fact that as with Green and others (cf. proaches the problem from the specific model %ituati intervening variable” without observing that strictly speakin be unnecessary to retain the concept of attitude. Moreover, if the factors which give rise to a certain type of observable and measu behavior under fixed conditions can be designated, and if we incl the so-called stimulus generalization, such an intervening variable tude then appears to be an outmoded encumbrance, or a remnant from a basic psychological view-point for which consciou:s experience and in spection are still relevant principles. At least when going out fro psychology of learning which concerns itself only with clearly deiimit situations and allied operationally-defined and directly-measurable v~iabl~ of behavior, it seems rather to indicate a certain ambivalence in h:nfdiing firmly to the concept of attitude as an intervening variable, in order to

expiain the fact that responses to certain stimuli have a kind of interrelationship or consistency. When in spite of everything: we have not made a clean sweep anId completely avoided speaking of <&&rest and attitude in regard to human behavior, this can in certain respects, be takeu as an indication that both concepts can be more or less useful in this connection. However, in order to find the vital point of this matter it seems necessary to dwell for a moment upon the scientific investigation and theory construction in the psyciholo~~ of learning. 3. 2% psychology

of leakng mu& the conceptional represent&ion of experiences It has already been suggested that a great degree of animalization has

occurred in the psychology of learning; this has often caused us to forget, even i;l connection with human learning, that we a- dealing with organisms who have the ability to conceive and speak symbolically, and who arce, therefore, equipped with what we call memory and consciousness. Whrru the borderline goes in this respect within the animal series is contested, to be sure, but many no longer seem to be wholly convinced that the higher animials lack the ability to remember, and they will, therefore, not deny that the animals’ behavior can be influenced and regulated as a consequence of this. As far as human beings are concerned it is sometimes acknowledged that verbally fixed hypotheses imply the presence of factors which change the learning process so that e. g., short-cuts are taken past more fundarnental mechanisms which have been studied in different animal experiments. But as a rule, one has not seriously questioned whether these simpler mechanisms are perhaps conjectures, and whether one could arrive at other explanations providing fear of anthropomorphization has not influenced the conception of animals as being more peculiar than they really are. As unforumatz as an older, naive anthropomorphization seems to he, equally erroneous seems to be the applying of experimental results of animal psychology to human learning without first testing them in regard to the influence of symbolic functions in the context. If animals really lack: the abililiy to form conceptions of their experiences, such a test is just as necsssary as e. g., in medical-pharmacological research. For human organisms, however, one must undoubtedly count on symbolicial reactions of a kind beside or above the real situation, the response in connection with it and the result, exactly as e. g., Thomdike does. He points out that S (a box), R (open a door), and E (get a banana) lead to anticiipations, pictures, memories and judgments concerning all three ele-

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and their interrelationships (24). The real S cau, therefore, give rise to a conc~~ption of R, and the real IX can result in a conception of E. In the same way the conceptions of S can actualize the conception of R, and the conception of R can lead to the conception of E. To anyone who calls this a return to a now obsolete psychology of association, may it said, that the time now seems to be ripe for such a reorientation. IJnfortunately the baby has been thrown out with the bath water in this connection.

