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International human rights: Universalism versus relativism
Book Reviews
257
REFERENCES BORDEN, G. A. (1989). Human communication systems, 2nd ed. Boston: American Press. GLENN, E. S. (1981). Man & mankind. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. HOFSTEDE, G. (1984). Culture’s consequences. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM Alison Dundes Renteln Newbury Bark, CA: Sage, 1990,205 pp., $35.00 (cloth), $16.95 (paper)
How can one simultaneously respect the integrity of other cultures and retain a firm commitment to the moral codes of one’s own culture? Relatedly, can there be any such thing as pan-human values and moral codes that can serve as the bases of international human rights? Renteln explores answers to these and related issues in this book. Based on the view that universal human rights are possible, the author proposes a basis of moral authority from which human rights may derive legitimacy. Human rights advocates and academicians have debated the legitimacy of various systems of moral authority. Renteln questions the validity of each of the four bases that are most often employed in this debate: (1) divine authority, (2) natural law, (3) intuition (that is, certain actions are obviously wrong because they violate inalienable rights), and (4) the ratification of international instruments. Renteln argues that none of the four provides a satisfying justification for the existence and defense of specific human rights. Divine authority, for instance, cannot lend much assistance as there are many variations of religious ethics (none of which is subject to proof). Natural law is viewed by Renteln as misleading because of the necessary assumption one has to make that natural rights (or human rights) are self-evident, that the rights are held by all individuals simply by virtue of their status as human beings, and that there is an agreed-upon set of basic human needs. Intuition is considered problematic for the reason that individuals and societies cannot clearly agree on what are inalienable rights. Renteln further rejects the common belief that human rights exist independent of culture, ideology, and value systems. According to the author, this absolutistic perspective often held by Western philosophers and legal theorists reflects a form of ethnocentrism. Nor is Renteln entirely supportive of the perspective of culture relativism-the idea that every culture follows its own moral precepts. Renteln argues that the
258
Book Reviews
relativistic theory has advocated cultural tolerance, and that this advocacy has transformed what should be essentially a descriptive theory into a prescriptive one. Accordingly, the author proposes a new method, a method that is based on cross-cultural research and the discovery of cultural values shared by all cultures. Maintaining that the on-going human-rights debates are too often based on the Western worldviews, the author seeks to find “homeomorphic equivalents for human rights in other cultures” (p. 11). While rejecting the absolutistic view of the universality of morality, Renteln argues that societies do share some common moral values and that our objective should be to search for such empirical universals through research. In proposing this idea, the author presents a brief case analysis of cross-cultural investigation of moral principles focusing on acts of retribution tied to proportionality (such as the feud, vendetta, and vengeance killings). Based on an analysis of major religious texts and cultural ethnographies, Renteln claims that the observed “ubiquitous” nature of the proportional retribution principle exemplifies a “global willingness to embrace particular human rights such as those against genocide and torture” (p. 14). A single case analysis such as this does not convince this reader of the ambitious claim the author advances. Nor can this reader feel confident in the abilities of empirical researchers to uncover universal values without their own cultural biases. Yet, Renteln makes a persuasive case for the need for, and the possibility of, empirically testing some of the assumptions held by those involved with human rights issues. Young Yun Kim University of Oklahoma Norman, Oklahoma
257
REFERENCES BORDEN, G. A. (1989). Human communication systems, 2nd ed. Boston: American Press. GLENN, E. S. (1981). Man & mankind. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. HOFSTEDE, G. (1984). Culture’s consequences. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM Alison Dundes Renteln Newbury Bark, CA: Sage, 1990,205 pp., $35.00 (cloth), $16.95 (paper)
How can one simultaneously respect the integrity of other cultures and retain a firm commitment to the moral codes of one’s own culture? Relatedly, can there be any such thing as pan-human values and moral codes that can serve as the bases of international human rights? Renteln explores answers to these and related issues in this book. Based on the view that universal human rights are possible, the author proposes a basis of moral authority from which human rights may derive legitimacy. Human rights advocates and academicians have debated the legitimacy of various systems of moral authority. Renteln questions the validity of each of the four bases that are most often employed in this debate: (1) divine authority, (2) natural law, (3) intuition (that is, certain actions are obviously wrong because they violate inalienable rights), and (4) the ratification of international instruments. Renteln argues that none of the four provides a satisfying justification for the existence and defense of specific human rights. Divine authority, for instance, cannot lend much assistance as there are many variations of religious ethics (none of which is subject to proof). Natural law is viewed by Renteln as misleading because of the necessary assumption one has to make that natural rights (or human rights) are self-evident, that the rights are held by all individuals simply by virtue of their status as human beings, and that there is an agreed-upon set of basic human needs. Intuition is considered problematic for the reason that individuals and societies cannot clearly agree on what are inalienable rights. Renteln further rejects the common belief that human rights exist independent of culture, ideology, and value systems. According to the author, this absolutistic perspective often held by Western philosophers and legal theorists reflects a form of ethnocentrism. Nor is Renteln entirely supportive of the perspective of culture relativism-the idea that every culture follows its own moral precepts. Renteln argues that the
258
Book Reviews
relativistic theory has advocated cultural tolerance, and that this advocacy has transformed what should be essentially a descriptive theory into a prescriptive one. Accordingly, the author proposes a new method, a method that is based on cross-cultural research and the discovery of cultural values shared by all cultures. Maintaining that the on-going human-rights debates are too often based on the Western worldviews, the author seeks to find “homeomorphic equivalents for human rights in other cultures” (p. 11). While rejecting the absolutistic view of the universality of morality, Renteln argues that societies do share some common moral values and that our objective should be to search for such empirical universals through research. In proposing this idea, the author presents a brief case analysis of cross-cultural investigation of moral principles focusing on acts of retribution tied to proportionality (such as the feud, vendetta, and vengeance killings). Based on an analysis of major religious texts and cultural ethnographies, Renteln claims that the observed “ubiquitous” nature of the proportional retribution principle exemplifies a “global willingness to embrace particular human rights such as those against genocide and torture” (p. 14). A single case analysis such as this does not convince this reader of the ambitious claim the author advances. Nor can this reader feel confident in the abilities of empirical researchers to uncover universal values without their own cultural biases. Yet, Renteln makes a persuasive case for the need for, and the possibility of, empirically testing some of the assumptions held by those involved with human rights issues. Young Yun Kim University of Oklahoma Norman, Oklahoma