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Into the next decade
410
INTO THE NEXT DECADE Major trends and uncertainties the 1990s
of
Michel Godet and Rkmi Barr6
We can expect profound upheavals in the international environment as we move towards the year 2000. This article presents a synthesis of probable trends, major uncertainties and risks of rupture which the authors perceive for the next decade. First, some multiple uncertainties are presented which demand flexibility and which make strategy a necessity. A quasi-certainty is identified-that actors will be in crisis as they face systems undergoing transformation. Among the most probable trends in the national and international environment up to 1995, 12 are noted. Three major uncertainties are reexamined. To conclude, new syntheses of trends, uncertainties and risks of rupture up to the year 2000 are proposed.
The world is changing; the geopolitical, monetary, energy, technological, economic and social environments which we will face in the next 10 or 15 years will all undergo profound upheavals. Without for a moment claiming to construct real scenarios of the environment, it seemed useful to us to throw some light on prospective thought through a synthesis of the probable trends, major uncertainties and risks of rupture in the 1990s. By definition, prospective thinking up to 1995 is easier than up to the year 2000. Notably, it enables us to disregard the consequences of the main change in the coming decades, which is of a demographic nature-at the beginning of the next century the European Community will have fewer inhabitants than the Muslim countries of the South Mediterranean basin, whilst the population of Brazil and Nigeria combined will be comparable to that of Europe. If we limit ourselves to the horizon of 1995, we have to say that, once again, Michel Godet is Professor of Prospective and Strategic Management at the Conservatoire National des Arts et M6tiers (CNAM), 2 Rue Cont6,75003 Paris, France, and is a member of Futures’s advisory board. R6mi Barre is also at CNAM, where he is Director of courses on Environment and Technology.
0016-3287/88/040410-14$03.00
0 1988 Butterworth
& Co(Publishers)
Ltd
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Into the next decade
‘the future is no longer what it was’ (P. Valery). Leading forward hypotheses which would have seemed improbable l
0 l l
411
experts rightly put some years ago:
a low inflation rate of less than 5%; positive real interest rates; relatively stable growth; and the price of oil between $15 and $20 per barrel for several years.
Reading between the lines, however, we note the weakness of these hypotheses. Doesn’t the current fall in oil prices run the risk of preparing new oil shocks between now and 1995? Furthermore, growth could be sustained for several years on vivid memories of the recession of the early 1980s; but fundamentally, the conditions for a lasting and steady recovery of the world economy are not all present. In an increasingly interdependent world, the lack of international regulations makes itself crudely felt. A new ‘world economy’ (to use Fernand Braudel’s term) will not take over tomorrow. Due to its irreversible relative decline at the heart of the global economy, the USA is no longer capable of fulfilling the regulatory role which it played during the ‘glorious thirties’. But for a long time it will remain capable of playing a disruptive role and preventing the recognition of any other regulator (in a multipolar world) in its place. In other words, fluctuations in US economic policy could themselves be enough to trigger off worldwide inflation again. In the meantime, we share the uncertainty expressed by some economists over exchange rates, with the dollar between f0.50 and fl.OO. We may regret the scale of this uncertainty, but it would be irresponsible not to take account of it. Taking uncertainty into account also means not seeking salvation in an ideal development of the international situation, but instead preparing ourselves to survive in the most unfavourable circumstances (the worst case scenario). Intellectual confusion is intensified by uncertainty over technological developments and social transformations. What products and services will be born out of today’s technological melting-pot? We know the question, but not the answer. Since it is impossible to reduce uncertainty, it is necessary to master its consequences. Country risk is a key variable, which demands prospective thought by groups who are heavily involved abroad and often seduced by the American El Dorado. We should recall that in the 21st century the USA could be what the UK was in the 20th century-a declining power. This point of view is voiced increasingly often by Japanese experts.* In these conditions we can question the regional strategy of certain companies and even the objective of external growth in the name of critical minimum size. In the car industry it was because of this myth-critical minimum size in the world market-that Peugeot risked itself in the Chrysler adventure and Renault in American Motor Corporation. At that very time Fiat was reestablishing its competitiveness by withdrawing from the US market and recentring itself on Europe. Finally, uncertainty demands flexibility in choice making and in organizations, and makes strategy a necessity. Before we commit ourselves to strategic choices, it would be appropriate to reach a better appreciation of their flexibility by looking at the cost of reversing such choices, and at the cost of their failure. Prospective thought should not lead us to forget that, faced with changes in
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the strategic environment, the future of a company depends largely on its internal strengths and weaknesses. External threats and opportunities should not be used as outlets for internal contradictions in jobs and structures. Knowing whether these last two factors constitute results or constraints of strategy is a real strategic dilemma. In all cases, flexibility and the seizing of opportunities are not ends in themselves, for ‘there is no favourable wind without direction’ (Seneque), and without a plan, which until now they have lacked, certain companies are running the risk of drifting.
Actors in crisis in the face of changing systems There is no subject more fashionable and more marked by diagnostic and forecasting errors than that of crises. In 1974, energy was the dominant explanation for the crisis. In order to regain strong growth we had to free ourselves from the energy constraint-hence, for example, the French nuclear electricity programme. Fifteen years later we are asserting that independence in energy supply was not the key to all our problems. Moreover, looking back over time, it is interesting to note that, in the North as well as the South, the most economically dynamic countries have also been very dependent as regards energy supplies (Japan, West Germany, South Korea), whilst countries with an income from oil (OPEC countries) have stagnated industrially. Not one OPEC member is a newly industrialized country (NIC). Today, a new explanation is accepted-the crisis of transition between two technological waves. The technologies and means of production which caused the growth of the 1950s and 1960s are exhausting themselves, the argument goes, and we must wait until the new technologies and means of production which will arise out of them mature, before we can emerge from the crisis. We are close to believing that the myth of technological long cycles is no better founded than the energy interpretation of the crisis after 1974. One should beware the effects of fashion. Interestingly, during the period 1974-77 technology was almost totally absent from the debate over how to emerge from the crisis. It is legitimate to ask whether the energy mirage has not been swept away by the technological mirage.3 As the crisis will, according to the theory, last for the duration of the ‘technological transition’, this must be accelerated by an increased effort in company research, innovation and investment. But this technological explanation of the crisis does not stand up. It is, for example, paradoxical that the fail in productive investment and in productivity came at the very time when the microprocessor was launching a new era of increased profits in industry and services. Perhaps we should see in this paradox proof of growing obstacles to gaining profits from technology. Such obstacles are not only techno-economic, but also social and organizational (such as excessive centralization, complexity of large systems). In this way we can better understand why, faced with the same environmental changes, some companies (or countries) are in difficulty and others are in good health-why there are companies which are losing money in sectors considered to be expanding (eg, consumer electronics), and others making profits in sectors said to be in decline (eg, textiles). In fact, as techno-economic change is faster than social change the result is a
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growing inadequacy of social structures and modes of behaviour in the face of new realities. In a rapidly developing world, the rules of the game and behaviour must also change. The famous technological transition will take even longer, because it must involve an apprenticeship and a process of adaptation which will be difficult to reconcile with the socio-economic rigidities previously accumulated. Thus, the three crises-monetary, energy and technological-which have been postulated since the beginning of the 1970s are no more than the translation into different fields of two forms of classic crisis: 0 0
the absence of regulation, or of adapted the refusal to adapt to new rules.