4. Conceptional ability and processes of motivation Ear my part I believe that the idea of the influence ‘of the coguitive components should be combined with the discussion of the process of motivation. While the struggle has been severe concerning the r&e of motivation in the phenomenon of learning, at least no one has questioned its connection with acknowledged results or achievements in differeut areas. On the alther hand, the earlier idea of *be applicability of the model “ueeddrive-action-recovery of equilibrium’” has been disputed (13). With need is meant a change in different aspects of the organism’s e@librium, while drive refers to the psychological results of this, or the stimulatiou within ,the organism closely associated with the disturbances leading to action unt;’ a change is effected, But in this case certain difficulties are regarded as cxistiug when it comes to explaining some more recent experiu data, among these the relation between the reduction of need and of The foremost question at this point seems to be that both these occurrences, because of the slowness of the metabolic processes, do not go hand in hand. Two facts can, however, be noted in this connection. Above all it must. not be forgotten that both need and drive are complex phenomenal even with such a nelatively simple one as hunger. Simply expressed, hua as well as the tension whereby one usually sums up the drive as a sti.mulus pattern within the body, i.s of a complicated nature. ,Secondly, one must distinguish between a static and a dynamic homeostasis or recovery of equilibrium (12,18,22). The former !s reflexive and automatic in nature as e. g., nna~ntenance of body temperature via the subcortical centers, while the latter is characterized by an instrumental action on the part of the organism. But in considering these two points of view it is small wonder, that with the partial iutervention which has taken place under experimental conditions, a complete correlation has not been found between the reduction of drive and of need; and further, that a certain amount of drive reduction which is usually coupled with need reduction, has apparently by itself, promoted performance.

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Taking into consideration all that has been said, one may still find it justifiable to regard the process of motivation according to the model “needdrive-action-recovered balance”. In any case, the dynamic homeostasis which in the present connection is the one of interest to us, can never be regarded as completely devoid of a greater or lesser role in the situation. In saying this the conclusive argument for my line of thought is the fact that the components included in the drive btild erzfective stinrulus patterns which e.g., have been used for real discrimination in different leilrning experiments with animals. For organisms with imagination and memory this means that the process of motivation must achime a cognitive cotmterpart of just that sort touched upon to z certain extent by Thorndike, as mentioned above. We could say in terms of introspection, that the individual experdences his drives, his own actions and their sequels, and that. these experiences even give rise to later reprcducable: conceptions and chains of comceptioas. Expressed in tenms of psychological reaction this means *&at we can say, at least for human organisms, that D (drive), A (activity) and E (equilibrium) and the relation between them at the cognitive level, correspond to conceptions in such a way that tbe situation D as well as the colnception of D can arouse the conception of A and this in turn the conception of E etc. 5. The controversy between psydwlogists adhering to the contiguity theory and those adhering to the efject theory One can, however, hardly avoid toncbing upon the controversy which has arisen in the psychology of learning between followers of the contiguity theory and those of the effect theory. It seems clear that a two-factor theory similar to Mowrer’s (13) e. g., corresponds best to the known facts. But the deciding difference between classical conditioning and trial and error or instrumental learning, does not seem to me to lie in the reference to the functioning of the auranomic and the central nervous system;s. For the sake of exemplification let us take zn ordinary case of avoida.nce learning: Buzzer

Electric

shock &

Emotional reactions

Withdrawal

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I believe that the most esrsntial thing is that the organism during the earlier part of the sequence, the classical conditioning must passively date itself to the circumstances. Nothing can be done about the of the two stimuli, and the reactions occur automatically. He tiguity is working to reinforce the connection buzxer-cmotion During the latter part of the sequence, the instrumental leai conditioned st.imulus is given. There is free scope for the organism in relation to the unconditioned stimulus, and the latter made to disappear hy a suitable choice of behavior. In this case the eftcct or drive-reduction is the most important factor for the associsl withdrawal. Ii such a two-factor theory is applied to the cc cesses in connection with the course of motivation, it bccomc here we have to do with a counterpart to classical condjtioni tinguishmg feature of the conception A is that it inexorably 10110 the situation I, or upon the conception D, provided the drive actualI to a certain activity.. It cao, tb.erefore, be assumed that contigui the associations situ.ation D-conception A, and conception. D+ We have with this returned to a very old point of view in psych nonetheless seems extremely plausible. 6. Consequencesfor certaintheoriesof fearni~~g

