- Email: [email protected]
International space exploration: Cooperative or competitive?
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Space Policy 21 (2005) 89–92 www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol
Viewpoint
International space exploration: Cooperative or competitive? Jacques Blamont CNES, 2 Place Maurice Quentin, 75039 Paris Cedex 01, France Available online 3 May 2005
Abstract France and the USA have in the past enjoyed a close and fruitful cooperative relationship in space but there is now a growing divergence between apparent US priorities for future activity and those of other countries, for whom human spaceflight is not so important. While accepting that it cannot match the USA technologically, Europe is increasingly sceptical of the wisdom of pursuing space cooperation with its given difficulties caused by the ITAR regime, greater suspicion of anything foreign in the USA and the unwillingness of NASA ever to cede a critical path to a partner. Nor are any of the non-space ventures currently being suggested as cooperation models attractive from a European point of view. A better way forward would be to have conglomerates of nations cooperating on an equal footing and avoiding recourse to US State Department-regulated technology. r 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction In May 1962 I came to Washington, DC to attend a COSPAR meeting. I was then the scientific and technical director of the fledgling French space agency, CNES, created a few days previously on 1 March 1962. At the request of the French embassy, my chief, the director general of CNES, and myself, were received at the White House by the scientific adviser to President John F. Kennedy, Jerry Wiesner. Mr Wiesner agreed that a large number of our young engineers (to be recruited) would stay 1 year at Goddard Space Flight Center to learn about satellites. These engineers became the backbone of the French and later the European space agencies and industries. This is why I have always claimed with gratitude that CNES in the child of NASA, and I would add, the loving child of NASA. There has always been a great friendship and mutual understanding between the two agencies, with joint programmes like Fr-1, Eole, Topex-Poseidon, Jason and now Calypso undertaken together. When General de Gaulle decided to embark on cooperation in space with the USSR, NASA supported our efforts to build a bridge during the Cold War. This did indeed prove to be useful to all parties when, in the
1980s, we were able to introduce NASA to the planetary missions of the USSR: Vega, Phobos and Mars 96. These steps paved the way to the full inclusion of our Russian partners in the world space community, laterly culminating in the ISS activity. But the people who have built this community now need to devote their attention not only to priority missions for the future but also to the approach that we will take to them. As my NASA colleague and friend, Wesley Huntress, said in testimony before the Committee on Science of the US House of Representatives1, ‘‘The Space Shuttle and the ISS are the products of NASA attempting over the decades to preserve the Apollo era of human space flight already passed by. As Apollo, they were developed to serve a foreign policy agenda, not so much for science or space exploration. This era is gone, and the imperatives for space exploration are very different now than they were in the 1960s’’. It is also worth quoting the testimony, given during the same session, of another friend, Professor Bruce Murray: ‘‘There is a growing sense we have lost our way in space and are bogged down in low Earth orbit, driven by past domestic and political commitments rather than by genuine enthusiasm and excitement for the future’’.
Tel.: +33 1 44 767612; fax: +33 1 44 767865.
E-mail address: [email protected]. 0265-9646/$ - see front matter r 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd. doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2005.03.003
1
On 16 October 2003.
ARTICLE IN PRESS 90
J. Blamont / Space Policy 21 (2005) 89–92
Circling the bloc forever generates only moderate enthusiasm from the taxpayer, and something else had to be invented to rekindle the flame. Now the fashionable concept is space exploration. It is widely accepted that exploration and the drive to discover are qualities that have allowed humanity to survive and become the dominant species on Earth. But the public’s innate acceptance of the abstract notion of exploration as a human imperative has to be complemented by the adoption of specific goals and benefits. The excellent report issued in July 2004 by the International Academy of Astronautics states that ‘‘Today the public benefit can be expressed as a clear set of goals because science and technology have progressed to the point where they can attempt to answer some of the most burning questions that human beings have been asking since they started gazing upward at the sky’’ [1]. Fundamental philosophical queries such as ‘Where do we come from?’ ‘What will happen to us in the future?’ and ‘Are we alone in the Universe?’ can be recast as scientific goals to be achieved in the course of exploring space, and there exists a consensus in the science community that these goals are the right goals for space exploration. However, from the outset (p. 2), the IAA study shows its true colours by claiming: ‘‘The ultimate goal is the establishment of a human presence on Mars for science and exploration’’. This assertion is a projection of the Apollo theology, essentially adapted to the institutional survival of existing agencies, scientific vested interests and industrial lobbies, and it derives from the American philosophy of the New Frontier.