rules of the game; and
The first form of crisis results from the absence of adapted rules of the game which are imperative for all actors (this is the case for geopolitics or the international monetary system). The absolute value of power does not prevent its relative decline-the USA today represents no more than 22% of global GNP, and 37% of that of industrialized, market economy countries, as opposed to 40% and 57% respectively in 1955. The USA is no longer powerful enough to impose its own regulations. But it is still strong enough to play a disruptive role, because it maintains a minority block on the global system capable of preventing any other rules being installed in its place. For its part, Japan has no desire to become the centre of a new ‘world The myth of Japan at the centre of a Pacific Rim which would economy’. definitively relegate the Atlantic Old World, and consequently Europe, to its periphery 0
0
is without
foundation:
At most, from now until 2000 Japan will account for only 12% of global GNP, as compared with 10% today-ie, roughly half that of the USA or Europe. Certainly the growth of the Southeast Asian NlCs is spectacular, but it is primarily a catching up phenomenon (GNP per capita in South Korea is six times less than in Japan). Pax Nipponica4wiII not take over from the defunct PaxAmericana, for, in any case, Japan lacks the military power. US-Japanese co-management of the global system would be a more realistic hypothesis, on the condition, however, that the USA managed to become reindustrialized. The Japanese are working on this through their investments, but they believe less and less in the ability of the USA to maintain its leadership, and criticisms of US economic and monetary policies, which are incapable of ensuring exchange rate stability, are increasingly intense.5
The Japanese might in fact find much more responsible partners in Europe, particularly in West Germany. Will Japan’s slogan become ‘Out of America, into Europe’? This is an open question. Europe should already rejoice at Japan’s renewed interest, which gives European countries an additional stimulus to modernize their production systems. Whilst we await a hypothetical multipolar world, the need for supranational decision structures, failing any real international decision making, is becoming greater because of international interdependence and increasing economic, social and environmental problems. We recall the famous phrase of Daniel Bell: ‘The USA has become too small for the big problems and too big for the small problems.’ In other words, lack of control is also evident at the nation-state level.
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The democratic illusion cannot obscure the fact that governments are increasingly under the influence of numerous organized pressure groups, in all domains of political, economic and social life. Domination by the strongest is the rule of the game, and works against any change which would be contrary to the interests (or acquired advantages) of these groups. The second form of crisis arises from the refusal of certain actors to accept the new rules of the game and to adapt their structures and behaviour as a result. The energy and technology crises are of this type, and will last for as long as it takes to learn these new rules.
Crises
are opportunities
To overcome crises one has to adapt and install new international, national and local rules in order to master changes and not simply submit to them. But how are we to bring about the necessary changes in behaviour and socio-organizational structure? What should we do to attack the structural rigidities which have accumulated over 30 crazy years (which, on reflection, were not as glorious as people said)? Political willingness to change is not enough-we also need consensus dictated by necessity. It is because they have the merit of provoking this necessity that certain crises bring hope for social change. Thus, crises are both a consequence of rigidities and the main lever for overcoming them.
Twelve probable
trends
At the heart of the numerous uncertainties bearing down on the future Western societies, several very probable trends can be discerned: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
of
New demographic imbalances, and the prospect of South-North migration flows. Threats to the physical environment and technological and industrial risks. A lawless and turbulent international scene. Slow growth which is irregular, unequal and interdependent. New energy price rises. An explosion of new technologies and renewed competition. Deregulation linked to new international and regional regulations. Economic competition on a global scale with states playing a key role. A fall in industrial jobs. Rising tide of service industries. Crisis of the Welfare State. Rise in social tensions.
This list is not exhaustive, and each of these trends which space prevents us from conducting here.
merits extensive
discussion,
Three major uncertainties If the trends above seem probable, what exactlywould result from a conjunction or confrontation between them is a question full of uncertainties. Here we call attention to three uncertainties which seem important to take into account.
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Rate of diffusion
415
of new technologies
Will the rate of diffusion of new technologies be as rapid as has been forecast? We can only postulate that generally progress will remain slow, due to inertia inherent in production and social systems. We could note numerous cases of resistance to the effective introduction of new technology. In the car industry, for example, with comparable technological equipment the noticeable productivity gap between European and Japanese manufacturers (of the order of 1:2) is attributable primarily to the efficiency of organizational behaviour and structures. Apparently, flexibility stems from technologies whilst inertia stems from structure and behaviour. Many examples show that technological investment is not fruitful if it is not preceded or accompanied by profound organizational change. This is a necessary condition and even in many cases sufficient in itself to improve competitiveness, independent of any extra technological drive. Investment in people makes the difference, and should take precedence over material investment. After all, the performance of Japanese companies cannot be explained by privileged access to technologies which in many cases have become commonplace on the global scale, but by the characteristics of work organization and behaviour coupled directly with the country’s socioculture. It is not a matter of taking this as a model, but of learning a lesson from it-that the key to adaptation and success comes through intelligent exploitation of one’s own socioculture. Resistances are perhaps even stronger in the tertiary sector, in so far as this sector has so far been less affected by the stimulus of international competition. At the end of the 1970s it was understood that in a few years’ time new office technology systems would take over all service industries (banks, insurance companies, administration, etc). Today we realize that this has not been the case at all. Many factors combine to explain the slow rate of this penetration. In the first place there is the question of reallocating time freed by new techniques (of production, organization, etc). What is the point of investing in order to obtain productivity gains which cannot be translated into production expansion (due to saturated markets or slow growth rates), or into staff reduction? The staff are there, and must be kept busy, and a reduction in working time can only be gradual (if it is to be equitably shared out between sectors). In the second place the generalization of office technology means that the world of work becomes relatively transparent, which works against established hierarchies. Information technologies are not neutral vis-A-vis power structures. It is therefore hardly surprising that certain actors at the heart of companies (often managers) feel threatened and resist innovation. Furthermore, we should not forget that what is technologically possible is not necessarily economically profitable (we should beware of creating a Concorde in the field of telematics) or socially desirable. As evidence we can take the issue of remote working and homeworking. It is unlikely that homeworking will develop to the point that office work disappears completely. Several factors militate against this maximalist hypothesis. For one thing, the actual physiognomy of urban housing estates in developed countries-their pokiness, lack of comfort and the mediocrity of the environment-makes it impossible that they will be lived in for whole days at a time. Moreover, we should take into con-
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sideration the fact that work is a social activity and meets a need for communication which is satisfied less and less elsewhere.
Metamorphosis
of work and employment
As far as European countries are concerned, if current economic trends and social rules of the game continue, there is a risk that unemployment will increase even more rapidly over the coming years. For example, for France (which had over 2.5 million unemployed in 1986 compared with 0.4 million in 1973 and 1.8 million in 1981) estimates show that between now and 1990 between 200000 and 250000 people each year risk joining the ranks of the unemployed, if, as forecast, the combined effects of a decline in industrial jobs, a slower increase in tertiary jobs and an increase in the working population take their toll. Today, unemployment affects 10% of the working population, tomorrow perhaps 15%, then 20% and more if there is no change in structures, organizations, social rules of the game and behaviour. In other words, we are heading straight for a dual society; a growing part of the population-the young and the old (who will become increasingly young)-will be excluded from the job market. Such a scenario can only be explosive. Ultimately, there is only one way out-a sharing out of work and income, matched with greater mobility of existing jobs (if there are only four jobs for five workers, this is not a problem if the jobs are rotated-it is even an opportunity to increase creative breaks from work). 6 If a continuation of the secular trend towards a reduction in working hours seems probable and desirable to us, it does not have to mean a decrease in hours of real activity. People do not want to work less, but to work differently. Reducing the working hours of one’s main activity in fact means opening the door to a variety of activities. In order to avoid the dual society, we must promote the pluralistic society (where each individual could have several jobs and where each job could be occupied by several people). Let us pause for a moment to look at the consequences of such a development on training, diplomas and qualifications required. Unemployment is very destructive in a world where work has become the essential medium for social recognition and value acquisition, and where the overburdened man or woman is the symbol of success. It is not surprising that in West Germany, for example, one unemployed person in three has health problems. In this particular case, we could question whether unemployment is the cause or the effect, but generally the effects of unemployment on qualifications, satisfaction and inequality are not questioned. Tomorrow’s jobs will not necessarily require higher qualifications. Since 1973, for example, the USA has created six times more jobs than Europe, but threequarters of these jobs do not require high qualifications (catering services, care assistants, security staff, etc). Too often there is a tendency to confuse education and professionalism. What is important is to prepare individuals to like what they do. Thus, raising the average level of education is not without perverse effects. Increasingly, in order to find jobs, people must accept less qualified posts when they move from one job to another. Here we have pinpointed one of the contradictions of our education system-the diploma is no longer a passport to success.