It can be of value in this coonnection to try to poirt ou sideration of the cognitive processes can shed light upcn ce in the psychology cf learning. One refers often to reactive a tianed inhibition according to Hull. A modern appliczion af structs is advanced by Eysenck (9) with an explanation of menon of spontaneous recovery. One seems then to over1 ;hat with extinction experiments the conceptions of Ihe occu the unconditioned stimulus which is tied together with the con stimulus, are better distributed than corresponding conceptions of sence of the unconditioned stimulus. Just as with Huml~b experiments with human beings (see e g. 13) an animai does not ce react at once as if the unconditioned stimulus actually di some time has elapsed the associations mentioned fit be strongest. If the conception of the unconditioned stimulus is comprehended as a stimulus for the unconditioned reaction of us have not experienced “mouth watering” at the the conditioned stimulus could then, again be followed to a cer the conditioned response; this is exactly what happens wit recovery which never leads to the same response strength as

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Results of massed and distributed practice can be explained in the same way without having recourse to reactive and conditioned iribibition (CL 9). With massed practice the organism probably undergoes uegative experiences in relation to its actual motivation, while the opposite is true of distributed training. The conceptional counterparts to these expariences function, therefore, as a kind of regulator for rhe actual drive, with sustained work. In one instance, the organism allows its drive to be converted into activity, while this is not the case in the other. 7. An attempt to delimit interest and attitude V&h the preceding comments we have touched upon an iaterpretation of how interest anaattitude could be delimited. It would be easy at this point to link it up with some older literature (see e. g. 16,233, but that is hardly necessary. It can be sufficient to state that a main point in the delimitig which will be considered here, lies in the fact that interest is connncted with an existing drive, while attitude exists, whether the cccmpouents of drive are active in the present or not. If introspective terms were still current, one could say that interest denotes the conditiou where the individual, because of earlier experiences, and with an existing need, counts on satisfaction as a result of a definite activity. Attitude in its turn, would then be the term for the fact that one, only under assumed premise.7 of a need, expects greater or lesser satisfactiou from an activity. If the same thing is expressed in terms of a psychology which builds on stimulus and response, but where even cognitive phenomena are included in the form of conceptions, the following will be the result. I have eartier tried to :;how that under these conditions we must take into consideration partly the actual processes of motivation and learning, and partly their conceptional counterparts. Thus one obtains:

Interest would be equivalent to the fact that the situation 9 on the basis of earlier experiences gives rise to the reaction A, which in turn leads to response E,:. This series takes place before the actual repetition of the activity A learned earlier, in as much as the cognitive processes function faster than the real ones. With attitude is meant that condition

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whereby the actualization of situation DC, likewise a result of earlier experiences, can bring about the reproduction of Ac and thi? in turn of EC. This can take place without the existence of D. Thus it can be seen that interest and attitude here are not any specific psychic phenomena, but simply &i+Tent terms for the cognitive processes

for which the foundations are laid with each act of motivation und learnirmg. The difference between them lies in the fact that these processes in one case originate in the existing stimulus-patterns of the organism which we call drive, but in the other case in a conception. That this, however, is a very important difference is bes.t understo when we take up the problem of whether the distinction can be confirmed empirically. Let us think of a simple case. We have two conceptions A, and A,, which can be actualized by D, and D, respective@, and which lead to the reproduction of E$c and E,,. If one now asks a subject to compare these two assumed activities with each other, taking into consideration the situation in which he finds himself at the moment, and then asks him to say which of them be prefers, D,-A,,-EJc should be the sequence which is carried out, provided D, dominates the individual% actual situation. The result of this is that S chooses A,. 2ut as soon as an act& drive-reduction has taken place, it is perhaps D, which stands out most strongly in the drive pattern of the individual. As a result of this Q2-A2L,-E.,C ought to be actualized, and the subject now says he chooses A, This means in other words, that if the subject is hungry one should expect a yltference for the activity “take food” in comparison to other possible alternatives, but that the preference will be weakened as soon as the hunger is satisfied. assuming of course, that the question is formulated in relation to the ibdlvidual’s immediate condition. The circumstances concerning attitude are altogether different. Here as we know the questions directed to the subject have always been of a more general nature. It has been a question of deciding whether one OIIr/x? ~hola, or with an attempt at over-all judgement, prefers the one or the other. Tbe individual’s actual condition has in other words, been dissociated as far as possible, from the decision. This takes plsce, as I have just tried to point out, on purely cognitive grounds. Under these conditions when A,, and Asc are compared with one another the result depends, among othei things, on the vigor of conceptions D,, and D,, which the specific question certainly should actualize, and on the strength of the processes D,c-A,&, respectively D, -ASr,-E,c which are brought about in this manner. The result therefore, seems to depend upon how usual and meaningful the fundamental acts of motivation and learning are for the organism. Few people e.g., if