2. The USA and the rest As the astronaut and former Senator Harrison Schmidt has said, ‘‘Space exploration is an element of our national being’’. After the magnificent achievement of Apollo, the American public considered space as a part of its national territory, and the image it formed of its country required that it maintain a permanent human presence in orbit. However, it has certainly not been proven that (1) the exploration of Mars, and (2) a human presence on that planet will provide a major increment in our understanding of matters related to the three above-mentioned questions. Even though space has generated major advances in our knowledge of the Universe, it has basically established itself as an extraordinary provider of services, both to civilian and military users, and it is considered important as such by the whole world. Outside the USA, exploration is viewed as a necessary complement to overall space activity but, not being considered as a driver, does not receive high priority. In particular, manned flights fall into the category of
marketing tools. And not many responsible people would agree with Wes Huntress’s affirmation: ‘‘A space exploration enterprise that satisfies the public require humans in space’’. In the world outside the USA, the decision of any government to spend money on space programmes is motivated by societal factors, and not ‘‘to fulfil the public’s sense of destiny’’ (W. Huntress). Let us quickly review the major players. Europe is engaged in the most extraordinary political endeavour of all times, the building of a community of 500 million people whose ancestors have fought bitterly among themselves over centuries and, in particular, during the previous century. Since 1990 the heavy burden of raising the standard of living of 17 million ‘Easterners’ has absorbed all the wealth of Germany. In 2004 10 new members, whose GNP is less than 40% of that of the other Europeans, have joined the Union; they require enormous investments and sacrifices to catch up. Here is the European challenge—at home, not on Mars. India, following the philosophy of the father of its space effort, has pledged to devote all its national effort to the development of its billion people. The same can be said of China and Japan. The 2004 orbiting of a Chinese taikonaut is motivated solely by nationalism and a desire for recognition and has no relation whatsoever to exploration. It would therefore be wrong to project the American perception of the world onto the preoccupations of other nations which are worried by the necessities of their development and the surge of potential dangers created by our inept management of the Earth’s resources. In other words, the current emphasis on exploration is not a world-wide phenomenon. Induced in the wake of the Columbia disaster by the failure of human missions to advance exploration, to deliver the promised benefits to commercial manufacturing and to medical research, and to open a safe way to affordable future human flight, after four decades, 244 human flights and 432 individuals orbited, including 21 casualties, such emphasis is considered to be an American business. If the USA wishes to send a man to Mars, that is its privilege; but, as far as we are concerned, what’s in it for us ? Let us suppose that, following President George W. Bush’s initiative of January 2004, the USA adopts a long-range plan for sending humans to the Moon and Mars. The philosophy of such a venture could be defined using the words of Bruce Murray: ‘‘Mars is the true space frontier, the legitimate abode for the dreams of the young for many generations to come. America should lead the world in that grand, positive human endeavour’’ (emphasis added). A likely scenario would involve a group of countries contributing various amounts of funding and other resources to such a cooperative venture. While studies have identified a wide
ARTICLE IN PRESS J. Blamont / Space Policy 21 (2005) 89–92
variety of approaches to international cooperation, in all cases the USA would be the natural leader of this effort, because of its enormous and visible technological superiority, and because of its financial might. Therefore, the USA would, as Murray says, lead the world.