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Evolution
417
of ways of life and social organization
The most persistent question concerns the development of values and ways of life. At this level conjecture fails, as futurists do not see clearly and sociologists have difficulty in understanding the present or even the recent past. As for analyses in terms of lifestyle, these have no predictive value. They record changes without explaining them. Lifestyles do not explain household purchase behaviour, but rather traditional sociodemographic categories. In technical terms, the percentage of ‘variables’ explained by ‘lifestyles’ is almost systematically negligible, and in all cases is IO times less important than any sociodemographic indicator such as the level of education of the housewife, or her profession.7 After the Second World War, new values emerged to replace the traditional values of fulfilling one’s duties, of making one’s efforts pay, of saving, and of hierarchies. These new values were to become dominant during the 196Os-they gave priority to consuming, to the attraction of novelty, and to the importance of keeping up appearances. From the end of the 196Os, however, this model, which had been taken on board by the majority and even become hegemonic, found itself challenged by the emergence of new values, characterized by the rejection of the criteria of social excellence, motives of status, large organizations and bureaucracy, in order to give importance to conviviality, personal and cultural life, relationships, quality of the environment (personal and collective), decentralization into small groups, autonomy and self-realization. Were the values of the post-materialist society about to sweep away those of the consumer society, just as 15 years earlier these had supplanted traditional, rural, bourgeois values 1 The 1970s were to bring many surprises, and in particular they were to strip this question of its meaning. As they spread, the new values amalgamated in a heterogeneous way with the values of the consumer society, which assimilated them. Conviviality was translated into Club Mediterranee, autonomy into the suburban detached house, and self-realization into hi-fis. Beyond a small minority fringe, were the new values to become anything more than gadgets, simple avatars of the consumer society? For the minority who really held post-materialist values, putting them into practice came up against the test of time. Thus, the post-materialism born of 1960s’ over-consumption found itself confronted by the global crisis beginning in 1973, ie, large-scale unemployment, and the paralysing effects of personal insecurity (fear of unemployment) and collective insecurity (external threats). The model outlined at the end of the 1960s was then shattered, and although the new emerging values did not necessarily disappear, the way they were translated into social reality changed form, or rather took on many forms. Double social fragmentation. Beyond the current phase of adjustment of demands and behaviour to new opportunities and new constraints, it seems that we are heading towards a double fragmentation of the social scene: 0
Deepened and renewed fragmentation at the level of the classical major social partnerships (employers, unions, the state, socioprofessional actors), who are negotiating over the way revenue is shared out, and over the status and development of the Welfare State. We have a social oligopoly, whose game will be further complicated by the appearance of new social partner-
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ships, and the often unstable institutionalization of minorities or groups representing other values. Fragmentation of the representatives of ‘new values’ into many groups and minorities, expressing different values or even different interfaces between common values and varied opportunities and constraints. This juxtaposition between the believers in moral excellence (the ‘militants’), the small, more or less closed groups (even sects), the ‘new consumers’, those who live for the moment, the minority who have a satisfying job, the ‘new agriculturalists’, those without work (or without declared work), etc, will translate into growing disparities in lifestyles, demands and behaviour.
In this variety we shall find all the possible degrees of compromise between partially contradictory trends developing in parallel, such as the search for both autonomy and security, for both freedom and a sense of roots.
Probable
trends, major uncertainties
and possible ruptures towards the year 2000
The main fields which we tackle here are as follows: international environment; energy; economy, technology and industry; ways of life and socio-economic organization. It is best to treat the terms ‘uncertainties’ and ‘ruptures’ as if there were a question mark at the end of each variable. These terms indicate propositions subject to doubt and controversy, whereas the term ‘trends’ corresponds to probable developments, even quasi-certainties. We ask the reader to excuse the sometimes pleonastic nature of this list.
Probable trends Lawless 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0
and turbulent
international
environment
Growing uncertainties; anxiety about the future. A world undergoing transformation and actors in crisis due to rigidities of structure and behaviour. Slow change in many fields from now until the year 2000 because of strong inertia of systems and organizations. Worldwide demographic pressure-5 billion people in the world today, at least 6.5 billion in the year 2000, then 8-12 billion during the first decades of the next century (current level of growth approximately 2% per year, ie doubling in 35 years). The OECD section of the population in relation to global population will decline from 17% in 1980 to 13% in the year 2000. Demographic concentration in developing countries (70% of the Third World population concentrated in eight countries). Inequality of development increasing more rapidly in the South (increased economic and ecological inequalities). Increase in the number of people living in ‘absolute poverty’ (less than $300 per capita per year) to about 1.5 billion people (30% of the population of the Third World), 600-800 million of whom will be in a state of endemic famine. A minority of those in the South (400 million inhabitants) will have access to Western-type consumption patterns. Lack of international regulators (the previous bipolar order is dead, but the
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0 0
0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0
419
new multipolar order is not yet ready to be born). International monetary instability-strong fluctuations in exchange rates. Increasing evidence of the counterproductive nature of past production investments in the agricultural sector-large dams (silting up, hygiene problems); irrigation (higher salinity, hygiene); pesticides (decreasing effectiveness); green revolution (fragility of plant species, input needs); exploitation of new, often fragile terrain (erosion). Explosive and anarchic development of the megapolises of the Third World (Mexico City will have 30 million inhabitants in the year 2000); domestic pollution, destitution, violence (‘polluted poverty’). General overexploitation of our heritage (forests, water, petroleum, minerals, agriculture, land, fish, etc), in order to satisfy local needs (the need for fuelwood will be over 25% greater than available supply before the end of the century), and in order to obtain, at any cost, export earnings or import substitutes (‘energy cultures’). A decrease of one-third in per capita water supply between 1980 and the year 2000. Political instability, social upheavals, strong regimes alternated with periods of anarchy; insecurity of mining investments in the South. Development of nationalism. Nuclear proliferation and sophisticated arms (several new countries will acquire the nuclear bomb during the 1990s). Growing numbers of regional conflicts and increasing difficulties for international consultation, including over the environment. International immigration pressure (800000 Mexican immigrants a year into the USA); flow of illegal immigrants and refugees.
Energy 0 0 (3
0 0
Rising energy prices (in the order of a doubling in real value between 1980 and the year 2000). Decelerated increase in global energy consumption (about 2% per year). Strong inertia in production and consumption structures. ‘New energies’ (geothermal, solar power, domestic solar energy, biomass) making a small contribution to the global energy supply by 2000. Development of conventional and non-conventional hydrocarbons. Variety and heterogeneity in energy policies amongst developed nations.