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asked whether they preferred to eat a meal or to brush their teeth, would choose the latter. The comparison in this case ls built on the processes which originate in general conceptions, which in turn rest on drive patterns radically different in frequeneey and intensity; there should hardly be any doubt as to which of the two cognitive events will be characterized as having the greatest strength of response. 8. Some resulting p@ummaa

in connection

with the new distinction

At this point it seems advisable to consider the advantages which this proposed dktinction has over other earlier deliminations. I shall now concentrate on &e conception of. attitude. The definitions which many hvestigators have suggested are all more or less impaired by the error that componems of cognition, emotion and action are said to be e.mbodied in attitude, although no one has succeeded in explaining their interrelationship, or the relative role they have played (1,lO). As I see it this difficulty is easily understood. There has been a desire to &limit as something essentia!, a cognirive process attaciw%i to aud ~so~iated with the emotional state, which in turn is found in connection with each act of motivation and learning whc,-_,de&&e actions lead to drive-reduction. I believe, however, that attitude should be conceived quite simply as these cognitive processes. But then a serkus dilemma with which we have struggled before ap pears in another light. An actual problem earlinr has been, viz., that the declared attitude and the real action have been far from compatible at times (see e. g. 25). Looking at it from my point of view, no such difficulties exist. Of course, nothing prevents a subject from givs-lg a false picture of the cognitive processes which he experiences. But th:lt is an entirely different question from the one that attitude and action $10 not go hand in hand. According to my proposal these need not necessarily coincide. The action itself enters into the dynamic homeostasis of the individual, while attitude as a cegnitive process is independent of the drive components functioning at the .noment. It becomes obvious that a satisfied organism can express a positive attitude to eating while at the same time refusing to carry out

the action. Interest and action should, as a rule, be concomitant, but not attitude and activity. Further there will be greater clarity in regard to the attitudes taken over from others. It has often been pointed out that an attitude is “readymade”, and - even though it is actually conceived as an action-tendency of a definite kind - 3t can be completely changed by the activity of the orga4sm. irself (see e. g. 1). It seems qulte natural to me that the process &-A& can be brought about in a purely intellectual manner by e.g.,

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observance of athers or by verbal communication. But it is equally obvious that this process must be changed as soon as an individual’s experier. indicate that the activity in question is not leading to the expected results. Finally, I wish to emphasize that the concepts interest and attitude according to my interpretation still have a purpose to fulfill. rf.ey are quite simply descriptive rerms which indicate of what nature an ind~viduai’s experiences of different things and actions in his existing surroundings in reality become in connection with his states of need and drive. In one case, this description takes place in relation to a motivation which actual1 exists, and in the other, with the greatest possible freedom from t dynamic homeostasis. Neither interest nor attitude add anything new to the previously known principles of motivation and learnin but they are, I believe, most useful as a description of the cognitive aspects of the cooacomitant results, not least in the psychology of individual differences. In addition, however, comes the drive-regulating role which interest, in the sel;se in which it is used here, can assume in the manner irnp~~~ earlier. The conception which most closely resembles my entire int of view as presented here would seem to be the theory of expectancy developed by MacCorquodale and Meehl (8, cf. 13). 9.