3. A bleak outlook? Let us now assess the climate of cooperation in which such a large international effort, costed at hundreds of billions of dollars, would unfold. In my view, this climate is bleak for the following reasons. 1. The ITAR regulations and the suspicious atmosphere in the USA towards foreign relations and persons have strained daily working conditions, changing the extremely cheerful and open atmosphere which we non-Americans have enjoyed for 30 years to our mutual benefit. If a few successful cooperation ventures fortunately still remain, it is difficult to believe that a large-scale endeavour, which would require technical exchanges on many subjects where American superiority is overwhelming, could be successfully carried out on a day-to-day basis. A recent article in Aviation Week and Space Technology describes the situation of transatlantic defence–industrial relations and in particular the frustration of foreign participants in major projects like AGS (the $6 billion-plus NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance programme), the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) [2]. The differences in point of view expressed by satisfied US officials and by their unhappy partners are notable in this article. Discussing the fight to obtain ITAR waivers, one US expert notes: ‘‘The British are simply pawns in a power struggle between the executive and legislative branches here’’. A personal example is equally telling. The 3-month loan of the mock-up of a Martian inflatable rover developed at JPL (and invented by me!), which was to have taken place as part of an approved cooperative programme, was denied to CNES in 2000 by somebody from NASA Headquarters (whom I shall not name) who told me: ‘‘It is unthinkable that equipment developed in a Federal Center might be used by a foreign agency!’’. 2. NASA has always rejected any international agreement that would concede a critical path to a partner. Take, for instance, the 1971 negotiations about European participation in the Shuttle: NASA’S obstinate desire to relegate the European contribution to expensive peanuts ended the endeavour, and generated our resolution to develop our own capability, Ariane. The same attitude has prevailed for
91
the ISS, with the difference being that some Russian systems have unexpectedly become critical, but these should not in fact be considered a product of cooperation, since they are bought by NASA: Russia is not a cooperative partner, but a subcontractor. The past history of the programme has fed the suspicions of some Europeans, that the US government’s invitation to join a long-term exploration programme is a ruse to guarantee US domination of near-Earth and deep space, just as the JSF programme aims to assure American dominance of the European military aircraft industry. Here again a personal story is illustrative. During the discussions between NASA and CNES in 1999 concerning high-level bilateral cooperation for a Mars sample return mission, one of my American friends at JPL was heard to say: ‘‘I could not look my children in the eyes if the French were given the responsibility of aerocapture’’. As is well-known, the project came to nought (for many reasons of that ilk). 3. Many in Europe believe that it is not a wise choice for us to place any long-term strategic trust in the USA. For example, when discussing the question of navigation by satellite, the London Observer suggested on 3 March 2004, that: ‘‘The US has breached too many international Treaties and shown such a disregard for anyone’s interests but its own, that we cannot trust it over satellite positioning strategy’’. And the above-mentioned article in Aviation Week, reports the testimony of BAE Systems Chairman Sir Richard Evans at a recent British parliamentary defence committee hearing: ‘‘It is no good when you have signed up and paid your check, then try to go back to negotiate the release of technology’’. BAE is the UK partner in the JSF programme, recently touted as a paradigm for organizing cooperation in a putative Mars exploration programme.
4. The way forward These considerations lead me to think that, if present attitudes remain unchanged, a major exploration initiative should be a cooperative venture among equals. And nobody is equal in space exploration to the USA. The czar cannot cooperate with the muzhiks. One realistic scenario could resemble the mode of action we used during the Cold War, but in a much more friendly way, of course. We could envision, on one side, a US-led venture, ambitious, wealthy, capitalising on incomparable technological and managerial experience, geared towards planting an American flag in the martian soil at some indeterminate time in the future. Any space agency could participate.
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J. Blamont / Space Policy 21 (2005) 89–92
On the other side, one or two conglomerates of nations cooperating on an equal footing, without political constraints, modest in funds and pretention, geared towards science through robotic exploration, creating many new vehicles as planes, balloons, inflatable rovers and following the maxim ‘‘Small is beautiful’’, as we did for Ariane. There would be no ITAR rules between partners, and they would develop the necessary technologies freely among themselves. We are already seeing the emergence of ‘ITAR-free’ nations or groups of nations ready to fund joint R&D ventures. Outsourcing software to Bangalore or chip manufacturing to Japan without reporting to the US State Department would be a regular procedure. We could imagine Russia, China, India, Japan and Europe as partners. The mode of cooperation could vary with the domain of action, under flexible and variable rules. In the words of the recent report of ESA’s Space Exploration Policy Assessment Group [3], the key actors’ cooperation objectives should be based on heteronomy, partnership and networking.
Strong programmatic coordination between the competing entities, which could include the development of common assets on Earth or in orbit, would be assured by an International Committee, issued from the existing International Mars Exploration Working Group (IMEWG). IMEWG has a membership drawn from representatives of space agencies. It could be enlarged to include politicians, scientists and industrialists. Even joint missions could be organized. This seems to me to be the only reasonable way forward.
References [1] Huntress W, et al. The next steps in exploring deep space. IAA: Washington, DC. [2] Douglas Barril, Robert Wall, ‘Access: denied’, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 7 June 2004. [3] ESA/C (2004) 61, 3 June 2004.