Economy,
0 0
technology
Increasing interdependence of economies, despite protectionist threats; an increasingly global market. Four-fifths of the solvent world markets situated within the triad of North America, Europe and Japan. Slow, irregular, unequal and interdependent growth. Growing gaps in development between countries of the South (the emergence of a North within the South). Increasing and unequal industrial specialization amongst developed countries (developing production giving high value added and with low vulnerability to Third World competition, opposed to declining production facing great competition).
00 0
and industry
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0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
into the next decade
New, painful industrial restructuring (eg, the car industry, chemicals). Delocalization of certain activities, notably the most pollutive (steel, basic chemicals) for reasons of market valorization of raw materials, and, more generally, comparative advantage. Exports of whatever sells, regardless of risks (eg, treatment of nuclear waste). Development of information technologies (automization of production, small-scale production), and of biotechnology. Sophistication of production processes and products (complexity and vulnerability of control systems). New era of growing profits (earnings from capital and work). Development of small, decentralized, formal and informal production units. Industrialization of tertiary activities (services) and tertiarization of secondary activities (industries). Mass production of variety. Development of production technologies with more moderate rates of energy and raw material consumption. Deregulation of services (banks, insurance, commerce, distribution). New regulations (internal European market). Continued decline in the numbers of jobs in industry. Persistent unemployment and rise in social tension. Future jobs will not necessarily require high qualifications.
Ways of life and socio-economic Structural 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Evolution of attitudes and behaviour will be slower than economic and technological evolution. Institutionalization of opposition pressure groups (social oligopolies). Slow increase in buying power. People holding on to jobs they have acquired, causing social rigidities. New inequalities (qualitative, status, lifestyles) growing together with inequalities in income and wealth. New constraints and inequalities bearing more heavily on young and old people and on women. Growing burden and declining effectiveness of the Welfare State. Extension of the market to collective goods and services, eg, education, health, environment, culture.
Socio-economic 0 0
0 0
trends
Development of the dual economy-formal economy and underground or informal economy. Increasing dichotomy between workers assessed by their status or qualifications and the rest who are exposed to risk, competition and insecurity or who are excluded (the unemployed). Worsening of unemployment between now and the mid-1990s. Ageing population and increasing health costs.
Trends 0 0
organization
trends
in lifestyle
and aspirations
Growing heterogeneity and differentiation in lifestyles. Development of contradictory trends-the need for security tection, job, etc) and aspirations to autonomy.
(social
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0 0 0 0
0
0 0
421
Growing feelings of insecurity-a return to nurture, the nuclear family (the family as social shock absorber). Need for freedom. New forms of social, cultural and technological exclusion (computer illiteracy, the perverse effects of the rise in the number of diplomas). Search for new forms of fulfilment-the family, children (decrease in the number of families without children), group life, associations, networks of solidarity and exchange. Qualitative extension of the ‘third age’ (people are old at an increasingly young age and young at an increasingly advanced age-it is difficult to find work after the age of 45, and yet people are fit for longer). Rise in the power of retired people (‘the grey panthers’). Loss of confidence in the future and the urge to live in the present.
Trends in city life and transportation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inertia of urban forms. Rejuvenation of town centres and small villages. Continuation of thetrend towards appropriation of living space by absentee owners (second homes). Renovation and rehabilitation of town centres. Social segregation in urban areas and decay of certain areas. Saturation point reached in car parks. More hours spent on transport. Long and frequent journeys. Continuation of the rapid development of air transport.
Trends in tourism 3 c> (3 0 0 0
Search for new tourist sites, including the rediscovery of what there is in one’s own country. Search for new forms of tourism and leisure. Extension of the phenomenon of the tourist ghetto in Third World countries, particularly on the coast. Large areas of tourist concentration and greater numbers of small areas of concentration. Distinction between holidays and tourist journeys. Development of business travel.
Major
uncertainties
International 0 0 0 0 0
() ()
environment
Importance of South-North migration (South of the Europe-Mediterranean basin). Degree of economic openness on the part of East European countries. Increased religious integration. Development of collective fear reflexes in developed countries. Level of annual aid to lesser developed countries (0.5%, I%, more . . .). Restrictions on the circulation of capital. Protectionist threats.
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0
Into
the next
decade
Growing gaps in development of the South in the North).
between countries
of the North
(appearance
Energy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gradual or graduated price rises. Amount of energy reserves and abundance of resources. Acceptability of nuclear energy. Importance of nuclear energy in relation to other energy sources. Extension of ‘energy cultures’. Offshore deep-sea oil. In situ gasification of coal. Localization of new resources. Role of virgin territories (deserts, Amazonia, the Poles). Cost of desulphurization of coal.
Economy, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Q 0
technology
and industry
Deindustrialization of certain developed countries (eg, USA, UK). Rate of diffusion of new technologies and associated products and services. Impact of robotization and automation on the size of production units. End of gigantism and beginning of ‘small is profitable’, physical decentralization of production. Rate of development of bio-industries. Return to their birthplace in the North of certain industrial activities which have emigrated to the South (eg, textiles). The delayed effect on the environment of present and past industrial activities (accidental and structural risks). Ability to control production, distribution and consumption processes. Nature of the metamorphosis of work and jobs. Decline of the traditional wage-earner (with one, full-time job). Rise in multi-occupations and entrepreneurship.
Ways of life and socio-economic 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
organization
Reinforcement of inequalities in income and particularly wealth. Length of working day, of working life and distribution of work. Lower, higher or flexible retirement age. Driving force of qualitative aspirationscatalysis and meeting point of demands and compensation for material and other frustrations (eg, will the unemployed be more demanding over their lifestyles?). Arbitration between risks and socio-economic trends/necessities/rigidities. New forms of organization of work-job sharing, part-time work, legalization of multi-occupation. The emergence of aspirations to order due to feelings of insecurity. Impact of technological progress on the dequalification of work. In-depth revision of fiscal systems and levying of social taxes. Importance of the social power of people of the third and fourth ages. Measures taken to reduce the burden of public expenditure.
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Interventionism or liberalism. Form which a reduction in working hours will take-weekly (eg, a three-day weekend) or annual. Impact on professional mobility of the need for a sense of roots. Future of inner cities and dense peri-urban areas. Development of multiple home ownership. Possible ruptures (examples) Traditional 0
0 0 0 0
international
environment
Fierce US protectionism. Serious social conflicts in Japan. Breaking up of the EEC. Blockade of the Persian Gulf and embargo on petroleum exports. Political and economic blackmail and embargoes, through technical industrial embezzlement.
and
Energy
Nuclear accidents and a sudden stop Technological breakthrough in fields geopressure, etc. Discovery of huge oilfields elsewhere Brutal and lasting rupture in supplies Economy, 0
3 3
technology
than the Middle East. from the Persian Gulf.
and industry
Changes in lines of production (eg, carbon chemistry, chemistry of wood). Revolutionary breakthroughs in bio-industries. Major technological accidents.
Ways of life and socio-economic 0
to nuclear programmes. such as fusion, gasification of coal,
Self-organization
organization
of the unemployed
(huge demonstrations).