Two hype thwes It is possible, of course, from my point of view to offer different 1 theses which can bc tested experimentally. Two will be mentioued Firstly, it is clear that Ss who take a stand in regard to new phenomena about which they know little or nothing, and who afterwards come to experience one of these phenomena with negative results, will exhibit a Jiminishing degree of both interest and attitude. The discouraging ex seems, viz., when the immediate situation is taken into consider indicate that the process D,-A,,-D,, culminates in a conception phenomenon in question does not lead to drive-reduction. The ca be the same for the question of attitude which actualizes the pr D,c-A,c-Etc. There is for the moment only the single experience which to build. Secondly, one can assume that an individual who ezpre! both interest and attitude to different well-known activities, and later carries out one of these, when investigated again, will show a lower de of interest but a stable attitude. The process D,-A,,+,, has been made more or less impossible through activity, while the process D,c-A:c-E,c on the ather hand, could still be the same. A series of experiments have been carried out in order to throw some light on these hypotheses. The results tend more or less to confirm them.

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But since the expeximents are not completed I &al.! report in 13 later paper on the e.mpWal basis which has been established for the theory presented here. REFERENCES 1. Allport. G. W.: AttRudes, in Murchison, C. (Ed.): A handbor?k of suciuf psychology. Wore., 1935. A psychological interpretation. N. Y., 1937. 2. - Personality. 3. Berlyne, D. E.: ‘Interest’ as a psychological concept. Brit. 1. PsychoI,, 1948-49, 39, 184-195. 4. Blair. G. M. et al.: Educational psychology. N. Y.. 1954. 5. Boring, E. 6.: A hisroT of experimental psychology. 2. ed. N. Y ., i950.. 6. Dee.%, H.: The psychology of framing. N. Y.. 1952. 7. Doob, L. W.: The behavior of attitudes. Psychol. Rev., 1947, 54. 8. Testes. W. K. et al.: IModem learning theory. N. Y., 1954. 9. Eysenck, H. J.: The dynamics of onxiety and hysteria. London, 1957. IO. Green, B. F.: Attitude measurement, in Lindzey, G. (Ed.): Handbook of social pqwhofogy. Vol. 1. Cambridge Mass.. 19%. 11. Greene. E. B.: Meawrements of human behuvior. N. Y., 1952. 12. Hebb, D. 0.: The orqunizution of behavior. N. Y., 1949. 13. Hilgard. E. R.: Thecries of learning. 2. ed. N. Y., 1956. 14. Hgffding, H.: Psyko.‘bgi i omrids. Kbhn., 1905. 15. H&n, T.: Intresse, in Psykologisk-pedagogisk uppslagsbok. 2:dra uppl. Sthlm., 1956. 16. Lillius, A.: SkoiGlderns sjiilsliv. Borg& 1916. 17. Rein, W.: Encyklopiidisches Handbuch der Piidagogik. 2:te Aufl., IV, Langensalza, 1906. !g. Shaffer. L. F. & Shoben, E. J.: The psychology of adjustment. 2. ed. Boston, 1956. 19. Sherif, M. & Cantril, H.: The psychology of ‘attitudes*. Psychoi. Rev., 1945, 52, 295-319. and 1946. 53, t-24. 20. Smith, H. P.: Psychology in teaching. N. Y., 1954. 21. Staguer, R.: Attitudes, in Monroe, W. S. (Ed.): Encyclopedia of educational research. Rev. ed. N.Y., 1950. 22. Stagner, R. & Karwoski, T. F.: Psychology. N.Y.. 1952. 23. Szymanski, I. S.: Psychologre vom Standpunkt der Abbiingigkeit des Erkennens von den Lebensbediirfnissen. Leipzig, 1930. 24. Thomdike. E. L.: The psycfiology of wants, interests and attitudes. N. Y., 1935.