Space Policy 21 (2005) 89–92 www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol
Viewpoint
International space exploration: Cooperative or competitive? Jacques Blamont CNES, 2 Place Maurice Quentin, 75039 Paris Cedex 01, France Available online 3 May 2005
Abstract France and the USA have in the past enjoyed a close and fruitful cooperative relationship in space but there is now a growing divergence between apparent US priorities for future activity and those of other countries, for whom human spaceflight is not so important. While accepting that it cannot match the USA technologically, Europe is increasingly sceptical of the wisdom of pursuing space cooperation with its given difficulties caused by the ITAR regime, greater suspicion of anything foreign in the USA and the unwillingness of NASA ever to cede a critical path to a partner. Nor are any of the non-space ventures currently being suggested as cooperation models attractive from a European point of view. A better way forward would be to have conglomerates of nations cooperating on an equal footing and avoiding recourse to US State Department-regulated technology. r 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction In May 1962 I came to Washington, DC to attend a COSPAR meeting. I was then the scientific and technical director of the fledgling French space agency, CNES, created a few days previously on 1 March 1962. At the request of the French embassy, my chief, the director general of CNES, and myself, were received at the White House by the scientific adviser to President John F. Kennedy, Jerry Wiesner. Mr Wiesner agreed that a large number of our young engineers (to be recruited) would stay 1 year at Goddard Space Flight Center to learn about satellites. These engineers became the backbone of the French and later the European space agencies and industries. This is why I have always claimed with gratitude that CNES in the child of NASA, and I would add, the loving child of NASA. There has always been a great friendship and mutual understanding between the two agencies, with joint programmes like Fr-1, Eole, Topex-Poseidon, Jason and now Calypso undertaken together. When General de Gaulle decided to embark on cooperation in space with the USSR, NASA supported our efforts to build a bridge during the Cold War. This did indeed prove to be useful to all parties when, in the
1980s, we were able to introduce NASA to the planetary missions of the USSR: Vega, Phobos and Mars 96. These steps paved the way to the full inclusion of our Russian partners in the world space community, laterly culminating in the ISS activity. But the people who have built this community now need to devote their attention not only to priority missions for the future but also to the approach that we will take to them. As my NASA colleague and friend, Wesley Huntress, said in testimony before the Committee on Science of the US House of Representatives1, ‘‘The Space Shuttle and the ISS are the products of NASA attempting over the decades to preserve the Apollo era of human space flight already passed by. As Apollo, they were developed to serve a foreign policy agenda, not so much for science or space exploration. This era is gone, and the imperatives for space exploration are very different now than they were in the 1960s’’. It is also worth quoting the testimony, given during the same session, of another friend, Professor Bruce Murray: ‘‘There is a growing sense we have lost our way in space and are bogged down in low Earth orbit, driven by past domestic and political commitments rather than by genuine enthusiasm and excitement for the future’’.
Tel.: +33 1 44 767612; fax: +33 1 44 767865.
E-mail address: [email protected]. 0265-9646/$ - see front matter r 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd. doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2005.03.003
1
On 16 October 2003.
ARTICLE IN PRESS 90
J. Blamont / Space Policy 21 (2005) 89–92
Circling the bloc forever generates only moderate enthusiasm from the taxpayer, and something else had to be invented to rekindle the flame. Now the fashionable concept is space exploration. It is widely accepted that exploration and the drive to discover are qualities that have allowed humanity to survive and become the dominant species on Earth. But the public’s innate acceptance of the abstract notion of exploration as a human imperative has to be complemented by the adoption of specific goals and benefits. The excellent report issued in July 2004 by the International Academy of Astronautics states that ‘‘Today the public benefit can be expressed as a clear set of goals because science and technology have progressed to the point where they can attempt to answer some of the most burning questions that human beings have been asking since they started gazing upward at the sky’’ [1]. Fundamental philosophical queries such as ‘Where do we come from?’ ‘What will happen to us in the future?’ and ‘Are we alone in the Universe?’ can be recast as scientific goals to be achieved in the course of exploring space, and there exists a consensus in the science community that these goals are the right goals for space exploration. However, from the outset (p. 2), the IAA study shows its true colours by claiming: ‘‘The ultimate goal is the establishment of a human presence on Mars for science and exploration’’. This assertion is a projection of the Apollo theology, essentially adapted to the institutional survival of existing agencies, scientific vested interests and industrial lobbies, and it derives from the American philosophy of the New Frontier.