Notes and references 1. This article draws implicitly or explicitlyon the global prospective thinking in which we have been involved for over 10 years, and which has been marked by several works, among them ‘Old World and new technologies’ (EEC FAST report 1980); M. Codet, Crises are Opportunities (Montreal, GAMMA Press, 1985); M. Codet, Scenarios and Strategic Management (London, Butterworths, 1987); as well as many articles, most of them published
FUTURES August 1988
INTO THE NEXT DECADE Major trends and uncertainties the 1990s
of
Michel Godet and Rkmi Barr6
We can expect profound upheavals in the international environment as we move towards the year 2000. This article presents a synthesis of probable trends, major uncertainties and risks of rupture which the authors perceive for the next decade. First, some multiple uncertainties are presented which demand flexibility and which make strategy a necessity. A quasi-certainty is identified-that actors will be in crisis as they face systems undergoing transformation. Among the most probable trends in the national and international environment up to 1995, 12 are noted. Three major uncertainties are reexamined. To conclude, new syntheses of trends, uncertainties and risks of rupture up to the year 2000 are proposed.
The world is changing; the geopolitical, monetary, energy, technological, economic and social environments which we will face in the next 10 or 15 years will all undergo profound upheavals. Without for a moment claiming to construct real scenarios of the environment, it seemed useful to us to throw some light on prospective thought through a synthesis of the probable trends, major uncertainties and risks of rupture in the 1990s. By definition, prospective thinking up to 1995 is easier than up to the year 2000. Notably, it enables us to disregard the consequences of the main change in the coming decades, which is of a demographic nature-at the beginning of the next century the European Community will have fewer inhabitants than the Muslim countries of the South Mediterranean basin, whilst the population of Brazil and Nigeria combined will be comparable to that of Europe. If we limit ourselves to the horizon of 1995, we have to say that, once again, Michel Godet is Professor of Prospective and Strategic Management at the Conservatoire National des Arts et M6tiers (CNAM), 2 Rue Cont6,75003 Paris, France, and is a member of Futures’s advisory board. R6mi Barre is also at CNAM, where he is Director of courses on Environment and Technology.
0016-3287/88/040410-14$03.00
0 1988 Butterworth
& Co(Publishers)
Ltd
FUTURES
August 1988
Into the next decade
‘the future is no longer what it was’ (P. Valery). Leading forward hypotheses which would have seemed improbable l
0 l l
411
experts rightly put some years ago:
a low inflation rate of less than 5%; positive real interest rates; relatively stable growth; and the price of oil between $15 and $20 per barrel for several years.
Reading between the lines, however, we note the weakness of these hypotheses. Doesn’t the current fall in oil prices run the risk of preparing new oil shocks between now and 1995? Furthermore, growth could be sustained for several years on vivid memories of the recession of the early 1980s; but fundamentally, the conditions for a lasting and steady recovery of the world economy are not all present. In an increasingly interdependent world, the lack of international regulations makes itself crudely felt. A new ‘world economy’ (to use Fernand Braudel’s term) will not take over tomorrow. Due to its irreversible relative decline at the heart of the global economy, the USA is no longer capable of fulfilling the regulatory role which it played during the ‘glorious thirties’. But for a long time it will remain capable of playing a disruptive role and preventing the recognition of any other regulator (in a multipolar world) in its place. In other words, fluctuations in US economic policy could themselves be enough to trigger off worldwide inflation again. In the meantime, we share the uncertainty expressed by some economists over exchange rates, with the dollar between f0.50 and fl.OO. We may regret the scale of this uncertainty, but it would be irresponsible not to take account of it. Taking uncertainty into account also means not seeking salvation in an ideal development of the international situation, but instead preparing ourselves to survive in the most unfavourable circumstances (the worst case scenario). Intellectual confusion is intensified by uncertainty over technological developments and social transformations. What products and services will be born out of today’s technological melting-pot? We know the question, but not the answer. Since it is impossible to reduce uncertainty, it is necessary to master its consequences. Country risk is a key variable, which demands prospective thought by groups who are heavily involved abroad and often seduced by the American El Dorado. We should recall that in the 21st century the USA could be what the UK was in the 20th century-a declining power. This point of view is voiced increasingly often by Japanese experts.* In these conditions we can question the regional strategy of certain companies and even the objective of external growth in the name of critical minimum size. In the car industry it was because of this myth-critical minimum size in the world market-that Peugeot risked itself in the Chrysler adventure and Renault in American Motor Corporation. At that very time Fiat was reestablishing its competitiveness by withdrawing from the US market and recentring itself on Europe. Finally, uncertainty demands flexibility in choice making and in organizations, and makes strategy a necessity. Before we commit ourselves to strategic choices, it would be appropriate to reach a better appreciation of their flexibility by looking at the cost of reversing such choices, and at the cost of their failure. Prospective thought should not lead us to forget that, faced with changes in
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into the next decade
the strategic environment, the future of a company depends largely on its internal strengths and weaknesses. External threats and opportunities should not be used as outlets for internal contradictions in jobs and structures. Knowing whether these last two factors constitute results or constraints of strategy is a real strategic dilemma. In all cases, flexibility and the seizing of opportunities are not ends in themselves, for ‘there is no favourable wind without direction’ (Seneque), and without a plan, which until now they have lacked, certain companies are running the risk of drifting.
Actors in crisis in the face of changing systems There is no subject more fashionable and more marked by diagnostic and forecasting errors than that of crises. In 1974, energy was the dominant explanation for the crisis. In order to regain strong growth we had to free ourselves from the energy constraint-hence, for example, the French nuclear electricity programme. Fifteen years later we are asserting that independence in energy supply was not the key to all our problems. Moreover, looking back over time, it is interesting to note that, in the North as well as the South, the most economically dynamic countries have also been very dependent as regards energy supplies (Japan, West Germany, South Korea), whilst countries with an income from oil (OPEC countries) have stagnated industrially. Not one OPEC member is a newly industrialized country (NIC). Today, a new explanation is accepted-the crisis of transition between two technological waves. The technologies and means of production which caused the growth of the 1950s and 1960s are exhausting themselves, the argument goes, and we must wait until the new technologies and means of production which will arise out of them mature, before we can emerge from the crisis. We are close to believing that the myth of technological long cycles is no better founded than the energy interpretation of the crisis after 1974. One should beware the effects of fashion. Interestingly, during the period 1974-77 technology was almost totally absent from the debate over how to emerge from the crisis. It is legitimate to ask whether the energy mirage has not been swept away by the technological mirage.3 As the crisis will, according to the theory, last for the duration of the ‘technological transition’, this must be accelerated by an increased effort in company research, innovation and investment. But this technological explanation of the crisis does not stand up. It is, for example, paradoxical that the fail in productive investment and in productivity came at the very time when the microprocessor was launching a new era of increased profits in industry and services. Perhaps we should see in this paradox proof of growing obstacles to gaining profits from technology. Such obstacles are not only techno-economic, but also social and organizational (such as excessive centralization, complexity of large systems). In this way we can better understand why, faced with the same environmental changes, some companies (or countries) are in difficulty and others are in good health-why there are companies which are losing money in sectors considered to be expanding (eg, consumer electronics), and others making profits in sectors said to be in decline (eg, textiles). In fact, as techno-economic change is faster than social change the result is a
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1988
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413
growing inadequacy of social structures and modes of behaviour in the face of new realities. In a rapidly developing world, the rules of the game and behaviour must also change. The famous technological transition will take even longer, because it must involve an apprenticeship and a process of adaptation which will be difficult to reconcile with the socio-economic rigidities previously accumulated. Thus, the three crises-monetary, energy and technological-which have been postulated since the beginning of the 1970s are no more than the translation into different fields of two forms of classic crisis: 0 0
the absence of regulation, or of adapted the refusal to adapt to new rules.
rules of the game; and
The first form of crisis results from the absence of adapted rules of the game which are imperative for all actors (this is the case for geopolitics or the international monetary system). The absolute value of power does not prevent its relative decline-the USA today represents no more than 22% of global GNP, and 37% of that of industrialized, market economy countries, as opposed to 40% and 57% respectively in 1955. The USA is no longer powerful enough to impose its own regulations. But it is still strong enough to play a disruptive role, because it maintains a minority block on the global system capable of preventing any other rules being installed in its place. For its part, Japan has no desire to become the centre of a new ‘world The myth of Japan at the centre of a Pacific Rim which would economy’. definitively relegate the Atlantic Old World, and consequently Europe, to its periphery 0
0
is without
foundation:
At most, from now until 2000 Japan will account for only 12% of global GNP, as compared with 10% today-ie, roughly half that of the USA or Europe. Certainly the growth of the Southeast Asian NlCs is spectacular, but it is primarily a catching up phenomenon (GNP per capita in South Korea is six times less than in Japan). Pax Nipponica4wiII not take over from the defunct PaxAmericana, for, in any case, Japan lacks the military power. US-Japanese co-management of the global system would be a more realistic hypothesis, on the condition, however, that the USA managed to become reindustrialized. The Japanese are working on this through their investments, but they believe less and less in the ability of the USA to maintain its leadership, and criticisms of US economic and monetary policies, which are incapable of ensuring exchange rate stability, are increasingly intense.5
The Japanese might in fact find much more responsible partners in Europe, particularly in West Germany. Will Japan’s slogan become ‘Out of America, into Europe’? This is an open question. Europe should already rejoice at Japan’s renewed interest, which gives European countries an additional stimulus to modernize their production systems. Whilst we await a hypothetical multipolar world, the need for supranational decision structures, failing any real international decision making, is becoming greater because of international interdependence and increasing economic, social and environmental problems. We recall the famous phrase of Daniel Bell: ‘The USA has become too small for the big problems and too big for the small problems.’ In other words, lack of control is also evident at the nation-state level.
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into the next decade
The democratic illusion cannot obscure the fact that governments are increasingly under the influence of numerous organized pressure groups, in all domains of political, economic and social life. Domination by the strongest is the rule of the game, and works against any change which would be contrary to the interests (or acquired advantages) of these groups. The second form of crisis arises from the refusal of certain actors to accept the new rules of the game and to adapt their structures and behaviour as a result. The energy and technology crises are of this type, and will last for as long as it takes to learn these new rules.
Crises
are opportunities
To overcome crises one has to adapt and install new international, national and local rules in order to master changes and not simply submit to them. But how are we to bring about the necessary changes in behaviour and socio-organizational structure? What should we do to attack the structural rigidities which have accumulated over 30 crazy years (which, on reflection, were not as glorious as people said)? Political willingness to change is not enough-we also need consensus dictated by necessity. It is because they have the merit of provoking this necessity that certain crises bring hope for social change. Thus, crises are both a consequence of rigidities and the main lever for overcoming them.
Twelve probable
trends
At the heart of the numerous uncertainties bearing down on the future Western societies, several very probable trends can be discerned: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
of
New demographic imbalances, and the prospect of South-North migration flows. Threats to the physical environment and technological and industrial risks. A lawless and turbulent international scene. Slow growth which is irregular, unequal and interdependent. New energy price rises. An explosion of new technologies and renewed competition. Deregulation linked to new international and regional regulations. Economic competition on a global scale with states playing a key role. A fall in industrial jobs. Rising tide of service industries. Crisis of the Welfare State. Rise in social tensions.
This list is not exhaustive, and each of these trends which space prevents us from conducting here.
merits extensive
discussion,
Three major uncertainties If the trends above seem probable, what exactlywould result from a conjunction or confrontation between them is a question full of uncertainties. Here we call attention to three uncertainties which seem important to take into account.
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Into the next decade
Rate of diffusion
415
of new technologies
Will the rate of diffusion of new technologies be as rapid as has been forecast? We can only postulate that generally progress will remain slow, due to inertia inherent in production and social systems. We could note numerous cases of resistance to the effective introduction of new technology. In the car industry, for example, with comparable technological equipment the noticeable productivity gap between European and Japanese manufacturers (of the order of 1:2) is attributable primarily to the efficiency of organizational behaviour and structures. Apparently, flexibility stems from technologies whilst inertia stems from structure and behaviour. Many examples show that technological investment is not fruitful if it is not preceded or accompanied by profound organizational change. This is a necessary condition and even in many cases sufficient in itself to improve competitiveness, independent of any extra technological drive. Investment in people makes the difference, and should take precedence over material investment. After all, the performance of Japanese companies cannot be explained by privileged access to technologies which in many cases have become commonplace on the global scale, but by the characteristics of work organization and behaviour coupled directly with the country’s socioculture. It is not a matter of taking this as a model, but of learning a lesson from it-that the key to adaptation and success comes through intelligent exploitation of one’s own socioculture. Resistances are perhaps even stronger in the tertiary sector, in so far as this sector has so far been less affected by the stimulus of international competition. At the end of the 1970s it was understood that in a few years’ time new office technology systems would take over all service industries (banks, insurance companies, administration, etc). Today we realize that this has not been the case at all. Many factors combine to explain the slow rate of this penetration. In the first place there is the question of reallocating time freed by new techniques (of production, organization, etc). What is the point of investing in order to obtain productivity gains which cannot be translated into production expansion (due to saturated markets or slow growth rates), or into staff reduction? The staff are there, and must be kept busy, and a reduction in working time can only be gradual (if it is to be equitably shared out between sectors). In the second place the generalization of office technology means that the world of work becomes relatively transparent, which works against established hierarchies. Information technologies are not neutral vis-A-vis power structures. It is therefore hardly surprising that certain actors at the heart of companies (often managers) feel threatened and resist innovation. Furthermore, we should not forget that what is technologically possible is not necessarily economically profitable (we should beware of creating a Concorde in the field of telematics) or socially desirable. As evidence we can take the issue of remote working and homeworking. It is unlikely that homeworking will develop to the point that office work disappears completely. Several factors militate against this maximalist hypothesis. For one thing, the actual physiognomy of urban housing estates in developed countries-their pokiness, lack of comfort and the mediocrity of the environment-makes it impossible that they will be lived in for whole days at a time. Moreover, we should take into con-
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into the next decade
sideration the fact that work is a social activity and meets a need for communication which is satisfied less and less elsewhere.
Metamorphosis
of work and employment
As far as European countries are concerned, if current economic trends and social rules of the game continue, there is a risk that unemployment will increase even more rapidly over the coming years. For example, for France (which had over 2.5 million unemployed in 1986 compared with 0.4 million in 1973 and 1.8 million in 1981) estimates show that between now and 1990 between 200000 and 250000 people each year risk joining the ranks of the unemployed, if, as forecast, the combined effects of a decline in industrial jobs, a slower increase in tertiary jobs and an increase in the working population take their toll. Today, unemployment affects 10% of the working population, tomorrow perhaps 15%, then 20% and more if there is no change in structures, organizations, social rules of the game and behaviour. In other words, we are heading straight for a dual society; a growing part of the population-the young and the old (who will become increasingly young)-will be excluded from the job market. Such a scenario can only be explosive. Ultimately, there is only one way out-a sharing out of work and income, matched with greater mobility of existing jobs (if there are only four jobs for five workers, this is not a problem if the jobs are rotated-it is even an opportunity to increase creative breaks from work). 6 If a continuation of the secular trend towards a reduction in working hours seems probable and desirable to us, it does not have to mean a decrease in hours of real activity. People do not want to work less, but to work differently. Reducing the working hours of one’s main activity in fact means opening the door to a variety of activities. In order to avoid the dual society, we must promote the pluralistic society (where each individual could have several jobs and where each job could be occupied by several people). Let us pause for a moment to look at the consequences of such a development on training, diplomas and qualifications required. Unemployment is very destructive in a world where work has become the essential medium for social recognition and value acquisition, and where the overburdened man or woman is the symbol of success. It is not surprising that in West Germany, for example, one unemployed person in three has health problems. In this particular case, we could question whether unemployment is the cause or the effect, but generally the effects of unemployment on qualifications, satisfaction and inequality are not questioned. Tomorrow’s jobs will not necessarily require higher qualifications. Since 1973, for example, the USA has created six times more jobs than Europe, but threequarters of these jobs do not require high qualifications (catering services, care assistants, security staff, etc). Too often there is a tendency to confuse education and professionalism. What is important is to prepare individuals to like what they do. Thus, raising the average level of education is not without perverse effects. Increasingly, in order to find jobs, people must accept less qualified posts when they move from one job to another. Here we have pinpointed one of the contradictions of our education system-the diploma is no longer a passport to success.