2. The USA and the rest As the astronaut and former Senator Harrison Schmidt has said, ‘‘Space exploration is an element of our national being’’. After the magnificent achievement of Apollo, the American public considered space as a part of its national territory, and the image it formed of its country required that it maintain a permanent human presence in orbit. However, it has certainly not been proven that (1) the exploration of Mars, and (2) a human presence on that planet will provide a major increment in our understanding of matters related to the three above-mentioned questions. Even though space has generated major advances in our knowledge of the Universe, it has basically established itself as an extraordinary provider of services, both to civilian and military users, and it is considered important as such by the whole world. Outside the USA, exploration is viewed as a necessary complement to overall space activity but, not being considered as a driver, does not receive high priority. In particular, manned flights fall into the category of
marketing tools. And not many responsible people would agree with Wes Huntress’s affirmation: ‘‘A space exploration enterprise that satisfies the public require humans in space’’. In the world outside the USA, the decision of any government to spend money on space programmes is motivated by societal factors, and not ‘‘to fulfil the public’s sense of destiny’’ (W. Huntress). Let us quickly review the major players. Europe is engaged in the most extraordinary political endeavour of all times, the building of a community of 500 million people whose ancestors have fought bitterly among themselves over centuries and, in particular, during the previous century. Since 1990 the heavy burden of raising the standard of living of 17 million ‘Easterners’ has absorbed all the wealth of Germany. In 2004 10 new members, whose GNP is less than 40% of that of the other Europeans, have joined the Union; they require enormous investments and sacrifices to catch up. Here is the European challenge—at home, not on Mars. India, following the philosophy of the father of its space effort, has pledged to devote all its national effort to the development of its billion people. The same can be said of China and Japan. The 2004 orbiting of a Chinese taikonaut is motivated solely by nationalism and a desire for recognition and has no relation whatsoever to exploration. It would therefore be wrong to project the American perception of the world onto the preoccupations of other nations which are worried by the necessities of their development and the surge of potential dangers created by our inept management of the Earth’s resources. In other words, the current emphasis on exploration is not a world-wide phenomenon. Induced in the wake of the Columbia disaster by the failure of human missions to advance exploration, to deliver the promised benefits to commercial manufacturing and to medical research, and to open a safe way to affordable future human flight, after four decades, 244 human flights and 432 individuals orbited, including 21 casualties, such emphasis is considered to be an American business. If the USA wishes to send a man to Mars, that is its privilege; but, as far as we are concerned, what’s in it for us ? Let us suppose that, following President George W. Bush’s initiative of January 2004, the USA adopts a long-range plan for sending humans to the Moon and Mars. The philosophy of such a venture could be defined using the words of Bruce Murray: ‘‘Mars is the true space frontier, the legitimate abode for the dreams of the young for many generations to come. America should lead the world in that grand, positive human endeavour’’ (emphasis added). A likely scenario would involve a group of countries contributing various amounts of funding and other resources to such a cooperative venture. While studies have identified a wide
ARTICLE IN PRESS J. Blamont / Space Policy 21 (2005) 89–92
variety of approaches to international cooperation, in all cases the USA would be the natural leader of this effort, because of its enormous and visible technological superiority, and because of its financial might. Therefore, the USA would, as Murray says, lead the world.