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Into the next decade
Evolution
417
of ways of life and social organization
The most persistent question concerns the development of values and ways of life. At this level conjecture fails, as futurists do not see clearly and sociologists have difficulty in understanding the present or even the recent past. As for analyses in terms of lifestyle, these have no predictive value. They record changes without explaining them. Lifestyles do not explain household purchase behaviour, but rather traditional sociodemographic categories. In technical terms, the percentage of ‘variables’ explained by ‘lifestyles’ is almost systematically negligible, and in all cases is IO times less important than any sociodemographic indicator such as the level of education of the housewife, or her profession.7 After the Second World War, new values emerged to replace the traditional values of fulfilling one’s duties, of making one’s efforts pay, of saving, and of hierarchies. These new values were to become dominant during the 196Os-they gave priority to consuming, to the attraction of novelty, and to the importance of keeping up appearances. From the end of the 196Os, however, this model, which had been taken on board by the majority and even become hegemonic, found itself challenged by the emergence of new values, characterized by the rejection of the criteria of social excellence, motives of status, large organizations and bureaucracy, in order to give importance to conviviality, personal and cultural life, relationships, quality of the environment (personal and collective), decentralization into small groups, autonomy and self-realization. Were the values of the post-materialist society about to sweep away those of the consumer society, just as 15 years earlier these had supplanted traditional, rural, bourgeois values 1 The 1970s were to bring many surprises, and in particular they were to strip this question of its meaning. As they spread, the new values amalgamated in a heterogeneous way with the values of the consumer society, which assimilated them. Conviviality was translated into Club Mediterranee, autonomy into the suburban detached house, and self-realization into hi-fis. Beyond a small minority fringe, were the new values to become anything more than gadgets, simple avatars of the consumer society? For the minority who really held post-materialist values, putting them into practice came up against the test of time. Thus, the post-materialism born of 1960s’ over-consumption found itself confronted by the global crisis beginning in 1973, ie, large-scale unemployment, and the paralysing effects of personal insecurity (fear of unemployment) and collective insecurity (external threats). The model outlined at the end of the 1960s was then shattered, and although the new emerging values did not necessarily disappear, the way they were translated into social reality changed form, or rather took on many forms. Double social fragmentation. Beyond the current phase of adjustment of demands and behaviour to new opportunities and new constraints, it seems that we are heading towards a double fragmentation of the social scene: 0
Deepened and renewed fragmentation at the level of the classical major social partnerships (employers, unions, the state, socioprofessional actors), who are negotiating over the way revenue is shared out, and over the status and development of the Welfare State. We have a social oligopoly, whose game will be further complicated by the appearance of new social partner-
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0
into the next decade
ships, and the often unstable institutionalization of minorities or groups representing other values. Fragmentation of the representatives of ‘new values’ into many groups and minorities, expressing different values or even different interfaces between common values and varied opportunities and constraints. This juxtaposition between the believers in moral excellence (the ‘militants’), the small, more or less closed groups (even sects), the ‘new consumers’, those who live for the moment, the minority who have a satisfying job, the ‘new agriculturalists’, those without work (or without declared work), etc, will translate into growing disparities in lifestyles, demands and behaviour.
In this variety we shall find all the possible degrees of compromise between partially contradictory trends developing in parallel, such as the search for both autonomy and security, for both freedom and a sense of roots.
Probable
trends, major uncertainties
and possible ruptures towards the year 2000
The main fields which we tackle here are as follows: international environment; energy; economy, technology and industry; ways of life and socio-economic organization. It is best to treat the terms ‘uncertainties’ and ‘ruptures’ as if there were a question mark at the end of each variable. These terms indicate propositions subject to doubt and controversy, whereas the term ‘trends’ corresponds to probable developments, even quasi-certainties. We ask the reader to excuse the sometimes pleonastic nature of this list.
Probable trends Lawless 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0
and turbulent
international
environment
Growing uncertainties; anxiety about the future. A world undergoing transformation and actors in crisis due to rigidities of structure and behaviour. Slow change in many fields from now until the year 2000 because of strong inertia of systems and organizations. Worldwide demographic pressure-5 billion people in the world today, at least 6.5 billion in the year 2000, then 8-12 billion during the first decades of the next century (current level of growth approximately 2% per year, ie doubling in 35 years). The OECD section of the population in relation to global population will decline from 17% in 1980 to 13% in the year 2000. Demographic concentration in developing countries (70% of the Third World population concentrated in eight countries). Inequality of development increasing more rapidly in the South (increased economic and ecological inequalities). Increase in the number of people living in ‘absolute poverty’ (less than $300 per capita per year) to about 1.5 billion people (30% of the population of the Third World), 600-800 million of whom will be in a state of endemic famine. A minority of those in the South (400 million inhabitants) will have access to Western-type consumption patterns. Lack of international regulators (the previous bipolar order is dead, but the
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Into the next decade
0 0
0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0
419
new multipolar order is not yet ready to be born). International monetary instability-strong fluctuations in exchange rates. Increasing evidence of the counterproductive nature of past production investments in the agricultural sector-large dams (silting up, hygiene problems); irrigation (higher salinity, hygiene); pesticides (decreasing effectiveness); green revolution (fragility of plant species, input needs); exploitation of new, often fragile terrain (erosion). Explosive and anarchic development of the megapolises of the Third World (Mexico City will have 30 million inhabitants in the year 2000); domestic pollution, destitution, violence (‘polluted poverty’). General overexploitation of our heritage (forests, water, petroleum, minerals, agriculture, land, fish, etc), in order to satisfy local needs (the need for fuelwood will be over 25% greater than available supply before the end of the century), and in order to obtain, at any cost, export earnings or import substitutes (‘energy cultures’). A decrease of one-third in per capita water supply between 1980 and the year 2000. Political instability, social upheavals, strong regimes alternated with periods of anarchy; insecurity of mining investments in the South. Development of nationalism. Nuclear proliferation and sophisticated arms (several new countries will acquire the nuclear bomb during the 1990s). Growing numbers of regional conflicts and increasing difficulties for international consultation, including over the environment. International immigration pressure (800000 Mexican immigrants a year into the USA); flow of illegal immigrants and refugees.
Energy 0 0 (3
0 0
Rising energy prices (in the order of a doubling in real value between 1980 and the year 2000). Decelerated increase in global energy consumption (about 2% per year). Strong inertia in production and consumption structures. ‘New energies’ (geothermal, solar power, domestic solar energy, biomass) making a small contribution to the global energy supply by 2000. Development of conventional and non-conventional hydrocarbons. Variety and heterogeneity in energy policies amongst developed nations.
Economy,
0 0
technology
Increasing interdependence of economies, despite protectionist threats; an increasingly global market. Four-fifths of the solvent world markets situated within the triad of North America, Europe and Japan. Slow, irregular, unequal and interdependent growth. Growing gaps in development between countries of the South (the emergence of a North within the South). Increasing and unequal industrial specialization amongst developed countries (developing production giving high value added and with low vulnerability to Third World competition, opposed to declining production facing great competition).
00 0
and industry
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0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
into the next decade
New, painful industrial restructuring (eg, the car industry, chemicals). Delocalization of certain activities, notably the most pollutive (steel, basic chemicals) for reasons of market valorization of raw materials, and, more generally, comparative advantage. Exports of whatever sells, regardless of risks (eg, treatment of nuclear waste). Development of information technologies (automization of production, small-scale production), and of biotechnology. Sophistication of production processes and products (complexity and vulnerability of control systems). New era of growing profits (earnings from capital and work). Development of small, decentralized, formal and informal production units. Industrialization of tertiary activities (services) and tertiarization of secondary activities (industries). Mass production of variety. Development of production technologies with more moderate rates of energy and raw material consumption. Deregulation of services (banks, insurance, commerce, distribution). New regulations (internal European market). Continued decline in the numbers of jobs in industry. Persistent unemployment and rise in social tension. Future jobs will not necessarily require high qualifications.
Ways of life and socio-economic Structural 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Evolution of attitudes and behaviour will be slower than economic and technological evolution. Institutionalization of opposition pressure groups (social oligopolies). Slow increase in buying power. People holding on to jobs they have acquired, causing social rigidities. New inequalities (qualitative, status, lifestyles) growing together with inequalities in income and wealth. New constraints and inequalities bearing more heavily on young and old people and on women. Growing burden and declining effectiveness of the Welfare State. Extension of the market to collective goods and services, eg, education, health, environment, culture.
Socio-economic 0 0
0 0
trends
Development of the dual economy-formal economy and underground or informal economy. Increasing dichotomy between workers assessed by their status or qualifications and the rest who are exposed to risk, competition and insecurity or who are excluded (the unemployed). Worsening of unemployment between now and the mid-1990s. Ageing population and increasing health costs.
Trends 0 0
organization
trends
in lifestyle
and aspirations
Growing heterogeneity and differentiation in lifestyles. Development of contradictory trends-the need for security tection, job, etc) and aspirations to autonomy.
(social
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Into the next decade
0 0 0 0
0
0 0
421
Growing feelings of insecurity-a return to nurture, the nuclear family (the family as social shock absorber). Need for freedom. New forms of social, cultural and technological exclusion (computer illiteracy, the perverse effects of the rise in the number of diplomas). Search for new forms of fulfilment-the family, children (decrease in the number of families without children), group life, associations, networks of solidarity and exchange. Qualitative extension of the ‘third age’ (people are old at an increasingly young age and young at an increasingly advanced age-it is difficult to find work after the age of 45, and yet people are fit for longer). Rise in the power of retired people (‘the grey panthers’). Loss of confidence in the future and the urge to live in the present.
Trends in city life and transportation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inertia of urban forms. Rejuvenation of town centres and small villages. Continuation of thetrend towards appropriation of living space by absentee owners (second homes). Renovation and rehabilitation of town centres. Social segregation in urban areas and decay of certain areas. Saturation point reached in car parks. More hours spent on transport. Long and frequent journeys. Continuation of the rapid development of air transport.
Trends in tourism 3 c> (3 0 0 0
Search for new tourist sites, including the rediscovery of what there is in one’s own country. Search for new forms of tourism and leisure. Extension of the phenomenon of the tourist ghetto in Third World countries, particularly on the coast. Large areas of tourist concentration and greater numbers of small areas of concentration. Distinction between holidays and tourist journeys. Development of business travel.
Major
uncertainties
International 0 0 0 0 0
() ()
environment
Importance of South-North migration (South of the Europe-Mediterranean basin). Degree of economic openness on the part of East European countries. Increased religious integration. Development of collective fear reflexes in developed countries. Level of annual aid to lesser developed countries (0.5%, I%, more . . .). Restrictions on the circulation of capital. Protectionist threats.
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0
Into
the next
decade
Growing gaps in development of the South in the North).
between countries
of the North
(appearance
Energy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gradual or graduated price rises. Amount of energy reserves and abundance of resources. Acceptability of nuclear energy. Importance of nuclear energy in relation to other energy sources. Extension of ‘energy cultures’. Offshore deep-sea oil. In situ gasification of coal. Localization of new resources. Role of virgin territories (deserts, Amazonia, the Poles). Cost of desulphurization of coal.
Economy, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Q 0
technology
and industry
Deindustrialization of certain developed countries (eg, USA, UK). Rate of diffusion of new technologies and associated products and services. Impact of robotization and automation on the size of production units. End of gigantism and beginning of ‘small is profitable’, physical decentralization of production. Rate of development of bio-industries. Return to their birthplace in the North of certain industrial activities which have emigrated to the South (eg, textiles). The delayed effect on the environment of present and past industrial activities (accidental and structural risks). Ability to control production, distribution and consumption processes. Nature of the metamorphosis of work and jobs. Decline of the traditional wage-earner (with one, full-time job). Rise in multi-occupations and entrepreneurship.
Ways of life and socio-economic 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
organization
Reinforcement of inequalities in income and particularly wealth. Length of working day, of working life and distribution of work. Lower, higher or flexible retirement age. Driving force of qualitative aspirationscatalysis and meeting point of demands and compensation for material and other frustrations (eg, will the unemployed be more demanding over their lifestyles?). Arbitration between risks and socio-economic trends/necessities/rigidities. New forms of organization of work-job sharing, part-time work, legalization of multi-occupation. The emergence of aspirations to order due to feelings of insecurity. Impact of technological progress on the dequalification of work. In-depth revision of fiscal systems and levying of social taxes. Importance of the social power of people of the third and fourth ages. Measures taken to reduce the burden of public expenditure.
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Interventionism or liberalism. Form which a reduction in working hours will take-weekly (eg, a three-day weekend) or annual. Impact on professional mobility of the need for a sense of roots. Future of inner cities and dense peri-urban areas. Development of multiple home ownership. Possible ruptures (examples) Traditional 0
0 0 0 0
international
environment
Fierce US protectionism. Serious social conflicts in Japan. Breaking up of the EEC. Blockade of the Persian Gulf and embargo on petroleum exports. Political and economic blackmail and embargoes, through technical industrial embezzlement.
and
Energy
Nuclear accidents and a sudden stop Technological breakthrough in fields geopressure, etc. Discovery of huge oilfields elsewhere Brutal and lasting rupture in supplies Economy, 0
3 3
technology
than the Middle East. from the Persian Gulf.
and industry
Changes in lines of production (eg, carbon chemistry, chemistry of wood). Revolutionary breakthroughs in bio-industries. Major technological accidents.
Ways of life and socio-economic 0
to nuclear programmes. such as fusion, gasification of coal,
Self-organization
organization
of the unemployed
(huge demonstrations).
Notes and references 1. This article draws implicitly or explicitlyon the global prospective thinking in which we have been involved for over 10 years, and which has been marked by several works, among them ‘Old World and new technologies’ (EEC FAST report 1980); M. Codet, Crises are Opportunities (Montreal, GAMMA Press, 1985); M. Codet, Scenarios and Strategic Management (London, Butterworths, 1987); as well as many articles, most of them published
FUTURES August 1988