3. A bleak outlook? Let us now assess the climate of cooperation in which such a large international effort, costed at hundreds of billions of dollars, would unfold. In my view, this climate is bleak for the following reasons. 1. The ITAR regulations and the suspicious atmosphere in the USA towards foreign relations and persons have strained daily working conditions, changing the extremely cheerful and open atmosphere which we non-Americans have enjoyed for 30 years to our mutual benefit. If a few successful cooperation ventures fortunately still remain, it is difficult to believe that a large-scale endeavour, which would require technical exchanges on many subjects where American superiority is overwhelming, could be successfully carried out on a day-to-day basis. A recent article in Aviation Week and Space Technology describes the situation of transatlantic defence–industrial relations and in particular the frustration of foreign participants in major projects like AGS (the $6 billion-plus NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance programme), the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) [2]. The differences in point of view expressed by satisfied US officials and by their unhappy partners are notable in this article. Discussing the fight to obtain ITAR waivers, one US expert notes: ‘‘The British are simply pawns in a power struggle between the executive and legislative branches here’’. A personal example is equally telling. The 3-month loan of the mock-up of a Martian inflatable rover developed at JPL (and invented by me!), which was to have taken place as part of an approved cooperative programme, was denied to CNES in 2000 by somebody from NASA Headquarters (whom I shall not name) who told me: ‘‘It is unthinkable that equipment developed in a Federal Center might be used by a foreign agency!’’. 2. NASA has always rejected any international agreement that would concede a critical path to a partner. Take, for instance, the 1971 negotiations about European participation in the Shuttle: NASA’S obstinate desire to relegate the European contribution to expensive peanuts ended the endeavour, and generated our resolution to develop our own capability, Ariane. The same attitude has prevailed for
91
the ISS, with the difference being that some Russian systems have unexpectedly become critical, but these should not in fact be considered a product of cooperation, since they are bought by NASA: Russia is not a cooperative partner, but a subcontractor. The past history of the programme has fed the suspicions of some Europeans, that the US government’s invitation to join a long-term exploration programme is a ruse to guarantee US domination of near-Earth and deep space, just as the JSF programme aims to assure American dominance of the European military aircraft industry. Here again a personal story is illustrative. During the discussions between NASA and CNES in 1999 concerning high-level bilateral cooperation for a Mars sample return mission, one of my American friends at JPL was heard to say: ‘‘I could not look my children in the eyes if the French were given the responsibility of aerocapture’’. As is well-known, the project came to nought (for many reasons of that ilk). 3. Many in Europe believe that it is not a wise choice for us to place any long-term strategic trust in the USA. For example, when discussing the question of navigation by satellite, the London Observer suggested on 3 March 2004, that: ‘‘The US has breached too many international Treaties and shown such a disregard for anyone’s interests but its own, that we cannot trust it over satellite positioning strategy’’. And the above-mentioned article in Aviation Week, reports the testimony of BAE Systems Chairman Sir Richard Evans at a recent British parliamentary defence committee hearing: ‘‘It is no good when you have signed up and paid your check, then try to go back to negotiate the release of technology’’. BAE is the UK partner in the JSF programme, recently touted as a paradigm for organizing cooperation in a putative Mars exploration programme.
4. The way forward These considerations lead me to think that, if present attitudes remain unchanged, a major exploration initiative should be a cooperative venture among equals. And nobody is equal in space exploration to the USA. The czar cannot cooperate with the muzhiks. One realistic scenario could resemble the mode of action we used during the Cold War, but in a much more friendly way, of course. We could envision, on one side, a US-led venture, ambitious, wealthy, capitalising on incomparable technological and managerial experience, geared towards planting an American flag in the martian soil at some indeterminate time in the future. Any space agency could participate.
ARTICLE IN PRESS 92
J. Blamont / Space Policy 21 (2005) 89–92
On the other side, one or two conglomerates of nations cooperating on an equal footing, without political constraints, modest in funds and pretention, geared towards science through robotic exploration, creating many new vehicles as planes, balloons, inflatable rovers and following the maxim ‘‘Small is beautiful’’, as we did for Ariane. There would be no ITAR rules between partners, and they would develop the necessary technologies freely among themselves. We are already seeing the emergence of ‘ITAR-free’ nations or groups of nations ready to fund joint R&D ventures. Outsourcing software to Bangalore or chip manufacturing to Japan without reporting to the US State Department would be a regular procedure. We could imagine Russia, China, India, Japan and Europe as partners. The mode of cooperation could vary with the domain of action, under flexible and variable rules. In the words of the recent report of ESA’s Space Exploration Policy Assessment Group [3], the key actors’ cooperation objectives should be based on heteronomy, partnership and networking.
Strong programmatic coordination between the competing entities, which could include the development of common assets on Earth or in orbit, would be assured by an International Committee, issued from the existing International Mars Exploration Working Group (IMEWG). IMEWG has a membership drawn from representatives of space agencies. It could be enlarged to include politicians, scientists and industrialists. Even joint missions could be organized. This seems to me to be the only reasonable way forward.
References [1] Huntress W, et al. The next steps in exploring deep space. IAA: Washington, DC. [2] Douglas Barril, Robert Wall, ‘Access: denied’, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 7 June 2004. [3] ESA/C (2004) 61, 3 June 2004.